agencies, stove pipes carry out their missions using their own contracting approaches, their own oversight methods, their own i.t. systems. and as a result, you had stove pipes data. if you have stove pipe data, you have inconsistencies. that produced from the audit, we learned from the audit, the fact that about 30% of the projects completed in iraq were not properly accounted for, not properly recorded in any data base. and therefore we couldn't really analyze the details of them without trying to find the paperwork wherever it may be hidden at particular agencies. that's something that the reform of our approach to stabilization reconstruction operations must address and it must address the need for uniformity in contract

stockman ting and the welch bill proposes that kind of reform. the corps of engineers founders consistently told me they support the current commander oversight works when it is on the ground, it is forward- leaning and seeks to do more than just manage a list of findings or police blotter, said to speak. it turned around quickly so that operators can use it to improve the mission. that was missing in the first year, too much waste occurred as a result and too much waste

occurred throughout the program .ecause of all these issues good oversight and good planning would reduce that. learning from iraq highlights a number of success stories. it is not just bad news. we focus on the challenges because that is our mission. finding the crux of violated our trust but we also included a number of reports and a number of anecdotes in learning from iraq about what worked and i want to highlight the program that made a difference for good in iraq. it was a tool in the commanders arsenal. when they were executed as planned, that is, small, targeted projects usually

underweighted thousand, they made a difference. when they exceeded 1 million or 10 million which was the case or even 20 million and a few audits we identified, then that lost focus and the lost money. plants can beed useful. this was created out of the recognition that these are demands put upon us in these settings. the purityearn from experience that the only work wake -- the only way they could work is to plan in advance.

this is a very generic and basic terms. often the phrase that we don't like the plan planning is the pre requisite to success. in these operations and that means planning before the operation begins.

churchill said those who plan do better than those who don't. though they really stick with that plan. his point being planning is the key to opening the door to success in challenging operations that we faced in iraq. we did have a plan at the outset, hard lessons gets into this in detail. and the plan was liberate and leave. but as puban talabani, you have plan a, but not a plan b. when we switched to plan b which is occupy and rebuilt, we didn't have a system in place sufficient to sustain the expenditure of what became $60 billion. the first plan is $2 billion and be gone by september. by ten years ago right now in iraq, we were up to 20 billion. so ten times the amount in the blink of an eye, in building the ad hoc, we should not be surprised that too much waste

occurred. it is what it is. but it doesn't need in the stand of the point in history. it needs to stand in the pointed lesson from which we should draw and from which i'm pleased to know that the hill has begun to learn in hr-2606, that would establish the u.s. officer contingency operation should it pass. and it would provide the kinds of solutions, the kind of solutions that i've suggested here that are key to ensure success in future stabilization and reconstruction programs. planning, uniformity, drawing together the significant body of personnel that are out there that could be focused in future operations. syria seems to be silting on our doorstep stra strategically with regard to this matever and the spillover effects are bringing to crisis, conditions in iraq at this moment. as kim pointed out last week in the article that iraq is effectively still at war. the war in iraq is not really over in the sense that the shiah militia that caused so much carnage in 2005, 2006, 2007, and the -- and the sunni aqui and the state of iraq and hook the various elements, the radical

shiah militia are stirring back up and causing, you know, murder and mayhem across the country as we speak. 61 killed in iraq in june. -- 761 killed in iraq in june. following upon the two bloodiest months in five years. this last quarter is the bloodiest quarter since the middle of 2008? and why? partly because of the failure to recognize on the part of the leadership of -- in iraq that reconciliation is the essential piece to moving forward. second, what's going on in syria. the spillover effects are substantial. the reason i laid that out is because while boots on the ground are something that no one wants. it may be that we have to have a capacity on the ground in syria post-assad should that come about. how that's going to be organized is an open question. a bill out of the senate

recently approved $250 million for rebuilding interior, but we don't know who would spend it. that is just an indicator for the need for the kind of reform that we can learn from iraq, that we propose in learning from iraq, and that thankfully is recognized in this most recent piece of legislation. so that's -- that's what we've learned at sigir for 9 1/2 years. and i'm honored, again, to be here with you, kim, and with the institute and thanks to all of you for coming and happy to entertain any questions you might have. >> we have some wonderful -- wonderful people here with the great deal of expertise and a variety of areas and i look forward to having them have their questions, introduce themselves and the organization that they're with. i'd like to start with taking my moderator's prerogative.

