united states of covering one million people in japan takes less infrastructure than covering one million people in the u.s. if you would evaluate the dense urban communities in the united states, everybody -- the key asian markets you are beginning to see them exploit the capabilities far more dramatically. they are ahead of us in mobile commerce and some of these types of applications. we are in very comparable places in terms of the technology. i think of innovation, we lose sight in the united states often times of this gem that we have developed in silicon valley. the innovation surrounding this technology is highly concentrated in california. the amount of capital, the

billions of dollars of capital now focused on applications and capabilities and exploiting the technology is off the charts. it is really impressive. there are some great things, cut -- but the key markets in asia are in very comparable places. >> president obama has nominated tom wheeler as the new head of the fcc. how do you expect the approach to change? >> many of us have known tom for a long time. .e is a progressive thinker he understands this industry. i suspect we do not agree on ,very policy issue, but i think i expected to be a fruitful fcc.

he has spoken and written about things like the i.t. transition, for example. i.t. technology across the united states. ,ur objective is we will sunset to turn off our legacy with tdm technology -- tdedium technolog. voice should be ip voice or voice to be wireless, that there is no market base reason why the legacy services should be in place full stop --. there have to be rule changes that would accommodate us anding off old technology we sometimes talk about we

cannot have the regulatory environment that locks us into old technology and that is what we have today. tom has written about this. i am energized by tom coming in. >> other questions from the audience? other people who have not asked a question yet? right there. >> thank you. thank you for another great program. developing apps for developing countries, my question relates to that. the senator talked about spectrum crunch. i do know that talking with some -- like in sub

sahara africa, there is the question of the spectrum auction will have in terms of its effect in other countries. with the introduction of the alonghone, and the cable the western coast of africa, you have a growing connection between data and internet. sure i understand your question, the key means by which the united states spectrum options and public policy can affect technological innovation and deployment in places like sub-saharan africa creates a model. in sub-e a policymaker saharan africa and i were interested in employing the technologies and getting spectrum into the hands of

people to exploit it, i would look the globe and i would ask, who got it right? who got it right by what right.. penetrationroadest of these services possible and i want the broadest investment into the spectrum as i can possibly achieve. i would suggest from a developed market standpoint, the places i .ould not look would be india what you are seeing in india is development of the technology that is achieving the first part, which is broad-based penetration of the services at low commodity prices and very low quality. nextre not seeing the level of innovation to bring all of the benefits of this. education and healthcare benefits derived derived by these wireless internet technologies.

you need the high-quality bandwidth. will have to move away from the indian model and somewhere closer to the mexican and may be towards the model to achieve that. i have to tell you, when you think about developing markets, the opportunity for these technologies to drive education to a completely different level is one of the most exciting things i have been attached to in my career. we made an announcement three weeks ago. this is an example of what this can do. isfrustration with education the cost routinely does this, it is the only area in the united states economy that has been exempt from the productivity magic in the last 20 years.

we combined with georgia tech and the company and announced georgia tech will be launching a fully accredited program in computer science, a masters in computer science. we will be introducing this degree for $7,000. i think $7,000 is high, but we can debate that. credentialnical degree can be introduced at 20% of the cost, why cannot not be into secondary education, ?rimary indication begin to introduce the highest quality education programs in the world entities developing economies. this is world changing, this

democratizes education and is a major deal. it is a big deal. i am with georgetown, how are you? andyou talk about video how your video platform is doing? >> video is a wireless derived impact as well because when you look at our wireless networks, it is the third of the volume is video. the broadbandng era right now. we go out of five years, number is dramatically higher. it is not just your traditional linear streamed video, espn or

nbc. it is a whole new world of video. it is unit or -- it is user video content, person to person communication. this is what drives the industry for the next five years. we are actively working, we will our networky change engineering criterion around being video delivery as the bases of how we engineer the networks. we think this is what will drive the spectrum requirements. we're on the very beginning of this. as you you begin to think about this is comical, but it gives you an example. why wife's and my son-in-law to the store recently to pick up something -- my wife sent my son-in-law to the store recently to pick up something.

he puts my wife on face time and says, is this it? got it. that is a silly example, but i believe utilization of video in day to day minute to minute interaction, not just video chat, but this type of application is going to be massive. it will be huge in education as well. >> the grocery store example would work in my household, too. >> other questions? >> your interim report talks about increasing certain .etwork -- density i was wondering if offering more at&t wi-fi in private buildings would help provide a seamless at&t customer experience. your questioner

directly. yes, it is a huge priority. if you are an at&t fixed line customer, we have deployed wi-fi in your building. -- if you are on a data session and you move into a building that has wi-fi, it moves. it auto authenticates. inyou have authenticated starbucks and you walk into starbucks. that is really important. are moving to small cell technology. rather than big cell sites with huge antennas sitting on top, you will begin seeing small cells. they are on the side of the

building or a lamp post. it is dense of find the network .- densifying the network you as a customer, five years from now, are not going to know and you are not going to care whether you are on lte or wi-fi or broadband or your company's vpn client. it should be seamlessly mashed and moving in and out of there. we are getting closer and closer to that. five years is a conservative timeframe to achieve that. the other places when you get to what we call then use. -- venues. you go to a dallas cowboys football stadium, that place is lit up like a christmas tree. hundred thousand people in that theirm, everybody is on

device. everybody is taking pictures, everybody is looking at stats. the super bowl in dallas the year before last was the first measured experience where the amount of data going out of the stadium was greater than the amount of data coming into the stadium. people were sending more than receiving. we are doing all of this in venues in stadiums across the country. >> going back to the auction, is tentatively scheduled for next year. there is a lot that is going to happen in the market to between now and then. who knows what will happen with sprint, clearwire is up in the air, t-mobile is integrating.

all of that said, we still do not have the low band spectrum that at&t and verizon have. things will likely change significantly from a market and competitive standpoint in terms of those two companies, how do you think that is going to impact how the fcc is going to structure the auction? .> it is an important point -- in an industry moving as quickly as this one, it is chasing the wind. you do not know who the competitors are going to be and what they will look like.

if we can do all of that and piece together an auction and have the action performed in 2014, i will be impressed and i will be blown away. we do not even know what the market is going to look like in 2014. the market is not sitting still waiting for a 2014 or 2015 auction. the more the rules seem to be bouncing around and moving, the more the industry and the markets are saying, what should we do today in light of this uncertainty? i think we will see the market change in anticipation of an uncertainty that nobody can put their fingers on. in spitee competitors of their massive spectrum holdings, they do not have the low-frequency stuff to compete. they have also said publicly,

we have the best spectrum position in the industry. you have to ask yourself the question summit do we as a policy stamp point make policy to pick winners and losers? >> gentleman right there. interesting question and comments. how do you see the development of predict of data in terms of the ability to locate an individual in the future and how do you think you might structure the infrastructure in order to generate that data? how much do you think that a customer user will have access to their own data that they generate? how do you see there might be

some mechanism that a customer can access the data that they themselves generate over time? >> isn't this a fascinating i think it will be huge. i think it will be very significant. we better make sure the customer is confident and secure in their geo-data. allowing somebody to see where you are. the customer has to give those permissions. i do not think it is our permission to give. there needs to be a transparency about this. the customer knows who, what companies, who is using that geo-data and how are they using it. that is important. .ou hit an interesting area you are seeing business models beginning to develop in the marketplace. why is x, y, z

going to make all of the money off of my data? is there a way customers might be able to monetize their own data? in this industry, the data side going to be a big driver. it will be where a lot of value is created for the consumer as well as for companies. the amount of investment that is going into these networks, the amount of innovation going into the capabilities, i do not believe all of the returns on this are going to be monetized by sending 100 million customers the bill. some amount of this will be monetized i the customers of allowing the companies to monetize to keep their bills lower. does that make sense?

think about all of the investment going into all of the infrastructure from silicon valley to the vendors, to the carriers, it is probably illogical to think that in end user bill will generate to justify the investment. , thenk we as an ecosystem key is making sure we have transparency for the customer. >> i know a lot of your businesses in the united states, but does at&t have interest in international mergers and acquisitions? >> i will not comment on specific m&a. i have been vocal about opportunities outside the united states. i have spoken to it a bit this

morning. think about how this thing has grown in the united states. the mobile internet revolution has been radical, some would say magical. think about the demographics of the united states. there is another country that has -- there is a nether region that has comparable demographics, the larger consumer market in the world is europe. these technologies and innovations have not yet taken off in europe. i cannot fathom why they will not. it is inevitable that they will. participate ino that? at&t would love to participate in that. is it by m&a? i do not know. we are putting home monitoring

capabilities into your home. this is an industry that has not changed in 30 years. we can fully equipped and monitor your home for a fraction of the cost. this was an over-the-top wireless model. , is itlooking at this transferable, can it be done in europe or latin america? we are looking at them closely. , but ire out of time want to thank randall stephenson for sharing your views about the future of the industry. [applause] fbi director will be on capitol hill tomorrow to testify before the house judiciary committee. the hearing is expected to cover of the boston marathon bombings, and government surveillance programs. live coverage begins at 10:00 on

c-span3. during the years of william , itnley us lyrical career served as their residence. -- political career, it served as their residence. it originally was a ballroom, but it was turned into living quarters. off of that room, an office that william used to conduct business. it later becomes the living quarters of ida and william mckinley. this is the kind of set up they had everywhere they went during his political years. when he conducted business, the door stayed open to the living quarters. she could hear what was going on. she was a silent political helpmate to william mckinley. she would discuss things, but

she would never take part in meetings. she would never join. this type of set up they had when they were in columbus when he was governor. also in washington. idaur conversation on mckinley is available on our website. .ww.c-span.org/first ladies the c-span video library has reached a milestone. there are now more than two hundred thousand hours of original programming. a public service created by private industry, and -- america's cable companies. >> national security agency erector keith alexander said the nsa director keith alexander.

this hearing of the senate appropriations committee is 2.5 hours.

