federal government. guidance ash their i think the federal government is the best way to spread whatever needs to be spread down as far cybersecurity. >> what did you think of what the governors had to say here? do you think they would go along with taking the federal lead? >> i would hope so. i would hope that they would not play partisan politics. i hope their constituents would not override what the government has to say. i just think the thing to follow the federal government instructions. >> thank you. withst want to know,

cybersecurity, is that going to mess up people's social security? it, the iraq he's already have the money anyway. so what is the use of having cybersecurity? we are living in a country where we have a democrat for president, i think you're doing a good job. he needs to do more to fight those people out in iraq. >> thank you, lloyd. next, we have another caller. what state are you calling from?

>> i noticed legislator in the state of new hampshire for 30 years, but we do not depend on the government. governor in this state, we insist, become leaders. the leaders in the state do not depend on government for anything at all. stills why we're prospering without a government income tax. concern about any cybersecurity? >> we are very concerned about that. family living out an arizona, and i'm very concerned

about that. we have a bunch of people moving in. >> we are going to move on. thomas is in south carolina. in i.t. myself. onave a couple of questions what our states can do in cybersecurity. had these huge irs advance of the news. regulation, clear how will we know what is going on with our government, when they keep holding so much back? there is a lot more abrasion i would like to know on how small businesses could row and thrive -- grow and thrive read -- th rive. >> you bring up a good point.

the bill that is making its way through congress said it will be setting up a training plan for more people like you. you can read more on the washington post and its article about this bill in congress. it will not incorporate some changes that have been requested, i will not have rules about the private sector. it provides no liability protection. fromorge, calling colorado? >> no, i'm going through indiana. you have international companies have these companies computers.

to george, and george is the one who has been trying to call people. i've been trying to know what it i was in michigan, and everything started from there. congress made a mist ache -- mis take. the economy is not going to go anywhere. i'm telling you. , it started from 1980. reagan was elected. went bad. >> thank you, george. we will leave it there. we are watching just the end of the cybersecurity session here, the final session for the nga

summer meeting. they met in milwaukee. technology professional. they do not invest in security. they usually have these plans that are incorporated by the state, and the state has the obligation where management ignores obvious threats. ched.get reach -- brea

is almost like banks not locking their vaults every night. >> do you think we are headed in that direction? >> i have spoken to the attorney general, and he is slowly coming realization. it is more the local property thefts, the illegal credit card information, that is still a lot of industry. they do not do anything until there been a breach, and then when they do something they only do it part way. out west toow move bre, illinois.

i am actually the stepdaughter of a chief of staff , and a speechwriter. i want to say one thing. i think everyone should ask themselves the big question. ask if it is smart or dumb, because the truth of the matter is depending on what your cell phone is reporting on her applications, a lot of people will be able to access your text messages and phone numbers. they can access other information. i think it is important for people to check themselves, and i always recommend people to read every single word on a contractor for greeting to -- before agreeing to sign it. >> thank you, brian will be our last call.

>> eyes wanted to make a quick profit. -- i just wanted to make a quick comment. perhaps we should be the first country to branch out and have a separate cybersecurity force. to use those young people from the military's like we have before. >> thank you, ryan. we will thank you and leave it there. thank you for everyone who called in. if you want to get in touch with c-span and get in touch with what we are doing online, go to [video clip] ortp://twitter.com/cspanwj journal@c-span.org.

we will turn now to international events. the state department issued a global travel alert. and consulates were closed as of today. on meet the press, two senators talked about this situation. the alert, andut the embassy security. here's some of what they had to say. >> i logged of chatter out there. the planning that is going on by the terrorists. it is what we saw pre-9/11. here, i think it is very important that we do take the right kind of planning. as we come to the close of

ramadan, we know that is a very interesting time. we are also 30 days away from the september 11 anniversary, so we are paying close attention to the chatter that is going on. the most serious threat that i have seen in the last several years. >> what makes it so serious? what thepon -- it is nature of the tax could be -- at ttack could be? this seems like a wide net that is being covered, we do not know the location. on we do have some specifics what is intended to be done. some individuals who are making plans, such as we saw before 9/11. vest that are going to be used, or whether they are

bombsng on vehicle borne being carried into an area. we do not know these things. but we're hearing those same types of chatter that we heard other anecdotes. us --sident biden gave vice president biden gave us a classified briefing last week and he gave us some areas that were particularly brutal world around the world. -- vulnerable around the world. some upgrades that need to be made, specifically 35 embassies around the world need specific upgrade in their security. we are living in an increasingly dangerous world, and this overfic threat, over and again, has reached a new level. correct that with illinois senator dick durbin with his,

it's. berger -- ive ropers ruppersberger and peter king also talked about the embassy threats. thing to do now is to protect americans throughout the world. we know that al qaeda and other people out there, will attack and kill us and our allies. haveood thing is that we good intelligence. portant to get- im this intelligence and facts. thatu heard him say operatives are in place. peoplee are high-level al qaedaight -- al

are talking about specific attacks. >> this is also spread domestically. we are on a higher alert here domestically. i do not think americans really understand the threat that is growing over the last few days. why the highroller's here in america -- why the higher alert here in america? tothey were so specific as the certain dates that we were given. we just do not know where it is going to be. the assumption is that is going to be most likely in the middle east around one of the embassies. but there is no guarantee. in the unitedhere

states, it could be a series of worldwide attacks. we have to be ready for everything. i think the ministration has embassies,lster the and also let state and local government no over the last several this is a wake-up call. al qaeda has mutated and spread. >> he also talked about the u.s. embassy closings. he was before the young americans for liberty conference. a former representative and 2012 presidential candidate. i lean towards optimism.

but i am concerned about what other countries have done. they usually go towards totalitarians. people get frightened. they scare people. we are told that there's going to be a lot of attacks around the world trade we are closing down embassies. saved you from all this grief because we saved all these attacks. the last 100 attacks they said they had stopped by the fbi, one of them was it no one. the 99 were once they participated in and set up and enticed and track people into participated they in and set up and enticed and track people into doing. [applause] you can watch all of ron paul aul's remarks -- p right after "newsmakers."

