questions and i don't have a chance to get to all of that. chapter one of the report discusses the conceptual history of the program, does the obama that's the obama administration want to replace chemical weapons with nuclear weapons? i encourage you to look at the report. dr. statements are extremely quick. i often think when we're reading chinese document, it tells us -- theperson who analyzes a statements made is about reducing the clear weapons for conventional weapons. can be ready lots of different ways. my understanding from trying to read the statements holistic play in trying to speak to

is when general cartwright was commander of strategic command and vice- chairman of the joint chiefs, he was clearly very much in favor of substituting nuclear for conventional weapons. using nuclear weapons to substitute for conventional weapons. inhe was very interested deeper reductions by conventional substitution. saw the boys on that question. isolated voice on that question. i think what the obama today is two things. worries that the use of nuclear weapons would not be credible.

which is not a scenario that is involving russia. it is iran, north korea, and by developing nuclear alternatives. the president is presented with a nuclear option andmy interpretation is that nuclear weapons cannot complete the substitute for conventional weapons. thosear or conventional would be scenarios in which the use of nuclear weapons might lack credibility. secondly, if the u.s. couldn't -- retains dominant, that it does not have to have nuclear- weapons as a hedge against inferior r.t.. -- inferiority.

that will not allow the u.s. to drawdown nuclear with numbers very much. that is my interpretation of what all of these doctrines mean. these are cryptic and can be interpreted in lots of different ways. >> the gentleman in the back. right behind the camera there. >> and thank you very much. i wonder if i could press back a little on your first recommendation on scenarios based analysis for assessments. the reason why is that it occurred to me as you were speaking that if we had scenarios based assessment of the cruise missile, a generation ago, we might not actually have the cruise missile.

many other alternatives were not considered. and there were folks that came to the defense establishment and said about why can't the same thing be done with these capabilities and cheaper or better, and there was quite a debate. explain your logic behind why we should engage in that sort assessment to my capabilities based assessment, for considering something like the pgs. >> i think we could get into a very deep philosophical debate about scenarios based verses capabilities -- versdus capabilities based assessments. there are two arguments i painted today.

first, different systems have different weapons associated with them. going after a terrorist in nails of afghanistan has a different requirement than going after janneys anti- satellite capabilities. and second, pgs weapons are different from one another. they have different strengths and weaknesses. those are all taken together implied to me that if you do not look at this in a scenario- way, there is a hybrid of buying -- there is a high risk of buying very expensive that are just not useful because they are not capable of dealing with this scenario in would want to use

them. can you take this scenario-based assessment too far? of course you can. focusing resources on the threats you think most likely to arrive and in the most effective way of combating those threats is the most strategic way forward. let me give a very brief shot out. another paper that makes this point very eloquently is what denis wrote. he is here today. there is a very interesting section in that paper about technologically driven programs verses strategically driven programs. i also give a shout out to that analysis of this question as well. >> thank you. this gentleman right here.

>> two technical questions. >> please introduce yourself. >> james tank. >> you were introducing yourself. i thought you were saying "james, thanks. >> can you point out of the technical instances of this? anti- avoca ma'at eyes -- and number two, i assume you cannot use gps? there are different? >> there are different kind of conventional warheads that you can stick with global strike weapons. if you were going after missiles, you would probably go after what is called flasch heads. these are metal fragments that you put a little bit of explosive in. if the weapon comes into the explosive is -- explodes and disperses the fragments over a wide area.

i have done some calculations that i will publish in a technical paper that will follow up that in a very optimistic scenario, you might be able to destroy a mobile missile within 100 meters. but that is optimistic. but of course, your target vacation area, whether you can detect a mobile missile within 100 meters is the question. if you're going after a heart and deeply buried target, and it is a small underground target, you might have one or 2 meters. the second issue raised is gps denial. all of the candidate gps weapons systems would primarily rely on the gps system for navigation. this is a much bigger issue than just cpgs. what if the signal is jammed?

