i was going to ask to general berkeley as a relates to overall priorities when it comes to acquisition and procurement, but also from a development standpoint. i will just defer to the two of you to determine who is best to answer my next question. the i tap program was a key priority for the army. i know you mentioned in your written testimony that the program would be placed at risk. can you elaborate on that as to whether it remains a priority and to what extent the sequester may impact the army acquisition strategy of maintaining competition to reduce the risk and cost? program is a very important program for the army as it offers key capabilities

that we normally don't have heard namely 25% fuel efficiency as an example. we very much would like to have competition on all of our programs. continues,estration it's compounding effects, we may be forced to down select earlier than we would like. that is the risk of sequestration, ok? i would like to give an example that is exactly what had happened on jack comes program. joint air to ground missile it $30 million mark and then a $69 sequestration on top of that. it is not that we wanted to make the cut, but we were forced to cousin budget shortfall. general posten would you like to add? >> it is critical not only because as you say we have fuel savings, 25% there. it also has a maintenance savings.

it is key to our developmental programs in the future. we are working to get that in the current platforms of and apache but it is also tied to our joint multirole aircraft. sequestration places this program at risk of having to do it early down select which will, appearsntinue -- and it that we will for several years in this environment -- that program will not only do an early down select, it could put the entire program at risk because it is tied to other programs. all this links together. also election about the impact on modern aviation and how that is going to impact the army aviation center of excellence in fort rucker. sequesterlates to the . >> yes, ma'am. rudd were isfort

in your district -- fort rucker is in your district. already has had an impact at fort rucker. art rucker was working around 1400 student throughput for the aviation force this past year they have dropped that down below 1200 heard we're probably looking to go below a thousand students, simply because of the cost rate trade we are already at -- we worked very hard for a three-year. to get the student down to a manageable level. we are now back over 500 students in the back load, which is about a two-year problem to get that back. it will only continue to grow as a move forward. from the training aspect, that also has an impact. the other part of that is, we start looking at radiation portfolio modernization for graham. the training helicopter at fort rucker was one of those aircraft we were looking at having to replace because of the age of that. that again will be part of our

look at the future to determine what we can afford and if we still will be able to incorporate that into our future buys and programs. quickly, i think this is the point that we want to emphasize. the sequester to for these very reasons. let's talk about how those numbers and the decrease in training of these aviation, the air forcein and army affects our readiness and ability to do what we need to do. if you could quickly comment on it is what keeps me up at night. >> is in the army, navy, air force. all of our pilots -- we are restricting all of their flight hours. we focusing on this combat aviation brigade that are getting ready to deploy back in afghanistan. those that are coming home we have reduced their flight hours

to where they not even at the proficient level. maintainingly currency levels. a're not able to maintain level of currency because of the flight hour restrictions we are placing on those units that are not out of the war fight or not categorized as next into the war fight. huge impact on the training readiness of those units. >> again, my time is expired, but i know it affects every person here in your position. it is something that we absolutely have to address, not justin's committee, but as a congress, because this hearing today, mr. chairman, demonstrates exactly where we are going to be when we enter year two. thank you all for being here today and iq for your service. my ranking go to member for questions, i want to note that our military officers will be given a chance to give a closing. we have had opening from our

secretaries and then after their closing comments if any of the secretaries have additional thoughts they would like to add to the record you will be given that opportunity. hopefully our questions will be gerard did and elicit the type of information you want to give. you will have opportunity at the end. >> thank you, chairman. ats up many is taking a look the implementation of sequestration for the year 2013. in the primary finding they "no weapon systems program for canceled and no programs reported canceling or severely changing program contracts. they said osd officials agreed with this assessment. so, the kind of contradicts with the dod and industry people were telling us would have sequestration. we were told that the impacts would be significant, dramatic, immediate third instead, it appears that through a combination of unused fonts and

reprogramming and delaying of elements and reducing quantities are getting better rises as we basically35, that we avoided this after fiscal year 2013. i first question is -- and you can just say yes or no to this -- is do you agree with the assessment by gao that no weapon program for canceled and no programs reported canceling or severely changing the graham contracts? and we will start the lady. >> i wish that every program is impacted and the budget year 2013 and would sequestration head, we were able to use prior year to absorb some of the impact. frankly, the department of navy had to push a significant amount of that in a into the out years words of impact is still staring at us across the board in the same programs. you cancel any? no hurried our

priority was that you cancel you more harm over and above what sequestration cost. some picturesith tactilely. what you didn't see was an ability of the services to use on obligated investment funds. those funds were earmarked for investmentfor each that we still have to reconcile, either throughout -- we still have to pay those bills. we were able to make good decisions in the near term with only six months in the fiscal year to avoid canceling programs. the services are always looking for an opportunity for reversibility. the the hope that inflexibility of the sequester could be remedied by congress. >> ma'am, i agree with my mates

here. i will tell you that every program we have a number in core was affect it, either by quantity are scheduled. in 13 think the sequester has set the conditions to cancel programs in 14, depending on the budget. >> i'm asking about the report itself, because nothing was canceled, no programs were reported canceling and not severely changing program contracts, is that correct or not? >> i am at a loss, because i've not read the report and i don't know what the definition of severe it is. anyn't know if they talk to of the service components at all. >> thank you, general david >> that could be corrected with the gao report says. the way it works is the

cancellation has started delay. the decision has not been made, but the major air force program for space situation awareness has been put on hold. contractors were told to stop work on that program about september 15. is it cancel? no. >> that is what we're having this hearing about. we want the truth, here. comments you your have not had an opportunity to fully review the report. some of you haven't even seen it, correct? has anyone on the panel seen that report? let's provide you with that report. >> so the air force, you stated previously that it would do whatever it takes to protect your top three acquisition f-35, the kc-46

and the long-range bomber. assuming you would get reprogramming authority in a timely manner which this committee some controls, do you think you could protect his programs fully in fiscal year 2014? >> i will give an answer for that to begin with, up to three programs the two in general that i think that the biggest risk regardless of the scenario our f-35 as well as the kc-46. the reason is quite simple. thatrs be, the dollars in and pick up production much later. it is just misfortunate in case of that row graham. earlier, as i said without doing any release, we are at risk of about 45 airplanes this next year. we are not good to have the opportunity, unfortunately, to take advantage of another great negotiation to buy them back. we just won't have that in 14. it is just the way it works. certainlyflexibility,

that can be mitigated to some extent. i can't claim that all their pains we brought back. f-35he problem with the which you really need to pay attention to, which is beyond 14, is finishing the development program, that is beginning to block it with new software. roughly 17 and in 18. have three f as critical. anything we have to do that will grant us from incrementing the program is bad. can we protect it? i am hopeful we could, depending on how much flexibility. in the case of the tanker, if we are not giving stability and it comes out to be a 13.5% public said? is a problem. the tanker is of the state rice contracts with the government has a very good arrangement with . that was a lot of excellent work and a lot of difficult lessons

learned. >> if you could reprogram to save your top three, do you think you could do it? likely saveould those two that i'm worried about with the following caveat. what that means for every other -- everys it means wallop, the numbers should the other programs somewhat close to 30%. >> what you think of you the big programs at the father wayside -- >> this is where we get to the discussion of everything being on the table. the types of dollars that one inld have to find our only the large platform programs. that is really get into discussions of looking at the vested sure and discussions of not starting new programs. if you look at the air force plan and say you see new programs that we are starting, i assume that's at risk. so it is all on the table. >> a quick question on that. i am very interested in this

situation, obviously. he talked about developments to the development of the software with f-35 or visit because of conference? no, that is separate from con current. >> yes or no with respect to con current? we did this and we are building it in a different manner, so for the future i need to know, or running into problems? are you worried about development of software because merging into the same time? >> i would say that can france is not driving that issue at all. >> ok. the last question i have has to do with the army. so, the testimony lays out a range of programs that are to be cut because of sequestration including helicopters, armored vehicles and communication equipment.

