lady's series with rachel jackson. later, general john allen discusses his time in afghanistan. >> as people gather in front of the supreme court, a couple of tweets from media outlets. tweet, andent out a another one from the hill's briefing room. >> tonight, called a bigamist

and adultery during her husband's 1828 presidential campaign, racheldax and dies of an apparent heart attack before andrew jackson takes office. his knees becomes the white house hostess but is later dismissed in the fallout from a scandal. angelica van buren is the white house hostess for her father-in- law, president martin van buren, who was a widower. we will include your comments and questions tonight live at 9 eastern on c-span and c-span3. also on c-span radio and c- span.org. >> former defense department on ail jeh johnson targeted killings overseas. administration faces questions over that legal rationale of that operation.

this is just under an hour. >> good morning. it is a pleasure to welcome you here today to new york's never ending winter. glad to see you could get up so early and break your way here. we are very excited about today's conference. first, i want to give a few banks. , directorthank susan of the center on national security here at fordham for her work in putting together this conference with me. it is god'sine work, so we have done that as well as everything else. today we are looking at 21st century warfare law, the enemy,

and the battlefield. andthe work of the center fort the other national security center law school, basically this is what we have been looking at for 12 years. legale been looking at a paradigms', the legal authorizations and space between law and war. i thought it was time to have a conversation that we probably should have been having all along. what is the future of warfare for the united states? where is the law involved and not involve? who is the enemy? who is the enemy going to be five, 10 years from now? where is the battlefield beginning and ending? it is a clue about where we i think we are all going in where we will be a year from now we have our next conference. one thing to point out today at

the outset is that lawyers have been unusually involved in the war on terror. if it was the case with the bush administration, is more so the case with the obama administration. lawyers are the spokespersons. they are behind the scenes and in front of the cameras. obama hasn't employed his lawyers to explain what he's doing to the nation, why he has -- why he is doing it, and to try to make interface between the public an administration policy. which means basically that lawyers have been inseparable from the presidential policies, in particular about war and how we are conducting war under the present administration. there is really nobody better to speak about the issues to which this conference is devoted than jeh johnson, who recently left the department of defense as general counsel. before that he has had other

public-service jobs. he was a prosecutor here in the southern district of york for couple of years. he was also general counsel for president clinton for the air force. there are many things you can say about jeh johnson, but from what i have seen and read and heard, hear other things i think are important to say. this is a man who understands and accepts the challenge and the responsibility of the fact that one man, one individual, one woman can make a difference. this is a person who believes that politicians and policy- makers can leave a mark, whether it is a mark for good or for ill. this is why we invited him here today. he reminds me of something that then attorney general robert kennedy said here at forum when he dedicated this building to

the law school at lincoln center. he said, quoting justice jackson, the best attributes of a lawyer is courage. jeh johnson's thought on warfare are of particular interest today. we know something about what he thinks, but not a lot. here is what we do know. and i am quoting from the speech he gave at the oxford union several months ago. he told a group assembled there, war must be recorded as a finite, extraordinary and i natural state of affairs. war violates the natural order of things. children vary their parents. in more, parents vary their children. he went on to say, we must not accept the current conflict and all that it entails as the new normal. peace must be regarded as the norm toward which the human race

continually strives. today we have gathered not to think just about the perpetuation of the current war against al qaeda but about war. is it desirable? is it important? is it impossible to keep it from spreading what is the role of the law when thinking about warfare, and what is the role of the law in mitigating the run to war in conflict. is there. in the war without -- when law can replace the military, or at least mitigate it? several of the palace today have been involved in the past 24 several of the panelist today have been involved with the authorization to use military force. that is something we will spend a lot of time discussing today.

