on the -- ciber has made a tremendous difference in the intelligence business because that is where information goes i think most of us have been in the business would feel a lot a keyif we missed communications that have we intercepted it, had we interpret correctly it would have saved the lives of our citizens than if we had not taken the effort to do it. so the information is exploding. we had this nagging suspicion there may be something out there which would save the lives of our fellow citizens or those in other countries, and we are driven by trying to be able to do that, interpreted correctly, get the information to the right people to save lives. that is the motivation of 99.9% of those of us who are in that business and i think that is

what our citizens ought to expect, and they get it. >> i have been given a two- minute warning so i think this will have to be the last. >> my name is chris taylor. thank you so much for your service to our nation. is it time for the national security act of 2014? is it time for us to truly sit down and talk about a national security budget, true national security budget? and with that have helped or hindered you in your previous jobs as dni? bei think you might just running the risk of opening a ofe can of forms -- can worms if you try to come up with new national security act legislation, at least from an intelligence perspective i would have thought you might advocate new legislation if you felt the

intelligence reform simply wasn't working. and my assessment is that it is working. it is not perfect. ideal.ot i would not have even advocated it myself eight or 10 years ago. we took over the community management staff functions of and the law presented us with that outcome. i think to reopen that whole debate could well be counterproductive. so from an intelligence point of view, i wouldn't advocate new legislation at this particular time. know, it is probably a personal thing, but looking forward, i think we do need to keep pushing at adjusting to the -- zero minutes, ok.

i'm in the negative time for those of you that are not mathematicians. need to think in new ways and if limit ways that will work. j edgarit goes to hoover and richard nixon have long been exercise, but it still gives us a bill full influence on some of the things we're doing. technology has changed, authority is changed. no big security problem that faces the united states can be solved by one of the national security agencies we have acting alone. they are all things that everybody has to do and everybody has to participate in. you have to have a team, a mission. if we can get towards that over time, that would be good. >> thank you very much, both of you. [applause]

>> on the next "washington journal," a look at how the u.s. protected citizens and interests . our guest is chad suite, former chief of staff at the hom homeland security department. talking about the lobbying efforts for immigration reform to the august congressional recess with eliseo medina. and then spotlight on magazines, bloomberg businessweek discussing a recent article about the $4.5 billion construction project for the new homeland security department headquarters. "washington journal" is live every morning at 7:00 eastern. institution, defense cuts coming in 2014, some of the most harmful to the military under sequestration. eventts were part of an

on the effective budget cuts on military preparedness. you can see it in its entirety any time at c-span.org. here is a look. >> if you look at the 2014 would behe cuts that required by sequestration are so harsh for that year and there's no way to phase them in realistically. it is even a worse debacle than the sequestration and the pain that occurs in that year towards even what we're going through this summer. a compounds what we are going through the air force isn't flying, for example, when equipment cues are piling up and we're not fixing the stuff we need to keep safe for our forces. so i think congressman ultimately said the $52 billion in 2014 defense cuts that sequestration would require need to be softened a little and maybe get at because to the backing or something. don't dowords, they

anything that is fundamentally changing the basic logic of sequestration to soften the blow and 2014. that is possible because the specter of sequestration next are so horrible for the armed forces. >> president obama continues his jobs and economy tour on the west coast this week. today he visits troops and their families at the camp pendleton marine corps base in california. starting ata live 3:50 p.m. here on c-span. c-span, we bring public affairs events from washington directly to you, putting you in the room at congressional hearings, white house events, briefings, and conferences him and offering complete gavel-to- gavel coverage of the u.s. house all as a public service of private industry. c-span, created by the cable tv industry 34 years ago and funded by your local cable or satellite provider. now you can watch us in hd. >> former nsa and cia director

michael hayden, cybersecurity threats will get worse before they get better. he was one of the speakers at an event looking at vulnerabilities in the: trees electric grid -- and the country's electric grid. this is 45 minutes. >> good morning. if everybody would take a seat. i want to welcome everyone. for those who don't know us, bp c was founded in 2007 by four senate majority leaders. we like to say we are bipartisan, not nonpartisan. we work with people who are

