i want to thank you for holding this very important hearing. as i understand it, in the case opm did actually go to the seattle police department to get the underlying police report. >> no, we did not. he do a lot of these investigations and our understanding was that seattle didn't make that kind of information available. us toetain me referred the washington state database and that is where we went. so we didn't try to get the underlying police report. the position was that we had dealt with seattle in the past. >> our obligation is to find out the disposition or if there has been charges and it was not as though we decided we would ache an effort here. based upon the fact that come in the past -- and this occurs with

other jurisdictions besides seattle, they will refer another database and that is what they did. we did not go in this particular case essay will you depart from your policy? this is, again, something we need to take a close look at and will be as part of the presidents review. isis problematic that there information written on a piece of paper somewhere that we did not have access to. shocking it incredibly that we wouldn't pursue a police report in any of these arrest situations because the nature of the charge, looking at the underlying police report, having been a prosecutor, can tell us very different information and a prosecutor may not have the elements to make a particular charge and the disposition may tell us nothing. here,eing prior behavior getting a police report would have set up a very different set of conduct for anyone looking at

that. so i do believe we do have to change that, we do have to get the underlying reports. and if that requires coming to an understanding with law enforcement across the country, i would be shocked, having worked with so many police officers, that they would not be willing to have an understanding with the federal government on this given what is at stake for the country. one of the things that concern me also is that i heard the discussion between -- judge, between you and mr. tester on lawsuit.e of the uses in 2011, coming before the committee, i wasn't a member of the committee then. wasthe fact that this suit , you didn't feel that you could share that information. i understand you have to go to justice on it vice so i'm not being critical, but what i would be critical of is why wasn't

-- this seems to me a core issue of oversight which is need to know that now we are seeing obviously some of the consequences of perhaps a part of this being uses -- obviously with snowden and what we are seeing in other cases. and it really troubles me to think that this would be sealed. was there any discussion about how this is a very important piece of information that the committee really needs to know? real problem that justice would not go to court and explain that there is a separate duty and congress needs to be aware of information to protect the country. i think this is part of the bigger issue. so wanted to get your thoughts on that. subsequently update us as soon as you could once this thing was unsealed?

>> i am here today. it was just unsealed two days ago. >> so it was sealed for two years. >> on the next round is. and thank you for calling the judge. i appreciate it. actthis is a false claims case. they have a very special treatment because somebody comes for it is a whistleblower and the government has to keep it under civic is a government has to decide whether to intervene in the case. so i think that is the reasoning. >> this is an issue because we have a different responsibility and we have to get to the bottom of this so that this committee isn't waiting a couple of years later while this decision-making is ongoing in the government when there is a critical issue the contractor that needs to be addressed. i believe this is an important issue that we need to be will to get at. >> i think the real question is, now that you have the obama there, the response i would say

is why weren't we monitoring quality assurance on our contractors to begin with and what have we done since then to monitor quality assurance on the contractors that are out there today? >> that is a fair question. with respect to what we were doing before, have been told that we were hot on the heels of this because we were starting to notice that the quality reveals -- all the reviews were being too much by one person or to quickly so we had already made inquiries. but obviously, we did not catch it quickly enough because it occurred. what we've done since then is we have focused more, as i have said, on those reports to enable us to find anomalies when they the problem isn occurring more quickly. and we have beefed up the federal staff working on those

matters. there have time, been many significant changes in the way that they opt rate. -- the way they operate. with respect to your question of not being able to talk about it, in some ways commit was very frustrating to us as well. imagine looking at stuff in the newspaper and unable to -- you know -- but i think you have to have the justice department warned about it but a believe this is required by law. >> i also wanted to ask about the issue of continuous evaluation. yesterday, senator collins along with senator mccaskill, myself and senator huy cam introduced a bill that would provide one of the issues i see in all of this, an issue that will rely -- that we rely too much on self reporting, especially after we granted a clearance.

our bill is fairly straightforward in that there would be two random audits conducted. as i understand your testimony, you have talked about this idea in your testimony of automated record checks. yet you say there is more research required. i don't understand how we don't have some random checks and we are relying totally on self reporting. frankly, people's lives changed dramatically and it can in five years time. and that we would have a system that really verifies that the domain should -- that people should maintain their clearance. >> what i was referring to is we do automated record checks at this time or electronic record checks. government agencies do that at times. for example, when director kaplan referred to the police checks going to the electronic record checks to get that

information, there are ongoing processes such as that going on it now. withi was referring to continuous evaluation is an expansion of that into more areas that include internal complement databases as well as external of both government and commercial databases. some of the specificity i can't get into in today's current environment in this proceeding here. but what we're talking about is building the enterprise light. in other words, having a not a made it records check ability, a continuous evaluation, whether several times over five years or more frequently than that, that can serve both the united states , the intelligence community as well as the [indiscernible] a continuous evaluation working group that was made up of ic members shared omb had

representation. omp had representation. and dod had representation. we had a concept of operations that is now ready for testing. it takes a level of checks and balances that are high enough to satisfy the requirement at the top of an organization like i . e -- like i.c that is a very touchy balancing act to make sure that we have enough checks. but it is an expansion that is currently done. there are national agency checks, please checks and financial checks for the secret level clearance is. we have expanded those to cover other areas. includeabases, which classified information and some that do not as well as the commercial databases.

the areas that you're most concerned about is the social media are publicly available electronic information and that is where the research is being done, senator. we have to find that balance between the civil liberties and privacy is of the u.s. citizen versus national security interests. representede as a -- as a representative the luxury of going through a social media or a publicly available database, pull information out of there, and submit it as being the truth. the government has a responsibility, an obligation to every one of its citizens to ensure that that information is true and accurate before we use it in an adjudicated rosses. >> i know my time is up, but i can tell you that, obviously, -- arer teenagers going teenagers going gets important information on social media but we are not in a use it to find someone is involved with

something, that is hard to believe. we need to take a commonsense approach to this. my time is up. i also think we need to have random checks on people rather than just relying on their own self reporting. thanks. >> thank you. >> thank you. i think this is such a critically important response and quick response to this horrible tragedy and i hope that the family members take some comfort that we, too, share their concerns. i have read this report. i can tell you, as somebody who used to do background checks for people involved in gambling in north dakota, if you are going to get paid minimum wage to deal blackjack, he would not have passed that background check. he could not have don't lack tact in north dakota. yet he had a clearance that allowed him to come onto a navy base and do serious human damage. is really frustrating. we are all frustrated here with his. and i completely appreciate

your privacy rules. but when you up like for this clearance, you waive your right to deceive. and every parent on this panel who deals with social media knows, if you want to know what your kid is doing, go on social media. you may think that it doesn't have the veracity of a court record, but i can tell you that, as somebody who has looked at court records repeatedly doing background checks, it certainly does. a victor is worth a thousand words. and it's heartbreaking. so we take this one example. i always fear that one example does not the case. that we have multiple examples now where we failed in the clearance system to actually fared out people who people- to ferret out who would murder coworkers but also do damage to our national security. so this is a very broad issue and a very important issue. i want to talk about self reporting and the consequences of not self reporting.