think that is probably unacceptable, but i'm thinking about the fact that i keep reading articles all over defense monthlies and dailies and weeklies were press reports keep telling us that the active- duty army will be down to 420 by 2019. that's a pretty -- that's a small army there may have today. it is done fairly quickly. if in fact his guys who brought reporter getting this information or my generals and from others who are in the know, maybe from some of us, given this rapid decline in force structure, how is the army protected its procurement requirements and to your comments today take into account the reduction that people are projecting for the army? first of all, we are starting 570,000h an army of

we're going to an army of 490,000 by fy 17. secretary and chief testified that was a level we're going to. under sequestration we know that we cannot support an army. not only camera not afford to pay for it, we can afford to train it and we can't afford to quit that the sequestration. atthe 490 is forcibly are were looking at the impacts of sequestration and where we will have to take the army down to. there are numbers that range anywhere from the hundred 80 in the ac back to about 84 50 number. our chief and secretary attacked cap about those different scenarios based on how we look at the plans, how we balance between readiness, we balance between modernization and then where we will end up being. there's still a lot of space here to make -- so, refresh my memory. before we get into the two land wars of afghanistan and iraq, what was the actual number in

the army. 482,000. >> so you are thinking you would come down to 497 even more than before you got into two major wars. these numbers have to do with the fact that the army is actually taking a look at sequestration and other budget issues to bring it down even further. >> i would say that osd is looking at sequestration in tax. as a spread that services, then we are all coming back to lay out how we're going to address sequestration cuts are being given to the services and is with the army is, we are about people. we are a land force. budget is 40% of the -- goes against paying the bill for the manpower, then that is part of our equation to get to where we need to go. we are going to have to take for

structure down thirdly, we're going? no. i would also that it is not only just active components. it is all components. it is active components, national guard and reserve a seat portion of that. we all have a choice, but to do that all components it down. intowe have taken that account as we are looking at all these different programs, changing the quantities advise and modernization impact. at different levels of where we will be and how that will result in changing some of those numbers. thank you, mr. chairman. the cuts because of the sequester and everything else, i have heard a few of the comments , the significant impacts and other things. we have had other hearings. heard some of us

very startling information, lisa hearings i was at, which basically said we were not combat ready to meet our current military contingencies. and our treaty obligations. i might be paraphrasing that incorrectly. but i know that specific to alln was addressed the different armed services. i think the chair was there, so you can correct if my memory fails me the question i'm leading up to, what you have aid here it almost leads to permanent c4, or a permanent declaration that each one of our armed services will not be combat ready in perhaps the near

future, 10 years? is very scary. comment one you to what i was saying because a lot of the things the sequester is a person understand. wherenderstand something our armed forces are not prepared for combat ready to go to war or a military situation where young men and young women can die. resonates, at least in my opinion, at least to me, at least in my district. you can kind of comment on where i'm going with this because obviously i'm not a big fan of the sequester. in regards to dear dear national security. walser, i can break it down

into a couple of categories. first on the nature of the equipment and you run them from the cr impact to the sequestration impacts and in the future budget impact. we are putting soldiers at risk just because of the new cer. starte of that, we can that. there's no new start. cr has an impact of providing something that we currently won't start for soldiers are in the fight now. the delays that result from this , the doubletree hall protect against iv interest to get that third striker organization so we can get into the theater for the last part of the fight to protect soldiers. again on the cocom side, the patriot missiles will have four will four units that we send.

every talked about the i cap engine during that or it is all contradicts dust reducing some programs that i'm trying to attach to the future programs would deal with our network modernization. as we lose some of our capabilities, we're going to slow that down. we were going to filter can brigade combat teams a year. we're now fielding only to those combat teams going into either so that has a training impact. , i knowegistry side that the secretary and chief army of the army had testified food those that are going out the door or the ones i retrained to the fullest level, those are the only ones that are getting international training centers. all of the brigade, and teams are not getting that opportunity because we don't have the money to send them in. forward,ntinue to look -- some of those that came on

afterward were continue to -- >> isown to feed part of parcel similar to chairman turner's question and i would like answered in two parts. in the two takeaways are the terms uncertainty and inflexibility. is the budget environment that we're in right now. the uncertainty of not knowing when we're going to have a budget or what that budget is going to be. ask, toy, we are to provide for presidents with capable ships to do our nations business. to do that, we have to plan. we have to plan a strategy, a

budget we have to plan for aviation and ship depot me. we have to train our people and we have to have a plan for that. we also have to have our maintenance schedules. with the uncertainty that is deceptive. when it comes to the planning. the inflexibility that we see with the budget environment that we're in right now, we have already seen what happened in 13. and when we look at 14, the combination of a continuing resolution in the sequester is going to impact our training. is going to reduce the number of in 13, -- and 14 it is going to be more than twice, half of our carrier air wings are going to be introduced training.

those that are is in your sins and. this is starting to impact our ability to search. himsequester and 14 will packed procurements and every facet of the navy because it's inflexible. so when you take that inflexibility and you stretch it out for 10 years, would you have is a navy that is less and less capable of providing the server that were used to. it is a navy that is increasingly challenged to have the readiness that we need for the non-deployed units. it is a navy that is challenged when it comes to billing the missions of a defense strategic guidance. specifically to project power.

to deter -- to provide support that we need for counterterrorism in irregular warfare. >> thank you. i turned to mr. winston. argument by noting the issue of language that we use with respect to the restriction. sequestration,ng people who are discussing it want generally obsessed cursor that the restriction can be removed from the department of defense. burnett not saying increase spending. the other issue is that stability or inflexibility. there are to ask next to sequestration and i just asked you in your closing comments to address this after mr. winston of another's good question. the bottom line number on the sequestration number is not right. if we see flexibility was needed, your stock with the lower number is going to cause you to be incapable of achieving your goals.

as a president structured sequential -- sequestration it was supposed to be an irrational program. it been was to not have a difficult experience. want, in your very clear statements of its effects being damaging because of inflexibility, i don't want able to conclude that the answer is we will just provide flexibility and we don't have to apply different amounts of dollars. i notice expensive and i know we had played out. >> thank you mr. chairman. i appreciate you being here and all that you do. could have reservist been in 15 years, a year in iraq. here. i came there are places we can make cuts. there things we can cut out trade we can reprioritize.

