one of the things i do not want to see in this authorization is, after it is authorized and force takes place, i want to see us continue to carry out the strategy that has been stated, and that is building the capacity of the vetted moderate opposition. i would like to have you address that. i would like to have you today also address how the use of military force supports that strategy, how it is going to affect the region and the aftermath. i thank you for being here today. i know a big part of what we're a big part of what we are making decisions on is the credibility of united states of america. people in the are watching. have beent we hesitant to move on with many activities got restated that we stated we would be carrying out.

today, i hope each of you will bring clarity to this. i know we will talk about, warfare, -- chemical that we will talk about how this will effect us overall. i hope we will leave here today with a clear understanding of how the strategy will be carried out. thank you and i look over to your testimony. >> secretary kerry. >> members of the committee, ranking member corker, thank you very much for having us here today. we look forward to this opportunity to be able to share with you president obama's vision with respect to not just this action, but as senator corker has inquired appropriately, about syria itself, and the course of action

in the middle east. as we convene for this debate -- it is not an exaggeration to say to all of you, my former colleagues, that the world is watching not just to see what we decide, but it is watching to see how we make this decision, whether in a dangerous world we can still make our government speak with one voice. they want to know if america will rise to this moment and make a difference. and the question of whether to authorize military action is, as you have said, this is obviously one of the most important decisions and responsibilities of this committee or any senator in the course of their career.

the president and the administration appreciates that you have returned quickly to the nation's capital to address it and that your appropriately beginning a process of focusing great care in great position, which is the only way to approach the potential use of military power. ranking member corker, i know you wanted to discuss, as you have said, why syria matters to our national security and our strategic interests. i look forward, with secretary hegel and general dempsey, to laying that out here this afternoon. but first, it is important to

explain to the american people why we are here. it is important for people who may not have caught every component of the news over the course of labor day weekend to join us, all of us, in focusing in on what is at stake here. that is why the president of the united states made a decision as he did, contrary to what many people thought he would do, of asking the congress to join on this decision. we are stronger as a nation when we do that. we are here because against multiple warnings by the president of the united states, from the congress, from our wrens and allies around the world, and even from russia and iran, the assad regime and only undeniably the assad regime unleashed an outrageous chemical attack against its own citizens.

we are secure because a dictator and his family's personal enterprise, in their lust to hold onto power, were willing to infect the air of damascus with a poison that killed mothers and fathers and children. some people amazingly have questioned the evidence of this assault on conscience. i repeat again today that only the most willful desire to avoid reality can assert that this did not occur as described or that the regime did not do it. it it happen. and the assad regime did it. i remember iraq. secretary hegel remembers iraq. general dempsey especially remembers iraq. secretary hegel and i and you on the day us remember iraq and a special way because we were here

for that vote. we voted. we are especially sensitive, chuck and i, to never again asking any member to take a vote on faulty intelligence. that is why our intelligence committee has scrubbed and re- scrub the evidence. we have declassified unprecedented amount of information and we ask the american people and the rest of the world to judge that information. we can tell you beyond any reasonable doubt that our evidence proves the assad regime prepared for this attack, issued instructions to prepare for this attack, warned its own forces to use gas masks -- we have physical evidence of where the rockets came from and when. contrary to my discussion with

their foreign minister who said we are nothing to hide. i said if you have nothing to hide, let the inspectors in today and let it be unrestricted. it was not, and they did not. it took four days of shelling before they finally allowed the men under prearranged structure. we have now where the hair and blood samples from first responders in east damascus have tested positive for sarin. i can tell you we know things beyond a reasonable doubt for the standard we send people to jail for lives. we're here because of what happened two weeks ago, but also we're here because of what happened nearly a century ago. in the darkest moments of world war i when the vast majority of the world came together to declare that no uncertain terms that chemical weapons crossed

the lines and must be the end for use from ever. over the years that followed, over 180 countries, including iran, iraq and russia agreed and joined the chemical weapons convention. even countries with whom we agree on little, agreed on that conviction. some have tried to suggest the debate we're having today is about president obama is red line. i could not more forcefully state that is just plain and we have now learned haveair and fund samples tested positive for signatures of sarah and gas. -- sarin gas.

we know what happened. for all of the lawyers, the former prosecutors, those who have sat on a jury, we know these things beyond a reasonable doubt that is the standard eye which we send people to jail for the rest of their lives. are here because of what happened to of weeks ago. we're here because of what happened two weeks ago, but also we're here because of what happened nearly a century ago. in the darkest moments of world war i when the vast majority of the world came together to declare that no uncertain terms that chemical weapons crossed the lines and must be the end for use from ever. over the years that followed, over 180 countries, including iran, iraq and russia agreed and joined the chemical weapons convention. even countries with whom we agree on little, agreed on that

conviction. some have tried to suggest the debate we're having today is about president obama is red line. i could not more forcefully state that is just plain and simply wrong. this is about the world redlined, humanities red line. a line that anyone with a conscious ought to drop. this is about congress up red line. you agreed to the chemical weapons convention. you the congress have spoken out about grave consequences if assad use chemical weapons. i said to you, that is one of the reasons why a assyria is important. as we debate and the world

watches and you decide in the world wonders, not whether the regime executed the worst chemical weapons attack of the 21st century, that fact i think is now beyond question. the world wonders whether united states of america will consent through silence to standing aside will this -- while this kind of brutality is allowed to happen without consequence. in the nearly 100 years since the first global commitment against chemical weapons, only to tyrants there to cross the world's brightest minds. now he has become the third. i think all of you know that history holds nothing but empty for those criminals. history reserves all so very

little sympathy for the enablers. so the reality is the gravity of this moment. that is the importance of the decision that this congress bases and the world is waiting to learn about in these next days. a ranking member corker the central question, why should americans care, beyond what i just said, which ought to be enough in the judgment of the president and this administration? well, it is clear that in addition to what i have just mentioned about the syria accountability act and threats to the middle east, we cannot overlook the impact of chemical weapons and the danger they pose to a particularly volatile area of the world in which we have

been deeply invested four years. because we have great friends here yet we of allies. deep interest there. since president obama's policy is that assad must go, if it's not insignificant that the -- to deprive him of the capacity to use chemical weapons or to degrade the capacity to use chemical weapons actually deprived him of a lethal weapon in this ongoing civil war, and that has an impact. that can help to speed -- stabilize the region alternately. in addition, we have strategic national security interests. to avoid the creation of the safe haven in syria or the base of operation for extremists to use the weapons against our friends. all of us know the extremes of both sides are there waiting in the wings, poking -- pushing and fighting. they would be desperate to get

their hands on these materials. the fact is if nothing happens to begin to change the current calculation, that area can become even more so an area of uncovered those extremists threaten either the united states or in war -- or more immediately, allies and friends of ours like jordan, israel, lebanon on or others. forcing him to change the calculation about the ability to act with impunity can contribute to his realization that he cannot gas or shoot his way out of his predicament. it has been the president's primary goal to achieve a negotiated resolution, but you have to have party is prepared

to negotiate to achieve that. syria is important because quite simply, i cannot put this to you more plainly, then to just ask each of you to ask yourself, if you are assad or any one of the other desperate in the region and the united states steps back from this moment together with our other allies and friends, what is the message? the message is he has been granted impunity. the freedom to choose the weapons again or force us to go through the cycle again with who knows what outcome after once refusing it. we would grant him the capacity to use the weapons against more people with greater levels of damage because we would have stood and stepped away. as confidently as we know what happened in damascus on august 21, we know that stepping away

is using it with impunity. opportunity for dictators to pursue their own weapons of mass destruction, including weapons of mass destruction. i will tell you there are some people hoping the united states congress is hoping to not vote for this proposal. everyone is looking to look the other way. -- iran is looking for us to look the other way. hezbollah is open isolationism will prevail. north korea is hoping ambivalence carries the day. they are all listening for our silence.

if we do not answer him today, we will erode a standard that has existed for those 100 years. in fact, we will erode the standard that has protected our own troops in war, and we will invite even more dangerous tests down the road. our allies and partners are also counting on us in the situation. the people of israel, jordan, turkey, each look next door in see they are one stiff breeze away from the potential of being hurt, of the civilians being killed as the consequences of choices assad might take in the absence of action. they anxiously await our assurance that our word means something. they await the assurance that if children live up in shrouds were their own children would keep the world promise. that is what they're hoping. the authorization that president obama seeks is definitively in

the national security interest. we need to send a message to the dictators, allies, civilians alike, the unmistakable message that when the united states of america and the world say never again, we do not mean sometimes. we do not mean the somewhere. never means never. so this is a vote for accountability. norms in loss keep the civilized world civil mean nothing if they're not enforced. as justice jackson said at the nuremberg trial, the ultimate step and avoiding periodic wars, which are inevitable in a system of international law was this, is to make states men

responsible to the law. it the world's worst desperate sees they can flaunt against the world's best weapons, then those prohibitions are just pieces of paper. that is what we mean by accountability. that is what we mean by we cannot be silent. let me be clear, president obama is not asking america to go to war. i say that sitting next to two men who know what war is. senator mccain and knows what war is. they know the difference between going to war, and what president obama is requesting now. we all agree there will be no american boots on the ground. the president has made crystal

clear we have no intention of assuming responsibility for serious civil war. asking only for the power to make clear, to make certain the united states means what we say, that the world, when we join together in a multilateral statement means what we say. asking for authorization to degrade and the terror the capacity to use chemical weapons. some will undoubtedly ask, and i think appropriately, what about the unintended consequences. some feared retaliation that leads to a larger conflict. let me put it bluntly. if he is arrogant enough, and i would say foolish enough to retaliate to the consequences of his own camp -- criminal activity, the united states and allies have ample ways to make him regret the decision without

going to war. even his supporters say publicly that the use of chemical weapons is unacceptable. some will also questioned the extent of our responsibility. to them i say, when someone kills hundreds of children with a weapon the world has banned, we are all responsible. that is true because of the geneva convention and chemical weapons convention. for us, the syria accountability act. it is also true because we share a common humanity and common decency. this is not the time for armed terror isolationism. this is not the time to be spectators slaughtered. we have spoken up against

unspeakable horror many times in the past. now we must and up and act and protect our security, protect our values, and lead the world with conviction that is clear about our responsibility. thank you. >> [inaudible] >> the committee will be in order. the committee will be in order. please restore order. >> nobody supports launching cruise missiles. the american people do not want secretary kerry -- >> secretary hagel. >> the first time i testified before this committee when i was 27-years-old, i have feelings very similar to that protester. i would say that is exactly why it is so important we are all here having this debate, talking about these things before the country, and that the congress