i was quite honestly shocked because i am new to this committee and new to looking at government security clearances. of people iner this country who have these clearances. this is a big group. we all agree with that. are asly, random checks critical and important part of this and you see that from the bill that we introduced. that we need to make self reporting more effective as well. so i want to know if all those millions of people who have these clearances, how many have ever been discharged from the government for failure to self- report? >> we can get you that information. we don't have it with us. >> in your database, how would you know that in your -- that information? >> if, for example, someone ,ails to rip port on their form that they're just deceptive -- question either lying on their

application or failing to report after a series of events that occur after the clearance. >> we will have to get you that information, but the latter is certainly a cause for revoking a security plan sand being dishonest when you fill out your form is something that you do to into consideration and decide whether to grant the clearance in the first place. >> if you're not checking local police records, you have no guarantee that, when summary checks the box saying that they have never been arrested, that they had her -- that they are the truth. >> we don't just take their word for whether they have been arrested. we do enough the eye check -- we do an fbi check. it will spit out whether someone has been arrested and then we do the follow-up and it requires work on a state-by-state races or local jurisdiction.

let's remember, we are talking in his case about a secret clearance. if it was a top sear. -- if it was a top secret clearance, a would have taken a greater investigation that may have uncovered the gun part of this and speculation. >> if i can take it one step further, we are talking about revoking a clearance. what about requiring that that employment be terminated? is that one of the things that you're considering and looking at him going forward, the this person -- for contractors, that is a tough call here but for government employment, it is not enough to just revoke the clearance. i think that it should be prima facie, a case that you now lose your job. that has to be serious consequences for not reporting. the have to be serious consequences for lying. and we have to look at the number of people who are out there who are not currently self reporting because, even random

checks cannot solve this problem. the have to be true consequences. i want to know how we will amp up the penalties for employees >> thatelf-report peer is absolutely what we are looking at is part of our 120- day interagency review. about anyth talking gaps in the self reporting portion as far as and active reinvestigation period. what is information that we it against measure the 13 adjudicated standards and is an awful right? that is all part of this. and then they can ability. there are not currently significant penalties for lying or not reporting adverse information. yes, it includes revocation of your clearance. an agency can suspend or debar the contractor or firm. if they think it is just a problem with that individual,

they can direct that that individual network on the contract or you can suspend or bar the individual. we are looking at all the accountability measures for both federal employees and contractors to make sure that only the people who should have access to our facilities and essential information due at any given time, not just when they are at work. >> human nature being what it is, it is simply saying, well, there may -- there might be a consequence. the point that i am getting at is a mandated this will happen if you don't report. and, mr. contractor, we don't is your job to report back to us. and if you don't, black mark on you and you will not eat a government contractor very long. that is the level at which i have passion for this issue. we should not be -- when we give sealthe good housekeeping of approval, which is what this security clearances, that ought to mean something.

and if they breach it, that on a be something that we consider very serious with very serious consequences. i've flogged -- i applaud your work and i would like to know who has -- how many have been discharged or disciplined for not reporting after the fact. thank you for the time. >> tough questions. tough questions. the most revealing things this morning is the realization that, while an arrest report may be part of a background check, there is not a requirement that the underlying police report he obtained. and i'll tell you why this is a shocking revelation. prosecutor as well. thatast majority of cases would reveal a mental disturbance would not have a disposition. the criminal justice system does a very bad job of adjudicating

the mentally ill. really,the mentally ill from a prosecutor's standpoint, if they haven't heard anyone, putting them in prison sometimes creates more problems than it solves. so most prosecutors, when they are confronted with a mentally ill issue like someone who says they heard voices, somewhere in -- someone where the police has been called for a disturbance, someone says there are microwaves coming through the vents and someone is coming to get me, they will do a police of the time,ost the police department will even try to file charges. that is a disturbance call that is related to someone who in their minds they do this all the time. something that, especially in a city as large as seattle or as large as kansas city or as large as st. louis,

that kind of disturbance call or someone is making a racket because they are mentally disturbed, it must be taken to the prosecutor for disposition. in fact, we are horrific in this country to even getting that person the mental health services. and the vast majority of the shootings are not going to be around the issue of whether or not has shown violent and sees or whether they have shown tendencies of a mental issue. the notion that we are saying, well, if the police did harm and will give us a report, we have checked the box. i think if you do a gut check on this issue, we will realize that a lot of the work we have been doing around this has been checking boxes. outt it that we can't go and do one-on-one and politically thread -- and pull every thread on every

application. ithough, if we did that come would be so expensive that we would be more decisive about who gets them. but the notion that you're calling what you are doing quality control, ms. camp when, is offensive. because i think there is a lot of checking boxes going on. was this report obtained? yes. was this report obtained? yes. but i have a problem with is, even on a random basis, a more thorough anexamination. i'm glad to hear the you have a working group. what i like to see us do as a committee is asked for some specific recommendations on who is getting clearances and are they all necessary? and all of this is risky. we can say that we're doing too many and then we can have a bad thing happen and then we will be

back you're saying why didn't they have a security clearance? on the other hand, what we're doing now is the worst of all situations because we are giving all of thesen that millions of people who have security clearances, we've checked them out. we are confident that they are mentally stable? they're not criminals? and they'll be alive. follow the law. we have no clue that that's true. this is a pro forma process with contractors. the reason why they are off the reservation is because they bid an amount and that contractor wanted to make money and now it's time to cut corners. you wanted to make your number and you wanted to make money, you didn't have to do the whole thing. just turn it in and pretend like you did. so i agree with the chair in the ranking member that this is time

for all of us to really quit nibbling around the edges on this thing and let's get to the meat of the matter. giveg that seattle doesn't a police report, that dog doesn't hunt in this context. that just as a work. my subcommittee has learned -- that just doesn't work. i subcommittee has learned that there are a lot of felons on installations. we have learned that the navy was giving these contractors 28 temporary passes at the get-go without any checks on anybody. is that true? a dods was the subject of i.t. report and the navy has look into these pacific circumstances. 50believe there were about people identified who were convicted felons who were given access without the proper checks. and the navy has taken corrective action, removing

individuals who do not want access from the installation. in other instances, given the eighth that some of the felony convictions were quite old. and made a decision to allow them to continue to have access to your but the fundamental issue is there was a failure to conduct the required checks for installation access and the navy has taken corrective action on that. >> so no more temporary passes? >> the passes would have to be based on the required checks. the national criminal investigative check as well as the terrorism database checked. that would bring up a felony conviction. -- iswhat you are doing there a different status for a certain kind of past than for america -- for a permit past?