strongly partisan of various parties, but who believe with good and rigorous analysis, negotiation and respectful dialogue, you can actually come to agreement on policy issues. it sounds crazy, right? but it is what we do. i think it is needed now more than ever. cybersecurity really is a type of issue that can and should be bipartisan. from our keynote speaker in a minute that the threats are real, and we will hear that from a lot of the speakers today, and the potential economic and human cost of a successful cyber attack or potentially huge. so this workshop today is to sort of look at, are we ready for this? what is going on within the government and private sector? what still needs to happen? it is part of a broader initiative on cybersecurity, a and security home

and cyber security. our goal is to develop recommendations for how multiple and sometimes overlapping agencies plus private companies can protect north american grid from potential cyber attacks. our frame we are using is not a really technical necessarily what should each specific company do to protect their operations, but the frame is governments. how to get organized to address these threats. things like, who is responsible for preventing attacks? what is the role of government? and amend federal, state, local governments. -- i mean federal, state, and local government. more standards needed? are there other approaches that would be more effective? those are the kind of issues we are grappling with. how do we share intelligence

between private sector and the government? and how do we ensure there are appropriate privacy protections while we do that? , how do we an attack limit that and how do we respond to that? how do we respond so we are prepared for that? our overall initiative on cybersecurity is chaired by general hayden emmett cochaired by general hayden whom we will hear from in a moment, and were also working with a good group of experts on cybersecurity and we expect to release a report with some recommendations for policymakers in the fall, so stay tuned for that read i am going to stop there. thank you for coming. thank you for our partners for helping us with this workshop. thing, the endg of each session, we will have time for questions and there are microphone stands set around the room. we asked people to come up and

introduce yourself before you ask your question. with that, let me introduce my colleague who is the director of homeland security program and she will introduce our keynote speaker. thank you. >> good morning. i know you didn't all come here to listen to me, so i will make this short and sweet. i'm the director of the homeland security project at the bipartisan policy center. for those not familiar, it is chaired by former governor tom kane and former congressman lee hamilton. they were cochairs of the 9/11 commission. that come together with a group of 14 other experts to do their part to make sure our country is keeping vigilant and remaining ready to sort any threat we face.

cybersecurity is something a lot of people are talking about, but not a heck of a lot is known on what to do about it. that is why we're so thrilled to be working with the energy team at the bpc on this very important electric grid cybersecurity initiative. today we have general hayden to speak to us this morning. he is the cochair of this initiative. is a renowned expert on the issue of cybersecurity. he was the director of the cia and nsa, now a principal at the chertoff group. he is going to spend a few minutes talking about the threat as he sees it and then we will open it up to q&a. we will be happy to hear your thoughts in his answers. general hayden. [applause] >> good morning. thanks for the chance to chat

with you today. i will try to limit my transmission appeared to about 20 minutes or so and then leave about 15 minutes for any questions or comments that you might have. as artie suggested, my purpose here is what my army buddies used to call the big can the little map. i get to do the strategic overview. what you have following me are people far more expert than i any specific definitions of the problem and specific responses to the problems that i think we're all going to identify your today. folks ingovernment, industry, federal government, state and local government, think tanks. perhaps can begin to map out a way had that we certainly want to see reflected in our final report. let me begin. bighand, little map, broad concepts. as the day goes down, we will get into specifics.

this cyber thing is pretty important and i think it is here to stay. we kind of messed it up. i actually did that at a black cat conference about four summers ago in las vegas. i'm in the ballroom of caesar's palace with 3000 reformed or , kind ofrmed hackers leaned into the darkness out there with the bright lights on me and said, look, as an american g.i., i view cyber as a space,-- land, sea, air, cyber. i know who did these four and frankly, i think you did a reasonably good job and i think i know who did this one, and that is you -- and i leaned into the darkness and said, and i really think you messed it up. thankfully, no one said, get a rope. the response was kind of mild giggles. and we moved on.

