being here and special thanks to the club for your initiative in making this event possible. many of those demonstrators he referred to a few moments ago were camped outside the embassy i was part of a few years ago. i know of what you speak personally and at considerable volume and i know well the great work that you have done to improve the situation between our two countries to the point where we have the incredible relationship that we have today. also a word thanks to kei. a big fan of what you do great work you have done to make this event possible today. and thanks to both organizations for your timeliness in selecting today to do this.

are living say, we and fascinating times in northeast asia and the korean peninsula in particular. we have entered a very difficult and occasionally disturbing and frightening few weeks in dealing with north korea. we have also been through a superbly managed visit by the president, a personal friend of mine. it was obvious during her visit that she has lots of friends and supporters in the united states. i am supposed to talk about the prospects for u.s. korea cooperation in dealing with north korea. i am nervous doing that in the presence of so many journalists during my days of a diplomat i was on the receiving end of their tough questions. i can show you my scars later on. it is a much friendlier gathering today. i feel comforted by that. since i know longer work for the government [laughter] , i can say what i think.

[laughter] freedom is a wonderful thing. i managed to talk to a number of friends of the current administration who were raving about the outcome of the visit. big thingsme happened, not the least of which was one of the most important outcomes of the summit, the establishment of a good chemistry between the two leaders. anyone familiar with summitry knows how important it is to get the chemistry right between the two leaders. there is no question in my mind that the chemistry between president obama and president pok is there. it will help the two countries move forward on a range of issues in the coming months and years. it was alsoignicant

comfort l, if that is the right word, in terms of the president's view of the south korean game plan going forward. , their new president is written and spoken extensively during the campaign about the need to reach out to north korea, build a relationship of trust, if possible, between south and north and try to jumpstart dialogue between south and north. that is something i think president obama and this administration feels very old. she had an opportunity -- feels very comfortable with. she an opportunity to talk about her game plan going forward. i think people are supportive of that. there is an understanding of why president gauck desires --

pok desires to try and reengage the north, to try and reduce tensions and remove the relationship with north korea in a different direction than it has been moving in and the last two years. moment ago,ed a also an understanding of how committed she was during her campaign to ongoing this course of action and to think washington is willing to see what can be done to help her in this respect. there was also an understanding in washington of a basic fact that is all too often forgotten when we are talking about korea. is name of the poland cella the korean peninsula. it makes sense for koreans to see what then -- can be done to move the relationship in a positive direction. there is trust and confidence in in theth korean allies mu president herself, i think that has helped solidify in korean's support

going first to deal with the north. ,he previous korean president also a good friend to have a very good relationship with president obama, also sought to put south korea in the lead. unfortunately, north korea had a very different idea and rejected his various overtures very strongly. unfortunately, the self north -northonship -- south relationship did not move positively in that time. nevertheless, it is important to try again. if for no other reason than to keep the pressure on north korea and remind everybody where the intransigence lies. if any party is going to bring the relationship to a halt or move things in a negative direction, let's make sure it is north korea and not self arena. all the more reason to keep the heat on.

he also ought to manage our withtations in dealing north korea. looking around the room, there are many veterans in this process of dealing with earth korea, and we all know how often we have been disappointed in the past. it is north korea that we are dealing with. our expectations or disappointing us in profound ways is what they seem to do for a living. we also need to keep in mind that there are limits to what north and south korea can do together. we saw that during the last administration. north korea was not willing to engage south korea on the terms that south korea had laid out. north korea was not willing to engage south korea in dealing with fundamental security nuclear weapons and missiles. the north koreans as a rule for to talk to the united states about those issues.

believing that if they can make ,rogress with the united states on nuclear weapons or missile issues, that somehow we will drag south korea and japan along. talks are possible between southern north. we will see her north korea react. they tend to look at south korea as a provider of , agricultural support, fertilizer, food and occasionally even cash. as we have seen from the suspension of work at the industrial complex in side north korea, the border from south korea, that project is now on that north fact korea had withdrawn their workers from it has raised some interesting questions about

whether north korea is any longer interested in the income 90 million u.s. dollars a year that the project used to generate for them. theiresult of removing workers, the north is now not going to get that $90 million a year, sso 53,000 north korean workers lost the family theers of theirs -- plus family members of theirs getting the other benefits, food, electricity, clothing, , those benefits will not be accruing to north korea anymore. that is another interesting question. the north koreans, as a result of the project, probably have 53,000 north korean citizens in their midst who are not happy that they are no longer employed and well fed and well showered and medical care, etc..