itself will act representing the american people. i think we all could respect those who have a different point of view, and we do. >> mr. chairman, thank you. german mendez, senator corker, and members of the committee, as we all know in the coming days, congress will debate how to respond to the most recent chemical weapons attack in syria. large scale gas attacks perpetrated by the syrian government against its own people. as a former senator and a member of this committee, i welcome this debate, and i strongly

support president obama's decision to seek congressional authorization for the use of force in syria. as each of us knows, committing the country to using military force is the most difficult decision america's leaders can make. as ranking member cooker noted. all of us that our privilege to serve the nation have the responsibility to ask tough questions before the commitment is made. the american people must be assured leaders are acting according to u.s. national interest with well-defined military objectives. with an understanding of the risks of the consequences and rolled. the president, along with the entire national security team ask those questions before we concluded that the united states should take military action i want to express how we reach this discussion -- decision by

clarifying the military objectives and risk of not acting at this critical juncture. as president obama said, the use of chemical weapons is syria is not only an assault on humanity, a serious threat to america's national security interests and those of our closest allies. the syrian regime use of chemical weapons poses a grave risk to friends and partners along at serious border, including israel, jordan, turkey, lebanon, and iraq. if assad is prepared to use chemical weapons against his own people, we have to be concerned that terrorist groups that have forces in syria would acquire them. and would use them. that risk of chemical weapons proliferation poses a direct threat to our friends, partners

and the u.s. personnel in the region. we cannot afford for his law or any terrorist group determined to strike the united states to have a sentence to acquire or use chemical weapons. the regime actions risk eroding the century old international norm against the use of chemical weapons that secretary kerry has noted. the norm that has helped protect the united states on land. weakening this norm would impose other nations to acquire or use chemical weapons. for example, north korea maintained a mass of stockpile entrant -- threatens the treaty ally, the republic of korea, and the 28,000 u.s. troops stationed there. i have just returned from asia.

we are at -- we had a very serious and long cover station with the defense minister about the threat, the real threat of the stockpile of chemical weapons. our allies throughout the world must be assured the united states will fulfill commitments. the united states must demonstrate through actions that the use of chemical weapons is unacceptable. the president has made it clear that our military objectives in syria would be to hold the regime accountable, to greed and the ability to carry out these kinds of attacks, and deter the regime from further use of chemical weapons. the department of defense has developed military options to achieve these objectives and we have assets to successfully execute this measure. we believe we can achieve them. general dempsey and i have assured the president that u.s.

forces will be ready to act whenever the president gives the order. in defining our military objectives, we made clear that we are not seeking to resolve the underlying conflict through direct military force. instead, we are contemplating actions that are tailored to respond to the use of chemical weapons. a political solution created by the syrian people is the only way to ultimately end the violence in syria. and as secretary carry is leading international efforts to help syria move towards a negotiated transition. the transition that means a free and inclusive syria. we are also committed to doing more to assist the syrian opposition. we also must examine the risk in consequence of action, as well as the consequences of inaction. there are always risks in taking action. the regime could feel empowered to carry out even more devastating chemical weapons attack without a response. chemical weapons make no distinction between combatants and innocent civilians and inflict the worst kind of indiscriminate suffering as we have recently seen.

the refusal to act would undermine the credibility of america's other security there are always risks in taking action. the regime could feel empowered to carry out even more devastating chemical weapons attack without a response. chemical weapons make no distinction between combatants and innocent civilians and inflict the worst kind of indiscriminate suffering as we have recently seen. the refusal to act would undermine the credibility of america's other security

commitments, including the president's commitment to provide iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. the word of the united states must mean something. every witness here today. cox we are not aware of the cost and ravages of war. that is the highest responsibility. all of us who have had the privilege and responsibility of serving this great nation owes the american people, and especially those wearing the uniform of our country, a vigorous debate on how america should respond to this horrific

chemical weapons attack in syria. i know everyone of this committee agrees and takes the responsibility of office just as seriously as the president as everyone sitting at the table. thank you. >> thank you. i know general dempsey is available to answer questions from the members of the committee. in that regard, let me start off by urging members, tomorrow there will be an intelligence briefing for the committee about the issues at hand a potential military action. in this setting we are obviously

somewhat constrained about what we might discuss with greater specificity tomorrow. you make and have made a compelling case, and i think it is important, and i appreciate you reiterating with a high degree of confidence that exists in our intelligence assessments. i think those are conditions that are needed to move forward. this weekend i was at a soccer tournament. i had a group of moms come up to me and say we saw those pictures, they are horrific. cannot imagine the devastation those parents must feel about to their children, but why us? i asked you, would you tell them that we would be more secure or less secure by the actions that are being considered for which the president has asked for the authorization for the use of force? >> i would say unequivocally that the president's actions

will make us more secure, less likely that that -- that he can use weapons, and the absence of taking the action the president has asked for will be far more threatening and dangerous and potentially a ultimately cost lives. >> do you consider the consequences of an action > the consequences of action? >> i do. >> general dempsey, what do we envision in broad terms this potential military campaign to be in terms of the effect? what do we expect at the end of any authorized action to see the results look like? what is the expectation? >> thank you, chairman. the task i have been given is to develop military options to deter the regime's calculus about the use of chemical

weapons and degrade the ability to do so. that is to say the activities directly related to chemical weapons themselves and the means used to employing them. would there not be collateral -- collateral consequence to the regime of further degrading overall capabilities? weeper -- we received a proposed resolution for the authorization of force. would you tell us whether you believe that a prohibition for having american boots on the ground, is that something the american -- the administration would accept as part of a

resolution? >> it would be preferable not to, not because there is any plan or desire whatsoever to habits of the ground, i think the president will give you every assurance in the world, as am i, secretary of defense and the chairman, but in the event syria at imploded, for instance, or in the event there was a threat of a chemical weapons cache falling into the hands of someone else, then it was clearly in the interest of our allies. i do not have to take off the table an option that might be available to our country. >> if we said there would be no troops on the ground for combat

purposes, that -- >> whether or not they had to answer in order to appease secure,-- >> we are absolutely confident that it is easy to work out language that will satisfy the congress and the american people that there is more -- no door open here to which someone can march in ways the congress does not want it to while still

protecting the national security interest of the country. confident that can be worked out. the bottom line is the president has no intention and will not and do not want to put american troops on the ground to fight this or be involved in the fighting of the civil war. >> i support securing them. i do think we will have to work on language that makes it clear that this is an overriding issue. what do think is the calculus of iran and north korea if we fail to act in what is the calculus of the allies if we fail to act. >> if we fail to act, we will have fewer allies. we have used -- we have huge that's right now.

i have heard their warnings very clearly about what is at stake in the region. i think it is fair to say that our interest would be seriously set back in many respects if we are viewed as not capable, or willing, to follow through on the things we say matter to us. as i said earlier in my testimony, this really is not president obama is red line. the president drew a line if that's anyone that should draw with respect to this convention that we have signed up to, and has been in place since the

horrors of world war one. the truth is through all of world war ii, vietnam, both golf course, afghanistan and iraq, but the combatants in those efforts have never resorted to this -- to this use. so i think it is clear with the prior year's usages that i referred to that we would be opening pandora's box with respect to a whole set of dangerous consequences as a result of the united states not keeping its word and would make our life very difficult with respect to north korea and iran. there is no question in my mind that those countries are watching. many are watching what we were

what we're doing with great interest. that is why even the quality of the debate in nature of the debate are very important. >> thank you, and thank you for your testimony. i want to first thank you for bringing this to congress. i think our foreign policy through the years has been to focus on the of ministration. i want to thank you for bringing this year and giving an opportunity to have the debate in advance. i want to focus on the strategy with the bedded opposition. i know of no one who has been to the area and spend time with

opposition that is not incredibly dismayed at the lack of progress that is occurring there. i know there is a lot of capacity that has to be billed. i know there are interagency discussions about whether we should move to industrial strength training, moving away from the kind of activities taking place to build capacity more quickly. i would like for whichever one of you to respond to talk to us for those of you that have been to the region, who are watching what is happening with iraq. why have we been so slow. why have we been so inept at helping build capacity of the opposition we have said publicly that we support? >> well, as a worthy and important question. i have had a number of meetings

since i came in and of the word. beginning with the meeting in rome, and subsequently and in stumble and jordan. -- instanbul. as little as a year ago, no great clarity to the structure of opposition or to the were in certainly have no experience in this kind of endeavor -- over the course of the year they evolves significantly. are there where they need to be? not completely, but they have changed over the course of the past few months. at our insistence, the insistence of all the supporters, the so-called london 11, they reached out and expanded significantly the base within that syria.

they elected new leadership. they brought and minorities, christians, others. they've built up a much more competent leadership. -- i only have a few minutes. what i am aware of why it is so slow in helping them with lethal support. why has that been so slow? >> i think we need to have that discussion tomorrow in classified session. suffice it to say, that is increasing significantly. it has increased incompetency. i think it has made leaps and bounds. >> i would add that it was june

of this year the president made the decision to support legal assistance to the opposition. we have been very supportive with hundreds of millions of dollars of non-lethal assistance. the vetting process has been significant. the part of defense has not been directly involved in this. this is a covert action. as secretary kerry noted, probably to go into much more detail would require a close your classified hearing. >> is there anything about authorization you are asking that in any way takes away from

our stated strategy of empowering opposition to have the capacity over time to join in with the transition government as we have stated from the beginning? is there anything about this that in any way supplements that? >> to your question about opposition, the past to the resolution of the syrian conflict is through a developed capable opposition. we know how to do that. secondly, nothing in this resolution that would limit what we're doing now. we are very focused on the response to chemical weapons. subsequent to that we would probably return to have a

discussion about what we might do with the moderate opposition in a more overt way. >> i am very sympathetic to the issue of chemical warfare and what this means to u.s. credibility and what this means to the fact that people are watching in the region and this will have an impact, but i want to say i am not sympathetic regarding the lack of effort that is taking place on the ground as it relates to the opposition. i hope the end this day that you imagine is something that enhances the strategy we have already laid in place, and i hope you will answer that yes or

no at this time. >> the answer to whether i support additional support is yes. >> this authorization will support those activities in addition to responding to the weapons of mass destruction? >> i do not know how the resolution will evolves -- >> i cannot answer what we're seeking. >> the action, if it is authorized, but that the consequences of degrading chemical capacity inevitably blow also have downstream impact on military capacity. >> this authorization is only about weapons of mass destruction? to go that is correct. this authorization is a limited, targeted effort to focus on deterring and degrading the chemical weapons capacity of the none of us are really to

support the possibility of having come to us on the ground. boots on the ground. >> let me be very clear now. i don't want anything coming out meeting.h let's shut the door now as tight as we can. all i did was raise a hypothetical question about some possibility, and i am thinking out loud on how to protect america's interests, but if you want to know if there is any -- the answer is what ever prohibition clarifies it to congress, there will not be american boots on the ground with respect to the civil war. >> thank you.