>> this afternoon i'm opening a hearing for cybersecurity. we will address efforts to protect the american people from sovereign threat and to protect our domains of .com and .gov. we need to make sure the american people know what we are spending our money for and to make sure that we make wide use of taxpayer dollars so that there are no -- we hope to make sure we know how to to help the private sector were and to protect real-time information and helping the private sector to the secure technologies we need. we need to prevent hackers and

criminals from stealing cyber identities, cyber espionage, cyber sabotage against online commerce or our critical infrastructure. i have two goals for this hearing. first, protect the american people from cyber threat while working together across the government to protect .com and .gov. second, how agencies will use cyber in the budget. the administration is requesting $13 billion for fiscal year 2014. the government is good at spending money, that we need to make sure we spend money well. failures and inefficiencies in government i.t. programs we do not want to happen as he moved forward in the cyber domain.

walking across the subcommittees and making sure as we look at this, the questions that we have are we developing the right technologies to protect ourselves? are we investing in the workforce we need? how do we protect civil liberties? i'm proud of my subcommittee chairs. i want to acknowledge the work of senator durbin and another on defense. i want to acknowledge the work of a ranking member. for me, we will have the fbi and the great vice chairman, senator shelby.

this is a committee that is loaded with talent in this area and comes with enormous expertise from authorizing committee. a staunch protector of our liberties. senator feinstein on the committee. we have the former chair of the homeland security committee. senator collins. rarely has a committee had so much talent coming together from appropriations and optimizers. i hope our country has a sense of urgency. we are already under attack. we are in a cyber war every day. every time someone steals identity or trade secrets, we are at war. we see the growing next this

between cyber criminals hacking our networks. director mueller of the fbi says cyber crime will surpass terrorism as the number one threat to america. secretary hagel and general dempsey continued to warn us against cyber as an insidious threat. these are such critical concerns that president obama in his recent meeting with the chinese president raised cybersecurity as one of our great international tensions between both countries. last year, we tried to put aside we worked on a bipartisan basis. but it didn't happen. but just because authorizing has not happened does not mean that nothing will happen.

in february, the president signed his objective order and it protects critical infrastructure provides critical infrastructure and cyber risk and -- into the federal service. today we will do something different. i bring to your attention the president's fiscal 2014 budget on the areas of cyber security. this would be the first time in one place we can look across all of the areas to make sure we know what the request is and the effects necessary to protect our country. it is significant. it is a public document that we have in one place, a one-stop

shop. the president of the united states in his budget message to congress has asked for $13 billion in order to execute the cyber security strategy across the agencies of the federal government. the purpose of this hearing today is to look at the cybersecurity threat. not every program from the department of homeland or the department of justice. it is focused on cybersecurity. this is a committee first. a senate first. no other committee has tried to

hold a hearing across the different domains and agencies and to do it in an open and public way. the expertise from the subcommittee chairs and authorizing is wonderful. we know we will be able to do it. the president has asked for $13 billion. $1.3 billion in homeland security. today we will hear from governments lead people in this. general alexander, the director of the national security agency. dr. gallagher, and richard feeley, the fbi assistant

director in charge of criminal cyber and response. i also want to acknowledge the and the last several days, many intelligence issues have been in the press. i understand that these are issues that are very much on the public's mind, and the members of the senate. last week, this topic of our surveillance program came out. a former chair of the intelligence committee, well- versed on the topic, that we would have a full committee hearing on that to kill her

program. that is not today. that is for another day. i understand that our colleagues, senator feinstein, the chair of the intelligence committee, has scheduled a briefing for all senators tomorrow. this is the second hearing that senator feinstein has opened. if senator shelby continues to brecht and that this committee hold a hearing on this matter, i will be happy to comply, and i pledge to that. we certainly will. today's hearing will focus on cyber threats protecting the american people, protecting the taxpayer. i would hope today we will focus on this it important issue.

this is a committee hearing. it will not be the last one on this topic. i now want to turn to my ranking member, senator shelby, who has been active in this matter. >> thank you. as you pointed out, this is a very important hearing on a topic that demand significant congressional involvement. the cyber threat, as we all know, is increasing, as our adversary become more bold. we have seen stark reminders of this threat of constant cyber threats on the financial sector, the chinese hackers of the new york times, and reports that information on our most advanced

weapons system were stolen by the chinese. earlier this year, a company publicly reported that chinese attackers are running cyber espionage campaigns with the likely support of the chinese government. all recently, the same company expose iranian hacking in the u.s.. these of elements remind us of how urgently we need a coordinated effort to counter and to respond to these things. madam chair, this committee may be the only one with jurisdiction over the couple met organizations involved with cybersecurity. it is appropriate we take a lead role in the oversight of this effort in working with others. i would like to hear how each of you today perceive the threat, and about your continuing efforts to protect critical

infrastructure against attacks, and to address the cyber threat outside of the recently issued executive order. cybersecurity is an immediate priority, but the framework envisioned in the executive order will take time to develop, and even longer to implement. there are still areas that need more attention, and may require legislation. such is the information sharing. additionally, the working relationship between the government and the private sector's are still a work in progress. on the requirements remain unclear, clearly a lot needs to be done. i look forward to hearing from our panel. to strengthen our infrastructure across the board. thank you. >> thank you. we will turn to our witness panel, and then we will go with questions him a starting with

senator shelby. i would like to suggest that general alexander go first, followed by mr. beers. the microphone is yours. >> thank you very much. i think what you and senator shelby have pointed out with respect to cyberspace is absolutely important for us to discuss. the threats that we face today continue to grow. it takes for the government a team to work. before i go any further, i want to point out that the team is here. it is great to be a part of that team. no one government department arranges he can do it sell. 4s is going to take a a

partnership between homeland security, the fbi, for us to work together. when i look at what is going on in cyberspace, and the capabilities that are growing, this is an incredible opportunity for us as a nation around the world to -- for us as a nation and around the world. the ability for education, this is a tremendous time. when we look at what we can do with this with respect to medical care in the future, it is a bright future for us. it is complicated by the fact that cyber espionage, and the threats that senator shelby talked about. i do want to hit on that. you mentioned the evolution of this threat. when you look at the threat as it is gone, some of the things the fbi and we see in the department of home security, a

series of expectations into our networks. the issue is how do you fix that? that issue is complicated by the fact that it is not only expectations that are going on, but we are seeing a district of attacks against our nation's infrastructure. we as a nation need to step forward and say how we going to work this? the government team that is here today cannot do it without support from industry. we have to have some way of working with industry. they own and operate the book of our nations infrastructure. we have to do in a transparent way, and a legal way. we appreciate the efforts of many on this panel for what you done to move the legislation along great we do need a way to work with industry. dr. gallagher will talk about parts of this. we couldn't have a better person to lead it from this. thank you for what you when the team are doing. we need to begin a dialogue of

industry. part of what the executive order is doing is giving the opportunity for that dialogue. we have to look at what we need and get that moving forward. thank you. from my perspective, you asked what it is it we need to do. i think there are key things we are working on. first, we have to create a defensible architecture. both the intelligence community and the defense department are moving forward on what we call the cloud architecture. a joint intelligence environment for the defense department, and the intel communities i.t. environments. the same thing for both communities, moving forward to what is a more defensible architect. we need to move it.

that is the first thing. the second, we need to be able to see what is going on in cyberspace so that we can work with industry. and amongst ourselves. getting information after an attack only allows us to police it up. we have to have some way of stopping it while it is going on. we need to be able to see it. we have to have a constant for operating in cyberspace, not just inside the defense department, but amongst all three of us. we offer role in this. we all play vital roles. from the department of homeland security's role with commercial industry, to the fbi's law- enforcement investigative things, to the defense department's responsibility to defend the nation. get have to bring this together. then reach out and say, how is that going to work with industry? how can we share information that is vital to our common

defense? we have to do that. we need trained and ready forces. i think that is one of the most important rings that congress expects of me. to create trained and ready forces that are trained to a higher standard. both on the defense, and on the. those capabilities that our nation needs, that are trained to that standard, then a how to operate lawfully, to protect american civil liberties from privacy, and to protect this nation in cyberspace. we have to be able to do all three. we have to have the capacity to act would authorize. the rules of engagement and the other authorities. we are working those.

from my perspective, the minimum and of cyber command and nsa, we have tremendous technical talent. we really do. these are great people. our nation has invested a lot in these people. they do this lawfully, they take compliance oversight, protect civil liberties and privacy, and the security of this nation to heart. every day. i could not be more proud of the men and women of the nsa and cyber command. what we now need to do is take next up and moving that forward. that is all i have at this time. i will defer now to my colleagues. >> thank you. chairwoman, ranking member, we all welcome this opportunity to appear before you. as you said, this is a unique opportunity to talk about the range of cyber security activities across the government, and we welcome that. as most of you know, cybersecurity is one of the five major missions of the department of homeland security, and one that we take very seriously. the threats that we face are buried, and serious. in that regard, our mission focus is into a primary area.

they are to protect the federal civilian networks, and to work with the private sector to protect america's critical infrastructure. in that regard, and as the chairwoman mentioned, the president's policy initiatives for the year ahead are to secure federal networks to protect medical infrastructure, to engage internationally and shape the future. with respect to the first, this is one of the major areas that dhs is responsible for. we are investing about $600 million in protecting federal networks through our intrusion protection assistance, and through our continuance diagnostics. we are also working heavily with

america's critical infrastructure both private and public. we are working under the executive order, with our partners in this to create the cybersecurity framework, and this is as you know an important initiative on our part. executive order, as you know, is the administration's effort after an attempt to get legislation last year, that isn't to say that we aren't interested in getting that legislation. that is having that we want to talk about. in addition to that, we are working through incident response, working with our partners in the fbi, and with the national security agency, and this is a call to one, call to all initiative in which we work together both in our headquarters, and operation centers.

in terms of sharing information, where we were together in the field in the deployment of teams to go to particular sites of particular incidents in order to determine what happened, and provide information to other parts of the private sector that will help them prevent the same kind of incidents. we are also involved in the international area, which individual countries and partners around the world. also, we -- with the european union as well. while it is a small program, it is a very important program. we have a lot of key partners that we work with. that is just in terms of the engagement in terms of face to face. in terms of the information sharing, our whole incident response structure, the nationals up -- cybersecurity

communications integration center. it shares information internationally with other computer emergency readiness teams around the world. in order to do with them what we do for ourselves nationally. in order to protect cyberspace around the world. finally, we work in terms of our research and development and other activities to try to shape the future. this is an important effort that is ongoing. one in which, as general alexander said, we could not do if we were doing it individually in dhs. it takes all this year to make this work. i want to thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today. and to talk about dhs programs. thank you. >> good afternoon. it is a difficult to overstate the potential impact

cybersecurity -- cyber threats posed our economy, our national security, and infrastructure on which our country relies. as why the fbi, along with our key partners at the table here, are strengthening our cyber capabilities in the same way we enhanced our intelligence and national security capabilities in the wake of 911 -- 9-11. i echo both of these gentlemen's comments this is a whole government approach when it comes to addressing this issue. in the last year, within the fbi, we had undergone a paradigm shift in how we conduct the cyber operations. while we previously watch and collect information and added to our understanding of the adversaries intentions, we do not we take action by seeking to disrupt them as in my in a counterterrorism base. we are now working with our

partners successfully disrupting an impact in the individuals behind the would've made it their mission to attack, steel, spy, and commit terrorist acts against our nation and citizens. instead of watching foreign countries steal our intellectual property, we are going out to companies and tried to prevent it. for example, working with dhs, we now routinely provide private industry and von force the partners overseas with ip addresses that are responsible for launching attacks against our country. just last week, the fbi and microsoft, and the services industry, conducted cordon operations to successfully disrupting within 1000 bought -- cover my computers that have been infected with a virus. that is estimated to be responsible for more than half

