you are probably right. like a lot of things when first conceptualized -- to your point about the concept, it is a concept. i look at it as a phase of an operation. i think that is the safest way to look at it. by that i mean it is an anti-x is ariel do now how do you deal in an environment where they do by thent you to come in? way, that is not new. technology has become more advanced to push them offshore the actualto the air.

aerial denial thing is -- it is historical. it goes way back. i look at it as a phase. if we are trying to impose our will somewhere around the world, the enemies will try its best to ensure that we do not. they will do that through a variety of means. one could be kinetic weapons. it could be air weapons. it could be weapons that go into the air and come back down. i would argue that cyber is an area where you could be denied. the impact of cyber could prevent a force from a comp wishing its mission -- from accomplishing its mission. as we think about terrain and coming on shore in a certain

environment, i think we take it very seriously. it is a phase. when you are going against a determined enemy, the last thing you want to do is go with ex enemy -- go where the enemy when youyou to go. start thinking about broad coastlines -- what you want to do is put the enemy on the horns of a dilemma. it is not just bullet versus bullet or missile versus missile. you could do that. there is a part of it that fits that. most determined enemies cannot what youn every front. want to do is have

forces that are capable to challenge enemy on a very wide front. there are a lot of ships that you can land around the world. without being on a runway somewhere. you could land amphibious forces. they could land on your flank. it depends on where you are and what country. so, it is off assets. an anti-access aerial denial strategy. it is one we all participate in. i do not think it is mature yet. i think it will get there. everyone worries it is a bunch of programs. it could be.there are people who think it is 150 programs. it is actually more than that.

how do we go against an enemy that is trying to rent us from it is nested in? there. we are all in there together. so, we have a number of programs that are very, very costly. it needs to be a part of how we conceptualize. >> the man in the jacket against the wall. >> good morning.my name is paul tenants, i'm a british army officer. a question about major theaters veryr.i would be interested in your vision for the next 20 years -- in broad terms of boundaries and the

roles you envision for the u.s. army. >> over the next couple of decades, how i see coalition boundaries between u.s. marine corp. partners? what do you mean? >> how do you see the roles in the u.s. marine core with [indiscernible] >> the u.s. army and u.s. marine corps and the relative roles. >> ok. let me make a couple of comments. we have got a phenomenal army. it is designed to be a dominant land army. it is designed to go to war and dominate on the battlefield. the u.s. marine corps operates along the seams. i will try my best trying to

describe the different domains. the ground domain of the army, the air domain for the air force. the u.s. marine corps works along the seams of all of those domains. we do not really have a domain. we transit those domains. it depends on what the crisis is and what the need is. most of the needs we have our urgent needs. we have been on the ground for 12 or so years. i make no apologies for that. i think we more than did our mission in iraq. where more than do our mission with our partners in that's really not why i merit that has a marine corps. america has a marine corps to deal with responses. something happens today and not 30 or 40 years from now. that is why forward

presence is so critical to us. two different missions. america does not need a second marine corps. we need a specific capability set and talent pool we bring to a crisis. as we look around international community, i was just in the u.k. as we include that asian-pacific area, our side of the marine corps and how we do business fits pretty well with most of the armies around the world. there is an infinity. it is almost -- it is not a there isl bonding.

inability to say, ok -- there is inability to say, ok i would like your expeditionary force -- you are responsive and adaptable and flexible. we will like to build a force kind of like that. we would like to fight along side a force like that. it is an affinity between the u.s. marine corps and many of the world.because of our size and our egos. we are not designed to be a dominant land army because that is not the reason for the marine corps. my sense is most of the armies around the world are not designed to be a dominant land. >> general, we are grateful for your time today and your 43 years of service. we're all thinking of you. we are thinking of you and your marines all the time. thank you to all of them and thank you to you very much. [applause]

[captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2013] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] pre-k's on the next "washington jonathan strong looks at the republican strategy in congress. .hen democrat plans and james corliss, director of transportation for america, they look at funding for repairs and upkeep. > next more on the challenges facing the u.s. military with general ray odierno. outlines defense priorities including troop levels in iraq iran's nuclear program and military suicides. atlanta council,

this is an hour. welcome to everyone. kemp, president and c.e.o. seriesched our commander more than six years ago with the supreme allied commander jim is now of course the scowcroft our brent center which is responsible for this series. a publicwas to provide platform and chance for interaction with some of the impressive individuals you will ever get to know. individuals who have served our country, often at great personal acrifice, wisely, bravely and

consistently. throughout his career general ray odierno now chief of staff the u.s. army has personified he leadership we hope to spotlig spotlight. thank you for your service and today. us just this month you said we are acing the most uncertain security environment that you have seen in your 37-year career. you called for a globally responsive regionally engaged that is ready to do many missions at many speeds and many sraoeurpblts. at the same time you warned away readiness hole a for several years to come worrying and -- hoping that you would not be a hollow armyt of of the sort that was there when service.d the those are powerful words and this array ertainly

f new and in many respectsen predictable shocks and challenges it readiness are two of the many things we can in this what i'm sure will be a fascinating conversation conversation. barry is a veteran of the entagon and white house and irector of the brent skcowcroft center and his moderation with our knowledgeable audience. -- introduce you thank saab north america for his support on this engage with u.s. and leaders.ilitary recently we hosted general and james aim o-- amos, the vice chairman of the the chiefs of staff and

ommander of the air combat command. general odierno is a native of w rockaway township, new jersey. commanded units at every echelon from platoon to theatre duty in germany, albania, during nd united states more than 35 years of service. met in kirkuk in 2003. only the second american officer to command at the division corps and army conflict ng the same during his time in iraq, since vietnam the second to do that. he knows his profession from all sides. after his first assignment with u.s. army europe he was ssigned to the 18th airborne

corps fort bragg where he ommanded it batteries and was ballo officer. operations he led the division during freedom.n iraqi from december 2006 to february commanding ed as a general multinational corps as the operational commander of the forces. willnk military historians be looking at that. e served as commander general multinational force iraq and u.s. forces iraq from september september 2010. commanded ly he united states joint forces command. e's served as assistant to the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff where he was the primary secretaries sor to of state powell and rice, lots

lots of responsibility. general odierno, we are honored to have you here. barry andn it over to general odierno. >> thank you very much, fred. general, thank you for taking time out of your extraordinarily this chedule especially year. i think we met in 2001 another moment momentous year when we were working on the strategic review that year. about to do that from a different position that with a strategy for the united states military times.igate uncertain we spend quite a bit of time range oking at long global trends sort of long range and egic challenges potential strategic shocks that surprise us and change the way things like the arab awakening. ou are spending quite a bit type map being the army of the future in this year.

the longer-term strategic challenges that you army to ring america's deal with? >> one of the true challenges we have as we look to the future is that as i look on history i haven't been very good at but it ng the future takes a lot of hard study and discussion to think of the difficult issues. there are a couple of things that i think are important. one, for me over the last three four years which comes to the orefront is the impact of instantaneous global communications and impact that s having not only on military operations but on the world of lf, the interaction people, passing of information s i call it the speed of twitter which enables groups to come together quickly not states but nation nonstate actors of all contained of thoughts coming together quickly. i think that presents some real significant challenges to us

you can see quickly uprisings and other things that short time a very period. we see -- i know you have urbanization of populations around the world which will continue to have a significant impact on how we what the future might hold. there is a couple of pieces that . think are important warfare is changing, it evolves. and frankly one of the challenges we've today and will that the o have is international world, international law, and other bodies are yet to recognize this evolving conflict personally played in and watched play out and continue to watch play out in afghanistan, and other places where what we call the war now is very different than 30 or 20 years ago. sure we o make understand that as we move forward. i think that it is unpredictable.

unpredictability and uncertainty of where your next look m will arise, let me at the middle east and syria. days the fact that hezbollah has said we are supporting the syrian government. a nonstate governmeactor. mean.u say what does that that causes internal conflict in lebanon. how do we have public voices supporting a e state act and they are not held to accountability in terms of international law because they not a nation state. for me that is the problem as we forward. that is why it becomes more difficult to predict. because you could have more groups like there continue to forward. as they do it will make it ifficult for us to understand where conflict is coming from. that is one reason i said

the last three or four months this is the most my 37 years ofin service. that is because of those kind of impacts. we don't know. and everything is related to each other. syria.use syria will not just impact syria but israel, lebanon, turkey, iraq, iran, assault and battery china. russia, united states. there are so many nations involved and you never know what impact will be as this occurs. if you go to north korea that is another one. an unstable government with a very young leader. it following at the normal pattern of northation that occurs in korea but what makes it different this is a very young individual. influencingw who is him or what he wants to achieve. nd the decisions he makes impacts japan, korea, philippines, vietnam, australia,