i ask unanimous consent of my statement be entered into the full record. i will answer some think a lot of people have been asking me. i will answer questions about the intel if i can. mr. chairman, thank you for showing as the images of children, because even though it is really hard to look at, we have to look at it. children gasping for air, young bodies lined up in a row should shock the world. the failure to act, i think gives license to use the weapons again and sends a terrible signal to other brutal regimes like north korea. can i think you -- thank you for bringing north korea? how many of us have been there before we see thousands of our

troops standing there a stone's throw away from north korea? we need to think about it. maybe because i am california, i tend to look at asia, but this is very serious. we see that danger up close when we go to that line. since i came to the senate i voted against the iraq war, but did vote for the use of force against osama bin laden. i voted for air strikes against serbia. i approached this serious issue in the same way i approach those, with a very heavy hearts and very independent mind. i have heard some of my colleagues compare his decision

on syria with the decision to invade iraq in 2003. i believe it is a totally false comparison. you drew that line again. the bush administration prepared to invade and occupy a country with well over 100,000 troops. in this case the president has been clear no ground invasion, occupation will have that in the resolution. why should we take any targeted action against syria? not only is important to keep north korea and mind, but also, allowing the continued use of chemical weapons to go unanswered makes it much more likely that we will see it again in syria and we will see it used to may be elsewhere, and terrorists that attain those and use them -- use them on america on allies and troops, use them

against israel and other friends. it makes it more likely. this is key. we will be viewed as a paper tiger when it comes to the nuclear program, and that is dangerous, not only for us and friends, but for the world. in 1997 the senate supported a ban on chemical weapons. should an overwhelming boats like that to mean something? as should the senate stand behind its word and action? in 2003 we passed the syria accountability act by a vote of 89-4. i wrote that bill with senator santorum. we had huge votes in favor of

it. it said acquisitions of weapons of mass destruction threaten the security of the middle east and the national security of the united states. shouldn't an overwhelming vote like that mean something? shouldn't the senate stand behind words and actions? i believe, as secretary scary -- kerry said in will reiterate that not only has the president on a line on the use of chemical weapons, and not only has the world done so, but we in the senate did so. i know there is tremendous reluctance to get involved in another military effort, and sometimes the easiest thing to do is to walk away, but i believe we cannot close our eyes to this clear violation of long- standing international norms. i believe in america's morality, reputation and credibility are

on the line. i applaud the administration and president for coming to congress. it is the right thing to do. i will support the targeted effort, but not a blank check to respond to syria unspeakable deeds to gas its own people to death. my question involves the intel. i do not know how much you can give us, so i will try to make this party brought to you can answer it. a lot of people are fearful because of what happened in iraq. i do not know how many intelligence agencies were involved in this. i do not know whether you can disclose that, but my question is, was there any argument about this back that they agree there is high confidence that these weapons were used by the regime? was there any debate, dissension between the various agencies?

to gut the intelligence community represented has released a public document, unclassified, available for all to see in which they make the judgment with high confidence that the facts are as they have set forth. i think that speaks for itself. >> i will press just a little bit harder here if i can. out of all the different agencies, because i remember in iraq, essentially the word came down everyone agreed, but that we found out there was disagreement. to your knowledge did they all come to the same conclusion? >> i have no knowledge of any agency that was a dissenter or any agency that had an alternative theory. i do know, i think it is safe to say they had a whole team to free the scenario to test the theory to see if they could come up with an alternative you to see who could have done it. >> last question on intel and

russia. i read in the publication today that members of the russian parliament will come here to lobby colleagues, to tell colleagues there is no such intelligence, that there is no proof. i met with the russian ambassador several times on this matter. i knew right away they were going to do nothing to help us. how could they make that case, given what they said? >> honestly i do not know. i have had personal

conversations with the foreign minister. no matter what you show, that is the argument you -- they take. as to why they do that, i will not speculate. the president is leaving this evening to go to st. petersburg for the summer. he will have ample opportunity to hear firsthand from the russian president and i am confident it will have a discussion about it. >> thank you. >> i want to add. i think it is important not to get into unnecessary struggle over this for a lot of reasons. there are a lot of people cooperating on this effort to

make a negotiated process work. i think they are serious about trying to make the way forward. on major issues the red shoes are cooperating. we have to deal with this thought fully and hope the summit might perverse -- that the president might have a change of heart. first of all, let me say that's that i have seen the pictures of what happened and have been seeing pictures for two years of what has been going on over there. you cannot have an ounce of compassion and not be moved tremendously by what has been happening there. it is horrendous. there has been 100,000 people killed. we all know that these people have used gas on multiple occasions, but the deaths have

only been in the hundreds and not the thousands. all of this is moving, no doubt about it. nonetheless, i am reluctant. i am reluctant at this point. part of this stems from where this is going to go as to the limit we're going to put on it. you said you met with the counterpart in russia. first of all, you say they are

first of all, you say they are cooperating on all major issues. i did not view them as corporate in. they're printing them currency, providing them with information, technology, a tremendous amount of military power. the question i have is, what is your counterpart telling you as to what they are going to do when and if america pulls the trigger? >> senator, i understand reluctance about this. i asked you to confront a greater reality if we do not do something. if you think it is bad today, think about what happens if they confirm the suspicion that the united states is not going to do anything. one of the reasons he has been using the materials is because they have up until now made that the west at large will not do anything about it. impunity is already working to kill a lot of people and make things more did -- make things more dangerous. i guarantee you that is in the assessment. if we make it worse by not doing

something, worse than that, our interests will be set back. israel will be a greater risk. jordan will be a greater risk. the longer this goes on, the more you will see the humanitarian crisis grow. we are ready the largest contributor because of the generosity of american people. we are already the largest contributor to refugee camps on the borders. many of you have been to them. you want to see them grow? you want to see jordan -- >> of course night -- not. >> i believe the best way to

curb that and reduce the threat is by acting. >> i do not disagree with anything you have said, but let's take that and expand on it. are we going to give them credibility if we go in with a limited strike in the day after our week after and the month after he crawls out of the rat hole in says i stood up to the strongest power on the face of the earth and i won? so now it is business as usual. he may say i will not use chemical weapons anymore but will continue to use conventional weapons, and we will go on with business as usual and thousands will be killed and allies will say what is the matter with the united states, you said you would do something about this. you did a limited strike, but did not finish him off.

the problem is just as bad as it was. what does that do to the credibility? that concerns me. >> let me speak to that. a good question. >> first of all, i think general dempsey will be able to tell you he may be helpful -- he may be able to crawl out of the whole and say i survived but no way with reality and other assessments he will be able to say he is better off. there is no question that he and the military effort will not be better off.

opposition will know that and people in syria will know that. already today just with a threat that action may be taken, the factions have gone up, and people in syria are reconsidering whether it is a long-term debt. moreover, general dempsey has made it clear and the president

has made it clear, that there will be additional support to the opposition that is only now in the third month of perceiving the over -- receiving or about to receive -- that they are about to receive that the process will increase. >> my time is almost up. i really want to get a handle on this. i need to be reassured on this. the other thing that really troubles me is what happens if this gets away from us? since the last four, has blocked his law has really beefed up. what will the response be? -- since the last war, hezbollah has really beefed that up. >> i have been on the phone today and appeal confident it will be able to do was a miscalculation. the rest of the community, turks, jordanians, saudis, united states, france and others all have a capacity. as i said in my statement, you have to make the calculations. if he is foolish enough to respond to the world enforcement's against criminal activity, if he does, he will invite something far worse and something i believe absolutely unsustainable.

there are plenty of options here. russia does not have an ideological commitment here. this is a geopolitical transactional commitment. our indications are in many regards that is the way they view it. there may be more weapons but will not elicit some kind of dangerous confrontation. they have confirmed the use of chemical weapons. the russians have. the iranians have.

as the proof of the use becomes even more clear, i think it will be more difficult for iran and russia to decide against the evidence that there is something worth defending. this is the kind of calculation you have to make. the calculation if we do not respond. if we do not respond, we will be back here. we will be back here asking you to respond to greater confrontation. because somebody miscalculated as result of believing the united states is not good for what it says.

that will invite much greater danger to the american people, much greater risk for armed forces, and conceivably much greater chances of a genuine kind of conflagration that we don't want to see.

>> time is up, thank you. >> let me thank all of you for being here but also thank you very much for your service. thank you very much for arranging this hearing. it is clear that the type of conduct that president assad has done in syria, the pattern of his actions creating humanitarian crisis, and now the use of chemical weapons. the evidence has been presented. it is clear we have to respond, that a military response is justified. i support your efforts. mr. secretary, the way you have

described it is what i think we need to comment we need to have it focused on that mission. it's got to be done in a way that protects civilians the best that we can. and it is going to be of very limited duration. i just want to come back to the

point the chairman raised in your own comments when you say we should shut that door is tightly as possible when dealing with put our troops on the ground in syria. i've read the resolution you presented to us. i think it is broader than what you have stated to the president's intentions on the mission, and i understand the president's strong desire to keep the mission very tight. it certainly does not close the door on the introduction of ground troops. i have also heard your comments about the unexpected, something could happen. i would just point out that the president as commander-in-chief has the authority, the inherent authority, to act in urgent

situations when time requires that action. i would suggest as you come to congress for this authorization, if circumstances change, you will have the opportunity to come back to congress and seek our participation. we are a separate branch of government, as you recall.

i just want to urge you in the strongest possible terms to work with our leadership to draft a resolution that is as tight as we can make it, so that we can go back and tell the american people that we in congress are supporting your action but are not leaving open the door for the introduction of american troops into syria. i want to talk a little bit about the pacific military operations and i will leave most of this for tomorrow in our discussion, but i just want general dempsey and secretary hagel to understand whether the mission is to degrade the weapons and deter the use of chemical weapons. have you put into that equation the fact that obviously syria is aware that we are contemplating military action, and therefore may try to change the equation during this. of time and make it more difficult for us to carry out that mission. has that been brought into your planning stages? >> yes, senator, it has. you know, time works both ways. you recall about a week and half ago there was a significant leak of military planning that caused the regime to react. so time works both ways. we have some pretty significant intelligence capabilities and we continue to refine our targets. >> both of you have indicated your concern about american military involvement in syria, that it could draw us in in a way that we do not want to be drawn into it, and internal conflict.