are you saying there doing something before a temporary pass are they getting the full complement of checks? >> for installation access, there are two basic criteria. one is someone who will be on the installation on a temporary basis. those individuals require a degree of vetting, a check against the terminal records and a terrorism database check. for individuals who are to have ongoing access, there is a requirement for a national agency check with written inquiries and other checks, which is the minimum standard for that issuance. the problemrected that someone is getting temporary passes without a background check. >> yes. >> is going on in other branches, temporary checks without background checks? the -- weengaged at are engaged with the components.

>> i would like to get a report back that this is not going on in any of the other branches. >> just one follow-up for information, who made -- whoever made the decision to allow that to happen to go around? were there any consequences to that individual who made this decision? >> there is an ongoing navy review what her at the navy yard that they to include all of the aspects that went into that. that is an ongoing review. youould we hear back from when the review is completed as far as the consequences to the person who made that decision? >> the navy review, the overall dod reviews and other reviews that are being conducted will be brought together in an omb final

for overarching security practices and i expect that to be part of the review. >> my specific question is a report back to the committee -- was somebody held accountable for going outside curve? , count a real problem ability and federal government. it's accountability. and all i want to know is what were the results? did we hold whoever made that decision accountable? >> senator portman, please. welcome. >> thank you, chairman. this has been constructive. we have raised 11 troubling issues. we have yet to hear from senators who have a lot of interest and background in this. we have held some hearings.

in june, we held one regarding background investigations, the inability of european general to audit and the background investigation process. that is where the score echoes developed. just a couple of weeks ago, we got off the senate floor and it does fix the i.t. issue. i know, brenda, you worked with us on that and we want to continue to follow that and make sure we get that cleaned up. we have another hearing in a few weeks. to continue looking at this issue and others. senator tester was here earlier. we will stay on this at the subcommittee level. i will focus on something that i think it is critical if we are really going to get at this issue. i guess the tragic example

recently at the navy yard is the unfortunate effect example of it. but it's not a new issue. it's this whole issue of continuous evaluation. and whether it is the five-year cycle or the 10-year cycle. this is to me the critical issue that we are missing. just with regard to the navy yard, but with this regaled her case and ricky alder in 2012 shot and killed a commanding officer at fort reg and then -- at fort bragg and then turn the weapon at himself. it was reminiscent of aaron alexis. his background investigation was done in 2006. over the next five years, he was charged twice with assault, one with dui hit-and-run, once for aggravated assault, none of which was reported in his

personal security chain. and alexis, similar, after receiving security clearance, he received nonjudicial punishment another nonjudicial punishment for being drunk and disorderly and arrest for firearm discharge. multiple law enforcement interactions, both military and civilian. a month prior to the incident that would have highlighted his mental health problems, and none of these triggered a re- evaluation to his access of classified material, classified facilities, none of those. and i think this is -- i mean, every issue raised here today is important, but if we can't get to this, the interim period between a clearance and, again, whether it's a five or 10-year cycle, i think we'll continue to have these tragic instances. in 2005, interesting, a year before ricky elder enlisted in the army, two years before aaron alexis enlisted in the navy, the

seven years to the date before ricky alder's deadlty -- deadly attack, the department of defense testified to this committee, and this was in june of 2005, about the automated continuous evaluation system. and you all said you are going to continuously evaluate the background. mr. prioletti, in your written statement, you noted three years earlier in 2008 -- three years later, from the 2005 testimony you gave before his committee, -- this committee, president bush directed by his executive order that an individual who is -- shallfor classified be subject to continuous evaluation. that was an executive order back in 2008. i know we heard today, we're working on this. we heard we have an interagency working group. we're developing a concept of operations. i wrote this down. we're doing research. this has been going on now for a decade. a decade. if you testified in 2005, was

going on in 2004, maybe more than a decade. so here we are. it's five years after the executive order, eight years after this committee heard about the plans, and we're dealing with the tragedy at the navy yard. i don't know who would like to talk about it. mr. lewis, maybe you can talk about d.o.d. by the way, you're talking about putting something in place but not for another three years and then it would be d.o.d. only. so i guess i'd like to hear what is happening. and mr. lewis, since d.o.d. is trying to take the lead to get this in place, i see from the technical report on the project there have been some pilot projects. you have 3600 personnel records that have been searched, and it is working. some have had clearances suspended or revoked due to derogatory discoveries. your search algorithms have found problems.

buff 3,600 people is a drop in -- but 3,600 people is a drop in the bucket when we have over five million people with security clearances. this has been 10 years that we have told that lessons learned is being incorporate understood database that will be in place in 2005, and here we are 2013. taxpayers have paid $11 million -- $11.6 million for this i don't know what the development costs are. we're trying to find out. or the cost after 2014 to fully demonstrate its capability at d.o.d. so can you explain the reasons why this capability will take over a decade to field? can you give us some sense of a total cost for this and what it's going to cost to field it over at the department of defense? >> i can't speak to the total cost. i would have to come back with that information, but i can give you a status of how the automated continuous evaluation system is being used. it has the capability of

flagging concern. so that's an existing capability. as you mentioned, it was used in an army project. out of 3,300-odd individuals, a total of 100 personnel actions were taken as a result of information identified during those queries. in addition, the defense security enterprise is developing a continuous evaluation concept demonstration, which would take this a step further. so aces, the automated continuous evaluation system, does a one-time snapshot in time query, this concept demonstration would have real time updates so that as information became available it would be pushed into the system.