administration released new nsa documents about their data collection program. representatives from the nsa as well as fbi and justice department appeared before congress last week. this is two hours. >> good morning. today the judiciary committee will scrutinize government surveillance programs conducted on the foreign intelligence .urveillance act in the years since september 11, congress has expanded fisa,

given the government sweeping powers to collect information on law-abiding americans. we must carefully consider whether those laws may have gone too far. last month americans learned for the first time the one of these 215 of the, section u.s. patriot act has for years been secretly interpreted to authorize collection of phone records. information was leaked about section 202. collectrizes the nsa to communications overseas. the way thatone these programs were disclosed. i'm concerned about the to oural damage

intelligence capabilities and national security. it is appropriate to hold people accountable for allowing such a massive leak to occur. we need to examine how to prevent this type of reach in the future. , thee wake of the leaks president said this is an opportunity to have an open and thoughtful debate about these issues. i welcome that statement. this is a debate that several of us on the committee have been trying to have for years. some of the others will get the classified briefings, but then you can't talk about them. if we're going to have the debate that the president called for, the executive branch has to be a full partner. we need straightforward answers. i'm concerned we are not getting them. just recently, the director of national intelligence acknowledged he provided false testimony about the nsa cost -- nsa's surveillance program.

i appreciate it is difficult to talk about classified programs in public settings. the american people expect and deserve honest answers. it has been thought to get -- to difficult to get answers about the program, but this program is a critical national security tool. some supporters of this program have repeatedly come to light about the efficacy of this complained about the efficacy of this section 215 . i don't think it is a coincidence when we have people make thatent comparison, but it needs to stop. the americanof people is beginning to wear thin. what has to be of more concern for the trustacy

of the american people is wearing thin. i asked general alexander about the effectiveness of section 215 . at a hearing last month he agreed to provide a classified list of terrorist events that section 215 helped to prevent. i reviewed that list. it does not do the same for section 215. the list does not find the events that were hoped to prevent. these facts matter. the collection has massive privacy implications. the phone records of all of us in this room reside in a

database. i have said repeatedly, just because we have the ability to collect huge amounts of data does not mean we should be doing so. the collection of internet metadata was shut down because it failed to provide intelligence. we need to take an equally close look at the phone records program. this program is not effective, and so it has to end. i'm not convinced by what i have seen. hear frome will witnesses today who said these programs are critical, have been identifying. the government is already collecting data on millions of innocent americans on a daily basis, based on a secret legal interpretation of the statute that does not, on its face, appeared to authorize this type of collection. so what will be next? when is enough enough?

congress has to consider the powerful surveillance tools granted in government, and make sure there is stringent accountability and transparency. i have introduced a bill that addresses section 215 and 702. it involves wiretaps, other authorities under the patriot act. the protection of americans' privacy is not a partisan issue. i thank senator lee of utah and others for the support i hope other senators will join that -- effort.ied current member of the judiciary, former judge of the fisa court. i hope this will give us an opportunity for an open debate courtthe law and the fisa

that led us to this decision. we will call on senator grassley, and then the first panel. we will put the statement in the record. it did not arrive in time. senator grassley. >> mr. chairman, i thank you for holding this hearing. it is very important that congress do its oversight work, which this hearing is part of, but even more important the more secretive a program is, the more oversight the congress has. as you have said, probably more about this program could be told to the public. undetanding and less

questioning on the part of the public. the foreign intelligence surveillance act provides the statutory framework for electronic surveillance in the context of foreign intelligence gathering. investigating threats to our national security gives rise to a tension between the protections of citizens' privacy, rights, and the government's legitimate national security interests. congress has sought through this legislation -- i hope successfully -- to strike a balance in this sensitive area. balanceit is the right is one of the reasons why we're having this hearing. the reports in the media have raised important questions whatding exactly information about american citizens is being collected by the government, whether the programs are being conducted as

and whetherended, there are sufficient safeguards to ensure that they cannot he abused by this -- be abused by or any future administration. questions have been raised about whether the proper balance has been struck. we need to look no further than the recent irs scandal to see what can happen when a non- checked executive branch bureaucracy with immense power targets political opponents. these actions trampled many citizens' basic rights to participate in our democratic process. this kind of abuse cannot be permitted to occur in our national security agencies as well. oversight by congress will play an important role as we move forward in evaluating the wisdom and value of the intelligence programs. accurateneeds

information to conduct oversight responsibilities that the constitution demands we do under our checks and balances of government. that is why it was especially disturbing to see that the director of national intelligence was forced to apologize for inaccurate ailments he made last march -- statements he made last march before the senate intelligence committee. though statements concern one of the very important programs we will be hearing -- those statements concern one of the very important programs we will be hearing about today. we have a constitutional duty to protect americans' privacy. we also have an equal constitutional responsibility to ensure that the government provides a strong national defense. that is a given. and intelligence gathering is as part of a defense.

we have a duty to ensure that the men and women of our military, our intelligence, and counterterrorism communities have the tools they need to get the job done. i understand officials contend that the programs authorized under fisa that we will discuss today are critical tools that have assisted them in disrupting attacks both here and abroad. to the extent possible in this unclassified setting, i look for to hearing how these programs have made our nation safer. i want to emphasize that this is an equally important part of the balance that we have to strike. as we consider whether reform of these intelligence programs is necessary or desirable, we must also make sure that we don't overreact and repeat the mistakes of the past. we know that before 9/11, there was a wall erected under the clinton administration between intelligence gathering and law

enforcement. that wall contributed to our failure to be able to connect the dots and prevent 9/11. none of the reforms that we consider should effectively rebuild that law. while the intelligence and law enforcement communities need to share information and walk away, any reform we consider should not consider the differences between these contexts. no reform should be based on a that foreignality terrorists on foreign soil are entitled to the constitutional rights that americans expect here. increased transparency is a worthy goal in general. whenever we can talk about these programs, there is less questions out there in the minds of people. we have probably created some public relations problems for us and this program and our national security community

because maybe we haven't made enough information available. i say that understanding that we what tell our enemies tools we use. but if we consider any reform that may bring more transparency to the fisa project, we should keep in mind that every bit of information we make available to the public to be read by a determined adversary. that adversary has already demonstrated the capacity to kill allison's of americans on our own -- millions of americans on our own soil. we seek to strike the difficult and sensitive balance between privacy and security. thank you very much. our first witness will be james cole. he joined the department of justice in 1979. he served for 13 years and the criminal division -- in the

criminal division. mr. cole is no stranger to this committee. please go ahead. >> thank you, mr. chairman. ranking members of the committee , thank you for inviting us here to speak about the 2015 business records program. we are constantly seeking to achieve the right balance between the protection of national security and the protection of privacy and civil liberties. we believe these two programs have achieved the right balance. all programs are conducted under public statutes, past, and later reauthorized by congress. neither is a program that has been hidden away. governmentranches of play a significant role in the oversight of these programs. foreignciary to the intelligence surveillance court