are you also putting into your plans ways to prevent that type of drawing in of america into the internal conflict in syria? >> senator, we are. as i noted in my opening statement, we have taken great care and much time in looking at not only the options but the contingencies that may be a consequence of the president selecting one of those options, including what you have just noted. it is imperfect, as i said, and i think everyone recognizes. there is always risk. we have tried to minimize that risk in every way we can, every presentation we have made to the present. the president has insisted on that. so yes, we have taken a lot of time to focus exactly on your point. >> secretary kerry, you point out that if we don't act, we are liable to lose some friends. we have a direct interest here. we not only have a humanitarian reason to respond to the use of chemical weapons, we have a direct american interest in the region, we have americans in that region who are at risk if chemical weapons or use. i feel a direct connection to u.s. interest. you say we might lose some friends if we don't act. why don't we have more participation in the u.s. military response in addition to just support? it seems to me that this appears to be -- we understand america being in the lead, but it does not seem like we have a growing list of countries that are actively joining us in the military operation. >> well, first of all, there is no definitive list at this point in time, because the president has not made the decision as to specifically which set of choices he is going to operate on. secondly, as many countries as we could conceivably need to be able to be helpful in a limited operation have volunteered to be helpful, and they stand ready to take part in any specific operation, and we are very comfortable with that. but the bottom line in many ways remains that we are talking about very specific kinds of capacities that in some cases,

only the united states of america possesses. and so that remains open. it is a process that will evolve as this debate evolves, as the president makes his decisions and the joint chiefs of staff of the military present him with the various options, and those will probably evolve as you mentioned, we will make adjustments in syria and i can ensure the syrians that general dempsey and his people will make adjustments as time goes on. >> i would hope we would have stronger international participation. is there consideration of a role for nato to play here, considering that turkey is on

the direct front line here on the use of chemical weapons? is that being considered? >> as you say, is it being considered, everything is being considered, and all of these things are being evaluated. discussions have taken place. i will be meeting on saturday with european ministers and i know this topic will come up. most of them or all of them are members of nato. we will have discussions when we are there. at the moment, this is a limited operation with the scope of support that the president makes the judgment that we ought to have. we will have very broad -- we have already very broad -- we have had some 53 nations or countries and organizations that

have acknowledged that chemical weapons were used here and have condemned it publicly. 31 nations and stated publicly that the assad regime is responsible, and 34 countries have indicated that the allegations are true and they would support some form of action against syria. there's a broad coalition that is growing of people that think we ought to take action against syria, but but the question is whether or not it makes sense for whatever number to be part of it is a decision that our military and the president have to make as we go along here. >> i will reserve the rest of the questions for the closed session. senator rubio. >> order. the gentleman will sit down or i will have the officer remove you. make sure the committee is in

order. [indiscernible] >> thank you, mr. chairman. let me begin by answering a question i get asked a lot as we discussed this very important issue, that is why we even care about what is happening in syria. i think my belief reflects the belief of most of this committee. what happens in syria is of vital national interest to our national security. the syrian relationship with iran is significant. it is a key part of their regional power. iranians love to brag that syria gives them a border with israel. it is a supporter of hamas, hezbollah. it is also ventures because of the instability that is allowing portions of syria to quickly become kind of what afghanistan was before 9/11, the premiere operational space for jihadists. now, added to that, there is the chemical attack, which undermines the post world war ii world order, which basically said these things are unacceptable. allies look at the united states and our capability of living up to our security promises is now at risk as a result of all this. this is why what is happening in syria matters to our national interest, why do so clearly tied to it critical national security interest in the united states. not all of this was true two years ago when i joined other voices on this committee.

at that time, they became the predominant rebel force in syria and not others, but that did not happen. the choice was made to lead from behind, to watch as this thing unfolded. others advocated that we should just mind our own business. we are sitting here now as proof that we can ignore them, but eventually they grow until they come to visit us at our doorstep. a moment ago you said that one of the calculations that assad used in deciding to use chemical weapons was that the u.s. would not do anything about it. i understand perhaps why he made that calculation. yes, this is a horrible incident where a thousand people died, but before this incident, 100,000 people died, including snipers that were used to pick off of buildings, women that were raped, they would go into villages and carry this out, and nothing happened. this is a reminder of what happens when we ignore the world, when we look inward and

ignore these problems. they only get worse and more difficult to solve. that is the fact we have here right now. we are left with options, all of which are less than ideal. i want to ask specifically about the one the president is considering. the first option is to help syrians remove assad and replace it with a more moderate government. today the rebel forces on the ground are not just the moderate rebels. jihadists now control major parts of the country, creating a real prospect that after the fall of assad, a new civil war could be triggered. one that could involve sectarian violence and massacres of minorities. it comes with a long set of complications. the other option advocated is

doing nothing. that would embolden assad and iran. portions of the country will still be uncovered and it will send a message to the world that there is no red line they should fear crossing. north korea can act crazier, if that is even possible. our allies in south korea and japan may start to doubt their security arrangements with us. iran will move toward the bomb. the third is the action the president is asking us to consider, what he calls a shot across the bow. a military strike of limited duration and hope that has three goals as i understand it that have been outlined here today. goal number one is to hold assad accountable and to degrade his accountability for attacks in the future. a limited strike would accomplish these things. i am a bit skeptical that what the president is asking for will

provide the support needed to achieve these objectives. and that these objectives are even realistic at this point. here is my first question. i will ask this of general dempsey. the reason why he is using these chemical weapons is he is afraid if he doesn't, he could lose this war, be overthrown and killed. that is the calculation he has made. he wants to beat the rebels. my question is this. can we structure an attack that tips that calculation where basically he will decide that he would rather risk being overrun by rebels then risk a limited

attack from the u.s. if he uses chemical weapons? how are you going to unbalance that and lead him to calculate that he is better off risking losing to the rebels? >> i think it may be even more insidious than that. he has reached the point where he now thinks of chemical weapons as just another weapon in his arsenal. that is the part that makes this so very dangerous. i certainly want to degrade his capabilities coming out of this. i want to come out of it stronger than we go into it. >> that leads me to my second question. how confident are you that we can, in fact, put in place a military plan that is limited in scope and duration that can effectively degrade his capability to carry out future chemical attacks? >> i am confident of the capabilities we can bring to bear to deter and degrade. we will have not only an initial target set but subsequent target

sets, should they become necessary. >> this question is for secretary kerry. one of the concerns i have and i have heard others express is that assad could take five or six days of strikes and emerge from that saying, i have faced down the u.s. and held onto power and survived them, and at that point be further emboldened domestically and perhaps even abroad. i understand the argument that inaction would be worse. have you taken into account what the invocations would be as to what it could mean for the long- term prospects of the conflict?

>> yes, we absolutely we have. the president is asking for a limited authority to degrade his current capacity and to deter him from using it again. he is not asking for permission from the congress to go destroy the entire regime or do a much more extensive kind of thing. that is not what he is asking. so he will be able to stand up, and no doubt he will try to claim that somehow this is something positive for him. i think general dempsey has made it clear, and i think we believe deeply, as do others who are knowledgeable about this in the region, that there is no way that it will in fact be beneficial for him, it will not translate for him on the ground, that the defections that are taking place now and other things that will happen will further degrade his capacity to prosecute this going forward. i want to emphasize something, to come back to it. i don't want anybody misinterpreting this from

earlier. this authorization does not contemplate and should not have any allowance for any troop on the ground. i just want to make that absolutely clear. i was hypothesizing about a potential that might occur at some point in time, but not in this authorization, in no way, be crystal clear there is no problem in our having the language that has zero capacity for american troops on the

ground within the authorization the president is asking for. i don't want anybody in the media or elsewhere to misinterpret that coming out of here. i said it earlier and i repeat it again now. that is important. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you for your testimony. i agree that we should not turn our backs on such a blatant violation of international norms with respect to the use of chemical weapons. and that if we stand quietly by while a tyrant like assad uses chemical weapons on his own people, that we will be giving carte blanche to any dictator anywhere in the world to develop and use chemical weapons. i think the question now is, how do we respond specifically? how do we best send a message that it is completely unacceptable to develop, much less use, these types of weapons, and how do we do that without inadvertently spreading the conflict beyond the borders of syria? that is really the question that we have today. we have heard that we want to deter the future use of chemical weapons, but according to the president and to your testimony today, we don't want to tip the scales on the ground. so how do we ensure that we can do that without spreading the conflict throughout the region, and how do we hit assad hard enough so that we deter the

future use of chemical weapons and don't affect the conflict on the ground? >> the language about not using american military power to tip the scale would be our direct action. the resolution is not asking for permission for the president to be able to use the united states armed forces to overthrow the regime. i want to go back to the earlier questions about developing a moderate regime that has capabilities to be a stabilizing force inside of syria. our military is focused on the chemical weapons but will have the added benefit of degrading and also supporting the

diplomatic track. >> the president has made it very clear that the policy of this administration -- and sometimes people have said, questioned precisely what it is. i will tell you precisely what it is. the president is asking for the congress to take steps that will specifically deter and degrade assad's capacity to use chemical weapons. he is not asking the congress for authorization to become whole hog involved in syria's civil war, to try to change the regime through military action. this is an action to deal with the problem of chemical weapons. but there is a separate track which the president has already committed the administration and the country to, which is that assad must go, that he has lost all moral authority or capacity to ever govern syria, and the

president is pursuing that track by helping the opposition, by now having made the decision to legally arm that opposition by upgrading the efforts of the opposition to be able to fight the fight -- not the united states, the opposition -- and to be able to come to a negotiated settlement because the president is convinced, as i think everybody is, that there is no military solution, that ultimately you want to get to geneva, you want to negotiate a settlement, but under the terms of geneva one, there is an agreement which the russians signed onto which calls for a transition government to be created with a mutual consent of the current regime and the opposition, and that transition government will establish the rules of the road for the syrian people to choose their new government. there is no way possible that by mutual consent assad is going to be part of that future.

the russians have agreed that that is in fact geneva i and the purpose of the geneva ii meeting is to implement geneva i. it is complicated, obviously. how do you get there? that is part of the struggle. the president is convinced that as the support for the opposition increases, there is much greater likelihood that you will wind up ultimately with a negotiated settlement. the alternative is that you stand back and do nothing and syria implodes, and al qaeda, hezbollah and others become more of a threat and it becomes much more of a sectarian conflagration. >> secretary hagel and general dempsey, you have made a number

of statements throughout the spring cautioning against intervention in the conflict in syria. why do you feel at this point that it is appropriate for us to take action? what has changed? >> i will let general dempsey respond for himself. well, first, very clear intelligence and evidence that the assad regime used chemical weapons on its own people. so we are dealing with a new set of realities. based on facts. i think it is at least my opinion that that needs to be addressed, that needs to be dealt with. i have said in public and also addressed in my statement, and

what secretary kerry and general dempsey have said, that is the most specific reason. the dynamics have changed. one additional point in regard to your question on this, as to your previous question. if, in fact, the president is given the authorization from congress to go forward, as he has already said he believes he has within his constitutional power as commander-in-chief to

act as well, and he has given his reasons, which we all support, why he came to the congress. there are parallel actions that would work along with whatever action the president would take. opposition strength, which secretary kerry has noted. second, defections within the syrian government and military, as secretary kerry has noted. other intelligence, other consequences, and this is about getting to an end game. the endgame is a diplomatic settlement. it is driving this toward what we believe the government views as the only way out of this. we do not want to see the country of syria disintegrate, result in ungoverned space, which i think the consequences would be devastating for our partners, our allies, and the entire middle east. then we would all have to respond in some way. i would just add that on to answering your last question.

