the spirit of how we want to get there is there. the two takeaways i would like you to leave with -- it is risk management, to me, and how we define that i think the standards momentum is there, but if used effectively in government and is district. the issue is targeting what problem we want to solve, and that is putting the definition around risk management. how we solve the problems, who is the threat, and how we for policy around that. >> i would say one of the takeaways would be continued to provide the oversight and follow-through. one of the challenges is the strategies and the different aspects of this is seeing it all the way through and making sure there is follow-up, feedback loops in terms of the agencies making sure what they are doing

is right, and that we, from this particular committee, provides oversight that if has in the past, and i imagine will continue to do. in our role, it is to continue help agencies in terms of their of violating their progress and making recommendations where appropriate. one last question, and i'm interested in knowing what is the most common cyber attack that your company faces and how that threat could best be alleviated. >> if you look at the higher- risk ones, these numbers sound bizarre, but when you look at the things that used to be a big deal like viruses, there are hundreds of thousands of those, and we protect those pretty well. what we are challenged with the most is threats from highly-

resource to organizations today that are targeting us and persistent with us. the concern is because those are developed that they end up going down and get learned and can migrate down into less sophisticated hands to work through. i think the fact that we have a large organization and by my reading of those are some countries and organized criminal organizations, that is a big problem, something that every government needs to help business and worked on. >> ip theft? >> the framework of government today manages said. is the issue of international -supported i.p. theft as well as intelligence

gathering in the companies that never had to the extent we are seeing it now. >> thank you all very much. >> one last question, if i could, for mr. kepler. your ceo spoke to us not long ago, not very impressive. he holds a leadership position in the business roundtable? >> yes. >> he is chairman. >> i think he is as well. we appreciate the continued input from the business roundtable. we welcome the input from the chamber of commerce and other business groups as well. we are mindful of the contribution that business roundtable can make and would ask that you pass along our thanks to your ceo and that we would like to hear more of that going for. this has been a good hearing,

and senator thune, we're here to the bitter end, but it has not been better at all. this is a hard issue. this is not an easy issue for me to get my head around, and a couple of months ago i felt like i reached the point where i knew enough to be dangerous, and after it this hearing today, i know enough to be really dangerous. hopefully to be very helpful. we share with the responsibility. it cannot just be the legislative, it said the branches, because we have a shared responsibility, and to do this right we will help our country a hole like. senator thune, senator rockefeller, we want to do this right, and your help in everett art is a big help. the record is done to the open

for another 14 years -- not really, 14 days, a short time frame, for additional questions, if anything, we would be most grateful. >> anything else? >> no. >> this hearing is a wrap. thank you. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2013] [captioning performed by national captioning institute]

>> on the senate floor, they voted 63-34 for john brennan to become cia director. the vote came after the obama administration and vowed to demands from senator rand paul to specified limits on the president's authority to order drone strikes against american citizens in the u.s. senator paul said he was satisfied with the a statement. earlier today, eric holder sent

a letter to senator paul which read, it has come to my attention that you have now asked an additional question, following his 13-hour filibuster is today -- does the president have the authority to use a weapon is drone to kill an american not engaged in combat on american soil? the answer to that question is no. senator paul responded to the letter by saying hurray. for 13 hours a month we asked him that question, and the results in a victory, address, and under public humiliation. the white house will respond and to the right thing. that from senator rand paul. today in new york at the united nations security council, they voted unanimously for tough sanctions against north korea for its latest nuclear test, a move that the associated press as has sparked furious reaction in pyongyang.

the new u.n. sanctions are aimed at making it more difficult for north korea to obtain material for its weapons program. here is what the vote looked like today at the united the nation's. -- the united nations. >> [speaking in russian] >> the agenda is adopted.

under rule 37, i invite the representatives of belgium, canada baja, denmark, the philippines to participate in this meeting. it is so decided. the security council will begin its consideration of item 2 of the agenda. members of the council also have before them a document, text of a draft resolution submitted by australia, belgium, canada, denmark, france, italy, japan, morocco, the philippines, republic of korea, rwanda, togo, united kingdom of great britain, and northern ireland, and the united states of america.

it is my understanding that the council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. i should put the draft resolution to the vote now. will those in favor of the draft resolution contained in documents s/2013/136 please raise their hand. the result of the voting is as follows -- the draft resolution received 15 votes in favor, the draft resolution has been adopted unanimously, as resolution 2094 of 2013. the security council has concluded its present stage of its consideration of the item on

its agenda. the meeting is adjourned. >> those sanctions are aimed at making it more difficult for north korea to finance and obtain material for its weapons programs. here is what susan rice had to say after the security council vote. >> today the security council unanimously adopted resolution 2094, strongly condemning north korea's highly february 12 nuclear test and imposing significant new sanctions under chapter 7 of the u.n. charter. the strength, breadth and severity of these sanctions will raise the cost to north korea of its illicit nuclear program and further constrain its ability to finance and source materials and technology for its ballistic missile, conventional and nuclear weapons

program. first, resolution 2094 imposes tough new financial sanctions. when north korea tries to move money to pay for its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, countries must now block those transfers even if the money is being carried in suitcases full of vault cash. likewise northern banks will find it much harder to launder money for the nuclear program. imposesresolution also new travel restrictions. if, for example, a north korean agent is caught making arms deals or selling nuclear technology, countries will be required to expel that agent. countries must also now prevent

the travel of people working for designated companies involved in the nuclear and missile programs. states will now have new authority to inspect cargo and stop north korean arms smuggling and proliferation. if a country has cargo on its territory that might be carrying prohibitive items like nuclear or ballistic materials, this resolution requires that the cargo be inspected. it will also make it harder for north korean vessels to offload such prohibited cargo if a ship refuses inspection on the high seas. thus forcing it to return to its port of origin. and airplanes carrying smuggled items can find themselves grounded. this resolution will also counter north korean efforts to

abuse diplomatic privileges to advance its nuclear and ballistic missile activities. it will now be much harder for such diplomats to procure technology or divert funds to the nuclear program without being detected and expelled. resolution 2094 further bans the transfer to and from north korea of specific ballistic missile, nuclear and chemical weapons-related technology. it lists new prohibitive -- prohibited items and calls on states to block any item at all that could contribute to these activities. it names additional north koreans and north korean companies whose assets will be frozen and those individuals will also be subject to a travel ban. this resolution lists a number

of luxury goods that cannot be sold to north korea. as a result, north korea's ruling elite who have been living large while impoverishing their people will pay a direct test. -- direct price for this nuclear test. this can be found on the u.n. mission web site www.usun.state.gov. these sanctions will bite and bite hard. they increase north korea's isolation and raise the cost to north korea's leaders of defining the international community. the entire world stands united and in our commitment to the denuclearization of the korean peninsula and in our demand that north korea complies with

its international obligation s. if it does not then the security council committed today in this resolution to take further significant measures if there is another nuclear test or missile launch. we regret that north korea has again chosen the path of prove occasion. -- provocationfar from achieving its stated goal of becoming a strong and prosperous nation, north korea has instead again opted to further impoverished its people and increase its isolation. we hope instead that north korea will heed president obama's call to choose the path of peace and come into compliance with its international obligation. >> the u.n. voting sanctions

against north korea, a unanimous vote, and that prompted pyongyang to threaten a nuclear strike against united states. the white house said the u.s. is fully capable of defending itself. jay carney said this -- >> can you respond to the threat of a nuclear strike on the united states? >> it is important to note as he saw the security council unanimously adopted resolution 2094 condemning north korea's provocative nuclear test and imposing strong sanctions under chapter seven of the united nations charter. the strength, breadth, and severity of the sanctions showed that the security council take

seriously this that. north korea will now face new barriers to developing its nuclear missile programs. 2094 demonstrates the increasing cost the autria's leaders will pay and defying the international -- cost the north korean leaders will pay in defying the international obligations. this treatment council committed to taking an additional measures and the case of an additional launch. dprk will achieve it nothing by further provocations. >> does the united states believe that north korea is capable of carrying out this threat of officials claim they have the missile on standby that can leave washington engulfed in

fire. what can you tell americans who might be concerned about whether they have the ability to carry that out? >> pm adds to its is fully capable of defending against any north korean missile attack, and our recent success in returning to testing of the upgraded version of the gbi missile will keep us on a good trajectory to improve our defense capability against limited ballistic missile threats such as those from north curling area. where fully capable of dealing with that -- from north korea. where fully capable of dealing with that threat. >> starting at 8:00 p.m. on cnn tonight, the senate judiciary committee to aids bills on -- on c-span tonight, the senate judiciary committee debates bills. on c-span2, senators reacted the filibuster by a grand ball on the nomination of john brennan to be cia director. c-span3, janet napolitano and

other witnesses testified on cybersecurity issues. all of that beginning at 8:00 eastern on c-span networks. next the senate foreign relations committee holds a hearing on the future of u.s. relations with north korea. this comes after north korea threatening nuclear pre-emptive strike against the s, and the u.n. passed unanimous agreement. the hearing is two and a half hours. >> good morning. this hearing will come to order. this being the first hearing of this new term, it could not be a more timely hearing. recent developments in north korea, notably the february 12,

2013 nuclear test and the december 12, 2012 missile test highlight the growing threat that north korea opposes to the united states, allies, and france in the region and the increasing dangers of severe instability on the korean peninsula. given this growing set of circumstances, i believe the committee needs to take a close look at current u.s. policy toward north korea cannot evaluate its effectiveness cannot identify any midcourse corrections or measures required to get our policy right. i understand that in the your the nine nations security council is sitting down to consider a resolution that imposes additional sanctions on north korea. this new security council resolution based on a u.s.-china draft includes tough new sanctions intended to impede north korea possibility to develop further its illicit nuclear and ballistic missile

programs. these sanctions include targeting the illicit activities of north korean diplomatic personnel, north korean banking relationships cannot elicit transfers of both cash and new travel restrictions. i think these actions are a step in the right direction, and very much in keeping with the sort of approach that the ranking member, senator corker, and i called in the north korean non- proliferation act of 2013, which the senate passed. i congratulate the administration for pushing thing so effectively at denied the nation's. -- at the united nations. and with a clear goal of north korea's abandonment of its nuclear programs. north korea yesterday make what i considered the absurd threat of a pre-emptive nuclear attack to destroy the strongholds of

the aggressors. in response to the action of the united states, china, are seeking at the united nations. there should be no doubt about our determination and ability to neutralize and counter any threat the north korea may present. i do not think the regime in pyongyang wants to commit suicide, but as they must surely know, that would be the result of any attack on united states. even as we think about all of our potential measures and actions to safeguard the united states and our allies, there should be no doubt about our determination to work with the international community through peaceful diplomatic means to achieve denuclearized korean peninsula. it is estimated that newt -- north korea has acquired up to 30 kilograms of plutonium, and it has not conducted three

nuclear explosive tests, and it is seeking to develop the capability to make a nuclear intercontinentalto cont ballistic missile. in that newt north korea could become a small nuclear power will lead other nations in the region to reconsider their commitments to non- proliferation. there is a the continuing danger of conventional military provocation from north korea that results in a serious military clash between north and south, and the potential for unintended escalation that could drop in united states and china and result in a dangerous confrontation on the peninsula. beyond the security concerns, there are the ongoing questions about human rights and a lot of the north korean people.