china. impacts of that? that is what makes it so uncertain at this time. the things that worry me. and the impact of how much to your you can get issue through instantaneous communication. that is the challenge. >> in light of what you just what is the one international scenario that that is ou the most plausible? >> boy. things.re a couple of i would give you two or they. lying sunni under shia conflict in the middle east. playing out in syria. you have hezbollah supporting syrian government who supports iran. you have the sunnis concerned support some of the sunni governments who support the opposition. not only ppening there, it is happening you could

bahrain, iraq. so, what does it mean? underlying tension in the middle east it concerns me significantly over time. how does it get resolved or does it continue to move forward? that is one. as we watch and the new prime minister, president. that mean -- i can't remember prime minister or president. apologize. i should know that. t is the internal stability of pakistan and what impact that will have. india, tionship with afghanist afghanistan, the fact that they of a significant amount weapons of mass destruction. all of those things combined are things that are concerning. north korea and there is china, not as something us achieving about a balance in the pacific. how do we achieve a balance with

so we continue to grow economically as a country as they continue to develop country and as a how do we do that that it doesn't lead to conflict. are probably the three things. >> it is amazing the first five almost we've covered every major international issue but i want to address iran. pray that our diplomatic efforts and sanctions coalition thatal the united states is leading continues to apply the pressure accedes and we come to the pursuitey cease of nuclear weapons capability. rguably this is the most important and potentially the most daunting national security calendar president obama will in his second term and among the most daunting that you as chief of tenure staff of the united states army. those efforts do not succeed even though we hope they

do? required if be iran, like north korea, over in either uccessful weapons nuclear capability or sort of not as transparent or not as stark but sense that they have it? in would the army's role the persian golf military military posture ow would it approach the centcom commander? biesides iran developing a nuclear weapon, if they develop our role is very significant in terms of what we provision, what we do in research and development and how we detect and protect ourselves, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. it is also one of the key things but other in iran of tries the proliferation

weapons of mass destruction. we don't want weapons of mass the handsn falling in of organizations that might use t as threats to other nation states or to gain more say in community.tional so, it is the fact that we have of se a combination capabilities, special operations forces, onventional investment that we have to continue as we look at the role and how it eapons increases or if it increases over the future. a role in trying to ensure it doesn't increase countries't have more with nuclear weapons. one of the threats if run a elops one is do we start nuclear arms race in the middle east. will there be other countries they have to have a nuclear weapon. that t speak for them but can be something that comes. so our role could be important in that. the rightk you raised

issues. i will ask one more question and then we can open it up. raised an issue i have been thinking about quite a bit which s the military broader capability for dealing with nuclear weapons in failed or failing states. a couple of unfortunate scenarios that can happen today. mentioned a couple already, north korea and pakistan. iran gets a nuclear weapon in the next five years center ossibility and one contingencies to me that is ri etric asymmetric. it is ugly, takes capacities enough of andhave takes capabilities that we don't our arsenal and technologies for detecting welear materials at distance don't have yet developed and the scale of some of the scenarios such that it would eat the entire u.s. army if the

case happiest. do you think the coming review as a more this serious contingency? as a think we recognize it potential problem. i would say what we have to come innovative new approaches. people on t 500,000 the ground or 250,000 people on the ground. of ave to put some level ground capability there but we technology, we have to form strong relationships to help us. i wouldn't see us going in the unilaterally doing that. f, for example, that occurred we would want help from other nations. same with north korea. it is a combination of all of capabilities. but it is something i think as we move forward we have to watch and continue to develop new contingencies. smaller ing some

training events this year with special nal forces and operations forces dealing specifically with this issue. capabilities we have and they have and how do we mix them to get the best solution. some discussions about this. i think that aware really work really working hard to develop tactics techniques and procedures at the at that particular time confidential and operational level. we have to have input into what strategic ean to level and policy decisions as we develop the capability in this area. those are important questions as we continue to move forward because there does there arebe a pattern some nations that if they get one or two nuclear weapons they certain things and we have to be careful and watchful of those nations. one more question because you raised an interesting point. orth korea, if this sort of scenario began to develop where we had the sense that the half