$1 billion in financial fraud. these actions are part of a larger u.s. -- the example fly how the fbi and our partners are using private- public partnerships to protect the public from cyber criminals. at the nci jps, which serves as the -- among 19 u.s. agencies, the government is coordinating its efforts and an unprecedented level. this coordination involves senior personnel at the agencies. while it is led by the fdi, it is -- we must recognize that to work together, we have to make sure that we keep pace and surpass the part -- capabilities of our cyber adversaries. the leaders of the fbi, dhs, and

nsa met last fall and clarify the lanes and roads of cyber jurisdiction. i believe that the collective of the worker levels is that there is now an unprecedented level of operation not seen since the immediate post-9/11 era. in addition to strengthening our partnerships and government, we have significantly enhanced our cooperation with the private sector. as part of that, we have begun the process of the briefings, and other information in terms to help dispel intruders. notice i guarding, it is based on the successful guardian terrorist threats system developed after 9/11. we are also developing an automated malware analysis tool to which von forstmann and industry partners to submit

samples of malware for triage and analysis. we expect an unclassified version of the system to be piloted for the private sector this fall. while we have been primarily focused on cyber intrusions, as we see as the greatest cyber threats or national security, we are working with our state and law-enforcement partners to identify and address gaps in the investigation and prosecution of internet fraud and crimes. the fbi and secret service should not bear all responsibility for this. we believe that there is a huge space for partners to join us in this fight. to address these gaps, we have developed a pilot program in cooperation with international chiefs of police, and other law enforcement organizations to enhance the internet fraud

targeting packages that the fbi complaint center, -- revised to state and local law-enforcement for prosecution. i think for the opportunity to be here today. i look for to answering questions. >> dr. gallagher. >> members of the committee, it is a pleasure to be here today. to join my colleagues and talk to about cybersecurity. since i am batting cleanup, i would touch on two topics. the all of government approach. good teamwork is based on playing your position. in this position, it is based on our mission. we are a measurement of science and standards organization. our role is to support industry. the owners operation or's, they respond to the information that they get from our television -- our intelligence committee, and from home and security. this is a top priority for this. our budget is a $24 million increase.

this is on top of our total investment of $68 million. this funding enables our r&d performance, and critical areas, including the national initiative for cybersecurity, the national strategy for trusted identities in cyberspace, and a moment haitian of executive order 13636. secondly, i like to give you a quick update on the executive order. as most of you know under the order, -- that supports the performance goals established by the department of common security. for this to be successful, two major elements have to be a part of the approach. first, the partnership between the agencies. as occurring.

we memorialize this with the understanding between dhs and my colleagues here. the cybersecurity framework must be developed for a process that is industry led, open, and transparent to all the stakeholders. we end up with an output that is technically robust, because it draws on their expertise, and a line with business interest and practices. this is not a new or novel approach for this. we have utilized a similar approach in the recent past to address cloud computing and smart grid. i appreciate the challenge before us. the executive order is very oppressive. it is to be developed within one year read the first draft is due

120 days. we have issued support this effort, and gather input from industry and other stakeholders. we have held the first two of four planned workshops. we will use these to finalize and develop the framework because it is this type of approach that allows us to have the appropriate levels of cooperation with the industry. in may release the initial findings. that release marks the transition from gathering facts to actually building the framework. at a monthly will have an initial draft draft of the framework, including an initial list of standards and practices. we will work with our agency partners to finalize the framework. even after the framework is done, the work is really only just beginning. adoption and use of a framework as going to raise new issues to

address. the goal at the end of this is to have industry adopt the framework themselves. so it becomes an ongoing process that enhances cybersecurity. the president advocate order lays out an ambitious agenda. it is designed around an active collaboration between the and private sectors. i hollered we believe that partnership is the essential ingredient for its success. the cybersecurity challenge in the.gov and.com domain is better than -- greater than has ever been. it is the only way we can leave this challenge. leveraging both roles responsibilities and capabilities, and we have a lot of work. i look for to working with this committee to make it happen. thank you. >> thank you very much to all four witnesses. we will function today is follow the five-minute rule rule. we will go with order of arrival. we also know that this hearing

does not preclude the subcommittees from continuing their own hearings for this, to probe more deeply am a and after we have concluded our questioning, we will understand that there will be certain aspects to drill down, we will also have an additional classified for him this afternoon in the classified section. now we will, not precluding further hearings. >> to all, just to reiterate the budget, the president has requested $9.2 billion. for all of justice, including the fci, $589 million. $215 million for commerce, primarily in this. department of state, nerdy $7 -- $37 million.

when one hears $13 billion, that is a lot of money. however, we are in an endearing war where our citizens are under attack from identity theft to state secrets, business secrets, etc. our question today is $13 billion added in the various areas, and when we spend the $13 billion, will we also avoid the kind of things where sometimes we throw money at a new problem, sometimes we have technical boondoggles. we've seen in the past.

this is what we are doing. let's go right to the president's request. as i understand, from the administration's priorities, the ministrations priorities, if you look at the budget, the federal networks. lead by example, and make sure our networks are safe and secure. protect critical infrastructure, engage internationally. shape the future. general alexander, you will be getting, if we pass this budget, $9 billion. i understand that $3.5 billion will be to protect the dod network. we understand that. what will you use the other $5.8 billion to do? how will we get security for that dollar? >> thank you. it is a lot of money.

i can tell you that from our perspective, what we're talking about is not just protecting protecting our networks, but developing the forces that we need to. part of that money goes to training and outfitting the teams of cyber command. part of that ghost the information in fixing the networks you hit on. when i look at this, from my perspective, i believe this is right. the right amount. i know that the ministration and the defense department has

already looked internal to this budget to see where we can take cuts, and we did. we cut it back to what we thought was the minimum that we could use, and still do this job. you pointed out that for the defense department, our job is to protect the nation and our networks. that is where that five $.8 billion goes. it doesn't go to one. $2.1 billion goes to in sa for doing their job is part of the intel community budget. the is rolled in there as well. 582 million dollars goes to u.s. cyber command. that is for five key areas. teams, setting up the teams,

training, charting the military construction to have a place to house these teams for headquarters, and research and development. i think is the right number. i think we have looked at where we can take savings, and i've done that. i also think it is important to state that the department sees this as an area to help ensure the nation is ready as we look at the rest of our course of action. this going to be key -- key to our future. >> let me follow one question. in your testimony, this goes to protecting critical infrastructure. this is a big we concentrated on when we were working on authorizing legislation under collins lieberman. in your testimony, you say, from a 0-10, you rated it at a three. a three to protect our grid. a three to protect our financial services.

my question is the money that you are getting, and her stand homeland security is supposed to protect us against domestic threads, where do you come in, and where does, security common come in? is part of your money used to do the services to support them? >> we do work together. our money is there an overlapping in this case. specifically, the defense department has to set several's and responsibilities here. one to build, operate, and

defend the dod network prayed as the one responsibility. there is a big cost because because that is our forces globally. that is the biggest bulk of the money that is here. the for second part, to develop the second part is to develop the teams to defend the nation. we work with fbi in setting up the ops centers, and funding and supporting those centers, so we can communicate amongst us. dhs has that responsibility to work with industry to set the standards. fbi has the responsibility to the law enforcement and investigation. new -- we have responsibility for for the foreign intelligence, and to defend against an attack. what we are doing is developing the capabilities and the teams. we're going to need legislation to do those operations. >> i could have follow-up questions. i'm going to turn to senator shelby. >> thank you. dr. gallagher, my first question is to you. could you explain since this is been tasked under the executive order, to reduce cyber risk, could you explain how the process works question mark how the development of a framework to reduce cyber security differs from the development of standards to review such risk? what you believe will compel private industry, which is important, the moment the framework that it has developed question mark and given the evolution of technology, thank

you very much need, in cyber threats specifically, how useful is it of a broad-based generic framework long-term? will it be chasing its tail so to speak, or will you be able to get ahead of the curve question mark i would be interested to share your thoughts here. how the framework and the standards will apply. , or could apply. >> thank you. i'm going to do my best. the idea behind the framework is very simply to get industry to develop a set of practices, standards, methodologies, what every would take the it implemented to sit -- to improve

cyber security. we use the term to refer to whenever you would put into place that would result in enhanced cybersecurity performance. that will include a large measure of standards, and the idea behind the industry doing it, as a couple of motivations. first of all, it addresses the capacity. the industry is the one developing i.t. technology and communication technology. therefore, they know where the technology is going. they can bring that skill and expertise into the process to

develop the standards. secondly, these companies, this internet is a global infrastructure previous companies operate at a global scale. by embedding security performance into the products and services themselves, we can achieve it broader than our borders. it embeds in the market. it gives her companies the power to shape the technologies around the world. in terms of chasing her tail, i think in a time when this technology is moving so quickly, and when the threat is changing right in front of us, this is going to be an ongoing challenge. i think that the bottleneck cannot be missed. we are simply not large enough to support this on our own. our role has to be viewed as, did we help industry come up with the vehicle so they could organize and be responsive? feeling way that technical capacity could be brought to bear. >> levitate on that if i could. -- i may pick up on that i could.

the discussions of a broad framework, which presumably, i would think, means it will be generic in order to have broader applicability, to all medical infrastructure sectors. how well a generic framework address the inherent differences in our critical infrastructure, and the unique needs being protected against cyber attacks? if we are not addressing sector specific needs, how can we be sure that we are actually helping protect any of these industries from a cyber attack? how do you bring industry on board with those -- they have system secrets. formulas, everything, to protect. the government would have to protect those, and should. how would that work? >> you are exactly right. i think that the challenge, the question you asked about industries capacity to come together and carry this out is the central question. how generic and sector specific this looks? the good news is that in spite of the long differences across sectors, looking at energy or act or culture, they are dependent on the core set of communications.

one of the advantages they have two working together to set up common platforms is that they can drive that performance into the market, and they can buy these computer services and i.t. equipment that better cost because they are helping to shape the entire market. that really gets to what you raised earlier. how to drive the adoption of this framework. the bottom-line is, doing good cybersecurity has to become the business. the end, this is going to be about alignment. these frameworks have to be compatible with profitable and well-run companies. that is really -- it may be turn up at the framework discussions are more about management than they are but technical controls. that is ok if it helps those achieve the level of performance were looking at. >> thank you.