security concerns may be our most important prior, but they are not our own prior to trick is that over a year since the leader to power amid speculation that this transition could lead to a. against the ability. that instability does not appear to have materialized. although we can never be sure about what the future is in north korea, kim has asserted control over the military and strengthen the party institutions. contrary to media hype focused on his education in switzerland, he has not proved their former creek is unclear where he has objections of other to maintain control of his economic system. altria represents a growing threat to national security -- north korea deserves our close attention. if its present course remains unaltered, north korea could pose a direct threat to the united states.

today north korea poses a threat to our allies and american forces in the region and threatens to undermine the international non-proliferation regime, as its arsenal grows, by spreading its threat to other countries through a transfer of nuclear technology and materials. we know that north korea has made efforts to proliferate nuclear technology in the past, building a plutonium separation plant in syria, which israel described by bombing it -- destroyed, and there is a long history of north korean-iranian corp. i hope that a continuing dialogue with the administration will help us explore questions other critical to inform our future policy. does north korea pursue a nuclear weapons program as a deterrent, for defensive purposes, or does the pursue a program as part of a policy intended to reunify the peninsula by force? could the current regime ever conceived partly with its nuclear capability, or does a

duties levels -- weapons as told as deterrents against others? getting these answers right will be critical to determine if there's hope for diplomacy or if a different approach is necessary. it is important to note the coming power of a new south korean administration led by president park at this time. we offer her parking corrections -- we offer her our congratulations on her inauguration's last week. operation, wes have an opportunity to work with a close ally to chart a future course in dealing with north korea. we need to consider how recent transitions in other countries in the region, including japan, as well as china, a present new opportunities in building in more effective approach to dealing with pyongyang.

whenever one's views on the policy efforts of the past, what has worked and what has not worked and why, there can be little question that these efforts have failed to end garth korea's nuclear or missile programs, failed to reduce the threat posed to our allies, and fail to lead to greater security in the region. i am hopeful that the hearing and a conversation we start the day might help us get to a place where 20 years from now we can look back successfully heading and that north korea and's nuclear missile programs and building a greater stability and security on the peninsula and struck the asia-pacific region. that may call upon the squeamish ranking member -- let me call on the the squeezed -- on the distinguished ranking member. >> north korea's nuclear weapons program, missile program, and proliferation activities pros a threat to the united states' that the security interests.

policy makers have attempted to influence north korea's behavior through deterrent tools, including inducements and punitive measures. u.s. officials have used diplomacy, a system of financial sanctions, and counter proliferation tools, including proactive interdiction activities. despite the combination of tools and the united states has failed to persuade north korean regime to abandon its nuclear weapons program. we know north korea continues to engage in a range of illicit activities to generate hard currency to support the regime. simultaneously, the situation for the north korean people has continued to deteriorate. with rampant human rights abuses, the continued expansion of north korean prison camps, and some analysts estimate they may hold as to what a thousand prisoners. china continues to serve as north korea's primary benefactor, accounting for 60%

of north korean trade. beijing remains pyongyang's source of food and fuel. policy-makers and not been able to persuade china, that the cost of beijing's continued support for out ways -- it is clear we must maintain our efforts. i recognize that north korea is a complex policy conundrum and there is no silver bullet solution. after 20 years of unsuccessful policies by successive administrations, is logical that we ought to undertake a comprehensive review of our north korean strategy, including new tools to crack the her policy not. that is why i work with senator menendez and other members to work on the accountability act which would require the -- undertake the review does not

require abandoning efforts, nor terminating sanctions. it necessitates we redoubled efforts to think outside the box. in recent months it has become increasingly clear to me that u.s. policymakers often pay closer attention to the non- military aspects of deterrence, including efforts to weaken and debilitate the north korean measuring. in particular we often do more to expose the north hospitality toward its own citizens as a means to influence the kim regime. we have -- we should promote the flow of information including our broadcast. do not mistake my interest in the nonmilitary aspect of the turks as a call to abandon the military posture security aspects of our north korean policy. i believe that a robust u.s. nuclear deterrent is the central

to u.s. security and remain critical to maintaining our security commitments to allies in the asia-pacific. including japan and south korea. ambassador joseph will speak to our deterrent later during this hearing. i look forward to hearing from you in regarding the administration cost radish, including efforts at the three council on new sanctions resolutions. i look forward to hearing from you and all are expert witnesses about our capabilities to deter north korean provocations, options to elicit enhanced chinese cooperation and opportunities to improve the lives of the north korean people. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you. together at the top decision makers on north korean policy from several

previous administrations. represent decades of experience. i can think of no better group analyzed at what has worked and what has not. i expect they may hold in some cases differed use in this regard, and that is only natural considering the importance of addressing north korean -- north korea, and we are born to look for to this discussion. we start off with the distinguished ambassador glyn davies. he oversees u.s. involvement in the six-party talks process, as well as aspects of our security assistance policies regarding north korea. he is a career member of the foreign service, serving previously as a permanent root

representative to the u.s. atomic energy administration and the u.n. office in vienna. as low as the principal deputy assistant secretary of state, an executive secretary of the national security council staff. an extraordinary wealth of knowledge. we look forward to your testimony. >> thank you very much. thank you for inviting me to testify today on u.s. policy toward north korea or as it is called the democratic people's republic. north korea's everett call announcement of its third nuclear test and its threats to conduct even more follow want measures are only the latest in a long line of reminders that the nuclear weapons programs have proliferation activities pose serious threats to u.s.

national security, to regional security, in the asia-pacific, and to the global non- proliferation regime. pyongyang continues to violate its commitments including its human rights record is deplorable. it's people are impoverished strip it poor sick of it sums into nuclear and ballistic missile programs that are forbidden by the united nations. north korea and its provocativethreatening actions, meanwhile, continues to grow. to take advantage of the alternatives available. the united states offeredand has continued to offerpyongyang an improved relationship with the united states and integration into the international community, provided north korea demonstrated a willingness to fulfill its denuclearization commitments and address other concerns. the dprk rebuffed these offers and instead responded with a series of provocations

that drew widespread international condemnation. 60 countries criticized the december launch. the february 12 announcement of a new protest which was proclaimed in this targeted against the united states represents an even bolder threat to national security, stability of the regime, and the global non-proliferation regime. the international response has been unprecedented over 80 countries condemning the test. we are working with the international community to make

clear that north korea's nuclear test has costly consequences. in adopting a resolution 2087 in january, the u.n. security council pledged to take action in the event of a nuclear test. we're working hard at the united nations security council to make good on that pledge, and mr. chairman, that is occurring even as we speak. we're hoping that the council of stops resolution that the united states put forward, that the security council will deliver a strong response that further impede the growth of north korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic weapons programs and its ability to engage in proliferation activities. the resolution today that we tabled builds upon strengthens and significantly expands the scope of the strong u.n. sanctions already in place. the sanctions contained in this

draft resolution will impede north korea up's ability to proceed in developing its nuclear and missile programs and expand the scope prospective of the tolls the u.s. house available to counter these and hamas and the elements. we are strengthening our core nation with our allies working closely with partners in the department of defense and other agencies. we will take steps necessary defend our allies, particularly the republic of korea and japan. multilateral and national sanctions will remain a vital component of our effort to dprk and its activities.

we continue to exercise national authorities to sanctioned north korean entities and those that support them, and facilitating programs that threaten the american people. most recently, on january 24, the department of state and treasury designated a number of north korean individuals and entities under executive order 13382. we will continue to take national measures as appropriate. sanctions are not a punitive measure, but a tool to impede the deployment of north korea's nuclear missile programs and its proliferation experts as well as to make clear the cost of north korea plus the fight of its international obligations and working toward our end-game will require an openness to dialogue with the dprk.

are committed to authentic negotiate since to implement the september 2005 joint statement of the six-party talks and to bring north korea into compliance with its international obligations through irreversible steps leading to denuclearization. the united states will not engage in talks for talks' sake. it will require a change in north korea's parties, demanding that pyongyang will meet its obligations on denuclearization. this leads to a few important other principals. first, the nightsticks will not accept north korea as a nuclear quest the united states will not accept the tree as a nuclear state. we will not compensate them for returning to dialogue. we will not tolerate north korea for bullying its majors -- measures.

-- neighbors treat the tysons cannot approve without improvement in injured-korean relations. in the meantime, at the u.s. diplomacy on north korea on a wide range of issues continues. close coordination with our treaty allies, japan, remain absolutely central to our approach. we have expanded our engagement might develop a new dialogue key global actors who have joined the rising chorus of voices, calling on the dprk to comply with obligations. china does remain central to altering or korea's calculus and close u.s.-china confrontations will remain a key focus of the medics -- of diplomatic efforts. while the cleared -- the new

queries asian is a goal, so too is the welfare north korea's 25 million people, the vast majority of whom bear the brunt of the government's decision to perpetuate an unsustainable self-impoverishing military- first policy. improving human rights conditions is an integral part of our overall north korea policy, and how the dprk addresses human rights will have an impact on prospects for improved u.s.- dprk ties. entire world is increasingly taking note of the grave human rights violations in hte dprk. knighted nations high commissioner for human rights has called for an inquiry to document abuses. we support this call. next week my colleague will

travel to attend a session where he will call attention to north korea's human rights record and urged adoption of an enhanced mechanician of inquiry into the regina's abuses. the obama administration policy of engagement and pressure toward the cuts a recognition that only to a policy of openness to dialogue when possible, combined with robust pressure to sanctions when necessary, can maximize prospects for progress in denuclearizing north korea. genuine progress requires fundamental shifts in north korea's shuja countless trips the leadership must choose between provocation and peace, isolation, or integration. north korea will not achieve security, economic prosperity,

and integration into the international community while it pursues weapons, while it threatens its neighbors and while it tramples on international norms of abuses its people, and refuses to fulfil its longstanding obligations and commitments. the leadership in pyongyang faces increasingly sharp choices, and we're working with our friends and allies to further sharpen these courses. if the north korean regime is at all why some it will embark on a path to denuclearization for the benefit of the north korean people, the northeast asian region, and the world. thank you again for this chance to appear before you today, and on -- and i am happy to try to address any questions you may have. thank you. >> thank you. we will start a round, and let me just take off of that, almost closing comment, that you

made, that progress depends on north korea changing its strategic calculus. the question is, what is it that we and our allies can do to defect -- can do to effect that calculus so it moves in a different direction, and in that context, it isn't the key here china? and its potential influence with the north koreans, and if that is the case, how is it that we give the chinese -- we get the chinese to be more robust in their efforts to get north korea to change its trustees tic calculus? , you have asked the biggest question that can be asked about north korean policy, and you are hitting on key themes.