to ask what are the impacts that these kinds of mills takes and errors have on achieving the mission in whatever country we're operating in. in this case, iraq? >> well, first and foremost, not having a coherent structure, a well planned system effective oversight and a capacity to execute means your stabilization and reconstruction operation can last ten years. that's what happened in iraq. it's what happened in afghanistan. and as i described it, rather than a ten-year rebuilding program, it would be ten one-year rebuilding programs in both countries, i think. and the question that i -- the rhetorical question that that procevokess who's in

charge here? mark. indeed, the -- the commission of wartime contracting asked that question of state, defense, and aid. and at a hearing and they couldn't answer it. and the same issue has aritzen in afghanistan as i've heard from -- from the special inspector general for afghan reconstruction. the consequences, though, to your question, kim, we identified a part that we report last summer on the human toll from reconstruction. concretely we could identify at least 719 lives lost while -- while conducting rebuilding activities. and so the costs in waste, i've identified at least $8 billion the cost in blood. 719 at least is too high.

but most importantly, staying ten years in carrying out a contingency operation at some point stops being a contingency. proeper planning, effective oversight will reduce that. >> wonderful. let me turn to the audience. if you would please introduce yourselves to the c-span audience and your organization or affiliation? the first question? >> it's remarkable to have an auditory of someone whose job it is to study how they prosecute people that deliberately misspent them or absconded with them talk as passionately as you mission. and that's always been one of the things that's a hallmark of the effort that i think has not been necessarily replicated in other similar efforts.

and i think it's -- as we learn lessons from iraq, that should be one of them. the role of the auditor is more than just of auditor. we understand this is a part of trying to accomplish our objectives and the person accounting for the funds should be thinking about how to account for them in a way that supports the mission. and you always have done that and it's remarkable. but i would like to pose to you for what many will be a fundamental question about this whole issue which is why do we need to do this when we're never going to do it again? and isn't liberate and leave to maximum that we can't expect to undertake, the model is libya. if we can't do anything in syria which we're desperate to avoid, at most, it would be liberate and leave. in the circumstance, aren't you preparing for something that policy has already decided it will never do?>> from the polic.

let me offer something to your point, if we don't, yes, we shouldn't engage in these operations because we can't afford with a $17 trillion debt to stay anywhere for an extended period to carry out these operations. we -- from the -- from the blood cost -- the cost in lives, also, the same point. it's our responsibility as a country to take on the lessons of iraq, apply them to our system, and improve a structure so that we don't occupy, rebuild, year after year after year. that is the unacceptable outcome in iraq that i think there's 100% agreement about in the united states. but the point of usoco is not to decide what the decision will be, but to provide the pth opti.

we don't have an army. we don't create a significant and powerful military because we want to go to war, we must be prepared to protect under the president's leadership. and by training and equipping the substantial force, the president has those options, a wide variety. do we have them on the front? no, we don't. part of the challenge in syria is what choices are at hand for him to make if you don't have a capacity other than bad ones? and that's why i agree, i'm all for no more iraqs and afghanistans. that's not a policy, that's a hope. let's create policy choices. by reforming the approach to the planning execution of oversight stabilization of reconstruction operations so that we're not limited to one choice. >> great to see you. >> good to see you. my name is saudi ausman.

good to see you again, stewart, thank you for your service, and for a job, very, very well done. >> thank you for your service in iraq. >> thank you. this one is a little bit of a tough question. who do you think did better with their projects as far as spending, executing, transparency and oversight? the military or the civilian side? >> well, there's enough fault to go around. let me start with that. second, let me say there's a number of facts that we were able to derive in iraq that we weren't willing to underscore earlier. over 80% of the contracts were military contracts. which is the problem. the policy according to nspd-36 was given to the state department. but 80% of the contracts are -- you have a dichotomy that's unworkable. i saw it. the various acronym of hypocrisy struggling across the