>> senator leahy. >> thank you madam chair. i am -- i have a lot of concerns about section 215 of the patriot act. section 702, we have a number of comments and proposals in the judiciary committee to improve these provisions, but the intelligence community has told us that we obviously don't have the ability. and so it is not the changes. i am told they are critical to

counterterrorism efforts. congress shouldn't tinker with it. we should sibley trust you to use them the right way. they shouldn't be made permanent. i do not think that his wife.

i think there should be sunset provisions, and we should look at them and debate them in a free and open society. we have information to declassify, and i'm not going into questions of whether he contradicted himself on a couple of answers. it appears in section 702, it was critical to disrupt the case in new york city. but it is not clear that it is pursuant to sexual 215 of the patriot act, reasonably critical or crucial. -- critical to the discovery of terrorist threats. >> i do not have those figures today. >> are they available? >> we are going to make those available. >> houston? >> over the next week.-- >>ho how soon? >> over the next week. it would be our intent to get those figures out. i talked to the intel committee on that yesterday. i think it is important -- not >> you talk to the intel community but you didn't have the figures yesterday? >> i gave an approximate number. it is dozens.

terrorist events that have helped prevent. >> we collect millions and millions of records through 215. dozens have been approved crucial. is that right? >> both here and abroad. in disrupting or contributing to the disruption. >> they've been critical. >> that is correct. >> would you give me the specific cases you're talking about? >> we will. we're going to the intel committee to do this. tomorrow, i will give as clear as we have connected resizing what we have done on each of those. the reason that i am wanting to get his exec lee right is that i the american people to know that

we are being transparent. >> you're not giving it to the american people. you are giving it classified to specific number of congress. >> that is two parts. i think for this debate, what you are asking and perhaps i misunderstood this, you are asking what we could put out unclassified. the intent would be to do both. >> you can do that within a week? >> that is our intent. i am pushing for that. perhaps faster. we do want to get this right. it has to be that it across the community so that what we give you, you know is accurate, and we have everybody here back and say this is exactly correct. >> section 702 was quite -- critical to the plot to bomb the new york city subway system. is that correct? likes non-- >> that is correct. not just critical, it was the one that developed the lead. i would say it was the one that allowed us to know it was happening. >> that is different in 215. >> that is different than section 215. i do think it is important that we get this right. i want the american people to know that we are trying to be transparent here. to protect civil liberties and privacy but the security of this country. on the new york city one, it started with a 702 set of information based on operatives

overseas. we saw connections into efforts a person in colorado pray that was passed to the fbi. the fbi determined that was, and phone numbers that went to that. the phone numbers were the things that allowed us to use the business records to going find connections from him to other players throughout the community specific in new york city. >> how was 215 critical? >> it is critical in cooperating, and in helping --

>> was a credible here? >> -- was 215 credible? >> some on the business records were cooperating three i think it is important to understand that this is an issue that only part of the debate. i put on there also the boston we need to walk through that so that what we have on the business records, all we have on 702, what you debate, the fact that we can give you, how we to lead to the fbi.

if we took that away, what we could not do, and is that something that women look at this from a securities perspective -- >> you could pass on the permission to the boston authorities. they said they did not. my time is up. i mention this because we are going to be asked very specific questions. >> i want to make sure that we are clear on one point. when i say dozens. why i'm typing about is -- what i'm talking about it this authority comment each other to identify terrorist actions. the column at each other pray what you're asking me is to state unequivocally a or b current to be two. -- contributed. >> senator cochran. >> thank you. let me first ask general alexander, and jen -- in testimony that was received by the armed services committee,

was a discussion about how to provide incentives to talented military personnel who may be interested in the cybersecurity field to become involved. i know it is hard to contemplate. what do you see as a first step in trying to get an inch or

structure -- infrastructure organized appropriately to carry out these missions? >> thank you. i think the most important part of top to bottom is the training. coming up with a clear program, which we have done with the services and nsa, to develop a set of standards. the training in of itself helps us build a great supper force. -- great soup -- great cyber force. we are standardizing that training amongst the services, and between nsa and cyber command. raising the standards has a couple of benefits. the soldiers, marines, they get great training. it is something look forward to.

the operations they do are significant. they feel good about what they are able to do for their country. it starts with training and building that kind of force. you mentioned incentives. adding incentives is going to play a key part in this. as incentive pay plays a key part, incentives for our cyber force is also going to play a key part. we had discussions with services about how to start that. we cannot have that in this this program you predict something we are looking at. >> there is also a question about whether or not the department of defense has the resources to maintain a number of cyber tests across is services and agencies. again, in the training phase, there has to be exercises with conventional weapons, and other weapons systems. could you share with the committee what is your thought about cyber ranges so that you will have opportunity to dedicate certain areas

exclusively for these purposes? >> there is a great question. one that we are putting a lot of effort into. i do think we need to bring the ranges together so we have a joint approach to this. one of the things that i would point out is the service academy. this gets into range issue when you look at how do you defend your networks anyway these service academies can compete against each other? when you think about that and a cyber range, what you want people to do is to practice their tactics techniques and procedures in a sterile environment so nothing bad happens. so they can learn. we have seen in the military side. we need to do the same here. those that have defended our networks, that know the adverse

ironies are going to do, and prepare for those, it helps raise that. bringing the ranges together ensure they are operating at the right level as a joint team. >> my staff and for me that last week emily received a notice -- our committee received a notice that half of personnel in the cyber threat center could be for load as a result of sequestration. that is a find. how do you find it welcome aboard -- has there been any intention given to what you want to do if somebody jumps up and says we have been sequestered? your funds have been sequestered? >> we have worked this across the defense department. the sequestration for all the military has been standardized across the departments. the nsa on intel side is not there.

civilians will be sequestered. as an 11 day or one day week for the last last 11 days of the year. that has a significant impact on us. i think that is a key issue, and has significant impact on our people. it goes right back to how do you hire good people, and then for load them -- furlough them? >> thank you. >> thank you for raising the sequester issue. it has been raised at the intel

hearings when we mention the worldwide threat. we are precluded by the house from playing the in the bill. i think that the intel community, which is primarily dod, a civilian force, you need that flexibility. we look forward to working on both sides of the aisle to be will to do this. i would like to share with the committee, we're going to go to durban, merkley, collins, tom udall, senator landrieu, senator feinstein. we will go right to you. then we will go to senator boseman, and then senator fryer. >> thanks to senator mikulski for bringing the cyber issue into sharp focus for the entire senate with their bipartisan briefing. i was under the intelligence committee after 9/11. it was automatic investment in intelligence resources to keep safe..-- keep us

a dramatic investment in the personnel to execute the plan to keep us safe. i trust, and i still do that we were hiring the very best. trusting them to not only give us the best in terms of knowledge, but their loyalty to our country. i would like to ask you about one of those employees. who is now in a hong kong hotel, and what we know about him as follows. he was a high school dropout. he was a community college dropout. he had a ged degree. he was injured in training for the u.s. army. he had to leave. he did the job as a security guard for the nsa in maryland. shortly thereafter, he did the job for the cia in what is characterized as i.t. security in a piece that was published.

at age 23 years old, he was stationed in an undercover manner overseas from the cia him and was given clearance and access to a wide array of classified documents. it -- at age 25 years old, he went to work for a private contractor, and worked for booz allen, working for our government. i am trying to look at this resume and background, earning between -- i'm trying to look at the resume background for this individual that access to this highly classified information at such a young age, with a limited educational work experience, and ask you if you are troubled that he was given that kind of opportunity to be so close to

important information that was critical to the security of our nation. >> i do have concerns about that over the process. i have great concerns over that. the axis that he had, the process that we did. that is the bad to look at my end -- that is something i have to look at from my end. the absolute needs to be looked at three i would point out that in the i.t. arena, and the cyber arena, some of these folks have tremendous skills to operate networks read that was his job for the most part from the 2009-2010.

he had great skills in that area. the rest of it, you have hit on the head. we do have to go back and look at these processes, we oversight in those prayed we have -- we need oversight in those areas. >> 10 years ago i first introduce legislation known as the safe act, i bipartisan bill to reform the patriot act. it included chuck halal, john kerry, and barack obama. my most significant concern with 215 was that it would be used to obtain sensitive personal information of innocent americans who have no connection to any suspected terrorism or spy activity. when the patriot act was re- upped in 2005, under this

standard, the fbi would have broad authority to obtain any information, even tangentially connected to a suspected terrorist. 72 information could have led to 215 of record information on any suspect. under microvision, innocent americans with no connection to any of these would be protected. the republican controlled senate approve my -- the bush administration objected. it was removed in the conference committee. in 2009 i tried again with no success. now that the focus has been lifted, the nsa obtained phone records of innocent americans with no connection to terrorism, the data includes the numbers of both parties to call us the locations, the time and duration of the calls. i have been briefed on these. i have -- i will not discuss their details here. it appears to me that the government could obtain the useful information we need to stay safe and still protect innocent americans. my question to you is this. section 215 can be used to obtain any tangible thing. that could include medical

records, internet search records, text records, credit card records, -- last year the government filed to one of 15 -- 215 quarters. there is an increase. this authority is being used for something more than phone records. let me ask you, do you think section 215, giving you authority to secure tangible things could include the category of things i just listed? >> we do not. i do not use those. i'm not aware of anything that does that. all we use this for today is the business records of pfizer -- fisa. as you know, this was developed

and i agree with you, we have this concern coming out of 9/11 how we going to protect the nation? we didn't know where he was. we didn't have the data collected to know that he was a bad person. because he was in the united states, the way we treat it it, he is a u.s. person. we had no information on that. if we do not collect the ahead of time, we couldn't make those connections. >> because the competence level is not where it should be, it is simply falling off. >> i could not hear your word. i could not hear you. are you saying confidence or top tents -- competence? >> technical capability, competence. we are working out a pilot project where we are going to package these types of threats and actually disseminate them straight to the major departments where they are located. at the same time, we're going to increase our outreach to state in local law enforcement and give them the tools and the training that they need to get them to that level of technical competence that they need. >> working with the fbi and a number of cases, as you indicated in the joint task force, we have a national computer forensics institute in alabama and we have trained over

1300 state and local law- enforcement, prosecutors, and judges in order to be able to deal with this. what we are dealing with here is the competence or not the national security threats or the criminal fraud threat. it is the stealing of credit cards and other identifiable information and using it to take money out of banks around the world. you heard about the $46 million taken out including a large amount in this country. that's the kind of training where we can give them the confidence and we can work with them. it's something that we and the fbi are trying to do very much. the outreach we have had to various police associations and others as part of it. the main thing is to get the youining to work together.

have specific information about telephone contacts. i quarrel with collecting all the information in california on telephone records to find that specific case. that seems overly broad. >> with the sleeve, this scenario he has laid out, to a telephone records search for all of omaha? walk us through that.