>> in response to your question about the past year, over the past year, we have provided a full range of options, based on my assessment of their linkage to our national security interest. on this issue, that is the use of chemical weapons, i find a clear link to our national security interest, and we will find a way to make our use of force effective. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i'm trying to reconcile the two tracks of goals we have going here, military action and then negotiated settlement. secretary hagel, you said we are not going to resolve the underlying conflict in syria. why aren't we trying to resolve that? >> i was referring in my statement to the authorization to use military force. that specifically is not why we have come to the congress or the

president asked for the congress's support. as he has said, the authorization is for a specific and focused military action. >> but our stated goal really is to remove assad and move to a negotiated settlement. why wouldn't we not use this opportunity to move toward that goal? >> that is one option. those options would range from an invasion -- there are a lot of military options on the table. what the president has said, what this authorization is about, is a limited authorization for a limited exercise. the goal of removing assad from office is still the policy of this administration. >> general dempsey, how confident are you that you can calibrate, tailor, find to military action that does not have spillover effects? >> the task was to do that, to deter and degrade and to be limited in scope and duration. that is the test. >> how can you calibrate that? >> we can calibrate it on our side. there is always the risk of escalation on the other, but they have significantly limited capabilities to do so, and most of the intelligence informs us we can talk about that in closed session. >> what plan is being undertaken right now in case this does spin out of control? i am glad to hear you are bringing into the equation what i feel is our number-one national security interest, and that is those chemical weapons falling in the hands of al qaeda or possibly even hezbollah. how do we know that we will prevent that from happening? >> this is this moment in time, and as the president said, he is asking for a limited military response, recognizing that neither he nor most of america want to be dragged in to a civil war in syria. >> but our goal is to get rid of assad.

>> our goal is to help the opposition. you have to look overall. the president and all of us agree -- can you imagine assad running syria? can you imagine this man -- >> i'm trying to reconcile why if we are going to go in there militarily, if we are going to strike, why not try to do some kind of knockout punch? is it because we have no faith that there is nobody on the ground, the military rebels -- is it not ready to change, is that the problem? >> the reason is the president is listening to the american people and has made a policy decision that that is not something the united states of america needs to engage in or ought to engage in. that is a much broader operation. is the congress of the united states ready to pay for 30 days or 30,000 airstrikes, and is there a legal justification for doing that? you can run through a whole series of different questions here that are very serious about what you are talking about. >> what do we know about the opposition here? have we been tracking them for the last two years? it seems like initially the opposition was more western leaning, more moderate, more democratic, and as time has gone by it has become degraded and more infiltrated by al qaeda. >> that is basically not true. that is basically incorrect. the opposition has become increasingly more defined by its moderation, by the breadth of its membership, and by its adherence to a democratic process and to an all-inclusive, minority-protecting constitution which will be broad-based and secular with respect to the

future of syria. one other point about the opposition. it is my understanding, because i talked to the president of the opposition yesterday. he is in germany now, meeting with the german parliament. he is coming to great britain and will be meeting with the parliament in great britain. he is prepared to come here as soon as those meetings are over in order to meet with you, and you can have an opportunity to talk to him and meet with the opposition and have a much better sense of who they are. >> secretary hagel, do you have a feel for the number of members of the opposition? how large is their force? >> i don't know the numbers. the intelligence community has those numbers, but as the secretary said, the momentum has shifted with those who are close to the situation. >> i am a numbers guy. do you know the force strength of the rebel forces? >> i don't have them committed to memory. >> but we have them? how many would be considered moderate versus elements of al qaeda? how do we know that hezbollah doesn't already have access to chemical weapons? do you have any feel for that at all?

>> i think we need to talk about that in our classified session. but let me just say to you that in terms of the opposition numbers, you see ranges up to 100,000 in total opposition. you see ranges -- i don't want to go into all the numbers, but in the tens of thousands in terms of operative, active combatants. i've seen some recent data on the numbers of extremists, actually lower than former expectations. syria historically has been secular, and the vast majority of syrians, i believe, want to remain secular. it is our judgment, and the judgment of our good friends, who actually know a lot of this

in many ways better than we do, because it is their region, their neighborhood -- i'm talking about the saudis, the jordanians, they will be interested in having a fairly rapid transition to secular -- the secular component of syria will reemerge. >> that tends to argue for a more robust response. you said this is the world's red line, and i agree. do we know how many additional countries will be supportive of this action? what do we have right now, and what is your goal?

>> our goal is to have a strong coalition in support as much as possible, and we are working that right now. but the military and the president are going to have to decide how many they want to actually have take part in the action. as i said, we already have more partners ready to do something kinetic than the military feels under this particular operation we need to effect that. obviously we want them to participate because we want it to be a broad coalition, but the final numbers will have to be decided by the president and by

the specific operation that he designs together with you in the authorization. >> i look forward to tomorrow's briefing. thanks. >> i would like to thank secretary kerry and hagel and chairman dempsey for your service to our nation and for your testimony in front of us today. i think the authorization of use of force is a commitment of american military strength is one of the most important issues we will ever debate in this congress, and i'm grateful to have the opportunity to have this conversation today. not just what we decide, but how we decide it, will send a very important message around the world that this congress can still function in a nonpartisan way in the interest of the people of the united states. as i have listened to delawareans in recent days, i think they reflect the views of a nation that is -- i have heard specific and pointed concerns that we not rush into action based on uneven or inaccurate intelligence, that we not be drawn into a civil war we don't fully understand or where we cannot quite discern the good guys from the bad guys, and more than anything that we not lead to an open-ended

participation, direct military invasion and occupation of a country in a part of the world that is often confounding and is full of competing priorities. having reviewed the intelligence this morning in classified briefing, having participated in a number of briefings from you and folks leading in your agency's department, i am persuaded that this is not that circumstance, that the intelligence is solid. that we have a clear violation of a long-standing, global red line against the use of chemical weapons. as you stated, something embedded in america's statutes and our treaty committments, something that is a global standard. as i watched the images that were presented at the beginning of this hearing and as i have spoken to family and friends and neighbors at home is that we take a real risk here if we do not act.

this is an instance where one of the world's worst dictators has steadily ratcheted up an ascending crescendo of death in his own nation. he began with the police and military taking on peaceful demonstrators, graduated to snipers killing innocent civilians, has used helicopters and jet fighters against his own people, has gone to cluster bombs and scud missiles over the last two years. there is no doubt that bashar al-assad and his regime is willing to go to any lengths to stay in power. the challenge now for those of us who seek an appropriate path forward, is to make sure that would craft an authorization for the use of military force that responds to america's legitimate concerns, but still allows the administration to act in a decisive and timely way to both deter and punish the assad regime for what they have done. i have a few questions for you,

if i might. the first to general dempsey. i think it is worth repeating, how do we strike the right balance between military action that is too insignificant to actually effectively deter or degrade assad's capabilities, and one that is decisive and overwhelming that it reaches beyond the scope of an authorization and actually becomes a regime change authorization? >> i will not recommend an option that will not effectively deter and degrade. that is the task i have been given. not just based on intelligence but based on the resolution comes out of this committee. >> and could you accomplish that mission with an authorization that is limited in scope and terms of time duration and in the scope as has been discussed with secretary kerry in terms of not introducing u.s. troops on the ground? >> the less limiting, the better off i will be in crafting a set of options, but i completely defer to the secretary of state to give me what i need to do that. >> our goal here is to not pass or even consider an authorization that seems so narrow that it prevents any effective message to be sent here, as i think you said in a

compelling way in your opening statement. our actions here are not just meant to deter assad but to send a strong message to actors around the world who might use chemical weapons or who might keep nuclear weapons. how do we craft an authorization, how do we take action that is effective in deterring other countries that are watching our decisiveness and our action? >> i think the language that the administration submitted with respect to military action necessary to degrade and deter and prevent the use of chemical weapons specifically is very targeted, but as i have said several times now, and will repeat again, i know the administration has zero intention of putting troops on the ground, and within the confines of this authorization, i'm confident we would have zero problem including some kind of prohibition there if that makes you comfortable. i would not urge an excessively pinpointed, congressionally mandated set of targets. i think in the course of the classified briefings, the intelligence community and the military community will make it very clear to you why that is not advisable. i think they have to have -- the general needs some latitude here

to be able to be sure he can accomplish his task. i think the broad confines and constraints of this particular operation are not hard for us to arrive at in agreement. i am confident we will do it very quickly. >> one of my other concerns, mr. secretary, is the flood refugees and their impact on the region. in a visit in january in jordan i was moved both by the humanitarian situation they are facing and by the very real impact this is having on our regional allies, on jordan, turkey, the destabilizing impact on lebanon, and of course the real impact it is potentially going to have on our close ally, israel. i was encouraged to hear there was a successful missile defense test earlier today, secretary hagel. what steps are we taking to ensure that our allies in the immediate area are able to defend themselves from a potential response by the assad regime? >> in jordan, you know we have patriot missile defense batteries in jordan. we are working closely with the

israelis. they have a very sophisticated iron dome missile defense system and we are in constant coronation with all the allies in the region. as you may know, general dempsey was just in jordan for a commander's meeting which included all the senior military from the neighboring countries and our partners. we are closely connected with and assisting our allies on this and other issues. >> last question, i'm interested in our having a follow-on conversation about how this specific strike and this specific authorization can also lead to a broader strategy for supporting engagement with the opposition that will lead to the diplomatic resolution of the syrian civil war that you have spoken about repeatedly. i don't think these are mutually exclusive. i do think it is possible for us to take action that reinforces the global red line against chemical weapons use but to still continue to strengthen and