look back at the history of this thing. we are lucky enough to have the people who created this still among us. this man comes to my class to talk to students, been out there in stamford and starting to plug things in and respond to the statement of work from arpa,, you me something that connects a number of labs and universities so i can move information quickly and easily. keep in mind what that statement of work was. quickly, easily, limited number .f notes, all over my trust that remains the architecture today and the world wide web. that is why we are in the position we are in. it wasn't built to be protected. it made no more sense to build defenses into that original concept and it would be for you and i to put a lock door to join

our kitchen and dining room. i mean, the whole architecture of the house designed to get food from the kitchen to the dining room while it is still warm, why in gods name would you put a lock door between the two? that is kind of what we built here. an unlimited number of nodes, most of which i don't know, and a whole lot don't deserve to be trusted. as clear as i can put it, statement of the problem. let me go down one layer and talk about cyber sins and sinners since i've already suggested it is a pretty tough neighborhood. three letter of -- three layer of sins. first layer, just dealing with stuff. defense secretary, bill lynn, pointed out almost all the things that we fret about on the web is in the range of stealing

your stuff. it is cyber espionage, criminality come a personal identifiable information, your pin number, credit card number. they are stealing your stuff. the second layer, and you will the commentary in a moment that this is getting worse, the second is not just dealing your stuff, it is disrupting your network. 2007, remember patriotic russian hackers crushing the estonian internet system because they were mad they were moving the memorial out to the suburbs? same hackers in 2008, invasion of georgia, brings the georgian net to its knees. more current, more problematic, more personal for you and me, chamoun virus, 35,000 hard

drives wiped clean. picture enterprise. imagine yourself going back to wherever you work and imagine you are 35,000 hard drives being wiped clean. you get the picture. governmentthough our has not announced yet, i think you and i know it is the iranians. apparently, the arabians somehow feel offended and the cyber domain -- the iranians somehow feel offended in the cyber domain. attacks against bank of america, wells fargo, jpmorgan chase and the list goes on. securityo an office and says under normal day, they get hit 15,000 times. they're getting 3 million hits a minute at the height of the iranian attacks. a lot more disruption. stealing your stuff, disrupting network, and finally, using this

domain appear to create affects not confined to my phone, but creating a fax down here -- affects down here. stuxnet.rheumatic is stuxnet almost certainly conducted by nationstates because it is too complicated to be done in your garage or basement. but given my background, former director of cia and nsa, blowing -- i will centrifuges describe what i just described to you in slightly different words. someone almost certainly a nationstate just used the cyber weapon to destroy another nation's critical infrastructure. ouch. that is a big deal. seen me on "60e minutes" that i care trusted as someone crossing the rubicon --

characterized as someone crossing the rubicon. lives are going to be very different. those are the sins. who are the sinners? nationstates. you know that. criminal elements. the third group that i have trouble defining come a anarchists, activists, anonymous, will sec, 20 somethings that have not talked to the opposite sex in five or six years. [laughter] blessedly, the capacity to do harm is pretty much the way i laid out. governments are by far most confident. criminal gangs are the next layer. then you have this group down here. as bad as governments could be, sooner or later they can be held to account. you have got criminal elements, and they can be pretty dangerous and they are kind of guns for higher, but fundamentally,

criminals want to make money. they enter into a symbiotic relation with whatever their target is. and it is a strange creature, a strange parasite in nature who enters into a symbiotic relationship with a host they want to kill or destroy. so i think even criminals are somewhat limited. what worries me is this game down here. right now their least capable, but you know better than i, the tide is coming in on all the boats in the harbor are coming up. so this group is beginning to acquire capacities for maybe a year or two or three ago we some ofdid only with the more confident, more capable groups. totime goes on, we're going see this group down here whose demands are actually hard to define, whose demands may be beginning toble, acquire the capacities that we

now associate with nationstates. let me drill this down to something specific. if and when our government grants edward snowden and brings him back to the united states for trial, what does this group do? well, they may want to come after the u.s. government that, frankly, it is about the hardest target in the united states of they cannot create great home -- harm, that you are they going after? who for them are the world trade center's? the world trade center's as they were for al qaeda? so i guess what i'm suggesting is, it is going to get worse before it gets better. i mentioned it being very hard appear. the me give you a couple of reasons why it is really hard for us to defend ourselves. dodme put you through a