changing north korea's calculus is proving to be a challenge. administrations of both strikes have been at this at least since ronald reagan was president, and one can argue it even before that. what we are trying to do is continuing to present a united front in terms of concentric circles, extending to our partners in the six-part process, and going beyond that to try to build an international coalition that understands the threat that north korea poses to the international system, not just on proliferation, but on human-rights and how it comports itself with the international financial system and so forth. north korea appears not yet to be absorbing those lessons, but we will continue to sharpen them, working with colleagues

and with our friends. on a more basic level, we are working very closely as we have for decades with our south korean ally to ensure that should north korea miscalculate and we call on them not to do that, once again, in the face of these new threats emerging from pyongyang, even in recent hours and days and how we work with the south koreans to make sure we are ready from an alliance standpoint militarily to deal with any threats that arise. that is very much at the macro level, how we are dealing with this problem. you mentioned china. you're absolutely right. china is a critical piece of this challenge. closest north korea's neighbor. they are often north korea's protector, and certainly an ally of north korea. they have had a special

relationship of sorts for quite awhile. we're concentrating a lot of diplomatic energy and effort on deepening our dialogue with china, to present to than the proposition that there is still a peaceful diplomatic way ford to deal with the north korean issue. it will not work and cannot work unless china stepped up, placed its four role in bringing home to pyongyang the choices it faces and setting the table for any return to negotiations. i am afraid the history of trying to draw north korea into talks that can deal with its nuclear program, its missile program, and all the other issues we're concerned about has not been fully successful, because the north koreans have been able to split us. we think it is time to work more

closely with china, but also of course with our close allies and other partners in the six-part process to bring home to the address they face -- >> for china, it seems to me there totwo calculus here. they can deal with us at united nations, which is pursue a noose set of sanctions, and that will rattle the north koreans, or they can choose to go had at significantly come back -- cut back on that which is essential to north korean excesses, which is its assistance in fuel as well as other sources. that would be far more significant. from your perspective, what is the chinese calculus? they have not chosen -- now they are joining us, with a welcome thing that has occurred council, but they have a much bigger,

more significant ability by virtue of the incredible assistance it gives north korea. >> safest thing to say about china is it is the falling. yesterday we agree -- we were greeted with the news that chairman mao's grandson, a general and the people's liberation army, called on north korea to move forward on denuclearization. there our developed in china. one could describe it as the beginning of debate about how china will deal with its neighbor. relations have not always gone smoothly of late between the two countries. i do not think it is up to us to figure out how to engage too deeply in that internal dialogue and china, but those are helpful sides. you're right, china is always the get out of jail free cards for north korea. they can provide ways for

the north koreans to export, import materials. china is part of the security council. i have been given a note that resolution has passed. chinese played a bigger role in crafting that resolution pick a permit -- and contains the provisions of the talk about. there are signs that china is beginning to stepup, more robustly than a month to play its role. they say they enforce these sanctions, we take them at their word. we trust to verify at the front, and will continue to engage the chinese to deepen our dialogue and to insure the chinese do the maximum amount they can to deal with this problem. >> senator corker. >> think, mr. chairman, and thank you for your testimony. i hear of the things that you are working on, and we thank you for your work, and we understand this has been going on for 20

years and to many administrations, but when you talk about verifiable deforestation, it seems to me that we can just continue to go in the operation -- in the opposite tertian, and while we talk about additional sanctions in the security council, it feels to me more like we're at a crossroads, that this is not about additional stages, but we're at a crossroads where if something it does not happen soon, there is no way that we can begin talking about verifiable denuclearization. do you agree with that, or to you think adding on additional pressures and the way we have been doing it will work? but it has been a combination of all the above, plus more. we need to continue to press north korea when necessary, and right now it is necessary to do that because they are in a provocation staged, so you are getting a reaction from this occurred council. pressure to sanctions is a

portrait we need to stay strong and our alliance with the rok, continue to is sharpen and deepen our capabilities. it is important to build this international coalition. 80 nations is somewhat stunning, nations like south africa, brazil, even the house and vietnam are condemning this most recent nuclear test. the greek chorus out there in the world is growing in volume. you're right, that is only good as far as it goes, because what is most important change north korea's calculus, so we'd also need to be ready to engage north korea incredible an authentic talks if we can ever see that they are prepared to take a real step to the nuclear rise and address our concerns. i think all of those can things are exceedingly important, and also very quickly we need to

take account of what we have achieved over the last 60 years. in south korea, we have worked with them, helped them create a bit of an economic miracle. i think the ratio is now 36-1 in terms of the amount of goods and services produced per capita versus the average north korean pick things are not going well in terms of the correlation of forces when it comes to north korea right now. i think we move on all these fronts, diplomatically, militarily, in terms of the international coalition. we need to keep drawing attention to their human-rights, and by continuing to press them and continuing to present to them the opportunity should they choose to accept it, to come talk to the international community and find a different way for the away from provocations' come away from boston, away from threat and

move toward a different feature that is absolutely available for them, i am at least guardedly optimistic that at some point they will see that is the way to go and i think that is why we need to to stay true to that. >> you talked about insuring japan and south korea and allies understand we are going to be there to protect them, and yet you are aware we are not investing in modernization in our own country, regarding our nuclear armament. does that tree in the concerns with allies that we are not doing the things in our own country to ensure that that deterrence is there? >> to be fair, i work for the state department, and that is a question for our defense planners, but i can take a bit of a stab at it. i have not seen in my frequent travels in japan and the rok

that there are deep concerns that our commitment to them is that all in jeopardy, and because we have begun this pivot to asia, we have begun to devote even more research is to the asian theater, and that is gone to reassure them. but the mechanism that is funding this nuclear activity uses illicit activities, and we have ways of countering that. we also -- there are people who are saying we should call the entire north korean government as a money-laundering concern, and we condemn the third -party candidates, some of which might reside in china. can you talk to us about ways of getting involved in stopping illicit activity so it is not finding what they're doing from a nuclear standpoint, and what

are your thoughts about us being involved in cutting down on entities that are allowing that money to flow through? >> some of the sanctions that have been part of the many resolutions to get at this, it is important we remain vigilant -- >> at present they are not doing what needs to be done. some of the sanctions get at that, but we are still not stopping the flow of money to these nuclear activities from a list of concerns trick is there more that we should be doing there? >> we are slowly doing that, and that is good because it makes it more difficult for the north koreans to gain the input they need for their program. it is important that in a kind of all aspects of policy to look at that, that is something we continue to work on, and it is interesting if you look at the

trend of great number of years there was a time that, to many years ago, these problems with methamphetamine exports, with counterfeiting cigarettes and drugs, this was really epidemic. i am not saying it is not a problem. it is, and we are vigilant about it, but a lot of the steps we're taking did a good job of making it more difficult for them to do that. a lot more work to do, no question about it, and it ought to be a focus of attention. >> my time is up, but i want to say i agree with efforts to point out the human rights issues that are taking place. that would help us build an even greater coalition, and i would like to share some point how we might influence citizens there 3 better broadcast activity taking place there. take you for your testimony, and

i look forward to the rest of your answer. >> thank you. thank you, ambassador, for being here, and i very much appreciate your service and willingness to go in to these difficult situations. could you tell us with regard to the wmd programs, what is the current estimate on when north korea would have a warhead missile combination that could strike united nations -- united states, and what are the most effective means of this occurring, or slowing down progress in that area. >> great question. it is a subject of a lot of debate among some highly qualified experts in the government and among the experts community beyond, people like a professor at stanford, who has expertise. he was the director of

our laboratory at los alamos pay >> that is exactly right. what i am going to have to do is take a dive, because you're asking a question that does good deeply into intelligence matters, and i do not want -- i would rather not i'm not an expert on these matters. i think as a general proposition, a lot of what is written in the popular literature about this and the think tanks and others, they are not too far off in terms of the estimates, some of which you've eluded to. but i can't get into those highly classified intelligence matters. >> i wanted you to just give us a general answer as you did. i think various folks have talked about a matter of months or even a year in those kinds

of situations. and i'm sure that we'll be getting briefings on that. a lot has been said about china's great cyber wall which blocks information critical of the communist party or policies from the chinese people. but my understanding is north korea has even a more robust restrictive policy in terms of the internet. and it seems to me that one of the things we're seeing around the world when you see democracy movements is the internet playing a role, is the people being connected, people turning out in the streets as a result of that interconnectedness. and you may have noticed recently and i know the administration didn't bless this, but our governor recently visited to try to promote the idea of the internet in north

korea. and i was wondering should the united states be actively engaged in helping to create access to the internet in north korea. and do you believe that this is in the interest of the north korean people as well as the other people in the region? >> great question. and it is in our interest to do that but it's a tough target stote convince the north koreans to open up. while we weren't crazy about the time of the trip to pyongyang, i was interested to see him make those statements. funny things are happening in north korea that could eventually have an effect. you have 1.5 million cell phones now,mostly among the elite and on a closed system. hume limits there, not able to access the outside.

but nonetheless it promotes the spread of information within north korea. we know from lots of good studies that have been done by private organizations interviewing these 23,000 north korean refugees who found their way to south korea that there is a surprising degree of understanding about the world outside their borders. south korean soap operas are popular and it is probably a bit of a shock when they get a thumb drive and watch one of these to see south koreans with one or two cars in their garages. so i think the media picture is changing. that is happening or ganically because of the trade between china and north korea and i think we do need to look at entrepreneurial ways to promote more of that, get more information in. i think broadcasting is a part of that.

the broadcasting board of governors spends a lot of time on this issue. we work with the r.o.k. on that as well. we work with private groups. there are a number of organizations who work hard to try to aleviate the challenges faced by average north koreans and their presence in the country i think is a great way to bring to the north koreans an image of what americans and the outside world are like. so i think across all of these fronts, there is much that is happening. there is much more to do and i'm very glad you raised it. ambassador, back to the nuclear weapons and i think this is less in the classified area, is getting north korea to dismantle the weapon the goal of u.s. policy and under what conditions might north korea give up its nike weapons?

>> it is still the goal of u.s. policy to achieve a korean p/e anyone you is la that is free of that. we had a few short range went thans we had there. we know this is not going to happen over night even if we're able to get some sort of diplomatic process started. i was personally engaged in following up the work that steve bosworth did before he left my position to try to draw out the north koreans to begin a process to go down that road and bound their nuclear program and give them up. i think there is still a chance for i did police woman ma si, there is still a chance for talks to work. but it will require a united front. and most of all, it will require a change of calculus in

pyongyang. and that is what we're working to. i'm hopeful we can get to that. i'm hopeful in a generation we can see a different picture. >> thank you for being here with us. this is a difficult assignment you've been given by evidence of the fact that ambassador rodman visited north korea and wasn't able to accomplish much either. >> but he gave up the baseline. >> you said a moment ago you are guardedly optimistic. that at some point this could be resolved thu negotiations. i want to share my impressions and get your impressions of that. some of this is not novel but i want to share it with you and get your impressions. my impressions are that the north korean regime seeks legitimate si for who they are

and what they are. they want the world to accept them as a nuclear power. they want to be legitimate miesed as a world government despite all the atrosstiss they commit and all the weird things they do abroad. and they want to be insulated from foreign interference in their affairs. and they've concluded the only way to accomplish these things is by being a nuclear power which and their strategy is this series of escalations with potential offramp as long the way they conduct. they conduct weapons test. they say outrageous things like they are going to -- i forth the rhetoric used a week ago about wiping out the u.s. forces if they conduct a joint exercise. they said they are going to strike us here in the homeland. they use this rhetoric and actions they take to scare people or get a reaction from

the world towards one goal. and that one goal is very sitchle to get the world to say fine north korea regime, you can keep your weapons and we'll accept you for who you are. that's their goal. i don't know how we can negotiate them out of that position at this point. they decide do we want to be kadafi or hugh sane. and once we have the capability of striking the u.s. at the homeland, they will have no choice but to accept us and everything they do between now and then is to delay or buy time. that doesn't mean i also hope one day they will wake up and say this is bad for us. i just don't think a government like this can survive if they had to get rid of their weapons and engage the world in a civilized way. my concern is -- why does this matter?