broaden our engagement with the opposition in a way that moves toward a post-assad future that is sustainable and secure, and i look forward to your info with us in our next hearing on that topic. >> absolutely, senator. i look forward to it, too. we can have that discussion in the confines of that committee and i think that might be helpful. >> thank you, mr. chairman, and thank you all for your testimony. i want to thank the state department for making information available with regard to unclassifying certain information and also for the classified hearings that have taken place with regard to the chemical attack. i think that what happened suspends disbelief, to assume that the regime was not in charge of this. secretary kerry, in your initial testimony, you asked us to ask ourselves what assad's calculation would be if we fail to act. i think that is an appropriate question. i think it is appropriate for us

to ask you, or the administration, what is the calculation of assad right now when rather than after we have proof that he did engage in what he engaged in, that we are waiting for a congressional authorization. i think one would have to suspend disbelief to assume that we would not be better off attacking those targets right now or a week ago than waiting three weeks for congress to take action. just drawing some parallel to the conflict in libya. i think the president's statement was, before we went ahead and engage in combat there, or along with nato, the president said, i refuse to wait for the images of slaughter and mass rape to take action. and did so without congressional authorization under the war powers resolution. we had some dispute when he came back, but initially we went ahead. here, we have evidence that

chemical weapons were used. how can we assure our constituents that this is not political, when the administration comes to congress to ask for authorization to take action that the president clearly has said he has authority to take? >> senator flake, it is somewhat surprising to me that a member of congress, particularly one on the foreign relations committee, is going to question the president fulfilling the vision of the founding fathers when they wrote the constitution and divided power and foreign policy, to have the president come here and honor their original intent of the founding fathers in ways that do not do anything to detract from the mission itself. general dempsey will tell you that he advised the president of the united states that not only was there not a deterioration in this mission by waiting, there might even be some advantages. so in fact, we are not losing anything by waiting.

i personally believe there are advantages, because we have time to work with our friends in the international community, because we have time to make the case for the american people and share with them the evidence that we have shared with you in the last days, because we have an opportunity to be able to build greater support, and as the general has said, we can adjust to any changes or shifts that they make in that time. this does not in any way deteriorate the fundamental mission of degrading and deterring the use of chemical weapons. if at any moment assad were

foolish enough to believe that this time of waiting is somehow an invitation to do more of this criminal activity, i can assure you that the president of the united states -- and i think you all would probably speed up your process and hope the president would respond immediately. this is working. there are defections taking place. there is great uncertainty in syria. we are building support and greater understanding, and i would far rather be playing our hand than his at this point in time. i don't think we are losing anything. i think the president made a courageous decision to take the time to build the strength that makes america stronger, by acting in unity with the united states congress. >> if i may, i can certainly understand that that is the

secondary goal, or the primary goal, that in the intervening time, and causes our allies to get with us, and causes russia to maybe put the pressure on to the assad regime, something like that is great, but purely in terms of military strategy -- i don't have a military background, but i would have to suspend disbelief, and i think all of us would, to assume we are better off in a couple of weeks doing what we are planning to do and what we will authorize the administration to do. general dempsey, is there

evidence that the assad regime is right now moving some of the targets -- general dempsey,

surrounding targets with civilians or others to make it more difficult to give effect to our strategy? >> for the interest of clarity, what i actually said to the president is the following. the military resources we have in place can remain in place, and when you ask us to strike, we will make those strikes effective. in other sessions in the principals committee, not with the president -- we talked about some targets becoming more accessible than before. there is evidence of course that the regime is reacting not only to the delay, but they were reacting before that to a very unfortunate leak of military planning, so this is a dynamic situation. >> secretary hagel, you seem eager to jump in.

>> i was just going to add something that you added, and that is the international community. in addition to what the president has already noted, a nation is always stronger when it is together, when he gets the congress and the american people with him. also, the international community, many of the members of the international community are with us on this. i think the president feels strongly that would be an important part of whatever decision he might make. it doesn't end with whatever military option the president decides to go with, as we have all heard. that is all the more important that we would want the international community with us.

>> secretary kerry, what will happen if the congress says no and does not authorize this strike, this use of force? what will the president do? >> i cannot tell you what the president is going to do, because he hasn't told me. but the president retains the authority, always had the authority to strike before coming to congress, and that doesn't change. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2013] [captioning performed by national captioning institute]

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hoff maicer

government, determines what resources will be produced, where, when and how. so, it is hardly a free market. who signs a contract to do business in russia does it of the russian face, and bureaucrats and politicians, es, are not them the best business eople and they are very interested in themselves and their own national pursuits. miserably has failed over many decades to fully develop its economy, its natural resource economy. i think that is likely to

continue. weakens itself by having such a state controlled system. >> john hofmeister. ban ki-moon says the use of force is legal only if it nvolves self-defense or is authorized by the security council. he did not, however, directly president obama's decision to respond to the use syria ical weapons in with military strikes. he spoke with reporters before d-20 summit.he this is 10 minutes. shortly for the d-20

ummit meeting, but i wanted to take a few minutes with you departure to brief you on the process in syria, weapo arly on chemical weapons. attacks in rrendous damascus two weeks ago the has been ions mission working urgently to establish facts regarding the nature and extent of any use of weapons. as the first proof of of the use of weapons of mass destruction of century, the mission's everyone's n interest. last friday i briefed the the permanent members council on the

investigation. the morning i briefed nonpermanent members. his afternoon my high representative for disarmament brief other member states. i will call for the mission to every opportunity to complete its task. the united nations investigation is uniquely placed to ndependently establish the an s and objectives in impartial manner. this work will be conducted strictly according to recognized lly standards. the mission has worked around following its return from syria to prepare the for ials it gathered analysis. that alled to announce biomedical and environmental have arrived at the designated laboratories by

tomorrow. we are doing our utmost to expedite the process. i need to time, stress the importance of not timerdizing the scientific lines required for accurate analysis. as soon as the mission has , i will t findings promptly report the results to ember states and to the security council. as as soon as we can the mission will return to syria to complete prepare tigation and its final report. repeatedly, essed if confirmed, any use of by anyone under any circumstances will be a violation of international law and outrageous war crime. following aourg ago

the horrors of the first world acted to been ty this use of weapons of mass destruction. compels n aluminumity us to ensure that chemical tool of o not become a 21st terror in the century. any perpetuators must be brought justice. there should be no impunity. earing in mind the primary responsibility of the security council, i call for its members develop an appropriate response should the be gations of use prove to true. duty curity council has a show leadership. this is a larger issue than the sir wyrisyria.

collective t our responsibility to aluminhuman k. this latest source, escalation shush -- should be a call to the international community. end the put to an atrocities the syrian people continue to suffer. we should avoid further conflict search for ze the political settlement. i take note of the argument for uses ofo prevent future chemical weapons. at the same time, we must impact of any measure to prevent further blood shed and facilitate the political of the conflict. the problem in syria and across region solving nobody. regional and international actors to convene

accords as soon as possible. is meantsummit meeting to focus on economic issues development goals and sustainable developments. opportunity e the of this gathering to engage the orld leaders on this tragedy including aluminum taeurpb ssistance for -- humanitarian assistance for the two million a -- refugees. this imperative to end war. i will be happy to take one or two questions. > we only have time for a few questions. >> pamela from cbs news. of the u.n. correspondents association thank you for the briefing and we wish well on the g-20 meeting. my question is, since you are end to impunity

and also talking about the of the charter which would prohibit any military u.n. security council authorization and with a stalemate in the security that you are is it proposing? what is in the tool box of the kind of void that confrontation with impunity and inspector's the report will be out before the convenes?ess has e security council primary responsibility for international peace and security. any course of actions in the future future, depending upon the outcome of the scientific nalysis >> it will have to be onsidered by the security council for any action. that is my opinion, that

everything should be handled of the he framework united nations charter. of force is lawful only in exercise of self-defense 51 ofordance with article the united nations charter and and/or when the security council approves such action. forms the principle of the additions. second d again for the question, our mandate to other gate the allegations of chemical use remains unchanged. hen we are ready, we will dispatch our mission again to report.r a final it will have to be considered

later on depending on the situation. >> do you mean, secretary general, that position taken by president obama that in his a strikehere should be is illegal? nd why did you agree or your team agree to limit the mandate of the investigation team to nature you put it, the and extent rather than if the if the information syrian government insisted to the protocol? >> i have taken note of and dent obama's statement i praoeappreciate his efforts te future course of action opinions of d particularly e, congress. nd i hope this process will have a good result.

s for other issues, i have on rly stated my positions other issues pertaining to use.cal weapons >> but who put the limits on the mandate? syrian government? limitations on the mandates? was it the secretariat? negotiated? was it the syrian government? or was it the security council? united nations' decision and my decision that is plan date of there team to determine the use of chemical there was or er iere team is f chemical weapons. to determine the use of chemical weapons, whether there was or not the use of chemical weaponss to determine the use of chemical weapons, whether there was or not the use of chemical weapons

to determine the use of chemical weapons, whether there was or not the use of chemical weapoe to determine the use of chemical weapons, whether there was or not the use of chemical weaponso determine the use of chemical weapons, whether there was or not the use of chemical weapons. it is not determined who is used whom.st or we do not have that mandate. this is a limit, but in is based on the ecognized standard of international community and we have been working very closely he group. thank you. i have to rush to the airport at this time. i hope you will understand. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2013] clearly adiatricia is dominant, increasingly dominant, criterion for every first lady. endless is the biographical human stories which the 19th mited to century, 2nd century or media. endure w these people in the very rough

world of politics. we preview season two of the original season of first ladies first ladies looking t private listens and public roles tonight at 9:00 eastern on c-span, c-span radio and c-span.org. had a carnegie endowment discussion tuesday on global onal prompt strike weapons, weapons capable of striking targets around the in a short time. this is a little more than an hour. >> good afternoon. the vice president for studies here at the carnegie

endowment. it is my pleasure to welcome you back to school after summer. the first tuesday after labor day day, it is a tribute to the james's guess, and to scholarship that so many of you have turned out on the first day back into the new year. me a special pleasure to introduce james and to the discussion that will follow after his resentation, because i think that this report is really a available outside model of bullet is a scholarship and careful analysis analysis. when you read it, i think you will find that it is by for the exhaustive public treatment