departmental lines in iraq over eight years led to inefficiencies. chief of missions says we'd like you to do "x," the head of the contracting office says we're doing "y," that's a bad moment. that kind of bad moment occurred much too often because of the lack of synchronicity among the departments in carrying out the mission. but to your question -- as we point out learning from iraq, about $25 billion of the $60 billion was spent in building iraq security forces. an army of 300,000, police force of 700,000, a million men in uniform. they are, today, better equipped, better trained than iraq has ever had. a security force better equipped, better trained than iraq has ever had. there's waste and challenges throughout. rebluing, remember that in 2006, 2007 where you had to clean out

the military interior because of shiah militia infiltration. in the end, it's an effective force. a mixed blessing at another level as well. the iraq special operations forces may be the best and the least, and the commander in chief's name is prime minister nouri al malki. i think that's a command and control line that is not the best for iraq at this juncture and is presenting some challenging circumstances today. >> i actually want to take a moment to plug the report done by marissa sullivan, the regime that talks about that chain of command through ipos and some of the alternative chains of demand that developed within the iraqi security forces. because they present a political

problem right now to the iraqi people, as well as a security problem. so thanks for bringing that up. >> exactly right. >> please. >> my question would be from the private sector perspective, when you talk to them, obviously a very frustrating mission. when you talked to them, what were the two or three the thingings they complained about the most with the easiest effects from the government's site. >> not knowing who's in charge. that's the weakness. and as a result, constantly moving target with regards to the reconstruction program. having nine one-year reconstruction programs meant that you had to be prepared to completely reorient annually. and having was the case 15 to 20

contractors over the life of the project meant you had to try to figure out what was going on, continuously. and having to deal with a security situation wherein it wasn't clear where the burden of providing security lay, private security contractors or the governments, obviously a mix of both. it was developed on the fly in iraq in a way unprecedented by our history. in 2008, there were 171,000 troops on the ground and 172,000 contractors. and substantial percentage of those were security contractors. and we learned, you know, from it what happens if you don't plan well in advance for how these systems should be integrated. and in iraq, iraq was about

coordination. and coordination worked when personalities synchronized well. and, for example, general he trace and ambassador ryan crocker synchronized well at a critical moment with excellent outside advice on the strategy. and we survived. that synchronization, though, that approach, that strategy, is a hope. a serendipity, not a system. not a structure. >> you brought this up a little earlier when you mentioned rather than one ten-year reconstruction, we had ten one-year reconstruction. i work spoke to my friends and they brought up due to high turnover of contractors, you have people going in for one year, generating institutional knowledge, and moving on to a

new project. that's one of the advantages probably for you having been there over the longer term of the -- of the conflict. but i'm wondering if there's anything in your lessons learned that deals with preserving institutional knowledge generated during the course of an operation to prevent this sort of ten one-year reconstruction problem? >> that's what the u.s. operations would do. the u.p.s. -- the department of defense has a significant lessons learned capacity at ft. leavenworth, there's an entire school devoted to it. pksoi in the peacekeeping civilian operations institute in carlisle similarly engages in stuff. but it's within -- these are operations that are unique and they've been going on steadily since 19 0, somalia, haiti, panama, the balkans, iraq,

afghanistan. they are the venue in which the national security interests will be protected in the future in this century. and if you do accept that they're sidmill, some don't, by the way, on the civilian side, and you do accept that they will happen again. and you do accept they didn't go so well in iraq and afghanistan, i hope you accept that we ought to learn our lessons and improve our structure. that's the only way to preserve them. you know, these are -- these are useful tones on what happened. they're just that if they don't change our approach. >> on that, i'd actually like to ask a follow-up question, which is obviously there has to be some give and take between having a flexible strategy and having a long-term strategy. for stabilization and reconstruction.

so how would you recommend creating some flexibility and resiliency in how we approach stability and reconstruction without getting to that 10, one-year plan situation? >> great question, kim. and i think we are stuck in a place of significant lack of resilience right now. it's what fred was saying about the choices we have in front of us with regard to our current structure. and the choices are very limited. and resilience means options, right? and resilience means capacity to respond as churchill said, to do your planning and to be able to response what comes next. your -- plan a will be the first victim. and that's understandable in the operation. but astal albany said we need to do plan b, what we switched to. that can only happen if there's

a structure in place prepared to execute b, c, d, and e or whatever that plan may evolve into. that requires uniform contracting, personnel procedures, funding. oversight. doctrine, training. and that all occurs before the operation begins. if you try to do all of that, after it begins, they wrote their own personnel regs and they didn't succeed as much as we all would have liked because of the improvisational nature of it. improvisation in the area of national security is a bad planning system. and yusoco couldn't resolve it. >> steven? >> after the best part of a decade watching iraq go closely -- 33 trip s?