so nuclear weapons reported in the press in north kor arsenal was loose or there was an implosion scenario you are trying to engage military and military level we've hopes for the summit next week but this scenario, would it be something our to tary with want to talk the chinese about? we don't want them going for the nuclear weapons at the same time there trying to secure them same time and south koreans are trying to secure them. of what we are talking about. be oesn't necessarily to complete unilateral operations. it could be a cooperative effort by several to make sure they are safeguarded because they could any country.o that is how we have to think about it. we have to develop some that provides us the bility to do something

unilaterally if it is in the best interests of our nation. questions.go to this why in the second row. the u can wait for microphone and identify yourself that would be great. freedberg breaking defense news. one of the big intellectual on many times to the missions and tie them together is strategic land power. maybe i'm just particularly obtuse, reporters could be. a good concept for what air land battle was and air sea battle is. still don't know what means in land power the context of this. maybe that is because you are on it.orking what is that score concept underlaying the army's approach? i think there are some things we have learned the last 10 or 2 years to project in the

future. one is importance of human fort ion and domain in conflict. we tends to attack things with what logy but ultimately we're trying to do is influence populations who want to dominate populations or other populations. they can do it by nuclear or ground forces or air or sea. back to the comes human domain. i think we need to better escribe that and how to influence it. we think the strategic land power of the future needs to ome up with methods to influence that. there's a couple of other things. one is cyber. it continues what is the interaction between the human conflictd dimension of and cyber warfare? how do they impact the future use this to we figure out how to conduct strategically into the future? that is kind of the thing aware

looking at. new and something that is needed. we are really trying to look and trying to come up with concepts we think we've to be able to learn it execute these problems come in xistence awake deal with them -- we can deal with them. that is why we've stood thup office. thank you. preoccupation with the budget control act. you guys have been asked by the services committee to detail how would you get to 52 billion in savings if it came to pass. what i'm interested in i don't kpecapitol e a path on hill to get past questions in 2014. give us a accepts of what it looks -- sense of what it looks like for the army if time get itahead of $52 billion in savings, your would f that and what it look like if it were questions having to take the money from

you folks. that is a very complex question. i will try to answer it as i can.as than sequester. one problem was we continued not to have a predictable budget. the secretary said since 2010 we continuing resolutions. that is killing us. resolution tinuing this year. that didn't match up with what for in the 2013 budget so we had a mismatch of operations and maintenance funds. of that a reduction in sequester and you throw on top enough we didn't get money for the war in afghanistan. shortfall 0 billion in operations and maintenance money it year. have been able to get about $12 own to billion or so based on new legislation that was passed.

we have a $5 reprogramming submitted to congress to reduce more. that still leaves us with about $8 billion shortfall. that is n i go into because we are now taking significant risk in training, in sustaining our equipment, sustaining our installations, to 2014 no arry on matter what happens. capit not part of our capitalation for the budget so we're in the hole before we get 2014. if you go into sequestration or resolution inuing which will go with sequestration because that means you haven't gotten the budget agreement, you are now doubling down on the problem we had in 2013. that are on this roll will continue to eat at readiness. the problem i have as a service is i really -- there are four things you balance. end strength, your nvestment, modernization,

readiness and the compensation piece which is related to end strength. things.e those that is what drives our budget. in the army 45% of our budget is people. i cannot take people out fast nough to meet sequestration numbers. t becomes after a certain amount say the army portion is about $13 billion in sequestration. next year i can get about $2 billion out of people because the $2 billion it consists you more to take eople out than it does to keep them. because of benefits and everything else. cautises me to do is take it out of modernization readiness. path of having significant level of readiness modernization accounts to affect us four, five, six, seven, eight years down the road. down a dangerous path. that is what i'm concerned with.

said in my testimony is backload the cuts because it using end t trength, modernization and readiness in an equal which that enables us to be balanced. doesn't mean i agree with the sequestration cuts but if i backload them past 2017 i can do it. 2015, 2016 we , ill have significant unreadiness. >> doug morrison. dupont director of army programs. to go back to the haopl human dimension. lives on the land. not in the ocean or air. army's ook at the programs going forward the soldie

platform the deployed with the marine partners the ast 12 years, the army is only talking about three priorities. how do we get after he innovation, continuing innovation and modernization of the soldier platform? aking care of soldiers, giving them the best equipment against those uncertain threats? is my you just told me ability of strategic message is going well because our modernization program is centered around our soldierless. first priority is make sure they are equipped with the ewest capability it not only have the best soldier but best squad. --t could be protecting them that goes with both protection and ability to conduct operations. the fundamental building blaock. one. is number second is getting information to the lowest level from theatre to