and the concept demonstration is currently scheduled to run from april to october of 2014. april to october of 2014. the anticipated population would be 100,000 cleared military, civilian and contractor personnel. and so we're anxiously looking forward to completing that concept demonstration. in their interim, we're using aces for continuous evaluation checks. again, testing the concept, getting more validation. looking at things like privilege users and some other groups of contractor employees. so this is an ongoing effort. we get results from it on a regular basis. and we are looking to take that to the next level in terms of a true continuous evaluation, which would give feedback to the

system as it is developed. so if an individual gets arrested tomorrow, the system would push that back to d.o.d. instead of waiting for d.o.d. to make that query. >> you weren't here in this job nine years ago when we heard that it was going to be in place by 2005, but you're here now. and so, you know, one question i could ask you is, why has it taken so long? and you might say, i don't know. i wasn't in charge. but you're in charge now, and you're saying that you're going to have this fully operational in three years, is that correct? >> for the automated continuous evaluation system, as it currently stands, it is -- it's an operational system. it's still in a research and development mode, but it is an operational system. the limits right now -- i mean, when i say operational -- >> i mean, when i say operational, i mean it would

cover more than a small percentage of people in between their clearances. you're talking about taking it from 3,600 to 100,000. how many security clearances do you have at d.o.d.? >> we have 2.5 million people who are eligible and in access for classified information. >> when will we cover those people? >> this -- the system, and one of the things we're examining is can we expand the capability of the system to handle that larger volume? and that is a work in progress and something we could -- >> do you think it's important? >> we, we do -- yes, we do. we need to address what happens between investigations. >> so what are you looking for in order to get this done? you're going to get back to us as to what the costs are. >> yes. >> have you sought additional funding? are you thinking that's the problem?

>> it's a question of having the right criteria in place to conduct the evaluations and then what we do with the data once it's generated from the system. how you evaluate that and how you take action based on that. >> my time is up and i apologize, mr. chairman. i think we've got to have some answers on this. if it we don't fix this problem, the initial clearance is incredibly important. we need to get arrest records. in the case of aaron alexis, it was clear as day. yet, there was no system to incorporate that data. and so i -- to mr. prioletti and the intel side, i want to hear what you're doing, too. we don't have time but i hope you get back in writing what you're doing. we're talking about d.o.d. here. finally, i hope g.a.o. can help us on this to establish some metrics, let's come up with a timeline that makes sense.

if you're looking for additional resources, let us know. if it's going to take another 10 years, because we're doing more pilots and more research and so on, that is unacceptable. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, senator. senator coburn and then i'll wrap it up. >> mr. jordan, can you explain to me the difference in the fieldwork contract and the supply services contract you have with usis? one. two, are contractors completing background investigations and are other contractors validating the completeness of those investigations? are these contractors from the same company? >> i can answer the second part. opm is better suited to answering the second part. yes, contractors perform background investigations, yes, contractors can perform quality reviews on those investigations

but only government employees make a determination as to whether to grant security clearance to someone. >> but my question is, is it the same company that's validating the work of their colleagues doing the investigation? is that correct? >> i'd have to defer to o.p.m. >> no. the companies that are doing the investigations have an only -- have an obligation under the contract to also do a quality review, but then we do another quality review. and the purpose of their quality review is we would like them to catch errors before the file gets to us but we do a quality review as well. >> so o.p.m. is the final validator of the completeness of the investigation? >> to some extent. i think another thing that validates the completeness of the investigation, it gets sent to an adjudicator who may want more information. ultimately it's a collaborative effort. they may send something back to us but we are the arbiter of whether we have provided an adequate investigative product.

>> is every investigation validated by you? >> every investigation is reviewed for quality. >> by o.p.m.? >> yes. >> one other question, then i'll submit the rest of my questions. there's a fund where you charge agencies for this. there's $2 billion in it. has it ever been audited? >> i've told it has not by the o.i.g. because they told us they don't have the resources which is why we're supporting their request to draw from the revolving fund to give to them the resources they need to do that. >> thank you. >> i suspect you'll have to -- have a number of questions for the record. thank you for your answers so far today. today at 12:00, we have a new senator being sworn in and we'll

start voting beginning around 10 minutes after 12:00. we'll wrap up here about 12:20. the last question i'll ask each of you, and you'll have a chance to think about it. sometimes i say, when you see something awful has happened and you hope some good will come of it, sometimes it does, sometimes it doesn't. a few things could be much worse than losing -- few things could be much worse than losing a loved one. 11 families lost loved ones in a navy yard not far from here. they would like to know something good will come out of something that was awful for them. i think the american people feel that way as well. one of the last things i'll ask you to do is to reflect on what you have said here today or heard here today and give those families some assurance that out of the tragedy they've suffered through, some good will come and

what that might be. -- just know that's coming, ok. >> i just want to follow up, when you say o.p.m. validates, do you use a contractor to validate? >> federal employees. we do a quality review. it is all fought -- federal employees. so it is federal employees who do a validation on the background information that comes in? >> yes. >> i want to come back to, i think, a question was maybe asked by senator ayotte and senator highcamp and i want to give you a chance to respond to it. i think it dealt with using social media and the continuous evaluation program. could you give us some thoughts on that briefly, please?

>> yes, senator. what i was referring to there is, we are seeking to provide as much of the comprehensive capabilities as possible in the overall investigation of the individual. the more information we can gain, the more enlightened the decision can be on whether or not to grant the access to classify or access to a sensitive position. one of the obvious sources, potential sources of information is social media. publicly available electronic information. what i refer to in terms of the research with the idea -- was the idea that we need to look at both what possible sources of information are out there, which ones would be of most benefit to provide adjudicatively relevant information and how do we do that in the best way to protect the personal rights of the individual as well as the veracity and the coverage of the united states government? >> ok, thank you. a couple of questions, a series

of questions, if i could, for youing before i ask the questions let me just make a short statement, but when an investigator fails to discover or disclose crucial information during a background investigation, that's an obvious failure. what could be more troubling is the report that efforts by agencies to measure and improve the quality of investigations have fallen short. the office of personnel management is supposed to review the investigative file and make sure it meets minimum standards. the agency responsible for granting security clearance also has a responsibility to review the file. yet when g.a.o. looked into what o.p.m. and others were doing in 2008 to review the quality of background investigations, it found almost 90% of the reports that d.o.d. was using to evaluate an applicant for a security clearance were missing required documentation.

three questions. first, how often were agencies making a security clearance decision without having all of the required information? and what motive did agencies have for doing this? that's the first question. >> the answer is, we do not know because g.a.o. performed thisage -- this analysis of the completeness of the documentation in 2006 and 2009. so, we did not know outside of dod the information you're asking for. this is the type of oversight that we're saying is needed. >> all right. second question. what type of information is missing? can you give us some idea? >> employment verification and discussions with the employers. social references, especially the number of social references in order to determine someone's character. completeness of the application which should be the very first

step as we noted before which should be done before you move forward. >> thank you. the third question, has g.a.o. had an opportunity to take another look at the issue since 2008? if you have, has there been any noted improvement? >> we have continued to monitor o.p.m.'s actions to implement ea the recommendation we made at that time. as i noted in 2010, we were very encouraged that there was agreement among o.m.b., o.p.m., d.o.d. and the d.n.i. as far as metrics of the quality of the investigation. there was somewhat of a plan to move forward beyond that. we have continued to monitor but at this time, all we know is that that plan has fallen apart. >> ok, thank you. my next question would be for mr. pieletti and mr. lewis. -- prioletti and mr. lewis.