topic, which is basically globaleyond the label of strike but looking at the capabilities united states would consider and analyzing from a technical perspective, function al perspective and looking at that is more way detailed and careful than exists in the public domain. i especially admire about it and that you will, too, read it is that james kind of an t it in open minded way. he is not making an argument for against the concept or particular application but actually looking at the options that have been proposed and kind of describing hat would technically be required and what technology does exist and what the

tradeoffs might be so that you left, when you finish, i thi exposed to a very , reful and rigorous analysis which probably won't lead to you a clear conclusion what you another but or will give you a accepts of the - sense of the important trade aft ffs, the necessary information to make a sound decision. nd that is what excellent analysts should do for you. those are the kinds of tours on they should take you through a topic. i is with great pride that personally and that the with ution is associated this report. it really is an excellent paste of work. will not delay us longer from

james and his presentation of basic outlines of the report. senior say james is a associate here at carnegie. e brings not unique in the sense there were predecessors throughout in strategic affairs scientific burundi, he is a physicist from cambridge a scientific technical background and apacity, but then for the last number of years he has been working on arms control and strategic issues. so, that blend of technical capacit capacity, historical analysis and strategic understanding, i this also helps inform report in ways that are very important. james, let me turn it over to you, then we will have a discussion. george. you, there is a hraoupbl number of

for e who i should thank help with the report and i won't list everybody now. the three organizations i would like to single out for thanks that contributed funding to the report. genuine to the john d. and mccarter and william carnegie hewlett and organization of new york. try e start, i'm going to to talk about 14 minutes and i look forward to having a you.ersation with let me start by talking about right time now the to discuss conventional prompt global strike. there's an anniversary this is 10 years since the u.s. military issued a so-called mission need statement. that is a statement in which they identified the need for a

new capability. in there case high precision conventional weapons capable of targets around the globe within minutes or hours. ever since that mission need tatement was issued this has been a part of u.s. policy to acquire the new capabilities. we had a national debate -- i say we -- i was not living in united states in the mid 2000's when this took place but there was a 00's national debate about convention global strike triggered by the bush administration to seek funding congress to take nuclear arheads off trident missiles, which are the sea based leg of the u.s. deterrent and replace with conventional weapons. hrly parked a very live

lie-level debate where a number congressmen and women took part in the debate. ack then the crux of the issue was something called warhead ambiguity. russia or was possibly china in the future would see the launch of one of mistake it fornd a nuclear weapon and launch a nuclear response. since the mid 2000's a tremendous amount has changed. there has been now almost a decade of research and into very difficult technologies from those that the bush dered by -2007.stration in 2006 he focus of deception of military planers in the u.s. has changed. mid 2000's shortly after the attacks terrorism was perhaps the primary focus. 's threat is . moving back it space threats.

denial capability, spread of nuclear weapons, antisatellite weapons. the physical environment has hange the radically since the mid 2000's. any new technologies are more expensive than the conventional trident system feels and it is at a time of severe downward pressure on the defense budget. of those reasons changes in technology, changes in the environment and nature of threat and, most importantly because the obama administration wishes to ed that it actually move from research and development to acquisition, that actually buy one of these systems in the not too distant it is it seems to me worth examining the whole conventional prompt global strike. you to start what

this report is not. this is something george has mentioned. an argument for or against acquiring conventional global strike. it is not an argument against or or any particular conventional prompt global strike system. what it does aim to do is raise series of issues that i think aven't will adequate consideration. almost all of the recommendations it makes are process oriented. say, it is about theng suggestions about how u.s. can get this decision right. let me point out what the national academy has said in the was mandated by congress in 2008. the national academy has the idea of the conventional trident modification. said is that any longer-term more versatile more would be a far expensive national investment

that the committee believes must broader con he connect of the national strategic strike policy and strategy.ecurity end quote. all of those systems that we are exactly ng today are those more expensive longer-term, more versatile options. is missing from the debate about conventional prompt picturetrike is the big of the nation's strategic strike policy and national security strategy. i want to do today is highlight four key issues that i think are missing from the debate. firstly, a lack of clarity about the role of these weapons. secondly, a lack of discussion bout the military benefit and weaknesses of conventional versus lobal is systems n nonprompt alternative. thirdly, a lack of attention being paid to enable being capabilities. that is the stuff that actually work.the weapons

fourthly, the full range of international ramifications. before i do that, let me comment technology.y on the the goal of conventional prompt global strike is usually developing high precision conventional weapons reaching a target anywhere in the world within one hour. description one often increasingly inaccurate description of the technology under development. n the most recent budget request by the president funding for the one global range system was under development was very, very hraefl reduced and he focus of the program is now on regional systems or int ntercontinental systems but certainly not global systems. basic , there are they technologies -- three basic technologies. you can find out more about the in the report but i will highlight the three basic

technological approaches. first you can take a ballistic in year one, op tick a conventional warhead on top and it goes knew a standard down.ry trajectory up and when it re-enters the atmosphere thatan add a pair of flaps can tear -- steer it on to its target. second option wigs the current favored option by the pentagon are so-called boost glide systems. these are hyper sonic gliders a evolved paper irplanes if you like that are capable of gliding 20 times the peed of sound in the upper expi atmosphere. they would be launched by glad potentially thousands of kilometers purely under their own state. he third is hyper sonic cruise

michaels li missiles they are powered a lot out the flight but faster there. >> is a bureacraticly separate prompt rom conventional global strike and a different funding stream and different goal.e but a similar finally i won't talk about there up in the bring it report that russia and china are both interested in these and ologies for themselves are developing them as well. the four points i want to make today, there is a ack of clarity about the possible roles of conventional prompt global strike. are in fact four different ideas that have been publicly about by u.s. officials what this technology could be used for. the counternuclear mission. tpnew ssentially denying a

proliferator, not russia or may have rater the ability to use its nuclear arsen going off to other country's nuclear weapons. countering an antisatellite capabilities. there is a mission that is maybe exclusively but very largely focused on china. thirdly, defense suppression. countering advance defensive systems generally access aerial access denial capabilities. this is mostly about china but no means exclusively about china. counterterrorism mission. yet made on has not hink doctrine al decision about whether the weapons would be used for. his is a problem in my mind balls the different missions

have quite different requirements. can't necessarily service all of these different missions. one distinction that hasn't been critical isthink is the difference between surprise.s and promptness is getting a weapon rom me to the target very quickly. surprise is the target not is on that the weapon the way until it is too late to do anything about it. surprise is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for promptness. let me explain there a bit more. staeealthy weapon can take hous but it the target could surprise an adversary. used weapon, even if quickly and just takes an hour long-distance, if an

adversary can detect it on might not be good enough to surprise. so those are that conceptually attributes. the distinction between them been made. this distinction is important. let's say the united states becomes worried this china is attack preemptively u.s. satellites. surprise wouldo, be critical -- sorry. to u.s. decides is about start u.s. satellites and they want to take out the capability of china. in that scenario surprise would critical. if china decided that it knew weapons were on the way it ay use the antisatellite capabilities before the u.s. could knock them out so surprise would be critical. i think, would not be so critical. any time the u.s. can ever

magine attacking china would only be after a prolonged crisis lasting days or more likely weeks or months. so, whether or not weapons took one hour or eight hours to reach be so get wouldn't important. counterpoint consider that north korea used nuclear weapons and u.s. wanted to stop from using any more, promptness would be critical in scenario. you are reduce being the time that the u.s. weapons took to eight hours to one hour could save a lot of hours. ut north korea would surely be expected an immediate u.s. response so it would be very ard to get surprise in that circumstance. also, the defenses would be different in those circumstances. china would have incredibly strong defenses that might be difficult to penetrate. defenses would be much softer. the range of the weapons longer inould be much china than north korea.

reasons, these distinctions between missions analysts lost when talk about in very abstract conventional prompt high strike to attack value distant fleeting targets. different missions have different requirements. the place where a strategic acquisition process should start from. so the kind of recommendations that flow from this are that the defense, if it is not already doing so, should scenario based approach to conventional prompt global strike acquisition. and there were senior officials in the bush administration who actively said we are thinking in abstract capability terms. we don't think it is helpful to scenarios. specific and i think congress should ontinue to push the administration on articulating what the military rationale for

are. weapons to make d point i want is different conventional prompt global strike weapons are not equally a good way of achieving the same military ends. distinctive strengths and weaknesses. weapon is best in some sense depends on the scenario. let me make this a bit more concrete for you. the reasons why the u.s. is interested in conventional is to global strike defeat advance defenses such as defenses.issile where you so g.p.s. try to stopped weapons receiving signals. that is something i discuss in the report but won't discuss today. adversaries might

try is the important high value target s that targets that cpgs might be used defenses.nd missile trying to tkoefrpblg large areas will be hard. but localized high value targets plausible. false cpgs weapons travel they don't necessarily travel life of upono make the defenses very hard. national s 1998 the kacademy was saying the hyper missiles could be vulnerable to point defenses. the glade systems -- glide extremely high velocity, 20 times the speed of after traveling hrough the atmosphere at

thousands of kilometers they slow down and may typically at the speed of a medium range ballistics missile. defenses against medium range ballistics missiles are unimaginably ot difficult either. and especially over the time cale they have to think with cpgs procurement, 20 or 30 years, point defenses against kind of speed is not so daunting. intermediate range ballistics missiles with ed advisable he most against advanced defenses. however, they are vulnerable to other countermeasures. some missions require surprise. one way an adversary may mitigate surprise is by an early warning radar. for instance like russia and

china have. missiles are particularly easy to detect with radar, whereas boost glide weapons are much to detect early with early warning radar. on which ing countermeasu countermeasures potential some aries adopt, conventional prompt global ystems could be ineffective against some and the weapons that are effective in one be weaker in another scenario. don't, however, just need to different weapons against one another. we also need to compare them alternatives.mpt the key nonprompt alternative is often stealth technology. a good is potentially way of evading advanced early

arning systems, of penetrating advanced air defenses. certainly don't have the clearances to know or to be able to make an educated guess about the next 20 or 30 years stealth or speed will be the penetrating advanced defenses. ut i do think that this is a critical issue that needs to be aken into account in internal analyses. at a time when there was a lot ore money available i think it was more tenable to say all ifferent alternative ways of solving the same problem should be investigated. fiscal austerity i think it is necessary to prioritize the option that the least risk of military fulfill goals. have no hese options

risks. the question is comparing risks. ne thing i suggest the department of defense do is analyze the relative effectiveness of conventional tkpwhrobl strike and alternatives for these missions. countermeasures is a crucial part of this analysis. if nonprompt weapons are a lot you can bring a weapons nonprompt wps to bear against any target. is enabling ue capabilities. with ng capabilities are make weapon systems work. intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance for targets. command and control for authorizing a strike. battle damage assessment for assessing whether the weapons effect on the target.