double and talk about intelligence and operations for a moment, but bear with me, i think there is a relevant point. down here in these domains where, frankly, i conducted intelligence for most of my career, intelligence is what you do before the operation. you got to know your enemy before you conduct an operation against your enemy. so it is sequential. intel first, operation is next. i also suggest to you as hard as intelligence was sometimes, intelligence almost always -- pretty close to universal rule -- intelligence gathering almost always was easier than the actual operation you are going to try to perform eventually. war,xample from the cold you get the soviet union and the missiles out there, threaten the united states. finding is bezos was kind of hard. deal with those missiles, much

more difficult prospect proposition. that is physical domain. now appear to my phone. reconnaissance appear still happens before operations. you got to know the target before your operating against the target. but unlike the physical -- the the risotto since reconnaissance is harder. it is more difficult to penetrate and network, live on an undetected, extract what you need from that network from a long. of time and continue to operate on it is far more difficult to do then figuratively or metaphorically taken the front door and something. in other words come up here, the attack, the disrupt or destroy

thing, the attack is a lesser included case of reconnaissance. if i can live on your network undetected for intelligence purposes, i have already established far more than enough control to use your network for disruption or destructive purposes. do you see the parallel i'm trying to draw here? that is why president obama in this year's state of the union when he kind of makes a cyber point about midway through the speech talked about enemies on our networks. enemies on our grid. and why that is so disturbing. if they're on their and undetected, they already have -- whatever their intent, whatever they intend, they already have the capacity to do harm. question, the country is skewing our stuff the most is

china. if you readdence the white paper put out several months back about the chinese, there is evidence they are out penetrating. frankly, i find it hard to imagine circumstances where china would want to do something incredibly destructive to any american network, the grid, absent a far more problematic international environment in which the cyber attacks is itself part of a larger package of really, really bad things. bear with me for a moment. i mentioned iran a few moments ago. , veryould prompt iran bright nation with technically competent people, what would prompt iran to try to inflict

, economic damage on the united states? sanctions? sanctions with no hope of relief? callwe see from the cyclic limited connecticut action against iranian nuclear facilities? look, these are all fanciful scenarios and i'm not trying to be predict if a peer, i'm just trying to be illustrative -- predictive up here, i'm just trying to be illustrative. it gets worse before it gets better. ok, how do we make it better? ok get the idea a lot of this is heading south. what are things we can do to stop it from heading south? what are steps we can take is a prudent people? it is much harder for us to

defend ourselves up here. i already talked about the geography. routines build any come oceans, so defense is very hard. but it is hard for another reason. it is hard for philosophical reasons. let me offer the view. i am being timbres and provocative and maybe 90% accurate . -- i am being 10% provocative and maybe 90% accurate. the united states will have one of the least offended networks on this planet -- least defended networks on this planet because of james madison and alexander hamilton and all those other good folks who wrote the federalist papers. have not yete created a consensus as to what

it is we want our government to do but here or what it is we will let our government do up here. i love my iphone down there in the portfolio -- i left my iphone down there in the portfolio. usually i pulled out my iphone and say, give me another 15 minutes and i will end see this as a gateway to conflict and you will all be scared of your iphone or blackberry. i usually get the response from the audience, yeah, he's right, i'm upgrading my phone after two years. i'm in the apple store in northern virginia. you know, the young kid comes up , he sells me an iphone. he is telling me the features. he points to the iphone and pulls up the page and says, aps. 400,000

then he turns to do something else and i turned to my wife and says, this kid does not know who are young. those are 400,000 attack vector's. and an audience -- american say, ok, where is my government? i pay taxes. why isn't the government defending me. i finished my speech, polite applause, and then they reach into their pocket and pull out their iphones a blackberrys and what did they do? check e-mail. -- they areconflict saying, where's my government? now it is personal communications. let me tell you a thought that has not naturally occur to american check interpersonal communications. gee, i wish my government were here. [laughter] and so, we have that tension.