>> the methodology would be let's put into a secure environment detailed records. know anything that's in there. we won't search that unless we have reasonable suspicion of terrorist related organization. if we see that, we have to prove we have that. given that, we can now look and say who was this guy talking to the united states and why? >> so you can search across the breath of telephone records? all you are looking for is who to talk to. if you did not collected, how do you know who he was talking to? ,f you don't have information, i just give you a number and say find out who's talking talking to. you don't have information.

.his was the debate this came up 10 years ago. how do we do that? how to resolve the talking? the answer was we want to protect civil liberties and privacy. and we want to protect the country. thought was a reasonable .pproach that we agreed on to put this in a way where we have tremendous oversight by the courts. go in,ime people can they have to have a reason to go in and look at the data. when they get something out, they have to say this is the day reporting guideline? only a few reports a year go out on that. >> does this extend beyond telephone records? what thateck and see person is googling?

who that person is e-mailing? going to the next step, once bitten by a person of interest, then a ghostly at ei. the fbi fbi will then look at that and say what more do we need to look at? so there are issues they will then look at. so the answer is yes you could. you can get a court order to do that. but with that take a court order? >> it would. to do any kind of search in this area, you need a court order. >> tonight gotten into phone records, who they might be googling, who they might be e- mailing. what else do you feel you can get? >> i am not sure of your question.

>> you don't know if it's a terrorist yet. you does have this uneasy notion that something is happening. >> wait, wait. let's just stop here a minute.

we're not going to inhibit your questions but i think we need to clarify the activity which your operating. you will be functioning also with the warring. >> if i may, it's my understanding you have the metadata and records of what appears on a phone bill. if you want to go to the content, then you have to get a court order, the same thing you would do in a criminal case. it would permit you to collect the content of a call. you can ask if that's right or wrong. >> that's correct. >> i assume that. i'm not talking about content. i'm assuming at some point there would be a legal standard by which you could do that. what i am only getting to is you've identified that you can get phone contacts. i'm asking can you get google contacts? can you get email contacts? i'm not talking about reading the e-mail or seeing what they're saying back and forth.

but i worry about is how far you believe this authority extends. i'm not asking about reading the email. >> is a couple things i want to make sure we've got. fisa only talks about phone metadata. that's all that program talks about. any program that we have -- senator feinstein, if you want to get the content, you would have to get a court order. in any of these programs, we have court orders for doing that with oversight by congress, the courts and the administration. my concern is i think this is an area where we have to give you both the details -- the american people need to understand it's a vacancy but we're doing and what the results are. -- so they can understand it and what the results are. we had this debate several

times. this is one where we need to bring out the rest of the story, show what we do, what it protects the country from,a nd have the debate. that's part -- to do that, we have to give you the rest of that data. tomorrow we will put that in a classified session with the intent to get as much out in public so everybody has the information. the reason i hesitate here is i don't want to make a mistake that causes the statements i have for our country to lose some form of protection and we get hit with a terrorist attack because i made that mistake. >> i thank the chair for the additional time.

the american public is fearful that in this massive data that you get, there is the ability of the federal government to synthesize the data and learn something more than maybe what was ever contemplated by the patriot act. the second thing is the more personal issue and gets into concerns about cyber command. you are and this unique role. we've always had this idea of separating civilian leadership of the military leadership yet

you have ths dual -- this dual hat and it creates a concern. not about you because you've got a remarkable record and i thank you for your service but it is a concern and will we find you in. and i just think we've got to get infomation out -- information to the public. we are all getting bombarded with questions he cannot answer. i am not the chair of the intelligence committee. i don't are on the committee -- serve on the committee and the impression has been created that people parked in our office are

given daily or monthly briefings on this and that is not the case. >> i think you had minus questions -- i think you had an excellent line of questions. we are going to move on from this question topics. what we are now moving into is a domain that is not the parameters of this hearing. this senator will not prohibit any senators from asking any question they want. tomorrow in the feinstein

hearing, many [indiscernible] i hope your questions will be as cogent as they are here today. >> thank you, madame chair. thank you, general. you referred to section 215. 215 requires for an application for production of any tangible thing. it says this application but have -- must have a staement of facts showing reasonable grounds that attend both things sought are relevant to an authorized investigation. so there are several standards of law and that it's. a statement of fact, reasonable grounds, tangible things that are relevant to an authorized investigation. as it's been described in this conversation and in the press,

the standard for collecting phone records on americans is now all phone records, all the time, all across america. how did we get from the reasonable grounds, relevant authorized investigations, statement of facts, to all phone records all the time, all locations? how do you make that transition and how has the standard of law been met? >> this is what we have to deal with the court. we go through the court process, a very deliberate process, where we meet all those portions of the 215. we lay out what we're going to do. we don't get to look at the data. >> let me stop you there. user requirements to acquire the data --these are requirements to acquire the data. here i have my verizon phone. my cell phone. what authorized investigation gave you the grounds for acquiring my cell phone data? >> i want to make sure i get this exactly right.

on the legal standards and stuff on the part here, i think we need to get the department of justice and others. it is a complex area. you are asking a specific question. i do not want to shirt that. i think we should walk through that with the intent of taking what you've asked and seeing if we can get it declassified so they can see exactly how we do it. i do think that should be answered. >> thank you. >> senator, i would like to help you out. you want to get it right. the answer should be in writing. that way you get it right and he gets his answer. >> we'll take that for the record. >> i asked i get -- i asked that get answered tomorrow. i would suggest both in writing, the hearing and into his hands.

>> i thank both chairs. if i can elaborate, is that okay? in between these two pieces, fisa is in competition -- gives an interpretation of the law. into what is governable. i have an amendment that said these findings of law that translates requirements in the law into what is permissible, needs to be declassified so we can have the debate. i believe what you just said is you want that information to bd class i -- to be declassified, that explains how you get from these standards of law to the conduct that have been presented publicly.

did i catch that right? you support the interpretations of the fisa core to be set for the american people so they can have this take place? >> i think that makes sense. i want to make sure i put this exactly right. i don't want to jeopardize the security of americans by making a mistake and say yes, we're going to do all that. but the intent is to get the transparency there. senator, i will work hard to do that.

if i can't do that, i will come back to you and tell you why. i defer to the chair of the intel committee but i think that is reasonable to get this out. i don't have the legal background perhaps you have in this area. i want this debate out there for a couple reasons. i think what we're doing to protect american citizens hear is the right thing. our agengy takes great pride in protecting this nation and our civil liberties and piracy. doing in partnership with this committee and congress and the courts, we have everybody there. we aren't trying to hide it. you're trying to protect america. we need your help help doing

that. this is not something that is just nsa or the administration doing it on its own. this is what we expect our government to do for us. we have to put those two together. i just want to put that one caveat there. if i can make it happen, i will. ask thank you for your expression of support. i also want to thank chair feinstein who helped develop and sent a letter expressing this concern about this secrecy of the interpretations of the court. i do think it's time that become understandable in public. otherwise how can a democracy do you have a debate if you don't know plain language means? i have concerns about the translation. i will continue this conversation and thank you. >> senator collins. >> thank you, madam chairman. i'm going to ask a question about computer security. before i do, i want to give general alexander a chance to

answer a very good question that has to do with americans concerna about their own private computer security and privacy. i saw an interview in which mr. snowden claimed that due to his position at nsa, he could tap into virtually americans phone call or e-mails. true or false? >> false. i know of no way to do that. >> perhaps that's one issue we could put to rest. now let me switch to computer security. >> oh, boy. >> in the president's budget, it is mentioned that the nation has four top cyber risks. the first one has been of great concern since we produced a bill last year that could not get past.

that is a tax better aimed at our infrastructure. the general has alluded to the fact that much of our critical infrastructure is owned or operated by the private sector. it's 85% in the private sector. our fbi witness has talked about the eye guardian program which encourages private industry partners to report cyber incidents to the government in real time. our legislation last year had a requirement of the owners and operators of critical infrastructure would be required to report major cybersecurity incidents. is the administration still

support mandatory reporting in such cases? >> that was our position then. that remains our position at this point in time. we are prepared to work with congress. you all ultimately write legislation that remains the administration's position. >> thank you. in that legislation, we did pay attention to the need for a more expert cyber workforce. this latest account that such a great job of going to the resume of this individual. it underscores how much work there is to be done in making sure that we have a well qualified cyber work force. i would like to hear from all

four of you on whether you are having difficulties in recruiting individuals who have the skills that you need so you can avoid having the hiring of a young high school dropout, community college dropout, did not complete his military service, young person with so little experience being given access to so much classified information. >> i would like to say first that in the military, we're going to hire young folks out of

high school to work in this area. the key will be the training we give them. ideally we would like to get four years of a top knowledge, top-notch engineering school for some of the military positions but we won't get that's what we have is the responsibility to train them. it takes several years to get somebody trained in this area. in effect what we are running as a cyber college for many of our young enlisted folks. on the nsa site, we are able to hire more college graduates into the government side. what i need is greater scrutiny. what am i getting with my

contract support, what other capabilities and how we manage that from a government perspective? that's something i have concerns about and have to address. >> we have a major initiative underway. we have defined our cyber workforce, we are matching the positions with the skill set required to serve in those positions. we are also in the process of looking to hire another 600 individuals to augment that 1500 person workforce. we have a series of programs, one with community colleges where we are looking to find people who have taken the correct courses at any college level who can hire as beginning workforce members and train them up. we also have a work force program in conjunction with nsa that goes to college is to have centers for excellence that provide us with top-notch, four year graduates. and an effort to reach out to the private sector to find individuals there.

i think we have an x workforce. force.xcellent work but we have a provision that was in the building you work on and that we would like to see in any cyber legislation that gives us some assistance in terms of recruiting and retaining that kind of a workforce which will allow us comparable pay and benefits to what nsa is able to offer to its workforce.