number one, because i believe if injury japan or south korea or other countries in the region. if north korea continues to expand and gets global acceptance of their nuclear program, they are going to want one as well. so this fear of an escalation of nuclear weapons in the riege season very real. the second concern is other countries are measuring their behavior. iran is closely watching what happens with north korea. they want to be accepted as the government they are. and they want to be insulated from foreign interference and they think a nuclear weapon system is the way to do it and they are watching how north korea is being treated by the global community and determining from that how they need to proceed forward. the reality is i think the best we can hope for is three things. number one we have to delay and preferably prevent them from a goal of reaching the u.s. or the west with these weapons. number two, we should never

allow the world to forget who these people are and what they are doing. the list of atrosstiss is too long for today. they kidnap people abroad. any relidge season banned. pun shable by death. the list goes on and on. and we need to create the conditions for reunification which is impossible today. but we don't know when the moment comes those conditions become possible. i think we need to do everything we can with our partners in the world to create the conditions where we can have a yuan fide peaceful korea. and that's not possible today but we can create the conditions where hopefully that will be possible. who could have predicted east germany would have fallen but it did. we have to strengthen. i know as a diplomat your job

is to try to bring a resolution to this. i don't think that is going to happen with this guy. they are convinced the only way they can accomplish what they want is to have a nuclear program. >> i don't disagree with anything you've said. this is one of the hardest foreign policy problems out there and not just for this particular administration, but for many predecessor administrations. so you're right about all of that. everything you prescribe i think is being done in one form or another. delaying their acquisition of these materials, working hard to prevent them from proliferating these technologies, never letting people forget the nature of this regime and what it is they've done to their own people, what it is their doing to the international system by

remaining an outlier. and you talk about creating conditions for unification. i think here, you're right, we need to continue to support the republic of korea. what the r.o.k. has done over the last couple of generations is nothing short of a miracle in terms of the way its pulled itself up by itself boot straps and created the largest economy in the world. become a much stronger nation. and i think we need to do all of this. and we certainly need to work more closely every day with the r.o.k. and its new president to present this united pront to north korea. and to do that also more broadly, within hours of their nuclear test, all of the other five parties, china and russian i can't included denounced what

they had done. >> are we potentially in the midst of a recalibration amongst policy makers in regard to north korea. is it possible we are in the moment that the chinese are looking at the situation and saying they are no longer what they once were? we don't need the headache they are? >> they are clearly not pleased in beijing that every time they try to impress them to take a different path, they thumb their nose at them. we see stunning articles with knowledge poft central authorities. i mentioned you've got the chinese blog sphere are saying what goes here. there is a nuclear test right across the border in north korea. this country is testing weapons

15 years after the last country tested. things are changing in china. will it create a fundamental shift? very hard to say but we're watching it closely. >> thank you. >> thank you very much mr. chairman and thank you for your testimony. there are three major challenges that i want to talk about. we've already talked about them. one, it's clear that north korea is moving aggressively on its nuclear weapons program. secondly as senator rubio pointed out, the record on human rights violations is the worst of any country in the world, the way they treat their people, no opportunity for decent or criticisms. they are kidnapping and torture, no or the youse and the third is the condition of their own people. the level of poverty and

hunger. i want to ask you three points that have been raised. one is that north korea has threatnd to cut off the military hot line. how important is that in dealing with the threat of confrontation? secondly, the united nations is looking at a commission on human rights. should we have any confidence that that, in fact, would put on adequate spotlight on what is happening? and the third is our contact in north korea is limited. we don't have a great deal of ngo's to work with. we are not providing any significant ade at all. should we reevaluate the participation with ngo's to try to deal with the population itself in north korea? >> great questions. the hot line cut off, they've done this before. it's one of the things they do on occasion. i don't know that it's necessarily the case this

latest threat to cut off the hot line or perhaps they've already cut the line is going to be at the end of the day is going to be different from what we've seen in the past, nonetheless it's serious. >> have we used it in the past? >> yes. at the peace village on the border it's often used to convey messages back and forth. your question about what is happening in geneva and the likely we hope establishment for the first time of a permanent mechanism of a commission inquiry to look at humeb rights. i think this is a significant development. somewhat stunning this hasn't been the case in the past. but we hope the u.n. is going to take that step. it's not a magic bullet but i think it will be a great way for the entire international community institutionly and indefinitely to look at what is going on in north korea and

broadcast to the rest of the world the results of their efforts. >> are there still hurdles that have to be overcome for that commission to be established? >> it's not done yet. they haven't looked at it and having served a couple of years i know nothing is done until it's done in u.n. land. t but we have tron believe there is the right kind of correlation of forces, japan is behind it, the r.o.k. has announced their support for this mechanism. we are actively seeking it. and i mentioned in my statement that u.n. officials are behind it and promoting it. i think it's going to happen. and we're going to do what we can to make it happen. and it will have an effect. >> on ngo's, that's a great point. yesterday, during the snow day that wasn't, i was in the office and i was on a wonderful conference call with 7 ngo's

many of them religiously baced. these people do work in north korea. they do medical programs. they get out of pyongyang and get into the country side and they do everything from you theburg cue loss sis work to digging wells and hospitals and dental clin nicks. and i think it is important to clear the path for them to do what they can do. it's not easy. and one of the concerns they had was about sanses and whether that will affect their ability to bring things in to do the work they do. i think we need to find a way to promote their work because i think that is important that this kind of people to people work go forward.

why? because 1/3 of north koreans according to a number of studies are severely chronically malnourished. they are forgotten by the elicit in pyongyang building parks and holding rock concerts. so it's important that we do what we can to work with them. >> we have in past when we've imposed sanctions tried to figure out ways to get direct aid to ngo's we have confidence in to provide humanitarian aid ha is appropriate. do we have confidence if that aid were to be made available that the ngo network is strong enough and there is enough account ability that kecked ensure this the aid went for the designated purpose and was not diverted to compromise the importance of the sanctions? >> well the ngo's take it very

seriously. they've got decades of experience. a lot of their work is scaled such that a lot less likely that the regime is going to try to divert the resources they provide, the services to the military or the elicit. i've been impressed as i've looked at the specifics of the programs they have under way, they've to a great extent figured out how to do this. and whether it's flood relief or bringing nutritional supplements to malnourished children, they are one of the ways we ought to go. and when we have done big feeding programs in north korea. there was the 500,000 met trick on the program under the previous administration this north koreans cut off only a third of the way into it. and the most recent one we put

into place. we do the work through ngo's because they are that good and they ensure that the goods and services they provide get to the right people. >> i make the final point, for congress to allow that type of assistance, we need to know and have confidence that we can account for how the aid is being used since we're not present in the country to be able to do that. we have to have that type of confidence, so it's something you need to be able to build up as far as the questions that will be asked in congress. >> thank you, sir. >> thank you mr. chairman. thank you for your testimony. can you bring me up to speed in terms of the progress of the new leader and the consolidation of power and how much of that consolidation really leads to the hi jinx we've been seeing recently? >> that's a really hard target.

a lot of terrific intelligence professionals work at that. we stay in touch with allies. i a week ago spent a couple of hours with an ambassador with one of the nations who had lots of insights to provide about the thinking of the government. just as a general matter, i think what has happened is kim came into power in december of 2011. there was a period that lasted a few months where everybody was saying this is maybe a new day. one think tank even talked about a cam lot moment occurring in north korea. i wasn't buying any of the stuff at the time and nor were many in government. but what we've seen is that debate has gone away. that the hope for the kind of more enlightnd approach to these issues, that's fading

fast. i think he has consolidated his power. he's got the six key titles. he's the head of the military and the government. the logic of their system is such. it's such a dictator system that in order for that system to operate as it has for the last three generations, there has to be a man at the top to whom all issues are referred and from whom all wisdom flows. we think that he is for all intents and purposes in charge. as to why he's taken the steps he's taken, some of the purges, that's been consolidating his power, firing the generals and so forth. and all of this tough talk, hard to say why they are doing it. i think it's the classical reaction to the fact that community is coming together and making it tougher to

operate. i think that's the kind of acting out we see from north korea. >> thank you. i'm new to the committee but i've been watching the lage out of sanctions and relaxing a little bit. basically the dual strath here. can you tell me in your mind what was the most effective set of sanctions? i'll start there. what worked best? i also want you to speak to what mistakes were made? what lessons have we learned in terms of effectiveness of sanctions and how we relax them and how the united states has been played like charlie brown more than once here. >> on sanctions the most important sanctions often tend to be the buy into the broadest number of nations and here i talked about the role of china and the importance of working with them to ensure that they

follow through on their commitments when it comes to sanctions. what's the most effective set of sanctions? that's hard to say. i've ai'm teverted to say the sanctions that have helped to cut off the flow of luxury goods is pretty important because it's prevented the regime to some extent of rewarding members of the elite. but i think a more serious answer is the sanctions that are getting at the nuclear program, getting at the missile program, preventing the inputs they need in order to build up the mass destruction weapon program. those are important. the latest resolution i was given a note that was passed contains not only a tightening of existing sanctions, but it's got some new sanction that is get at that problem. i think we need to keep building on that. i think what you'll see is there will then be national

sanctions that will be by us and others that will tighten down sanctions further. but i think it's in the nuclear and missile areas where the sanctions are having the most effect. and finally interdiction which is to say and this new resolution has a lot of good stuff in it about preventing the export by north korea of its armaments which is a key source of income by sea and by air. and there is a lot in this resolution that gets at that. and i think that's what we need to keep working on. >> didn't we freeze bank accounts for leaders? >> we've done a number of financial sanctions. there are more in this resolution approved just minutes ago. there are individual designations of key people and their apparatus who play key roles in exporting their

materials, importing what they need to build up their programs . travel bans on these individuals and so forth. so it's a combination of individual designation s, institutional designations and the inputs, the actual machinery and technology that they need. we just need to push on all of these fronts and keep it up. >> the word recalibration was mentioned and strategic calculus. of the members of the six party talk, what has been the most significant recalibration of the strategic calculus, whether it's russia, china, japan, can you speak to that? where has been the move just to give me a sense of that history? >> i think the movement, i have to admit it's like watching paint drie sometimes it's such a long process. i think the movement has been

incrementle. all of the various efforts and there have been quite a variety of approaches to this problem by various administrations in the past, whether engagement, whether pressure, different ack tech chures internationally, there were six party talks, four party talks. at one point here. and bosworth can speak to a great deal of this. i think the biggest change has been the steady accumulation of experience, of pressure, of sanctions, over the yeerls, over the decades and i think that's made a huge difference. then the final thing i'll say is that the world is beginning to weak up to a gretter extent to this problem. there were 80 nations from every corner of the world would issue statements condemning north korea's nuclear test. this coalition is building,

it's growing, it's strengthening and it's meaningful. because these are people who sent messages to north korea and to china. it's very difficult in an international system for a nation like north korea to ignore the fact that increastingly thare actions are seen as dill tiryouse to the functioning of the world system and to the interest of these countries. hard for me to point to one calibration that's occurred. maybe what's going on in china will fit that bill. but i would just say it's this incremental broadening pressure that's been important. >> thank you very much. i wanted to start by talking about the north korean economy. there is a popular impression that the north korean economy is a vast waste land of work camps and starving people,

while that is true for a big part of the country thrrks is a relatively stable economy in the capital. there is a class of ruling elicit that are doing fairly wem. you mentioned briefly about the impact that euro sanctions have had on holding back luxury goods from that class of individuals that has seemingly been pretty resistent to the type of poverty that has struck the rest of the nation. can you talk a little bit about the state of the north korean economy? can you talk a little bit about our relative success or lack of success in trying to change the calculus for the ruling elite based on their economic 1259 us the and any new thool may be at our dispose toll try to change that? >> well, the economy question is a great one. and there are a number of experts who look that the hard.