will it carry us through the next year or the next decade, or do we need more? these are questions that confront the nation, and as before, others who are interested need to confront these and earlier rather than later. these are among the questions we will ask today. i am delighted to have come to join us. without further ado, i give you jeh johnson. [applause] >> thank you very much, karen. can everyone here me, especially in the back? i see heads nodding. i cannot help, cle.ecall a speech at a when i was general counsel at

the department the air force 12. five years ago, i was giving a tok at the usmc in london our jag's station all around europe. within an auditorium about this size. i cannot remember what i was talking about, civil litigation or something. way in the back was the ambassador the u.s. to the united states in short sleeves, listening to my speech. a filing could not resist the temptation any longer and i asked him, mr. ambassador, what brings you here echo he said south carolina cle. everybody needs their cle. thank you all for your interest in national security. i recall when i went to law school 30 years ago, these types insubjects were discussed

international law courses. i find it fascinated -- fascinating that their whole conferences devoted to what i get to do in my job daily. anyway, thank you again for this invitation. today i want to join the current public debate about a national security court for the prior approval of legal counter- terrorism operations, or as some court." it, a "drone many have come down forcefully on one side or the other. i goal is to set up what i believe are the pros and cons, based on my prior personal experience as the senior legal officer of the department of defense and the former federal prosecutor and as a career litigator. as a preliminary matter, i cannot help but reflect for a

moment on how we got to where we are. most people, i think, do not have a quarrel with the bottom line conclusion in results. most legal commentators would agree with the general proposition that a u.s. citizen who is a senior leader of al qaeda and a terrorist, parsley and actively involved in plotting from an overseas remote location to kill innocent american men, women, and children, and you cannot physically be captured or apprehended is inappropriate target for lethal force by the u.s. government. most informed observers would agree, i think, that as a result of our government counter-terrorism efforts, spanning both the bush and obama administration's, and which having targeted lethal force against known individuals, the u.s.:it is safer today from a terrorist attack launched by al qaeda from overseas.

some would say if it is not broke, don't fix it. the problem, however, is that the american public is suspicious of executive power shrouded in secrecy. in the absence of an official picture of what our government is doing and by what authority, many in the public envisioned the worst. they see dark images of civilian and military national security personnel in the basement of the white house, acting as prosecutor, judge, jury, and executioner. going down a list of americans deciding for themselves who shall live and who shall die, pursuant to a process and by standards no one understands. our government in speeches given by the attorney general and myself makes official disclosures of large amounts of information about its efforts and the legal basis for those

efforts, but it is never enough, because the public doesn't know what it doesn't know, but knows there are things the government still withholding from them. the revelation 11 days ago that the executive branch does not claim the authority to kill an american non-combat, something that was not, is not, and should never be an issue, is big news, and trumpeted as a major victory for congressional oversight. a senator who filibuster's the government is prepared -- compared an iconic terms to jimmy stewart. at the same time, through continual unauthorized leaks of sensitive information, our government looks to the american public as undisciplined and hypocritical. one federal court has characterized the government's position as alice in wonderland, while another this past friday referred to get as neither

logical and more plausible. an anonymous, unclassified white paper leaked to nbc news promise more questions than it answers. our government finds itself in a lose-lose proposition that fails to officially confirm many of its counter-terrorism successes and belts to confirm, deny, or clarify unsubstantiated reports of civilian couch -- casualties'. it is in this atmosphere that the idea of a national security court as a solution to a problem, an idea that for a long time existed only on the margins of the debate about u.s. counterterrorism policy, that is now entertain by more mainstream figures such as senator dianne feinstein, and a man i respect greatly, my former client, robert gates, has gained momentum.

and national security court composed of a bipartisan group of federal judges with life tenure to approve targeted lethal force would bring some levels of credibility, independence, and river to the process. those are worthy goals. in the eyes of the american public, judges are for the most part respected for their independence. in the eyes of the international community, practice has become increasingly controversial would be placed on a more credible footing. a national security court also help answer the question many are asking, what do we say to are thisions who capability in ago a group of judges that approve target lethal force would set a standard and an example. "targetedhe so-called more commoncome

must be realistic about the degree of added credibility such a core can provide. is proceedings would necessarily suspectcret and i almost all of the government applications would be granted. the government would be sure to present a compelling case. at the same time, the new york times editorial page promotes a court for targeted legal force derived by the court as a rubber-stamp because it almost never rejects an application. ,ow long before a drone court operating in secret, is criticized in the same way echoed meanwhile, what about the

views of the judiciary itself? i know a number of federal judges that would accept this unpleasant job out of a sense of duty, but many want the judiciary to have nothing to do with this. former judges have publicly articulated this view in emphatic terms. i can hear many in the judicial branch saying that courts exist to resolve cases of controversies between parties, not to issue death warrants based on classified submissions. eggs partyt like submissions because they know they are not getting two sides of the story. i am sure they would like them even less at the decision must make a final and irreversible. but in a more cynical way, i can imagine many federal judges thinking we don't exist to provide coverage to the executive branch for difficult decisions.