the squad soldier level. that is the information network which passes both intelligence operational capabilities down to the lowest level because away believe in this environment operating in sometimes squads of platoons make strategic decisions, you want to have the pwbest information to make the right decision at the right time. which is our ability to be mobile, we have to make the squads mobile. gets into the jltv for forces, gcv for heavy forces. that allows us to put the i.t. capability into the platforms in existing t do platforms. the humvee or bradley for example. they don't have the room or power in order to have it capability. we have learned is about mobility and survivability. ecause of what we learned the last 10 or 12 years of warfare e sacrificed mobility for

survivability. i have to even that where we gain both an even amount of to be mobile and survivable. o move or squads around the battlefield. that gets to the ground combat bradley o replace the and joint light tactical vehicle vees.place hum >> thank you very much. robert hunter former ambassador nato. on the questions about sequestration and the like, we austerityng an age of even if we get past that. where you are ff a force provider and shaper and trying to r, without anticipate the outcome of the q.d.r. something will have to give. wondering, with your strategic perspective how do you see a shift in overall investments and capability to

the best shot of having an army that will be able to do are called that upon in a world that you may not ven be able to predict right now? how do you make those choices of in the want to have future? on one comment of make based that scenario it is impossible revolutionary.avolutionary we need to be evolutionary because it will change. one of the tenets i they down is let us evolve. try to be revolutionary we'll get it wrong. of things s a lot week don't say the army evolves. evolve the , as we size of army and capabilities in the army we know that based on will have toe army get smaller. we have announced that for the $487 billion cut we'll go in the active component.

a waye to do that in such to evolve the army and where we to l have the capability respond. i look at characteristics, , ility, flexibility adaptability. how do we gain these capabilities? there is a few strategic advantages that i believe we exploit. we have to one is mobility. one is our strategic mobility we do it ur ability better than anybody, our ability it massive forces quick i -- forces quickly whether by air or sea. we have to maintain those capabilities. we have to build packages to llow us to deliver people quickly and small increments based on the situation. to do ond is ability command control intelligence. we do it better than anybody else. exploit o continue it our ability to develop command and control and intelligence

apability that we can push forward as fast as possible to the lowest level. logistics. we do a better job providing logistics perational and that allows us to sustain whether a ations battalion or company forward or forward.corps we have the ability to do that. we have to exploit those key that i believe we have. the final one which is the most mportant one is leader development. the one thing we must focus on of uncertainty and budget uncertainty is developing leaders. because we need to continue to ave a noncommissioned officer corps and officer corps that enables us to deal with complex issues. refocusing that. will announce in the next 30 days or so our new leader development program. evolve the

capabilities over time. he one thing i worry about is in everybody's declaration that here will be no more ground wars and need no more ground the army tool make small. we have to be careful because we have proven that that's not been the case. i see nothing on the horizon yet that tells me that we don't need forces. i know a lot of people say i to demy on't ever have ground forces again. hope we never have to deploy ground forces again but it deter adversaries and have the right protect this nation you have to have the right number of ground forces so e have to do it in a measured way. that is my view on that. >> let me follow up on one issue. said several times that working with our partners it is very important. a question about

our european ground cousins is relevant. i know away produced our sort of permanently stationed units there. you have a new concept on regional force. talk about how that fits. how do we tends to our base alliess the longstanding in europe as we deal with threats in other regions such as potentially st and asia? >> first, i do believe it is important for us to stay chose nato allies and other friends and partners in europe. a couple of ways. the army has already -- in the irst part of our reductions based on the budget patrol act e took an additional 12,000 soldiers out of europe. we have now set which will leaf brigades and some logistics and support capability forward will about the hat is right amount to allow us to continue to work with nato

allies. we are doing two other things. we now have the joint .ultinational training center we are using that as a platform nato applies our and other partners. e are making that more of a multinational capability. we want to invest in that so we an continue to do the joint training. as part of regional line forces i can bring firsts from the over there to train with them and make sure we build the relationships. exercises that are high level. umanitarian assistance, disaster relief exercises or higher-end operations. he other piece we committed to for the first time is department of defense has committed we will of the rigade as part nato response force. that will come from a brigade in the united states. less people ave forward stations i would argue i like this set better because i