of the point of view enabling capabilities, perhaps he single most challenging target out there are mobile targets like mobile missiles. many potential targets for onventional prompt global strike are mobile. lmost all nuclear armed ballistics missiles, the targets for conventional prompt global strikes, can move. chinese's missiles are mobile. some of china's antisatellite are mobile. terrorists are also mobile but different shas. issue because they are hard to kill. famously states discovered this in the 1991 gulf

when the u.s. q id something called the great scud hunt. in 1,461 sortie against mobile related targets the united states achieved a grand total of kills. that is how difficult the targets are. capabilities to attack mobile missiles has improved then, or urably since very significantly let's say. oday the most effective means that the u.s. would have of missiles, obile locating and tracking them, would be through aircraft, operating unmanned from within the theatre. based airplanes are a good example of this. may very well play a

role in this. but it doesn't make much sense use aircraft operating from to provide heatre targeting information for very long long-range weapons. ecause if aircraft can survive in the theatre, you know, if they can beat whatever air there are, why not just utfit those aircraft with missil missiles? because then they would be a lot where the targets much and they would actually be more down mobile hunting targets and it would be a lot heaper than developing conventional prompt global strike. so, the existing u.s. capabilities for hunting down mobile targets are suitable for y data for conventional

prompt global strike. the surveillance systems that a lot of sense with be space based radar. if aircraft could not survive in the theatre because they were and the u.s. n, had a globe-spanning array of radar that were capable of locating mobile targets from a distance, that a lot of sense. ow, the u.s. has some space based radar at the moment but not nearly enough to provide continuous coverage. 15 years there have been various acquisition plans to develop a globe-spanning constellation of space based radars. canceled.has been he cost of these satellites or constellation is perhaps on an order of magnitude more than the cpgs weapons.

if you read, friendships -- that an example of a clear existing u.s. issieu apabilities and government accountability office has called on the pentagon to conduct a study into enabling capabilities. the pentagon issued a n nonconcurrent concurrence is you concur with the recommendation and then explain why you are not going to do it in a differentit form than the one suggested. so, i worry that enabling are being left out of the acquisition process. the fourth issue i want to flag p today are the international r ramifications. sorry, sorry. enabling hing on capabilities. his is a good area for congressional involvement. i think that congress should to ire the administration conduct a study on needed

with plans ability to fill the gaps. needs to happen before cpgs acquisition. pt want to flag is the full range of if i kicks l ram about conventional prompt global strike. international ramification, warhead a.mbiguity, has attractd of the attention so far. as a reminder, that is the risk could ssia or china detect the launch of the cpgs misidentify it as being a nuclear arm and launch a nuclear response. there seems to me one problematic case in which that might arise. china does not yet have advanced capabilities. but if it were to develop them,

prompt onventional tkpwhrobl streak were -- global trike were used for attacks on china that seems where war hrerd a.m. by tkpwaou to would be a particular problem. the analysis of warhead a. to convince how russia that a strike on a third was not a ke iran russia. strike on the hard case is how you deal he -- where a n t strike is not on a third country with the country advanced early warning capability like russia or much china.ikely that said, there are benefits conventional prompt global strike that are not being at the moment. risks was talked an analystelaine was

and now she is a deputy defense.t secretary of one thing she pointed out is the lide systems which are highly maneuverable, unlike ballistics issiles where a ballistic missile is launched you know where it is going to land, or at of the bass end phase. -- boost phase. maneuverable boost glide cruise and hypersonic missiles have ambiguity about where they are going to land. observing them can't know where they are going to maneuv use they are maneuverab maneuverable. this creates a risk that the united states is targeting , but russia or, in the future, china thinks it the victim of the strike. th , whether problem that or not the observing state

correctly identifies the weapon rather than al nuclear. another problem is target a.m. ambiguity which is uncertainty about whether the united states for a conventional target or a nuclear target. the best example of this is chinese command and control, identified as a cpgs.ble target for china is believed to have a shared command and control conventional ballistics missiles and its uclear armed ballistics missiles. f in a deep crisis or war over taiwan the united states attacks hat command and control system for the purpose of denying china control of its conventional missiles, beijing may think the u.s. is going after nuclear weapons and is trying to deny china command and

arsenal.f its nuclear and that could be highly escalating. there is the classic problem of crisis instability. china or russia or another state believes that prompt global strike could take out their strategic weapons, by which i not just nuclear wednesday but antisatellite weapons, they use have an incentive to those weapons first. scale, ither end of the think there are genuinely persuasive arguments for why prompt global strike could enhance deterrence. war with act that these weapons can be unpredictable and dangerous can of war and st enhance deterrence. there is i think preliminarily but reasonably china, ve evidence that russia and other states think

these weapons would be extremely may lead to ich enhanced deterrence. n short, there is a paradox here if you like. conventional prompt global less likely,ke war but should war occur it could much harder to on control. if you look at the white house prompt n conventional global strikes that it sent to ratification of new start, only one risk was ambiguity.warhead i think the congress should be asking the administration for a range of the full risks of conventional prompt global strike. now, in terms of reducing the risks, the ting the obama administration has unilateral measures of risk reduction.

a big icular, it made deal by boost glade systems aying they don't have ballistics trajectory. adversary could nuclear armed an missile. i think that is correct as far goes. but there are other risks with -- boost glide systems. someone the trajectory is unpredictable. another risk is that their unobservable after the boost phase. russia or china after developing early warning capabili satellites based early warning capability, up see launch of the boost glide boosters areind of the kind that satellite based

and warning is designed optimized to detect. but what then happens is the vehicles fly much lower than ballistics missiles. they fly underneath early warning radar. what you see is not a weapon in a nonballistics trajectory. what you actually see is nothing all. o, you detect the launch and then you don't detect the flight of the vehicle because it is warning derneath early radar. it is not at all clear to me significantly less ri risky than weapons on ballistics trajectories that have and ctable trajectories observable trajectories because they fly very high and can be monitors by early

warning radar throughout the whole time. fact, there is clearly no onvention at prompt global strike technology that is ideal every attribute you would want it to have. inevitable s become and they have not been adequately explored, in my opinion. conclude that a much more effective way of reducing the and in unilateral technical measures is cooperative confidence building. some risks can be mitigated with cooperative confidence building. the risks associated with to do strikes on china re very hard to mitt tkpwaeutd -- mitigate cooperatively if at mitigated.e can be let's make three very, very rief points by cooperative confidence building.

first, russia and china are not about war orried -- warhead weu tkpwambiguity ambiguity issues. heir primary concern is the survivability of their forces and that is probably the most mportant area for confidence building. indeed, they are to the purely indeed focused only global trike but nonprompt capability such as cruise missiles and gravity bombs and confidence done ng has to be holistically, not narrowly limited. second, a lot can be done with narrowly focused confidence measures. inspections so this russia and hina can be confident conventional prompt global trike wednesdapons don't have nuclear warheads. declarations, joint studies. huge amount that can

be done here. strong there is a very arpbgt for making -- argument or making conventional prompt or conventional prompt global strike weapons accountable in a treaty.s control the prospects for any other arms ontrol treaty are extremely break, however, so i won't discuss this too much. what i would say is, again, real tradeoffs between particular systems. for instance, congress has expressed particular concern conventional prompt global strike missiles on the submarines that are used to carry nuclear weapons cruise missiles in a modified farm. -- form. through about is one advantage an hey are already part of arms control regime and easy to

submarines. class if you base conventional prompt lobal strike wednesday on surface ships you have the big not tage that they are co-located with nuclear weapons ut the disadvantage that the navy will be pretty resistant to class ions to virginia submarines or surface ships so tradeoffs.eal i'm looking forward to having a conversation with you on these questions. let me make one remark in conclusion. really difficult decision whether to acquire global on aal prompt strike and if so which systems to acquire. don't know whether i -- i kind general -- i'm agnostic promise.e if you are agnostic my goal was

that the full range of relevant issues are not discussed at ly the moment. i hope that is one thing i have you of it is a much bigger and more complex issue of han the one warhead ambiguity that has to date. the debate thank you for your attention and i look forward to having a conversation with you. [applause] >> thanks, james. summary.a terrific you should still read the report but he summarized it very well. do now is ask those to ou who have a question raise your hands. colleagues who will bring you a microphone. i would ask you to identify so that the colleagues in the audience and james will know who you are. on lady here, and gentleman

the end there as backup. he is right there. is very simple. [inaudible]? >> i didn't understand the question. >> chemical weapons. >> chemical weapons? she is asking the relevance of talking about goes to the problem of chemical weapo weapons. obama the bush and administrations have sometimes counter-w.m.d. global conventional strike. so not just going after another country's nuclear weapons but after chemical or

biological weapons as well. hat hasn't been talked about much, and i don't find that a role for ersuasive exactly the reasons that the , at least istration suggests discussion, did not consider hitting syrisyria.ockpiles in because if you start hitting hemical stockpiles you can disperse the stockpiles. t would be truer with conventional global strike because with conventional prompt global strike we are talking a smaller capability so ou would be bearing much less ordnance against the target. if you wanted to go after iological or chemical weapons -- and i'm not saying it is a i'm talking dea, purely in military or technical terms -- you would want to use a ordnance to destroy as

and material as you could it is generally regarded that dispersement is inevitable but as much explosive as you could and conventional prompt global strike is not the weapons do it.to cpgs weapons t see 10 years down the line having a ole to play in another syria type of situation. c.m. brown with the american security project in washington, d.c. is related to this lady's question in some way. part of the impetus or rationale strike entional global s at least implicitly if not always explicitly, to be onsistent with president obama and the administration's desire to reduce the role of nuclear for strategic tasks, not

and lesser hnical than strategic tasks, even for for nuclear ven deterrence. in the president's new guidance on nuclear military to the u.s. in which the military is a lot more pay attention to conventional and also toerations targeting, tervalue namely against population centers and to reemphasize counterforce targeting. his is all embedded in this basic orientation of reducing the role of nuclear weapons. come up in your own analysis or in your own conversations with people who for this particular weapon? a series of very deep

questions and i don't have a chance to get to all of that. chapter one of the report discusses the conceptual history of the program, does the obama that's the obama administration want to replace chemical weapons with nuclear weapons? i encourage you to look at the report. dr. statements are extremely quick. i often think when we're reading chinese document, it tells us -- theperson who analyzes a statements made is about reducing the clear weapons for conventional weapons. can be ready lots of different ways. my understanding from trying to read