according to some news reports, the company that hired alexis, a company called the experts, had phoned his hotel room in rhode island in august saying he was unstable and that the company was bringing him home. according to news reports, the human resources director of question the experts talked to the mother of aaron alexis on august 9 and she informed the company of her son's past pair paranoid behavior and stated he probably needed therapy. i would ask first of all if the company had hired alexis had become aware of the increasingly troubled behavior, do you think the contractor should have a duty to report the behavior to the department of defense? and did they report it? >> senator, in this particular case that you just described, in terms of a national security perspective, it behaves everyone

-- it behooves anyone to report any unusual activity they see, whether it be a colleague, a co- worker or a subordinate that works for you. >> and the second half of my question was, did they report it? >> to the best of my knowledge, sir, it was reported to the mother, as you described there. i am not positive whether or not they reported it to d.o.d. >> i ask both you and mr. lewis to answer that question for the record. i'll give mr. lewis a chance to answer it right now. >> the contractor is required to report any derogatory information coming to their attention regarding a cleared employee. the defense security service has done a followup review at the experts and they've determined that the company was aware of the indications of mental instability on mr. alexis' part and they failed to report that information.

>> all right, thank you. mr. lewis, stay with this area of questioning, what do you think should be the role of d.o.d. contractors in monitoring the suitability of their employees to hold a clearance? >> this is part and parcel of their responsibilities as a cleared contractor. as a prerequisite for getting a company cleared, they must execute a security agreement and part of that security agreement is the national industrial security program operating manual. they have been required to do this literally for decades. this is an established process and contractors must execute that responsibility. >> ok, thank you. i ask you to think about a question, i'll give you a little time to think about it, what can

you say to those who lost their loved ones, their husbands, their wives, their moms and dads, brother, sister, what can you say to them that might give them some comfort to know that out of a horrible tragedy in their lives, our country's life, what can we say today to make them feel some good is going to come out of this? mr. jordan. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i would first say we owe the survivors of this tragedy and the american people a comprehensive and thoughtful review. what information do we look at? when do we review people in the suitability and security clearance process? how can we improve on all these aspects? the review i talked will be done donelked about will be collaboratively. the reviews, the department of defense reviews and the overarch review, which all

our agencies are involved in. this will not be a siloed effort. we will act on any improvements as quickly as possible. where there are gaps, we will close them. where there were failures we'll correct them. if i was one of the families of the victims, i wouldn't just want to hear about processes and procedures. i would have some concerns that there's a blue ribbon type creation as opposed to actual improvements to prevent this happening again. i would just say to them, i live near the navy yard. on the morning of september 16, my wife and my 2-year-old son were playing in a park across the street when they were cleared by police as the tragedy was unfolding in the navy yard. we lost a husband of a senior member of our acquisition community. i would tell them that getting this right is personal to me and we will to everything we can to -- we will do everything we can to i improve our processes and everything under our power to make sure nothing like this happens again. >> good, thank you. >> of course i would echo what joe said. our hearts were broken that day for the families and for the folks we lost, the federal

employees and the contractors and i think in addition to what joe said, this is getting attention at the highest levels. the president is the one that ordered that review and i am sure and i know that he feels very strongly in the same way that joe just articulated that this was an awful loss and we have to do whatever we can to prevent it from happening again. >> thank you. mr. prioletti. >> i would like to echo the comments of director kaplan and mr. jordan. there are no words to describe this loss. both to this nation as well as to the family members who are sitting behind us. but i can give you a guaranteed commitment from not only the dni but each of us at this table that we will continue to work to find a solution. this is an evolutionary process as we find gaps in our processes

and the way we do our business, the techniques, the available information we will continue to , utilize those to come up with the best possible process to improve how we do our business on behalf of the u.s. government as well as the u.s. citizens. >> thank you, sir. >> in addition to what my fellow witnesses have had to say, i would just add that we need to make a commitment and effectively ensure that what happens between investigations is something that is tracked. we vet people, we trust them with our classified information and access to sensitive facilities and we have an obligation to ensure that we're looking at people between investigations and taking appropriate corrective action as needed. >> thank you. >> i would say it's unfortunate that the tragedies we saw at the navy yard focuses attention on this process but we have seen

the dedicated leadership from these executive branch agencies in the past and when they make their minds up to take on a problem and solve it they do it. and now is the time for actions, not just review. >> a lot of folks in the room know that the general accountability office, g.a.o., is regarded as a watchdog. an arm of the legislative branch of our government to be a watchdog for really the whole expanse of the federal government is a huge job. we have a lot of people to do it, probably not enough. but we need your can't continued -- we need your continued vigilance to help us do our job, and that's the oversight role. i think probably the most two most quoted things ronald reagan ever said, one, he said to mr. gorbachev, mr. gorbachev, tear

down this wall, at the berlin wall and it was torn down. he also used to say when he was trying to negotiate reductions in nuclear arms with the soviet union, he would say, trust but verify. all of us on this committee, our staffs as well, trust you. we trust the good will of the folks with whom you work, who are responsible for carrying through on these reforms to make sure it's not just words but actions to back it up. so we are trustful. but we're going to be doing some verification along the way. ms. kaplan, as you go off to your next assignment, we wish you well. and we again appreciate the time you've given being with us today. even more, we appreciate the help of those who follow you and those who make sure that these words, that this promise is a her words, that this promise is

a promise we keep. -- to make sure that these words, that this promise is a promise we keep. that having been said this hearing is adjourned. thanks so much. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2013] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] >> in january, 1963, the communists did something they had not done before. they stayed and they fought. five american copters were shot down. three americans were killed. kennedy's sees this -- kennedy sees this on the front page and says what's going on, i thought

we were winning the war. beginning in december and through january into february, he will hear varying reports from white house officials, state department officials and military officials, giving contradictory evidence about the state of the military campaign in stout vietnam -- south vietnam. >> it marks the 50th anniversary of president kennedy's assassination. at 7:30 p.m. eastern, part of american history tv this weekend on c-span3. andn friday at the woodrow -- on friday, the woodrow wilson center hosted a discussion with the head of the international atomic energy agency. specifically iran and north korea and syria. this is just under one hour. >> good morning.