you diminish both are branches of government. axt, the advisability of national security force depends in very large part on the scope of what it is the court will hoc review and approve. i suspect the constitutionality of such accord depends on that as well. permutations, though there are more. first, a court to review and approve all targeted legal force by the u.s. government away from any so-called hot battlefield, against the terrorists, including the course of a congressionally authorized armed conflict. second, a court to review and approve targeted legal force but the u.s. government away from a hot battlefield, but only against a terrorist who is also u.s. citizen. again, including in the course of a congressional authorized armed conflict conducted by the

u.s. military. 3, a court to review and approve targeted legal force but the u.s. government away from a hot battlefield against a terrorist who is a u.s. citizen, but only in instances not part of a congressionally authorized armed conflict conducted by the u.s. military. courtically, if this proposed jurisdiction is limited to u.s. citizens, and applications should be very rare, hopefully not even one a year. it is also the case that as a result of fisa and other things, article three judges can receive highly sensitive classified information exportation. but of course limiting the court's jurisdiction to u.s. citizens leads to the inevitable question, why do all our

citizens deserve less from the government? on the other hand, if the not includeit does all legal force of of battlefield, that is a different matter. in that event, the current world in burma, the judge will have supplanted the senior legal official of the national security agency from a large part of his or her job. to do that conscientiously and effectively, one judge or another on the court should consider getting an office in the pentagon and plan on spending a lot of time there. the continually available, ever vigilant, and have continued, around-the-clock access to secure communications, counter- terrorism personnel and executive branch lawyers. to hear presentations, receive intelligence, probe intelligence officers for weaknesses in the intelligence come and ask questions. this is not something to be done

on the papers, as they say in court. next, if the court's jurisdiction is limited to u.s. citizens, there is the question of exactly what the court is to decide. if one accepts the criteria for targeting u.s. citizen set forth in the attorney general speed your go, it has several parts. first, the target as a senior operational leader of al qaeda or associated forces and is actively engaged in planning to kill americans. second, the individual poses an imminent threat to the united states. third, captor is not feasible, and fourth, the operation would be conducted in a manner consistent with applicable laws and principles. starting with the last of these criteria, this one is implicit in every military operation. this includes consideration of, for example, the top of weapon used and the elimination or

minimization of collateral damage. often these matters are and should be left to the discretion of the military commander in direct control of the operation, along with the time, place, and manner of the operation. even if the overall approval of the operation comes from the president or secretary of defense, this particular aspect of it is not something that should normally seek to micromanage from washington. likewise, there is not much to gain by having a federal judge review these details in advance. next, there are the questions of andibility of capture eminence. these really are up to the minute, real time assessments of the type i believe the judge was referring to when he said reports are institutionally ill- equipped to assess the nature of battlefield decisions. indeed, i have seen feasibility

of capture of a particular objective change several times in one night. nor are these questions once of a legal nature, by the way. judges are accustomed to making legal determinations based on a defined federal set of facts, a picture that has already been painted. these are not one-time-only we want military and national officials to continually assess these two questions until the last minute before and operation. if these types of continual reassessments must be submitted to a member of the article 3 branch of government for a violation, i believe a compromise our government's ability to conduct these operations effectively. the cost will outweigh the benefits. in that event, i believe we will also discourage the type of continual re-evaluation i am

referring to. that leads to believe the question of whether the objective is in fact a senior leader of a al qaeda plotting to kill americans. of those of heaven vinified, this one is actually the simplest and most freight forward, but it is the only one that's got to be referred to a court, in my view. those i have identified. asks a question we should in every instance, is it therefore really worth submitting to a court? other considerations, many like to draw distinctions between on and off the so-called hot battlefield. in my view, the distinction is becoming increasingly stale. hot battle feel less since 2001, afghanistan, the u.s. is winding down operations, while al qaeda has migrated to