you have two alternatives. the first is to integrate an international navigation -- and inertia navigation system. and you also need external signals. it is not accurate enough for a strike over thousands of kilometers. it might be enough to take over at the end of the flight. it is hard to assess where that is. the national academies in 2008 was very optimistic about inertia guidance. the defense report in 2009 was much less optimistic about the feasibility of doing that. both had the clearance to know the answer. the other was to use some kind of internal center, like 8 -- like an infrared sensor.

that could identify the target. that has a lot of problems. there's something called target signatures stability, the temporal stability of the target. does how you train the terminal guidance system to recognize the target. the options out there are very hard to assess with an inertia back up guidance system. >> and this speaks to the enabling that you talked about earlier, all of the background enabling capabilities that would be required to integrate what ever system. >> gps is a classic example of an integrated system. >> jennifer and then over here. >> jennifer maccabees.

you mentioned in the beginning that russia was interested in this, but from what matters stand, russia uses missiles and then number of other things as to where they do not want further arms control at the moment. i wonder if you could explain that a little more. >> my point in the beginning was russia appears primarily interested in hypersonic cruise missiles. he has been very vocal and encouraging them to develop these missiles. and the russian chief of the general staff to the first time i know of gave public mention to the boose guide systems. -- boost glide systems.

i was not implying that because russia is developing those systems it was an interested in further arms control. i think you're exactly right. it is hard to convince them to be interested in arms control right now for a range of issues. the fundamental issue is that u.s.-russia relations are pretty poor at the moment. that is the number one russian issue. no. 2 issue is the strategic capabilities. conventional strategic in the russian terminology incorporates more than just the conventional gloede strike. this will be an issue of arms control if it starts. i think there will be solutions year. if russia does pursue these systems seriously, would it want

to limit it owns -- its own system by our own control -- our arms control? it would have to agree to limit both systems. i talk a lot about arms control in the peace, but right now, the likelihood of another round of arms control between the u.s. and russia is extremely bleak right now. i think will hold off on all of the vacations'. -- i will hold off on all of the implications. >> the greater challenge with russia will be maintaining chinese concerns and that relationship with china, because in many ways what is envisioned is threatening to china in ways that are not so threatening to russia.

>> exactly, and i find a chinese ingalls much more interesting than the rushing -- russian ngle. two of the possible missions are very china-focused. china's nuclear forces are much smaller and much more for survival. and the chinese are much more serious about developing this technology than the russians are. the chinese anti-ship ballistic missile is a cpgs-like system. it is designed to go after u.s. aircraft carriers and other mobile targets. i know it is not called chinese military power anymore, but the annual report on military security developments involving the people's republic of china, that showed that china is developing medium-range ballistic missiles. for all of those reasons, i

think the china ankle, there's a lot more going on there. there's a lot more opportunity for reciprocal confidence- building with china, which i think is very valuable to pursue. there's also a much greater probability of instability building in a china scenario horey reischea scenario. -- or of russia scenario. >> i do not understand this scenario under which using these kinds of events to be helpful under non-state terrorists.

everyone they can do that channahon has learned under withering glare of drones and special operations that they should not gather in one place and should not -- and should be careful how they communicate. how. cpas -- how does cpgs help us any way with counter- terrorism? >> the argument is this. imagine a highly reliable source tells us that the key will be at such and such a place in half an hour and only for an hour. we need a weapon capable of getting to where that terrorist is within an hour-and-a-half. it's where you have this magic nugget of intelligence that

needs action immediately. it is pretty clear i'm skeptical of this rationale within the report. as you say, historically, acquisition of information on terrace has been slow and gradual. and the fact that the no. 1 terrorist was killed with butz on the ground suggest that you may have strategic warning. on the other hand, you may have made the argument that you cannot know what is going to happen. it is possible that policy will arrive. why don't all of the agency's involved in counterterrorism go back through their records and find out if there have been any historical occasions on which the united states would have been able to kill a key