plays a role in authorizing the programs and overseeing compliance. the executive branch conducts extensive internal reviews to ensure compliance. congress passes the laws, oversees the implementation, and determines whether the current laws should be reauthorized and in what form. let me explain how this has worked in the concept of the 1215 -- 215 program. it involves the collection of metadata from telephone calls. these are records maintained by the phone companies. they include the number the call was styled from, the number the call was styled to, date and time of the call, and length -- , date and timeto of the call, and length. they do not include cell site or other location information. they do not include the content of any phone calls. these are the kinds of record that under long-standing supreme

court precedents are not protected by the fourth amendment. the short court order published in the newspapers only allows the government to acquire the phone records. it does not allow the government to access or use them. the terms under which the government a access or use the records is covered by another, thatdetailed court order the dni declassify today. another other court order called the primary order provides that the government can search the data it has reasonable, articulable suspicion if the phone number being searched is associated with certain terrorist organizations. the order imposes numerous other restrictions on nsa to ensure that only properly trained --lysts a access the data, can access the data. justification is important so he

can be reviewed by supervisors before the search and audited afterwards to ensure compliance. in the criminal context, the government could obtain the same type of records with subpoena. every 90o to the court days to seek authorization to collect records. since 2006, the court has authorized a program on 34 separate occasions involving 14 different judges. as part of that renewal process, we inform the court whether there have been any compliance issues. courtre have been, the will take a hard look and make sure we have corrected those problems. as we explained to the fisa judges -- they don't approve an order until they are satisfied we have met all statutory and constitutional requirements. congress also plays a

significant role in this program. the classified details of this program have been extensively briefed to the judiciary and intelligence committees and their staff. if there are any significant issues that arrive with the 215 programs, we would report those to the committees right away. any significant interpretations by the fisa court would be reported to the committees under statutory obligations, including opinions of significant interpretation along with any court orders that go with that. in addition, congress plays a role in reauthorizing the provision under which the government carries out this program and has done so since 2006. action 215 of the patriot has been renewed several times since the program was initiated. connection with recent renewals, the government provided a classified briefing paper to the house and senate intelligence committees to be made available to all members of congress.

set up theg paper operation of the program in detail, explained that the hadrnment and fisa court interpreted the 215 authorization to authorize both election of telephone metadata and stated that the government was collecting such in formation. -- information. the dni declassify and release those papers today. declassified and released those papers today. although we could not talk publicly about the program at the time since it was properly classified, the executive branch took all reasonable, available steps to ensure that members of congress were appropriately informed about the programs when they renewed it. i understand there have been recent proposals to amend section 215 to limit

both collection of telephone metadata. as the president has said, we welcome public debate about how to best safeguard our national security and the privacy of our citizens. considering in the coming days and weeks further steps to declassify information and help facilitate that debate, just as we have done this morning in releasing the primary order and congressional briefing papers. in the meantime, we look forward to working with the congress to determine a careful and deliberate way the tools can best be structured and secured to secure the nation and protect .ur privacy and civil liberties >> the administration did you classify this quarter -- did declassify this quarter.

ask a question. before we go into the legality and usefulness of this, we had a huge security breach committed by edward snowden. it appears that manning downloaded hundreds of classified as is if documents and downloaded them to wikileaks. if this had happened in the private sector, somebody would have been accountable by now. there's a lot of material kept in the private sector, trade secrets and so on. if they allow this kind of leaking in most countries, someone would be held accountable. who at the nsa is taking responsibility for allowing this incredibly damaging security breach to occur? >> accountability must be considered at two levels, at

least. one of the individual level. we have to take a hard look to see whether individuals exercised the responsibilities appropriately, whether they exercised you diligence -- due diligence -- >> obviously, there wasn't. dropoutyear-old school can come in and take out massive obviousof data, it's there were not adequate controls. has anyone been fired? >> not yet. >> is anyone been admonished? those investigations are underway. when they are complete, we will have full accounting to the executive branch and congress. day, we have the to look to see whether people exercise the responsibilities appropriately, whether they exercise the trust accorded to them in our system, and we extend top-secret special compartment at security clearances to a range of people

and expect they will exercise that trust as the american people intended. president reagan made of a statement about trust, but verify. i realize you have to have a considerable amount of trust. don't you have people doubled checking what someone is doing? >> yes. >> who checked mr. snowden? >> there are checks at multiple levels. >> you obviously failed. >> in this case, we can say that they failed, but we don't know where. >> he is sitting over at the airport in russia with millions of items. >> i would say that with the benefit of what we now know, they did fail. we may find that they failed at multiple points in the system. the exercise of individual responsibility and the design of

the system in the first place. >> has anyone offered to resign because of this failure? >> no. everyone is working hard to understand what happened -- >> how soon will we know who screwed up? >> i think we will know what over weeks and months what happened and who should be held accountable. are you taking any steps to make sure such a screwup does not happen again? >> we are. we instituted a range of mechanisms to ensure that we would understand and immediately be able to catch someone who try to repeat what mr. snowden did. andave to be creative thoughtful enough to understand there are many other ways that someone might try to beat the system. why somen understand people use expression, locking the door after the horse has been stalled? >> yes, sir. general alexander

is in las vegas, but i will ask you this question. last month i was promised to be provided with specific examples were section 215 phone records collection has been used. there were dozens of cases where 215 authority has been critical to discovery and disruption of terrorist plots. and reviewing the classified material that nsa sent, i'm far from convinced. .he document is classified section 215, thwarting 52 -- how manyots cases of section 215, phone , critical toction preventing a terrorist plot? >> i might offer to provide

details in a closed session. the administration has disclosed there were 54 plots but there were disrupted over the life of these two programs. >> section 215 was critical to preventing -- >> no, sir. of those plots, 13 of those had a homeland nexus. others have plots that i come to fruition -- europe, asia -- >> how many of those 13 were plots to harm americans? >> the 13 that would have had a homeland nexus. 12 of those. 215 minute contribution. your question was more precise. for case to bef made. that is a difficult question to answer. it is not how these programs work.