i have a grave concern about our readiness at this point. i have seen the numbers at least on the army side the projections will look like. clearly it is not a force that is ready to take on the problems of the world. ,hat we have seen recently we've cut the military and then deploy them. going into libya and we are talking about sending some to syria. his is a combination that can't go on. i still serve as a surgeon at walter reed. i can tell you that i know firsthand by the people i see coming through that we are still at war right now. >> we're asking way too much. believer could i have told veterans and you can appreciate this they have said i have served but not during the war. >> i told them if you were not there we would never have these. a strongo maintain

deterrent force in this country whether we are at war are not heard there should be based like that we maintain, always, and have the ability to ramp it up when we need to. and do it quickly. the industry to be able to turn on and off. we can't expect our personnel to be able to turn it on and off. when i look at what we're doing personnel,cutting you're going to people going on unemployment and i know that comes out of your budgets ultimately. .e are paying them anyway so it is really seen a trend that we are. andt on these committees see everyone is concerned and i know you have to testify in front of other people. i know you meet with the senate and hopefully the administration. , isally just want to ask anyone who doesn't get it yet though you find opposition to what you are saying when you say we are ready ipo is anyone

saying back to oh yes you are, you're ok, you're going to be fine with what you've got very i am wondering why we are getting this taken care of. if anyone would want, and that i would appreciate it. >> congressman, i have never heard anyone say that sequestration has had a positive effect on service readiness across the board. another negative impact on the air force. i will go back to ranking member sanchez's question about the gao report one of the key places 2013, 31, coded squadrons in the air force stood down for a significant amount of time.

were additional squadrons reduced to takeoff off and landing currency only. they regroup flying at minimum rates, just as with the other services we deferred critical maintenance on our aging platforms in order to make sure we could pay the bills and continue with our investment accounts. with less impact on our investment accounts them he would've had if we didn't go to the redness account. from an air force perspective, we were not ready in 13, it drives a readiness degradation into 14. under sequestration we will not recover our readiness so we are >>dy to fight tonight very >> world in preparing those we aboutnto the fight it out

time and brigade level of proficiency, we are and are going down to the to level, sometimes down to the squad level. sequestration, to make it onto the individual cruet squad level, which is the lowest level of training we have ever been. when i talk about and follow up to that, i talk about a deterrent force. basically what you're saying is we really don't have one right now. the ones that are trained and ready to go are the ones that are going. without the correct? this is on us, and i yield back >> mr. mcintyre?

two questions into different areas. come in a little late because of some of the situation. everything is happening today now that we back on a regular schedule. i want to clarify what is on the f 35. on -- theimates based marine corps analysis the cost for flying the f 30 free coins. it achieves a saving of $12.3 billion over the next five decades. i guess my question to the three services that have the f-35 is that you feel like the initial operation capabilities as well as lifecycle for your respective 35, in what way will that be impacted by the sequestration.

? >> first, the data that you just described in terms of costs reflect the positive trend of .he program as we enter the in service. .f the program we are seeing objectives come down in all areas and is regarded as good. those dates were set with a clear understanding of what the and capabilities are to report those ioc's. , the marine corps and the from 2015 with

plot to be and in 2000 and 18 have a good track on those, we understand capability will deliver. equally and more important is maintaining the path that goes beyond this initial capabilities through the continued development of the program. right now, after much great ,ffort on the part of program we are seeing the positive returns that we've been yearning for through a long program. i would like to add that the sequester pressurized we remain we know that unchecked and averted sequester will remove an f 35 ce from the u.s. navy.

sequester it is, when i is determined flexible, i mean that sequester applies a percentage to a program prospector activity. as you those percentages case of for the navy is a 14% impact on the program. that puts pressure and facilities into the development and ultimately puts at risk our ability to get to ioc in 2018. i know a lot of data that we have is from the f 35 the. we are still on track. we note that the sequester and

14 will take a bailout. we still think we can get to our twice 17 ioc and the deployment of that aircraft where it needs the. at and related to the cost to operate it posted the flying our cost of a do due diligence and we get the money and energy and engineers, cost to operate will come down. a sequester, i fear if we continue on that path will reduce his efforts and i hate to see us bottom out on the cost to operate those aircraft bird i would like to -- we need to operate the aircraft of the most of way. just a quick comment to say that to air force is trying

-- thank you, mr. chairman. -- i amurn up the talking about multiyear procurement. i am a navy pilot i treated. i float e2 hawkeyes and f-18s and we worked hard to get multiyear procurement of the e2 d. that it was critically important for our carriers. my concern is that i have heard testimony from admiral green at that because of the sequester we are in a situation where we're going to have to give up any to hawkeye in the procurement is the and the reason cost per unit is going to be higher if we can't do multi-year proof entertainment.

that there will be are a number of concerns. we are in the car. the cost per unit is going to be higher than it otherwise would the. is the problem for the taxpayers . beyond that we have an industrial base is going to enter into long-term contracts for multiyear procurement and now there is a political risk. the on just the technical risk. watch.stack late >> yes sir, there are two parts to this. d is a waiting passage of the defense authorization act. it is supported by both houses but we cannot move forward without that authorization. to have as, you need

bill that provides for the 2-d multiyear. , when we put together a multitier construct through the to date. aircraft, that bought the requirement for substantial savings that goes with the verification. when you look at the impact of sequestration, in the first year of a multiyear were you at risk of losing one of the first five aircraft. then the potential over the five years of can and you'd see a station. now you have this destabilizing isact program plan that trying to bring stability and the affordability that comes with that. hold onto trying to is the stability that the foriyear provides, not just the affordability gives us but

also for the industrial base. we are trying to do that in the face of the storm called sequestration. industry asng with we negotiate this multiyear wait upon congress to pass it but the authorization. , we haveave to do is to do this in such a fashion that if downstream there is another ship in terms of the theet, we will plan for the -- if there is a teutonic shift in the budget, then that may well impact the program. we have to construct this so we don't lose the savings it for the aircraft that we eventually buy. >> as far as contracts, would there be cancellation of contracts because of a short- term interested in seeing what is going on the summer? >> i think we have seven

multiyear is on the books right now. mv of them, for example is a 22. as an ongoing multiyear. sequestration in 2014 threatens three of the aircraft in that budget year. that would break the terms of that multiyear contract. get across that we -- they are core to our total plan. regardless of what comes out of the congress in terms of areopriations and 2014, we going to continue to work within industry to hold together the goodness of the multi-you're going forward and for each of the multiyear's we're staring at, we're going to go down that same path. >> we think about the future of multiyear contracts, would it seem reasonable that industry would go into the price of their products. the risk that multiyear attracts

maybe worth their salt. we would benefit as much from future multiyear contracts. is that a fair substance. , frankly, the list is on the government part currently signed up to that multiyear. we made a commitment to a certain quantity over number of years. now, when industry provides back as can commission ceiling. they canceled at any point in the program, we understand what our liability is the association -- with associated to interior design. off some part of the contract, then we are negotiation. that negotiation at the i lateral negotiation will ultimately arrive at what is fair and reasonable for both hearties. back. i yield back,

thank you. >> i appreciate your comments today including your written statements. each of you, you have very complex issues to manage. only are of you, not you anchored in the present, you are seeing the future. you see what we need to do and what is possible and feeling what our options are. as we go to new threats. that is why think your statements are so important trade is not about what is happening here tomorrow, is what is happening in the future as a result of these. want to give each of the military officers a opportunity to add to their comments. anything that they believe they would like to conclude with on the record and then i will offer that to the secretary of state.