terrorist if it had fastened of weapons. and there are classified examples of that. and you can go to the president and say, here are three examples in the last 10 years worth we had this capability, we would have been able to get a high- ranking terrorist. that is pretty significant. and if they cannot identify any such examples, that is pretty significant, too. there are rules challenges verifying that. even if this magic nugget of intelligence did arrive, you have to verify the target, do the collateral damage assessments. it is a really difficult situation for enabling capabilities, and really difficult for enabling capability to track down

dispersal missiles. >> ed next. >> edward levine. retired gadfly. >> your a gadfly. you are retired senator. >> yes. if i understand conventional wisdom about the probable strike correctly, it is an extremely expensive niche system. perhaps a niche system perhaps upset -- a niche system precise the because of its expense. i wonder if you have found any education where if we developed one or the other system there might be in a -- a possibility

of economies of scale, like the example of the cruise missile, that would make it something other than a niche system. i also wonder whether a reasonable justification for at least slow development is simply to maintain technology dominance even if you're never really going to work well enough to define it. and i wonder if a comparison could be made to a generation ago when people when peoplefobs. >> what are fobs? >> fractional orbital balance systems. >> developing economies of scale -- obviously, the conventional strike capability might be relatively cheap for the following reasons. effuse retired nuclear missiles

-- if you use retired nuclear missiles, you have the expensive part of the cpgs system already made. at that point, it just comes down to fabricating the glider, or wherever. you can get to tens of system is relatively cheaper. there are pros and cons in the delivery system that i discussed in the paper. if you want to go to a bigger deployment: you have to design and build a new missile. then suddenly, the price jumps significantly. at that point, though, than the economies of scale start to kick in.

100 new weapons if you have to build a new missile will be very expensive. 1000 weapons, then you get huge economies of scale relative to the cost of weapons. i've never heard anyone say -- understanding this technology in case adversaries do it is a good reason to keep doing it. i'm not sure it would be decisive argument in my mind about but it is there in a factor. during the cold war at some glorious time during the late 1960's and early 1970's, when people started getting very worried about the idea of putting nuclear warheads in a fractional orbit. he would stick it in orbit and it would go part way around the world and it would be on the target in a way that would not

covered by radar. nuclear arms fobs were arguably banned by the outer space treaty. cpgs would not fall under the outer space treaty for two reasons. one, it is not nuclear. it is conventional. and the treaty only deals with weapons of mass destruction. and secondly, unless these things go very fast, close to 900 meters per second, which is orbital velocity, you can argue they are not in orbit. there are differences -- differences between the fobs systems being considered and the cpgs now. and >> another question.

>> thank you for raising your hand again. i forgot. >> i think you mentioned that the interoperability of these things can enhance deterrence. how much of this risk is actually created of of how the u.s. targets these weapons? you mentioned command-and- control, and by satellite weapons, and air missile defenses. that would seem there is a larger campaign coming. the festival may look at suppression against systems in the pacific.

>> i think that is exactly right. first, the u.s. targeting policy will only ever have a limited effect on anniversary -- an adversary. russia thinks it is all about russia. frankly, what ever the u.s. says about how it targets these systems, and historically it says very little, but even if it was to publish documents, the assumption would be getting these all made up. that would be the first issue. imaginend issue, let's use a cpgs system against iran,

and russia sees its launch and coming roughly in russia's direction. and because it would be unpredictable and an observable, -- and not observable, russia and italy have the u.s. were about where to go -- russia would only have the u.s.'s word on where it is going. it is not risk free. there are risks associated with not doing it. there are risks associated with doing it. my goal with this project is not to make any grand conclusion. but it is to break that analysis of, to highlight all of the different areas of risk, associated with both proceeding and not proceeding, and then let other people argue about how we get there together.

>> any others? ok, again, let me thank you all for coming and ask you to thank james for providing the text, which i hope you all read, on this occasion. [applause] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2013] >> in a few moments, secretary of state john kerry and the defense secretary testified before the senate foreign relations committee about congressional authorization for the use of military force in syria. we will talk more about syria on washington"journal at 7:00 eastern.

we will be live at noon eastern when they testify before the house foreign affairs committee. >> c-span, we bring public affairs events from washington directly to you. briefingse events, and congress's. c-span, created by the cable- tv industry 40 years ago and offended by the local cable or satellite provider. now, you can watch us in hd. hagel kerry and chuck testified on congressional authorization for a missile strike in syria. opening statements for about a half hour. this time to respond to the 426

children. acquire appropriately series and a section in the lease. term think he for welcoming the. the per public event early july. are all here. ase them against our allies, we convened for this debate, it is not an exaggeration to say to all of you, my former colleagues that the world is watching not just to see what we decide, but watching to see how well we make this decision. whether in a dangerous world we can still make our government speak with one voice. they want to know if america will rise to this moment and

make a difference. the question of whether to authorize our nation to take military action is, as you have said and have echoed, mr. ranking member, this is obviously one of the most important decisions important responsibility for of any senator in the course of a career. the president and the administration appreciate you have returned quickly to the nation's capital to address it and appropriately beginning a process of focusing with great care and precision, which is the only way to approach the potential use of military power. ranking member corker, i know syriant to discuss why matters to the national security and strategic interest beyond the compelling humanitarian reasons.

laying thatrd to out here this afternoon. tost, it is important explain to the american people why we're here. it is important for people who may not have caught every component of the news over the course of the labor day weekend to join us, all of us, and focusing in on what is at stake. that is why the president of the united states made the decision. we are stronger as a nation when we do that. because against multiple web -- warnings from the president of the united states, congress, friends, and allies around the world, and the from russia and iran,

regime and undeniably the regime unleashed an outrageous chemical attack against its own citizens. we're here because the dictator and his family's personal enterprise in the last to hold on to power were willing to inspect air of damascus with a poison that killed innocent mothers and fathers and hundreds of their children, the lives all snuffed out by gas in the early morning of august 21. people here in their amazingly has questioned the evidence of this assault. repeat here again today, that only the most willful desire to avoid reality can assert this did not occur as described for the regime it did not do it? it did happen, and the regime

did it. i remember a rack. -- iraq. it in aus remember special way because we were here for that vote. we are especially sensitive to never again asking any member of congress to take a vote on faulty intelligence. that is why our intelligence community has scrubbed in real scrubs the evidence. we have declassified unprecedented amounts of information, and we ask the american people and the rest of the world to judge that information. we can tell you beyond any reasonable doubt that our evidence proves the regime prepared for this attack, issued instructions to pair -- prepare

for this attack, warned its own forces to use gas masks. we have physical evidence of where the rockets came from and when. not one that rocket landed in regime-controlled territory. not one. all of them landed in opposition control or contested territory. we have a map, physical evidence showing every geographical impact, and that is concrete. within minutes of the attack, 90 to be precise, maybe slightly shorter, social media with her rick davids -- pictures of damage. men and women sprawled on a hospital for with new wounds, no blood, but all dead. those scenes of human chaos and desperation were not contrived.

we're certain that none of the opposition has the weapons or capacity to make a strike of this scale, particularly from the heart of regime that territory. common sense. intelligence community tells us that after the strike the regime issued orders to stop, and then fretted openly about the possibility of u.n. inspectors discovering evidence, so then they began to systematically destroy it. their foreign minister who said today and let it be unrestricted. it was not, and they did not. it took four days of shelling before they finally allowed the men under prearranged structure.

tested positive for sarin. i can tell you we know things beyond a reasonable doubt for the standard we send people to jail for lives. we're here because of what happened two weeks ago, but we're here because of what happened nearly a century ago. in the darkest moments of world war i when the vast majority of the world came together to declare that no uncertain terms

the lines and must be the end over the years that followed, over 180 countries, including iran, iraq and russia agreed and joined the chemical weapons convention. agree on little, agreed on that conviction. forcefully more state that is just plain and simply wrong. aline that anyone with conscious ought to drop. this is about congress up red line. chemicald to the weapons convention. you the congress have spoken out about grave consequences if

assad use chemical weapons. i said to you, that is one of the reasons why a assyria isas we debate and the world watches and you decide in the world wonders, not whether the regime executed the worst chemical weapons attack of the 21st century, that fact i think is now beyond question. the world wonders whether united states of america will consent through silence to standing aside will this -- while this kind of brutality is allowed to happen without consequence. in the nearly 100 years since the first global commitment

against chemical weapons, only to tyrants there to cross the world's brightest minds. for those criminals. so the reality is the gravity of this moment. that is the importance of the bases and the world is waiting days. a ranking member corker the central question, why should americans care, beyond what i

well, it is clear that in addition to what i have just mentioned about the syria to the middle east, we cannot to a particularly volatile area been deeply invested four years. here yet we of allies. deep interest there. since president obama's policy is that assad must go, if it's not insignificant that the -- to deprive him of the capacity to use chemical weapons or to degrade the capacity to use chemical weapons actually deprived him of a lethal weapon in this ongoing civil war, and that has an impact.

use the weapons against our the wings, poking -- pushing and fighting. they would be desperate to get their hands on these materials. the fact is if nothing happens to begin to change the current calculation, that area can become even more so an area of uncovered those extremists threaten either the united immediately, allies and friends of ours like jordan, israel, lebanon on or others.

forcing him to change the act with impunity can contributeit has been the president's primary goal to achieve a have to have party is prepared to negotiate to achieve that. syria is important because quite simply, i cannot put this each of you to ask yourself, if you are assad or any one of the other desperate in the region and the united states steps back from this moment together with our other allies and friends, what is the message? the message is he has been granted impunity. the freedom to choose the weapons again or force us to go through the cycle again with who knows what outcome after once refusing it. we would grant him the capacity to use the weapons against more people with greater levels of

stood and stepped away. as confidently as we know what 21, we know that stepping away is using it with impunity. destruction, including weapons of mass destruction. i will tell you there are some people hoping the united states congress is hoping to not vote for this proposal. everyone is looking to look the other way. look the other way. hezbollah is open isolationism will prevail.

north korea is hoping ambivalence carries the day. they are all listening for ourif we do not answer him today, we will erode a standard thatin standardwill erode the that has protected our own troops in war, and we will invite even more dangerous tests down the road. our allies and partners are also counting on us in the situation. the people of israel, jordan, turkey, each look next door in see they are one stiff breeze away from the potential of killed as the consequences

of absence of action. they anxiously await our assurance that our word means something. they await the assurance that if children live up in shrouds were their own children would the world promise. that is what they're hoping. the authorization that president obama seeks is definitively in the national security interest. dictators, allies, civilians america and the world say never again, we do not mean sometimes. we do not mean the somewhere. never means never. they'reis a vote for

not enforced. as justice jackson said at the nuremberg trial, the ultimate step and avoiding periodic wars, which are inevitable in a system of international law was this, is to make states men responsible to the law. it the world's worst desperate sees they can flaunt against the world's best weapons, then those prohibitions are just pieces of paper. that is what we mean by welet me be clear, president obamai say that sitting next to two going to war, and what president obama is requesting now.

we all agree there will be nothe president has made crystal clear we have no intention of assuming responsibility for serious civil war. asking only for the power to make clear, to make certain the united states means what we say, that the world, when we join together in a multilateral degrade and the terror the capacity to use chemical weapons. think appropriately, what about the unintended consequences. some feared retaliation that leads to a larger conflict. let me put it bluntly. if he is arrogant enough, and i would say foolish enough to

activity, the united states and him regret the decision without going to war. even his supporters say publicly is unacceptable. some will also questioned the extent of our responsibility. to them i say, when someone a weapon the world has banned, we are all responsible. that is true because of the geneva convention and chemical weapons convention. for us, the syria accountability act. it is also true because we share a common humanity and common decency. terror isolationism.

this is not the time to bewe have spoken up against the past. now we must and up and act and protect our security, protect our values, and lead the world with conviction that is clear about our responsibility. thank you. >> [inaudible] order. the committee will be in order. please restore order. the american people do not want this. >> secretary hagel. >> the first time i testified

before this committee when i very similar to that protester. i would say that is exactly why it is so important we are all here having this debate, talking about these things before the country, and that the itself will act representing the of view, and we do. we all know in the coming warwick scale gas attacks perpetrated by the syrian government against its own people. as a former senator and a member of this committee, i welcome this debate, and i strongly

support president obama's force in syria. as each of us knows, committing the country to using military force is the most difficult decision america's leaders can make. all of us that our privilege to serve the nation have the responsibility to ask tough questions before the commitment is made. the american people must be assured leaders are acting according to u.s. national interest with well-defined military objectives. with an understanding of the risks of the consequences and rolled. the president, along with the entire national security team

ask those questions before we concluded that the united states want to express how we reach this discussion -- decision by clarifying the military objectives and risk of not acting at this critical juncture. as president obama said, the use of chemical weapons is syria is not only an assault on humanity, a serious threat to america's those of our closest allies. the syrian regime use of chemical weapons poses a grave risk to friends and partners along at serious border, including israel, jordan, turkey, lebanon, and iraq. if assad is prepared to use chemical weapons against his own people, we have to be concerned that terrorist groups that have forces in syria would acquire them.

and would use them. that risk of chemical weapons proliferation poses a direct and the u.s. personnel in the region. we cannot afford for his law or to strike the united states to have a sentence to acquire or use chemical weapons. the regime actions risk eroding norm against the use of chemical weapons that secretary kerry has noted. the norm that has helped protect the united states on land. weakening this norm would impose other nations to acquire or use chemical weapons. for example, north korea maintained a mass of stockpile entrant -- threatens the treaty ally, the republic of korea, and the 28,000 u.s. troops

stationed there. i have just returned from asia. we are at -- we had a very serious and long cover station with the defense minister about the threat, the real threat of the stockpile of chemical weapons. our allies throughout the world must be assured the united states will fulfill commitments. the united states must demonstrate through actions that the use of chemical weapons is unacceptable. the president has made it clear that our military objectives in syria would be to hold the regime accountable, to greed and the ability to carry out kinds of attacks, and deter the regime from further use of chemical weapons.

the department of defense has developed military options to achieve these objectives and we have assets to successfully execute this measure. forces will be ready to act whenever the president gives the order. we are not seeking to resolve direct military force. actions that are tailored to respond to the use of chemical weapons. a political solution created by the syrian people is the only way to ultimately end the violence in syria.

and as secretary carry is leading international efforts to help syria move towards a negotiated transition. the transition that means a we are also committed to doing more to assist the syrian opposition. we also must examine the risk in consequence of action, as well there are always risks in taking action. the regime could feel empowered to carry out even more devastating chemical weapons attack without a response. chemical weapons make no distinction between combatants and innocent civilians and havect the worst kind of

recently seen. the refusal to act would undermine the credibility of america's other security provide iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. the word of the united states must mean something. every witness here today. and ravages of war. responsibility.

all of us who have had the especially those wearing the uniform of our country, a vigorous debate on how america should respond to this horrific chemical weapons attack in syria. committee agrees and takes the responsibility of office just as seriously as the president as everyone sitting at the table. werethank you. and what>> thank you. after a classified briefing, members of the senate foreign relations committee will meet to consider a resolution authorizing military force in syria. this will limit action to 90 days. live coverage on c-span to at 11:00 a.m. eastern.

-- cspan2. in a few moments, of a look at today's headlines. at noon eastern, secretary of state john kerry, defense ecretary chuck hagel and general martin dempsey are on capitol hill to testify about syria at this time before the house foreign affairs committee. minutes, we will look at president obama's approach to syria and the international reaction for his decision to seek congressional authorization. pletka.t is danielle owens christine discussing efforts on the wage -- on the part of the low-wage workers and minimum-wage.

[captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2013] >> the senate foreign relations committee meets to draft operations for syria. it prohibits american pats on the ground and limits military action to 60 days and requires a report from the obama administration. you can see that hearing live at 11 lone 30 on spone two as and chuck secretary hagel live on c-span at noon and you can also listen to it