you essentially have a range of tools i your disposal. one or more of these tools might tip you to a plot. one of these tools might give you an exposure to what that tool is. multiple instruments, including law enforcement power, completes the picture. there is an example amongst those 13 that comes close to a but for example. >> i have read the material on that. the target 54, but for's -- >> this metadata is focused on the homeland, and -- -- is 54r his 54 cases cases. >> it made a contribution to a plot that was disrupted overseas. i think that shows that this is looking not simply t

homeland, at homeland nexus. mixing upwe are not 215 with other sections. >> they are distinguished but, -- comp laments rituals -- complementary tools. as youst want to add -- mentioned before, how many dots do we need. we need to frame who the adversary is and what they are trying to do. they're trying to harm america, strike america. we need all these tools. of 702tioned the value versus the value of business records to 15. they are different. i make the analogy like the baseball team. you have your most valuable player, but you have the players who hit singles every day.

i want to relate to the homeland plot. in the plot to bomb the new york subway system, business record to 15 played a role. yet identified specifically and number we did not previously -- it identified specifically a number we did not previously know. >> was there undercover work that took place there? >> yes. each tool plays a different role. >> was the fbi aware of the individual and in contact with them? yes, but not aware of that specific telephone number that nsa provided us. we could have more security if we strip search everybody who came into every building in america. we're not going to do that. borders close our completely. we're not going to do that.

if we put a wiretap on everybody's cell phone in america, if we search everybody's home. there are certain areas of our own privacy that we americans expect. at some point, you have to know where the balance is. mr. chairman, clarify for me -- we have had the testimony now, so we ask questions of all the people. inglistions of mr.: mr. -- cole and mr. inglis. >> i will start out with mr. cole. my questions are to emphasize to inform, and even the repetitive. the public needs a greater understanding of what we are up to here. there are two legal authorities

we are discussing here. one, section 702 authority. i'm going to lay that one aside. the other authority is section 215. many americans are concerned about the scope there. they fear the government is spying on them and prying into their personal lives. i asked questions to make absolutely sure i understand the scope of 215. first question, what information does the government collect .nder this program if anyone's name, address, social security or location collected? name, address, location, social security number is not collected under 215. it never has been, never will be. collection isthe very dependent on this reasonable, articulable suspicion. while a lot of metadata does

exist in a database, it cannot be accessed unless you go through the procedures of documenting that there is reasonable, articulable suspicion that the phone number you want to ask about is associated with terrorists. get that step made, you cannot enter that database and make a query. for emphasis, is the government listening in on any american phone calls through this program? i heard within the last week on some news media that somebody is declaring that any bureaucrat someplace and some intelligence agency can pick up the phone and listen to the conversation. >> nobody is listening to anybody's conversations to this program. through this program, nobody could. no information like that is being collected through this program. >> section 215 requires that

records collected out of the program provision b quote unqu ote, relevant to authorize investigation. as a legal matter, how can you justify the assertion that phone records of millions of americans who have nothing to do with terrorism are relevant to an authorized investigation under section 215? >> i begin by noting that a number of judges repeatedly over the years have found that these records are relevant. we arendard of relevance talking about is not the kind of relevance that you think about in the perry mason cents in a criminal trial. broader sense. conceptwell accepted that if you need to get a large group of records in order to find a smaller group of records that provide the information you need to move forward, the larger

group of records can be relevant. int is particularly true this case because of the kinds of controls that the deputy mentioned. the fact that the queries and access to data is limited. court has found that these records are relevant. any legal precedent that supports such a broad definition of relevance to an investigation? >> i defer that to the deputy general. >> the legal precedent comes from the history of the orders that have been issued. the courts having looked at this under the fisa law and provisions of 215, and making sure that under the provisions and ability to get these records relevant to a foreign intelligence investigation, they have gone through the law that was described on, i believe, 34

different occasions. the legal precedent is there. >> mr. joyce, one part of the two strike ise protecting privacy of americans. the other one, national security. boston bombing, we had prevented large-scale terrorist attacks on american soil. i have a few questions about how valuable the role of section 215 and 702 programs have played in predicting our national security . two questions, then i'll have to stop and go to our colleagues. can you describe any specific situation where section 215 and section 702 authorities helped disrupt a terrorist attack or identify individuals planning to times -- ifumber of you do not have authority to

collect phone records and evolve the way they are now under section 215, how would you have effected those investigations? as affers question, as for specific example of when we utilized both of these programs. plots sinceected 9/11. whenptember of 2009, others conspired to plot to bomb the new york subway system. about himly found out through and nsa 702 coverage. he was talking to an al qaeda courier. his help tog for perfect and explosives recipe. but for that, we would not have we followt the plot had coverage on him and others as we investigated the plot.

were submitting legal process, telephone numbers and other e-mail addresses, other selectors. of arovided another number co-conspirator. veryis an instance where a serious plot to attack america on u.s. soil that we used both these programs. there is a difference in the utility of the programs. each and every programming tool is valuable. there were gaps prior to 9/11. what we have collectively tried branch andexecutive intelligence community, we have tried to close those gaps. is oneiness record to 15 of these programs that we have closed those scenes. i respectfully say that the

utility of that program initially is not as available. valuable. it plays a crucial role in closing the gaps and seems that we fought hard to gain after the 9/11 attacks. when we use the business record program,gram -- 215 initially the fbi opened a case in 2003 based on a tip. we investigated that tip. we found no nexus to terrorism and closed the case. nsa advised us through the business records 215 program that a number in san diego was an contact with al qaeda in somalia. we identified the phone number.

through further investigation, we identified additional co- conspirators. convicted.een some pled guilty to material support to terrorism. to remember what happened in 9/11. everyone in this room remembers where they were and what happened. >> you are stating the obvious. we are going to have votes on the floor. want to keep someone close to the time -- we want to keep somewhat close to the time. >> you mentioned the dots. we must cap the dots to connect dots -- -- can it the have the dots to connect the dots. a lot of different abilities and various areas of expertise.

the next witness is the chair of the senate intelligence committee. questioner, senator .einstein it is a great advantage to us to have her on this committee. >> thank you very much. i would like to begin by putting a couple of letters and the -- in the record. for this program come up before the senate, explaining it, making the information available. the second is that same letter to the house. [indiscernible]

i believe mr. angus -- ingle s'statement makes an important fact available. it is on page four of his letter. described thate the query, the search of the database, can only be done on reasonable, articulable suspicion. only 22 people have access to that, trained and vetted analysts at the nsa. if the numbers are run and it ,ooks like there is a problem the report is made to the fbi. if theylooks at it. want to collect content, they must get a probable cause warrant from the foreign intelligence surveillance court. let me quote. based on those fewer than 300 selectors -- queries,

288 for americans, we provided a total of 12 reports to the fbi which altogether tipped less than 500 numbers. what you are saying, if i understand it, mr. english -- there were 12 possible cause warrants. is that correct? >> and in one of the numbers that were tipped could have led the fbi to develop probable cause on more than 12. there were less than 500 numbers in those reports collectively that were tipped to the fbi in 2012. >> let me ask mr. joyce this question. can you tell us how many orders -- how many probable cause warrants were issued by the fbi in 2012? >> i can't off the top of my head, senator. i can get you those numbers following the hearing.