, in the news about a lot of recent things. before all of the recent stuff low up, they got a bipartisan bill passed through the house of representatives. frankly, a tremendous step forward but on balance a very modest bill about information sharing. ok? that thing is dead in the water. this congress is not going to ball muchg the cyber down the field. a lot of that has to do with what has been in the news for the last seven or eight weeks, and that is edward snowden. frankly, the greatest concentration of cyber power on this planet is a $45 cab ride i'm here up the bw parkway at the intersection of the baltimore-washington parkway in maryland route 32. keith alexander has world-class notetes not only known --

on the field, but not on the bench. they have not suited up because you and i have not figured out what it is we want our government to do or what it is we will let our government do. this whole snowden saying, raising the specter of an overly aggressive government and government overreach and so on is going to freeze this. so, those of you in private industry, i guess the point i really want to make to you, the next sound you hear will not be a you goal and the sound of pounding hooves as the federal calgary comes over to your cyber rescue. to the degree you have never expect that it down here in the physical domains, you're responsible for your safety appear a lot more personally, corporately, then you are down here. by the way, the snowden thing also seemed to have cleared another, i think, useful approach with regard to dealing

with this domain and its inherent dangers. and that is international cooperation to create global cyber norms. his release of alleged nsa hacking of chinese computers was time to precisely a few days before our president met with the chinese president where they were going to begin an honest dialogue about appropriate cyber behavior, and that, of course, turned into mutual recriminations as snowden's allegations allow the chinese to pretend there was actually an equivalency between american and chinese cyber behavior. so, industry is going to have to do a lot more up here than they are accustomed to doing down here. the government is going to be hermit lead late believe. by the way, you are going to have government speakers up here. i hope it does not offend them. i was government for 39 years and i tried my best.

but i know culturally, politically, philosophy, we will be late to lead. the good thing is industry understand that a great deal. i have been out of government for almost five years and i have seen the migration of industries appreciation of the problem. when i started working with the chertoff group after i left government we got to talk to cio's -- aso's and we talk to ceo's he now because they want to talk to us. -- as client. -- i amnt as provider sorry, the private sector as client has seized the issue and government as provider is also doing some incredibly interesting things. there is just a tremendous intellectual ferment out there in terms of reducing vulnerability, managing

consequences, or precisely identifying the kinds of threats that you and your industry should be worried about. let me give special credit to two industries that i think are really seized to this issue. one is a mental services and the other is the electric industry. -- financial services, and the other is a lecture. they are very different but they do enjoy one thing in common. if something goes bad, you are going to notice that in both of those industries. so, they know they are on thex, as we used to say up at langley, and both of them are working very hard to do the kind of things i suggested they are going to have to do up here to secure. and more the industries are different. there's a lot less personal identifiable information sloshing around in the electric in the than there is financial services problem. so, i would suggest to you that

the electric industry, in addition to being seized to the issue, understanding how lucrative a target they are and understanding the vulnerabilities others might try to exploit, in addition to all that, the electric industry might actually be the trail breaker here. the electrical industry might actually have the opportunity because they have a few less of the problem sets that financial services might have. they may be able to establish newdence up here in this domain that not only, a, helps the industry better defend itself but, b, break trail, as i said, for the kinds of relationships we are all going to have to develop over time between the private industry and government. that is kind of the topic we have here for today. how is the electric industry going to scope the problem? what are the avenues by which they can move forward? the point i simply wanted to make at the end is other

industries are going to go to school on what is industry does. that actually is a pretty attractive proposition. with that, i used that might a lot of time. said there will be questions and there are some microphones there. i am happy to take whatever you might have. are you going to moderate? [applause] >> i think we will open it up right here. if you could introduce yourself and your affiliation. >> spencer ackerman with "the guardian here," suggested in the event of apprehending edward snowden, there might be cyber terrorism as a private. could you tell me who you anticipate would pull off the attacks, where on the level of the three scales the outline they might occur and what evidence do you have that tell

-- causes you to say something like that? >> spencer, you heard me say i was being entirely speculative and not predicted. just find it illustrate there are a group of people who make demand, and the demand might not able and not the kind of thing the government cannot accommodate. but certainly mr. snowden has created quite a stir among those folks who are very committed to transparency -- global transparency and the global web kind of ungoverned and free. there is a know logic between trying to punish america or american institutions or his arrest, but i hold open the possibility. i could sit here and imagine circumstances and scenarios, but they are nothing more than imagining. would be,'t think it for instance, a foreign intelligence service who would pull up some kind of thing but you think a transparency group? what what that level of attack or capability you think look like?

