at c-span.org. that will do it for the town hall on syria. we appreciate you participating in the conversation. the house and senate gaveling and for brief sessions tomorrow. that tweet earlier from john mccain at his town hall. here is the associated press reporting on that. signsn see the road test a reminder we will continue the conversation when washington journal gets underway. tomorrow we will hear from the retired lieutenant general david parnell -- barno. we will also does us the united nations and nato response. she will take your questions about what diplomatic options

are available for's eerie gun -- for syria. when we examine new figures on what it means to be a household in the u.s. tomorrow morning at 7 a.m. eastern. next, a for him on this. the book war from earlier this week. they will talk about potential u.s. strikes and opposition. minute.90 >> ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon. my name is frederic hof and on behalf of fred kemp, the

president of the atlantic council and michelle done, the director of the center for the middle east, i would like to welcome you all to today's program. this is a joint production of the hariri center and the atlantic council. over the past two weeks, we have witnessed a truly extraordinary chain of events that began on the 21st of august with a chemical attack in a suburb of damascus. in the fullness of time, i think we will probably know for sure what motivated the assad regime to take this step and what it was actually thinking. in terms of trying to get away with it. what is objectively clear at this point is that this was a criminal attack on defenseless

civilians. it was a clear violation of international prohibitions against the use of chemical weapons. and it was a direct challenge to the credibility of president obama and the united states. particularly, in the wake of warnings about red lines and game changers. one striking feature of this

chain of events -- sorry, has been the manner in which the obama administration has reacted to the key event itself. for well over a week, the burden of articulating outrage and making the case for a powerful response fell mainly to secretary of state john kerry. when the president and the secretary of defense chuck hagel spoke, their combined effect at times was to blur somewhat the clarity of secretary kerry's message. all of this changed last weekend when president obama announced he had come to a decision on the use of force, and would seek from congress and authorizing resolution, "to use the armed forces of the united states as

he determines to be necessary and appropriate in connection with the use of chemical weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in the conflict in syria." in order to one, to prevent or deter the use and proliferation within, to or from syria of any weapons of mass destruction. including chemical or biological weapons or components or materials used in such weapons. two, to protect the united states and its allies and partners against the threat posed by such weapons. congress is now actively engaged in hearing from the administration about the national security objectives and strategy in which likely cruise missile attacks on syrian targets will be embedded. this is of critical importance. much of the syria related work in 2013 has centered on the need for an objectives-based u.s. strategy towards syria. clearly, president obama

believes contrary to the assad regime and its orders that there is no military solution to the syrian crisis. obviously, he would like to see a diplomatic solution consistent with what was agreed to by p-5 in geneva in 2012. although it is obvious that the president wants military strikes to bring about the deterrence and prevention results mentioned, clearly there must be a syria related national security set of objectives that transcends the response to the

horrible events of august 21. prior to that date, the assad regime had already killed tens of thousands of syrians using mostly conventional munitions in a campaign of mass terror, one that has produced over 2 million refugees and nearly 5 million internally displaced persons. a campaign having enormously negative affect on american allies and friends in the region. prior to that date, the assad regime had already established itself as a palpable threat to the peace in the region. prior to that date, the united states needed an objectives- based strategy for syria.

the need for one now as military action is contemplated is manifest. our focus today, however, is on what is directly in front of us. the prospect of u.s. military strikes in syria and congress's debate over whether or not to authorize the president to move forward. we have three excellent speakers who will tackle this subject from three different perspectives. first, barry pavel is an atlantic council vice president and director of the center on international security. for nearly 18 years, he served as a senior official in the office of the undersecretary of defense policy and the department of defense, after

which he served on the white house staff as a special assistant to the president, working for both president george w. bush and barack obama. he brings to the table a wealth of experience on u.s. defense policy and strategy, all of which is extraordinarily relevant to the situation we are facing in syria. dr. elizabeth o'bagy is a research analyst at the institute of the study of war where she studies syrian politics and security. she is also involved in humanitarian work as the political director of the syrian emergency task force. her major reports on the syrian

opposition include, the free syrian army, jihad and syria, and syria's political opposition. she is widely acknowledged as an expert on the syrian armed opposition and has done extensive fieldwork. as the u.s. president and the public agonizing over what is to be done and its impact of united states, elizabeth will bring what you needed focus on the alternatives that exist. finally, faysal itani is a fellow with the rafik hariri center. he is a relatively new and very welcome addition to the center. faysal is a middle east analyst whose focus is transition in the arab world with an emphasis -- before working on the council, he worked as a risk analysis analyst advising international

organizations on political, economic and security affairs in the region. faisal will help us shape the discussion of potential regional implications of whatever it is the united states is about to do in syria. i will ask each of the speakers to frame the key issues as they see them and to do so within about eight minutes each. we will then turn to questions. which, given the size of the audience, will need to be tightly focused. i will attempt to do a brief wrapup at the end and we will make every effort to adjourn promptly at 2:00 p.m. i would ask you to switch off cell phones, and with that i

will turn to barry. >> thanks very much, fred. thanks, everybody for coming. i am going to be really brief, partly in the interest of time to hear from you. partly because of lot of what i have said has already been in print. i will be brief and a little provocative and then we can discuss it. i always start with conversations about the u.s. role in the conflict in terms of its military role, what are the mission objectives? i will outline four or five. i did this before some of the leaks came out that described it. it is sort of a ladder. you can see increasing levels of ambition, the u.s. is increasingly involved for good or for ill and that depends on your opinion. the first objective would be to

deter further chemical weapons use and we will talk about the military manifestations of these mission objectives. the second is to more comprehensively takeout assad's air force and ground force units, many of which are the delivery vehicles for chemical weapons. they also serve other regime aims. third would be to increase the quantity and quality of weapons going to the rebel groups. this gets a more involved on the ground. this gets us more obviously picking sides on a political military bases. fourth would be the establishment and enforcement of a no-fly zone so that we take away assad's use of air power completely. this is a more sustained operation and would involve much more of an investment in terms of our military ownership of

aspects of the conflict. fifth, and we heard this from general jones on piers morgan last thursday, another objective would be the establishment of safe areas in some portion of syria on the ground that would have to be protected and managed by some forces on the ground, because proxies or direct forces from a coalition. i think about that ladder and for me that drives the rest of our applications as a military role in it. at this point, i emphasize that, it looks like the operation is definitely focused on objective one which is deterring further use of chemical weapons by the assad regime. i say there is a little bit of two and three in there also. i would love to hear from our panelists as well. i think there will be some targets of the eventual military campaign that would address air force units, air force bases, ground force units, ground force bases, associated military command and control and communications facilities, etc. we heard from senator mccain after he met with president

obama outside of the west wing, that there is also a plan to increase the quantity and quality of the weapons that the united states will be providing to vetted rebel groups. the more ambitious that one goes up this ladder, there are more implications of military conflict. we will hear some of that from faysal. increased danger of u.s. entanglement. it increases the probability of syria in retaliation and potentially iranian military involvement. if assad thinks we are only going after objective one, i think most of the interests he would be thinking about would be, i will treat this like a hurricane. i will hunker down in my bunker. when the storm is over, i will

do everything again. probably with a little more freedom. if it is more, i am going to hurt core assets that are valuable to assad and the military, then you start making the price too high for them. that is the framework i use to thing about this. there is broader consideration beyond syria as well. i wouldn't under emphasize these. the syrian part is really important. i think -- i am a former math major so i did the math. over 4000 people, has been roughly the average of being killed. when you think about the two and a half week delay between when we thought the operation was going to strike and the earliest time congress can vote the next week that is a shame.

we are talking 2500 people killed while we go through this process that we are going through. in terms of broader considerations, there is a classical theory of deterrence that is relevant here. the president established a policy that chemical weapons use would cross his red line putting the united states security commitments on the line. there are two elements of deterrence that are relevant. deterrence is threatening some sort of cost or punishment on an adversary that crosses the line. there are two aspects of that. it should be swift and very effective. second, the exact nature of that punishment should be uncertain in the eyes of the adversary. thomas shelley called it a threat that leaves something to chance. you don't want the adversary to know exactly what you're going to do, because he can play out

more precisely and get a better estimate of his cost, of his retaliation, etc. you want them to know that something really big, really harmful and really swift is coming their way and you don't want them to know exactly what it is going to be. with those graduate school 101 deterrence tenets, i would say the obama administration has succeeded in violating both of them fully and frontally with the leaks that were let out about the timing, expected timing of the operation, the objectives, the numbers of targets, the types of targets. more detail than i had when i was doing planning in the pentagon. assad as a result now has a wonderful amount of time to prepare fully for what he thinks is coming and what we think is

coming. as i tweeted a few minutes after the president's announcement, i said certainly assad will be moving in with her units into civilian neighborhoods. that is what i would do. and moving civilians into military areas. i think we have seen some reporting of that since then. i think the ideal effect -- i think about this -- what do you want assad to take away from this operation when it is done? you want him hunkering down in his bunker, bombs all over the place for a sustained terrifying period of time. the reason you want that is so it will never think about doing it again. you want him coming away not even thinking about the possibility of resorting to weapons of mass destruction again.

at this point, from what we understand, he probably knows, i have nothing to fear. i am just going to hunker down and when this is over, i am going to come back out. my view is, let's keep the purpose of this operation as a political military purpose. just because general dempsey told the president we can strike anytime, time does matter. for these reasons, i have dubbed this operation slow motion pinprick. the attributes of that are the opposite of what i would say the united states should be doing.

a broader point that is really important to me and i think to you the united dates, u.s. allies have been watching this stream of the vents very closely as have some partners. these are allies that have a legal defense treaty commitment with the united states and who have relied on the united states in some cases for 60 years to come to their defense when they feel threatened. in many cases, from wmd armed adversaries like iran, north korea or threatening allies like south korea, japan, and our gulf allies. they are already scared about u.s. defense budgets, about sequestration, about the reduced capacity of the military to bring assets to bear in times when they need them the most. they are also scared of the

resolve and will of the american people and of the president to come to their defense in such contingencies. this administration in many cases has focused its priorities on rebuilding the united states economy, dealing with domestic issues. i think it would be wonderful if the world would wait for us to get our own domestic house in order or would go along with our pivot to asia in terms of defense policy. obviously, that is not the case. i think it is really important for global purposes, for the purposes of stability in key regions like the asian pacific and the persian gulf, that the u.s. respond to this violation of a declared u.s. threshold be met in the most effective way possible. i am confident that president

obama has his eye on iran as he goes through the policies he is going through. that is something we should keep a very clear. i know he considers it one of the foremost challenges in his and term in terms of security threats to the united states. one big convio on everything i have said, we are going on reporting. we haven't seen the operation play out yet. it hasn't happened. it could be an operation that meets the requirements that i have just talked about and so, would i love to be happy when operation whatever it is called is going to come out and do exactly what i think most

observers who have very high stakes in the u.s. response would be looking for. i am hopeful that is the case. i will end my remarks there. >> barry, thank you very much. i hope that the question period will present an opportunity for you to say what you really think. [laughter] >> thank you all for having me here. i think it is really important to ask two questions that are on people's minds as they make this decision. the first is, what is going to be the reaction from the regime and the opposition? the other, who is the opposition? two years into a conflict, we are still asking this question. there seems to be a meta- narrative that has developed into a radical movement that is so radicalized, they are all in cahoots with al qaeda. to the point that my comments are going to address the likely

reactions by the regime and the opposition and try to take a more nuanced look at various opposition forces and how dynamics have changed over the course of two years to the point we are at right now. first, starting with the reaction by the regime. i think a lot of this will go back to the exact objectives we are trying to achieve with a strike. if this is meant to be a punitive measure that strikes at a few token symbols in order to send a message, i think you are likely to see the inverse affect. you could see an empowered assad who can come out and say, the americas attacked us, and we are still here. we survived and in a sense, spin the narrative to a positive.

to that degree, i think there does need to be some considerable thought given to the psychological impact that any attack will have and what the regime is likely to do with that attack. we have been tracking very closely the repositioning of assets with hopes of the fraying the cost of any u.s. action. there is going to be a lot of -- there is a strong possibility that any attack if not carefully chosen to significantly degrade the assad military capabilities, given the time they have had at this point, there could be the chance for retaliation or escalation.

i think there is a real fear of escalation if the strike is punitive or limited. you could potentially see some lashing out, more chemical weapon attacks, other possible retaliation against regional allies, a very large embassy in iraq. there is potential for retaliation. that is why we are considering the possible reaction by the regime. you need to look at the grading the military capability to reduce the potential for any possible escalation or retaliation affect. on the opposition side, moving away -- the civilians i have talked to, most people believe there needs to be a response to chemical weapons. they are very disappointed that the syrian government has been allowed to use chemical weapons and there has been no international response to that breach. i think that is a really critical point.

you are beginning to see some radicalization by the result of this feeling of abandonment. from the opposition standpoint, there are a lot of expectations. many that i have talked to plan operations -- to that degree, it has been a little that upset and confusion about the potential of a u.s. strike and have the opposition should respond. i think that explains a lot of the comments coming from the opposition that aren't always in agreement with each other because there is a very real sense of confusion given the expectations they had. also, going back to this idea that the opposition is weary of a punitive strike to the degree that you see commanders coming out and openly saying, if you're just going to give him a slap on

the wrist, please don't delay. instead, it needs to be something that degrades military capability, preventing the atrocity and actually helping to empower the opposition. to that degree, it is this focus on a more comprehensive strategy because of the likely consequences that a smaller attack would have. my own personal opinion is that even a punitive strike at this point could have an important psychological impact on the civilian population. again, the radicalization that i have seen develop over time was

actually stopped for some time because of positive developments in syria. it is now starting again as chemical weapons are being used and there is no response. my own personal opinion is that if there is nothing else, and i do not agree with a limited strike, but if there is nothing else, psychological impact of sending a message is very important. moving quickly through the opposition, who are the opposition is to mark what do they represent? let me say this. circumstances are very fluid. i have traveled there frequently and things change frequently. when you're talking about the opposition, who is in power, you really have to look at it based on transactional legitimacy.

frankly, i think there is a very real threat coming from the islamic state of iraq. this is a more modern opposition coming together in ways they haven't before. they are feeling the threat from this new extreme threat to the degree that on my most recent rep in early august, i witnessed much more cohesive organization much more cohesive alliance and i have seen in the past. they are actively planning joint operations. there is active communication, attempts to come to agreement on a joint strategy. they are together working on plans across provinces. you do see some levels of organization at provincial levels, but nothing at the national level. we are now beginning to see the

foundations of that national strategy come together. it is a direct responsed to this growing threat. part of this also speaks -- i cannot emphasize enough the impact that support coming from u.s. allies had on creating and empowering a modern opposition force. we are beginning to see through the well-known saudi funded and cia facilitated programs, we have seen what funding can do for creating and empowering a moderate opposition to the degree where they are not only much more effective, but they are able to marginalize extremist forces. they are finally at a level where they can compete in terms of that transactional legitimacy with more extremist groups. in the past, one of the reasons you have seen such a huge dominance is resources.

the civilian population has not been welcoming to the extremist groups. they have access to funding and they leverage that to give them a more dominant position than they would have otherwise. once you begin to see the more moderate forces at that same level in terms of resources, we have already seen a positive impact on the ground. very briefly, i don't like using terms -- all these religious terms. i don't think that the way people identify religiously is indicative of our own understanding of what these

terms mean. when i am talking about moderate forces, i am talking about people who have over the course of two years not only talked about but actually demonstrated a respect for minority rights, respect for women's rights, respect for civilian leadership. they have struggled with local administration councils to ensure there is this vibrant and initiative taking root that has helped develop based on democratic pluralism. that is the way i am defining moderate. that being said, i think moderate groups make up a huge percentage of the opposition. especially the opposition that is fighting on the front lines and taking part in the primary battle against the syrian government. i have actually been documenting cases of the more extremist groups leaving the primary battle front and heading to areas where they are working on

patterns of authority and control and creating the framework of a safe haven. the vocalizations on creating safe havens has led to an unimpressive military record in confrontation. they claim credit for a lot of operations that they are not participating in. it is implementation of these more harsh principles of islamic lifestyle being pushed back. recently, i saw numerous demonstrations pushing back against more extreme measures they are trying to implement. i think this threat is having an

impact on the opposition's ability to come together and forcing them to work together that they haven't in the past. finally, i think i will end on this note about who their specific leaderships are and whether they are aligned with u.s. interest. based on my definition of moderate, i think there is a force inside of syria that can be relied on. if empowered, it could serve as a reliable governing partner that would not only be aligned with u.s. strategic interests but would also help create a governance system that would be conducive to the desires and demands of the population itself but would also help serve. >> elizabeth, thank you very much. your report is interesting on

many levels. for me, it really contrasts significantly with the message of the assad regime which is to say, remove us and the alternative is al qaeda. a message that has actually grown roots in certain quarters of the united states congress. faysal, the floor is yours. >> thank you. you have made a lot of strong points. i will be brief. despite the warnings within the debate, the conflict, i think we can all honestly agree that it is a regional conflict and a proxy war. the only difference is different proxy backers are involved to different degrees and with different levels of commitment. examining the possible backlash or reactions of whatever level of ux action is taken, i think it is useful to think of

possible military operations on a spectrum and examine the different scenarios to see how regions would react. the key point is, all of these actors involved are relatively weak and constrained to what they can and cannot do. i think that improves the prospects on one hand. it could mean -- the first scenario is the u.s. intervention that might actually break the regime or shift the balance of force in the civil war. i don't think it is likely to start with that in mind but i do see that it could potentially escalate further down the line into that sort of operation.

looking at iran, they have always struck me as highly risk- averse, very cautious despite their fervent ideology and rhetoric. their greatest asset here is their military capability in the region. if they do perceive that the regime is falling or is in danger of being defeated, i think hezbollah is the first thing they would activate. would they do this against thei? yes, i think so. even though lf is highly constrained, fighting in syria, trying to cover their backs in lebanon, this is one of the few scenarios i would imagine that they would be compelled by their own interest as well as by iran to fight the war. that would mean raising the cost u.s. and its allies of

intervention against the regime. the other thing the iranians may resort to is carrying out proxy military attacks and other u.s. allied areas. they do have the capability to do this. they have been very hesitant to use that sort of tool. i think it is one in their arsenal that they can employ effectively. syria itself, i believe despite all the bluster, is barely able to keep up the fight at home. certainly not capable of retaliating a significant way against u.s. interests. what they can do is further destabilize lebanon. that is a tool they have employed effectively in the past. they do have strong

intelligence networks there. over the past couple weeks, there were large-scale bombings in lebanon. sunni mosques, it is likely that islamist militants who are sunni were probably behind them. i believe that is a way of setting a price for involvement within the syrian conflict and also due to lebanese president and governments to word syrian behavior. that is something escalating. has below use of weapons of mass destruction, they may very well choose to use them liberally in the domestic conflict. that includes chemical weapons. i think the day after scenario is -- i believe this is probably

already planned. an insurgency option in syria. one in which, it is a mirror of what is happening already. this is something they practiced in iraq. they would conduct a slow insurgency campaign to degrade rebel assets inside syria. i do think there is a positive here which is that a decisive show of u.s. force in the region would rally regional allies and reinvigorate them. the likely outcome is a different question of course. within lebanon, i think there would be an escalation in violence simply because hezbollah has been successful at deterring their domestic sunni levels.

i think they would be important to challenge hezbollah. you could say real spillover into lebanon. of course, on the other side of the spectrum is the slow-motion pinprick you described. i think it is clear to me with the original result of that would be. the iranians would calculate that u.s. rep lines can be crossed with relative impunity so long as the united states -- to restore cosmetic appearance. they are not compelled to make any significant concessions over a nuclear program. as for the regime itself, i think this would clarify to them what the rules of the game are. what they are and are not

allowed to do. they will likely be punished if they break those rules. i suspect in the immediate aftermath that they would stay away from using weapons of mass destruction and stick to conventional means. at least until they know how committed the u.s. is to shifting the balance in syria. i think one of the things they might do as well is employee hezbollah. it is not clear to me how active they have been in the rest of syria. there is more capacity they can take away from lebanon to fight conventional wars in syria. i imagine this would apply in damascus as well. i think hezbollah, lebanon and the real short and its rivals disheartened. turkey and jordan would be quite vindicated in the caution they

have shown to shoulder this burden against the regime alone. they are risk-averse because they see the u.s. commitment as faltering and week. the gcc feels very vulnerable due to perceived u.s. disengagement. i can also imagine that this would deepen their commitment to what they see as their own proxy in syria. for now, it seems that the convergence of what those should be, i am not sure that that would hold. that would have dire affects for the cohesion of the rebels and u.s. interest. the moderate rebel groups would

be thoroughly discredited having gambled on strong u.s. backing. that would be to their own peril, to the u.s.'s peril and beneficial to others. that seems like a total undermining of what the united states objectives are in syria. i think this pinprick strike may temporarily postpone the use of chemical weapons. it might change the calculus in a way that is detrimental to u.s. interests in the long run. the only way to see a different outcome from that regardless of what the u.s. the site studio is if this is accompanied by a genuine full-fledged effort to support the moderate rebel movements in syria. i would think it needs to be

done. i think this is sort of the elephant in the room. the burning question to me was, was anyone asking the question of why we find ourselves in this situation? to me, it is linked to the failure to support the u.s. stated objective of supporting the moderate rebel movement as an alternative to the assad regime. that toomey is the only way to restore u.s. credibility. otherwise, probably futile at best. at worst, downright harmful. i would come down and say that playing this card of military action after such a fuss with the mystic politics without achieving any significant strategic aims is worse than nothing.

thank you. >> thanks, faysal. i will get the ball rolling with questions. barry, the question for you is if deterrence is the centerpiece of the military mission, can it be considered reliable if the chemical stockpile itself is unaffected and delivery means remain in place? elizabeth, my question for you is, the profile of the opposition so far is rather low in all of this. perhaps that is understandable given the political controversy in the united states.

is the opposition considering any kind of information outreach to the syrian people, either before, during or in the immediate wake of any american operation? faysal, my question for you, in your view, is it possible that the regime is effectively deterred is now on the chemical warfare front given the nature of the crisis that has erupted in the wake of august 21? is it remotely possible that a key lesson has already been learned? >> you gave me a softball. the question of whether deterrence, whether it can be effective without actually destroying the means of delivery of chemical weapons or the agents themselves, my understanding is you can

actually destroy -- you can't militarily take care of chemical weapons themselves unless you put soldiers on the ground. while there are some technologies in some of our munitions that i have read about that and if you'd the agent, i can't imagine the president has the confident to unleash those in a comprehensive enough fashion without causing the billion casualties. leaving the affect on the decision-maker that i suggested, sure deterrence can work. there are lots of cases in history where deterrence has worked. you need to make it clear, the essence of deterrence is imposing costs on the decision-

maker that they are not worth potential benefits that he could gain. my understanding of why he used chemical weapons is, it is a more efficient means of doing what he has been trying to do anyway which is kill anybody who might be in opposition. because he has other means to do so, if this operation is done the way it should be done, i would say deterrence can work well. >> do you have a sense than of potential scope and duration? >> you mean how it should go or how it looks like it is going to go? >> let's assume that your prescription for what it would take to make deterrence operationally effective? >> there are lots of different ways to shade military operations and assets. that would be hitting those

targets. at a rough public level discussion, i would say weeklong campaign that come randomly strikes as many targets as possible, those that are not so near the billion neighborhoods that you don't end up with an enormous number of casualties. now that aside as a week and a half to move things around, it will be much more difficult. >> thank you. elizabeth, where is the opposition in all this? are they going to lift their heads above the trench line? >> i think the opposition needs a good pr campaign. they could use some help from public relations firms. part of our problem with understanding is because they haven't been able to speak with a unified voice. going back in response to the delay in u.s. action, you see a

plethora of opinions coming out from various figures who don't always agree with each other. getting the opposition on a united page where they are speaking with one message has been difficult. i think that they are -- they do a great despite those minor details, they agree on specific principles. to that extent, even more importantly, they are now attempting to reach out to the american public and make their case as to why congress should authorize military action in syria to really come together, to finally put a unified voice behind the opposition in ways that could potentially be much

more rallying for any sort of u.s. support than have an in the past. >> thank you. faysal, is it remotely possible that deterrence has already happened? >> if they thought they could get away with doing so unpunished, they are a cautious bunch. they don't take risks. the way they thought this war has showed me that they have escalated gradually, seeing what the limits are and how the world would react. i sense that at this stage, they are probably already feeling a missteped the bounds. clearing out with less casualties probably wasn't worth

that risk. therefore, there is no reason to use it in the future. unless they are existentially on the ropes. in that sense, if our objectives are so humble as to temporarily delay or postpone or eliminate the use of chemical weapons until the next presidential administration, and perhaps they have been determined. i am not sure how that changes the picture in terms of broader u.s. strategic interests. i think we shouldn't be so naïve as to assume they are charging full speed ahead. >> i would urge you to state -- first of all, identify yourself, state the question as briefly as possible, and please identify the person to whom the question

is directed. >> my question is to you and to barry. there are two bank strategic countries that were not mentioned, russia and iraq. the day after -- what role will iraq play? they have a strategic position in terms of closeness to syria. >> when we take these in groups of three? >> [indiscernible] my question to barry and elizabeth, why do you think that has happened? but the speculation about obama doesn't want to do this. [indiscernible] >> my question is addressed to

mention the mistakes obama made, that he is forced to do it but does not want to do it. theory and lost a lot of confidence in the u.s. lost a lot of confidence in the u.s. they get some time to prepare opposition, and the question to elizabeth, supporting the opposition would require coordinating. would the u.s. do this?

>> straight back. >> my question is addressed to barry. you talked about the possibility if syrian action takes action, there could be retaliation, and i am thinking about 2007 when israel took out the nuclear reactor, it was even before assad was confronted with the destruction, and then syria did nothing, and israel took out missiles three times and it did nothing. what brings you to the conclusion that he might actually retaliate now? >> ok, we will go with those three. i will start with the issue of

russia, ok, and i think i will defer to faysal on iraq. this administration has made a major outreach to the russian federation on this issue from the beginning. secretary of state john kerry in particular really led with his chin on this back in may when he went to his counterpart and said what we really need to do is reconvene a geneva format. what the secretary of state ran into was a real unwillingness on the part of a regime that thought it was winning on the ground to engage in that kind of a dialogue and a strong reluctance on the part of the opposition, which sought that it

was losing on the ground and really wanted some upfront guarantees about the status of assad, which were not part of the geneva format. i suspect -- and it is obviously very difficult to answer -- but i suspect at this point vladimir putin and his colleagues probably know the truth of what happened on august 21. i think that just from a real politik point of view, they understand. they will not like it, they will try to dissuade the president,

but they understand that the united states has no choice but to strike and strike hard here. and i think that understanding, i think their understanding of the facts regardless of what they are saying publicly, will probably minimize their reaction to whatever it is we do. i will say in fairness, though, that the potential of various russian reaction is something that has to be taken into careful consideration by the administration. among other things, basically, the windpipe of our logistical way into afghanistan is in the hands of russia. so this is an important consideration. faysal?

>> on iraq, it is more useful, rather than thinking about iraq as a discrete political player, think of it as a broken country that has a strong military apparatus. that is how i would read their reaction in a day-after scenario. they are seeing this through a sectarian prism. their primary fear would what would happen in the sunni areas if the assad regime were to be weakened particularly, if the eastern border area of syria has a strong rebel presence. also through a sectarian prism, and due to their weakness concerning iran, they would have to go along with that strategy. whether they would be direct

participants or not, probably not. they would be focused on what is going on at home. would they continue to facilitate supplies, logistical things, i suspect, yes. >> ok, barry, whatever order, whatever you prefer. >> as it relates to the leaks and the russia question, i'm speculating there are two main factors. one is normal indiscipline and looseness in the pentagon on these kinds of things. i was in the white house right when the obama administration began, and we were developing the new strategy for iraq and afghanistan, and i remember the moment when the first leak came out of central command at the time on what plans the u.s. had

for various options. i was on air force 2 at the time and raised it to senior white house people and said if you do not deal with this now, with some pretty seriousness, as a team to the pentagon, then you will have a bigger problem on your hands, not that it is possible to control it, but that was my naïve attempt at the time to do so. there is a discipline part, but also deliberate leaking we know from the white house on some of these things. in that case, their intent was to try to send messages to various audiences. i say there are three audiences that are important. one is to syria, assad, we are going to do this limited operation, we are not going after your head, so chill out because we do not want to get involved. the second audience is russia, and here the question was we do not want to risk world war iii

here. we know assad has been a client of yours for decades. why don't you not send too many ships to the mediterranean and chill out until we are done this and this is not something risking a major u.s.-russia military confrontation about. then i think the third audience was the congress and the american people. and here i think the president has not wielded the inherent power of the presidency in a way that i think is easily doable, and, boy, he is a convincing communicator when he sets his mind to it, but because public opinion polls are what ever they are, 80% for, 20% against, there is presidential leadership when you can go to the people, you can talk to them, you can inform a public debate, you can mount a base and stakeholders and

convince them this is the right thing to do. we are all war weary. not to denigrate that fact, the military families who have borne the brunt the last 12 years, and the type of assets moreover that would be mostly engaged, we are talking naval and air, are the least stressed, although still stressed on some specialties, but lesser stressed than ground force units. it is a question of presidential leadership. rather than leaking this is going to be a pinprick, i would have gone with a more outward use of the office of the presidency, which has so much that it can bring to bear. the other question about israel strikes on syria's nuclear capabilities and on syrian

missiles, 2007, and more recently -- the reason syria has not retaliated is israel has a good repetition for deterrence, and they do not mess around and they do not do so motion or pinprick. they do fast and very hard and very clear. so i think the question of deterrence against israel, the reason it was not retaliation because they knew that the retaliation against the retaliation would be a heck of a lot worse than anything that was done beforehand. whereas, the u.s. -- it is at least conceivable that syria could do things, be more aggressive in lebanon, if iran was stimulated to get involved to use its global network of terrorist capability and of capabilities in the persian gulf, etc., if it had sufficient interest at stake, then it might also think about retaliating because i think it has a sense the u.s. does not mean what it

says after the last several years of u.s. policy and relative perception that we are withdrawing from the region. >> elizabeth? >> the issue of funding is a very important question, and specifically to the disparate sources of funding have had a debilitating impact on the opposition to the degree that there are different players who are funding different groups, sending in funds and resources with very specific objectives to be achieved without funding and resourcing, and to the degree it has kept the cohesion of forces from coming together and having a unified channel of funding and support that would eventually help promote a reliable chain of command which we have not seen that developed yet.

the u.s. could play a key role in terms of his leadership, rallying all of our allies and people involved in syria, have a vested interest in syria, and getting them on the same page and forcing allies to partner together and achieving that single unified channel of support. this is something that could i think be done with very limited uses of u.s. resources and assets and could actually have a very profound impact on not only empowering the opposition, but also creating the mechanisms for cohesion and coordination that could be very well be the framework for a reliable earning partner. >> thank you. faysal, anything else? ok, anybody else on the side of the room? yes, sir. >> thank you, everyone. a question for you, elizabeth. you noted that extremist groups in particular are leaving the

front lines and starting to consolidate bases up across the country. could you be specific about the areas that you see these groups having a stronghold in? thank you very much. >> thank you, and right in front, right there. >> i am curious for any of the commentators, to what extent you think this gradual escalation in the middle east, north africa region, of at least the countries who are vulnerable at the moment, is indicative of the declining respect for the word of america on the global stage, and indeed, to take the question a step further, whether it threatens the deliverability of a declared shift to the asia- pacific region? >> thank you.

we will take one more. yes, sir. >> [indiscernible] barry, i think you have correctly put the conversation where it needs to be on the question of objective. to summarize, i think it is the objective number one was to influence assad's behavior. elizabeth, in some of your writings, one of the most interesting points you have making is that one of assad's core tactics, reasons why he uses these brutal tactics, not necessarily in the chemical weapons, but since the war has begun, it is not necessarily aimed at his adversaries, but within his own alouite community. the point you make is he has to send a signal to his own community on the only option he has got, you have to stick with

me, and some of the brutality explains that in an interesting way. my question is, then, with respect to what the u.s. should do in achieving this objective, if the u.s. goes heavier, heavier than a pinprick, the more it does, if it does not break the regime, does it not then, elizabeth, create the incentive not to cower, as barry would like assad to do, but the opposite, to demonstrate his viability through his own people? thank you very much. >> thank you, edward. elizabeth, why don't you take the two that were addressed to you specifically, areas where extremist groups are making adjustments and edward's question. >> looking at the growth of extremist groups in the north, we see most prevalent in aleppo and another city, to the degree

that they have moved up north toward the border area in order to control some of those logistic networks moving in and out of the country. this is where they have been able to establish a power base by controlling those networks and being able to the take where resources coming into the country are been distributed and where they are going to. you really see a strong presence in aleppo and now moving into parts of northern -- and now the coast. i think a lot of what we have seen and actually it is remarkable when you talk to some of the people from these other groups, this really started in early april when the battle for a city was ready.

at the time there was an assessment that, a, the opposition did not have to resources or capability to defend homs province. as you saw at the regime consolidating in that area, you see these groups pull out because they think there is no way for them to win, so why lose their men and their resources? to that degree, we have documented, since late april, early may, a huge rise in the extremists moving from the frontlines and go to areas where they can focus on governing and controlling resources and kind of boosting their power from there. a lot of it is focused on the border areas and a lot of it is focused actually on trying to gain some sort of embeddedness with the civilian population. i talked a lot about in my recent article about the

geographic separation, which i think israel between the north and the south, but when you look at these areas where they have a dominant presence, it becomes difficult because they have not been embedded in the population and they are corporate in with some of the various armed position groups because of their control of resources and because they control the border areas and it makes them difficult for them forces to operate independently of peace groups. i am not underestimating the role that they have in establishing areas of control, but a lot of it is attributable to resources, legitimacy, and there are civilian populations that are pushing back and trying to curtail some of their more extremist measures, trying to curtail some of their leadership, and working to

coming together with the civilian and the armed opposition groups to try and push back. in regard to your question, ed, this is critical and is back to the point that if it is a strike that does not significantly degrade their regime's capability, it could we spun in a way where it is seen as victorious, where it is seen that he has survived an american attack and live to tell the tale, so to speak, which could be very dangerous in terms of escalation in trying to not only show that he survived the attack, but that he actually has the capacity to protect his community. we saw a number of massacres that occurred in the coastal area, the area between the coast and inland provinces, that were directly related to this idea that the opposition was

threatening some of their strongholds and there was a need to reinforce this notion amongst his core constituencies that he can protect them and he will go to all measures to protect them. i think the potential for escalation in that regard is very real, and, again, is why i think any sort of u.s. action needs to look at what the regime is likely to do domestically in order to shore up his support base and also address his means of retaliation. >> and my own sense of that, frankly, in the context of an attack or a series of attacks, a campaign that is more or less along the lines of what barry is suggesting is that if the assad regime feels strongly about the need to take additional stern measures in syria, and if it is

able to do so without an air force, without airfields, without scud missiles, about a major piece of his artillery holdings, welcome to it, but i think that could be the situation we are facing. i am going to turn to barry on the question as whether as a general rule respect for america's word is fading around the world. our cutoff time is 1:30. anyone who feels obligated to leave, please do so, but we will continue for a while longer as long as we have got some questions. >> of central importance, a central question for u.s. security policy, and i have been thinking about it a lot, including when i was in the pentagon and white house and still thinking about it now, if you look at the broader expanse

of our recent history, i think the iraq misadventure was perhaps the single most damaging activity by the united states for reducing our influence in the world. i thought president obama did a masterful job in 2009 did this deliberately of resetting the tone. he gave a speech in prague on a nuclear weapons nonproliferation agenda. he gave a speech about detainee policy in guantanamo. he gave a speech in cairo which electrified the muslim world. he did a masterful job of resetting the table and of setting the conditions for regaining and restoring u.s. influence, even among some negative and contrary trends in raw power. i'm talking about the massive shift of global economic activity that we are currently witnessing from the west back to the east after a few hundred years, including the debacle of

the lack of u.s. governance in washington, where it looks like we are in that in managing our polity, our national resources, and also adding on top of that our budget cuts that are coming in which we cannot even stop, even though we have foisted them upon ourselves. all of this adds up -- and i traveled the world and have been to asia within the last year, and to the middle east, to europe, and i hear in every region the same refrain -- where is the u.s.? why are they withdrawing from the world? even some of our asian friends say i like your pivoting, but we are scared you are going to pivot away. middle east says, where are you? why aren't you engaging? europe is very worried and has their own internal problems as well. i think president obama has gone too far since he reset the table in 2009.

i agree, get out of iraq, although i do not think it was done in the most masterful way at the end game, and agree with the question of wrapping up wars that are in ways that are effective for u.s. interests. this is going too far. people are screaming for u.s. leadership, including on syria, and it has not been happening. i think we are not in good shape, we are in worse shape than we were, at the end of 2009, but i will end on a positive note. this is reversible. the u.s. has a basic national resources, economic opacity, especially with the energy revolution. no one should count the united states out in terms of restoring its leadership. i believe it was the singaporean prime minister who gave a speech last fall in beijing at communist party central headquarters, and it was

released in public and he basically told them you better watch your rhetoric and your actions, you are overplaying your hand. the united states is one budget deal from being back. i agree that -- i guess my main point is this is easily reversible because we still have the basic national capacity to lead in the world. we just need to sort of regenerate the will, and i think it is easily done. >> thank you. yes, sir. >> thank you. peter, center for national policy. this is a question for elizabeth. given that the aid we have given two rebel groups is extremely limited, reportedly not including anything more than light mortars, what is the

perception among rebel groups of what it is we are trying to do? clearly, it is short of either supplying or promoting supplied by others of game-changing levels of support that are capable of overthrowing assad. so what is the perception -- what does the u.s. gain in the alliance of the rebels, and to what extent do they consider we are behind those supplies that exceed our minimal levels in terms of anti-tank weapons or other heavier stuff? >> take you for that. yes, sir. >> from the atlantic council. one, the considering deterring

the use of chemical weapons in the future, is a u.s. strike against syria and the assad regime have to include specific targeting of assad himself in order to be effective, or to be sufficiently severe that it clearly leads to his near-term downfall? i wonder if he is able to survive this, that level has not been reached, it will not be an effective act that deters future use of chemical weapons. the second question would be, what happens if you do get assad in a strike, either intentionally or unintentionally? what is going to be the immediate impact on the ground in terms of the relationship to the moderates in the opposition and the more extremists that we have less of a preference for? >> thanks. one more. >> michelle, from the atlantic council.

it seems that the president's motivations regarding actions in syria spring from issues other than syria, right, from the iran issue and the credibility of u.s. red lines, and another thing i think he had in mind at an early stage was the stability of jordan, a major regional ally that has not come up in this conversation. i was wondering if any of the panelists could say something about the situation on the border with jordan. i know there has been a significant increase in flow of refugees toward their, and assuming strikes take ways in the southern part of syria, what is going to happen with the flow of refugees toward jordan? >> ok, three excellent questions. elizabeth, what do rebel groups think we are up to and what are we actually up to? >> to be frank, for a long time

there has been conspiracy theories floating around on the ground in syria that the u.s. is supportive of the assad regime. in many respect those have been now confirmed with the delay of any sort of u.s. response to chemical weapons, and i have spoken to people who are now absolutely convinced that the u.s. government is supporting the assad regime, would prefer to keep peace with the government in power as it stands now, and are in no way committed to helping the opposition. frankly, i kind of agree with them at this point, given our actions. it seems to me that we are, we do seem to have a preference care for keeping the syrian government in power despite our rhetoric, our actions on the ground not having met that rhetoric. that being said, i travel frequently in syria and i get a lot of questions about what -- how do people receive me as an

american researcher who is known to work in close relations with various government agencies and officials, and i can say i am very well received, and despite people feeling much abandoned by the u.s. and feeling very sad that the u.s. has not stood up for the principles that it claims to stand for, including democracy, pluralism, and a free syria which many in the opposition still continues to fight for, people still -- this is not something that can't be changed. there are still enough opinion on the ground that if the u.s. did something, people would be very receptive for that, would have a positive outlook of the u.s. engagement, and would be very much happy that the u.s. was getting involved to the degree that, like i said, i am well received on the ground and people are very willing to engage with me even as an american among even if they see me as someone who works with the

government, even though i do not. that is often their perception. >> [indiscernible] >> right, usually that is what it is. but i think this is a critical point. we are at the threshold in which we have to do something. chemical weapons have been used. the population, not only the opposition, but the population as a whole is expecting a response to the use of chemical weapons against the civilian population. if we do nothing, it will be severely radicalizing on the population as a whole, and it is very important, the psychological impact of any sort of response to this. i think the other question of what happens if assad is taken out, this is a question i myself have asked any times because i am not sure if our target set should include assad himself or if it should be more directed at

evening out the parity between military forces and help shift the balance of power across this negotiation. it is our objective to create an environment in which negotiations are actually possible, because right now they are not. that being said, one of the things that is not mentioned, even less so than the opposition, that is actually the rise of pro-regime militia groups, and this is something that is very significant, not only in terms of iranian funded militias, hezbollah-trade relations, but the empowerment of what are known as the alouite communities that are acting on behalf of the syrian government that are not related to the chain of command. this is i think a very untenable situation in which if the

government is and assad himself is removed from power, you could see a disbursement of these various pro-regime militia groups that are then engaging on an insurgency basis. if this were to happen, i do not think we have empowered the opposition as yet to severely take over a governance role. that is why i believe anything we do needs to be part of a more conference of strategy that does in fact empower a moderate force that could serve as a reliable governing partner. if today assad is gone, i am not sure we are there. >> the other question is whether assad should be part of anybody's target center. john kerry made a rather elegant

turn of phrase yesterday when he suggested even though the mission would be one of the preventionce and there could be certain downstream effects. barry, do you think one of those effects should be key members of the regime actually caring for their physical existence? >> i think that is an excellent question, a very controversial and radioactive question. in this case i think you are playing with fire a little bit if you announce to the world that you have objectives x minus 100 and you end up going after x, and the system would go tilt in the sense that recall russia's reaction after libya, they signed up to a u.n. security council resolution that enabled a nato-led coalition. that nato-led coalition ended up essentially killing or

providing close air support to kill assad -- >> gaddafi. >> gaddafi, i mean. u.s. targeters are careful that these are geopolitical stakes you're targeting it. i would turn to the latin roots of the word "deterrence," which means to cause terror. if you leave that key shakers shaken that what they value most could be taken away in a subsequent effort, then i think you have done your job. i personally would not recommend, even though under certain understandings of law, assad is a legitimate military target if he exercises command and control of his military, i would personally not recommend

targeting assad himself for a number of reasons, but including the fact that what is the president possibility going to be that we are only going to deter committal weapons use and exacts regime change at the bottom of a bomb? that would be not wise. >> faysal, i am understanding we are on your time now. >> this is a red line line, and probably a real one this time. jordan is in such deep economic trouble and already faces such a severe refugee crisis. the last i heard, not only is one of the camps the fourth- largest operation area in the country, but they are building another one now modeled along those same lines in the north. the question of what a u.s.

strike would do, i suppose that depends on the scale and duration. if it does lead -- or even if it does not -- what would only be worsened by that sort of thing is the problem that i suspect may actually end up becoming permanent or long-term, perhaps even going beyond the military balance in syria. there a return to syria would depend on the stability in southern serious, which frankly is slightly more likely happening in the north, but still highly unlikely now. that for me would turn jordan into what it is now, which is a state highly dependent on international aid to more or less total bankrupt one that would be a client of the either the gulf states or the united states or whoever was stepping up to fund it, because unfortunately, before the war

broke out, they were in pretty poor socioeconomic circumstances and the regime was also facing a crisis between it and its economic base and its political base, which are not the same. i would be seriously worried and slightly alarmed by what is happening in jordan. >> thank you. let me just close by saying that in my view, for what it is worth, i strongly suspect president obama will get the authorization he is seeking, and i strongly suspect that before very long there will be a u.s. military operation inside syria. i would suggest that perhaps the most interesting thing to keep one's eyes on in the future is whether or not we are seeing the emergence of an actual coherent

objective -- a strategy in this administration for syria. because irrespective of the vote in congress, irrespective of what might happen on the ground, as early as next week, the challenge presented by syria to allies and friends of the united states is not going to go away figuratively speaking in the next 20 minutes. this is going to be a gift that will keep on giving for quite a while. and for the united states operate in a strategic vacuum is not a good idea in many respects. it is precisely the thing that has brought us to this situation we face today. so thank you, all, very much or sharing your time with us, and please join me in thanking our speakers. [applause]

[captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2013] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] >> coming up this weekend, debates on syria. you can watch that saturday morning at 10:00 eastern. on sunday morning, at and 35, eastern -- 10:35 eastern, john kerry, chuck hagel and the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff martin dempsey on the proposed syria resolution. >> wilson was so intellectual and he was almost academic, the most educated president. he was the only president with a phd. as a result of that, i think most of the books that have been written about him have been academic in nature. i think they have missed the very human side of this man.

he was deeply emotional, passionate, romantic. he had two wives. when his first wife died, he courted and fell in love with a woman and married a second time. thousands of passionate love letters to each of these women. this was a real, living, breathing human being. i don't think we have seen that about woodrow wilson. >> pulitzer prize winning a scott berg's biography of woodrow wilson releases next week. here more on sunday. >> in a few moments, military strike on syria and how they could affect u.s. policy towards iran. in a little more than an hour and a half, c-span's town hall on military strike in syria. after that, another look at the atlantic council for him on the syrian civil war.

we will continue our discussion of u.s. military strikes on syria on our next washington journal with retired army general david barno. then, the united nations and nato's response to syria. sangwon yoon will take your questions. examining new figures on what it means to be a household in the u.s. including the decline in families with two married parents with children. washington journal is live on c- span everyday at 7:00 a.m. eastern. syriamilitary strikes on and how they could affect u.s. policy towards iran and its nuclear program. the jewish institute for international security affairs hosted this hour and a half of and. event.

>> welcome to red lines, a blueprint. we are here to read the first policy paper at jinsa. it is the first paper of our new iran task force, and we have almost half the task force here on the dais right now on the panel. as you can see, and i will mention some of the names, it is a very distinguished bipartisan group of leading experts in the field. this paper, which we have in the back and hopefully -- please take one if you have not already is the first of a series of paper we will be putting out on u.s. policy toward iran. i will also note the report is also posted on our newly revamped website, at jinsa.org,

and i encourage you to check it out. over the past week, washington, certainly the country, and really the whole world, has been focused on the question whether the united states should and would strike syria militarily. and if so, what sort of strike that would be. following the story and its many plot twists has been a dizzying experience for all of us, and also for our allies. perhaps insufficiently stressed in this story and perhaps insufficiently understood has been in this debate that i think the syria issue needs to be understood largely in the context of iran.

the panel will be addressing the syria issue, but also how it affects the iranian issue. to make clear, we say in our paper a strategy to prevent a nuclear iran, we stated upfront on the first page that stopping a nuclear capable iran is the gravest, most pressing national security threat facing the united states. how to do this? in light of the price election earlier this summer, -- the surprise election earlier this summer, rouhani, and despite a number of people across the world believe and consider rouhani a moderate, and how best to prevent iran in the context of what is going on in syria, is that a complicating factor, it is also an opportunity?

i would encourage everyone to read the whole report, but i want to highlight a few key points before and then introduce the panel before i turn it over to mort zuckerman. we disagree with the obama administration that the aim is to prevent iran from developing a nuclear weapon, which partly we believe is based on history it is myopic to believe we will be able to detect iran from putting all the pieces of a nuclear weapon together and then acting in a timely fashion. we believe u.s. policy should be aimed instead at depriving iran of the ability to pursue nuclear weapons. the metrics for making that assessment should not be limited on what is really prime minister netanyahu stated last year, at the u.n., a year ago, when he

focused on iran's nuclear stockpile. we believe the metrics are more complicated, and there are a number of variables that go in how to assess nuclear weapons capability. our belief is that the red line for preventing iran from becoming nuclear is to prevent them from getting material faster so that the united states could successfully prevent it. prevention will only be possible if the progress is stopped before it attains an undetectable nuclear weapons capability. turning to the iranian elections, we grappled with what the significance of the election meant of rouhani. it was a surprise, many people thought that someone more

seemingly closely aligned with the supreme leader might be the one elected. yet it was rouhani. what does this mean? we offered in our report two possible interpretations of the meaning behind his election, but we believe both of those interpretations argue for a very tough policy toward iran. let me mention them quickly. interpretation number one is that the regime is weak in iran, if not -- and possibly the security apparatus has collapsed. khamenei was too weak to enforce his own preference who was elected. they feared the repeat of 2009, after the presidential election, that if they named their favorite and they decided to

accept the rouhani victory. that was one interpretation. the other was an elite commendation that means that the regime is merely weakened, not collapsed, and they are seeming to reduce pressure, internal and external, and if they felt that rouhani was acceptable because he is a consensus builder and he is seeing both internally and externally as a moderate, so having him become president will reduce their pressures. we believe the implications of both of these interpretations are the same. if the security apparatus has collapsed in the first interpretation, then united states must go for broke, put maximum pressure to fracture the elites, and then arms control agreement then will only alleviate the pressure.

if the regime is merely weakened, we still believe you have to increase the measure because otherwise the status quo will still be continued. if the regime is hurting, then a negotiated solution might be in reach. if its means of coercion has evaporated, the u.s. should help the regime find its way into history's dust bin. the u.s. needs to quickly test both of these interpretations. the best way to do that is through the engagement that would test iran's sincerity and determine really, help explain really the political dynamics behind rouhani's election. the panel will discuss the possible diplomatic options, but i will say we had a heated discussion about that.

there was disagreement about exactly what the best approach was, but we narrow it down to two. we disagree -- let me continue, though -- we disagree with those that many have argued that if you relieve pressure that the regime will feel more secure and more likely to come to a diplomatic arrangement. we believe on the contrary that history with the iranian regime should suggest the regime only responds to pressure. we also believe in rhetoric and in action obama and congress must convey concretely the will to strike iranian nuclear facilities as a last resort. we discussed if political warfare as an important pressure. these are some of the highlights. the group will not only be discussing syria, but all these issues and how it affects iran and flash some of the points i

raised out further. to conclude, i want to thank at least in my office jonathan for his hard work on this paper. also jennifer and andrea smith and bill for their efforts on this paper and organizing the events, and i want to highlight jamie, our communications director. let me turn to the panel. we have a distinguished panel, and mort zuckerman is going to be moderating. mort is editor and chief of "u.s. news and world report." ambassador eric edelman is the co-chair of the task force, a former undersecretary of defense for policy, and now is a

distinguished resident at -- ambassador dennis ross is the other co-chair. he is a former special assistant to president obama and a senior director at the national security council for the central region. he is a counsel at the washington institute for near east policy. john hannah is currently a senior fellow at the foundation for the defense of democracy. steve rademaker is former secretary of state and is currently a principal at the podesta group. and ray takeyh is a senior fellow at the council of foreign relations.

please take a look inside to report. i will mention the other members of the task force. chris carney, professor elliot cohn, larry goldstein, retired admiral gregory johnson, retired general chuck walls. they are the other members. i turn it over to mort. thank you. >> thank you very much. as i was driving here with a driver who was not sure where we were going, it reminded me -- thank you -- can you hear me? as i was driving here with a driver who was not sure where he was going, and brought to mind the old adage, when you do not know where you are going, any road will do. still not working. >> get closer to it.

>> there is an old phrase which is when do you not know which way you are going, any road will do. every now and then i have had that feeling with the way the administration has been conducting itself. there is a point that we must now look at and that was the president's response to the chemical weapons attacks by assad of syria and whether that affects viability and credibility in the way of our threat that president obama pledged shortly to use all the elements of american power to support iran plus nuclear ambition and prevent, not contain a nuclear iran, and that on issues like this in these matters he does not bluff. he said this year a nuclear iran would threaten the stability of

the global economy as well as triggering a nuclear arms race in the region, unraveling the nonproliferation treaty. i will add, how does his response to the chemical weapons attacks in your judgment affect the credibility and the viability of what we have heard in just in terms of words and intentions? >> well, mort, i think you have put your finger on what is an extremely important questions, one that we tried to address in the report that is being released today. one of the reasons i think the report is timely is that with all the attention that has been focused on egypt and syria over the last few weeks, we have a great example of what many of us who have worked in washington have seen before, which is the

urgent chasing out the merely important from people's time and attention. in the midst of all this, about a week or so ago the iaea delivered another report on iran's nuclear progress, which shows mostly bad news. the good news is the heavy water reactor is not proceeding as quickly as earlier reports suggested it might. on the other hand, iran is proceeding apace with the installation of more effective, more efficient centrifuges for uranium enrichment. one of the things the paper addresses is the issue you raise, which is the credibility of the diplomatic effort and what underpins it. i think one of the things we talked about is that you do need an all government approach, all

the elements, and in particular diplomacy needs to be underwritten by clear military intent and capability. and so obviously what has happened over syria is extremely important. it is one reason why it is crucial that congress actually authorizes the president to take action. i would hope they would urge along the way that the president take more robust action. it is worth perhaps reflecting on how we got to this path, because there are steps that could have been taken earlier that might have made it less necessary to deal with this issue. but i think it is important for the institutional presidency and the credibility of the president's statement with regard to iran that the congress authorized the use of force. unless iran believes there is a credible military option

underpinning the willingness to negotiate, there will not be a successful negotiation, and we all agreed a negotiated outcome would be the best from everybody's point of view if we can get there. >> i generally agree with what eric had to say. i would make a couple of points. first, and this hits to the heart of what you're asking. i think the framing of the issue by the administration on syria makes it unmistakably clear that if there is not a response to the crossing of a red line, the iranians will draw a lesson that when we create red lines we do not mean them. the president is seeking a congressional authorization that adds, creates a greater sense of political legitimacy for the actions they are taking. i think it is if congress were

not to authorize, the message that would be sent is not only do we not have a red line, but the congress would be sending a green light to anyone to use chemical weapons anywhere and know that they can do it without a response from the united states. obviously the iranians will try the conclusion which is to say the americans have established a red line, they are not prepared to act on a red line when the administration makes it clear that prevention is an objective that will look more rhetorical than real. there is a direct relationship between what is going on in syria and how the iranians will perceive it. there are those who say somehow that if we use military strikes against the syrians, because of the use of chemical weapons, this will strengthen the

hardliners within iran. i would beg to differ. it has the opposite impact. it makes it clear when the united states says something about its objectives, it aims, what it says. and almost i would say the most certain way to assure diplomacy has a chance to succeed with iran is for the iranian regime is to understand that force will be used. that is the last thing iran wants. if we want diplomacy to succeed, the thrust of what the report suggests, i think the more credible it is that we will be prepared to use force, that is more likely to make a diplomatic outcome a certainty.

at this point i think the thrust of this report is that there is a chance to have diplomacy succeed. i do think -- one point i would quibble with is what mike had to say. i actually think the position of the administration is -- the president has said that you cannot just wait until they are at that point. i think the measures we have identified in this report, which is you have to have sufficient time to be able to detect and then act creates the kind of standard by which to judge when you are past the point where in fact you would lose the ability to in short when you say prevention is your objection you can fulfill let objective. >> thanks.

thanks to jinsa for putting together the group. one thing i say on the issue of credibility and red lines, and the audience is not only in iran, and it is in particular throughout the world, but in particular with respect to iran in the middle east. i think anybody who has traveled any time i would say over the last two years or three years over the region knows already before the syria crisis the store of confidence in the president's red line with respect to the iranian nuclear program and his willingness to really take on necessary measures to stop the iranians from achieving a nuclear military capability, that confidence was already very low.

in the wake of the syria crisis and what has happened to the xtent that people do see a degree of indecision, lack of resolve, and unwillingness, very rapidly, once a red line is crossed to take measures to address it, i think has at east momentarily put us into a much more dangerous position, but the number of calls i have gotten from israelis and the number of discussions i have had in recent days, they really are alone in this and it is really going to be up to them.

then your space and time for action, for israel, becomes uch quicker than it is for the united states. to the extent people measure the israeli red light, green light response -- we have gone into a much more dangerous posture, and the president can recover still, but i think now the bar, if he gets approval from congress, which i think he should, and i think it is necessary at the expectation for what he is going to do to enforce that red line and the kind of damage he will do this. the kinds of consequences there will be for crossing

president's red line, people will be looking at that. we are beyond the realm of shot across the bow and doing enough not to be mocked. this will have to be a serious operation. whatever the president thought before saturday when he threw in this into the congress' hands, and this is an indication of how worried israelis are, how important this issue of american credibility and the credibility of the president and the congress is this decision by apac to go public yesterday with their endorsement for congressional authorization. they know how essential fulfilling that threat against syria is to this larger issue of iran, and that is one of the best indicators. the other final question i would raise, and i do not know how israelis are thinking about this, whether the administration has thought about it, but as a procedural matter and a presidential matter, having thrown this relatively small issue on enforcing an obvious breach of a red line into the hands of congress, what is the president going to do with respect to the

iranian nuclear program, where confidence levels and arguments within the community much be more severe and it is not going to be -- the iranians, not having used a capability, but the prospect that they have capability, what will the president do in that situation, and that is a big question that people have to think about seriously now, how do we put in place a structure now so that we are not in the same situation we have been in the last two weeks when we did determine iran is very close to a breakout capability. >> please go ahead. >> thank you. i agree with everything my colleagues have said about the importance of congress voting to give president the authority he has asked. our national interest requires it at the current stage. i think it is unfortunate that we have come to this issue the way we have. if obama thought authorization was necessary, he should have said that at the outset instead of waiting so late in the game to decide that was an essential tep.

the way this has played out reminds me of the movie "high noon," a classic with gary cooper. in the movie, gary cooper is the marshal, and he breaks away from his wedding to grace kelly to round up a posse to confront the outlaws. as the movie plays out, the members of the posse break up, so by the climactic scene he is all by himself facing the outlaws. that is what has happened here. obama breaks away from his vacation to deal with this threat, to round up the posse, and david cameron bails out so suddenly the president decides and says what i need is congressional authorization. it does not suggest a high level of confidence in his conviction that he is doing the right thing.

i think that has fed the skepticism in the congress. it has made it more difficult for members to feel comfortable that they are doing the right thing by voting to endorse the president. for the reasons that have been articulated, having to do with iran and the perceptions of the reliability and seriousness of the united states, i think congress needs to step forward and give the president the authority he has requested. >> to be the last speaker -- i want to highlight to arguments made by dennis and john, in terms of effects on diplomacy. it seems to me the experience of the past decade suggest that the iranian regime, whatever political complexion, is more interested in diplomacy when it feels anxious and distressed.

the question becomes how much distressed and anxious are they because of this perspective use of military force? in terms of demonstration effects, to highlight the point hat john made, demonstration effects in terms of demonstration of the use of military force in one place and its effect on others, demonstration effects affect allies more than u.s. adversaries. what happens in serious often considered in context of iranian calculations, but the calculations of the gulf states, israelis, and others looking at this issue is going to be more material as you think about this issue. those are the two points i wanted to make. i apologize that steve gave away the end of the movie, for those of you who have not seen

it. >> gary cooper stands alone and faces the outlaws. president obama decides to convene a meeting with the city council to advise him. there is quite a contrast. >> one of the ironies is that the president and united states that have to rebuild their credibility after what some would have called a fiasco over serial, and that is a difficult process because without it we cannot develop a credible war campaign against iran that we need. we have to address, and i would like you to think about that and talk about that, is we are in a situation where there is a precedent of going to congress. i do not know whether you can alert congress to the kinds of risks that we might be able to assess the iranians and have enough time to have a long national dialogue about that while iran goes about its merry way. are we not putting us into a

different posture vis a vis iran regarding syria and how do we get out of this? >> i would just say one brief thing and then dennis might want to add or subtract from it. the president, when he made his nnouncement on saturday, did ay correctly in my view that he has the authority on his own to do this and that he did not need to go to the congress. but he chose to do it for the reasons he articulated and perhaps some others. i think with something of the magnitude of iran, i would hope that he would continue to believe he has the authority to do it, and i would argue we should not look at this as a precedent, although there may be people now who argue that it is. >> i agree with what eric aid.

i think the key here is to be able to show that, a, assuming here is authorization, the character of the strike itself represents one kind of impact. john's point earlier -- john made two points. one was that the strike itself needs to be seen as effective, not just symbolic, but because it becomes a manifestation of the use of american power, that has an effect on the iranians and may have an effect here. point one. point two, i think in the president might be is trying to draw a distinct line between iran and syria. and to some extent i suspect that one if his hesitancies in that he sees serious abuses and

he did not want that to somehow limit that he could do about iran where he has viewed that being a more strategic threat. one can debate whether to see it that way or not, at that has been the perception he has had great one response in the aftermath of this, aside from i hink the importance of being effective. in terms of number two, one of the responses john was suggesting, to prepare the ground now, which one would be the way to affect the point you're making about political warfare. you want to convince iranians that diplomacy is the best way out, and that is by lining up your ducks in advance, that we are serious about diplomacy ucceeding. when you prepare the ground for

that, you're sending messages to the iranians. some of the preparation would be appropriate, but there is something that the president could do, to reinforce the point at eric was making and that the president himself made in his statement on saturday that he did not need to go to the congress for this. he chose to do it because he felt given the current context of syria and the character of the conflict they are, it being a civil war, it being characterized by not just a civil conflict, but also an opposition that is itself highly fractured with elements that we absolutely oppose, that he puts that in a very different category than iraq, and he has been very consistent on the issue that iran cannot have a nuclear weapon, and i would say he has something else that he could also use publicly. he is the third president in uccession to make the same

point. you had president clinton make the point that iran could not make the point, president bush make the point, and now you have president obama doing it as well. this is a different issue. this is not a civil conflict. this is a case of ensuring that a regime that has violated all the international resolutions, that that as result, three different administrations have said this country cannot be permitted to have nuclear weapons. i think he can do more to in a sense draw the decision between syria and iran and that would make him less susceptible to the charge that he has established a precedent. >> i do not disagree with my colleagues, but my hope is that

the president reserves the right and the authority to strike iran on his own. i do think -- i mean, the syrian crisis has given him an opportunity to talk about iran, and he will probably be doing hat carefully. i say the president was basically awful about preparing the american public for about what he is about ready to get into with syria. the public is more wary, but they have not heard from their commander in chief and what his red line meant up until the last week. the american people are rightly incredibly confused and they still have not heard anything from him that is authoritative and out of the oval office talking about this and raising the stakes. he has done some of that on

iran. i think he will have to do a lot more of that. he has got to get serious about congressional consultations at least. i think he has made his domestic situation with suspected iran touch more difficult because in some ways syria is an easy case, when someone uses weapons of mass desertion openly and publicly in a decisive way. that is in some ways the easy way to get people to act. on iran i have this is that if he does that we advocate and hit them before they are about to test a bomb, all of the stars have got to align for him to be able to take a credible case to the american people, and if he does it without congress and with very low support amongst the american public for going into a big,

wider war with iran compared to syria, so we are told, he is buying himself a hell of a problem. ome people have talked about the issue of getting some kind of earlier pre-authorization from congress on the question of the use of force in the iran under certain conditions. and people have shied away from that because it will lose in the congress. that is an idea out there, and t a minimum, this conversation the president is having with the people and congress about iran, pivoting off of syria, i think he has got to engage that in a much more serious way. >> you asked a good question about the presidential value of this when it comes to iran.

fortunately, the syria matter does not exist in a vacuum. there is history, including in the obama administration, and i have in mind libya, which obama conducted operations without authorization, relying on his constitutional authority, and part of the consternation i expressed earlier is accounted for by the contrast with libya, which unlike what i understand to be completed for syria, was a much more serious operation. forgive my digression, but i know that there is a good case to make that what president obama has in mind with regard to syria would not even trigger the war powers resolution, because that resolution states at any time the president introduces united states armed forces equipped for combat into

the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign country, he has to notify congress, and after 60 days he has to withdraw them if congress has not authorized the operation. tomahawk cruise missiles did not exist in 1973 when the resolution was written, but there is a good case to be made t the tomahawk cruise missiles fired from a distance are not united states armed forces equipped for combat, and so on like in libya, where we had manned aircraft flying over the country and had u.s. armed forces for combat in libya, the war powers resolution applies. a cruise missile strike, over in a few matter of minutes, not involving manned aircraft, i think is a decent case that that resolution does not cover that. in syria, the president has decided to go forward without authorization. when it comes to iran, i think

he has a precedent to not seek authorization, but there will be members of congress who will say absolutely, for a larger, more momentous operation against iran, he needs to seek authorization. i am not a military expert, but i would suspect that the success of any operation against iran will be much greater if we have the element of surprise on our side, and a prolonged debate about whether or not to authorize this of course will probably cost us the element of surprise. >> again, i echo some of the things that have been said. i have worked in congress. i have reverence for ongress. i would say that on the issue of iran, the president should do much more consulting with

congress than they have, and i agree with john on this. there should be much more of a dialogue. what is an acceptable agreement? the legislative perspective differs from the executive. oth capsules, washington and tehran, are falling into the same mistake. rouhani has talked about moving the nuclear department to the foreign ministry, because one of the advantages of the council, where they have a bottom of all the critical constituents. everybody had a buy-in. on the other side, i think the executive branch here has done not a particularly good job of bringing in congress into their way of thinking about iran. iran has always been -- you know -- policies do not work. i think they should shed light

on bringing in members of ongress. let me focus on the diplomatic agreement. a diplomatic agreement cannot e an agreement negotiated by john kerry. both parties have to understand they have to sell that agreement back home to critical onstituencies. and preparing those onstituencies for what concessions they want to make is an important step forward, and that is a dialogue that needs to be had, along with what has been spoken about. what sort of a program is the administration willing to live with? what sort of program are the revolutionary guards willing to live with?

what kind of nuclear program are congressional persons easy to live with? all these things need to come to align, and there has to be much work. this was in 1970. it does not work that way anymore. there is way too much media. the iranian media is full of speculation about the messaging that has been sent between the united states and iran. iran does not have a free press, but it has a competitive press. the right wing press will create the story the way they broke the iran-contra story. this will not remain behind curtains. that is not the era we live in. it is time for us to start having those dialogues here, and rouhani should have that dialogue with his constituencies as well. that is when you begin to see their arms of a doable arms-control agreement as opposed to one that is expeditiously violated. >> i would like to it back to a ifferent aspect of the

question you asked, which was what is the impact of what has been going on this past week, the syrian question on the iran question down the road. we focus on the presidential issue of going to congress. here is another issue that i do not think he has received sufficient attention, which is that if the congress authorizes military action, and the president indicates a serious, more robust action than what has been suggested, and as dennis said, it is effective, it is going to be an expensive proposition. it is going to cost as much as a couple of billion dollars. it is going to expend a lot of u.s. military assets, and this comes against a backdrop of being on the cusp of a second

year of sequestration of the defense budget, with a $52 billion additional sequester of the defense budget when the new fiscal year hits, unless there is a deal by january 1, which will make it extremely difficult for the department of defense to plan rationally for the next time, which could include the iranian case. and in which certain military tools that might be useful in a military strike on iran to be expended. this is already against a back round of a circumstance in which sequestration has forced on the administration a choice that secretary hagel and the vice chairman described between capacity and capability as it tries to deal with the

consequences of sequestration. i do not want to get into the debate about which is right or ot, that you are talking about a military whose readiness is being graded and having to carry out what will be a complex military operation and how it will be enabled goes to one of the core recommendations we make him a which is we need to seek certain military activities going on with parallel efforts to make them suspects will. >> the best solution is whether or not we have credibility in what we say we would do if iran goes beyond certain red lines. and how to we do that in a sense at this stage of the game, given what clearly seems to me has been an impact in the arab world, not a positive impact of what has happened. i came back two weeks ago and i was astonished at how completely upset they were about the attitude of the

united states and the behavior of the united states. but can the united states do in terms of public opinion here and in terms of what we can do militarily? i would in some way or another give enough credibility to the fact that we will act or react to what we come to the onclusion is going on in iran, that persuades them to come to a different conclusion that it seems to me that they are going to now. >> first, i accept that we are where we are in terms of perceptions, but i would, as omeone who is doing a new book that also involves a fair amount of looking at america's historical posture in the middle east, i am struck by the fact that this moment is not unique. it is interesting at one point after the coup in libya in 1969, kissinger in his memoirs

remarked at one point that every single one of our friends in the middle east, at the highest level, is sending messages to the white house about perceptions of our unreliability and we are not doing anything about it. it is not the first time that the perception has been the case, and what tends to turn things around is when we actually act and are seen as being effective. we have within our means to do that now. for all of the unease that we have been collectively feeling, if the congress authorizes, as it should and must, and if in fact we carry out not cosmetic, but what are an intensive set of strikes, over a short time,

that, if you listen to what secretary hagel was saying yesterday and what the chairman of the joint chiefs was saying as well, that actually degrades the capability of the syrian forces and this is seen throughout the region has the u.s. is now suddenly in the context of where the congress has actually authorized -- and some ways it seems to me that even if the use of force is finite, you actually have an interesting situation i suspect where the president may feel the need, having gotten the authorization, to ensure that strikes are somewhat more intensive, are more effective, s a way of making not just a symbolic statement, but having a practical effect upon syria's ability to use their forces, hat will send a message to the whole region and will also send

a message to the iranians. as i said, if you look at this, not the first time we have been in this position, and when the u.s. acts in a way that is seen as being effective, it changes those perceptions. >> it is the first time in which we're dealing with a country that is developing nuclear weapons and the capability of delivering, and that is not going to be an actual act of warfare, it is going to be something that is handled fairly secretly within however iran is going to do it. we do not have quite the same kind of clear guidelines that we can rely upon here. how do we persuade them not to go too far when we do not know exactly where they are and we do not know exactly where they are going? hat will be credible at this stage of the game? >> i was going to ask everybody the same question anyhow. >> i will start.

it seems to me this is where there are a number of things that we can do and by the way, all of these fall in what i would describe in a dramatic realm hurt quite apart from how you posture your forces, and also by the way what eric was getting at, if we were to do something to address this issue, i would be another way to send a single that we are meeting what we say and preparing the ground. one way to prepare the ground is for us to go to the other members of the five plus one and make it clear we are very serious about diplomacy, but we also need to plan for the day after. the more you begin to do that, the more you're sending a message. you are not just focused on diplomacy. he wanted to work, but the fact is if you have to use work against the nuclear program that will not end the nuclear diplomacy, because you will want to engage in diplomacy, you will want to make it difficult for the iranians to build, and that is why maintaining sanctions is important. there is no doubt remaining

that we want to pursue a diplomatic path. there is some disagreement about what the character of that proposal would be, and i come back -- this gets to what you're asking -- what reason you want to put a proposal on the table that shows the iranians could gain what they want, which is to say all they want is civil nuclear power, if you put a proposal on the table that would enable them to have civil nuclear power, that is seen as being credible by much of the international community, and the iranians turn it down, hen you have exposed them, internationally, domestically as well. that puts the president in a different position to go to the american public and say the last two presidents have said they cannot have this capability. i have said it consistently. we have offered them a way to get out, a proposal that allows them to have exactly what they say they want and they have turned it down because it turns out that is not what they want,

they want weapons, and that will not be permitted. that would be part of how you get addressed the question you raise. >> if i could chime in for a second before john and other colleagues. when we announced this panel in june, we had an event, and i cannot remember which panelist made a point that plagiarism is the highest form of flattery -- the point was that people who think iranians do not pay attention to red lines have not been paying attention to the iaea quarterly reports, because the red line that prime minister netanyahu said for the amount of 20% low enriched ranium that the iranians produced has been consistently avoided by them because they

have been transforming some of it into oxide for the tehran research reactor. when there is uncertainty about whether the red line will be upheld, it modifies their ehavior. that is another argument why to fail to go forward now with the red line that has been drawn on syrian chemical weapons use would have disastrous cuts wants is for those of us who think diplomacy still has a chance of being successful if it is underpinned by credible threats. >> there are more commerce historians on this panel then mean, but in 1969 and what followed is a bad time for the united states in the middle east and more broadly in the world.

if we are in that kind of posture in 1969 where the american order looks to everybody else like it is unraveling, we are in a very serious situation that needs to be addressed. i think that is where your question goes to, because otherwise disaster strikes. the arab oil boycott of the 1973, the war, all kinds of awful things can happen, the tart of the retreat from vietnam. i agree that there are certain parallels in what is happening in the world today, in the basic sense that people out there who have relied on us since world war ii, that the system, the order that the united states established and enforced is beginning to unravel at some level. and people are really beginning to start to make calculations based off of that, and for me, example number one is the saudis and what bandar is doing i can understand how aggressive

hey've gotten in certain areas. the trip to moscow worries me because there are serious things happening in that relationship that would not have happened were it not for the absolute collapse of faith in the united states, and while there may be good things that can come out of it for the saudis to be off on their own, a lot of bad things can come out of that as well potentially. ut that is the kind of uncertainty that we are dealing with in the system that i think has led to quite a bit of trouble. i agree in the first place that syria now takes on this huge importance in terms of trying to convince the iranians that we are serious. i think that operation is now going to need to be something that perhaps the president and his team did not think a couple of weeks ago it might have

needed to be. it will now need to have real effects on syria and on other adversaries in the region, that they do not want to test the united states in this regard. i do not disagree with dennis. i think the timeframe for the iranians approaching some kind of nuclear weapon cap capability is fairly short, and people would put it in the middle of 2014. that is a short time. i agree that we have to test this fairly quickly. they have to try as part of our strategy to get to a bottom line very quickly. i do not know if the iranians ill allow us to do that.

i do not know if the p-five plus one will allow us to do that. this has got to be to get international support and domestic buy-in here, for any chance of it to succeed against the iranians, it will have to be a serious proposal, different than what has been put on the table before, and i am willing to sign up for a very restrictive capability that dennis has talked about, provided that if in fact that our strategy has to be in like 1991 in saddam -- baker says this is the final proposal, and hat he rejects it and you have a clear system for determining hat he has rejected it, in days bombs start falling,

things start happening. i'm not sure we can put together that kind of proposal and get buy-in from it, not only from the people, but from he international community. at the same time they go through some serious diplomacy to get to a bottom line fairly quickly. we have got to be pedal to the metal on the separate pressure track. i would not -- i agree with a lot of people in congress who believe that congress needs to be going forward with new sanctions that really threaten to bring this economy to the verge of collapse and at the time we need to be doing all of the military things that we need to do both alone and with our allies that we would do if we were really serious about undertaking a fairly significant military strike

against iran within the next six months to a year. i think we have to be peddled to the metal on the separate pressure track. i agree with a lot of people in congress who believe at least the congress needs to go forward with new sanctions that really threaten to bring this economy to the verge of collapse. serious about undertaking a fairly significant military strike against iran within the next six months to a year. >> on the issue of red lines, i think clearly and credibly drawing red lines is one of the most important things that governments do in the conduct of international relations. and when they do a bad job of it, the consequences could be really dire. i think a lot of historians believe that we had to fight the korean war because of a peech that suggested we were not prepared to fight to defend korea. a lot of other people believe that we had to fight the first persian gulf war because our ambassador had a meeting with saddam hussein and which saddam hussein came away thinking that the u.s. was not prepared to fight to defend the independence of kuwait. in both of those cases, when the independence of those countries was therein, the united states thought thought about it and decided it was repaired to fight. historians debate whether had the u.s. done a better job drawing the red lines more clearly, we could have avoided

those wars, and i do not know f we will ever know the real answer. i am prepared to say that i wish it would have been more clear because it would have been nice to avoid fighting those kinds of wars and i am troubled about where we are on iran today, because i do not think united states has been very clear clear on what its red lines are. we talked about the ambiguity and the difference between roducing a nuclear weapons and achieving nuclear weapons capabilities. the administration has been on both sides of that issue in terms of their declaratory policy. asserting something like all

ptions are on the table is not a clear red line. that is pretty ambiguous about what you're prepared to fight for. i have to give credit to prime minister netanyahu. he literally drew a red line at the un security council. lo and behold, iran as sort of done backflips to avoid crossing that red line. netanyahu, i guess, holds credibility with the iranians. that is what you have to take away. i worry about u.s. red ability. you know, president obama drew a red line with regard to chemical weapons used in syria, and the assad regime stepped over that line. i sense some reluctance on president obama's part to enforce the red line. congress is going to vote on this now. what is he going to do if congress votes no? i served on the first bush administration. i was a lawyer handling the war powers issue for the first president bush. he was pretty clear that he was giving congress a chance to authorize it and our nation would be strengthened.

he made the case that he thought saddam hussein was more likely to back down and we could avoid having to fight a war if congress authorized us to potentially fight a war. congress accepted that argument. but bush was pretty clear that he deployed hundreds of thousands of u.s. armed forces to saudi arabia -- he was clear that he was going forward no matter the outcome in congress. so it was not critical to what ultimately was going to happen. the obama administration has been conspicuously silent on what it will do if congress fails to grant the authority that the president has requested. we do have a precedent here. n the united kingdom, they

oted no, and the prime minister said good luck. is that what obama will do if congress votes no? i do not know what obama will do. he has not been as clear as president bush was about his commitment to proceeding your respective of what congress does. going back to the red line, the iranians are trying to assess how determined the u.s. government is to prevent them from achieving a nuclear weapon. things could play out pretty badly on syria in a way that ould reinforce doubts in tehran about how serious the united states is and how much they have to worry about the military option on the u.s. side. >> there has been a great deal of apprehension and the arab world about the seriousness of the united states in terms of its willingness to play the leadership role in that part of the world. so this is going to compound that concern until we find ways to clarify that in ways that make it really clear.

>> i will get into the historical part. on the red lines, there is a lot of suggestion about the syrian red line. it was mentioned that three american presidents have suggested that iran in possession of nuclear weapons was unacceptable. three american presidents have drawn various red lines with a large degree of impunity. in the summer of 2012, the u.s. policy was that -- they had a slogan for it. ship of at least 20% fuel. that is probably not our policy today. it is probably, in any forthcoming negotiation, that is unlikely to be our policy. you can suggest that that articular red line was unreasonable. well, then do not draw it.

if you think your red line is nreasonable and unsustainable, then do not draw it. and do not attach a slogan to it. so the syria red lines are important, but there have been lots of red lines on iran that have come and gone. on the historical issue, reasoning through historical analogy is always imperfect and too often imprecise, so here i go. if you kind of look -- i agree with dennis, it looks like the 960's, and that is kind of a gray thing. the middle east is a region that has a habit of constantly dividing against itself. in the 1950's and 1960's, there was a division. you see a similar division today, but the basis is a far more entrenched and ideological division. there is iran and the resistance. this is what the iranian commander said yesterday, syria

is part of a larger front of resistance. therefore, it has to be thought of along those terms. hezbollah, iran, syria, mobilizing against the sunni bloc. the region is divided. the region has been divided before in the 1960's. hen it was to buttress its allies. also, with very close u.s.-israeli relationship which is beneficial to all the of the relationships the united states had in terms of its allies and in terms of deterring its adversaries. today, the u.s.-israeli relationship has worked its way through its own growing pains. the united states, for reasons i do not always understand, is less inclined to be involved in middle eastern conflicts and rivalries. war fatigue.

there is a propensity of this, and we are probably learning the lessons of the iraq war now. there is less inclination on the part of the american public, therefore the u.s. government, to be involved in relief. i think president obama's position on the middle east is contested in the capsule, and i think it is largely unassailable in the country. if president obama goes to st. louis, chicago, san francisco, los angeles, and seattle, he will get criticism for his reticence. and the president has actually invited that popular reticence by suggesting that east asia is where the future lies and the middle east is where old conflicts simmer. ll these things have to be taken into consideration as one thinks about iran policy. i will say one last thing.

we really need an iran policy, not just a proliferation policy. we need to figure out how to negate iran's influence in the region, how to weaken the iranian regime at home. if you have a broad-based policy, it will fit in there. you kind of negotiated arms control agreement with a country that you are accusing of sponsoring terrorism and your capital at the same time. i mean, you're negotiating measures on the nuclear issue with a country that you are turning -- we need an iran policy. all these pieces kind of fit together. >> let's spend a couple minutes before opening the panel to questions to the audience on two things that might give us more credibility. one is to go after iran's financial energy and other

economic matters, that we can take a much tougher line on. that might have a message to be conveyed. the other is, what can we do with respect to israel to give them certain kinds of weapons like the tankers, air-based tankers, to give them greater range and greater military credibility? netanyahu, for the moment, seems to have credibility. how would you all feel on these kinds of issues? >> i think one of the recommendations in the report, of course, is that, with regard to the sanctions that are lready on the books, that we stop giving out as many passes to people as the president can, because there is waiver authority in the legislation, but we need to stop giving people waivers and force them

to actually go forward with the sanctions that are already on the books. i agree with john, i think there is more we can do on sanctions. i think if i were in the obama administration -- i do not think they would necessarily welcome me, but if i were in the administration, i think i would actually be not unhappy with voices being raised in the congress trying to push for arder sanctions. that is something that i think they can use. with regard to assurance and reassurance to israel, underpinning the already existing credibility that netanyahu has in tehran, in an earlier iteration of this panel e recommended certain military capabilities be made available to israel. congress actually took that up in some measure. as far as i know, they still have not been transferred.

there certainly are things that can be done. i think there are things we can be doing to do more visible testing. certain military capabilities we have, thinking of the massive ordinance penetrator which would almost certainly be involved in any kind of attack on the iranian nuclear program to which i think would have a very powerful, demonstrative impact on calculations in tehran. i think there are certainly things that can be done. >> i pretty much agree with hat eric said. you can see that if negotiations take place with the iranians, i can see the negotiations not necessarily adding to the sanctions but eing able to point to congress nd say -- look, unless there is going to be an agreement,

this is what is going to happen. the fact is -- the sanctions have obviously had an effect on the iranians. hat is why he was elected. think there is a logic to that. there is also a logic for transferring additional capability to the israelis. there has been a lot done already, and i think that is something that is positive from our standpoint and sends a message from our

standpoint. i have suggested that we should have a demonstration and put it on youtube, let it go viral, let the iranians see it. this is a capability that was developed basically to deal with them. a 30,000 pound bomb. you know, these are the kind of things that would be helpful. i still think, at this point, given where we are with syria, the most important thing right now is to act on the red line and do it in a way that is seen as an effective and meaningful and serious. the other thing we just discussed at this point would be less important than that. in fact, if you try to do those things, it will be looked at as a kind of very limited compensation that is not very credible. in the context of doing that, i think a lot of other things you do, even things that would be less important, will be taken as much more serious. >> john? >> i agree, sanctions have been surprisingly effective and have helped bring us to where we are. i think the only debate is -- and yes, we can easily identify additional measures with regard to sanctions and with regard to transfers to israel of useful

military items. the only question is whether we should persist with continuing to move in that direction or whether we should declare a pause because we are pleased that rouhani has been elected and we want him to become an negotiating partner. on that issue, it is clear we need to continue and not take a pause. the pressure that has brought us to where we are should continue to be applied and it should be increased to the extent we can increase it to it we should not hesitate to do that for fear it will complicate the negotiations. on balance, over time, it will strengthen our hand in those egotiations. >> ok, thank you all very much. let me open the floor to questions. shall we start over there? >> the russian quasi-alliance with both iran and syria -- it is

not clear to me and i wonder what you all think about if we are more successful in following through on syria, whether we would throw russia and iran closer together, aking it harder for us to have a more effective policy? elated to that is the question about whether this whole p5 lus one structure serves our interests or serves to undermine as. i think it is curious that congress has been much more active on the sanctions issue against iran than the administration. the administration would essentially follow through with halfway measures, much less than congress would authorize. on the p5 plus one, i think it s --

>> actually, i think effective action to enforce the red line against syria would actually undermine russian-iranian relations, rather than strengthened them. in the sense that, notwithstanding all his culminations, i do not think there is very much that president putin can or would do to actually get in the way of u.s. military action. i think that would send a very owerful message to tehran that russia's backing, when push comes to shove, might not be effective in keeping the united states from acting. we now know them captured documents that saddam hussein believed that support for both rance and russia, in particular, were going to keep

him from having to face u.s. military force in 2003. that turned out to be a terrible miscalculation from his point of view. again, if we do something, and i want to associate myself with what dennis said, if we do something that is not cosmetic but is serious and seriously degrades syria's ability to operate its military forces, hit some of the pillars of the regime. i mean, we should not forget hat this is a regime that is rooted in the air force. that is the service from which the current president of syria's father comes. if we are able to essentially ground that air force, keep it from flying, that will have a very powerful impact. in the first session we had in june, i made the point then

that we really are engaged now -- and this goes to a number of points that were just made, it is a struggle for mastery and the region with iran being one of the protagonist. the syria issue has to be seen in that light as well. i think effective action would do more to drive moscow and tehran apart than ring them together. >> i would like to add one quick point to that. you know, you could see some sort of tactical moves, and i would not dismiss that. i do not think the iranians have a lot of belief and the russians to begin with. the real question i think here is from the russian standpoint -- putin has positioned himself on syria so he looks like he is the key actor. everybody has gone to him. i think for us to act, and i think the president has also

said that he would do more to upgrade the capabilities of the opposition, at least those in he opposition would be prepared to support. think the more we do in terms of degrading the syrian capabilities and the more we do in terms of at least getting serious about providing support to those within the opposition that we think are deserving of it, that has a chance to affect the balance of power, not only between the opposition and the regime but within the opposition itself. that creates a very different set of incentives for the russians. right now, you know, they have very little incentive to change their behavior. so to the extent to which we are acting in a way that makes it clear that it is time for change and the russians have did decide what to do. they can decide right away, but

it creates a different kind of incentive for them. they can think of a solution without assad, which is not what they have been prepared to do up until this point. >> it is a useful international mechanism for us. what is the point at which preserving the unity of the five plus one comes at the cost of what you are trying to do, vis- à-vis the iranians? that is something you have to constantly be re-assessing. mentionedthe panelist before that the situation in the mideast reminds them of the 1960s. for me, watching this for decades, it reminds me of a byzantine-chinese opera.

byzantium, gentlemen, can any of you address the situation vis-à-vis turkey and all of this, whether it be iran, syria, or egypt, and how this vibrates? [laughter] >> [inaudible] the difficulty of addressing the issue of turkey is that turkey is implicated in so many of these issues, as your question suggests. i do not want to take the rest of the time to go through it all. sayhe syria, suffice it to -- on syria, suffice it to say, for better or worse, the government of turkey and the united states government are on the same wavelength about the importance, as the president

said, of assad departing the scene. i think there is actually been -- has actually been some impatience on the part of the turks about how willing united states was to actually make that happen, and i think also unfortunately because, in addition to other things that have happened, turkish foreign policy has taken a much more sectarian turn over the last year or so as the no enemies with neighbors policy has sort of fallen apart. they has been more adventurous than they should have been in support for some elements of the and that istion, something that in the longer run will put us at odds with turkey over the future of syria, as opposed to the present. >> to questions. -- two questions.

i'm a little confused about what exactly is the consensus of the group with respect to whether or not the offer that was included in the report should be made. is there a consensus about this? it sounds like there is still so, whatent, and if might the preponderance of you preponderant view be? as a second brief question, is tore any view with respect whether, over the syrian crisis, i ran should be included in any shoulddiplomacy -- iran be included in any future

diplomacy with respect to how to end the war? well, i think there is a consensus on prevention being the right objective. i think there is not a consensus on what the right kind of proposal is. view, of outlined one which is you put a credible offer on the table that, in a sense, either the iranians can respond to and accept, or you expose them if they turn it down. involve a limited enrichment capability on their part. there is a disagreement on the part of some on the panel whether that is the right way to go or not. quo, they would get

sanctions lifted. the sanctions related specifically to the nuclear program lifted. as for whether they should be part of the political process on syria, my answer would be no. >> let me add. within the group, there is agreement on the characterization. we should put forward a serious, credible proposal that advances u.s. national interests. i think there is disagreement on the question of enrichment, whether zero enrichment, which has been the position up until now, should remain the u.s. position, or whether we should show some modest flexibility on that. i think there are others like myself who would prefer to keep the current position of making a proposal that would allow no enrichment. our has to do with

perceptions of what the u.s. national interest requires. we haven't taken a vote. i do not know what the answer to that question is. >> simple question. i hear you, but nothing that you said convinces me that we are going to do anything until the first missile is in the air or lands on israel. would you comment on that? i hear what dennis says. i think sanctions are great. i think that is where we are going. that is something we can actually debate here. i think i could say that this panel probably would not exist --we weren't concerned that if there is an action, that we could end up where you are describing. we are suggesting policies that we think will help us avoid that outcome, which we agree is totally unacceptable. >> good answer.

in yugoslavia, in libya, in afghanistan, we demonstrated that air power can affect regime change. apparently, atme least according to reports, was in the process of getting the upper hand in the civil war. what do you think is the regimes of the alawite whenploy chemical weapons it flies in the face of a very strong statement by our president, by our allies, and potentially invite the type of strike that is being contemplated now? what do you think went into their calculation? >> you know, i think this goes back to appoint steve made earlier about red lines, how

they are drawn, how they are enforced. my observation of syrian behavior and others on the panel may have a different view -- there has been over a two-year period, as the conflict has intensified and grown more violent, that the regime is off -- regime itself has been pushing the envelope. first you saw airstrikes. then you saw the use of scuds against civilian populations on the small -- on a small scale. thatse of chemical weapons could in some sense be denied or fudged. then a slightly larger scale. until you got what we saw week or so ago. i think this goes to the whole issue of how you draw a red line and how you enforce it. on the part of the regime in damascus that no matter what it did, it kept

going and kept being able to get away with it because there would be pious denunciations from the international community and the united dates, but nothing would happen, i think has, over time, emboldened more and more action. it is one of the reasons why i think it is so essential that the authorization for military force be approved by the congress and the president executes it. >> can i quickly add -- i'm not sure the perception -- there is a real debate that even after ayr, that they were on the verge of winning this war. in fact, there was a lot of reporting that they were having a terribly difficult time in eastern damascus. that they have thrown everything at it conventionally and have not been able to dislodge this fede that was being said -- through a pipeline coming from jordan. of being that context

worried about the capital and what the rebels might be able to do in the capital if they could not get them out of these neighborhoods, the military decision was taken to throw a chemical weapon at them, and quite a large way. i think it did ultimately come in the context of what eric describes. i would have to go back and read the transcript. a remarkable admission by secretary kerry yesterday in which he basically said -- why wouldn't they have used it? the international community has set this as a red line. we have set this as a red line. yet they have used it multiple times now. i'm not sure the number. it is a shockingly high number. it is in once or twice or three times, but repeated use on smaller scales. day,just at the end of the this is what tyrants do. theylarger powers --

question their credibility -- if they are not willing to enforce it, they tell their people, nobody is going to come to help you. we are going to crush your will. these are wars of will and morality both sides. the was clearly on anniversary of the president's declaration of the red line, assad telling these people and the entire syrian population, no one is going to help you. you are finished. it is not a thing the united states can or will do about it. -- there is not think the united states can or will do about it. >> we are out of time. i will end it by quoting a phrase from my home country, canada, where we used to say, if you are going to try cross- country skiing for the first time, pick a small country. don't pick united states of america. this issue is going to be a huge issue coming forward. i think we could not have found a better group of people then this panel. i want to thank the mall for what was a very illuminating what was-- them offer

a very illuminating dialogue. [applause] together areally put really excellent group here. this is a pivotal time for both u.s. national security interests -- i hope you will return here to the center as we continue to address these issues going forward. thank you very much for attending. [applause] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2013] >> coming up this weekend, the congressional debates on military strikes on syria,

including the senate foreign relations committee discussion and the vote approving the resolution of authorization of force. that is saturday morning at 10:00 eastern. on sunday morning, the house withgn affairs hearing secretary of state john kerry, defense secretary chuck hagel, and chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, general martin dempsey , on the administration's proposed syria resolution. >> the ringing of the spell announces the opening of thanksgiving day of the 22nd --ual sale >> this house will always grow and should. it was such a shame when we came here to find how everything was part of the past. hardly anything before 1910. then we went to columbia, the presidential palace there has all the history of that country in its.

every person -- every piece of furniture in it has some link with the past. i think the white house should be like that. >> our message was this -- as mothers are concerned, as first ladies we are committed, and as citizens of the world, we pledge to do all possible to stop this scourge. >> season two of our original series "first ladies: influence and image," looking at the public and private lives of the women who served as first ladies, live on monday nights, including your calls, facebook comments, and tweets. monday with edith roosevelt on c-span and c-span 3. moments, c-span's town on military strikes on syria. in two hours, and atlantic council for them on the syrian civil war. after that, we will re-air the jewish to for national security on how discussion military strikes in syria could

affect policies towards iran. a couple of live events to let you know about tomorrow here on c-span. beginning with the brookings institution discussion on china's economy at 10:00 a.m. eastern. at 2:00 p.m., we will be at the center for american progress for un ambassador rice samantha power's discussion on the situation in syria. i moved to vote on passage of the resolution. is there a second? seconded. the clerk will call the roll. proxy.by >> aye. >> aye. >> aye. >> aye. >> no. >> no. >> aye. present.

>> aye. no. no. >> no. >> aye. aye. >> no. no. >> aye. >> the clerk will report. ayes, 7 nays, 1 present. >> the resolution is agreed to

and his reported favorably reported by the committee. in thevote yesterday senate foreign relations committee approving the limited authorization of military force against syria. 10-seven, with senator markey of massachusetts voting present. it is onen town hall, time we have been taking some time to hear from you on issues of politics and policy, and tonight we are going to opus on area -- going to focus on syria. the house and senate are actually returning tomorrow. we will tell you about that in a moment. you can join us by phone. the numbers are make sure that you meet your television or radio when you call and. we welcome our c-span radio listeners. you can also join the

conversation on twitter. #cspanchat.is also on facebook, facebook.com/c-span. how would you tell your member of congress to vote? a look at the highlights from the two main hearings this week, the senate foreign relations committee hearing from secretary kerry and hagel and general dempsey, and the house foreign affairs committee, also hearing from the same trio. we will show you some of the highlights from this week. we will also look at the week ahead. we will hear about the rebel alsos in that country, and here with the international community is expected to contribute to that effort or may contribute to that effort. all of that ahead on c-span townhall. a quick check on some of our facebook comments that have come in. one -- 1 --

that is from facebook. a tweet that came in late this afternoon from senator joe manchin of west virginia, the democrat of west virginia, on how he's planning to vote up to ridose coming your calls coming up as well. before we get to those calls, let's hear about what is ahead in the house and senate. they are coming in for a pro forma session tomorrow, but a look ahead with a capitol hill reporter from earlier today. burgess everitt of politico joins us on capitol hill.

what are you hearing from senators and representatives as they come out of these briefings on syria? >> not a lot of people for it explicitly. a lot of people undecided. i was just outside of briefing downstairs in the basement of the capitol. a couple democratic members said they were against it. alan grayson of florida predicted that it would fail based on his pulmonary with counting. that is kind of where we are at right now. politico, thee in headline reads "editors remain unconvinced on syria plan." who is trying to do the convincing in some of these briefings? >> it is kind of been left to the administration officials, most of whom who have been kind of kept secret from us in terms of who is explicitly selling -- john kerry has always been publicly doing some convincing, but dianne feinstein, the chairman of the intelligence committee in the senate, announced she would vote for the

resolution. i asked her, will you be trying to with these members? she said she would be providing as much intelligence as she could about how far she would go on that. it is left to the administration right now. we will see the senate democratic leadership ramp up their efforts next week. withe schedule has changed the senate coming in for a pro forma session, what is described as a pro forma session, on friday. what can you tell us about the schedule in the house and senate and what do you know about the house, perhaps? >> the house is a little shakier. we expect them to follow the senate's lead. i do not think they feel any rush to put this on the floor before they see what happens in this and it. -- in the senate. we are expecting a 60 threshold --cher vote on wednesday cloture vote on wednesday. that would be followed by a passage vote at the end of next week.

i would expect if the cloture vote is successful, then the house's machinery will get more into play. then you will see more firm dates for their resolution, went to pick up the senate toss resolution. >> of the senate leadership, we have yet to hear from the republican leader, mitch mcconnell. any indication of what role he will play in all of this? >> there is none. some of my colleagues have reported that he is staying briefed. he has staffers devoted to it. my questions to his office about his position have gone unanswered the far -- so far. it is not exactly clear which way he could go. that could change as we get closer and see how tight the vote would be. there would be more pressure on him. i'm sure as soon as he gets to the capitol on tuesday, he will face some questions about what his position will be. >> reports indicate this afternoon that president obama's scheduling of a planned trip to next week is canceled to stay in

washington. your colleague jonathan allen writing earlier today, the headline -- "white house outreach on syria has hit three in one lawmaker so far." what can we expect from the white house and others? >> the senate will come in and vote on a couple of executive branch nominees on monday. that will be the first time they have all been here since they broke for august recess. there will be a briefing open to all senators right after that. feinstein has been saying that there needs to be no excuse for not getting enough intelligence. this is unprecedented outreach. apart from that, it is not clear. i would expect we are going to hear more briefings. there'll be something similar for the house next week in terms of making it available to all members, people who do not come back during the recess. i think the administration's goal is to make sure that no member has any excuse of saying, i did not hear enough

intelligence. i think they will keep that out which up until every undecided member has heard the spiel from the white house on this. everett is on twitter. you can see his reporting on politico.com. they give her the update. >> -- thank you for the update. is coming inte tomorrow. the senate will gavel in for a pro forma session. the resolution will be filed by majority leader harry reid. all of the senate on c-span 2 and the house here on c-span. tonight,pan townhall all about syria, and how you would tell your representatives and senators to vote on the issue of the syria resolution. let's go to anthony on our democrats line, woodhaven, new york. caller: hi, i have a few thoughts pertaining to -- hello? >> you are on air, anthony. caller: looking at this entire

process, and most of our representatives have law degrees, love backgrounds, -- law backgrounds, and when we of highesterry speak degree of confidence, that is short of confirmation that chemical weapons have been used by the assad regime has reported. i think we do not know. there is also, with high confidence, other theories or concepts that point in another direction. foryou do not seem to wait the evidence to come forward from an independent source, such as united nations, where ban ki- moon has clearly stated that this should be settled in a political forum. yet i listen to our delegates speaking as if it is already confirmed that a side has used

chemical weapons -- assad has used chemical weapons grade -- weapons. i have seen the decapitation of christian monks and other atrocities that seem to go by the wayside in terms of the opposition. the president putting up the case for military action -- why isn't there an adverse series of people or witnesses to balance a proper way out of viewing this delicate situation? >> one more piece on the use of chemical weapons. a tweet that came across from liz sly, the bureau chief or "the washington post" --

good evening to michael on our republican line. caller: good evening. >> go ahead. caller: a couple of things. -- why doesn't the news media asked some pointed questions to our diplomats? obamae second is, why did lie about the red line when he is the one that set it? i am a vietnam veteran. i have been to war. kerry lied about his service. he's got no business being a secretary of state. we have no business starting another war. my vote is no. my congresswoman, mary bono mack, had better step up, or she and the rest of them, like mccain who voted yes the other

day, is out of a job. she should know better. >> has mary bono mack indicated how she's gone to vote in the house? caller: i don't know. i called her office. she's never there. mentioned, michael, pointed questions. did you see much of the two hearings? caller: yes sir, i watched both of them. a if there was a question -- pointed question you would ask a secretary kerry or secretary hagel, what would that be? caller: why did kerry lie about his vietnam service? >> thanks for the call this evening. two roland in florida. -- to roland in florida. caller: yes, i want my senators and congressmen to know that the ,nited states is weary of war and we do not need to get war ind in a civil

another country that we know nothing about. ofre is no strong evidence anything. even if there was, it is none of our business. we need to stay out of it. let them settle it. the rebels are not fighting the syrian government. that is what we did with the british. we won. so whoever wins, wins. but we need to stay out of it. i want all my congressmen and senators to vote no. thank you. >> that was roland in florida. as last town hall we will do congress returns tomorrow, earlier than expected. they were due back on monday, but both the house and senate coming back tomorrow for pro forma sessions at noon eastern. the house on c-span, the senate on c-span 2. "cq" writing about what some members are hearing as they return. many of them have returned this week. here is the headline late this afternoon

thema quick comment from senator durbin of illinois at tuesday's hearing talked about the rationale for a potential strike against syria. this was from the senate foreign relations committee. more of your calls coming up. [video clip] >> on saturday, i was standing with a group of friends, watching the television screen with the announcement that any minute the president would make a statement, and they turned to me and said, i that the missiles were launched and shut off hours ago and we will hear about it now. to my surprise, the president , i haveward and said that authority, i have made that

decision, but i'm going to respect our constitutional democracy and give the congress -- that is, the american people -- a voice in this decision. from where i was standing, that was good news. for as long as i have been in congress, i have argued about that congressional responsibility. some presidents have respected it. some have not. most of the time, congress, in writing or in speeches, insists upon being respected and given this authority and then starts shaking when it is given. it calls on us to be part of historic, life-and-death decisions. it is one of the toughest calls we will ever make as members of congress, but i salute the president for respecting the constitution, giving us the responsibility. i think the turnout today on short notice in the midst of a break on this committee, mr. chairman and ranking member, is an indication we are taking this seriously and solemnly. i will also note to senator

kerry and also -- secretary kerry and secretary hagel, we all served together 12 years ago and faced similar awesome, historic decisions related to iraq and afghanistan. we saw those differently in some respects, but i voted against the iraq resolution, going to war in that country, and felt that the events that transpired afterwards gave me some justification for my vote. i voted for the war in afghanistan, believing that it was a clearer response to 9/11. we were going after those responsible for killing 3000 innocent americans. we were going to make them pay a price. i still believe that was the right thing to do. but i did not know at the time that i voted for the authorization of use of military i was voting for the longest war in the history forhe united states, voting

things that nobody could have envisioned at that moment in history. secretary hagel and secretary , take this very seriously. i understand the president and his values. question of expanding this mission into something much larger, something that would engage us in a new level of warfare or a new authority for this president or a future president. i hope we can have your word and assurance that we can work together in a bipartisan fashion to craft this in a way that carefully achieves our goals, but does not expand the authority anywhere beyond what is necessary. >> sender, thank you. a very important statement. you not only have my word that it will not do that, but we will work with you very closely, with the white house, in shaping this

resolution. no hidden agenda. there is no subterfuge. there is no surrogate strategy. there is one objective, and that objective is to make sure we live up to our obligations of upholding the norm with respect to international behavior on the use of chemical weapons. that is what the president is seeking in this authorization. >> let me speak to the issue of chemical weapons trade i don't know if general dempsey or secretary hagel or perhaps secretary kerry is the appropriate person. the french have done an assessment of what they believe the syrians have in terms of their chemical weapons arsenal. general dempsey, are you familiar with it? >> i am not familiar with the french assessment. i am familiar with our own. >> we have a copy of it here. it has been published. we have talked a lot about sarin

gas and other nerve agents. report --ar from this i would ask you if it is close to what your assessment is -- the syrians have more than 1000 and of chemical agents precursor chemicals, several hundred tons of sarin, representing the bulk of their arsenal. it has also been speculated that they have the missile capability of delivering these chemical weapons in israel, portions of turkey, jordan, iraq, and beyond. what is your assessment of their potential when it comes to the delivery and their capacity when it comes to the amount of chemical agents they have available? >> our assessment very closely matches the french assessment. >> i guess my question to you, mr. secretary, secretary kerry, in light of the vulnerability of these countries, what has been

the response of the arab and muslim world to this? you have listed four or five who have stepped forward to say they support our efforts. that if this danger in the region is so profound that we would have even greater support. senator, this is something i would be happier discussing in greater detail with you in a closed session. there are obviously some countries for whom public statements are more competent than others. i think we should talk about that and the other session. >> fair enough. general dempsey, we saw these photographs earlier. heart breaking photographs. post,"ree of "washington a photograph that is riveted in my mind as a father and grandfather. the children on the floor in shrouds, victims of this chemical agent and gas attack.

what the administration is asking us for is military authority to launch additional attacks. what have you been charged with in terms of the issue of collateral damage from those attacks as it would affect innocent people and civilians and the nation of syria? >> senator, the guidance we have received on targeting is to maintain a collateral damage estimate of low. briefly, on how we come up with our assessments of collateral damage, it is based on how much we know about a target through intelligence. its proximity to civilian structures. weapons affects. a collateral damage estimate of low means just that. we will keep collateral damage lower than a certain number, which i would rather share with you in a classified setting. that doesn't mean, by the way, that we would have the same constraint, if you will, in what

damage could be done to regime personnel. that is a separate issue. although even in that case, i could probably tell you some more things in the classified setting. >> i look forward to that. thank you very much. >> this is c-span town hall bringing you some of the highlights of this week's hearings on syria and asking you how you want your member of congress to vote on the issue, taking her comments on facebook, by phone, and on twitter. #cspanchat. this one from matthew he also tweets also, from fiscal cliff one more from cynthia who tweets

#cspanchat. mark in baltimore on our democrats line. good evening. caller: good evening. how are you? >> doing fine, thanks. caller: i have several responses. of my two united states senators and my representatives is to vote their conscience. the reason i say that, we are going to have access to information -- they are going to have access to information that we will not have. data andthe classified all the other information, the only thing that is reasonable to is that they vote their conscience and they do the best that they can under the circumstances. i think, as a citizen, i can give my inclination, give some of my thinking and concerned, but at the end of the day, they have to make what i would call a

considered judgment. i am willing to except that, either pro or con. some of the concerns are reasonable. the issue about boots on the ground, certainly the issue of any possible retaliation by assets,ainst american and by syria against its neighbors. the only thing that i haven't heard much of a response to is, after the strike, if they do go forward, what can be done either by the united states or i suppose by the allied nations or syriations that surround to go in and secure that arsenal? from whatlike, general dempsey said and secretary kerry and secretary hagel, syria has quite a stockpile of these chemicals.

i think, at some point, they need to be seized and taken out of their. >> -- out of there. >> we began the program looking at some of the highlights from the senate foreign relations committee. the committee passed the 7esolution by a vote of 10- yesterday. we have a link to that on our homepage. you can click on the link. it will take you right to the resolution that the senate passed yesterday. back to calls. auburn, washington, carl was on our republican line. caller: good evening, i'm very happy for you to take my call. i think we need to take a look at the bigger picture. be bigger picture happens to , what happens when this all spirals out of control? one of the questions that was posed by the congressman to general dempsey was, is russia still a superpower? in light of that, general dempsey's answer to that

, what could happen if russia took action against us? he did not want to answer that question in the room. he said, i will have to take that question in private quarters. very,k that strikes a very alarming -- when we have united nations not in sync with the united states making a strike and taking in securing these arsenals, i think we are making a crucial mistake and error when we have russia and china and other nations that whenin fact, superpowers we take our own action, which is illegal, based upon united nations. now, with that in light, my

alief -- we are risking greater war, a global, possibly nuclear, war that will spiral out of control to the entire fewd and not just affect a thousand, but millions of people on this planet. i am an absolute no to mr. obama, who i believe has other plans. i'm going to leave it at that. puttinge that he is not on the table exactly what is really in the best interest of the united states or the world. >> we see some video of the president earlier this week. the president is at the g-20 meetings in russia, meeting with president putin of russia. the associated press saying they shook hands and exchanged pleasantries and made "smalltalk" about the scenery.

-- headline in yahoo! news "world powers fail to heal syria rift at g-20 dinner" - putin made a last-minute announcements for the participants to air their views over dinner. russia has led opposition to u.s. military action against bashar al-assad over a chemical attack on august 21. in new york, u.s. envoy to the united nations accused russia of holding the un security council hostage while british prime investor david cameron said london had fresh evidence of chemical weapons use. more on the international scene a bit later on on our c-span town hall this evening. this is mark in portland, oregon, independent line. caller: hi, c-span. it is not as simple. there are some politics to it.

a wildfire or similar in that way. [indiscernible] we have obligations in the region. we have non-humanitarian ones. there is a bona fide humanitarian mission, the geneva convention side of it. we heard a whole lot on the other side of it. if i were asking my congressman. >> mark, thanks for your call. we are taking your calls and comments. more of your calls coming up. comments on twitter as well. senator john mccain raised some concerns in testimony over

letting the enemy know about the timing of the attack. here is a little bit of that exchange with secretary kerry. [video clip] >> i think the witnesses, and may i say, john, it is very good to see teresa here with you in good health and in good spirits. thank you. teresa, i apologize for what i am about to do to john. john -- >> man, there is a set up. >> john, when you tell the enemy you are going to attack them -- i'm not going to take any time on this -- they are obviously going to disperse and try to make it harder. i'm looking right here at an ap ia said to be "syr hiding weapons in moving troops." they may be moving some of their assets into the russian naval base. let's not get -- it is it is not to think --

wise from a pure military standpoint not to warn the enemy that you are going to attack. secretary hagel, in the "wall agonet journal" today, "pent planners were told not to develop strike options that would drive aside from power -- assad from power." is there any truth to that? >> senator, as i have said, the president asked us for a range of options. >> i'm asking if there is any truth to the article. >> our options are not limited -- >> i would ask you if there is any truth to the story. >> no. >> secretary kerry, in the same in providing delay arms to the opposition in part reflects the broader u.s. approach rarely discussed publicly. the current administration doesn't want to tip the balance in favor of the opposition for fear that the outcome may be even worse for u.s. interests than the current stalemate."

is that accurate? >> no. >> thank you. >> may i add something? on the warning issue, i would disagree you -- disagree with you about the warning. the general would disagree with you. >> the general said it would be just as easy -- let's not get into that. >> all i want to say to you, john, is that there were leaks, which are the bane of everybody's existence,, and the fact is the newspapers began to carry stories about the strike and targeting well before any decisions were made. that began a process of moving. it. got i really would like to move on to some more important questions. >> i thought all of your questions were important, john. [laughter] >> thank you, john, that is good. i will try to remember that. the president said today that the purpose of the military action in syria is not just to respond to assad's use of chemical weapons but to degrade

military capabilities as part of a broader strategy to change the momentum on the ground. as the president said, "allow syria ultimately to free itself." do you agree with that assessment, john? >> i said up front, i said several times, as a result of degrading his ability for chemical weapons, there will be downstream impacts which will have an impact on his military capacity. i agree with the president. >> thank you. general dempsey, do you agree with that statement of the president's? >> i agree. i have never been told to change the momentum. i have been told to degrade capability. >> do you think, general, that without a change in momentum that syria ultimately could free itself, as secretary hagel -- >> senator, i think they are all connected. degrading in military capability, as you know, is a pretty significant part of

momentum shifts. , john, over kerry the weekend, "the wall street journal" ran an important article. she spent a great deal of time inside syria. i want to read her assessment of the situation on the ground. "thete the story -- conventional was them holds that the extremist elements are completely mixed in with the more moderate groups. this is not the case. moderates and extremists wield control over distinct territory. contrary to many media accounts, the war in syria is not being waged entirely or even predominantly by dangerous islamists and al qaeda diehards. the jihadist pouring into syria from countries like iraq and lebanon are not walking to the front lines. instead, they are concentrating their efforts on consolidating control in the northern rebel held areas of the country.

moderate opposition forces, clutching of groups known as the free syrian army, continue to lead the fight against the regime. while traveling with some of these battalions, i watched then defend christian villages from government forces and extremist groups. they have demonstrated a willingness to submit to civilian authority. working closely with local administrative councils. they struggle to ensure that their fight against assad will pave the way for a flourishing civil society." john, do you agree with her assessment of the opposition? >> i agree with most of that. they have changed significantly. they have improved. as i said earlier, the fundamentals of syria are secular. i believe they will stay that way. >> i think it is very important to point out, as you just said, it is a secular state. they would reject radical islamists. in some cases come in the areas

in which they have control, people are demonstrating against them, that is the information i have. when we see these commentators say, well, we do not know which side will win. we do not know who the bad guys are. with thisee assessment, we certainly know who the bad guys are. is that correct? >> i believe we do, for the most part. there are some worse than al-n usrah. they tend to be in the northern area and the east. >> i thank you. again i would like to ask -- can you share with the midi -- the committee, if the administration does not see a protracted stalemate as the goal of u.s. policy? >> the goal is not to stalemate. the goal is a negotiated solution that results in the departure of assad and a free choice of the syrian people for their future. >> finally, i would like to ask

again. if we reject this resolution, does it send us seriously bad message to our friends and allies alike? it would dispirit our friends fighting in syria, but not just there, around the world. >> senator mccain, i've gotten to know my counterparts in the middle east particularly well because of the number of crises and initiatives that we have had to deal with in that region. enough howphasize much they are looking to us now, making judgments about us for the long-term, and how critical the choice we make here will be, not just to this question of

syria, but to the support we may or may not anticipate in the middle east peace process, to the future of egypt, to the transformation of the middle east, to the stability of the region and other interests we have. there is no way to separate one thing from all of the rest. relationships are relationships. they are integrated. that is why this is so important. >> i would also emphasize, if it is the wrong kind of resolution, it can do just as much damage. >> back to your calls and comments on c-span town hall. how you will tell your member of congress to vote on at the syrian resolution. the house and senate coming back tomorrow for a brief informal session. this is houston, texas, good evening to linda. caller: hi, thanks for taking my call. i live in houston, texas. it is an international city. of dispute here

about what is going on in the middle east. i would like for my congressman, al green, to not support this effort. i think that our resources need to be used here at home. there are many children that have started school here in the houston area who are living in homeless shelters, trying to go to school. i am a widow of a vietnam veteran. i am very familiar with the war. the outcomes and the cost. result of died as a chemicals being used in vietnam. i think it is a very bad thing to do this to children in syria or anywhere else, but the time comes when we have to say what is most importance. they are not attacking our borders. they are not attacking our people. even the pope cannot save everyone in the world.

intove to put our efforts taking care of our children here. i have a daughter-in-law who was colombian born. i have visited columbia. i have never seen such devastation and hunger and poverty as i did when i visited columbia. i just think that all of the money that would be wasted in this effort could be used to feature john of the world. i'm totally against it. >> linda, thanks for your call, telling your congressman al green to vote against it. here is a tweet from congressman grayson of florida -- alan grayson has been an outspoken critic against the resolution, and he says in this tweet that just cannot -- came out rich, theiew from jim senator from idaho --

he has linked to the youtube video of his comments earlier. let's hear from brady in dermott, arkansas. good evening. caller: can you hear me? >> we sure can. i would like to tell my congressman to vote no. they want to spend all this , tens of millions of dollars. you can keep on counting. you can count to 1000 by 10 and put millions on the end of it. >> brady, thanks for your call. go ahead, i didn't mean to cut you off. caller: i'm not done. them what they would think the people in syria would want.

they just got gassed. do you think they want bombs dropping in on top of them after that? i wouldn't think so. gas -- someone bombing knee on top of the gas. let's hear from randy in alabama. caller: thank you. i think we should vote no on this. maybe americans need to take a vote. we do not need to be in war with syria or russia. tother thing when it comes john kerry, i do not think president obama should have appointed him. i do not think he is qualified. him, we've gotre drugs running rampant in the united states. we need help with that. it is destroying our country.

i do not think we need to go to war with them. it is just a bad idea. if we do, it is going to be a real bad deal for all of us americans. these politicians need to quit putting our men and women in harms way. inx special forces. they need to quit doing this. >> randy mentioned special forces. we will show you comments on facebook next. let's hear from john and arizona. go ahead. caller: yes, sir. my name is john. >> go ahead, you're on the air. caller: thank you for taking my call. i would like to make a comment about syria. it seems like our country has to and wefirst ones in, have to be the leader of the charge, as you might say, on any trouble in the world.

maybe if we just step back and look, and some of these nations that say they want to get involved -- if they think they can get involved, it should be up to them. it seems like we are always in a war or something. i would say no to this one. here is john on our others line. iparty called my representative. however, i do have a suggestion and this is what i said to them. through the united nations, there is an international courts headquartered in the netherlands. i am curious why, if this is a use of weapons of mass destruction