>> we would appreciate that. very good point. whether the 702 program or the 215 program, once that information is passed to us, we must go to the foreign intelligence surveillance court and show probable cause on the weren't -- warrant to provide content as far as overhears for that specific individual. has produced and declassified a chart which i would like to make available to all members. it has the 54 total advance. it includes section 702 authority, and section 215 authority which essentially work together. disrupted a events stunning combination of these two programs.

europehe homeland, 25 in , five in africa, and 11 in asia. intelligence committee before 9/11. i remember how little information we had, and the of theith -- criticism government because of the inability to share intelligence and collect intelligence. we had no programs that could have possibly caught two people in san diego before the event took place. i support this program. know, they will come after us. we need to prevent an attack wherever we can from happening. that doesn't mean we can't make some changes. yesterday the intelligence committee, i outlined some

changes that we might consider as part of our authorization bill. let me quickly run through them. the number of americans phone numbers submitted as queries under regular basis, annually from the database -- the number of referrals made to the fbi each year, based on those queries. and how many times the fbi obtained probable cause warrants to collect the contents of a call, which we now know is very few times, relatively. the number of times that a company -- this is at their request, from the high-tech company -- that any company is required to provide data pursuant to fisa's business records provision. the companies who provide information are seeking to be able to speak more publicly about it. and i think we should. there are some changes we can make to the business records section.

we are looking at reducing the thatyear retention period nsa keeps phone records in its database down to two or three years. it is my understanding that the usefulness of it tails off as the years go on. we have to determine that point and inconsiderate. and requiring the nsa to send to the fisa court for its review, the records of each query of the database as soon as is practicable so the court can determine the propriety of the query under the law. these are things that can be ,one to increase transparency but not to stop the program. i believe that based on what i have seen -- i read intelligence regularly -- we would place this nation in jeopardy if we eliminated these two programs. thank you, mr. chairman. >> may i offer a brief response?

would you also include reporting how often nsa or anybody else goes to the individual's browsing history, social media activity? >> we could do that in the private sector, too. i wanted to say that i think the administration is more or less in the same place that senator finds thine is -- feinstein is. to running the program in a way that has public confidence and trust. house has directed the director of national intelligence to make changes in

those areas. we look forward to working with that committee to see if there are changes that can be made it will preside -- preserve the essence of the program. >> thank you. of the diversity we have. he is the deputy republican leader and we appreciate the amount of time he speaks in this committee. thanks to each of the witnesses for your service to this country. those of us who have been here for a little while and through the evolution of these programs have learned more than the public generally knows about how they operate. that should give us confidence in what is occurring. i am also sensitive to senator feinstein. it was reiterated, the importance of maintaining public

confidence in classified programs, which is a tough thing to do. i have also reminded the fact that 2007, we have 43 new members of the u.s. senate. there are been people who have come to the senate in recent years who perhaps have not been able to observe through their regular work some of the development of these programs. the hearing like this, the other hearings you participated in that i have attended have been important to giving everyone a foundation of information where they can have confidence on behalf of the people we represent. -- maybeike to ask starting with mr.: going down the line -- to get your reaction going criticism -- cole down the line -- to get your reaction to the criticism made by the foreign intelligence surveillance court judge james

robinson. this has to do with the nature partepartake -- ex proceedings before the court. when it comes to individualized warrants, it is common in our system to have ex parte proceedings. when the foreign intelligence surveillance court is authorizing a program, it is according to judge robertson under this expenditure is diction, it is turned the court into something of an administrative agency -- it hass jurisdiction, turned the court into something of an administrative agency. having more of an adversarial process -- i trust your experience with the adversarial

, usuallyn our courts produces more information that allows the judge to make a better decision. i would like to get your reaction. >> thank you, senator. i can tell you that we have had far more than another administrative agency. they push back hard. they make sure that they are the guardians of the law and the constitution. having an adversary -- and that is an area worth having a discussion about. it is being discussed in the senate and house. it is one of those areas that i think is part of the debate that i think we should be having about how to do this. there are issues that we will it's notwork through.

the usual course. in the criminal law context, we ,ave many search warrants title iii surveillance warrants the common that are not part -- that are not done in an adversarial way. this is part of what we would like to be doing and would like to see this has some utility. mydo you have any to add? >> background is obligation will -- operational. i have an obligation to ensure these things are done in a way that is consistent with the constitution. we welcome any any and all hard questions. we enjoy the process. we think that we should be held accountable to these questions. not just the defense of the national security, but the defense of civil liberties. >> the point i would like to make, from the perspective of the intelligence community is, this is unusual process.

the court being involved in the conduct of foreign intelligence. i do not know any other nation in the world that has the degree of overseeing that this nation people make a mistake and analogy when they hear the term, court, and think of this as an adversary proceeding. the question is, what is the best way to ensure that our intelligence programs are conducted in compliance with the protection forte people's privacy and civil liberties. to have an help adversarial process built into that, that would be entirely appropriate. we should not make this a criminal trial. >> my a different process. background is operational. i will defer to my leader. >> i hope you are we haveng that

something that is very unusual. i hope you're not saying that the courts should not be involved. >> i'm not saying that. >> thank you very much. as a former prosecutor, i have believed that our laws must strike the right balance between protecting our civil liberties and our national security. i think that most americans will say that they did not expect the sweeping nature of these surveillance programs. for that reason, i think this opportunity to re-examine these programs to make sure that they are more transparent without sacrificing the benefits they make to national security is very important. i just got this court order that is hot off the presses.

you said that the metadata, which i assume is the collected data that we have been hearing about on domestic phone calls, not the phone conversation itself. then we going to a second category when you are investigating parts of that metadata. that is based on this order. this is category three. this is when you get a court order to investigate a person. is that a fair way to look at this? >> that is a good way of looking at this. the only thing we are involved in surveilling are smaller groups that we have reasonable suspicion for. we are not surveilling everything that is in the database. you have to go to the specific requirements.