yemen and north africa. i can envision a lot of debate and uncertainty about what really constitutes a hot battlefield. is the u.s. boots on the ground echo if so, how many? in 2011, forbya example? the distinction makes sense for developing policy, but i caution the development of legal regimes and standard on that basis. next, a minor point. is ahrase drawn support catchy phrase that fits on a bumper sticker, but it is a conceptual misnomer. the activity we are talking about is not limited to unmanned aerial vehicles. targeted legal force can be, and is, conducted from several other types of platforms, including man aircraft. then there are other constitutional issues. again, this depends in large part on the scope of what we are considering. i agree with the analysis on the

subject, article 2 of the constitution states that the president shell be the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. this is his burden and responsibility. he may delegate it within his own chain of command, but he cannot assign part of it away to another branch of government, nor have it taken away by an act of congress. the article 3 problems are just as serious. offer legal advice to the president. they exist to resolve live cases or controversies. many refer to the accord by analogy and say that the fisa or does not resolve cases or controversies. authorizesht -- also surveillance, but this judicial and activity has its roots in the war and department of the

fourth amendment. judges do is an extension of what judges do every day when they issue search warrants. the idea of judicial authorization lethal force against an enemy combat and, particular during an armed conflict, has no similar routes to any activity typically performed by the judiciary. to the contrary, the idea and motivated by a desire to rein in the president's constitutional authority to engage in armed conflict and protect the nation, which is the very reason it has constitutional problems. that any requirements links certain objectives to a national court must contain exceptions for the executive branch to act on its own to exit in certain circumstances. also, beware of creating the wrong set of incentives for

those who must conduct these operations. it may include an individual, whether his name or citizenship are known. may also include a location like the terrorist training camp or an object like a truck filled with explosives. by creating a separate legal regime additional requirements for an objective if his name or citizenship becomes known, like conditions do you create for operator to know for certain the identity of those likely to be present at a terrorist training camp or behind the wheel of a truck bomb? or must the government refrain from an attack on what it knows to be an active and dangerous training camp if an al qaeda a terrorist, who might be a u.s. citizen, wonders then echo here is my bottom line. like others, i believe the idea of a national security force is

worth serious consideration. certain advantages, but i also see a number of legal and practical problems. as i said before, the advisability of the idea also depends in very large part on the scope of what it is the court is to review. if i must be labelled one way or another, i guess i've along in the category of skeptic. what is my alternative description? continuedat first, efforts at transparency, as an important government interest in and of itself, is not going to keep the press, congress, and courts off its back, when its back is up against the wall. that is easier said than done. with. hard. the reality is that it's much easier classify something than to be classified. bureaucratice

biases in classifying something once it is classified. put 10 national security officials and a room to discuss declassifying a certain thing and they will all stand on transparency in principle, but at least seven will be concerned about second or events. someone will say, this is really hard, we need to think about it some more. the meeting is adjourned, and the 10 officials gone to more pressing matters. last year, we declassified the basics of the u.s. military counter-terrorism activities in yemen and somalia and exposed what we were doing in a june 2012 war powers report to congress. it was a long and difficult, deliver process to get their, but when the white house persevere, we said publicly and officially what we were doing, and as far as i can tell, the world did not come to an end. second, in my view, targeted

lethal force is at its least controversial when is on the strongest, most traditional legal foundation. the essential mission of the u.s. military is to capture or kill an enemy. armies have been doing this for thousands of years as part of a congressional -- the foundation is even stronger. furthermore, the parameters of congressionally authorized armed conflict are transparent to the public from the words of the congressional authorization itself and the executive branch's interpretation of that authorization. which this administration has made public. lethal force outside the parameters of congressional and authorized armed conflict by the military looks to the public to lack any boundaries and lends itself to the suspicion that it