>> 34. >> 34 triples. how do you use the future of iraq. how do you see it going -- >> my metaphor is a financial one. short iraq in the short term, long iraq in the long term. the reason being is unlike afghanistan, their bank is in the ground. they have the resources to succeed. with -- with their attiturk as i described it, someone shows up with a vision, the need for reconciliation thate it's ane seb sensual element need for the democracy to succeed in the maelstrom of ethnic and sectarian mixes that's governing the country right now that there's a way out as and that passes iraqi nationalism, then iraq should be the leading country in the middle east. and i'm hopeful that that person

will -- will arise on the scene sometime in the next ten years and when he does, then i expect that long bet to pay off. >>. [ inaudible question ] [applause] have any idea of where to look? >> as i said, i want's a hope. so we'll have to wait as you have to with hope. >> so, in fact, i wanted to take a moment to recognize steven for his most recent report, "iraq's uneasing crisis." he's also the author or one of the authors of our iraq weekly update that could be found under outstanding word.org thank you for answering the hopeful questions. i'm actually -- i'm sorry, fred,

go ahead. >> i'm guessing from the -- given the answer to that, that -- [ inaudible question ] i'll throw one out there and you can duck and i'll try to throw one out there that i'd like for you to answer. could we be in better position if we somehow managed to maintain u.s. forces in iraq and been able to oversee the effort s but the one i expect an answer is, we talk about contractors a lot. and, of course, usa went long ago to a model of relying almost entirely on contractors for executing things. and the downsizing of our uniformed military has driven the military ever more in the direction of relying on contractors for a variety of things. to what extent do you think that the -- the contractorization of our foreign security policy is a problem? or that somebody is just managed

with adequate oversight as you recommended? >> great questions -- tonight the first one by quoting my interview with secretary panetta. according to the secretary, the inability to negotiate a basis for continuing u.s. military presence in the post 2011 framework agreement left the united states without important leverage in iraq. this weekend the capacity to push for greater change within the government of iraq. on the outsourcing issue, that's a huge question. it started in 1989. with log cap. that was the -- that was the watershed, frank lip, for outsourcing and moving fuel and food to the private sector. and under kbr, we're in log cap 4 pow and three different contractors hold it, over 30 billion, 30 -- 30 to 40 billion spent on it in iraq. but i think that the challenge

that was new, and was not resolved, is a security issue. how do you outsource the aspects of the security management in a stabilization reconstruction operation? when historically, that's always been a government's nondellble dutied. and the commission of wartime contracting tried to get to this and identified it as a problem but unable to articulate a concrete solution for it. the congress is addressing it as well. less and less so since the operations are winding down and going away. the problem hadn't gone away. and i think that there needs to be a center of gravity for grappling with it when it's not in your face. that's what usoco would do -- begin to plan with the department and to work with the hill about structuring the solution.

given iraq and afghanistan. and but -- but a system that doesn't have concrete lines. and those lines need to be defined. >> if i can follow up on that question of security contracting, have you in your auditing and calculations actually been able to establish the costs of security and contracting, outsourcing security in iraq by the cost of maintaining u.s. forces to conduct that same security or similar security operations in iraq?