do k it will enable us to more with our partners in a lot of places. i think it is important? we have proven the last several conductto is willing to operations outside of the european continent. hey have become important partners as we deal with this uncertainty. the concerning thing is they are significantly reducing their capability while we reduce ours. in ave to make sure we stay we could become unbalanced as nato and we want maintain capability in nato as a group moving forward. > >> new american foundation. on the cuts in our european partners. o you think the defense, say

the american defense intellectual establishment at arge has wrapped its mind run-around the fact our traditional european allies don't have the capacity we are even inseeing from them the last 10 years. the british can probably no they did forn what you in basra and french could because they have withdrawn from others. ave we as a defense intellectual grasped how decrease is?hat >> that is a great point. are very much understanding. i'm not sure the entire defense understood t has this yet. i have a close relationship with and as the british army continues to reduce in size several ad conversations of how we get to keep them integrated in with do but in a lot of ways they are depending on us especially ground capability

future. so we have to make sure we understand that. not rench have actually reduced significantly yet but they are still having discussions about that now. are probably going to have to reduce. they have been strong partners of us and been everywhere we have again. they are reduce beiing their gr so the ability to rely on allies we have to make sure we understand their capabilities. everybody knows the investment in europe is not going up. down.going we have to understand that. that is one of the values of jmtc to better understand how well fight in the future. e mindful of their capabilities. t. h korea has a problem ill reduce the size of the arm because of the demographics because the way the population young don't have the people to support the size of army they have now. ecause their demographics have

changed so much. that is a problem as well. we have to pay attention to as we look at what the nterests are around world. >> thank you. you to make too much bad news before your pws holds a igh level meeting but you mentioned cyber and safeguards. a piece was done about cyber p.r.c. into by the u.s. defense systems and contractors specifically. comfort give us your level with their protocols with the d.o.d. and whether or not discussions with your counterpart in beijing and o go to a question mentioned earlier about troopers, can you also give us a sense having commanded troopers for a while the epidemic of suicides?

>> great question. first, i have not had any discussion with my correspondent in the p.r.k. that is the easy part. here is severalfold. it is about capabilities that we d.o.d., which continue to progress. but that is not the issue. issue is more how do you want to use d.o.d.'s in protecting our infrastructure. congress ando with administration developing policies and coming to an want to on how they use d.o.d. ecause we have some specific a s that right now that is homeland security issue is not necessarily a d.o.d. issue. o, we have to come to grips with that. i think there is legislation that is pending that has taken a this now.at to me that is the first step is userstanding how we want to

our defense department defense our to infrastructure, defend against cyber attacks or are there other ways to do this working with other partners in t the interagency. that discussion has been going on for a long tame. but i think now it is getting legislation. i think that is the problem. to come to grips with that as we move forward and it is a very important issue. issue for the american people. because it gets to people what are we ut doing on the internet? what are we looking at? doing to protect ourselves. there are a lot of freedom and liberty issues. issues. complex in order to deal with that problem we have to resolve this. i think that to me that is the important thing. it is a of suicides,

perplexing problem. thrown an incredible amount of assets at that problem reason,e is no rhyme or no golden trail that we can follow that solves the problem suicides. the one thing we do know, which s a longer-term solution, is we've learned we think as we build a more ready resilient will help us t long term. what do i mean by that? that tell us s that as you improve physical soldiers, the our mental capability of soldiers and emotional capability of our to deal they are able with the very complex situations in.t we put them suicide, i believe, is a national problem. the militaryare in it gets highlighted more because stresses.dded we look at suicides it is always few things.

personal relationships, how you are doing on the job. hen throw on top of that the added concern of having been in combat ones, twice or three times. so, it is about us building resiliency in the soldiers and family. we have started that program. for those that as we continue to building resiliency we have to make sure we have ystems in place to identify individuals who we believe are susceptible it suicide and allow them to come forward and or proper them to get the health. we have to increase the number of behavior health specialists. recruiting them but we've not been able to fill the positions because they are not vailable because they are wanted in civilian and military communities. we have to continue that. that is a very holistic approach but it is very concerning. i get a report on every suicide in the army.