is an expedient substitute for criminal judgment. third, a president can and should institutionalize his own process internal to the executive branch to ensure the quality of decision making. in this regard, i will note the various public reports that the obama administration is considering doing exactly that. this raised me to my final point. let's not lose sight of the reality that in this country, we have for some time entrusted the president with awesome powers and responsibilities as commander-in-chief. arsenalols the nuclear and he alone has the authority to use it. he alone has the constitutional authority, with certain limits, to deploy thousands of men and women in the u.s. military into hostility on the other side of the world. further, as we entrust the president to conduct war and authorize these of force against

an individual, that presidential level decision brings with it a whole cadre of cabinet and subcabinet level national security advisers from across justicense, state, and departments, and the intelligence committee, who bring to the table different perspectives and engage in very lively, robust debate. i say only half jokingly that in 2009 in the then existing structure, when the most aggressive things the new president could do to promote credibility and ensure robust debate within the executive branch was add to the mix as state department legal adviser a certain human-rights law professor from yale, give him access to all the counter- terrorism activities and give him a voice and a seat at the table. over the last four years of the administration, carolco made me and others work a lot harder. -- hartold coe.

he is back at yale. the president is elected by the people and accountable to them. his legal and policy advisers are chosen just like a federal judge, appointed by the president and confirmed by the senate. if the senate is not satisfied that a nominee for a legal position in the national security element of our government to provide independent advice and all the rule of law, it should exercise its prerogative to withhold its consent. it delays -- the senate delays confirmation for a lot less. confident barack obama is sensitive to these issues. i also have a lot of faith in the new cia director, john brennan, who happens to be an alumnus of this university. over the first four years of the

obama administration, i probably sat with him for somewhere between 5100 situation room meetings. i believe i know his mind and his values, and in my opinion, john brennan embodies what the president talked about when he says an aggressive counter- terrorism policy, rule of law, and american values are not trade-offs. they can coexist. i finish with something i said a year ago at yale law school while i was still in office. as a student of history, i believe that those who govern today must ask ourselves how we will be judged 10, 20, or 50 years from now. our applications of law must and the test of time, because of the passage of time, what we find probable today may be condemned in the permanent pages of history tomorrow. our national security and the people's faith in our government

depends on this. thank you very much. [applause] >> we are going to have a few questions and answers. i thought we might start with the panel is coming later today, this might be a good way to start of today's questions. otherwise i would just go to general questions. i see two. are either of them panelists? he is thinking.

>> if this court were to be only reviewing military strikes as the purview of the aumf, what would you say to a hypothetical armed drone having drugs approved by this court that go with that not in theory make it legitimate because it would be cia dronepothetical, strikes by a civilian agency? >> are represented the u.s. military for four years. i cannot and up won't comment on a counter-terrorism activity of any other nation state. permutations that i offered in my prepared remarks, i outlined three, very simply worded. one was, all targeted legal force, including as part of a

congressionally authorized armed conflict by the u.s. military, all target lethal citizen,inst a u.s. including as part of a congressional declared armed conflict by the u.s. military, and then my third permutation was targeted legal force against the u.s. citizen of the hot battlefield and not as part of a congressionally authorized armed conflict by the u.s. military. make, that iint i am making, is that targeted lethal force is at its least controversial and on the soundest legal footing when it is conducted by the u.s. thetary as part of congressional authorized armed conflict. i believe that is the case, and i have said that before. david. >> i have two questions.

what is judicially reviewable, and you suggested the operational leader who has planned attacks and plans to engage in a tax is reviewable, but eminence is not reviewable. as i understand eminence as defined by this administration and set forth in the white paper is not an up-to-the-minute assessment of whether someone poses an immediate threat, but rather it is a categorical persons tot certain fit this category by definition pose an imminent threat to us. isn't that equally subject to ?udicial review the second question is, if we put aside for, and having an

internal executive process, what about having a devil's advocate position? you will not always have harold ae, but you could always have defined institutional role, somebody whose job is to defend life, at least in terms of what has been leaked thus far, we are relying on harold coe. he is gone. we are hoping somebody else might be sensitive to those concerns. with that not make a more robust process? >> i have a couple of responses. experience as bit gc for the department of defense for four years, the application of what i think we would