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[captions copyright national able satellite corp. 2013] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] >> 3300 report. f the 3300 reported, 70% are sexual assaults and rapes. one in 10 go to trial. of the ones that go to trial, there are 302. let's say you increase it by 25. 25 more cases in the trial. that's a good thing. that's a really good thing. i appreciate that the commanders

make and take that step. pretty good conviction rate. pretty good. the problem is if you only have 302 cases going to trial but there is some number of 3300 of cases actually taking place, it is the reporting that we need to change. we look at our allies that we fight with. look at israel, the u.k., canada, germany, australia. they have made this decision already because of the objectivity problem and because of the reporting issues. in israel, because they have done some high-level prosecutions in the last five years, their reporting has increased by 80%. what would that mean if our reporting increased by 80%? it would men we would not have 33 -- mean we would not have 3300 reported cases. if that many are reported? how many are going to go to

trial? a lot more than 300. even with an aggressive mappeder, you might get more. a lot more are going to trial. let's just listen to the victims. they say it is in chain of command. that's why they are not reporting. so we can believe them or we cannot believe them. many here don't believe the victims. they don't believe the chain of command is the problem. i urge people to support our ormingal version of the personnel markup. >> thank you, senator gillibrand. i'm going to insert senator fisher here. senator fisher? >> thank you, mr. chairman. i certainly appreciate your leadership on this issue and i will support the proposal that you have brought forward. i would like to thank all the members on this committee who have worked on amendments. senator gillibrand, thanks to you. senator shaheen.

i would especially like to recognize senator mccaskill. because i think you brought forward from your experiences as a prosecutor issues and a viewpoint that has been very, very helpful to me as we have heard testimony and as we have discussed this horrific issue. that is before us. o thank you very much. sexual assault is unacceptable. because it goes truly to the very core of our armed forces. and so as i look around this table and i look at my colleagues, i know that each and every person here is going to continue to focus on this issue and is going to continue to monitor how the military is behaving. as we move forward. that's a good thing.

because i think it states to the military and it states to the ublic, especially to the victims, that we are concerned. we don't take this lightly. and this we will continue throb in the future. because -- to be there in the future. because changes have to be made and we need to solve this cancer that is taking place within the armed forces. thank you, mr. chairman. > thank you, senator fisher. the order now if i can remember what i said would be senator mccain, i think that is what i announced. >> thank you, mr. chair. >> let me just interrupt. i'm going insert them in that order. >> one thing i feel very confident about sitting around this table is that everyone who

is here, everyone who serves on this committee believes the victims. believes the victim who is have testified and believes the victims who have been reported on in surveys we have received. i don't think that distinguishes anyone on this committee from each other. the test moan has been harrowing. i was at the subcommittee hearing and the hearing last week. every last member of this committee, democrat and republican believes the victims. we all believe that we have a major problem. we believe that the problem of sexual misconduct is a stain on the military and because it is a stain on the military, it is a stain on the nation. we're short of heroes right now and our military is as good as it gets. when our heroes have a problem like this that is so serious, it is not just a stain on the military, it is a stain on our country. a positive development is that there is also much agreement on this committee about a whole series of significant and major

reforms that we need to take, and for that, i give credit to all of my colleagues, but especially to senator gillibrand. we are agreeing, i believe, or poised to agree on a package of significant reforms to reporting, prevention, training, recruiting, anti- retaliation measures, investigation, prosecutor, punishment, cancellation of v.a. benefits and protection for whistle blowers. we are poised to agree to a whole series of what i think are significant reforms. there is only one major policy disagreement. that is should we remove from military command the decision to prosecute serious offenses. remove the from the chain of command. for two reasons i do not think we should. that's why i'm supporting the chairman's amendment. first, and this has been covered significantly. i don't think removing this issue from the chain of command is the best way to fix the

problem of sexual misconduct. i do not believe we're going to fix it by taking responsibility away from commanders. i think we need to give resources and tools to commanders. i think we need to force the chainor command to take this more seriously. we will not solve it by reducing their authority. we will solve it by increasing their authority and increasing our expectation. we accepted the message not just that you're doing a bad job, we're sending that message with the package of amendments we're about to embrace. we're sending the message with have no confidence you can fix this. that's the message we send if we take it away from the chain of command. we have confidence in them in the war and confidence in them making decision and confidence in them to two ongoing cultural changes, don't ask don't tell and the decision to remove

barriers to women serving in combat positions. we're counting on the chainor command in those instances to change the culture. second, i support the chairman's amendment because i think it maintains the focus on the issue which is sexual misconduct. the proposal preamendment is to remove from the military chain of command the decision to initiate prosecution in all serious nonmilitary offenses. murder. larceny. robbery. forgery. bad checks. arson. extortion. burglary. housebreaking. perjury. fraud against united states. the proprofessional is to remove from the -- proposal is to remove from the chain of manned and initiate prosecution in all

of those offenses. there is very smart people around this table. lawyers, prosecutors, those who have served in the military. however smart we are, we have not heard one big bit of evidence to suggest that the chain of command is not capable of handling all of those kinds of offenses i just went through. we have heard ample evidence about sexual misconduct. to act on the basis of no evidence and pull all of it out of the military chain of command, we would lose the focus on the problem. the problem is the sexual miscaught of the criminal variety and hostile workplace. we have to solve all of it. for those two reasons, we cannot fix this without the chain of command and we should not try to fix problems that we have not yet heard exist. chairman's

amendment. >> thank you. chairman bloomenthal i believe is next. >> thank you, mr. chairman . i want to join in thanking you for the serious and hard work that you and others have done in crafting this proposal which i think is an effort to strike a balance and we all recognize the competing interests at play here and as senator cain has just aid, we share this interest. as everyone of our service chiefs condemned it when they came before us. i just want to say that i think the military deserves some credit here. i think that attitudes are changing. the very powerful testimony that we heard on our committee from beyondervice chiefs goes just the rhetoric and the words.

they have taken action. just to give you one example, one informed me this morning he is convening a group of his senior commanders, colonels and lieutenant colonels for a very extended session which will include showing them the testimony and questions and statements during our hearing. in that connection, i want to say thank you to senator gillibrand for her leadership, because i think her proposal has helped to move this debate. line of ed the nsensus in favor of a more independent review with the knowledge that trust and credibility are everything here. some - i have reservations about your proposal

mr. chairman that will lead me to continue to support the proposal. first of all, i think that we have to look at this problem from the standpoint not just of the commanding authority, but from the standpoint of the victims. how the system looks to him or her. and my fear is that it will look to the victim as though we are simply tinkering with the process. the system will remain for the ictim essentially a black box. there will be little or no you want to participate and virtually no information during this supposed system of review and the review itself in almost every case will go to the senior commanding authority and never reach anybody in civilian authority. that just is a fact of the way the system will work because if the commander decides not to

charge and the jag supports not charging then it goes to the senior commanding authority. so i will continue to support the proposal to make a more demons rative change in the current system and i join in the view that the military leadership of this country will not be let off the hook, but they don't expect to be let off the hook. they will hold themselves accountable and i look forward to their knowing that we will revisit this issue. in fact, i think that we are in many respects deferring to another day a real solution to this problem that will provide for trained and experienced prosecutors to be making these decisions and i would just finish on that point.

as senator mccaskill has said so eloquently, there is a real need to know how to do these cases, because they are a very demanding and difficult and in some ways unique kind of prosecution that the training and experience not only the make the decisions but review decisions really requires. and i hope that we can continue to work to make the system worthy of the greatest military in the history of the world that is changing because we have a new generation entering and because we are promoting more women, which i think may be the two decisive factors in changing the culture. thank you. >> thank you. senator? >> thank you, mr. chairman . i echo the sentments of my colleagues in thanking you and the ranking member, but in particular thanking senator gillibrand for her leadership

and mccaskill and all the other of my colleagues here who have focused on this issue like a laser beam. this has been going on, sexual assault in the military has been going on for decades and while i certainly appreciate the chairman's efforts to move us forward, i will not be supporting his amendment, although i acknowledge the improvements that the chair's amendment does constitute. i they the people who suffer sexual assault in the military, when they think about reporting this, really have two great fears. one is the fear of not being believed, but because in these cases, it is usually he said, she said or sometimes he said, he said. the fear of retaliation, while i acknowledge you have in your provisions that make retaliation a crime, i know that the language in the amendment really

focusedst on retaliation as it relates to personnel matters and while thas that, in your amendment knows that is just the minimum, there are so many ways that retail yax united nation can occur in this -- retaliation can occur in this environment. you can be retaliated on the basis of not so subtle or subtle -- or you can be retaliated by having to undergo a psychological evaluation that finds you somehow psychologically having some kind of psychological disorder. so there are so many ways that retaliation can occur that is really hard define and so i acknowledge your efforts to try and define it, but i do think that is one of the biggest, biggest barriers to reporting and that really is the bottom line issue here, i believe. the non-reporting by thousands and thousands of people who have

endured sexual trauma in the military. and yes, it is a cultural issue. and to change the culture as one of my colleagues said, you to change the culture. this culture has been going on for decades and i do believe that sometimes the cultural change can more rapidly occur when you make a structural change. like the sort that senator gillibrand is proposing and i certainly have nothing against the military and in their efforts and i acknowledge the -- their service, but this truly is a very unique kind of crime that requires us to continue the focus and again, i echo my colleagues in saying that we are going to continue to hold our commanders in the military

leadership accountable. this is not the end of the discussion. we know that we're going to need to continue to provide oversight as we proceed. thank you very much. >> senator cruz? >> thank you, mr. chairman . i would like to thank committee for its good work in drawing attention to this very serious problem. sexual assault in the military is a total violation of the obligation we have to the men and women who step forward to defend ourselves and to defend our nation and defend our limbts and i demend good work of this -- commend the good work of this committee working to improve reporting to improve prosecution and commend the chairman in crafting this amendment, which i think is working to improve the situation. i want to commend the leadership of a number of leaders on this

committee including senator mccaskill and senator shaheen and senator ayotte and in particular, i want to commend senator gillibrand. i'm going to be voting against the chairman's amendment and i'm going to be voting against it because i was persuaded by the arguments that senator gillibrand presented in this committee a few moments ago. i think she made a powerful and effective argument that the lack of reporting is driven by a fear of not having an imparking lot ble third party outside -- impasht partial third party outside the chain of command to report a sexual assault and i think that was buttressed of her pointing to our allies that implemented similar policies and seen significant increases in the reporting that occurred when

there is an impartial actor to lodge that report. now based on the comments of many senators at this hearing, it appears likely that the chairman's amendment is going to be adopted. and i would suggest that if that is the case, it may well prove that -- that this amendment makes material progress in solving the problem. and if it does, i know all of us would celebrate that fact. if it does not, if going forward in a year or two or three, we see the data and the reporting is still abysmal, it is still not working. there is still a fear of not having an impartial prosecutor, an impartial tribunal, then i would suggest it may well be an order for this committee to return to senator gillibrand's very good proposal and i would