.lus all those family members this raises an interesting question about whether north korea will be able to keep those people happy. not that north korea worries too much about keeping their people happy. there are some interesting indicators, asking about why that project is no longer moving forward. there were some interesting indicators that suggest that the north koreans were concerned ,bout the potential solution spiritual and political collusion of the project was producing. the reasons of that some elements in north korea were prepared to forgo the income, because they saw the downside of allowing the project to go forward with to allow this political and intellectual pollution to spread into other parts of north korea. of myioned in the opening remarks, we have hit a difficult

patch with north korea. i don't have to remind you of the outrageous threats we have heard from north korea in recent months. there are some interesting signs that we have moved into a new stage of this crisis. and threats of imminent nuclear holocaust throughout the pacific, we are not hearing that right now. suggesting we are moving into a new phase. i would remind you that if you look back over the history of our efforts to deal with north korea, we have seen an interesting pattern develop over the years, going back to the 1980's and 1990's. involving an opening phrase of ,rovocation and tension followed by a time of negotiation, followed by an agreement in which north -- receivese some some awards or benefit. followed by quiet, followed by a breakdown in the agreement, followed by more provocations.

thisould probably ask you point, are we moving into the next phase of that cycle again? we can discuss that during the q&a. some of the reasons why north korea has decided to tone down the rhetoric and cool off the temperature. anybody who has been to north is the annualere ritual that takes place in april and may of every year where hundreds of thousands of north korean soldiers leave their barracks and go to the field to engage in weeding and planting and agricultural work. without that labor in the fields, the north koreans would not be able to eat at all later on this year. it is a critical component of the north korean economy to get them into the field areas those soldiers on the frontlines, if they are ratcheting up up

tensions and running exercises, those soldiers are not doing that duty, but doing military duty. another reason for the toning down the rhetoric might be that it is difficult for north korea with its limited resources to tempoue the operational of its military. to continue those exercises. continue flying those airplanes in response to what we are doing for a lengthy time. it is possible that the north to calmwere compelled things down because it was getting difficult to keep those planes moving in the air and keep the tanks running. to show us that they were ready to take us on in some military confrontation. despite the fact that the temperature seems to be a bit lower on the peninsula, we cannot rule out the possibility of another provocation.

when i speak about provocationreans understand tt h korea today is a very different place from south korea a few years ago. there is no doubt in my mind and the minds of south korean citizens that the next conventional military provocation that north korea engages in will be met with a commensurate oteri response by south korea. i hope north korea understands that. i also hope they appreciate the importance of the recent agreement between washington and seoul, the two governments agreeing on how to respond together to the next military provocation by north korea. very important agreement was achieved and the implications of that are profound in terms of there being a joint effort to respond to whatever the north koreans do next. is that if not korea does engage in future

provocative behavior, we are more likely to see it in the area of a nuclear test or missile test. they have made it very clear that they intend to move forward very quickly with missile and nuclear weapons development. i think it is more a matter of when, not if, in terms of a nuclear and missile test. of a nuclearurs weapon or missile, i think we will find, as we have in recent weeks, washington and seoul on the same page together with tokyo, i suspect. this raises an interesting question about the role of china in this. that is something that did not come up in a big way in the earlier panel. i want to make a couple of points along these lines. china's role going forward, i think is still open to some question. there is no doubt that there have been some critical things said of north korea by chinese officials. indirect, but it was clear who

they were talking about. we have seen a number of chinese academics, including some were very well-connected in chinese communist party circles. saying something very critical of north korea. and moreeen more chinese north korea expert advocating for a major shift in china's policy toward north korea. almost open-ended support and tolerance for north korea's outrageous behavior. caution you.y this is one take away i hope you'll leave with. please feel free to question me on this. i hope you would not over changes in china's posture on north korea. it is not clear that china's leadership, ise prepared to fundamentally change its relationship with north korea. that the from clear long-standing pillars of china's north korea policy, i

think many of you are familiar with the us, among the pillars is china's desire to maintain north korea as sort of a buffer, keeping south korea and u.s. troops far away from the border. there are long-standing fraternal and ideological ties between north korea and china. china has long felt more comfortable with the notion of a invited korean peninsula rather than a united one. there are some in beijing who have said this to me, they like the idea of north korea existing under the -- a burr saddle. think how many assets are tied down because north korea exist. is china about to do a 180 degree about-face on its north korea policy?