i got another one today. o, it is a very concerning problem for us and we are doing everything we can to work this. the question.ing >> are you hopeful in there now or hat a year from two years from now with that we s winding down will be on top of that? tale of the longer term the families and children and support community have been years.d with the last 10 >> i think that there are this.al pieces of i think suicide is a bit of an epidemic in the united states. i don't quite know why that is time of our history i think it is. but we are going -- as you it doesn't end when we come out of afghanistan. 15, 20 continue for 10, years. you just have to understand vietnam to understand that.

can't just say we don't have to worry about it. ferocio attack more ferociously in making sure we hand off between the army and affairs because as the individuals transition it is important they transition appropriately appropriately so people can continue to assist them. something we are dealing with. n terms of family members and spouses, we track that as well. we haven't had a large amount of suicides among family members and spouses but we have had suicides. to continue to track that and watch that carefully. here comes the microphone. if you could talk about how the army is capturing lessons learned from averages and particularly the dimension of civil military integration and synchronization

political and economic lines of effort? >> that's a very good question. called an organization arms hich is combined lessons learned in fort leavenworth. hey are responsible for collecting lessons learned, lessons and operational learned for iraq, afghanistan ll lines of operations to include the civil and military lanes. one thing i asked them to do was level lessons learned. hat gets into the higher level what have we learned in operating in these environments and what do we have to do at the highest levels to ensure we are interagency activity. if you look at our doctrine as you will published it ind joint interagency, intergovernmental, multinational. that is from what we have or seven e last six

years of doing this. what is my concerned? strong relationships over the last seven or eight years civically between the military communities. and we have done that because we had to in iraq and afghanistan. sustain that when we come out of afghanistan so when we get to the next problem we established this keub capability? i want to make sure we don't go corners.he that we stay together. direction is doing we are going to continue to put leaders in interagency washington.around we will send officers to the state department, treasury, f.b.i., others, so we continue to build on the relationships that have been established. we will continue to ensure all of our schools invite people attend er agencies to them so we can have integration as we continue to learn. to lose and have to reinvent this again. valuable.

one of the things i talk about lesson i me is one learned is that there is a limit to military power. you can only do so much. you have to have that inter agency agency, intergovernmental to use that allows you military power if necessary but use the other tools out there. my officers and senior leaders to think in those terms to deal with gin keubl conflicts. >> there is a related issue. mentioned jointness sort of an old washington the pt that we have had sense was solved a bit ago. you have had some interesting iscussions with the british current parts earlier this year, chiefs.iefs meeting our i have the sense some of the learnedon focused on we

to get smaller and joint and liminate some of our bureacratic obstacles. i wonder if you can give us a sense of what you took away from that discussion. where are we in jointness? >> one discussion we had mentioned i was demander of joint forces command. you didn't mention he was the one. we closed it down. he reason we did that was we felt into it was no longer necessary. it was necessary in the we were so newse at trying to integrate our joint concepts. because of what we have done the last 12 years and the act that in all of our combatant commands we are far enough that we don't need a together.hat brings us the british have just stood up their own joint forces command. reason they have done that they believe they are now where they need to, because of their reductions, they now

need to have this to initially manufacture forward. i think it is the right decision. but for us it is important that we have stood down this, that doesn't mean we are walking away from joint operations. do ultimately has to be joint. eachse we have to leverage other's capabilities. we have to make sure we don't redundancy.ch we have to make sure that we are ble to utilize all of the capabilities of a all services going forward. i think the new aspect is what about, what is new is it is now just not joint. is interagency multinational. that is the new piece we have to ned that we have integrate. there is some that talk about we the ability it identify the interagency piece. that is necessary but we have to make sure as we ove forward with joint capabilities intertwined with that is the interagency piece of

that going forward. third row.ack in the i'm here with the atlantic council. i wanted to ask a question about the defense industry. suppose, theaking i service chief is not in the chain of command getting it done. therefore, it makes my curiosity chief ow this service thinks about industry relative you are charged with doing is. say although i have i have l responsibility a lot of influence and ability to have impact on what we want to do with our defense industry partners. i think that the secretary of has been very clear that he wants me to play a role in that area.

although i have no authority, i ertainly have a lot of influence in that area so it is important. one concern rward we've is do we continue to with i would eady consider much smaller defense industry that we have had in the pa past. where we run in problems is not the larger defense contractors, smaller ones had do so much for us in terms of eveloping some niche technologies. ow do we keep them going as we we have reduced budgets. if i'm sequestration of the next three or four years to take more money out of research acquisition nd programs that will impact all of the defense industry. with the ho deals army. how do i sustain that until i get money become in the program in -- 2019, 2020.