>> the comparative study was beyond our reach, but we did identify cost of 25%. it went to paying for security, and that is right that contract or security. it is impossible to discreetly develop data on the government side, on the military side, because it is baked into the overall cost, but it is huge. >> i was recently with the contractor working in countries like iraq. i wonder if there are any things we have not yet talked about that you could expand on further with suggestions. >> yes, there is. the office formed about 20 years ago by rick who is now leading the bureau for stabilization operations at the state department.

a great guy and a great person to lead that. they accomplish great things. it is fairly modestly sized program such as fighting gang violence in the liu sure of elections in kenya or judicial security, but this is not that kind of mission. they are ostensibly assigned to planning this kind of operation. it was a revolutionary development at the pentagon in 2005, but how is that being realized? not very affect totally. the treasury, also created in the last 25 years, did a good job in iraq. not good for any stabilization. then you have a justice in charge of reviving assistance, also established in the last 25 years. this is pretty much a new structure in response stabilization challenges, and it has been a piecemeal development without integration.

and i would say now is the time to take account of that history, to recognize it has those successes but it does not have the capacity, and it needs that center of gravity. that center of gravity could be the u.s. office for contingency operations. >> i could not agree with you more, but do you see that happening? the integration needs to happen. what is the next big challenge?

>> not without reform. that is the operational answer. >> the structural question, will this become law, i do not know. i think it is a good idea, and good ideas can develop their own momentum. time will tell. >> thanks for your service. >> are their information gaps that resulted in waste, and is there enough for intelligence support? >> yes and yes.

a responsibility with regard to project management to implement a quality assurance program, which is effectively ensuring a contractor. as a quality-control program. that requires a person go out and investigate the issue. if you do not have the capacity to do that you do not have quality control, and you have waste. that is an information gap, and it happened all the time in iraq. there were too many situations where they were the first american you would see. allows a weakness that too much waste to occur.

intelligence --i would love to have been able to resolve it and have some access that would have provided information that would allow me to pursue cases. i understand they were never able to fully connect those dots. we have had 80 cases. we will have 105. i believe there are substantially more. >> if i could follow up, from the perspective of dan, where i -- of afghanistan and the titular where i had the pleasure serving, there is a special inspector or general. one thing we thought in late 2011 and 2012, they need to

create additional oversight. through organizations such as taskforce 2010 which went into investigate during the contract. from your vantage as an outside -- certainhy is it aspects of contract. why is it supplemental organizations were needed to do have the problem in iraq. >> task force 2010 was an attempt to apply lessons from iraq to afghanistan. >> in iraq, it was the joint contractor. it was partly demonstrated by

our early audit. -- des moines -- generated by early autumn subcontracting problems. i remember we asked for 41 contracts, and they could not find 33. they had three people working. it was a massive disconnect at the front from which we were playing catch-up. jcci was part of the catch up. task force 2010 was part of the catch-up in the afghan theater, but it circles back to my key point. who is doing planning? who is in charge? who is responsible for oversight? capacity to execute? it is right now nobody, and that can only be resolved through reform.

a goldwater-nichols reform -- that is commission by general dempsey, the chief. there must be a goldwater nichols type reform with regard to operations. that is the diagnosis. this is a cure. >> please. >> i did spend a couple months in the late spring in iraq. with oga. it seems like over time there was a problem with getting government groups to work on this. how do deal with the fact they

put a gun to the head of foreign service officers? how do you propose -- it is bad enough --and said of 10 years you deal with one year 10 times. how do you propose to get government staffers to do their job? >> that's one of the things that would be addressed. it would root why are those up to recognize they are deployable, and you are right. there were a number of personnel hiccups early on, and it happened too often. the other was the penalty. because not want to go they felt it would be penalized.

-- they would be penalized. this system it reform would solve both of those issues. is reality is our situation not significantly improved some years ago. other than we have thousands of people with experience. useful facts but it needs organization. >> masisa. >> i want to get back to a point you mentioned earlier, important complications. can you talk about fact or's for successful consultations but also from the iraqi side, and what were the challenges you saw, and what were things we could do better?

>> general petraeus costs interview addresses that. he said before you begin reconstruction, you need to be sure those planning for it are properly versed in economy, social structure, infrastructure of the country before showing up, whether it is a sure those planning for it histr consist training, and with that capacity in hand, you can engage because you have a context. just saying, we want to provide you the best, while well- intentioned, may not provide a

good fit because of capacity issues, and that was the case with water treatment, the single most the project we did in iraq. project we expensive did in iraq. it is not operating anywhere near full capacity because of the lack of fit. in practice, prime minister malawi, they all said to me the united states pursued it agenda. -- its own agenda. they would say they did talk to the council. the lesson there is that deference is important andheavy engagement is important. modestly and gradually move up. they should ethnically step up.