i suspect not. will they be somewhat more helpful? i suspect so. i am not expecting a fundamental turnabout in the north rim policy. -- in china's north korea policy. how to understand china's position, evolving position on north korea and how to influence it in ways that are more conducive to the direction we would like to see china move in. and how to convince china's , as some experts have already been convinced, aat north korea is no longer net, strategic asset of china's. liability. strategic increasing numbers of chinese agree with that. i am not sure large numbers of the chinese politburo agree with that. central task for the

united states and south korea going forward, since we're are talking about coordination, is the disturbingh emerging new reality that we face in terms of north korea's growing nuclear missile capabilities. a lot of your familiar with the details here. in a word, north korea has made it clear that it is not going to give up its nuclear weapons. they have made it clear that expande determined to the capabilities. experts who study this a great that north korea will have the ability to deliver nuclear warheads on virtually every major population center in east asia, including every u.s. military base in the western and central pacific. and ultimately, will be able to strike parts of the western united states with those capabilities, in about four or five years time. i don't need to remind you that north korea in recent

statements threatened to do exactly that. they have said they will use nuclear weapons against south korea, japan, the united states. some experts believe that north korea may already be able to deliver nuclear warheads on .reas just east of north korea u.s. bases in japan, south korea. in a already be able to deliver nuclear warheads to target in those areas, using some of its medium-range ballistic missiles. there is some disagreement within the american intelligence community on this. i side with those who believe that north korea may already have developed the capability to do that. , and a key question that arises for the united states is, how are we going to deal with this emerging threat? the threat we will face not

only in the next few months, but next several years in north e threat of a larger and more dangerous north korean nuclear missile program, as well as the proliferation threat that north korea has posed and will continue to post. let me just wrap up by saying u.s. policyrent towards north korea, which is been carefully come to with our south korean and japanese allies, is based on a number of elements. including strengthening economic sanctions on north korea, increasing the pressure on north korea through sanctions and increased military exercises, increasing the scope of some of our military exercises, antimissile deployments in the region. we have talked about that already a little bit. measures that are being taken against south korean banking system. which we believe -- north korean thank you system.

.- banking system it may cause them to return to the gold -- to negotiations. maybe it will convince them of the best option is to implement its commitments to rid itself of nuclear weapons. bebe those things will not effective in doing so. if that is the case, if north korea does not agree to give up its nuclear weapons program, if it is serious in the rhetoric we have been hearing, determined to become a de facto nuclear , what is to be done yet though what is the u.s. going to do about that day when it comes in the not-too- distant future? that is one of the toughest questions to face the alliance. it will be with us for a weil,

but we had better begin answering it in the immediate future. thank you very much. [applause] i do appreciate what you have presented to us. i will go to the [inaudible] >> good afternoon. it is a great honor and pleasure to be here with you. it is nice for me and particular. asmet when he was in seoul an ambassador.

managing andi was we got together on treasure and on a windy day, i don't remember the square he hit. anyway, he told me just before that his score is very improved. [laughter] most of my prepared parts are similar to what he said. i prepared some short comments for you your convenience. .ome points as you are aware of the principal two decades that the

, southoreans politics korea and the united states have followed a predictable pattern. there was a cycle of north korean provocations. negotiations. and a breakdown of deals, followed by renewed provocations and negotiations. for south korea and the united states, it was a bad time in which they've used the dialogue and pressure in a two track approach. north korea's development of a nuclear weapon and the capability of north korea

nuclear deployment is now going into a new dimension. [indiscernible] on northegic patience korea respectively. those strategies [indiscernible] north korea has advanced its nuclear capability. [indiscernible] the obama administration has threatened north korea for four years. a more accurate evaluation of u.s. policy would be