welcome to the wilson center. a special welcome to our guest this morning, director yukiya amano of the international atomic energy agency. i'm the executive vice president. modern technology kept our president and ceo on a tarmac in new york city, or rather, laguardia airport, for over two hours this morning. she has just landed and will be here shortly. she will make a closing comment. she apologizes, but we wanted to get started. the wilson center is a public- private institution created by an act of congress and serves as the official, national memorial to the 28th president. we tackle global issues through independent research, open dialogue, and actionable ideas. we seek to provide safe political space for addressing key public policy issues. nuclear proliferation issues

are a lane of excellence for the center. our nuclear proliferation international history project is a global network of individuals and institutions engaged in the study of international nuclear history through archival documents, oral history, interviews, and other impure goal sources. -- empirical sources. the wilson center has very strong ties with a los alamos national laboratory. especially closely, and recently had two international ground troop briefings on these talks, conversations with experts in the field. we are very proud to have michael adler on the podium here is a senior scholar at the wilson center. michael was the correspondent in vienna covering the iaea for years. michael will moderate today's session.

digi amano is here to help us understand the iaea, help us understand how it is helping preserve the nuclear nonproliferation treaty's grand bargain. he is uniquely qualified to do so. his career spans 36 years in the japanese foreign ministry, and he has served with the iaea since the 1990's. he played a key role in securing an agreement should to -- to shut down chernobyl's unit number three as chair of the g7 nuclear safety roup in the year 2000 -- group in the year 2000. please join me in welcoming director general amano. director general amano will speak briefly, and then michael adler will have a dialogue for our guest, preserving have the time for your questions.

thank you for coming to the wilson center this morning. director general? [applause] >> good morning, everyone. it is a great pleasure to me to be invited and given the opportunity to speak to you. i had meetings with some high u.s. officials yesterday, and today i'm delighted to meet michael again, whom i know very well, and michael knows very well about the iaea. four years have passed since i

joined the iaea in 2009. today i would like to explain a little bit about the activities of the iaea. [indiscernible] the iaea is known as a nuclear watchdog, especially in media. i would like to say that the iaea's activity is much more extensive than a nuclear watchdog. we are a very unique stakeholder. for example, cancer is a very serious problem in developing countries. some people think that cancer is a problem in developed countries.

2000 deaths by cancer occur in developing countries. many countries in africa do not even have radio nuclear therapy machines in their country. they come to the clinic too late, and it is not possible to provide life-saving treatment. this is very unfair. i am insisting that cancer control in developing countries should be established as a global health agenda. the nuclear technology can save lives in developing countries. everyone knows that food shortage will be a serious

problem. here, too, nuclear technology can contribute by accelerating plant mutation. we can prolong the shelf life of food, or we can eliminate the toxicity of the food. water can be better managed by analyzing the aquifer by using nuclear technology. the iaea has a huge project in sub-saharan countries to better understand the water resource. if i keep on talking about these things, it becomes endless. i stop here. the point is that iaea has the technology. we have the function.

we encourage people to use it safely. iaea is a unique player to contribute to the promotion of millennium development and its follow-up. i never thought there would be such a huge nuclear accident during my tenure in japan. i had to use a lot of time and energy to address this issue. if you have interest, i would come back to this issue. the iaea adopted an action plan to enhance the safety of nuclear power globally. the action plan is now implementation.

nuclear plants are safer now. despite the belief or expression of some people, many countries continue to improve nuclear power as an option. we are providing a regular report on iran, syria, and a dpr case. the rain in -- iranian nuclear issue is a very complicated one. every country needs to imply had the comprehensive safeguard -- implement the copperheads of safeguard -- comprehensive safeguard.

for example, united nations security council. this is standard. all the countries, including iran, need to abide by. by this standard, i can say that the material and facilities placed under safeguard in iran are staying for peaceful purpose. there are additional protocol and other obligations not implemented. they give assurance. we had long negotiations with

iran in recent years. on october 28 and 29th of this month, we had a meeting with iran. after the coming of president rouhani, we had carefully observed -- we had a meeting. we had two meetings, on the 28th and 29th. we did have a very productive meeting. if you have interest, i will come back to this issue. on syria, in 2011, i drew a conclusion of the facility that was destroyed was very likely a nuclear reactor.

we are very confident that our conclusion is correct. no follow-up has been made so far. we also need to understand that syria is in a very difficult situation. iran is the most important and only issue. seeing from tokyo, or asia, this issue is also a very serious issue. in one sense, the situation is worse because they have expelled all the inspectors and detonated nuclear weapons. one positive thing in that, there is a dialogue.

it is dynamic. it is not functioning now, but countries are working formally and informally to reactivate this process. the iaea is ready to send back our inspectors, and we believe we have an essential role to play in the verification of de- nuclearization of the korean peninsula. iaea has multiple objectives. it is a technical organization. we are working in a very highly political environment. now i will stop and be happy to converse with michael. thank you very much.

>> it is an honor and privilege for me to be hosting mr. amano, one of the first people i interviewed when he was japan's ambassador just over a decade ago. we have remained friendly since then. he has stamped iaea with his own style, one of talking and calling it like it is. in that spirit, i hope we can have a good session with my questions and with the audience's. this meeting which you had with the iranian deputy foreign minister, and then there was a meeting of the two sides. the atmosphere of the talks, you said, was better. the question is, when will we see concrete progress, such as a

visit to the site? >> we had that meeting with iran on the 28th and 29th of october. this is the second meeting between iran and iaea after mr. rouhani became president. the first one took place at the end of september. it was a get to know each other meeting. the last meeting was a very political meeting. it was productive, and there was some positive development. the important thing, there was a change. there was some change of tone, yes. there has been a change of tone

since the coming of president rouhani. iran and the iaea agreed to resolve all the present and past issues through cooperation and dialogue. iaea and iran are now working on the new proposal. we carried forward at the november meetings. by no means, it means the end of the process, and much more needs to be done.

this is where we stand now. >> you say there was real progress made. you have several key demands. the problem is that a site which was once a container in the open now has a shed over it. they have asphalted over the ground. the question is, it will they finally let you go there. the other question which you differed from them, you wanted to be able to go back and ask questions at any time. iran once one file to be closed, you move on, you cannot go back to the file. those are substantial issues which get to the heart of your being able to be affected. will you be able to be effective on those issues and on others? >> the first question is about the site. this is a part of the issue

which we call it issues of dimension. in the report i issued in 2011, we have identified 12 areas where we need verification from iran. that site is one of these 12 areas. we have agreed that all the issues will be resolved, and the access to parchin will be part of the process. we are now working on other issues.