>> i would like to thank you for the opportunity to present the statement today and answer your questions. the army's leadership understands the gravity of our nation's current the school situation. as the army g-8, i must allocate resources that ounce manpower, readiness and equipping for army to me the strategic artists and a defense budget party. however, the combined effects of the continued resolutions and a magnitude and flexible agency street is our the ability to only are of that tv guide. daniel can is in, delaying starts, introducing new oddities and in short order having of car costs and ultimately postponed -- if the army operates under a full cr and f- 14, we would be forced to encounter new programs.

we would also delay the villain of the stocker doubled the halls to the third stryker brigade combat team. we would reduce combat and commanders patriot missiles loaded. ishe army chief of staff recently testified about sequestration, the army cannot reduce its -- readiness and modernization will take the brunt of cuts through fy 17. the cuts result in significantly degraded readiness and extensive modernization shortfalls in the near-term. to fy 23, the --y may through a balance try to meet those requirements that are laid upon us by our nation. we will do that by paying for structure and instrument, and will harm the stability. sequestration levels continued, they would compound the

community effects of a cr. -- itnts enclosed would would reduce our patchy helicopter procurement by 50%, which is equivalent to one attack battalion. it was all the procurement of the war fighter information network. that would have an impact on 50 brigade combat teams. without relief from sequestration in the future, we would be required to take increasingly significant actions by ending, restructuring or delaying about 100 acquisition programs. wouldtration levels result in decreased capabilities for the soldiers and every area from a combat vehicles to aviation era missile defense. in the end we decided to be good stewards of taxpayer dollars. while balancing the existing resources we have to meet the defense strategic guidelines. the combined effect of crs and sequestration undermine these endeavors. today thatd cost resulted in inefficient and wasteful use of taxpayer dollars

and an undersized less capable force in the future. we urge congress to provide fiscal stability and predictability. itt if we must offer under -- doing so would help us mitigate some of these affect. , thank you for unwavering support of men and women in the united states army. on civilians and families heard i appreciate the opportunity to testify today. >> chairman itner, numbers of committee, has been an honor to be able to be here before you today. requests 14 budget need strategic guidance. it will enable us to continue to rebalance our efforts towards

the asia-pacific rebalance, supports are partners in the middle east and focuses our lifts.e in key strategic it also enables us to meet highest priority capability to man's of the geographic commanders. to be frank. sequestration combined with the continued resolution in fiscal year 14 will be very hard on our navy. two -- we will have a larger reduction than we did .n fiscal year 14 in fiscal year 14 we don't have the priority assets and we can use to mitigate the impact as we did before. ability tove the just differ, carryover bills into the future years, like we did in the past are these are

going to start coming unbound. sequestration and continuing resolution will reduce our readiness in the near-term and it exacerbates program reductions that are required that under the current law. we have been compelled to cancel or defer maintenance and invested tens. continues to find a fiscal balance, the navy is endeavoring to ensure that the near-term readiness in the future were biting capabilities are probably balanced. it is important that we establish and pursue a bland for to develop a deliberate nature on how we go about finding fiscal certainty. we are committed to an efficient

use of the american taxpayer dollars. the reduction of this magnitude take time to implement. it takes time to read the savings. they also need to be done very carefully and strategically. as i previously testified to very congress. i feel like the most serious impact of sequestration in the continuing resolution is uncertainty. it is imperative that we have a predictable budget and associated authorities. need.ity, that is what we it will enable us to bland and develop and execute a strategy to guide their effort sustain the appropriate readiness for today's navy. while building a fleet for the future that is able to deliver most important presence and capabilities that our war fighters. just a fewied minutes ago, the role of the navy is to operate forward and

to be ready with a trained and capable force. to do that, we have to plan. we have to plan a strategy that goes beyond. aviation and ship building glance. operations glance, maintenance schedules we need sailors are trained and ready to operator ships and aircraft. when they're needed and where they're needed. sequestration and the budget uncertainty and immensely different disruptive nature of the combination impacts our ability to plan as physically change. it disrupts our ability to operate. he saw that in fiscal year 13. it then impacts the way that we're going to operate in the next fiscal year. , it disruptsantly

a dedicated killers, civilians and their families, because of all the answer to that is now the challenging art of everyday life. we understand what our responsibilities are. we also understand that this is something that we need to work through together. togetherthat we can do and stability back into the budget process, at the end the automatic and inflexible sequester the bca caps would not only be appreciated, but would be embraced by the 634,000 navy sailors and civilians that are operating around the globe detecting this nation. thank you for the opportunity to testify and a half of the united states navy.

>> we have about 10 more minutes. .erald walters i'm going to ask of can keep your comments relatively leave -- relatively brief. ofhere, i will of the people -- is a piece of paper away here. thank you for the opportunity to testify today. little over a month ago, the marine corps is the nation's expeditionary force in readiness. our nations heads against uncertain to win with forces to swiftly despond to crisis and -- we mitigates the risk inherent in an uncertain world while being ready to respond to today's crisis with today's force today. our ability to mitigate these risks is compromised by our inability to get a budget approved to get facilities and

some imagine now. our race is strictly allted to see, sequester impacts we face on readiness today will have riemer and secondary effects while it primary effects on short-term range will begin to be observable and 54 the peer longer-term effects will be even more devastating. we are consuming tomorrow seed corn today to feed our requirements for readiness today. and willtion has continue to have a significant negative impact on our civilian workforce. our civilians play a critical role in the acquisition process financial management ground, equipment maintenance, installation support services. all that and all our family yearrt programs in fiscal

13 hours civilian workforce took a 60 furlough and started this on furlough. money was not the reason they chose to work for the ring core. they chose to work for public service and to serve their fellow civilians. to dows public service their part in making united states at this country in the world trade for don't value their contributions, many which is to find a line of work elsewhere. i thank you for this opportunity to share my thoughts. less flexible-- and less ready to meet our nation's current military allegations. more importantly, it will make it very difficult for us to prepare to meet the challenges we will face in the future.

erosion in readiness will carry far greater consequences. means we may get there in time. means are less one. to put ourrespond invaluable men and women are going to harm's way at greater risk. it's a put, a sequestration is fully implemented over the course of the next 10 years. the air force will not be ready to fight tonight. it will be unprepared to meet tomorrow's challenges. the air force will be forced to cut thousands of total for sermon and hundreds of platforms. we will focus on the vestiges of entire fleets of aging and costly platforms and less survivable and heavily defended airspace. we don't want to do this.

but the bottom line is sequestration will need a smaller force,. >> any of the secretaries have any in else to add to that. >> the combined effect is devastating. we are reaching a historical low in research development and ,cquisition in telling dion which will continue to do greater keep the these months the budgets that in stability without sequestration. we need to have the ability to ,lan without cr sequestration furloughs and government shutdowns. thank you for the opportunity to testify. thank you for your unwavering support of our soldiers. briefly, congress and the department of response.

have percent the defense strategic guidance as a document . we have submitted the president's budget request as a determination of the funding we believe is necessary to meet the defense strategic guidance. in 2013 and again the four separate committees in 2014, that was fully supported by the congress. and yet. the invisible hand of sequestration from that head of -- department of the navy that results in a small and navy, small marine corps, less presence, less ability to meet with defense strategic guidance.