it's tough to measure. they don't produce straths that are reliable. the scope of it, many people are fooled when they go to pyongyang which as i've said is a bit of a walled city state, you can't easy get in or out where the elicit live. you see people with cell phones and cars in the street and restaurants and they conclude that north korea is really coming up in the world economically. i don't think that is the case. they have some goods and services to offer to the world. they have mineral deposit that is are of value to china which seeks to exploit them. they export lab boarers to places around the world who remit moneys to north korea. thare economy is in some sectors has done reasonably well but the problem is their

ago culechure sector remains unreformed. when the new leader came in, he made a number of promises at hinted at reforms he would institute. we have yet to see that for whatever reason. he seems to have drawn back from going forward with those reforms. to some extent the reform of the economy would be good for the people. the chinese are telling us we should help the north koreans reform their economy and i beg to differ on that. >> the second question is this:so to what extent is food aid an actual tool to recalibrate their strategic interest? we have had success in these temporary agreements by exchanging food aid for concessions on their nuclear

program. but it can blow up within months. is this a real pressure point in negotiations or have they just used this as a means to delay and postpone? >> i think the latter is the case. we don't link food assistance to political matters. what i found when i came into the process towards the end of our year long effort to negotiate this deal with the north koreans that was the north koreans were insisting that the offer we made of 240 tons be linked to the concessions they were going to make only nuclear missiles. they enforced that from their side. we don't use food as a weapon oher a tool and we don't link it to political matters. and no country has been more generous than the united states over the years in providing food to the north korean people. i think since 1997, it's been on the order of some $800

million of food. so we support the people of north korea. we trie, and it's not easy, to bring them aid and comfort, bring them food because it's quite clear that the authorities in pyongyang don't care about what happens in the inner land of north korea and they allow this malnutrition and sometimes starvation to occur. so we don't link the two. i would never put forward that food aid is something we should use as an inducement to political change or change on denukization. >> and then one last question on china and you may have responded to this. but in particular to what

senator rubio talked about with regard to the arms race that could develop in the region, we can control the north koreans if we are responsible for 70% of their economy. even if they do get nuclear power capacity, we can deal with that. but they have to understand that the power shifts if ten or 15 years from now there are five nuclear powers in the region s. that a bright line for them? do they view that as a serious threat? >> sure. the last thing i'll do is speak for the chinese on this. but there are sign that is the chinese are watching closely these debates that are occurring in japan and the r.o.k. among some. i don't think any consensus is developing or will twop in

favor of going forward with developing nuclear weapons. i hope not. it's important for the standpoint of the non-proliferation treaty they not go forward in doing that. the chinese are taking notice and it concerns them. one of the things we say to them when we have conversations about what is happening in north korea is if you have concerns about america's kind of recalibration of its force posture toward asia, then if north korea continues to go on the same direction and we can't resolve it, yile see more of the same and you're not going to like it. yule see more developments such as the extension of the r.o.k. by the range of its missiles. you'll see more developments like the placement of radars in japan. you'll see more on missile defense and on the rest of it. so you have some voices in

china saying it's the united states trying to enkirkle us. that's not it at all. we're trying to defend ourselves. they know these phenomenon are related and we hope it becomes an insent tive for them to step up and do more and try to resolve this problem. and we stand ready to work with the chinese 20 do that. >> thank you. i'm going to pick up on the chairman's opening question which is what is the right way to change the calculus and many questions have been about external measures and i want to get to those in a second. but i'd like to get your sense of internal measures. nations that have abandonned nuclear programs, often it's been an internal calculus

that's caused them to do. so in looking at the arab spring, people grow to tolerate and live under dictatorships but they get restless under he are red tear dictator ships. at once dictatorship starts to become a hereditary dictatorship there is unrest and the population wapts to throw it off. let's talk about the internal dynamics of north korea and educate me a bit on that. is there any potential for internal decent that could drive a rethinking of the nuclear program? and is there anything we can appropriately do? it's like hydrofracking, is there anything we can

appropriately do to drive that decent and increase snit >> we don't see signs of significant internal deincident north korea. and maybe that's often the case before changes occur,ion -- i don't know. that presents a challenge to us where do you drill and what do you pump in that whole to engage in this kind of fracking. i love that image. it's tough. and i think the important thing is to keep firing on all sill ders. to keep broad casting into north korea and work with our allies. work with n.g.o.'s. i think the situation is changing in north korea. they are educated. i think many of them are hungry for information about what is happening on the outside. but when it comes to the classical stuff we all know

from history about is there a unit of the army or is there somebody in the regime who is susceptible. there is nothing like that that presents itself to us that we can exploit or reach out tofment and it makes it a very, very tough problem. >> explain that as somebody who is an expert in this area, the absence of this kind of visible decent. and nurfwood touch with nature that is have diplomatic presence in north korea. is it the sheer demoralization and poverty of those who don't have any credible ability to match up against a military power? is it the long term affects of famine? how would you describe what we're seeing elsewhere we don't see there given famine and the poor economic conditions that would drive decent elsewhere?

>> sure. that's really hard for me to answer. i'm not a life long north korea expert. i don't think we're going to know if and when that opportunity necessarily presents aitself any better than we have in recent years when we've seen dramatic change in parts of the world where there were dictatorial systems. and the problem with north korea is it is the most sealed, high walled paranoid state out there. i don't think it really has it's equivalent anywhere in the world. >> since albania fell, maybe it doesn't have an equivalent. >> i have to admit even though a lot of very dedicated qualified people work this issue in the intelligence

community n our military out of the state department. and we do that on a daily basis, there isn't anything there that i could point to now that is the pressure point, the fisher that we can exploit. i keep coming back to the necessity for staying true to our principles, staying close to our allies, working hard with our partners, in particular china given their relationship, highlighting the human rights deprivations in north korea. and i believe that there will come a day when things will likely change. i don't think that north korea has forever to make the strategy choice to go in a different direction that will involve reaching out to the world and fulfilling its

promises and going down the path of denukization. 24e have an off ramp. there is a way to work this out diplomatically we've given them time and time again. they've chosen not to do it. we'll continue to do it. when the pounds per square inch pressure builds up enough, they will see the light and take door number one. >> let me ask about the five parties to the six party talks and china especially. but there are other nation that is we have strong relationships with that aid and abet or at least have interactions with the north korean government that help them to gain or continue momentum on their activity that are not the direct part of those talks. but talk about our abilities to utilize those relationships and either through the u.n. action

today or other actions get them to stop anything that would promote north korea's forward momentum on nuclear proliferation? >> that's a great question. we work at it all the time. there have been some successes. you're familiar with the burma example where the new government has made the strategic decision to go in a different direction and change the nature of its relationship with north korea. that's very important. that will take time to play out and work through. the same is true of many of the other traditional customers or states that have dealt with north korea. since the al cabar reactor was taken care of in sir yarks i think that's a relationship that is no longer what it was. so i think the truth is we take

it case by case. we work with these countries that still maintain an arms relationship with north korea. i think the effort to exand if international coalition and consensus about north korea is important because the moral has saturday of dealing with north korea becomes a more important factor for many of these countries. but i guess the short and honest answer is it's a case by case effort that we undertake and we're seeking to step it up. and this resolution passed today in new york i think is going to help us to a great extent to get at that problem. >> thanks very much. >> i just want to ask and i'm not sure how this has been asked or answered before. but do you believe for the reductions on our part as a

result of the treaties will do anything to persuade the north koreans to move ahead with reductions or not move ahead with what they are doing? how effective is what we do with their own actions or is that completely independent? >> here i can draw on my couple of years working at the national atomic energy agency where in the wake of speech where he said a world without nuclear weapons, i found representing the u.s. in that body, 150 nation body that that had a tremendous effect on convincing a lot of the fence is iters around the world that the united states was serious about trying to move forward. if you go back to eisenhower's nuclear bargain which he laid out in the speech it was clear those with nuclear weapons would seek to get rid of them.

those without would pledge not to aquire them. so for many countries in the world the united states demonstrating that its serious about keeping up its end of the bargain has a tremendous sket. when it comes to north korea, i'm not going to spin you and tell you the north koreans are going to pack up their nuclear weapons and give them up if we pass further treaties with russia and so forth. but it has a tremendous affect on all 189 countries of the treaty and it makes it easier for us and others who care about this treaty to move that agenda forward, reduces north korea's running room, makes it tougher for them to climb they need these went tons defend themselves. so i think it's a vital aspect of winning over hearts and

minds globally and eventually setting up asset of circumstances in which it's very, very difficult, if not, one hopes eventually impossible for them to continue to maintain as an international out lier to maintain nuclear weapons. >> i listened to you and i know that you are working hard and many people have for many years. but i think have you ack we esed and said this is probably going to continue on and we don't see any changes and more pressure will be a34r50eud. i'm curious. we have a situation with iran where there is a red line. and we've been pretty bellicose about the line we would usele military action to keep them from having nuclear weapons.

and in korea, equally nutty folks and human rights even worse. why is it we have a policy in north korea that is so different than in iran when you have equally bellicose and i would say regime that is are rogue regimes. why would we have such a different policy? >> actually the policy has more common al tiss than divenses in both cases what we seek to do, as i said earlier, in the case of north korea use pressure when we have to use pressure and seek to exploit engagement when it's possible to engage them. i don't agree there's been no change. i think that the pressure, the sanctions, the coalitions we've built, the work in six party, a lot of the diplomatic efforts

went a great distance to -- >> they are certainly way past any kind of red line that we would accept in iran. they are way beyond anything we as a country stated pub blickically we would accept in iran. it seems to me we have two very different policies. i'm just curious why that is the case? >> i think we have two situation that is have developed. and i think it's because of the different set of circumstances in both. i'm not an iran expert. i could quickly get myself in trouble by trying to compare the iran case to the north korea case. but as the north korea case developed. i think we have sthrodethare efforts to create these weapons. i think we've built this coalition that is going to don't decrease their running

room and space in which they can operate. i have faith if we stick with the principle that is have be deviced in a bipartisan basis over 20 or 30 years that we will see the kind of changes we would like to see. and i'm sorry, it's true, these are per nishes problems. this is the land of a lot of bad alternatives. and so i think the way you deal wit you is stick to your principles, you stick to your allies. you 345euk modest progress here, sometimes dramatic progress there. occasionally there are set backs but you keep at it. american leadership is essential. it's born a lot of fruit. sadly it hasn't changed the strategic situation yet. but if we keep at it, if we keep together, we are going to see sooner or later, hope it's

sooner, the kind of changes we hope are needed and i want to re-emphasize this one point, it's up to north korea to understand that it has another path that it can take. it has a partner in the international community that will engage with north korea but it has to be the one to make this decision, make this strategic choice to ban nuclear weapons and if they do there will be a different future and one that will be for the benefit of all the careen people north and south. >> i think that's a highly aspirational statement that doesn't seem to be based on reality today. but i thank you for your optimism. and i'll go back to my original premise and would like to understand that more fully. thank you. >> let me make an observation. first of all, we're very aspirational here. >> you have to be on north