regarding the question as to whether we can go back to the place again or not, we have not discussed that much in details at this time. the basic agreement is that we will resolve all the issues through cooperation and dialogue. this is very important. >> i wish you luck going forward, and i hope you can make some progress. another question about iran, are you currently inspecting iran in a full enough weight to be able to detect any breakout effort to make enough weapon grade uranium for a bomb? could iran do this in a two-week period? >> we are quite confident that we can find any changes, any deviation in a reasonable amount

of time. for if there is any facility not nuclear, we don't have that assurance. >> since you have not been applying judicial protocol since 2006, would they be able to be hiding things from you elsewhere? >> it is essential and helpful for us to have a better understanding. the implementation of additional protocols will give us more confidence on the peaceful nature of iranian activities. >> the advanced centrifuges

which they installed, they have not put nuclear material in them yet, as of the last report. how good are those centrifuges? do you think they will work? >> we do not know yet. they are not operating. the main purpose of our inspection is not to verify how effective they are. the main objective is to verify that the material and facilities stay in peaceful activities. >> regarding pmd, which is a huge sticking point, is the agency's aim to uncover details of all alleged activities, or simply to verify that iran is no longer engaged? >> we are seeking clarification unto iran.

we would like to clarify the present and past activities. how far we can go and how far weekend attack, it depends. -- we can get, it depends. it is essential that iran cooperates with us to clarify these issues. >> if iran cleared up the past, would they get some sort of amnesty? there would not be measures against him for this, it would be one step going towards a deal, or would there have to be some kind of sanction? >> in resolving the iran nuclear issues -- there are two roots. one is on the iaea wrote. -- route. these routes are different, independent, and separate. in the route between iran and iaea, the main focus is on that

verification. we would like to see the implementation of more timely provision of information, which is called modified implementation of modified code 3.1. it means timely information about iranian nuclear activities. parties that attend these talks are iran and iaea. on the other hand, eu-3 dialogue is dealing with possible lifting of sanctions, possible limitation of enrichment activities. the parties involved are different. russia, china, and the united

states. they are negotiating with iran. an important meeting will take place on the seventh and eighth of november next month. >> as you pointed out, the two tracks are separate from each other. hasn't iran said very clearly that there can be no progress in vienna until there is progress with the p5+1, and doesn't this inject a politicizing of the iaea? >> i have not heard that since

president rouhani started. sometimes there was indications, sometimes there was no indication. i can tell you that after the coming of president rouhani, we had a meeting, but we have not had this linkage. >> that would be a truly substantial change, if that is the case. >> i think so. there is some substance in the new proposal by iran. we would like to carry it forward in the next meeting on the 11th of november. >> you arrived in washington and met with secretary kerry and susan rice at the white house. what are they telling you about how they see popes -- hopes for progress and iran, and the iaea

and how they feel you are doing? >> i have met with secretary kerry, and susan rice. we have discussed the iranian nuclear issues, certification, with support to the peaceful activity, a wide range of issues. i sense a strong support of the activities of the iaea. the diplomatic purpose is not to talk about the ongoing discussions. >> did they give you any idea about the upcoming talks in geneva? >> not much in -- i take into

account a discussion that just took place in vienna. p5+1 is preparing for the next meeting. i don't have much to report unto you on this issue. >> two quick questions. the first is on syria. have the site been affected by the civil war? is there a place you can go to do proper verification? >> in syria, we have a so-called reactor that has some small amount of enriched uranium that is under iaea safeguards. we visit that facility regularly. that facility is staying in

peaceful activities. >> and then the other three sites yo? >> three sites are not under -- we have two defenses. one is the syrian nuclear facility, and that safeguards. and then we have -- there's another one that i mentioned, and it is under safeguard. there is another issue of the destroyed facility located in another place called baliat asu.

we came to the conclusion that it is very likely that it was a nuclear reactor. but nuclear reactor does not happen in independentsy. we have some interest in verifying that there are three facilities and that they are not under safeguarded. no association was there to have access to them. we have not yet had access to the facilities. are fort know how they now. >> have many of them been inspected? >> i don't know. >> my last question. you explain the situation in north korea very well. returns,en the iaea what would be the verification

approach given that continuity of knowledge has been lost? what is safeguarded inspection be enough? would you return to north korea additional tools for protocol for a wider inspection? >> according to the united , north korea has to implement all iaea safeguards. that north korea has declared to have withdrawn from the treaty. arguments.ome the reality is north korea is not acting as a member of the mpt. it is it is clear that north korea has withdrawn from the iaea and

north korea's not a member of the iaea. so in order to do any activities in north korea, we need the first political agreement among major states, and we need consent from the board of governors of the iaea. what can we do with respect to north korea? i think the first step we can take is a small step. perhaps we can send back our inspectors to where there exists a nuclear facility. it would just be a small step, but i think it would allow for a meeting. when we had our inspector up there in 2009, and now we continue to monitor.

>> thank you very much. i would like to open up to questions from the audience. members of the press, please hold your fire, we will get questions from you later. state your name, affiliation, and please ask the question, we do not have much time. no speeches. >> thank you very much. one of the goals is to secure against more intrusive inspections by the iaea. what would these more intrusive

inspections involve? what would you need to do that you're not doing now? >> this is the issue of one of the paths, where i cannot give an answer. it basically means measures contain an additional protocols. it is verification measures of the more comprehensive safeguards agreement. , including more additional protocols. sometimes it is immediate. did i answer your question? >> more or less.