consider imminence is not necessarily what you would assume from reading that white paper. i am not a big fan of white papers because in my private, professional life, you don't give a client white papers the could you don't know who authored it, who saw it, so i am not a big fan of white papers. in situations, i have seen situations where we were looking at a military objective what we concluded that , andhreat was not imminent therefore not appropriate for the specific type of military force we have been discussing here. monitor ortinue to pursue other means. i am not giving you a whole lot of detail here except to say that in its application in my

experience, the standard does not necessarily line up with how one might read that white paper. it ald probably write little different. second, i like the idea of the devil's advocate, something i think could be made part of the process, could be institutionalized within the military. you have some special considerations. the chainive goes up and all of a sudden the colonel has to be the devil's advocate in the face of three are four- star generals and he is going to work to make sure there will not be any retribution by being a good devil's advocate. i actually believe that being

devil's advocate or something of that nature would be a good , and as a career litigator, i am accustomed to always making arguments, taking positions outcome expecting there will be somebody on the other side who is going to take issue with everything i have said, and there is somebody in the middle their resolve the dispute. as a lawyer in the executive branch, a senior lawyer for government agency, you don't have that luxury most often in doing your own legal review. i think it would be advantageous -- gunnoe i've been in situations where i sit around a conference table and say would anyone like to be devil's advocate here among the 12 u? i assume the role of devil's advocate if no one else

was. so i think it would be a good idea. yes sir, in the back. >> what is the practical operational standards of proof before you authorize someone to be killed, an american citizen, american resident or not? is it effectively proof beyond a reasonable doubt eco how sure are you, how sure do you have to be and how sure do your people have to be before you kill somebody? >> there is a standard that we apply in the department of defense. i am not sure it is public, unfortunately. we, lawyers in

particular, want to think about these things in litigation and law enforcement terms because we are used to experience with dealing with evidence admissible in a court, and terms like prove beyond a reasonable doubt, preponderant of the evidence. what you are dealing with an armed conflict in counter- terrorism is intelligent, very often, not evidence. i always bristled when, in those contexts, you want to talk about evidence. it is not evidence. evidence is something a judge admits into proper seating because it leads to a certain threshold appropriate for courtroom. what we are doing is assessing intelligence, and we want the intelligence to be reliable, dependable, and we want to be pretty darn sure that you are

acting on the appropriate level of intelligence before you make a decision. because there are lots of things that in the intelligence realm, one is allowed to consider that you don't consider in court, and very often in my experience it can be pretty reliable. sometimes it can be sketchy, but sometimes they are very, very reliable. >> [indiscernible] >> i am not disagreeing with you. i don't believe that if there is a standard, i don't believe is public. .hil carter >> [indiscernible]

>> that is a very good question. i know that there is a hot debate going on among people in this room on that very issue. myselfxious to immerse and what has been written on the subject. i have only looked at it very quickly. i think the answer depends almost entirely on what are the existing threats out there right now? 3.5 months out of government, knowing how often it can change, i don't feel equipped to make that judgment. i think it depends in very large

the on what the budget for four years i was in office, i thought that we made the aumf work. is our interpretation and the executive branch that were sustained by the court in litigation, and congress last year or year before last in 1021 codifier our interpretation and it became the subject of litigation here in new york. branches essentially came to an appropriate interpretation of the aumf. now there is a point beyond which we want to get at various terrorist organizations, various affiliate's, affiliate's of

affiliate's. it was intended for a specific 2001, andt existed in one of the things i said at oxford was that there is a point where that group has been decimated so that the enemy as we knew its in 2001 no longer exist. at that point, our national leaders, the president and the congress, have a decision to make. how do you want to deal with the future threats? i think it would be unfair to simply ask the lawyers in the executive branch to keep making -- just keep interpreting it so we meet existing threat and don't bother the congress with this. so our national leaders have to make a decision based upon the existing threats, whether we want the government as a

country, a new congressional authorization to deal with the existing threat, or whether we revert to relying on more traditional means for our counter-terrorism activities. law enforcement, intelligence community, and the military for imminent threats. that is a judgment that has to be made with the best available, most recently available intelligence at hand. the new york times editorial- page the other day -- the editor happens to be a good friend of timeand we debate all the about these things. i am just not sure how one can call for repeal of the aumf without knowing what the current threats are out there.