>> again, spencer, i said there are three levels of attacks. this one down here worries me the most. blessedly they are currently the least capable but they become more capable each day. i can't precisely predict where one or another element of the group -- which you know is very dispersed -- might have skills, what vulnerabilities they may have detected and how much of a massive effort they could put together on short notice. i know nothing of that. one,know wikileaks stage they distributed denial of service attacks against american credit card companies and paypal and so on, and theoretical punishment for the steps they took. just suggesting it is possible he could happen again. >> right over here. -- y name is chris i found your comment interesting about how government and private sector getting bombarded every day with a cyber attacks. it is fair to assume one of the potential ways to combat those

are reduction in the nature of communication electronically? god forbid, we use patterned paper and telephone. is that a trend? is it fair to assume governments and private sector would be looking at dummy in -- dummy information across networks. if they know they are being attacked, i assume you could peopledummy data to send down rabbit holes. might those be a couple of ways to start to combat this? >> yes, obviously. to make it less lucrative, more problematic. to keep the less talented from stealing, for example. those who are less sophisticated. one idea i have heard. if i said a whole lot about this i would be truly making it up. for my liberal arts background. secure, talk aboutdot kind of an additional network -- people talk about dot secure -- taking a mulligan, getting a do over.

it does not mean undoing what we have. keeping what we have for everybody who wants to violate their own privacy and post things on facebook and so one, and they enjoy the freedom. but create another, more secure environment over here that is less ubiquitous, let easy to use, requires multiple factor authentication. it is not nearly as fast. has a high degree of latency built in. it is really hard to take your money. i am a history major. i do not reason by technology but a reason by example. i have been to london. went to london 30 years ago. anybody been to so well in london one he or 30 years ago? a bit cleaned up now. but soho back then -- theater, art, dance, freedom, liberty, license and the drugs, prostitution, petty theft, ok? that's kind of over here.

where'd you get the maximum liberty and the maximum danger. other neighborhoods in london were incredibly boring. in fact, most of the houses had fences around them. i don't think they are nearly as interesting as soho, but then again, there was not much petty theft there, either. there may be a future in which we begin to build an alternative hasverse that actually is, security cook them from the beginning rather than trying to apply here. hayden, you have been very interesting this morning -- you said you only 10% - a friendly audience, it may be true. , it would be see -- because it are 90%

provocative. you raise the snowden, and you said apprehension, and of course the russian and chinese would consider a kidnapping. let's say you mentioned even air ron --iran. i am sure you remember the united states and israel together hacked the iranian nuclear facilities first before they started attacking financial and so one. this provocative speech you are getting here, is it meant to promote the united states government to give more contracts to you? >> first of all, the chert of group -- the chert off group is not a government contractor. we had our fill of government. there were some questions in there. hang on. there are two countries on earth -- toave a cyber demand my knowledge that one is republic of korea and the other is united states of america.

by the way, i mentioned bill -- deputyicle secretary of defense, "foreign affairs," two or three years ago. the most important line in the article was under the title. -- deputy secretary of defense. in other words, the seminal american article on cyber by theg was not written deputy attorney general, not by the deputy secretary of commerce, not by the office of science policy in the white house, not by the u.s. trade representative kirk -- deputyntative, but the secretary of defense. i am catholic by tradition -- bless me father, i have sinned, because i was part of it. we could be accused of nudging the militarization of cyberspace in that direction by the way we talked about it as a nation and by the way we have organized ourselves as a nation. bill lind's article talks about