>> thank you chairman turner and thank you for your subcommittees work. needld like to add that we help in getting a readiness back. we need to get stability so we can do >> the title of this hearing was impact on modernization. iscan say the conclusion sequestration is bad and getting worse. it.fully, we will offset all members of the armed services committee are proud to get it lifted. there are offset elsewhere in the budget. sequestration will not have these devastating impacts on the department of defense. thank you all for what you do. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2013] a talk about the role of budget cuts. it is about an hour.

>> there should be a natural continuation of the themes that were highlighted in the last conversation. we are joined by people who serve on the board of directors. a conversation about how to sustain and strengthen america's defense capabilities. i thank the gentleman who will introduce and moderate our speakers. brad is the editor of armed forces journal. it has been published since 1863. congratulations to them. he has written extensively about the u.s. navy. bradley if you will? >> well, we live in interesting times. we have left iraq. we are drawing down in afghanistan.

we are still pursuing al qaeda and similar groups. syria is burning. china is rising. it has not settled whether it is rival or partner. climate change is altering the world. globalization has entwined as productively and made us more brittle. our communications web allows the spread of violent ideas and unimaginable speed. the general who runs the development center put it this way. the momentum of human interaction is increasing exponentially. the security environment is changing. our military services which have spent much of the past decade relearning the lessons of counterinsurgency and expanding

upon them are trying to figure out what they should be 5, 10, 20 years from now. the strategy side is just half of it. after a decade in which military funds were all but limitless, budgets are down again. there has been a buildup in which we did not recapitalize our arsenal. the u.s. has emerged from a decade of war with fewer aircraft, fewer ships, thousands of combat vehicles now abandoned in foreign lands. instead of getting larger, our military has become smaller, older and more expensive. no longer can the military do it all. advancing our national ambitions with our defense budget requires serious prioritization or perhaps innovation. do we sacrifice near-term capacity to build long-term capability? do we rely on allies and partners to a degree once thought unimaginable? during his last few months in office, robert gates who led the way in making the first round of cuts was known to say, tell me what we are not going to do anymore.

what defense do we need? what defense can we afford? we won a strategy-driven, resource-informed solution. there is another twist to this. a budget process has gone from cumbersome to counterproductive to slightly insane. we will talk about that a little bit later on. you could not ask for a better panel to help us figure this all out. the gentleman to my right needs no introduction and yet i am a slave to orthodoxy so i will offer one. his term as deputy secretary of defense under bill clinton cap a quarter-century of government service that included posts such as under secretary of the air force. before that he was on congressional staff holding various positions including staff director for the house armed services committee.

after leaving government service, he ran boeing's office for several years. currently he is senior vice president for national security at the center for american progress here in washington. he will speak for five minutes. >> thank you for the invitation. i thank the sponsors for the chance to come here and participate. this is a very important discussion in terms of how to be thinking about the defense budget, how to look ahead. we are in one of those times where we need to recalibrate. a period dominated by iraq and afghanistan is coming to an end. we still have combat troops in afghanistan. their exit in 2014 is something that we have to have a focus on. moving beyond that, we have got the asia-pacific at the center of global commerce, the center

of the recovery from the economic slowdown. a series of unusual economic alliances. yet, the military alliances and strategically, the security of asia still revolve around the united states. we have a middle east that is as complicated as ever. including a civil war in syria. preliminary diplomacy in dealing with iran but unease among gulf neighbors. the perennial question of the west bank and the palestinians and their status. all of those issues, as critical as they are were in the middle of the most complicated and chaotic budget process that i think our national security has seen since the end of world war ii. that is a huge period with lots

of -- dod is the most sophisticated of the government agencies. it works also something called the future years defense budget. 5, 6 years in the making long- range decisions that the secretaries look at. they were able to do it in a strategic environment and set the direction for budget alterations and execute them across a decade. now, we have gone from the period of the five-year defense plan to continuing resolutions which were for a while six months. now there are four months in duration. add to that the sequester which is the product of the debt ceiling compromise two years ago. to quote leon panetta as he was

the parting as secretary of defense, he said we can no longer go from budget crisis to budget crisis. he said this is not a game. that coming from a secretary of defense who had unique skills, but perhaps our shrewdest budget expert in the government. figuring out a path forward in terms of how to create budget stability -- one last comment, if we look at the sequester, that is $1 trillion worth of cuts off of 10 years. the president has put an alternative number down that is a little bit more than $500 billion over 10 years. there is a huge gap between how congress sees the future defense budget and how the president does. in terms of the magnitude. a very dynamic and challenging time. the rest of the world will not stop. >> another man who needs no introduction but i will deliver

one anyway. he is a former pentagon comptroller. among his other posts have been deputy undersecretary of planning and resources. from 2002 to 2004, he worked in afghanistan. earlier, he was a defense and foreign policy analyst. after leaving government service, he became senior vice president of booz allen hamilton holding he is a senior fellow, senior adviser. he chairs the national intelligence council. he is a member of the commission on wartime contracting afghanistan. i think you get the idea. without further ado.

>> thanks for a much, brad. full disclosure, eric edelman and i co-authored an op-ed not long ago. rudy and i have been on radio a while back. what you're going to hear, you're going to hear shades of difference, but for the last 60 years there has been a fundamental consensus about the united states strategy which is forward. it involves across the board deterrence. it involves relatively stable budget. there is so much uncertainty now. because there is, we tend to be overly pessimistic. there is always going to be uncertainty about where we fight. other than world war ii, korea

was unpredictable, one could argue about vietnam. we got into it far more than we thought. just about every war we have fought, they were not things we expected to fight. we can't be certain about what kinds of tools we are going to use. you have to be very careful about what you throw out of the toolbox. we have become certain in a different way about what some people call multipolarity. they keep talking about the brics, the chinese, the russians, the indians, the brazilians and maybe the south africans. every one of those countries is having economic problems now. there is no indication that there are going to get out of those problems anytime soon. their gdp's have leveled off.

their populations arrested. that kind of prediction, that somehow the united states will be less powerful because others are becoming more powerful, i am not sure it holds water. to the contrary, this goes to some of the budget concerns we have got. i don't believe the issue is dealing with a ten-year sequester. i don't think anybody believes that. one of the reasons that i don't is because within five years, we are supposedly going to have a different energy profile. that means there is going to be a lot more in the way of taxes coming into the government. a lot more revenue. therefore, when we think about defense, we have to be careful not to cut those things that will be impossible to replenish was the money starts coming in again. i am not sure we focus sufficiently on that.