korea. >> i think in part just an observation on the question which is that obviously one of the reasons we have so vigorously pursued a sanctions regime on iran is because y van not where north korea is in terms of its nuclear program and we do not desire it to get to the point north korea has. whether or not it was a different point intime maybe a previous administration should have adopted a similar position as we have now with iran. we are past that moment. and the question is how do we deal with the realities of the moment and change the calculus inside north korea and i hope the strategic calculus of china which plays a kee role of getting us to the point we want to be. with the thanks of the committee. we appreciate your appearing and we look forward to the

continuing dialogue and the administration on this critical issue. as we excuse ambassador dave viss let me call up the next panel. he served as the u.s. special representative for north korea policy. from 1997 to 2001. ambassador bosworth was the ambassador to the republic of korea. he was the executive director of the korean organization and japan. and ambassador bosworth has a distinguished career in the u.s. foreign service for nearly three decades. joseph is the president of the intelligence and national security aligns. he previously worked as the

senior advisor in the office of the director of national intelligence, proliferation center and as the north korean mission manager. prior to his work at odni he served as the special envoy for north korea. he's worked in numerous roles throughout the central intelligence agency and has extensive experience in that regard as well. robert joseph is the senior scholar for public policy from 2005 to 2007 it was the secretary of state for arms control and national security. and he served in the national security council as special assistant to the president in home lapped defense. he also served on the department of defense as

secretary of defense for international security policy and deputy assistant secretary of defense in arms control which we have a very distinguished panel here. i'm going to ask each of you to summarize your statement in around five minutes. your full statements will be entered into the record so we can have time for dialogue here as we move forward. we want to pick up on your expertise to draw some of questions and answers to some of the issues that's already been raised with our previous panel. so we'll start in the order that i recognized you. ambassador bosworth. >> thank you very much mr. chairman. i'm grateful for the opportunity to appear before the committee. i will not try to summarize the current scene with regard to

north korea. i think ambassador davis did that quite well. i would say a few things as an opening. first, this is a very, very difficult problem. and it follow that is there are no good options for dealing with it. if there were, i trust that some of us would have found those in the past. instead i think what we've found is that north korea by enlarge has conted to exceed -- continued to exceed what they could accomplish both in their missile program and their nuclear program. having followed this issue for now 20 years, i would venture to say they have consistently outperformed the expectations of the outside world. and i don't think we have time to get into the question of why. but they have created a situation in which now they are

demons trabblebli within reach over some period of time of being able to mate a nuclear device with a missile. and that changes the strategic balance in a number of ways. as i said, the options for dealing with them are very limited and very ob cure. we can as we have in the past as various times simply stand back and wait for what we consider at the time to be the inevitable collapse. that policy has not succeeded. we waited for their collapse back in the late 1980's and when i last checked, they are still there. similarly, we can rely on a policy of containment and deterrence which we will have to do in any event. but i think what we've found is detainment and deterrence do not prevent the threat from

growing more acute. also we can, of course, as has been hinted in various questions this morning, we can rely more heavily on china to solve this problem for us. i am not optimistic that china is going to do that. i am encouraged by their willing rns to continue plate tougher sanctions as they have this last time around in the u.n. but i think china continues to face an serble co-none drum which is on the one hand they do not want north korea to become a nuclear state, on the other hand, they do not want north korea to collapse. in their view they are concerned that bringing sufficient pressure to bear on north korea to stop their nuclear program, much less to demantle it would risk creating a situation in which north korea could collapse. and for china, an equally

undesireable outcome of all of this would be to wake up and find the border of south korea is now the river because it's collapsed and south korea with a with the military alliance with the united states. that changes in a fundamental way what has been called the correlation of forces on the korean peninsula and chinese strategic thinkers have this very much in mind. all this being said, my own personal view is that at some point, i cannot say exactly when, but i would think sooner rather than later, we will come back to an effort to engage with north korea. in some manner only because the alternatives are so bleak. and i think that that is what we should try to do because we have no good options. the question that will exist at that time is, engage on what basis?

do we again seek to engage on the basis of denuclearization pretty much by itself at least as a primary objective, or do we seek to engage on a broader basis going back for example, to the joint statement negotiated in the six-party process in september of 2005 in which all the parties signed on to a four goals, and for your objective -- four objective agreement. they agreed to provide energy and economic assistance to north korea. in my view it would be more productive to look from the outset to engage with north korea on the basis of that broader agenda which seeks in my judgment to get at what is the fundamental problem on the

korean peninsula. the problem which gives rise to the nuclear threat and that is the inherent weakness of north korea and the strong conviction of the north korean regime that it will not do anything which will risk its demise. only by my judgment, only by addressing these broader considerations of a peace treaty to replace the armistice, economic and energy assistance, and diplomatic relations, do we have a prospect of getting at where it remains and will remain our central and abiding concern which is the north korean nuclear the north korean nuclear problem. rather than simply focusing on that and try to identify it and to try to resolve it, in and of itself, which is not proving to be very feasible over the last several years, we would be much better off looking for a broader focus and i think the prior agreement of september, 2005 provides the seed for such a

broader agreement. and with that, i will conclude my remarks. >> thank you for the invitation. my statement is on the record. a few comments. i agree with senator bonds worth. denuclearization is the name of the game with north korea. committing north korea to maintain that program and as we see, enhance their program with additional nuclear weapons not only plutonium but uranium, would be a destabilizing factor for the countries in the region. it is a fair question. countries will be looking to acquire similar capabilities, we're talking about the potential for a nuclear arms race and the potential for nuclear terrorism. others who want to get their hands on nuclear devices.

in 2002 we confronted the north koreans with their uranium enrichment program. it was a clandestine program. they denied having that program. in 2010 the admitted to it. they had 2000 functioning centrifuges operating. as he said this was the state of the art facility. austria was and is ensuing the uranium enrichment program to a company nuclear program. theypoint to and i agree totally with the ambassador, the september 2005 joint statement as a single statement. kim jong il committed to this when he said even in beijing they commit. and it says clearly in exchange

for economic assistance, security assurances, ultimately diplomatic relations with the address the illicit activity issues of counterfeiting currency and pharmaceuticals and cigarettes, trafficking in methamphetamine. and where this -- there is transparency on the human rights issues, then we would talk about diplomatic relations. with denuclearization comes normalization, no. that is a process toward normalization. hopefully that would be enough of an inducement and the north koreans signed upwith to the statement and also in that statement, the provision of eight light-water reactor. they have a bright to a civil nuclear program and is in there. coming back as a non-nuclear

weapon state back to the ntt and so forth. that fell apart. on 19 september the north koreans were offended by the fact we had [inaudible] that was the patriot act, section 311 and that was the predicate being money laundering. north koreans or laundering their money. there retained $25 million of the money current -- north korea had in the bank. eventually the bank was in compliance and the money was returned. it was referring to returning to our banking system. the north koreans insisted they did not want to get back into the international financial market. thank god it is back on the path

to and denuclearization. we eventually took them off the list of state sponsors of terrorism. that was to be in response to north korea committing to a verification regime that moves us toward comprehensive, verifiable irreversible dispense and of their programs. they refuse to sign a verification protocol and that led to the unraveling of where we were with the september 2005 joint statement and that is unfortunate because it has gone downhill ever since. in 2006, 2009, nuclear tests, missile launches, we have seen in 2012, and we have seen last month in february with the third nuclear test. north korea is enhancing their nuclear capability and enhancing capabilities. china in april of 2003 brought north korea to the table after holding back on some fuel that went into north korea.

it sent a message. come to the table. that was the beginning of the six party process. my personal view is china can do the same thing. we bring south korea to the process and sit down no. 3 and say what are you doing? un committed to denuclearization? and determine if there is any viability to go back to the joint statement. that is a process and that is a meaningful one and my last comment is, i was one of the few in 2012 who was optimistic. i saw some personnel moves being made by kim jong un. he replaced his ministry of defense and replaced his chief of staff. he put people in there, the party officer who is overseeing the military general. he put his uncle into a high

position where he treated -- there was some momentum and that fell apart. because of the process. they just launched an they tested and that has come to this position where we're at. a very dangerous stalemate. the chinese now can move this process forward. get them to the table and get some momentum going rather than continued escalation and potential for confrontation. >> thank you. ambassador joseph. would you put your microphone on, please? >> thank you for the invitation to be here and to testify. i will try to be very brief. while one can argue and i think some would legitimately that u.s. policy has succeeded in slowing the north's progress and galvanizing international support, the successes that we have reached that we have achieved our at best, tactical.

as president john adams once said, the facts are stubborn things and today, north korea has declared itself to be any clear power. and it seems determined and well on its way to acquire the means to hold american cities hostage to their long-range missiles and nuclear weapons. i see a long pattern of failed policies that must be changed. this change should be based on experience, not on hope and is on this basis that i offer the following lessons learned from my own experience. north korea will only agree to abandon its missile and nuclear programs if it is judged essential for survival. the d p r k places the highest onues on the easthese cable -- these capabilities. these are means of

preventing intervention such as occurred in libya. they are building prestige at home and earn hard currency. the north has used its nuclear program to extract inducements to those who seek its elimination. the should be seen as a long shot. at times previous administrations have thought they were all but there. but it never happened, whether it was in 1992 and 1994, orion 2005. p'yongyang would agree to abandon its nuclear program only to violate its commitments each time. this pattern of failed negotiations followed by violations of obligations, provocations, and the offering of more inducements in turn by the u.s. and others to get north korea back to the negotiating table, has been the main characteristic of u.s. policy for two decades. the u.s. and others have and will no doubt continue to apply

sanctions on the north but imposing economic hardships and threatening isolation have not alter the regime's behavior. in part, this is because the dprk cares little about whether it's people start and the ability is dependent on isolation. in part it's because china has kept open all lifeline of assistance to the north no matter how blatant or lethal its activities and it is in part because of our own practice in releasing pressure on north korea in exchange for empty promises. the record of failed negotiations is not an argument that diplomacy should be abandoned. but negotiations by themselves is not a strategy. a comprehensive approach that integrates all tools of state craft is required if negotiations are to have any chance of success. these tools, financial, intelligence, interdiction, law enforcement, and diplomacy and we talked about the mall this

morning, must be brought together to bring sustained pressure on the regime. pyongyang must be faced with a choice. it can retain its nuclear and missile programs or pays a high price. it must no longer be allowed to use these programs as a means to extract concessions that only serve to strengthen the regime and perpetuate the missile and nuclear threat. as for diplomacy, our main focus should be on china. the principal obstacle to bring effective pressure on north korea. four, the promotion of human rights. while part of u.s. official talking points for years has not been a significant element of u.s. strategy. it should be as it was in the reagan administration and its dealings with the soviet union. exposing the domestic brutality of the regime is the moral course and potentially an effective means to influence dprk leaders. because north korea is likely to retain its as -- nuclear and missile capabilities the u.s. must insure that it can defend

against the threat. this requires missile defenses that protect allies and the u.s. will lead from attack, failing to deploy offenses -- defenses that keep pace with the growing threat, whether as a means to encourage russian participation or reduce the budget will only undermine deterrence. and increase the risk of destruction to the united states. similarly we must continue to deploy a credible nuclear force that can meet the spectrum of deterrent requirements and provide solid assurance to allies. going to lower and lower levels of forces in pursuit of a nuclear-free world is likely only to embolden our adversaries and shake the confidence of our friends and allies. if our allies doubt our capacity or will to meet security commitments, the outcome will be the reverse of the golal rather than fewer lechler weapons. the u.s. must lead. we have failed to show the required leadership, avoiding