that is grave to keep it going. problems the last 10 years in the army with our acquisition programs. we have tried to develop new systems and didn't technology.ht or our requirements weren't quite matching what was capable done th. that is why the uniformed services has to develop the we t requirements and what think away need and deciding how well is that matching with nownology that is out there or with technology in the future or what are the technologies we in ld be investing long-term. i think that is the role i try to play. other piece is you have to determine where industry, maybe is the defense industry, going capability faster than we could. how do we take advantage of that. information technology is one area. they are growing at a much

investing with a lot of money. how do we leverage that? having systems iteratecan iter rate -- new technology. we buy a system every two years technologyt with new and it gets cheaper, more capability. better we are starting to see that in a ot of these information technology issues that we are developing. i think that those are the kinds recognize.e have to where do we need to put our defense ith the industry or other industries and what do we need the defense of stry and take advantage what they are investing in. that is what we will have to do moving forward. to us. important here to the front row. south asian center

he here. about the one issue that keeps you up at night and which e a list of them included the scenario involving pakist pakistan. two scenarios come to mind. one is the implosion of the following economic and political unrest. potential for e the initiation of nuclear between india and pakistan particularly with tactical eveloping nuclear weapons. beoth scenarios what role can the united states play and what role can the army play? capacity or would it be better to focus more on confidence between countries in the region and between us and the region? >> a couple of things. first, i will always say away

latter first.at e our first attempt is to always build d confidence, capabilities, develop elationships between countries and us assisting in doing that. i have seen where the military that.gin military relationships can begin it establish confidence or a bit of trust between nations that that.s us that is always the first priority. if you talk anyone of the we call commanders phase zero building relationships. out of phase zero they have failed. their job is to ensure we stay conflict. that is always the first priority. scenarios, those are things i worry about. if that fails first it is not it is not the first priority but if it fails what do we have to do. thing i have recognized in the army and reason i pushed of regionalized

forces that supports phase zero. we align the forces to -- to army it influence build capacity, to influence to build utions confidence, to build trust atween nations, to me that is very important mission. ourselves so ing ach whether it is south asia, southeast asia, middle east, where they can utilize the army to build this trust. always think is easier to begin with those relationships. that is the number one priority. as an army i always have to be nation's wars.ur but that is the last resort. first answer.e >> i think we have time for one more question. row.t

>> roger kirk with the atlantic council. you mentioned several things that give you concern. nonproliferation in the middle east. there is also a opinion scenario scenario that the israelis may be compelled to action.itary what is your view on that? any ain, i think third-party action has a impact on the united concern cause what my is first of all we have lots of ivilians and soldiers and sailors and marines in the middle east and there could be if this occurs. so that is a concern. then what does this mean in toms of what is the reaction this action. to this it mean fragility that we see in the middle east as a whole? does it move it forward?

it draw a further line etween the sunni and shia concern. it can also have an impact on that. on the have an impact reaction against israel and allies.ne of our strong for me, it is difficult if that occurs. it will take a lot of work by us to mitigate the responses to we are able nsure to keep that fragility in place. we will have to wait and see. very concerning. >> general, i cannot think of a we have had here as important and interesting and comprehensive as this discussion we have had this morning. thank you for your time and your leadership of the institution protects our nation and thank you for your own service to our country. [applause] [captioning performed by national captioning institute]

[captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2013] thing,s a very important real engagement in the substantive issues. -- ceman are not debate people are not debiting to recover they are debating what first blogged in plan should look look. a hard question. the u.s. will be the first country to figure it out. tricky but e important issues to address. it is not like the new chairman in on friday and they will have an auction monday. complicated orders that need to go out and this be the most complex in world history and the right n, ex-chairman, is in that we are going faster than have.st of the world and so, the eyes of the world at it space are looking at

the u.s. to see how we handle this. >> the upcoming spectrum auction and other communications issues f.c.c. monday night 8:00 eastern on >> next, "newsmakers" with senator jerry moran of kansas. later, q and a. >> joining us on "newsmakers" is senator jerry moran, republican and chair of the national republican senatorial committee. thank you for being with us. >> and reid wilson. thank you for being with us. let me begin with the main question. how do you get sick seats to retake in 2014. what is your target?