right now, all the talk is about, we don't want to fight another man were. guess what, mcarthur said that. we said that after vietnam. bob gates has said it. we don't know if we are not going to fight another man were. nobody knows. we don't know where we are going to fight next. how far you cut back on that is a very open question in my mind. we say, we can rely on special operations and cyber, and space. that is all true. to what extent do we rely? do we need other things? whether we worry about china or iran or any other places, we seem to constantly call upon the carriers and the carrier task forces to do the job for us. is this the right time to be cutting carriers are cutting the navy or cutting the air force which is trying to some extent to work with the navy on these

things? we have got to think differently about what we plan to do today and what we are planning for. i believe what we ought to be doing is thinking about how to get from here to there over the next few years until the money starts to come in again. not because there will be another war but because there will simply be more money there. we have to be very careful not to cut our noses off to spite our faces. that means thinking about efficiencies but not necessarily about things we want to cut. i will give you one final example. i have seen many analysts say we ought to stop spending money on what we used to call national missile defense. we should stop -- it hasn't done

anything for us. yet this very administration which is full of people who have written and said that for decades, as soon as north korea threatened to hit the united states, whether they could do it or not, they decided they wanted to buy more of these missiles. that is my point. once you get rid of something, it is very hard to get it back. let's be awfully cautious. >> for this to my right, ambassador eric edelman. his wide range of jobs has taken him from the ambassadorship of finland and turkey all the way back to the wild of the pentagon and white house. he was undersecretary of defense for the bush administration. eric retired from foreign service in 2009. he is a distinguished fellow at

the center for strategic and budgetary assessment. you get the idea. eric, please. >> thank you very much. as a member of the board, let me say how pleased i am to be on a panel with two great public servants, rudy deleon and dov zakheim, both of whom i have had the pleasure of working with in the past. the title of our panel -- i agree of course with most of what has been said before may. i certainly hope dov is right that we are not dealing with a 10 year sequester. i don't think we should necessarily plan on that. let me start by saying, the title of the panel was, what kind of defense does the united states need? brad added, what kind of defense

can we afford? let me make a couple of comments about both. rudy and i three years ago served together, the congressionally created independent panel to review the department of defense's 2010 defense review. the panel we served on was made up of 20 members. it was bipartisan. it was cochaired by bill perry and steve hadley. it articulated their set of things -- it thought the united states had done and continued to do. among those were defending the homeland, maintaining the freedom of the seas, freedom of transit in air, outer space, freedom to use cyberspace. maintaining a balance of power

in europe and in asia through our alliances as rudy mentioned in his comments and dov did as well. and being able to provide international humanitarian aid when disaster strikes as we have done repeatedly. i would say those are still things that the united states needs to be able to do. it is something that we have done for the last 60 years. we have provided global public goods. i think what the events of the last month and a half -- i would conclude that include both the budgetary issues and the debate over syria, they have begun to call that into question.

they call into question whether the united states is willing to continue to provide these global public funds. president kennedy gave an interview to bill lawrence on abc news after the cuban missile crisis. in that interview, he talked about the fatigue after 17 years of national exertion since the end of world war ii that americans felt at having had to provide global leadership. now we are 60 years on. clearly we are going to have to have that national debate now. the traditional coalition on the hill that existed when rudy was the staff director working for the chairman -- it doesn't exist anymore.

most of the blue dogs have been defeated. they are not in the congress anymore. the republican conference is now deeply divided. the republican congress is deeply divided between those who continue to bleed in the strong international role for the u.s. and those who believe that defense spending is no different than any other category in the budget and it is useful for negotiations over cutting discretionary spending or entitlement spending. i think we really need to have a debate. we have lived in a period where we take it for granted that the u.s. will play this role, that it will have these kinds of treaty alliances. when you look back at our history, if bob were here, he would point out that it is the

exception and not the rule. those of us who have been used to accepting this, the consensus position has gotten -- about having to make the case for it. i think we need to remedy that and make the case for why we are dividing public goods is vital to the nation's security and its future asperity and to that safety of the world in which we live. >> thank you. each of you has mentioned the impact of the current budget situation and the danger it presents to the ability of the u.s. to carry out its foreign policy. it is also striking that we have heard various ways -- it is

difficult to reconstitute what was once lost. there is a problem. it looks like we will not be able to do all of that. how do we get from here to there? how do we get to where we are to where we want to be? do you want to take that up? >> sure. i want to reiterate that i have a piece that -- the tea party, what those folks do not seem to understand -- and it is not isolation. it is ignorance. america's economic security really depends on stability. stability depends on that u.s.'s ability to maintain its military capabilities.

that has been -- these quarterly reports as it were were ever quarter or every four months, you have no idea where the united states will be, it leads people to ask what i have been asking by foreigners from every part of the world -- are you guys crazy? that is not the way to promote stability. to answer your question directly, as long as we have got this madness going on, let's it is sequester ends tomorrow. you still have the cuts. not trivial money. clearly the has to be some things done that has not been done. when eric says we have to take him seriously, he is right. the pentagon has not managed well.

there are efforts to manage it well. we have all done our best to manage it well, at the bottom line is that it is not managed well. too many civil servants and to many contractors. an acquisition that is so bad we have set up a new rapid acquisition system to get around our own acquisition system. there is something wrong with that picture. we have defense agencies that are fortune 500 companies that are managed by -- can you imagine a gs-14 running exxon mobil? or amazon? or frankly, any of the nfl teams except the redskins? [laughter] we have to rethink how we manage budgets. let's face it, even with cuts,

we talk about budgets in access of $400 billion a year. that is a lot of money. it has to be spent well. we have too many the silly these. congress has to do something about brack. we clearly have to get our arms around health care. woody $9 billion a year this year for health care. -- $49 billion a year for this year for health care. the actuaries say we can save billions right now. there are things we can do. what we shouldn't do -- and i will reiterate what i said before it -- you limit capabilities that we will -- should a n contingencyew should a new contingency come that we did not see. -- should a new contingency come that we did not see. >> anyone else want to take it

up? >> most of the debate in washington right now with the sequester and appropriations, what is the timeline for dod going to be? the problem with the duty budget dod budget is impacting the top line obviously. it got very expensive in the last decade. there is concerned it is not sustainable in the coming decades. it has to work and be affordable. it has to bring in great people. we had compensate them fairly and provide for the other

elements in defense. we have got to look at some of the things that are driving costs. on the acquisition side, the google generation needs to get in touch with the boeing and lockheed generation. our platforms are becoming integration of multiple information systems to run the ship, notify of threat, communicate back to headquarters to receive updated intelligence. as platforms become essentially integrated, fighting computers, with pilots or aviators or operators in control, we have got to bring these generations together. one of them wears white shirts like we do and the other wears and may shave every other day, but they are just as smart and

capable. they have lived in these new architectures. we are in a period where the costs of personnel, the cost of the equipment, we cannot continue to maintain those costs drivers. i think the other thing is we need to figure out how we can work across the aisle more regularly on the national security issues. serving in the clinton administration, i had a republican secretary of defense. another was regularly working with the reagan white house i'm a foreign-policy initiatives -- on big foreign-policy initiatives and later with george bush and iraq he freedom and desert storm in 1991. -- iraqi freedom and desert