confrontation on a number of its most harmful activities including its missile and nuclear proliferation. this absence of leadership affects not only the calculations of p'yongyang but also of tehran where another repressive regime is seeking missile and nuclear capabilities to undermine u.s. interests in a region of vital interest. iran does watch closely u.s. policy and u.s. resolve to reverse what three presidents, clinton, president bush, and now president obama have declared to be unacceptable, and nuclear- armed north korea. what they have seen so far is certainly not dissuaded them. thank you again for the invitation of being here. i look forward to your questions. >> thank you. thank you for testimony. -- your testimony. let's start and i would like to have an interplay between ambassador bosworth and -- if this was the best pathway toward achieving our goals, and you

suggested that the issue of patriot sanctioning of the bank and the $25 million, that would flow back to north korea and that was a disruptive element in pursuing the process. in any such process there are going to be bumps along the road. does that not call into question how serious no. career was in even in this more expanded process of 2005 to achieving its goal and i would like both of your observations on that. it sounds to me that especially when the money ultimately flow back to north korea that the process would have resumed again if there was a real desire to pursue it. >> you are right. my point on the 2005 was this. we told the north koreans

clearly, illicit activities will not be permitted. diplomacy is one thing. you can continue to counterfeit our currency, you continue to deal with the methamphetamine and traffic in ampemethamphetame and we will continue to go after you. do not marry that to this policy -- diplomacy. the federal registry put that out that the bank was being sanctioned because of the predicate of money laundering based on the section 211-311 of the patriot act. that was a message that cannot link them and try to get us to go soft on illicit and human rights and put out denuclearization as a carrot for us to go on. >> while that may have been our message, that did not -- they did not accept that message as a

means to move forward. >> they protested and the walk away from the table for about eight months until that money was returned. the bank was in compliance of the work -- they were permitted to return. >> if that is the case and so easily disrupted, how do we see that as the path we forward? >> it is easily disrupted. we have seen north korea's adherence is tenuous at best and they have to be continually reassured they're not giving up their pace of negotiating leverage. in return for an empty promises. it is important that as we try to move forward, north korea come away with some conviction that it is not just denuclearization we're going to make progress on. we are encouraging -- making progress on a peace treaty to replace the armistice and that is a very high priority from a

north korean point of view as well as diplomatic relations and economic assistance and energy assistance. please understand me. i'm not saying that this is somehow a magic solution to the problem. it is the one piece that we still have that they have agreed to. and as -- has constituted a foundation to move forward. they have not disavowed it in that sense. >> there is some pressure reports that suggest you have been on jocose egressions to north korea. i am wondering if you could tell us what was the temperature of the interlocutors that you met with. >> those reports have been addressed to the senate and house intelligence oversight committees and i am not at liberty to discuss it here.

>> you have discussed this with the house? >> the house and senate oversight committees have been addressed. these issues have been addressed with these committees. >> we will pursue it with the intelligence committee. let me ask you, with reference to your comment that the chinese were the ones who got the north koreans to the table in 2005 as a result of tweaking them with some of their assistance. what was the calculus at that moment that made them do that and how do we think about, how do we get them to make that calculus now? >> april 2003, it was a very tense time. north korea said they were processing the spent fuel rods. they had asked the iaea monitors to leave the country.

they left the mpt and asked the auditors to leave in 2003. they advance their reprocessing the spent fuel rods that were in the cooling ponds. with the indication they would represses with the purpose of weapon is asian. -- they would reprocess with the purpose of weaponization. how do we defuse this tense situation? a number of days prior to this meeting, there was a few shipments that were not as extensive as they were in the past between the countries and that was the reporting at the time. some analysts at the time, it could have been a message from beijing to the dprk. they should comply and if they're being asked to sit at the table they should sit at the table. >> >> thank you and thank each

of you for your testimony and/or past efforts. regarding this issue. it does not sound hopeful to me as i listened to each of you and you agree with that. and let me ask this question. we had some discussions about our libya intervention. here we had a person that was not a good person. we had a person who had done away with weapons of mass destruction. we had a person who was working with us with al qaeda. we took them out when they did not have weapons of mass destruction. what kind of learning moment was that for the leadership of north korea? >> i suspect it took lessons from that that were inevitable. they're going to complicate our policy-making with them for the foreseeable future. the most obvious lesson would be if people think you have weapons

of mass destruction and you take action to show that you do not have weapons of mass destruction, this gives your adversaries room for maneuver they might have -- might not have had previously. there are legitimate reports that the north koreans came away from iraq and libya with the conviction that if these countries had in fact had weapons of mass destruction, what happened to them would not have happened to them. >> the point i was trying to make at the time and -- go ahead. >> i would agree. the message in pyongyang is they saw what happened to sit down and to -- saddam and gadafi. we don't want to move down

that path. there are those in p'yongyang who are committed to retaining nuclear weapons. >> i do not see any -- i cannot imagine why north korea would not consider going down the path they're going because of recent experiences. it does not sound like we have much of a way to deter that. i have not heard anybody speak to how we do that. other than china. sounds like they're the only ones that have any cards that are worth playing here. other than something i think our country does not want to engage in at this time. it seems to me that the entire issue around north korea is not us but china. and i wonder if you might speak to that. >> i was -- i would look to my colleagues. it is a failed economy. north korea now with the additional sanctions, there are

three sections in play with this morning's. having consequences. when that leadership realizes they're not getting the funds necessary to sustain their lifestyle there will be pressure at a higher level. beside the provinces that are not getting much of the benefits because it is a two-state system. pyongyang feels they're having problems sustaining, i imagine there would be leadership to change and take some of the pressure off and to live as a prestige. one has to wonder how they will survive to the mid term. >> there is one time in my experience in which i observed

the chinese on the cusp of making a strategic commissiodeco change its relationship and that was in october 2006 after the first test. the first nuclear test was a profound shock. it was a profound shock in the region and it was internationally giving the risk to the non-proliferation regime itself. within a couple of days of that test, condoleezza rice was asked to go to the recent -- region and asked me to go with her. we stop in japan and in japan, the focus of prime minister shinzo abe, the foreign minister also, was on the reassurance of the japanese public that the united states would stand by its security commitments and explicitly restate its nuclear guarantee to japan. what is interesting is when we got to beijing, the first thing

the chinese did was think as for reaffirming our security and our nuclear guarantees to japan. what china was concerned about was unclear dynamic. it was the dynamic of the possibility of japan and south korea going nuclear in that context. that was the only time that there seemed to be a prospect, a window of opportunity for getting china to change its policy. this is the first time that china went along with the u.n. security council resolution which had real sanctions. 1718. china offered to work with us to implement those sanctions including denying the luxury goods for the elites of north korea. but it was not too long after that that china went right back

to its comfort zone and did not challenge the north korea provocation and it did that in the context of the united states and others releasing pressure on north korea. instead of increasing pressure, we released pressure. we did that because of the false prospect of negotiations. the false promise that north korea would stand -- come back to the negotiating table and it did. only to start once again this cycle of negotiations, provocations, concessions, and failure to live up to its obligations. i do not know what is going to take to get china to change its assessment. china has many reasons for supporting north korea. the concern about what happens with unification, concern about refugees coming over the border. it is going to take a real

concerted effort and it is offering to take pressure on the part of the united states and china to change. more dialogue about the six party talks is not going to do it. we're going to have to decide whether this is important enough to us that we put some pressure on china to change its policy but even if china changes its policy that will be a very important step for getting north korea to alter course but that is not enough either. we need a comprehensive strategy to deal with this. >> thank you. >> thank you. let me follow up on that important point. i asked a version of this question to special representative davies. i tend to agree that possibly the only thing that brings the chinese to the table is the fear that there becomes a nuclear arms race in the region and we

throw around the inevitability of nuclear arms races in the middle east and that sector of the world without term understanding of all the barriers that would stand in the way of that happening. particularly in a place where we hold a lot of cards with the other players in the region. you may be just answered this but you talk about applying real pressure to china but without china feeling that they lose control of the nuclear situation in the region, what cards do we have to play there and the second question is, is there any chance that we do lose control of the nuclear capabilities in the region? is there any real chance that the japanese and the south koreans do change their disposition and decide to remove themselves from our nuclear umbrella and develop their own capacities, or is that not realistic?

>> senator, i am taking your second question first. i think there is a chance that if we fail with north korea, and if we do not demonstrate through both our declaratory policy and our capacity in both the nuclear area as well as the missile defense area, there is a likelihood that japan will overcome its long term allergy about nuclear-weapons. and begin to hedge. south korea also very much a concern about proliferation in the future if we fail. if we fail with north korea. in terms of what cards we have to play with china, there are not an easy ones. if there were easy ones i think it would have played them by now. this has been going on for 20 years. i think we have to make the assessment whether or not this

issue, the issue of north korea and china pose a continuing support, continuing lifeline of assistance to north korea, is sufficiently important to us that we begin to put economic pressure on china, that we began to call out china for its part in sustaining what is most -- the most abhorrent to regime in the world today. there are a number of things that we can do but up until today we have been more interested in china's role as a facilitator in the six party talks. that does not get as to where we need to be with china. >> do you agree that the thing that china fears most is the nuclear arms race and whether that is a concern? >> tschida is concerned about proliferation within the region. >> is that their primary concern? >> no.

one of several concerns. they are concerned about the stability of north korea for the reasons we spoke of earlier. they're concerned about the nature of their relationship with the united states and i think it has been made clear to them that north korea policy is not a pit of that relationship. it is very important to that relationship. they have very many points of interest at play here. i think we sometimes make the mistake of thinking that china is somehow a policy monolith in which problems are fed and solutions come out. one of the things i came away with dealing with this problem convinced of is that the chinese are of various lines of how to deal with north korea. there is no single fuel and is something that is debated and addressed within the policy circles of north korea. within the government, the party, and the so-called think-

tank world. they do not have a solution for these concerns. they recognize the nature of these problems. it is something they have to deal with. they also understand how complicated and how many different points of interest in china our concern about possible outcomes in north korea are. that includes the party, the military, and the government. >> thank you. >> thank you. and thank you to all the panelists for being here. i am sorry i missed the earlier part of the hearing. i appreciate your insights into what is happening in north korea. nice to welcome you here. i want to follow-up on the proliferation issues that have been raised because it seems to

me that given the past history, given their efforts to help syria building nuclear weapons facility, that we may not know exactly what we do not know about what china -- north korea is doing with respect to proliferation efforts. i wondered how comfortable each of you are with where our knowledge of what is happening with respect to north korea and proliferation might be right now. and if you can elaborate on exactly what we now about that. >> can i just comment briefly, i look to my colleagues and you mentioned syria. that was in many ways a week of call for many. that was going on for a number of years and until the israelis took it out in 2007, that was almost going operational.

nuclear proliferation is so central to the issue of the nuclear station for north korea and that drives china and everyone else but china is a neighbor and ally. if there is any instability, what would happen with nuclear weapons or fissile material? we know the element of the potential of nuclear terrorism. there is -- this is a central issue to why denuclearization has to be part of the goals and objectives. it is not arms control. it is denuclearization. proliferation is central. >> anything either of you would like to add about what we know about those efforts? >> i would only add that as a longtime consumer of intelligence, i have been impressed on the one hand by how hard our intelligence community works on north korea but i have been impressed by what a difficult target north korea is.