>> can i ask, how do you recommend various effort of the u.s. to rebuild do not improperly empower political factions during or as a result of that consultation process? >> that requires heavy engagement so you have as many>o sources and input in the process and proper input to have a sense of the political landscape, so they will produce the best decision you can make.

talk to as many groups as you can and that will produce the best decision you can make --not always perfect, but it will be better than otherwise. >> i was there from the beginning, and we went in as liberators and became recognized as the occupiers. we requested it from the un. we were in charge of their money and spent it. how did we do with their money? >> we have done 29 audit on that subject. our last one issued in january found that controls were week, accountability was poor with

regard to 11.7 billion of the 24 billion of which we had control. control continued to several billion to find the contract. -- to fund contracts. there were specific examples of fraud that we uncovered. in babylon,we broke a fraud scheme that resulted in the theft of tens of billions. conviction of eight people. the big crimes occurred on the iraqi side. corruption has been a cancer. i call it the second insurgency in iraq. it's still burdens the country today.

you remember the minister and his deputies stole $1.2 billion. >> samir is in america. station, the police and he is going to go to jail. why? he is an american citizen. they are after him. but they are after him. questions? fred, last question. >> i think it is important as we have this conversation about details of the program to realize why this is so important.

towe realize we do not want go to war again, we start asking questions about what options we have in the national arena. other than giving speeches,this is one of them. you are talking about holding an alternative. important is very that not get lost in the discussion, but you are also talking about something that would coordinate i committees of this date department -- of the state department, and you gave a shout out for the program, which i was happy to hear because the experience has a very valuable, but we also found the program was at odds with the traditional international development

priorities. there seem to be a lap between traditional development and stability operations that i to ask you about the culture clash. even if we could cobble something together, would a philosophy negate the value that would mitigate it? >> culture clash is what he used when i interviewed him. he said, ambassador to help. hill.assador it is a bureaucratic issue. it is apropos of the need to

reform. if we do not do any in, the problem will recur. there is very little activity across lines within the system. they take policy guidance from national security. this is what usoco would result. that is whose job it is to mediate in all spheres. the direct are also reports, it is unique in executive branch systems, and these challenges are unique. in the history of our national security strategy. i think,unless it is identified as a current challenge, and

unless there are open discussions about how to resolve it, you will be culture clash again. >> may i ask you whether you have closing comments? >> first, thank you. it is great to be with you. great question. we are really delving into the issue. i have spent part of the mission, and i think it has allowed me to contribute, and it has been a privilege to do that. my dad was a fighter pilot, and i come from a military background myself. serving in iraq was a privilege.

to contribute to the improvement of the program was an honor. to share the lessons was an honor. thank you. >> thank you for your presence, for your long service your career but particularly through the last nine and a half years. i think there are few who have the same tenure of service and few who have the same insight into our engagement and the operation that has consumed so much of our effort, our funding, and many, many, many lives. i have a really good insight into some of the ongoing

project. i think whatever the dictates, whatever is demonstrated, it suggests we ought to have the capacity to engage in stabilization, whether we believe we will have a large intervention or not. we have heard about u.s. forces owing to jordan to help with the spillover of the crisis from syria. that raises a red flag, because it means even if we have the

desire not to engage in conflict, we must engage in stabilization, the stability, and some of the societies that are really prone to conflict. i thank you for the insight you have given us. for our audience, please check out it predecessor, and i -- check out learning from iraq and its predecessor, hard lessons and i invite you to --it the website to learntanding war,oeg,

more about the conflict in iraq, the conflict in syria, and ongoing operations in afghanistan. thanks for joining us today. [applause] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2013]

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at 9:15,"the salt lake tribune" talk ♪ host: former representative bill gray died yesterday while attending wimbledon good senator mark udall's brother is missing. mitch mcconnell has a senate challenger. as are some stories we're looking at as we go through the newspapers here on "washington journal." as we go through the papers, we want to hear from republicans only on immigration reform. the house is getting prepared to debate the topic. republicans only, should there be immigration reform? yes or no and why or why not?