[indiscernible] the former defense secretary came to seoul earlier this year and the stanford university turning the symposium on northeast asia. they were involved in the korean [indiscernible] process. -- solve theerve north korean problem. people in biggest diplomatic history. it seems to me that we could take the horse to the

river. north could not make korea drinking water. -- drink the water. is it really time for creative and more effective north korea policy. , i think south korea and the u.s. should conduct [indiscernible] review of north korean policy. certainly, the fundamental , theems in north korea unrelenting nuclear ambitions. south korea and the united states should concede that the directorea policy has continuity and consistency. [indiscernible] north korea unconditionally. we cannot let north korea keep

strengthening the abominable nuclear weapons. [indiscernible] with a new come up concrete suggestions. make this will pave the way for a new [indiscernible] negotiations are resumed. the press and north korea should not be discontinued. it is important to seek various ways to put pressure to make it feel the pinch. from.s. sanctions on asia 2005, which apparently caught

north korea off guard. is important.a south korea and the united states after considered china's position during the nuclear crisis on the peninsula in the 1990's. now, we cannot get [indiscernible] without china's help. they must create conditions under which north korea cannot keep changing [indiscernible] that requires more active diplomacy rather than waiting until north korea changes. thank you very much. [applause] >> thank you very much.

now it goes to chang, the of thent and publisher weekly publication. >> thank you. before beginning my presentation, let me just clarify one thing about myself. , i amot the publisher merely in charge of a small affiliate company, which publishes chosen weekly and monthly chosen. [laughter] >> i am promoting everybody. a even though i am not politics experts, as a journalist i want to share some

of my thoughts on dealing with north korea. on our north korea policy of south korea and the united states. to discuss about some confusions that we had in dealing with north korea. the first confusion i want to our wrong expectations. but the problems with north korea could be solved through dialogues and agreements. it was not the case, as we know. orth korea has repealed keyified several

agreements with south korea and the united states, included in the lessons for tour is in business -- license for tourism business in 1991 and of thent declaration denuclearization of the korean peninsula from 1992. and the inter-korean basic agreement from 1992. and even the armistice treaty that was signed in 1953. these agreements were all part [indiscernible] should we reopen dialogue with north korea with a new hope of solving the nuclear problem you g?

can you suppose that any new agreements this time will really be cap? -- kept? on what grounds should we believe that these will not be in the latter flee nullified -- unilaterally nullified again? it is north korea itself that ofermines the legitimacy such an assertion. because of its own records of breaking agreements. am i saying that dialogue is usually settled? >no. but i am saying that we should be aware that dialogue serves only for limited objectives for a limited time. as engagingves andh korea through dialogue sustaining such a low tension

situation for a while. hissecond confusion of about the regime and the people. the real thing as an autocratic family faction, standing and peoples sacrifice. north korean regime and the people have a fundamental conflict of interest. their contradictory with each other. let me skip comparing north korea with china and vietnam. [indiscernible] whatve to think deeply helping north korea actually means assisting the regime that is oppressing the people or

helping the people oppressed under the regime. the and on good terms with north thea actually prolong misery and hardship of north korean people. some thought south korean governments and politicians were confused about this. even now in south korea, there are many leftist intellectuals and liberal politicians who almost never mention about or pay attention to the mystery of whilerth korean people asserting the necessity of assistance to and reconciliation with the north korean regime. they tend to boast themselves as nationalistic. but north koreans are as many

as one third of all koreans. supporting north korean regime, that is the main obstacle to the welfare of north korean people, should be regarded as anti- nationalistic, i think. the third confusion is about peace and reunification. most south korean people think that peaceful reunification is the utmost national task. peaceful reunification is the official policy of south korean government. in reality, peace and reunification have conflicting aspects with each other. peaceful coexistence with north korea is a continuation of divide between the south and north.

peaceful coexistence is one good thing, but it is also bad, because it belongs -- prolongs the miserable hardship of the north korean people. regarding peace as the first priority is relative to disregarding the urgency of reunification. assistance to north korea may be needed as means for certain objectives, but sustaining the regime should not do the objective. , the objectives of some korean policy in previous south korean administrations were just sustaining the north korean regime from collapsing and

peaceful coexistence with it. now i am wrapping up my presentation. our final goal should be reunification. a system with free democracy and market economy. the government of the unified nations should be chosen by the people. we should achieve reunification peacefully, through talks. the government, through unified elections. ,o accomplish that final goal we should drive north korea's normalization through openness and democratization that enables real elections. that means that we have to adopt can be precision and

pressure. precision and pressure are mutually come to mentoring and can be adapted simultaneously. the logic for persuading north korea should be rational, consistent with universal values and very importantly, acceptable to china. what will that be like? we should persuade north korea -- toina to believe that realize that the insecurity of north korea comes not from the military forces of south korea and the united states, but from the political and economic misery of the people within north korea. how could we put pressure to north korea?

all of theost outside aid into north korea should be stopped. choose a similar course as china and vietnam did. especially resources that can be used for military purposes, should be strictly controlled. ?ho can do all this ca most available resources, for precision and pressure. then, how to get china's full cooperation for this. that is another question of international cooperation, especially between south korea and the united states. thank you. >[applause] >> thank you. any additional presentational comment he forgetting questions questions from the floor? ok.