>> [indiscernible] will the record be preserved and when might it become available to the public, 25 years, 50 years, or will it ever become available? >> i did not get the first part of your question. >> will the written record of these determinations ever become available to the public? >> of interrogations? that is a good question. people are not shy of making these requests. at some point, i suppose years the government can

always for the sake of transparency the classify certain components of its internal decision making about counter-terrorism. i think there are other ways that we can promote transparency without necessarily releasing any kind of written record of internal government deliberations. >> [indiscernible] >> in five or 20 years from now? how likely is what? i am a skeptic, and i speak, theas we

world environment may also be may, in, such that we the future, rely, as i mentioned at oxford and here again today, on more traditional means of counter-terrorism. it really is the case that armed conflict, targeted legal force, should be regarded as extraordinary and an extraordinary state of affairs to deal with an existing threat came to government grapple with over 12 years ago. almost 12 years ago. i think there is a current debate that deserves a lot of attention, and people in congress, in washington, need to have this discussion, but as i tried to lay out this morning, i

see some real practical legal problems. i will take one more question. yes, sir, gentleman in the red tie. i am sorry i missed anyone who has had their hand up. >> i wonder if you could say a of of about the capture wing the test. separately and operating question, and how you create incentive for agencies to develop a greater ability to capture in the future? >> thank you for asking that. i fail to make a point that i wanted to make earlier, which is that when you talk about talk feasibility of capture, those are not necessarily legal questions, and judges don't necessarily have to be the ones to make those calls. officeren, a military

-- some civilian national security official is fully equipped to make a judgment upon his orbased her assessment of the intelligence. what i have seen happen is, lawyers tend to believe that only lawyers can answer these questions. a point that i think needs to be emphasized is that lawyers said the outer boundaries for things. lawyers said the legal lanes in which military leaders operate, so lawyers can come to a judgment. i have seen this countless times. lawyers come to a judgment that something or someone is the lawful military objective, but there are lots of military reasons why that individual should not be acted upon.

the point i would like to make here is that lawyers set the outer lanes in which a lot of judgments get made by not lawyers about how to pursue on conflict, how to pursue counter- terrorism. there are plenty of people equipped to make a to makeimminence, not necessarily lawyers. we lawyers think we know it all, but we don't always have the best skill sets for making these decisions. thank you all very much. i wish you a good conference. [applause] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2013] >> tuesday, the supreme court will hear oral arguments challenging california's ban on same-sex marriage. we will bring you the same day

audio from the court at 1:00 p.m. eastern. per se, director rob reiner on his support for same sex marriage. >> one of the reasons we took on proposition 8, aside from the obvious reasons of marriage equality and we should all be treated equal under law, and it was a bad initiative and some courts have already overturned it. we hope the supreme court will oppose those rulings. it is an education process. we discover as we go along that first of all, there's not one person in this audience are everywhere that doesn't have a gay person in their family or a gay friend or gay persons they work within their workplace. nobody, nobody. the normalizing of things, being able to teach, being able to show people that everybody is equal, that nobody is different, if they are doing their job,

they should not be thought of as different. that is one of the reasons we took on prop. 8 and one reason we did a dramatization of what went on inside the courtroom here in san francisco at the district trial. we put that on because we wanted to show people what actually went on in that court room, and to normalize it. we find that as we move along, the wind is at our back. it's like we are hitting critical mass. you see more and more states adopting it. great britain, you are seeing more countries. it will happen. it is supposed to happen. i have said this many, many times, that we cannot imagine that there was a time that women could not vote. we cannot imagine that there was a time when black people could not vote. we cannot imagine there was a time when black people could not marry white people. there will be time years from now when we say gay marriage,

what was that fuss all about eco it will take time, and we are moving in the right direction, but it is about a fundamental right. our fun and --at of our fellow citizens -- i cannot look at somebody i love and say you are lesser than me. you deserve less than me. you are a second-class citizen. you cannot feel comfortable about yourself knowing there are millions of people in this country that are not considered people under the law. by america'seated cable companies in 1979, brought to you as a public service by your television provider. >> coming up next live here on c-span, first ladies, influence and image. former