note that i thought senator cain made a very good point about the breadth of the offense and in particular the offenses not related to sexual assault. i have not heard a predicate that there is the same problem with other offenses that appear with sexual assault. it may in the future make stones consider the approach that senator gillibrand has presented but narrowed and focused on those offenses concerning sexual assault which is the heart and concern of this committee. i commend the good work of so many of the leaders. i am going to vote no because i think senator gillibrand's proposal is a good one. >> thank you, senator cruz. sorry, senator king. >> mr. chairman, thank you very much. i have to say first, as a newcomer to the senate and to this committee, this is one of

the most impressive discussions i've been engaged in since i've been here and this is way these important decisions are supposed to be made, with passionate and well-conceived arguments on all sides. i find this a very tough call. i've gone back and forth as senator gillibrand well knows as we have discussed this issue over the past several weeks. there is the natural tendency of any hierarchy to protect itself first and i think that is an instinct of whether it is the army or any other similar kind of organization, and that makes this a particularly tough call. another preliminary comment i want to make is i think it is really important that we focus on the about the that this is part of a package and that there is a long list of initiatives in this bill, in the personnel bill

and in the amendments, the 10 amendments that we adopted today and all the controversy is about one and it shouldn't take either our eyes or the public's eyes off the fact that this is the most comprehensive approach to the -- to dealing with this issue that in my knowledge has ever been taken by the congress. i think that is a very important point of context. next, to me, the most -- what may turn out to be the most important part of your amendment is the retaliation section. i think that is what's one of the major things that is driving people not reporting and the data is -- they didn't say we're not reporting because of the chain of command. they say we're not reporting because of fear of retaliation or because we don't think anything is going to be done. it is unclear. you can interpret the data in

different ways, but clearly retaliation is part of problem. at our hearing last week when we had the second panel of the officers that are hearing these cases, one of the witnesses actually testified and answered to some questions that he believed that right now the more likely grass roots response is some kind of retaliation against the complainant instead of against the perpetrator. i thought that was a very damning but honest statement. ultimately, mr. chairman, i'm going to support your amendment because i believe that in any organization, the leader sets the tone. and that's what we're talking about here is tone and culture. and if you take the commander of the unit out of the equation, then you're -- as senator cain mentioned, you're sending a message that we don't trust these folks, but also basically

that commander then can say ok, this is not my problem anymore. and we want it to be their problem. engagement that the of the leader of the group, whatever lefrl, is a terribly important part of the solution of this problem. the target is the failure to report. and i think if we can -- if we can establish that retaliation itself is an offense, that i believe will be a very important contribution in addition to the safeguards that are the heart of your proposal that this -- there will be an alternative route if the decision is negative and finally, i think senator cruz said something very important and i was thinking it and trying to figure out how i was going to put it but you put it very eloquently. this is a test. this is not the end of this

story. and i realize there is a long history to this and it is not satisfactory to victims to say well, we're going to try something for two years and see if it works. i think this is a very far-reaching comprehensive and strong proposal, but if it doesn't work, if we don't see an improvement, if we don't see higher levels of reporting and a change in the culture, then i think this committee is going to have very little option but to change fundamentally the way these matters are handled in a sense, i see this as a last chance for the chain of command to get it right and for all of those reasons, again, gile back to the beginning, i consider -- i'll go back to the beginning. i consider this a very tough close call but i think we have done something very important here today. i commend senator gillibrand. i am so admiring of her passion

and energy on this issue and i don't think there is any question that we would not be where we are had she not been so strong on this, but on the other hand, i commend the chair and others who listened to both sides and found a solution that i think is creative and will be effective. i will support. >> thank you. i'm going to ask the clerk to call the roll. >> mr. reed. >> aye. >> mr. nelson. >> ay everyone. >> ms. mccaskill. >> msshaheen. >> no. >> mrs. gillibrand? >> no. >> in bloonl that will. >> no. >> mr. cain. >> aye. >> mr. king. >> ay everyone.

imhoff. >> i have a proxy. >> mr. wicker. >> i have a proxy. >> ms. ayott. >> ay everyone. >> mrs. fisher. >> aye. > mr. blunt. >> mr. lee. mr. cruz. >> no. >> mr. chairman. e. ay 17 aye's. 9 noes. >> i would particularly ask everyone to just concentrate on this just a little bit technical procedurely. we cannot have a roll call

should it be desired on the sexual assault package as amended as a whole. is there a desire for a vote on that? >> mr. chairman, there are some other amendments that have not been cleared. on the sexual assault portion. >> i think we cleared all of them. >> few left. apologize. >> i apologize. thank you. >> senator mccaskill. >> the first amendment that i would like to talk about is amendment number 17. right now, during the clemency phase of the trial, the con veeng authority receives a pabt of materials by the senate's council. there are no limitations of what can appear in that pact. it presents an opportunity for the defendant to attack the victim which curse almost in every case. except this time without any ability to rebut. this amendment does two things. first, it gives the victim the same opportunity as the defendant to provide information for clemensy information and

gives a voice to the victim during the clemensy phase and prohibits them from if that information was not presented as evidence at trial. this keeps the convening authority from hearing what the jury was not allowed to hear. thatape shield statute is where the prosecution and defense lawyers argue to the judge whether or not prior sexual or post sexual contact of the victim is relevant. the judge makes a decision. i have learned in many cases that after the judge ruled that none of that was admissible, it when the pact. totally inappropriate. this amendment would not only give a voice to the victim during the clemency process, it would make sure that no one is reading anything about the victim that was not deemed admissible in trial.

>> a move for a voice vote. >> let me see if there's other debate on this. this amendment has been cleared on our side, i just want to hear from your side as to whether there is any objections. >> i think it is a good amendment. >> any further debate? all in favor say aye. the aye's have it. is 18 second amendment -- this is a provision in the bipartisan legislation that senator collins, president of turner and i introduced. mandatory require discharge or dismissal with conviction of a sexual crime. i move for aan, voice vote. side?there debate on this

this has been cleared on either -- on our side, but i think we have to hear from the other side. #19 -- i have is >> #18. >> this has also been cleared on our side. >> this has not been cleared on our side. i personally would oppose it. i think it provides no discretion to address circumstances where discharge may negatively impact the family of the accused. it could be a significant impediment and a guilty plea as i see it. at have commons. >> mr. chairman, i would like to look at it longer. i understand was senator mccaskill is trying to do, but if you're going to mandate a miss george -- discharge, i would like to look at it and

maybe if there's a problem i can sit down with her, but i don't want to hold up progress. senatoro ask that blumenthal be added as a co- sponsor. >> i think senator gramm said we could modify it later on a voice vote card that does not mean my ranking member would read can we have a voice vote on it and work on a later? >> yes, and it can be addressed. >> all those in favor say aye. the aye's have it. abouts is amendment 19 the victim interviewed which requires the defense counsel give notice to the -- it does not limit access to the victim in any way. the victim can still be accessed by the defense council, but it requires defense counsel give

notice to the prosecutor before they interview a victim, which will give the prosecutor and adequate opportunity and desire to give support to the victim during that interview. it also requires upon request the victim have counsel present for those interviews, reaffirming this right under this law. there further debate? >> could you say it again? >> it requires defense counsel give notice to the prosecutor before tried to interview the victim, it does not limit how often they can interview the dictum, the have to give notice. secondly, if the victim requests that they are entitled to have counsel present for the interview. >> you got me on the first one, but not the second, so i oppose this. >> is there further debate? >> yes, because we're trying to fix problems and create others. i am not sure i am ready to

commit having been a defense attorney that the only time i can never interviewed the person accusing my client of a crime that can put them in jail for life or other things that i have to sit by and have someone else in the interview. -- inot so sure that is don't know if it breaches attorney/client privilege. there are two sides to every court martial or every trial. >> if there's no objection, we will put this on for later for further discussion during the markup. senator mccaskill, #4? >> this is amendment 193, a limitation on the convening authority in terms of their ability to grant clemency. >> what is the number on this one? >> 193. it addresses the ability of the commander to overturn the findings of a jury. this would address the commander's ability to modify a sentence. the commander could modify his sentence only for cases where

there is a prearranged plea- bargain or where the defendant provides substantial assistance to the government in the investigation or prosecution of another matter. we have heard a lot of concerns that clemency agreements are often used to provide some monetary assistance to the defendant's family and ease their burden. i agree protecting military families is important so my amendment would allow for commander to modify for torture -- forfeiture of pay. it would allow forfeiture of pay issues to address family needs, but it would only allow them to modify sentences for plea agreement or cooperation with the government with the prosecutors on another investigation. is this for all felonies? >> this is for all felonies. >> senator lindsey graham? >> i should have looked at these. i will blame myself, but i am

not ready to commit. i will defer. with no objection, we will hold this for later. >> my final amendment 195, an offender data base. this may be one we need to talk about, too. the civilianabout criminal justice world, can you imagine the situation where a rape victim comes forward and then as a perpetrator and then refuses to go forward and give any additional testimony that name would disappear into thin air? that is what happens in the military. that man disappears into thin air. the predator is free to strike again and another base, another country at another time. this amendment would allow us to build an offender data base for

long military force but only, and would not identify the victims, but it would allow investigators to go back and see , you know, a report some base here in the u.s., they go back and say, well, this person does something like this over and lejeune or was accused of doing something like this and then you could maybe go back and find that victim and talk to that victim and find the same m.o. and would really enhance the ability to investigate these crimes and find the guilty parties and hold them accountable. i think this is something that is just common sense in the civilian world, and i was shocked to learn is not even contemplated in the military system. this is limited to sexual

assault matters? >> it is. >> is there further debate? >> it makes sense to me, quite frankly, that you're not going to use an unfounded accusation approve some guilty in a court- martial, but if we have a sexual predator problem, you're dead right. there is a network of people out abusers, and there are people out there who talk about where you go and what is the best part to go to. believe it or not, it is true. let's see if we can work on this. i like the idea of captured for the systems say, not to be used against someone being accused of someone it cannot be the end of your career, but it sure needs to be captured some how. >> senator nelson? >> we are in a nation that you are presumed innocent until proven guilty.