>> there would have to be reasonable suspicion that there is a terrorist? >> reasonable suspicion that it is relevant to an investigation of certain terrorist organizations. >> is there a percent of that data that you look at when you are getting to the big meta-data and go down to the next category. what percentage of the metadata is the next category? >> it is hard to quantify. i've heard anything from 0.0001%. it is a very tiny fraction of the metadata. >> we are down to the part where you are actually investigating. >> that is even smaller. we have to have probable cause to believe that those people are falling within the requirement of the foreign intelligence surveillance act. >> is there no way of limiting the program that would not have adverse effects on our ability to monitor national security

threats? >> this is what we're looking at right now. as chairman feinstein noted, she has made some recommendations and we are in the process of looking through that to see if there are other ways of going about doing this where we still preserve the effectiveness of the operation and limit whatever intrusions come from that. >> i know one idea that general alexander suggested is the idea of telecommunication companies holding the records, rather than the nsa. as long as the government could get access. do you want to testify about that? is that a viable alternative? >> there are multiple implementations that could work. we need to score the

implementations against a set of criteria. they also need to have sufficient breadth. let's say you have the situation with east africa and al qaeda. there is reasonable suspicion of a plot against the homeland. you want to check to see if there is a connection to the you have confidence that you can take that. if you get a response you found it. whether it was in any particular location. it is so you can do this in a timely way. weekend thi disrupt one that --e can do this that may matter. you have the time to take more time. we will have to think our way

meetgh whether they can that standard. to the question that senator feinstein has asked, do we need to hold these for five years? to have a significant tell all. there is a need that may live two years or three years. andeed to base it determine how long these things are necessary and how long they are valuable. it is to declassify some of the legal rationale. >> we are trying to classify a number of rings. our goal is to try to get out as much information as we can.

>> thank you very much, let me ask this. with regard to mr. joyce's comments about dealing with the thing that you could interdict and stop. the collection of data under this program played a role in the culmination of that case. fundamentally you are a -- you are a deputy attorney general under janet reno for six years you are the member of criminal justice. used ids issues using that as -- you have studied this issue. has this violated because it using it anyway by defying u.s. law and the constitution? >>

thank you for the promotion, i never served as judy attorney general. >> i have a hard time keeping all the deputy assistant straight. i just want to raise a certain point. i think the answer is under the controlling case law that the collection of this kind of telephone metadata from the telephone companies is not violating anyone's constitutional rights. >> when as a federal prosecutor, you are a federal posterior.

this complex case resulted in a subpoena to phone companies. >> i would say vast majority required phone records. when you did that, you would get a lot of details about the call, but not the contents of the call. >> you can get the subscriber information. once the phone and things of that nature. we do not get that under this program. >> this haystack of information is only numbers. it does not have the name of the person connected to that number. is that correct? >> if we find a thing that is important, we had to do other investigations to find out who belongs to those numbers. the chairman and others talked about, when the patriot act was passed, we went into great detail about this issue. i would say that balancing the constitutional rights of danger versus constitutional rights is not the right way to phrase this.

i believe that everything in the patriot act at we passed was consistent in principle with the things that have been done by law enforcement for years and decades, in terms of the ability to issue subpoena and obtain the records. there are a few new applications of its two new technologies. essentially, the principles were maintained. would you agree? lex yes. i think that we have struck the balance properly. there is always room for discussion and getting people's inputs. sometimes, we revisit these things and make sure that we get a balance right. >> i agree with that. this haystack of phone numbers, there is no ability to listen to any of these conversations that occurred, is there? >> no. we do not capture these conversations. there is no ability and no possibility of listening to conversations.

>> as an intelligence lawyer, you had the ability to tap a terrorist phone call in yemen. that person calls into the united states on a lawful wiretap, do you listen to the call? a wiretap listens to the conversation that the bad guy has with whoever they call. >> that is correct. under pfizer, the court requires us to have minimization procedures to make sure that we do not disseminate the communications of americans unless they are evidence of a crime or valid foreign intelligence. >> if you want to tap a terrorist in the united states, you have to have a warrant with probable cause, do you not? >> that is correct.

>> if you identify a person by surveilling a foreign terrorist, you still have to have information sufficient to get a title iii warrant to listen to that person's phone calls. >> they could be a title iii warrant or an individual warrant. either way, there is a relevant probable cause standard that has to be met. >> i know this committee has worked hard on this. we have tried to make sure that every provision in the act was consistent with our constitution and legal heritage. we will listen to the concerns that are being raised. if we have made a mistake, i am

going to change it. i'm inclined to think that all of these things are consistent with the constitution. >> one of the reasons that we are having this hearing is that there are going to be proposals for changing the law. >> thank you mr. chairman. i want to thank all the witnesses for their service to the country. >> i want to be clear at the outset, these programs protect our country and save lives. i think there is a critical problem at the center of this debate. that is the lack of transparency around these programs. the government has to give proper weight to keeping america safe from terrorists and protecting american's privacy. almost everything about these programs is secret.

the company is involved under strict gag orders in the american public has no way of knowing whether or not we are gain a balance right. that is bad for privacy and bad for democracy. tomorrow, i'm introducing a bill to fix this. it will force government to disclose how many americans have had to information collected under the key authorities of the foreign intelligence surveillance act. it will force the government to disclose how many americans have had the information reviewed by federal agents. my bill would allow private companies to disclose aggregate figures about the number of pfizer orders that they are receiving and the number of their users that these orders have affected. two weeks ago, a broad coalition of 63 internet companies and bipartisan civil liberties groups sent a letter to the

president asking for reforms that my bill would make law. i'm proud to say that i am introducing my bill with the support of chairman blakey -- leahy. senator feinstein and i might have some overlap in our purchase. i will be happy to work with her. i like to focus my questions on transparency. in the weeks after mr. snowden's leaks, the office of the director of national intelligence decide to declassify the fact that in 2012, 300 queries were run on the database of records under section 215 of the patriot act. can you tell me why this fact was declassified? >> to be cleared, what was declassified was the fact that there were fewer than 300 telephone numbers approved for queries.