i think their ability, their capacity for surprise is not limitless, it is greater than we might expect. >> i come at this from a non- proliferation expect -- perspective. that is my expertise if i have expertise. clearly, north korea has been the no. 1 proliferators. it is a serial proliferators. we know from its missile sales and the transfer of missile technology to a number of countries. we know it from the syrian experience and providing a plutonium reactor to syria. north korea will sell what it has. i am very concerned not only about state proliferation relationships but also as the ambassador mentioned, the non- state and access through north korea to fissile material and

weapons. it is a hard intelligence problem. and we have been subject to a number of strategic surprises in this area. despite knowing how hard the intelligence community works on this problem, i also share the sense that there is a lot we simply do not know and we need to be prepared for the worst based on north korea's experience. >> you have dashed my hopes to be reassured. as we enter another round of sanctions, how can we be more successful at implementing those sanctions in a way that really has real impact on north korea, because maya understanding is that today, we have had a rather sporadic success at implementing

the sanctions. >> we have to start with the realization of the reality. sanctions by themselves are not going to solve this problem. sanctions can make life even more difficult for north korea. sanctions can force north korea to contemplate issues they might not have contemplated without them. sanctions are not the solution to this problem. it is part of the solution. sanctions have the effect of making us confident where we are doing something, we're not sitting here passively and waiting for divine intervention of this problem. we're taking some action but we should not be under any illusions that sanctions are going to solve this problem. >> i would look to the ambassador joseph and i do not disagree. i will say what we saw today was

china part of this new un security council resolution. it is indicative of the fact that china is saying what is going on here? when we have the countries coming together whether it is proliferations or going after the banking system or the diplomats and how to move money, that is causing pain. is that going to be the answer? that is not the answer as such but it is part of a process to tell north korea you have to change your behavior. you need to come back to the table and you need to commit to denuclearization. >> just to add to my colleague's comments with which i certainly agree. sanctions will only work and they have limited impact. there will work in the context

of a broader strategy. we have to put these various instruments together and that has been lacking. what has also been lacking is a sustained effort. when we have made a difference, when we have created pain and the bank experience is apt here. when we have put pressure on the north, we have allowed that pressure to be released and we have done that through this false and fanciful promise of negotiations. negotiations will only work if we apply pressure and that is one thing we learned from the libyan experience. it was not you get into negotiations and release the pressure this is negotiating 101 but time after time, republican and democratic administrations made the same fundamental mistake. we hope north korea will change. we ignore our experience for the sake of hope. >> thank you. i am out of time.

i would love to follow-up and see how that fits with what is being proposed on iran but that is a different topic. thank you. >> thank you for your very insightful comments and answers to questions on a very challenging but important national security and national interest issue before the committee and before our country. with the thanks of the committee, the committee's record will remain open until the close of business tomorrow and with that, the hearing is adjourned. >> thank you. >> earlier today as you heard during this hearing, the u.n. security council voted for new sanctions against north korea for its latest nuclear test. the resolution put some restrictions on north korea to finance and obtain technology for its nuclear weapons program. here's a look at that brief meeting.

>> the agenda is adopted. under rule 37 of the council's provision of rules and procedure, signed by the representatives of belgium, canada, denmark, italy, japan,

and the philippines, to participate in this meeting, it is so decided. the security council will begin its consideration of item two of the agenda. members of the council also have before them a document, the text of a draft resolution submitted by australia, belgium, canada, denmark, france, italy, japan, morocco, the philippines, the republic of korea, rwanda, togo, the u.k. of great britain and northern ireland, and the united states of america. it is my understanding that the council is ready to proceed to the vote. from the draft resolution before it. >> i shall put the draft

resolution to the vote now. >> will those in favor of the draft resolution contained in documents s-2013-136 please raise their hand? >> the result of the voting is as follows. the draft resolution received 15 votes in favor. the draft resolution has been adopted unanimously as resolution 2094 of 2013. the security council has concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda. the meeting is adjourned. >> here's a look at our prime-

time schedule on the c-span network. starting at 8:00 p.m. eastern on c-span, the senate judiciary committee debates gun- control while passing a measure that toughens penalties for those who buy guns for people cannot legally owned them. on c-span2, senators react to yesterday's 13 hour filibuster by kentucky senator rand paul. and on c-span3, janet napolitano and other witnesses testified on security issues. all these that a p.m. eastern on the c-span networks. -- at 8:00 p.m. eastern on c- span networks. >> the u.s. has many fantastic qualities. i do believe may be many people have the possibility of pulling themselves up by their bootstraps. i think every year, that is less and less probable but the united

states especially in its foreign policy which is what i have worked on for years and years is not the great nation. it is an interventionist state. it is extremely aggressive militarily. we mess with other people's politics in ways that i cannot imagine americans tolerating. imagine if some country invaded us to bring their system of government the way we did in iraq, for example. can you imagine americans sitting there and thinking that is okay? and yet somehow we still in this country have a mentality that people are thrilled when we invade them. that is insane. i believe 99% of the time we create new enemies. >> she has made a career as an advocate for world peace. more with jody williams on "q & a." >> earlier today, house speaker

john boehner held his weekly briefing and spoke about the federal budget and the reason automatic spending cuts during this 10-minute event. >> good morning, everyone. where is your tie? [laughter] i would like to start this morning by letting the american people know that the united states capitol is open to visitors. we love to have the american people to visit their capital. even though our budget has been cut like everyone else's, thanks to planning we are able to avoid furloughs amongst capital workers and the tours will remain available for all americans. i think it is disappointing that the obama administration did not follow our lead and find savings

in other parts of their budget. i think it is silly they have insisted on walking down the white house which the american people actually own. yesterday the house passed legislation to keep the government funded for the rest of the fiscal year. it is a straightforward bill that includes a bipartisan agreement between the house and senate on improving military readiness. everyone has something they would like to add to this bill. -- everyone has something they would like to add to this bill, but the house is not using this as a vehicle to advance other agendas and i would hope the senate, too, would avoid doing so and either pass our bill and make straightforward changes. senate democrats try to load up this bill with extraneous provisions, partisan riders, budget gimmicks, we will be prepared to move a clean continuing resolution through the end of the fiscal year. i don't want to do that. i don't think that would help

our troops. i would urge democrat leaders in the senate to not get greedy and get carried away and try to put forward the possibility of a government shutdown. our goal is to cut spending, not to shut down the government. the c.r. left in place the president's sequester. as i have made clear many times, sequestration will remain in effect until cuts and reforms are put in place to put us on a path to balance the budget over the next 10 years. there are smarter ways to cut spending and that's why the house has acted twice over the last year to replace the sequester. unfortunately, the president and senate democrats have yet to recognize that we have a spending problem. yesterday, i released a list of 170 economists who have agreed that spending the problem. over the last 24 hours, 10 more economists have signed on to this letter.

we have to start digging our children out from this mountain of debt, not continuing to add to it. that's why next week under chairman paul ryan's leadership and republicans will begin to advance a balanced budget that would promote economic growth and create american jobs. our plan would cut wasteful spending, fix our broken tax code to create more jobs and increase wages and strengthen priorities like medicare. every family balances its budgets. washington should balance its budget as well. democrats talk an awful lot about balance, so here's my question to them. -- where is their plan to balance the budget? there is nothing about a balanced budget that doesn't actually ever get to balance and i think the american people

support our efforts to balance the budget over the next 10 years. and i would challenge president obama and senate democrats to embrace this commonsense reform and offer their own plan to balance our budget. >> is the debt ceiling going to increase in may and july? >> yes. >> what about the idea of possibly changing \[inaudible] >> paul ryan, and budget committee members have been reaching out and listening sessions with our members over how do we get to our plan to balance the budget over 10 years. and they have done a very good job of listening to people and still continuing to make their tweaks as they get ready for next week's markup. when they are finished, i'll see it when you do.

>> comments have been made \[inaudible] in exchange for resigning. can you comment on that? >> this is a disgraced congressman who went to jail and made a lot of baseless and false book. it's sad. >> reaching out to number two republican senators, we went through campaign-style events all eefer -- over the country and i had a discussion with the president last friday. and this week, we have gone 180. now after being in office now for four years, he is going to sit down and talk to members. i think it's a hopeful sign and i'm hopeful that something will come out of it. but, if the president continues to insist on tax hikes, i don't

think he will get very far. the president doesn't believe that we have a spending problem. toon't know if we are going get very far. but i'm optimistic. >> you think that \[laughter] >> are you hopeful they can do what you guys were not able to do, going around you, meeting with ryan without senate leadership, that's the strategy? >> as i told the president last week, the more members that we engage in this process, i think the better off we are for a couple of reasons. there are a lot of people with good ideas around this congress, both in the house and the senate. and secondly, if you are ever going to pass a major bill that will begin to address our spending problem, we are going to have to grow this support and it's going to have to be an

organic process. i think it's a hopeful sign and maybe something will come of it. >> on that point, is there any worry that there will be a deal coming up in the senate and push you guys to the wayside? >> we have a process in here that both chambers have to pass a bill and if we disagree, we go to conference, that's what i would expect here if we were in disagreement. >> you have been so adamant, i encourage the senate to take up the house bill. i have talked to a number of people on this side of the building that it would be tough if they make changes. that is their prerogative to do so. they could risk a shutdown but some people might blame house republicans. >> listen. i can't decide what the senate will or won't do. trying to predict what they will or will not do is like trying to predict the weather here in washington d.c. my

forecast was closer than anybody else's around here. >> do you support representative gohmert's amendment to ban obama's golf trips until the white house brings back tours to the public? >> i know he was talking about offering something, but as you know, i don't typically vote on the house floor and i didn't yesterday. >> two questions. are we to understand you are cool with the idea that the president in the sense going around you --? >> i don't feel like the president is going around me. you look all the presidents i have worked with in the years i have been here, each president has engaged the leaders and members on an ongoing basis for some time and i think it's somewhat hopeful sign that the president now in the second

term, even the leaders have to have support of the members and if you look at regular order, those come through committee where there is a process and bringing them to the floor and you are right about what happens in committees and more members understand it. it is an organic process to move a bill through each chamber. >> is ryan bringing a message at all? have you spoken to him? >> i have spoken to chairman ryan yesterday a couple of times. he's not carrying a message from me to the white house, no. >> are there any provisions that will curtail any aspects of obamacare that you intend to attach to must-have legislation in this congress? >> the house believes that obamacare will drive up the costs of health insurance in america and make it more difficult for employers to

provide it. we have voted several times to defund obamacare and i'm sure we will again this year. there are other provisions in obamacare having an effect on employers today. the employer mandate starts january. but there are look-back procedures in the law that are affecting the way the employers hire their staff today. there are a lot of effects of obamacare that we are starting to see and the house, i expect, will have extensive oversight hearings on the devastating impact of this law and the american people. >> \[inaudible] >> we'll look at them when we get there. >> will that go into the budget? >> i don't know that. last one.

>> have you worked out a schedule when it comes to conference? >> i'm not -- the president talked about coming up and having a conversation with our members. i'm not sure when that conversation will be. as you know, he is getting ready to embark on a trip to the middle east and that's one of the issues he'll want to cover. but i'm sure the issue of sequestration will come up as well. we are going to welcome the president to come up and talk to our members and i'm looking forward to it. >> wednesday morning? >> when we are ready to announce it, you'll know. \[captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2013] \[captioning performed by national captioning institute]