this is an allegation. this is not a conviction. >> let me just point out, under that scenario, we should not take any fingerprints of anyone accused of a crime, but where the -- where the crime is not brought to trial. we should not take dna if the case is not brought to trial. we should never keep their name on record if they've been accused of a crime but not been brought to trial. we're not talking about this been a public record or available, but within the law enforcement community being able to access this information. there are no rights that will be taken away from this person. it would not be available if someone asks for it. i just think you're handcuffeding for law enforcement capability in the military if you do not have some kind of database tracking this information. >> with the accused have been --

would be accused have been in the military court system, would they have been actually charged by the prosecutor? >> no. >> or is this just an alleged offense because the victim comes forward and says so? >> yes. >> as i understand what she's saying, if someone makes an allegation but they don't want to go to trial. >> right. >> that this is captured. if we do this in child abuse cases. there is a system that tracks child abuse complaints for adoption, for other things because this is tough. i understand what you're saying. i don't want it to be used to deny some a promotion and i don't want the promotion board to get access to it, or used in a different trial. but if somehow we confined for long for some purposes only the alleged can find for a long

first of purposes only, a way to keep track of it, it is not a bad thing to do. given the fact i think sexual predators' are organized and just don't do it one time. >> i understand the amendment will allow law enforcement officials to identify people possible sexual predators' where victims at different times and at different places report they were a victim of this person. it seems to me that is reasonable going in. i suggest we would adopted by voice vote -- .> if i could ask a question what is the database used for if they've not been convicted of anything? >> here is what would happen. says,n comes forward and i was stalked outside the barracks last night and this man

threw me up against the wall and brutally raped me, but i am not -- i will tell you his name but that is all. it is too personal, too painful. law enforcement in the military could then go in the database and see if someone else made the exact same accusation against the same person, the same way, the same with the crime was committed in another location at a different time. then you go back to the victim and say, you know what? this is not the first time he did this, so we consider talking to us and go forward? many times victims who will not, for it in isolation will do so when they learned there's another victim that is willing to come forward that at the same exact powers shall be committed upon her. we cannot do that in the military because they do not practice in the military. we do it all the time in the civilian law enforcement world. explain that,

please come in the civilian law enforcement one that record is kept -- please, in the civilian law enforcement, why that record is kept? you said dna and fingerprints and so forth, but that is not what this is brit and arrest has not been made. the allegation is made, but in your particular case, the alleged victim says she is not going to prosecute. >> within the law enforcement community, information is maintained when accusations are made. it does not mean it is a public record or in packs that person's life in any way, but they don't destroy information that comes to law enforcement just because a victim does not want to cooperate. >> so in the civilian law enforcement community, there is an ability to track from one state to another the fact that someone had an alleged crime

committed and yet the prosecutor never prosecuted? >> don't let me misrepresent this in that i'm not saying this works perfectly in the civilian law enforcement world, and that there are not a whole lot of allegations that don't get capture. i am saying i was shocked to learn there is not even in efforts being made to capture the allegations for purposes of law-enforcement revealing -- reviewing. it is difficult in all the different jurisdictions in the 50 states to have a system that is perfect in terms of sharing information among law enforcement. but in the military when you know for sure the perpetrators are going to be moved, it will not stay put, will be moved around, it is even more imperative -- especially because you can protect the information and the rights of the accused because it will not get out in the mainstream because of a

closed community. respond to, may i that just to say, we have done so much good in what has been adopted, i would hate to see us start to mess it up getting into these very sensitive issues. as the senator was speaking, i was thinking, do we have this kind of tracking and the civilian area? for example, with people in the state department or the same kind of thing where they move around from place to place? i just don't know enough to be comfortable about getting into this area. >> let me ask a question. for clarification, are all five of these you're bringing up or have brought up, were discussed at the subcommittee level and

then for did to the home committee? >> no. >> there were filed in time here to be considered here though? >> they were filed in a timely manner to be considered. i'm trying to get at this problem of restricted reports. respecting the victim's right to not come forward is an important thing. on the other hand, it is our huge enemy in this area. if someone's a restricted report but wellington and the perpetrator, i think that name ought to be available to law- enforcement down the line. >> i think what is unusual about this crime and sets it apart from others, there is a reluctance for the reasons which have been referred to by many of us, a reluctance often to come forward. that is not true with other crimes. in exception has been made with child cases, cases involving children. i think there is a basis for

collecting this, of limited restricted way, this kind of information because of the reason of their reluctance people have of coming forward in this type of crime, which does not exist with other kinds of crimes like larceny, murder, etc. we have all talked about it today. i think this is a response to that circumstance. i would suggest if you are willing to take a voice vote -- >> mr. barnum would have some comments. would have some comments. >> i want to invite the attention to amendment 22 that was previously adopted today as part of the package, as part of that amendment it included a proposal that a similar provision would be sent to the department as part of the 576

panel crated and last year's national defense authorization act to specifically look at this issue of how the information that is included in restricted types of reports may be considered for the purposes that senator mccaskill has pointed out. i would also suggest that one of the reasons why this may be important for your consideration is that unlike the under stricter reports which were for law-specifically enforcement purposes, restricted reporting was not designed for that purpose. it was designed primarily in the law to create an opportunity for those victims to pursue the types of treatment and counseling and other support they need after a sexual assault without necessarily triggering that law enforcement action. for that reason i wanted to ensure that your where this has previously been adopted and is included in the mark as it would

go to the 576 panel review. question that you just said if i may, mr. chairman, it has been adopted that we were going to study this question about keeping this kind of data. >> he is correct and that the amendment adopted was also my amendment. i thought was important to bring this forward because this is the equivalent of someone filing a police report and saying we will not give you any more information or cooperate with and civilians and destroying the police report. i think the police report should be available to law enforcement. i am happy to put this over and we could talk about a later in the markup or defer it based on the other amendment but i did

not want this moment to pass without acknowledging this is an issue for our law enforcement community in the military where they are really handcuffed. there is no question that someone who is moving around, a predator, as the upper hand as long as they can continue to keep victims quiet. debate?ere any further my inclination would be to voice vote this -- >> hold it over. hold itenator nelson, over. we will hold this over for for the debate during overmarkup or for the flow -- floor. other comments? >> mr. chairman, we have talked a lot about trying to make the system more responsive, allowing the victim to come forward,

feeling there is a support network available and making the allegation through multiple channels to you don't have to worry about your first sergeant or the nco and the other -- we have hot lines, many ways to capture the allegations now outside the traditional chain of command. most of us have decided the chain of command is necessary to solve the problem and to be held more accountable, not less. being a military lawyer for 30 years, i to understand exactly what the chairman and senator mccaskill were saying. you look at this as a lawyer. there's a difference between being a lawyer and a commander. i know the difference. it is night and day. amos,ason i asked general why you take a case to trial in the lawyer said, don't think we can get there from here? i knew the answer. i don't mean to bore the committee, but one of the first

cases i dealt with as a young captain in the air force was involving a guy that was an alleged barracks thief. if you want to create chaos in the barracks, just have people's property stolen. it really is bad for morale. it is one of the worst things you can do. sexual assault is 1000 times worse because it does destroy the unit. but this trust we're talking about in the military is real. you don't live where you would like, you live where you are a sign read you don't get individual rooms or pick your roommate or get a bunch of locks. you share everything. so when someone reaches that trust and praise on the property people, in this case, it is -bad the property of people come in this case, it is a bad in this case, he is the type of guy that would do that. the allegation to be was more

about, we don't like him, then he actually did it. i remember the commander saying, if you don't scare the -- if you not willing to go after some that might be innocent, you can never scared the hell out of the guilty. it was funny at the time, but it is not funny now, is it? we talked the commander down. the article 60 allows a commander to convene authority to send a case to trial but also to provide clemency after it is over based on what is best for the unit. this guy got whacked to heart, i think we need to back up a little bit. the article 60of powers would allow a convening authority to set aside a finding of guilt and target or by specification, in another case. in the marine corps, this article 60 power of setting aside a finding of guilt in part or total, there have been no cases where it was exercised in

a sexual assault allegation. as a matter of fact, there were seven cases -- just very few cases where the convening authority set aside a finding of a court martial but not involving sexual assault. in the air force, there were 40 cases set aside out of 3713. sexual misconduct, sexual assault. in the navy, none. in the army, 68 cases out of 4603, and none involving several salt. so the article 60 powers to set aside a finding of guilt in a sexual assault case is very rare. but this other case got a lot of attention. i have listened to the facts, senator mccaskill has listened to the facts. why would you give the commander the power to do this? all i can tell you is we know now that commanders push cases that lawyers say you should not go there because they want to

send a message. disbarring to make sexual assault -- desiring to make sexual assault 0, a noble goal. individual cases also have to have a chance of getting it right. what i fear is we are creating the environment where it will be almost impossible to be found innocent if we do not watch it. aswe micromanage the system, we try to correct the system, god knows it needs to be corrected, i just feel we don't want to create a situation where there is a contested trial involving sexual assaults that the only outcome that people believe is acceptable is that of guilty. all of you know every try to be done right has two sides to the story. the tickets back to the role of the defense counsel.

-- that it's back to the role of the defense counsel. i have been a prosecutor and defense attorney. i don't know if i want to put the defense counsel in the situation someone has to be in the room. i will have to think long and hard about that. i have modified our solution to the article 60 hours. i have said when it comes to the fences that senator levin has outlined, rape, and forcible sodomy, we are going to take the power away from the convening authority to set aside a finding of guilt. we do have an appeal process. i just don't want to say that they have lost the power in every case where you have a years sentence or more. the military. the reason they're coming down on you so hard is you have not stepped up to the plate and done the right thing. to my colleagues. these reforms i think are going

to create the most supportive environment of anywhere in america for someone who has been sexually assaulted. but having said that, there will be a trial in many of these cases. i want to make sure that that trial is conducted in a fashion that those who accused have their fair day in court, too. so i am willing to restrict the article 60 powers of the commander in these cases because of the way the system has been broken, but i just would not want to take it away for every case that involves a crime over a year. i just think that is going too far and that is amendment what is would do. >> is this in amendment you're offering now or are you holding up for later? >> i can withhold it. talk to center mccaskill and others and see if we can agree on a. >> i think the words of caution are welcome. i think all of us want to make sure that victims of sexual

assault feel free, comfortable, to report those crimes. it is essential we change the culture and dynamic, but we also want to protect the rights of a defendant to a fair trial. i hope nobody ever wants to this country to change that. your words of caution are welcome. if you can withhold that, we can take a look at that later. is there any other discussion or debate before we vote now on the package of the sexual assault language as amended that came from a subcommittee? we will have a roll call vote. the clerk will call the roll. [roll call]

>> thank you all very much. this has been a very good discussion, debate, and i believe a good resolution, but nonetheless, time will tell. we will meet in room 222