cyberspace the way i talk about the airspace as an air man. air dominance, cyber dominance. using domain for your purposes. and i use to others upon command. that is how we talk about it. so, i get it. ok? i have no views on who may or may not have conducted the attack against -- with the stocks met -- with the virus, but my view is, it was a big deal. what i said is i understand the difference in destruction is dramatic but this has the whiff of august of 1945. somebody just used a new weapon. and this weapon will not be put back into the box. i get all of that. but you were probably were snowden, common of suggesting equivalency between american and chinese cyber behavior. there where you steal stuff,

let me go on record. we steal stuff. we are really good at it. as director of the national security agency, i used to view that we were number one when it came to stealing stuff in the cyber domain. but we steal stuff to keep you free, we steal stuff to keep you safe. we do not steal stuff to make you rich. a big discriminator between ourselves and a whole bunch of other nationstate actors out there. tom? >> hi, general hayden. from npr. you seem to be pretty confident about the ability of the private industry to -- electric industry to safeguard assets. but in the private industry, executives have to make cost calculations. the costs ofweigh the mitigation measure against a threat or against a risk. the kinds of incidents you are talking about are, i would say, butably low probability

high impact. the combination you are familiar with from the intelligence world. are you comfortable with private industry facing low probability of incidents that would have a high impact are going to make the same cost calculations, expense calculations that a government agency would make? >> tom, that was a great question. let me make it even tougher. very often, even in the event of the low probability-high impact the industryost to is infinitely less than the cost of the surrounding society. i live in northern virginia. two summers ago, the violent storm derecho came through and cost dominion power a lot. what it cost a million -- what it cost dominion power nowhere came close to what it cause northern virginia. in addition to the low probability, you've also got the fact that your cost may be more confined than the cost to the overall society. all true.

therefore, what you need to do -- number one, it is really hard to build a business case for this. it really is. and so, it is more of a broader responsibility case that has to be made in terms of good corporate citizenship in addition to the narrow business case. idea, tom --tal and it is not quite tied to what you're suggesting -- is the whole concept of cyber insurance. which then spreads of both the costs of defense and the cost of catastrophe over a wider audience. i don't know what cyber insurance looks like quite. i don't know the equivalent of collision, comprehension, -- comprehensive, and personal interest -- injury. but i could imagine cyber insurance for -- i lost my stuff, i lost my network. my network was used to harm somebody else. or i've got a big class action

suit because all of that personal information is out there. there may be ways to create that structure of insurance, and then within the insurance -- i kind of check the shingles on my house now before i buy it because the insurance is different depending on what kind of shingles i have or if i am closer -- you understand. there may be ways that we collectively spread the burden over the society that the mechanisms byters which these natural forces take shape and affect rather than the guy with a whistle and the clipboard kind of coming through your industry and checking things off. sorry, great question. and we've got a lot of work to do. but i think there are ways. >> i think we have time for one more question? >> yes, thank you him a general, for your comments. kerry gerrit, state utilities commissioner for new jersey. you mentioned in your talk about house billn rogers'

which stressed information sharing. my question is, how important do you think it is for the federal government to share information about threats with the utility sector? and do you think the federal government is doing a good job in that area of developing relationships with the electric sector in sharing information the electric that industry can take into account and respond to? >> when i talk to anyone in government, they tell me they are doing a really good job. [laughter] now in the private sector, however, when i talk to other folks, it is not quite the glowing review. let me take your question and describe a dynamic and problem inside government. i would director of nsa for six years. an essay is very famous for its offense is quite -- nsa is very famous for its offense in squad. going in stealing stuff. about a fifth of the agency is defense.

it also has the responsibility of protecting government secrets in the united states. not every country in the world intelligence its center that way, to put the offense and defense in the same organization. we have done it that way. i think we have done it well and correctly. we have done it that way because offense and defense rotated around the same concept. --t concept is home ability a vulnerability. if you mastered the vulnerability you can play offense, if you master the vulnerability you can play defense. and the life of nsa -- let's go pre-cyber. nsa, you always had a trade-off between the two squads. when you discover a vulnerability, do you want to exploit it to play offense or do you want to fix it to play defense? back in the pre-cyber world we had a pretty well-worn road as is.here the line