>> i would like to hear about [indiscernible] i think there is a key factor we should take into account. is japan affairs, the u.s. focusing their efforts on trilateral cooperation with south korea and japan. of relationsnt have been effective by history [indiscernible] how do you think south korea should handle the japan issue? >> delicately. [laughter] no, seriously. much't want to spend too time on this, but it is an important question and was

addressed in the earlier panel. i did not have an opportunity to commend gordon for the excellent job he did in answering a question very similar to yours, or dealing with a similar concern. i have worked on u.s.-japan relations longer than i have worked on u.s.-korean right -- relations. i just finished writing an article which gordon flake wonderfully summarized, even though he has not read it. among the points that i make any article, i will be brief, is that, if you look at overall stability on the korean peninsula and our responsibility to defend the republic of korea and prevent north korea from taking advantage of the situation in northeast asia, attacking south korea, etc., it is physically impossible to defend the republic of korea without japan. in a very practical sense.

the basis that we have in japan, ports andor japanese other facilities. you could not prosecute effectively a war on the korean peninsula without the use of those facilities, many of which are dedicated ethically to the defense of the republic of korea. if you look at it the other way, if you look at the threat that north korea potentially poses to to imagineis hard our ability to do an effective job in defending our japanese allies south korea being on site. -- side. for that reason and a lot more to that comes out in a few weeks, i argue that now more than ever, tokyo and japan realizestep back and the implications of this ,ownturn in relations and also

ask themselves the fundamental question. in benefits from a downturn relations between seoul and tokyo? to some extent, beijing is eyeing that and saying, this is interesting. america's two major allies of northeast asia cannot seem to get along. wrongg may draw the conclusions from this. i go into a lot of other issues in this, but i think fundamentally, the arguments are the ones i have just made but also the ones that gordon flake made earlier. there is a logical and important connection between south korea's interests and japan's interests in terms of maintaining peace and stability. you have two major trading countries and two major allies. you have two major market economies. two major democracies. :he things in the similarity outnumber the things and need to similarity calm.

-- column. one cannot erase history. went to urgently try and manage the legacy that history has left us with. now more than ever, is the time to do that area >> i would like to take a question from the floor. start from there. larry over there. [inaudible] he made an excellent point in ofking about the emergence anti-north korean sentiment among different elements in the chinese body politic. i certainly agree with his talk

about expecting any really fundamental changes in chinese policies toward north korea. the emergence of these groups it seems is really a long-term work in progress. i use the word work in proess what do weeaning, do about this? what do south korea do, what if do? united states can react t things in our diplomacy towards north korea that you could think that perhaps highlight would serve us in terms of attractiveness to these critics of north korea and china. things in our diplomacy that would drink in their sentiment

that china should change its approach to policies to north korea and bring more interference in china to this group of north korean critics. things in our diplomacy that we or might neednot to develop more fully in the future. let's go buy 1, 2. question is for mr. kim. a strikingly fresh and different framework or context for viewing relations to north korea.

i have two questions related to that. one is simply, how widespread is int new that you laid out south korea gato is that a view that is increasingly being held? givenond question is, that he said that our experiences negotiating with north korea have been relisten frustrating, why would you thect in this context pressure and persuasion would be any more successful? microphone, please. quit it seems that utilization of a north korean weapon would result in instant dismemberment of the kim regime. as such, these weapons are useless. why does in the u.s. simply stand up and say that?

announced that the utilization of these weapons would mean the end of the kim regime. why is their uncertainty at the that would effectively castrated weapons. i don't understand why we don't do that. >> next. right behind him. want to ask about russia. no mention of russia. russia has stayed in the background during the talks, but a few years ago, intervened forcefully in the north and south with an offer for getting back to the pipeline and the railroad. as a basis of these through , creating an environment in which these would be possible. i would like to have your view of why that has fallen apart. secondly, abe was just in

moscow. very strongly moving forward on the question joint development of the russian party. this is something that the russians want from korea as well. this would bring about korean technology and probably north korean labor. this is a framework separate .rom political egg throwing putting in place by kind of for growth, benefiting all sides. we will be going back there. >> i have a question about china. it seems interesting that from two different perspectives, the korean commentators are saying, we have a to turn to china. nothing there has been

on what china is trying to do. i have been struck by how little in korea is written about the -- dispute. viewf you -- to point to a of chinese who have written --tically about north korea most of these people, you know, we talk to them, they say, we don't have any impact on this regime. we are taking vantage of an opportunity to write about it erie it any interest groups that we can specifically designate. who actually in korea is analyzing what china is going to making recommendations

based on reality in china, ?ather than wild hope >> any other questions from the floor? >> sure. great questions. point about china is very well taken. by way of background, i have been talking to the chinese, on and off but the korean peninsula since the late 1970's. and i was stationed there many intense conversations since. i think that there has been a ofnificant transformation chinese thinking about north korea. i will just repeat what i said earlier. don't take it to the bank. i don't see a fundamental 180 this in china's policy at

point. there is a recalibration going on. it is a recalibration that is being compelled by the outrageousness of north korean behavior. by the fact that north korea is the only country today on the planet that is arguing for the use of nuclear weapons anywhere on the planet. and promising to use them under certain circumstances. this has been china nervous. the recent north korean nuclear test took place within easy striking distance of the .hinese-north korean border something that did not sit very well in beijing and among the chinese people. they were very unhappy with that. for various other reasons. for example, the attack on the island in november 2010 seemed to have shaken up the chinese leadership. they saw the real crust acts

that we might be moving toward another: for war -- peninsula war. that unnerved many chinese. your specific question about how to move the chinese in a better direction is very important. some things that we are doing are already moving them in perhaps a more hopeful direction. keep in mind, every new military deployment that we make, every new anti-ballistic. and technology that moves and the region that is intended to deal with the north korean threat, every major new movement by u.s. aircraft , on thebattle group east or west side of the peninsula, has implications for china's own security. all of these weapons systems, these exercises, these deployments, may be intended for north korea, but if you are

sitting in beijing you have to , pleasel of these take your complaint to pyongyang o. i think there are other things we can do to get their attention, as well. i think there is a role for track two and tracked 1.5. unofficial and semi official alternativewhich futures for the korean peninsula is discussed. what would a reunified korean peninsula look like jack? would it pose any threat to china yet? what relationship would have with the united states? would there be a reason to have a significant u.s. military presence on the korean and peninsula?

this could increase china's comfort level with the notion of a reunified korean peninsula. i will stop there. i do want to eat into the time. on north korea's use of nuclear weapons, the use of nuclear weapons in north korea would result in there being no north korea. not just the leadership, but other things would no doubt happen. we have said this. in various forms, to the north koreans. when i was in government, i was in meetings which this was communicated very clearly, including by implication when i accompanied bill perry to john pyongyangohn yang -- in the 1990's.

hy hasn't had no effect? no effect?ad don'tmy view, they intend to use those weapons for offensive.... they are useful to get our attention, to bring us to the table. changeo intimidate and the balance of power. they are a useful asymmetric tool for the north koreans. they don't have many other useful weapons in their quiver. the concern that i really haven't comes to nukes and north korea is the miscalculation factor. during the recent ramping up attention for the peninsula, the north koreans moved to their newer intermediate range ballistic missiles that may have a ability to strike as far away as long. as i said earlier, they could be nuclear capable in the minds

of some experts. they move those to launching positions on the east coast of the korean peninsula. if things had continued to heat up in this moment of tension, and the north koreans had somehow signaled that those missiles were no clear case for and began want preparations, what would we have done? there is the possibility of miscalculation. , mention in my earlier remarks concern about proliferation. north korea is not a potential proliferator. they have a track record by its own admission, of having proliferated nuclear related technologies. that is another concern. two quick words on russia. pipeline idea, gas pipeline idea, great concept rooted the concept of north korea adopting chinese i'll economic reforms, also great concept. you notice that neither of these have gone in the order of north korea. you have to ask yourself, why ? they have been talking

about implementing chinese style economic reforms since at least 1980 told -- 1982. the fundamental problem for the north koreans is that fundamental, economic reforms, systemic reform, would probably spell the death of their regime. that is why none of these things have moved forward. i have no confidence in their ability of their regime survives increase in, the unregulated economic transactions, the flow of a relation, the breakdown of the old order and security that would result from implementing .hese three forms. -- reforms [captioning performed by national captioning institute]

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