storm in 1991. the talk in washington has moved from caucus rooms to blogs and talk shows where we focus on the differences rather than our ability to make compromises. it was meant to me get more revenue from the energy supply we are developing domestically it was also mentioned to me we get more revenue from the energy supply we are developing domestically. all of those things require that we work across the out of work with each other. i'm at a loss. maybe the exception was a cold you wore -- cold war years were we had less political fighting. we had to figure how to do

things that are not just simply common sense, it also to do things that will be hard to do. the coalition between -- military reform in 1986. i will be significant thing that has happened in dod and the last 30 years. we have got to figure out how to work together. no top line in the word -- world is going to satisfy requirements if we do not deal with these costs drivers that are there and present every day. >> yeah. to pick up on both what they said, if you look at the big downturns in defense spending after world war ii and korea, in each instance, we were able to generate considerable savings. the size of the strength of the force had grown considerably in each of those conflicts. largely, savings could be derived by cutting the size of the army and the air force, etc. what is different about the current situation is over the last 10 years, the strength has increased that much. the expense of the force has. that does mean that rudy is right.

we have to get at the embedded costs. it is a microcosm in some sense of entitlement problem we face as a nation. it would be difficult to do politically. personnel costs over the last decade has grown at 4.2% and adjusted for inflation. if you project that out, i think in 2024, it becomes the entire dod budget. that will not happen obviously. what highlights is the danger of that crowding out of other defense investments and acquisitions and capabilities that we will need in the future. brad talk to lead a bit -- talked a little bit about how we make sure we have the right mix of capability that we want in the future?

there is a question of who you trade off current capacity for readiness for future capabilities? even if we are looking at only the $500 billion in cuts over 10 years, money has got to come from somewhere. there is a limited number of

places where you can generate that from. secretary hagel and the vice chairman, when they announced the results of the strategic choices in management review back in july, they want to prioritize and emphasize the feature capability and we are willing to take some risk in current capacity. i think in an ideal world, all of us would say that. i would say that there is a bit of a danger. one of the things we have not talked about as a panel put on the table as well is make sure as we do this, as we try to figure out what the feature capability is, number one, all

become victims of the belief that the current program of record is necessarily what we need in 20 years. there is a danger that bureaucratically, elements of the department of defense invested in the current program will defend it and that other promising capabilities and technology will be shortchanged in the process. secondly, i think that we have to make sure we do not end up like written between the wars -- britain between the wars. we will not go to war over the next 10 years. as doug points out, you do not know if you will go to war or not. the brits folder 10 year rule forward every year until they got to the late 1930s and

decided they needed to rearm in the face of german aggressive policy. by the time they got there, they discovered that there per chairman policy of the 1920s and 1930s had essentially destroyed britain's shipbuilding industry. they were unable to engage in the naval buildup they needed to. since 1945, we got used to not talking about or worrying about the impact of defense budgets and cuts. i think we have reached a point where we don't have that anymore. we have to think carefully about what the impact would be certain cuts on the apply chain and the

industrial defense base. -- supply chain and industrial defense base. >> not allowing the sub costs to be a driver of what we do, but it has a was been a driver. the problem is breaking some of these habits that you mentioned. the habit of accepting the program of record as of late it will be. what can be done? >> i will take a shot at that. i will begin with an attic though. when i came to the reagan administration, -- i will begin with an anecdote. when i came to that reagan administration, there had been an election campaign that focused heavily on defense. i remember meeting with a bunch of two star level folks. the army says it does not matter what your secretary says. i never forgot this. it doesn't matter what your secretary says. he have a five-year defense plan. he is stuck. of course, everyone knows that turned out not to be the case. what i am pointing to is leadership.

the only way you can affect change in any institution and especially in institution that is as a hierarchy is the pentagon, is from the top. if the commander-in-chief, secretary of defense wanted to change, there would be change. people will salute and do it. do not expect them to do it by themselves. don't expect it to come from the bottom. that is not the way it works. you cannot change that culture. unless it comes from the top. i have seen over the course of my career -- guys come in and leave each with a new buzzword. the staff would repeat the buzzword for the new person to come in with a new organization

chart and a new buzzword. and nothing changes eerie what you need is not a secretary of defense, but all secretary of defense to be consistent about the changes. if you get that and it does not become a stand to inherit what you're good assessor did and to carry it forward, then you'll get progress. but every time a new person hums in and you toss it all up again and you start all over, you will not get anything done. that is bipartisan. >> we have talked a lot about names in the united states and in the pentagon on capitol hill at the white house. maybe we should turn our view outward for a moment. they talked about thing that has become known as a pivot.

the syrian situation, along with the arab spring, it is not easy to make that pivot. think about that strategy and what it means. >> well, let me say one observation. the u.s. is increasingly become more energy self-sufficient. when i say independent. i do not think we are ever truly going to be energy independent. we are becoming more self- sufficient with shale gas. i think in some quarters, that has made people think that the middle east in which we have been heavily invested in for

much of the last two and half decades is not important anymore or we can relegate it on the secondary position and we can reallocate our attention. there is no doubt that we need to be spending plenty of time and attention on east asia. i have no doubt about that. there is a giant flow of wealth and economic activity to east asia and the u.s. it has a was been a civic power. we have to give more attention to the pacific. i do not think it will be so easy to disengage ourselves from the middle east. even if we end up with no residual force in afghanistan, i think we will still be engaged in their because number one, oil remains a globally traded commodity. the price of oil even if we are not getting a lot of it from the middle east can affect the u.s. economy. it will very much affect our treaty allies in europe and in asia who are still dependent on those sources of hydrocarbon

energy. it will be much more difficult. we wrote an op-ed together about the so-called rebalance. one of the things that worries me about the rebalance is is that there has been a little bit more talk than reality to it in the sense that the rebalance if you look at them military -- were really talking essentially about a rotational deployment of 2500 marines to darwin, australia. ships home ported in singapore an increase in exercises of the type you have been doing with

the philippines. all of which is good, but not sufficient i think to really carry -- assuring them that in an area -- that the u.s. will be able to come to their defense and meet its treaty obligation. on the atlantic to the pacific, it is occurring against the backdrop of overall declining sides of the navy. the net less capability is not too great. i worry a little bit that we should not to be talking a big game about a rebalance, but need to be focused on producing more military assets that can change that calculation of folks in the

western pacific. >> before we start doing the q&a with the audience that is very important, or have to not turn it in view the rebalance of asia. there was a feeling that we really had neglected asia as the americans were very much involved and focused on iraq and afghanistan in the last decade. if we were to look at the u.s. and asia, it is as indispensable as ever. our military alliances have been reinvigorated in part because of the tremendous economic role that north korea plays along with the threat of kim jong un. also, our relations with japan have been very much

reinvigorated. secretary pineda and hagel are making regular visits to their. we have spent some time in an area where we have had spent a lot of time the cousin our courses were employed to the middle east. we have got to look at the rebalance in asia as more than simply a military strategy. it is a national security foreign-policy strategy. the middle east, as much as we think that there is a path forward, it will demand more attention. i goes back to fdr -- it goes back to fdr. there is a book that talks about the breakup of the colonial era. it was a combination of world war i am definitely -- and definitely world war ii.