i am willing to enter into a debate that that line might not be in the wrong place. that the old approach to it, the old calculation -- i want to keep that home ability because i want to use it in the future -- might actually be technically correct, operationally sound in a discrete one-off decision kind cumulative effect of the discreetly correct decisions has been a real strategic problem that industry vulnerabilities out there. i actually think the trend line and the more we can accelerate it, the better. it will go too far. you know how it works. and we will pick it back a little bit. but i think the trend line now is in the direction of more defense, even if it has to be at the expense of offense. the degree of what we need to do with the trendline is to accelerate it, because i think

it moves it into a positive direction at the time in which we are located. how does it translate? you will have people up here talking about security clearances, the classification, sharing of information. that is how it works. it comes back to the core problem. what do you want to do with the vulnerability? at the level of grand strategy, we have the balance point perhaps not quite in the right place. >> thank you, general. >> can i ask one more thing? when you talk about the threat of mexico is the role and canada in helping to prevent these types of attacks and providing assistance if it happens? dea is receiving information from nsa how critical do you believe this information is helpful to fight the drug cartels? emp, ier one, regarding

don't know a lot about it. i know when i touch it while in government, we would have big meetings, realize this is a really hard problem and firmly decide we need to meet again on this in two or three months. i don't mean to be so flippant, but there really aren't any facile solutions to this. i will just leave it at that. it's hard for me to, -- you intelligenceignals and drug cartels. it is hard for me to comment specifically about any operational activities. but i would thank you for the question and take the opportunity to say, although the snowden allegations seem to point to the americans spying on everybody, actually the americans share intelligence with almost everybody. botho the benefit of ourselves and our partners. i will just leave it at that. thank you. [applause]

i am not some sort of anti- suburb person who thinks everybody needs to live in new york city. i was very sensitive to, cross -- coming across as espresso kind.ng elitists of some that is not what it did this. i understand why people love the suburbs. set up with a lot of daily life in new york city. the trends were just so undeniable and the fact that there is a shift in the way suburban america is perceived by the people who live there is too big a story to ignore. eigh gallagher on where the american dream is moving, sunday night at 9:00 on "afterwards" on c-span2. >> coming up live on c-span, "washington journal your code 10:00 a.m. eastern, secretary of state john kerry announces the new state department initiative

to reach out to international faith communities. then at -- [no audio] i am not some sort of anti-

suburb person who think everybody needs to live in new york city. comingery sensitive across as an espresso sipping, conduct welding elitists of some kind. that is not why i did this book. i understand why people like the suburbs. with a lot of daily life in new york city a lot. trends were just undeniable. and the fact that there is a shift in the way suburban america is perceived by the people that live there is too big of a story to ignore. h gallagher on where the american dream is moving, sunday night at 9:00 on "afterwards" part of the tv this weekend on c-span2. >> if we turn away from the needs of others, we align

ourselves with those forces which are bringing about the suffering. -- he white house is a >> obesity in this country is nothing short of a public health crisis. [inaudible] >> so much influence in the office. a shame to waste it. >> i think they serve as a window on the past to what was going on with american women. >> she becomes the chief confidant. way, was then the only one in the world he could trust. >> many of the women who were first ladies, a lot of them were writers, journalists, the road books. >> they were in many cases right frankly more interesting as human beings than their husbands. are notbecause they first and foremost defined and limited by political ambition. >> edith roosevelt is really one

of the unsung heroes. when you go to the white house today, it is really edith roosevelt's white house. statement you were a little breathless, too much looking down. and i think it was a little too fast. not enough change of pace. >> yes, ma'am. i think in every case, the first lady really has done whatever fit her personality and her interests. >> she later wrote in her memoir that she said "i myself never made any decision. i only decided what was important and when to present it to my husband." howstop and think about much power that is. it is a lot of power. >> part of the battle against fear thatto fight the the companies the disease. >> she transformed the way we

look at these bugaboos and made it possible for countless people furnish thatd to flourish as a result. i don't know how many presidents realistically have had thisimpar lives. walking around the white house grounds, i am constantly reminded about all of the people who have lived there before, and particularly all of the women >> first ladies, influence and image, an original series produced in cooperation with the white house historical 2, as weon season explore the modern era from edith roosevelt to michelle obama. guest: