>> good afternoon. i am from the wall street journal and i'm honored to be sitting with barney frank and hank paulson, of hank, the new documentary. two rock stars of the financial crisis. welcome to the council on foreign relations meeting. this is part of the history makers series. this features individuals and made a critical contribution at junctures in u.s. policy. the crisis qualifies. the series is made possible by the continued generosity of hbo. let me start with a question that is on the minds of many people in the public. when you look at the entire picture and a number of prosecutions, the sec charges, executive compensation, the public statements of contrition,

or lack thereof, do you think the people who were responsible for these decisions that led to this crisis have been held accountable? >> wow. i know that is a question on the public's mind. i will say something that may not resonate with a lot of public. if you except my explanation of the crisis, the excesses have been building for years, that a giant credit bubble burst, that a definition of a bubble is something that the market never fully understands until it burst, and my explanation that every financial crisis in history has its roots in flawed government policies and manifest itself in the financial system, no matter how it is structured, then, you may except my answer, which is that the banks made a lot of mistakes and there is -- if we should focus on those

mistakes, we should correct them, but the men who are running these banks and the people who are running these banks were dealing with a 100 year storm. something they had never seen before. you have to go back to the great depression to see something like that. they were trying to blow up their entities up. -- entities. given all the investigations that have gone on, when people broke the law, they are being held accountable. i understand that that view out there exists.

>> he is not the justice department. we had an important job. preventing things from falling apart totally and trying hard to keep them from reoccurring. i speak you from direct involvement and i want to talk to my liberal friends about this, one of the reasons we had to pass a lot of new laws is because a lot of things that were bad were not illegal. a central element in due process is that you do not currently prosecute someone unless he or she had good reason to know that that conduct was illegal and there was ambiguity's. -- there were ambiguities. >> is it still around?

>> i think that's a major reason. e had people doing things -- you had people doing things that were against the law. on the other hand, i'm disappointed. i think they are acting like we hurt their feelings. if you look at the law, we do not stop them. if people want psychic income. they have a lot people making a lot of money by saying that they said such mean things about us. >> as a former banker, i was disgusted by the things that i saw. disgusted by the mistakes that were made and the behaviors and so on. you can be disgusted and disappointed and still take the basic view that barney and i take.

i assume that the legal system is working. >> barney frank. lehman brothers. hank paulson has said that he tried to save it and could not. they do not have legal authority to do that. you had a line that was, this is national free-market day. >> by the way, what ever to bipartisanship and where did it go? it was a live in well in september 2008. you had a republican president come to a democratic congress and say that we had serious problems. we were cozy den. -- then. i came to hate friday afternoon at 5:00 because the phone would ring and hank paulson would tell

me about a new disaster after the markets were closed. we're talking about lehman brothers and i knew he was doing everything possible to keep it going. i said to my husband, barclays is going to buy lehman brothers. then, the fsa pulled the plug. he tried to do that and my comments was to mike conservative friends who said they should go bankrupt. mimi was about to fall and the consequences were so terrible that a consensus came that we could not have that happen again. i said it was national free- market day. >> the other thing which barney allowed me to tell the story and it came out with the reissue of "on the brink." it wasn't too long after bear

stearns went down -- again, with bear stearns, only been saved by jpmorgan. we had the fed assisting that buying. we had learned that we did not have the necessary authorities to save a failing investment bank without a buyer. them bernanke and i went and talked with barney. we explained that we do not have the powers for investment banks to wind them down and take them outside of the -- wind them down outside of the bankruptcy process. we were not going to be able to get those authorities from

congress. the only chance of getting them was by saying that we would have a huge crisis if we did not get them because we meant would have failed and that would have -- lehman would have failed and that would have been disastrous. >> the opposition was coming from the republicans, rather than the democrats. you had republicans saying, let it happen. hank convinced me that if an institution failed, we had one of two choices. we can pay all the debts or none of the debts. lehman paid none of the debts. aig paid all the debts and everybody is in a bad mood. what we did in the bill was to give them the authorities.

we had death panels for big banks and our bill. not a health-care bill. the banks can pay as much of the debt as they think is necessary to avoid further contagion. that was in the bill because hank and ben bernanke had asked us to put it there. it was all or nothing. we said do as much as you have to do. >> on lehman we did not have it all. they could not guarantee are putting capital. the fed was able to make a loan because it was secured. >> that was the other thing.

herbert hoover had signed a bill that gave the fed the power to give money to anybody that they felt they needed. that was repealed. you do not have that power anymore. >> elizabeth warren has said that we get a lot nice things in. frank -- we did a lot of nice things in dodd-frank, but we haven't solved the problem. >> too big to fail has to and. -- end. this is not what i'm concerned about. as a result of this legislation, regulators have the twill's -- tools to manage the failure of

large financial institutions and keep it out of bankruptcy. what i have said is that too big to fail is a misnomer. it is not just size. it is complexity and interconnectedness. i go on to say that, that, no bank is too big to liquidate. if we had in other global one, is a system set up? >> we can deal with what we have in the u.s. we have much better tool is to work with. if you ask me if those twill sub and refined globally, i would say that more needs to be done. -- if those tools have been refined globally, i would say more needs to be done. we do not have a perfect regulatory system in the united states. we have five different regulators are doing and fighting with 20 other -- with

one another. is it perfect? no. dodd frank has required the living wills and plans to liquidate these large institutions and has given regulators the authority to do so. the things that we did -- a law the reasons they were unpopular was because institutions that are failing should not be propped up in their current form. that is what we were forced to do. >> here's how the bill works, institutes are too big to fail

and eight nor the consequences. -- ignore the consequences. nobody the federal government can do was done for aig. you cannot advance an institution that cannot pay its debts money and keep it alive. people are fired, the shareholders are gone, the board is sold and the sec taken over as the resolver. in financial terms, resolve means dissolve, i don't know where they came up with it. the secretary of treasury may find out there is not enough assets in the bank to pay all of the debts and the secretary treasury is mandating them to recover financial institutions over 50 billion. >> one group -- one group says that there will be overwhelming political pressure to keep it going.

in what country? in america, with george bush and barack obama, we were barely able to get it through. the idea that the american people would come to the rescue of a big bank is fantasy. what the bank somewhere else -- that still has to be addressed. a global failure or a massive failure, our scheme work in 2008. lehman was in trouble and a couple others were. hank had to force jpmorgan and chase to take the money, so as not to stigmatize the others that needed it.

it could be -- and there is a massive -- he was asked, what is your plan if the soviet union attacked israel? >> to me, where politics could enter in, i grew barney, -- i agree with barney, the banks are better regulated. my focus is on other issues. not that banks are the big problem, but, i am more focused on any in frederick -- fanny and freddie. we will know how these things work when we have a crisis and

people use the authorities. the place where politics could come in, ok, is my making. the things we did were so unpopular. really unpopular. there were poles when i left office that showed torture scrolling -- scoring higher. >> and you are up for reelection. >> those who voted for it are more concerned about the polls that i was. the deal is, i think regulators have the twill's they need. -- tools they need.

everything that i think they need. there may be a bridge pressure pressure to liquidate these banks >> the question is, what if too many of them fail. if one fails, the other ones are in stronger positions. >> if you could have added one more title, what would it have been? >> i would have merged the sec with the fotc. is the farmers in the east coast and west coast financials. it would have been very difficult and you would have had shays rebellion. >> it would have been in congress. >> there is no rational way you would've set them up.

when it started, it dealt with corn and pork. then, financial derivatives came to the floor and caused confusion. i proposed that we give the ftc jurisdiction over everything edible. the agriculture people would not give it up. >> you mentioned fannie and freddie. we have a nationalized mortgage market. what should we do? >> i will get to that but, i want to say that barty and i and democrats and republicans worked on getting these extraordinary authorities for fannie and freddie done. they have not gotten as much attention. these organizations were larger

than lehman brothers and were auctioning $20 billion of securities. if you had people bumping the securities, it would have been terrible. can you imagine the number of defaults we would have had if those institutions were put into conservatorship? anything we did during the crisis -- that is the biggest untold story. i'm concerned because, right now, 90%, not quite, roughly 90% of mortgages in america, residential mortgages, have some kind of government support and i argued that that means that

government subsidies are setting the price and not the private marketplace. my thought is that i am no longer treasury secretary and i do not have a come up with this proposal. what i say is come up with principles. i like the corker-warner bureau bill. i'm not someone who says that they should not exist. i would phase them out. i would have a clear roadmap for what succeeds them. anything they do should have private market participations and government guarantees should be explicit. the government should be paid for the gilt currencies. the price should be sufficient

for the private mortgage market and i would limit the mission the income of the borrower and a first-time homeowners. but they are doing all the things you wanted to do? >> i have been very skeptical of home ownership. i said, we are going to have to make a factual part. from 1994, the homeowners equity protection act said that we need to regulate mortgages and not let them be given up improperly. he rejected that authority is said it was an intrusion. he said he did not think it would go out of control. from 1995 to 2006, i was in the minority and the republicans controlled the congress. i became persuaded that thinks you to trade -- change will stop i became persuaded that things needed to change and i wrote the first major legislation in 2007.

we did it and it is a solution that i agree with. there's too much tension. here is the policy debate, some of the free market and conservative purists believe in getting rid of it altogether. people in the housing businesses say that if you want 30 year fixed-rate mortgages available, there has to be a guarantee. there should be an availability for people to buy interest rate risk for 30 years. priced to clear. that is what we're talking about. that is what corker-warner does. i think people have oversold the ordinance and i want to see a housing fund set up.

i want to set up mortgages. the bill outlaws bad mortgages. question think the bush and obama and measures and get as much they could to help people who were underwater? >> it was not the bush administration or the obama administration. it was the none of the above administration. we had a serious problem to deal with during the presidential transition. hank and i talked about this. the first 350 billion went out and we argued about that.

i said, i can draw another 350 if obama oks it. i asked the administration to ok it's. they said that they were not in charge. bush and obama were not ready to get engaged. the bush admin is -- the obama administration said one president at a time and i got in trouble because i overestimated how many presidents we had i one. >> i would say one thing, in seriousness, i think george bush was a great president during this time. i think he dealt with the fact that he did not worry about public sentiment and was

determined to do was right. housing is weak and we can spend a lot of time talking about housing finance. i was not able to limit the way of foreclosures. i regret that. it alluded the obama administration, as well. despite the angst i felt during the transition, as i look back at it, the policy continuity was extraordinary. because, president obama picked timothy geithner and ben bernanke was still there. barty was still there. chris dodd was still there. he picked him at the geithner, who had worked hand in glove with us as we designed this. -- he picked tim geithner, who had worked hand in glove with us

as we designed this. there was pressure and i have no doubt there was pressure. because, with every new president, there is pressure from the base to get rid of what the other guys did. >> i agree. bush defied his ideologues. we had mortgage relief written into the tarp bill. i know that there was such urgency. they could not wait for some that money to go out. he was asking for the second tranche of money, which would have been used.

the money had to come from somewhere. somebody had to come up with the money. we could force the banks to take a hit, but that is where the transition fell through. i have to be critical of the secretary. we took $1 billion of the tarp money and said i'm a use that to relieve the mortgage distress of the people who are unemployed. he got so bureaucratic, only half of that was spent. we gave authority and it was not used. >> i will ask one more question before we go to the audience. the fed. how much has been public and contentious fight her the fed? >> look, i remember when alan greenspan was german -- chairman and i was a dissenter from the people who said that everything he did was wonderful and i found myself being a defender of the fed from a left-right coalition.

the fed would have been the logical one to take it away from. greenspan said that we cannot do monetary policy without insight. i hope people will look at this. when aig, which have been the recipient of $165 billion of free money, when they gave large

bonuses to people, the pitchforks were out. i was worried that we were going to lose the capacity for coherent government. that is when the fed got demonized. first they gave the money to these people and then they gave some bonuses. chris dodd got in trouble because he had tried to lift them retroactively. the fed was weakened. i think it happened from the reaction. they get little blame for the bailouts. >> do you think the fed has been hurt? >> by? >> by the storm of who should replace ben bernanke. >> it has been accentuated by the fire and storm and unpopularity of the actions we had to take and the fed took. the american people never

understood that we did this to prevent a disaster. barney and i both understood it. barty was the first one to a splendid to me -- barney was the first one to explain it to me. he used the word, counterfactual. you are never going to get credit for the crisis you avert. crisis you avert. this infuriated the american people. to get your specific question, i hate it. i hate the turmoil that we have seen and the politics around the appointment of the next chairman of the fed. i do not like the way this is been handled and i would like to have a decision made quickly. we have good people. larry summers is a good man and is highly regarded. i -- you know, janet we yell and

janet yellen, the key thing is that we have some good candidates and this is an important decision that president obama has to make. i have always argued that president bush made some important decisions and ben bernanke was a good one. this one is important. what bothers me about washington is that people disagreed with your policy and go after you on all kinds of other issues and personalize it. i'm saddened by this. >> one of the distressing things to me is the finance committee. what you've seen -- >> the financial community? >> the fed has been under and on fair assaults. -- unfail assault and the role what has happened is, the most ideological people, some of the life and some on the right, have turned against the fed. the financial community knows

better. their failure to defend it is discouraging and is coming back to hurt them. they have a responsibility to not allow the fed to be as attacked and damaged. >> you may be right. i wonder if the financial community speaking up for the fed would help or hurt? >> it would. i don't want to make public speeches. they need to say, here is $5,000. >> with that pragmatic recommendation, i will turn to questions. >> they want to say yes, here is your $5,000 that please ease

up on the fed. recommendation. return to questions. the question and in the? . no speech. corporate members may have a question. can we get a microphone in the frontier? >> i have been struggling since it fell apart to figure out how it happened. the thing that puzzled me is no one was concerned that giving loans to people that had no and the assumption was

they would have it for a few months and sell it and the price would go up i just thought was not. why didn't anybody raise that question? >> here is what happened. if the years ago, people who borrowed money would have to pay back the person who lent it. because of look would it be sourcesrom non-think and information technology, you were able to get into securitization. so people began to make loans, sell the loans, and not have any further responsibility. the lender borrow discipline slipped. one of the substitutes was supposed to be the rating agencies. that is essentially what happened. people gave loans who should not have gone loans. the worry they would not be

repaid was a problem. one of the things we put in the criticism ofone the administration implementation, we put in the requirement for risk retention. the idea is if you made mortgage loans, the president would ring them up and securitize them and had to retain some of the risk. the regulators, to my dismay elapsed by categories. now there were some loans we did ban. ae other thing is if you make loan for mortgages, you did not have to have the risk retention. that is my most serious complaint. >> i agree with everything barney has said. i will just add to it. war ii theworld

plethora of policies we have had and the u.s., not just fannie mae or freddie mac, have tended to promote homeownership. tooernie said, you can have much of anything. residential home prices tended to go out for the united states. all of the models and things people look that did not see it big drop in residential mortgages. if you are an investor and owned a residential mortgage, the biggest risk was you would get the money back too soon. the other thing i would say that disappointed me in terms of dodd allowedhe regulators the exception if a mortgage was a qualified mortgage. the new consumer finance protection bureau originally had regulation that said the buyer

had to be able to afford the home and put 20% down. there is huge resistance. affordability is important. willingness to pay is also important. so even on that this new consumer finance protection bureau out to the political pressure. by the way, i do not think it had to be 20% down. there were supposed to be three categories of mortgages. then there were supposed to be to others. the average mortgage where there was risk retention securitized. a small number of really good mortgages. did not happen that last exception. one thing about the filibuster

--e them is 60% gives and every senator a gun. so what the regulators did -- the cfp be disappointed me on this. banks,e a coalition, the the poor people's advocate -- the only solace i have is the statutory authority is still there. i hope within a few years they will be considered -- >> gentleman in the back. right here. >> you mentioned earlier there is still work to be done. should there be a contingency they're a big chinese banks would run into trouble or even fail? >> that would be popular.

there are some things that , butery hard to plan for we did contingency planning when i was treasury secretary. i am sure they do contingency big, local banks failing. and for crises starting other places. our financial crisis i maintained without a u.s. the nature crisis. it was a u.s./european. did not deal with it the way we dealt with it. look at the timeliness and effectiveness for us in terms of getting capital. yes, i am sure regulators have contingency problems for the things that happen globally. as bernie said, we do not have control in terms of what foreign

companies do. we just have to coordinate. might bethe case that less likely given the fact that the chinese government would be less constrained by public opinion? that they could step in and stop the bleeding earlier and easier than we could? i did not want to get into specifically china. i am not predicting that likelihood. i would say all over the world off, theropean started germans were bailing out countries over the weekend and no one was noticing it. the crisis did not just start in he u.s. historically there was much less lyrical concern about bailouts.

-- we have had., crises for a long time and regularly. most of them are manageable. it was only when we did not have the authorities we needed, and this was such an extraordinary test could be a very few hurt. -- that americans were hurt. lexi spoke about the lack enforcement of criminality. could adjust the same question from the point of view of regulatory authority and the ability of the regulators to step in and take action against individuals, executives and board members who engage.

very important. they have argued all we can. the argument we do not want to put another big company out of business is valid. by the way, going after individuals is a determinant. finding the company does not bother anybody. i do not know why. here is the one factor i will their defense. the securities exchange commission and commodities trade .ommission are underfunded we gave the cftc to deal with the rivets. frankly it is a partisan difference. when the republicans took over the house in 2010 they decided theignificantly underfund sec. the problem is if we begin to

get tough on these people, they will -- they will litigate. they have resources beyond what we have. a couple of the cases can exhaust us. thing i was hoping we could have done was to get the sec the fiscal autonomy the bank regulators have. can you give the woman in front, second row. .> go ahead >> peter ackerman. seven percent of all mortgages were held by gse's. today 90% held by them. of all americans own their homes. my the question is, what are we trying to and >end? what are we trying to accomplish

as a country with a housing policy? >> that is the question. you heard me say i thought one of the most effective things we did was putting in the conservative ship. i remember talking right as we were doing that and got nothing but support from them. we both said and i said this is a timeout. we cannot straighten this out right now in the middle of the crisis. me -- nover dawned on one was saying this is a great system. public support for private profit. this is a great system. it. all, we have still got right now because they're making money hand over fist in the

money is in the federal budget, way it is adding to the deficit. you have disincentives. i would say it will be dealt with, but the other thing i would say as you said not to spam you may and for, housing policy. tell me it is -- tell me why it is there someone should get an interest rate reduction on a million dollar mortgage. where does that come from? >> if i was turning over again, i would not have a home mortgage interest of action. unfortunately, it is now built in. you cannot just pull it out. we have had a national policy that treated renting as if it was somehow second-best. i will give you a shocking example. had one ofk times the most outrageously bigoted articles i have seen on how terrible these poor homeowners who live in areas where there is

foreclosure now have to put up with renters in the area. it was all about how renters are bad for the neighborhood. so i think we need to move away from this emphasis. the reason we are not getting way -- it ingrid of fannie mae and freddie mac, there was a political solution in the german constitution after world war ii. people were worried about the instability of france and italy where you can getting government overthrown by coalitions of people who were antis. the german constitution said you cannot in the parliament overturn a government. you cannot turn a government out unless the same institution name for government. there is a majority in the

american congress for getting ready it -- getting rid of fannie mae and freddie mac, bob not together on any one version. strong enterprise people in the house who want to get out of it. a public utility where you can get an interest rate guaranteed. it is not all me example. never get enough people together on the alternative college. that is what keeps fannie mae and freddie mac alive. barbara matthews. i have the honor of this serving the treasury secretary in brussels and before that, i served on the committee. my question is international. what did you learn, and what would you advise american policymakers today about american leadership in the financial institutions globally based on your experience x and he good examples of cooperation >> everyone knows the story about the police officer. there must have been some good

and that happened that were not told. what have you learned about american leadership in the process? >> you read my book on the financial crisis to explain what happened, how it happened and when it happened. that story is told. many wayse crisis in brings out the worst in some people, but the best and many people. there was great coordination and cooperation in the way we came together. when you look at the three weeks but trying -- between the time lehman brothers went down, and without the tarp legislation passed. -- this was not just the u.s.. european banks were teetering. six different countries came in to rescue their banks. the g-7whe --en

came together with a multiple point proposal but said we will stand behind all systemically important institutions. we will not let them go down. we will capitalize banks to the extent of that make sense. we will make sure we have robust federal deposit insurance. there was great coordination and cooperation. communication throughout this. -- we werecture stormg with a 100-year without the regulatory system in the u.s., and lawfully the u.s. system was where ahead of where we were globally. i think people came together very well. as i look back on it now with the perspective of five years, at the time, i was very

concerned. i now look back with great gratitude for the way various people were through it. >> there was a lot of corded nation. we have a lot of coordination in writing the regulation. the prime minister from ireland and i talked a lot. i told him we were going to do risk retention. he went back to the eu and was running onto some resistance. the americans are going to do it. then when i ran into resistance, i was able to save the eu did it-- say the eu did it. there has been a lot. one great example of international cooperation, and i think the media focuses too much on the negative, that is the tax agreements coming forward. apparently great progress being made multinational leon cutting

people's multinationals ability to pay taxes to nobody. far as the other stuff is concerned, we are talking about it. financial people, one of their is the teenaged child of divorced parents. mommy would've let me do that. translates to if i was in england, they would let me do that. if i could go to japan i could get away with it. we did it by moving first. i think we have been the opposite. i think we have been a good influence on each other, and there has been a lot of conversation and it is not perfect. >> gentleman in the back. much.nk you very

i am happy serving in the asian real estate station of america. the d.c. metro chapter. thank you for talking about housing and the global financial system. about eu and a not heard you talk a lot about the u.s. and china. i think that is a lot of balance of cap between the financing system and china. we talk about too big to fail. actually, the china icon -- economic system, there is a lot on state-owned enterprises. how to protect the american middle class from people with cash coming in and buying it from us. we have gravitated from one adequate and

creating a bubble in the crisis. we seem to have another crisis havelaos -- as people do 20% down and excellent credit score. the new feature does not have that. >> have we made it too hard for people to buy a house? >> no. i thought the 20% may have been too rigid. 20% did not mean you could not get a mortgage. it meant whoever lent you the money to buy your home without a 20% down payment had to believe it was good enough loan to retain five percent of the risk if you did not pay it. notion there is risk retention. must not have been any mortgages in america before

1985. securitization did not exist before that. securitization was brought forward in the 1980s. i know we have not made it to heart. >> peter von bush. two questions that relate. what do you think about the volcker rule and the movement to make big banks smaller? >> i believe you will see a vocal role adopted fairly soon. rule adopted fairly soon. i think there will be a very solid rural. i do not think it will harm what goes on. we talk about international. the british are doing something very similar. i think that one will work. we didake even smaller,

the regulators the power to reduce banks if they believe anyone financial institution is becoming a problem, even by making them shrink in size or reducing a function. we do see them in principle. points out one of the reasons the banks got bigger is we spent two years asking bank of america and wells fargo and jpmorgan, we you please buy this think? to some extent, they have a legitimate complaint. -- to some extent, they have a legitimate complaint. we did pressure them to buy jpmorgan chase. i do not think it is a problem. one answer is too much political pressure. anyone who thinks the banks have nott of clinical clout did watch legislation. on every issue where there was a

dispute between smaller banks and big banks, the smaller banks one. -- won. we changed to assessment. cfp be.l banks get the we increase the deposit insurance from 100 to $250. i know people have concern about weakness in general, but i am not persuaded the size of the banks alone is the problem. >> i agree with barney. my focus right now is on other issues. that is not to say there are not issues with the banks. the bigger and more complicated the organization is, the harder it is to run. but i take the view there has been so much focus on this that the ultimate defenses capital and the quiddity, and i am all

new federal's. i think that is a good starting point. incorporates that come or requires the largest institutions have that. -- dodd-frank. i am trying to call attention to shadow banking, fannie and freddie. there is so much more -- >> no one has told me, and i have asked them, how big should they be? if you worry about too big to fail, lehman brothers was the cause of the problem. what is the size about which they become -- >> an interconnectedness and is one of the real issues. that is why i have said innovation is great almost too much you can have innovation in finance, my judgment. complexity, that is all why i am

for a there is too much complexity hitting the banks with much higher capital requirements against the complex instruments, i am pleased dodd-frank requires them to be traded on clearing houses. i think there is a lot that has been done. i am not discounting it, but i want to learn our lessons and clean up messes. it withnk we will leave that. mr. frank and mr. paulson, thank you for your time. [applause] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] http://twitter.com/cspanwj several live events to tell you about. steny hoyer will be a politico to talk about the debt ceiling debate. you can see the conversation on c-span three.

lew speaks of the economic club of washington. later, the national press club hosts republican governor mary fallin of oklahoma. in a few moments, today's headlines, plus your calls and tweets live on " washington journal." the house will be in session for legislative business at noon. today's agenda includes a debate on forest management. in about 45 minutes we will discuss the middle east reaction to the situation in syria. eastern, susan glasser, abaco -- editor of

"politico" magazine will talk about the role of the united nations regarding syria, and we will also look at the role of the federal reserve and who might you place chairman bernanke, and our guest is nela richardson, senior economist at bloomberg government. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2013] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] is tuesday, september 17, 2013. washington, d.c., waking up to flags at half staff a day after a shooting spree by a lone gunman left a dozen people dead at the navy's oldest sure facility about a mile from the u.s. capitol. while the investigation continues into a possible motive, secretary of -- the secretary defense chuck hagel landstuhl a a wreath at the u.s. navy memorial in the sea to honor the victims of the washington navy yard shooting. as it takes place today, the latest mass shooting is