it left them in a very your friend position. there was a tremendous stabilizing influence in the region. some of it is the rise of radical islam. some of it is a huge and graphic bulge. all of these things make it harder. my first week on capitol hill as a young staffer was 1975. they were publicly in high school in those days. [laughter] this was five years before camp david. it was a huge strategic moment. egypt was aligned with the soviet union. when that came, it was a real alignment to the west. it was a critical will the block for the u.s., part of a peace process that every president has

worked to go forward. in november 19 75, the population of egypt was about ready million. very prosperous middle class. the economic tools of how to keep a dynamic middle-class with three times the population that you prior had is a huge challenge of economic strategy and all -- could be reflected that there isn't enough jobs for young people in the region, particularly in egypt right now. the u.s. can have a big, stabilizing impact. some have to be solved internally to those countries. i would agree with the ambassador that the u.s. role is going to be important in asia. we are there in the middle east because we have been the broker

how we have helped it out board avoid big wars. that is a challenge for the future. >> do you want to take a crack at it? >> no. it is question time. >> what do you see the future for major platforms? >> i think that we have to be judicious about what we get. the long range is a very interesting question. there have been questions about manned bombers for strategic forces for a long time. on the other hand, if you move away from nuclear forces come at the long-range bomber might be useful. if you're focusing on the pacific where there are vast tracts of ocean and uncertainty, that make -- might make sense.

the jury is still out. we have to be avoiding knee-jerk responses. there are debates over defense systems that tend to be very stylized. there are ferrier -- fewer carriers or more carriers. we have to be more subtle about what we do and the mixes of capabilities we have. it is different. there are areas where we are clearly ahead of everyone else and we want to make sure we stay that way. on the long-range bombers, you probably want to work on developing them, and how far we go is still to be determined. >> the next 1 -- how involved militarily or be likely to be in the future in africa? you just mentioned egypt. ambassador, do you want to take that one?

>> probably more than we want to be. again, a panel that we served on years ago identified a number of trends that were going to be important for the nation's defense and future security. one is something that the secretary gates had identified as a problem, which is that threat to our global security that is represented wife rail -- represented by frail states. we have had several instances in africa of this. we had in kenya and reminder of the spillover effect on the chronically failed state of somalia and generator for much over the last 20 years. our french allies did a good job of going in to molly -- mali.

we don't know if we have completely seen the last of the second and third order consequences of the success of operation odyssey don and the overthrow of the qaddafi regime. there are some energy security issues in africa and in the gulf of guinea and nigeria where the state frailty might have some broad international implications that will be called upon and have the u.s. play a role. not to mention the humanitarian issues or just kind of law and order issues that the search for kony and things i cap. i suspect we will be involved in africa much more than -- and rings like that.

i suspect we will be involved in africa. to prove that you never know where you will end up fighting surely after the general became the second commander, he was fighting a war. i think that is indicative of what we are likely to face there over the next decade. >> here is one from twitter. in a time of budget and continue strategic -- is the time to reduce our nuclear arsenal? >> i think we need to make smart decisions about how we deploy all of our forces. the strategic forces have been pivotal to the best ability. the proliferation issue has to be at the top of the list. the countries with nuclear

weapons have understood the rule that if you use a nuclear weapon, it will be catastrophic. holding the spread of those weapons whether it is in iran or north korea or other places that we can only guess right now, i think that is the biggest challenge. with respect there is a whole question of follow-up systems and replacement for the marines. in addition to the bomber question that will require a lot of sharpening the pencils to make sure these programs are affordable, i think we know that some of the programs you can

price as pivotal as they may become i think we learned this from secretary cheney during his tenure as secretary of defense that there are some programs where they can cross themselves out and no longer be relevant because you do not get the effectiveness in terms of the same amount if it were spent on ships. i think we need to look at the size of our nuclear arsenal. i think some changes can be made. in terms of what the u.s. feels each requirement is, look at that and size the force accordingly. >> i think this is a good question to end on. how do we get back to bipartisan defense? >> well, since these two guys

spoke about it as well, getting back is not going to be easy. i think that the end of the day, getting back the responsibility of this country, what informed folks like all of you and presumably those who will be watching this, if they care enough to watch it, they are probably reasonably informed. and from people have to put the word out that you cannot mess with defense. you can disagree. you can disagree about how many nuclear weapons you should have her how many carriers to have. those are disagreements that are based on the fundamental acceptance of the fact that the country's prosperity and way of life depend on its national security. that has been what has govern both congress and administration's for 60 years and certainly for our professional lifetime. it is up to the voters.

if voters do not understand us and are fed all kinds of -- to lead them to believe that defense is just another trade off of entitlements or whatever, then we will have a serious problem. they will elect people who believe that same thing. i do not inc. we can afford that. -- think we can afford that. >> there are a lot of folks who in recent years have talked about going back to a stricter to the constitution. to those folks, in the constitution, the number one obligation of the federal government is to provide for their common defense.

by the way, it is the only obligation that is mandated and not optional for them. they might do other things, but they must provide for the common defense. i think you need to get more folks who understand that is the primary responsibility. >> i think they have made a good comment. when the truman guys were writing the marshall plan, the later secretary of defense and was one of those pillars of national security, america's security is rooted in its unique economic strength. as we talk about our defense needs and to provide for the common defense as ambassador just mentioned, i think that we

have got to figure out one comment how to do a budget in washington that we can manage all of the pillars of defense of entitlement and revenues and not make it political every time we have this debate, but also fundamentally look at our own economy to build the next generation. just as we need volunteers to serve in the armed forces, we need young people i can go into the high-tech sector your or into the medical or pharmaceutical or transportation sectors. were college students are graduating with a huge burden of debt that previous generations

have not had. we have got to figure out how to get the economy generating jobs for our young americans who have great skills. leaders will have to work together. there was a deal done. president reagan in his social security bill with tip o'neill. both sides had to give. he seemed to have lost that capability in that era -- we have seen to lost that capability in this era. we have to find the area in the middle that we can all work toward. >> i think that is a fine sentiment. do we have a hand for all of our panel? thank you. [applause] next on c-span, "washington journal" with your phone calls

and headlines. and testimony on implementing the health care law and building the insurance exchanges. what is the most important issue congress should consider in 2014? that is the question ntcam videos stude competition. include c-span video for your chance to when the grand plies $5000.d prize of >> coming up next on "washington ," public opinion and politics after the government shutdown followed by a preview of congressional negotiations on the farm bill.

later, the future of u.s. relations with afghanistan as the united states it's ready to withdraw from the region next year. "washington journal" is next. host: good morning, it is a back to work week for the senate as congress takes up budget negotiations, the farm bill, and we have another round of hearings on the affordable care act, often referred to as obamacare, as well as the troubled government website. it is sunday morning, october 27. kathleen sebelius will testify on wednesday. in politics is the final stretch of campaigning in new jersey and virginia, two states that will be electing a new governor next month. and with voter