there can be more than one query, based on the same telephone number. for example, over time, you can check. the number that was clicked -- that was declassified was the one under reasonable and articulable suspicion. >> why did you decide to declassify the fact? we are looking at all the information surrounding these programs. what has already been revealed. fundamentally, these programs were declassified to begin with because revealing our capabilities would give our adversaries and edge in how to

avoid these abilities. once these programs became public, we listed at all the details around these programs. we are making assessment to each one of them to make sure that it is in the public interest to release that fact that has been declassified. i think that -- i do not want the public to take our word. i think there's a balance here. transparency is part of that balance.

i do not want a situation where the government is transparent only when it is convenient for the government. >> i think -- >> about an hour ago, there is a revision to section 215. for weeks, they knew this hearing was coming. they release his before the hearing began. again, it is a step forward, but you get the feeling that it is ad hoc transparency. that does not engender trust. >> i cannot agree with you more. we have in the -- an obligation to look at the bad and the good and declassify what can be declassified without danger. we had a discussion within the executive branch about whether or not we should release these documents is morning or not. is generally not a good idea to release things on the morning of >> did you just are about that decision yesterday? your known about this a long time. you might have thought about this weeks ago. instead of, the day of. >> we have been processing the's as quickly as we can.

they're things that remain classified. it is a time-consuming interagency process. >> my time is up. i think that we should create a strong permanent set of public reporting requirements that will empower the public to recent own conclusions about the merits of these programs. that is with the bill i am working on will accomplish. i love to work with senator feinstein. i would love it if you would work with me to make sure that we get the reporting requirements right as we move forward with the bill. would you do that? >> absolutely. i would be glad to do that. >> i want to comment all for the witnesses here for their candor and on one at single out mr. inglis.

i have been advised that you have always been clear and straightforward. often that is in classified sessions. however, that is in open sessions. >> i'm sorry i was not here to hear your testimony. i know you have all noted in your written testimonies that there are checks within the fisa system. do you believe that there are insufficient checks to outweigh the concerns that some have about the appointment of an independent counsel? if you have touched on this in earlier questions, i apologize. you mention this with regard to independent counsel. in the second panel, mr. baker raise concerns with the independent counsel. can you give me your thoughts about whether or not it is needed?

>> this is a topic being discussed within the administration and congress as one avenue that might be available. traditionally, when you issue search warrants and wiretaps, you do not have an absurd a process that takes place. there's not someone on the other side. there is a legal tradition that the way we have been doing it is one that we have done in other context. we have a court involved. that is unusual, as it was pointed out. ridiculously within a foreign intelligence context. this is something that we are open to having discussions about. what the utility and the role would be. how would work. the devil could be in the

details. all of these things are worth discussing. >> if there was an independent counsel involved, would there be problems of timeliness? would you have staff cleared to review sensitive information if others wanted to address that? >> i will start -- it may be, a little bit. the core pushes back -- the court pushes back itself. we make sure that we satisfy all the requirements under the law and constitution. and there's someone on the other side, i would would imagine they do the same thing on the same schedule. >> there is a letter that the chief judge of the foreign intelligence surveillance court has written to the chairman. it is available on the internet and outlines, in some detail, the procedures that the court has followed. it indicates the care that the fisa court has followed.

>> there has been criticism about the process that we have in the selection of these judges. and may lead to more republican judges being appointed then democrats. do you sense or see any difference with -- with -- is that an issue that people should be concerned about? >> from my experience, i have not seen any decisions that are being guided by politics. that is certainly a topic that we would be to the sound discretion of congress. >> other thoughts? >> any problem with the process of selection of judges? >> it is hard to tell how another judge would have rendered the decision. you only have the one judge rendering the decision. >> thank you.

>> thank you. i'm a liberal arts lawyer. i took some courses but it has been a long time ago. i'll ask the panelists to help me do some math. in 2012, there were 300 questions that resulted in a search of records. we are told that there are three hops. if i was the subject matter of the search and i called senator feinstein, they would evacuate all the records of my telephone calls. and all of the telephone calls of senator feinstein. it may include chairman leahy. mr. jennifer, of the aclu, will testify and speculate later that if i had 40 contacts, that would mean that for my name, you would accumulate 2 million phone records. 2 million.

for one inquiry. multiply that by 300. we're talking about 600 million phone records. multiply that times seven years. what has been described as a discrete program, to go after people who would cause us harm, when you look at the reach of this program, it envelops a substantial number of americans. can somebody help me with the math here question mark have i missed something along the way can someone help me with the math here? have i missed something along the way? >> i would be happy to follow up in any detail that you'd like. first and foremost, analysts are

charged with providing information that is useful. in that regard, they try to be judicious about choosing when to do a second or third hop. those are always exercised. they do not always exercise a second half for all numbers provided by the first top. theoretically, 40 times 40 times 40 get you to a large number. what we see, for example is that the second hop, there are significant numbers that are associated with that number. it will have to come with something that you glommed onto. you do not want to pursue a pizza delivery man. that is not useful. if, on the second hop, you see it is linked to a number that is

to a known terrorist, you want to make a third hop. >> i understand that part. we're trying not to waste the time and resources of government. the reach of this goes beyond 300. but that is an important question. we have to compare the theory to practice. the reason we declassify the numbers is to show that we are judicious. only 300 times it we use a selector for query. >> if i can add one thing, it is important to remember that all we are getting out of this is numbers. nobody's name, nobody's address. this is a tool to identify health phone numbers. >> i understand that.

here is what i offered to a committee that garnered four votes. most members were not aware of this to 15 program in detail. i knew more than some. not as much as i am learning today. there is concern today. at that time, he cousin limited knowledge of the members, i got four votes. if my cell phone is an area code 217, which it is, and i am a suspect, i think is appropriate and eying courage my government to find out why i'm talking to. that is important will stop i cannot get to the point where i required everyone who was a 217 area code to have the records collected. multiply that across every area code in america. look at the potential reach. it seems to me that what is being described as a narrow program is, in fact, a broad program. what i would like to ask is, we have saved lives with this.

the 215 program has saved lives. good. that is what we want our government to do. could we have saved the same amount of lives if, knowing my phone number, as a suspect, you could search my records as opposed to everyone's records in my area code. >> i think that is a great question. what we knew only made this query was that we had a reasonable suspicion that this was affiliated with a terrorist plotting against the homeland. this was associated with al shabab. we need to do where he -- query. we do not know what area code it

would be. we do not know the set of possibilities. and were defined the needle, -- in order to find the needle, we needed the haystack. before we made that clear he, -- the query, we can now. -- we did not know. >> this operative, you can go after this person and his telephone records. the question we are faced with is, you need five years worth of data on everyone in america so that the haystack -- >> that is a fair question. in the future, it may well be that the plot occurred in the past. if you do not have the past

records you cannot determine -- >> that is -- >> that is a fair point and it is possible. >> i agree. >> under the current legal framing -- >> how hard would it be? i do not think it would -- i do not think it would be hard. >> senator feinstein said to ask him about the expense. >> within classified session, i can give you chapter and verse about the expense. the expenses are different. the government requires the providers to retain the records to share the expense. >> thank you.

i understand the nsa's collection of metadata -- the kind of metadata that we have discussed today -- is accomplished under 215 of the patriot act. section 215 faces an important limitation on the collection in that it limits the government's ability to collect the metadata. it has to be relevant to an authorized investigation. at some point, relevance is a concept that is difficult to define in the abstract. it is a fluid concept. it is something that a jurist might say, i know when i see it. they struggle to define it. even though it may be difficult to define, in the abstract, what relevance is, haven't we left the station of relevance before we get to the point of collecting metadata for 300 million americans.

-- americans? how can you get your mind around that concept of all that information being relevant to an ongoing investigation? >> senator, it had been noted how broad the concept of relevance is in civil discovery and many different legal contexts. it can be things that can lead you to things that you need. >> right. i understand a broad conception of relevance that was explained at the brookings tax -- at the brookings institution.

there is no context, and civil discovery or otherwise, where one could justify taking in information about each and every single american who owns a telephone. >> the answer i would give you, senator, is that we are not accessing, or getting into all of the metadata. we do not get to look at it until our heart is content. you have to look at it within the context of the primary order that was declassified today. it says that the only way you can access it is it you have a reasonable and articulable belief that this is related to specific terrorist groups. if you do not have that, you cannot get into this.

the surveillance concept is important. you cannot surveilled this without that gate being checked through. >> that gate is not controlled by a warrant. if you want to access that, you do not have to go to court, correct? >> that is correct. their control by the court order and compliance audits that are done by the executive branch and the court looks at how it is implemented on a periodic basis. >> very briefly, i want to make clear that the standard of relevance that i articulated is not mine. it has been approved by the judge of the fisa court and was known to the members of this committee and intelligence

committee at the time that 215 was renewed. >> i understand that. that is part of the problem that we have. until recently, most people did not have any idea about those and we had constraints that limited our ability to explain why we had concerns about the patriot act on both sides of the aisle and we voted against it. we were unable to speak against it because we have secret procedures pursuant to secret law. it has been a bit of a problem. what would you say -- getting back to you -- i understand what you are saying, we are collecting it and we are not looking at it. we're closing our eyes. to not wearing about it. what would you say to my constituents would say, i did not want the government having this information. it doesn't meet what is a

reasonable expectation of privacy. to collect that much information, the information of 300 million americans. lex i would say two things. we have had 34 different times where the court has said that meets the standard of relevance. further, what we are doing today. it is worth having a debate about whether or not there is a better way to do it. is about having a debate -- it is worth having that debate about where we are finding security for the nation and civil liberties. that's a a tough balance to find, it is worth talking about. it is a process we are welcoming. >> thank you. i see my time has expired. i appreciate your insight.

i think it is worth discussing publicly. we need to consider this from a constitutional standpoint. we have been relying on a 34- year-old supreme court case, smith versus maryland, to get at this idea that metadata is belong -- beyond the reach of the fourth amendment. involve collection on a single target and on a standard that is our character -- archaic and would involve a mini school amount of information. we collect this much information on this many people, and create some problem. that much data on hundreds of millions of people creates a big problem that was not considered the united states and maryland versus smith.

>> thank you. senator whitehouse. you have served on this committee and the intelligence committee. >> thank you. one of the -- mr. cole, you have said that it is worst having a debate -- worth having a debate on these issues. you're right about that. i hope the executive branch take a lesson from this experience about the value of classification or, what i would consider to be overclassification. i've seen this over and over. when we are fighting with the bush administration about the

torture program, the executive branch got to tell its side of the story because the executive branch was the classifier. we were stuck with fax that we knew him well the argument -- we were stuck with facts that we knew blew up the argument. where becoming more aware -- we are becoming more aware. in the private sector, companies didn't want to talk about it. the government over classified everything. now, i think we have a terrific article that senator feinstein wrote. we have good testimony by bob mueller. we have good information out there that helps the american people understand this program.

it all came out late. it all came out in response to a leaker. there was no organized clan for how we rationally declassify this. there is an executive branch reaction towards classification. that reaction is, in part, because it did and that it gives to the executive branch over the legislative branch. looking back, we are worse off for that effort in the first instance. i would urge you to take a look at this.

there is this old saying of, i'm not going to get exactly right, but, the rumor is across town before the truth can get its boots on. you have lived that experience. i hope that this is had an effect on you because it is a recurring problem. we need to be thinking about the value of declassification against the value of classification. you guys are one-sided, in favor of investigation -- classification. you guys are trying to get your boots on because you do not take appropriate steps that would avoid a lot of this . -- this. >> you make a valid point. these are topics that we need to debate. they are not easy. they involved that balancing that we are trying to do between

national security and civil liberties. what kinds of programs we put into place to gain intelligence. it is the same kind of debate that we need to have about what is and is not classified. if it was easy, we would have this left and right. from what i have seen, the executive branch is not doing this to disadvantage the legislative branch. >> it has that effect. >> and may have that effect. i will concede that. it is easier to over classified van under classified. it is safer to over classified van under classified. -- overclassify than underclassify. >> it was shown to be the wrong decision.

>> i want to add to this. you're familiar with what i'm going to say. this public debate is not without cost. it does damage to our ability to protect our nation. we are losing capabilities. abel are not paying attention to this. the way we go to this legislation and it passes through its internal rules, it has sought to achieve the balance between the needs to protect sources and methods through the intelligence committee and the other committees. typically, this the form that has been used to strike this balance. >> we all get that. my point is, the american public is an important part of this debate. we would be better off if there is not such a strong instinct in favor of keeping things

classified. if we develop ways to minimize that intelligence collection loss to have this debate. thank you. >> thank you. i want to thank the chairman for this hearing and his legislative proposal. to each of you, for your extraordinary contribution to our nation and the thousands of others in the intelligence community who have thwarted and stopped terrorist threats to this country which, all too often, i believe, have been ignored because the efforts to stop them have been so successful. the debate, as mr. cole has termed it, is important.