>> thank you, director general amano. welcome to the wilson center. the discussion up to now has been on specific countries of concern. more broadly, looking at there will be an expansion of nuclear energy, for energy security reasons, and because it is the primary source of low carbon energy going forward. howl that expansion of nuclear -- how will that expansion of nuclear energy, not withstanding the setbacks that there has been in the -- in japan, but more broadly, how can that expansion be accomplished without creating proliferation risks? and what does that in turn mean for the iaea's mission and

resources? >> according to our latest estimate, there will be an increase in nuclear power, and it would be an increase of 17% to 19%. we foresee a great increase in nuclear power. it is a we are in -- what does it mean? an increase in the workforce. therefore we are doing the best we can to maximize without risk.

he cannot expect a big increase in funds in the coming years. another very important thing that we are doing in different countries is to recommend them to follow a step. embarking on nuclear power is a huge project, it requires huge participation. it means to strengthen nuclear infrastructure, the ratification of major international conventions, established regulatory bodies, training people, and have a good selection of sites and technology.

we have identified 19 steps to prepare for the embarking on nuclear power, in 16 of these countries. -- and we are assisting these countries. we are not encouraging or encouraging the use of nuclear power, but if we continue to use it, they must used it safely, securely, and without increasing the risk of proliferation. by these efforts, i hope that we can use nuclear power without bringing the risk of proliferation. >> good afternoon, mr. amano. diplomat.red can you speak to the nature the iaea's contacts with the israeli officials?

senior and not official? >> we have regular contact with them in vienna and israel. they sent some senior staff to the general conference. that is the most important meeting of the iaea, in september. they have also been there when i have attended some other meetings, such as the munich conference, where i've had contacts with the senior officials of israel. we have had regular, normal contact with israel, and i believe that is helpful to have good communication with israel. >> i will come back to you in a

second. back there. >> thank you. i'm from the partnership for global security. i want to ask if you could speak to the iaea's role in the nuclear security process, and how that has developed over the years, and where you see that going following what we expect to be the last summit in washington in 2016? thank you. >> the first big event for me after i joined the iaea was to attend the nuclear security summit held in washington in 2009. i was tasked to make a presentation in front of president obama, and i was excited, and i was frightened, and i wasn't sure if i could survive.

[laughter] after that, i regularly attend the securities conference, and we make our input. the iaea has a central role in strengthening nuclear security. we have the capacity to analyze, and we have information in our database. we have information on the illicit trafficking of radioactive materials. information is very important. we have helped countries by capacity of equipment, and training people. through all of these efforts, we can strengthen our nuclear

security in a concrete manner. we can make input into our nuclear security summit, and the summit participants can give guidance and instruction in their own countries to strengthen nuclear security. one of the other areas that we are focusing on, is entry into the amendment on the convention of the protection of nuclear material. we call it cppmn. convention itself has entered into force. it is applied onto the sea transports.

this expands in scope. on land, it can be covered under this convention. we are promoting the entry of the amendment, and we believe that we can enhance, we can send strengthen -- strengthen the amendment. iaea has held a meeting in july of this year, the summit was one of the biggest meetings of the iaea, and we have continued to hold these conferences, and we will strengthen our nuclear community.

>> hello, welcome to washington. my understanding of the uranium proposals is that they want to keep the facilities they currently have an build even newer infrastructure. in return, they would provide more transparency. is that your understanding, and would you be monitoring the iranians 24/7 with remote cameras? >> live streaming back to vienna? >> yes. >> in the iaea iran route, we are not discussing that much in details at this stage.

we have agreed to resolve all of the issues through cooperation and dialogue, all of the issues current and past. we have brought forth a proposal based on step-by-step work, and substance. we are working toward that november 11 meeting. we will see. >> thank you. good to see you. i have a question about special instructions. the agency, as i understand, does have the option to it -- to conduct a special investigation. with a special military

dimension, has the agency considered this? could it be useful in resolving current and past questions about those activities? on technical cooperation, the agency provides a lot of technical cooperation to state including nuclear energy. what steps is the agency taking to ensure that that technical cooperation does not provide assistance to nuclear weapons programs? for instance, pakistan has heavy water operations, and has used uranium mining to produce plutonium. what is the assurance to make sure that that cooperation does not indirectly create the manufacture of nuclear weapons?

>> we are giving these cooperations to the facilities that are under safeguards. for the countries that have not embarked on nuclear power, we are asking them to adhere to the conventions that establish a safeguard system -- regulatory system, and help them in every way to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. for the special inspections, certainly special inspections is available under the iaea comprehensive safeguard

agreement. it has conditions, and we can call for special circumstances, and in the case of north korea, and romania, the case was a bit different, but it was like other cases in which we have called for special inspections. >> was that successful with north korea? >> we called for special inspection, -- >> negative reaction. in the middle, please. >> thank you. justin anderson.

director general, i wonder if you could comment on the general state of health from your perspective and from the iaea's perspective of the protocol, which is a framework and has been implemented with specific countries. the approach of the protocol has been around for a few years. how do you feel that it has worked in strengthening your ability to safeguard nuclear materials? if there is anything you would change in terms of the diplomacy part of it or the technical or scientific aspects of that, what would you seek to change? thank you. >> the immediate object of of us in the near future is to universalize the protocols. we are working on expanding the applications and implementation. when i joined the iaea in 2009, there were 93 countries that implemented the protocol.

now 121 countries are implementing the protocols. additional protocols are essential to exclude the possibility of undeclared activities. we would like to see more countries that would adhere to the additional protocols. where else we could do more or not, i think that the priority for us is to universalize or expand the number of countries that implement the initial protocols. >> unfortunately, because the questions are excellent, we will break off questions now.

>> our dear leader, jane, will speak. >> dear leader references are a little uncomfortable, but i -- i'm jane harman. before becoming president and ceo of the wilson center two and half years ago, i served as a member of congress for nine terms. i met with you in vienna as part of a delegation in january 2010 just after you have -- had assumed the responsibility as director general. we in congress at the time knew three things about you, and they still apply. number one, we know how confident you are from your years as chair of the board of governors of the iaea. number two, we knew about your straight talk. everyone in this audience has heard that. number three, we knew your willingness to take strong actions. all of which are essential as the iaea goes forward in an

extremely dangerous world. you described three countries and there are probably others that could be on a longer list. you honor us by making the wilson center your only public stop after a conference since the election of president rouhani. you have let us ask questions. there is michael adler who contributed so much, right? trying to understand sound policy choices. i want to thank you and remind everyone that one president wilson accepted that the nobel peace prize in 1919 by letter, he wrote that the cause of peace will be a continuing labor. almost 100 years later, the

cause of peace is a continuing labor and a reason that i hope we will make progress. we have the iaea under very strong leadership, your leadership, thank you and thank you all for coming. [applause] >> this concludes our program. thank you to the inspector general for coming. it was a great pleasure. great session. we have a press conference here. the press could come forward. thank you very much. >> president obama spoke

tuesday. other speakers included former president bill clinton, house john boehner, and democratic minority leader nancy pelosi. you can see that service tonight at 8:35 p.m. eastern on c-span. senate negotiateators held a budget committee meeting. if they cannot reach a mpromise, congress faces shutdown in le january. this is 2 1/2 hours. january. this is 2 1/2 hours.

>> thank you for being here. we begin with opening statements. the committee leader of each house will be recognized and alternating between the minority and the majority. after both have made statements, it will be alternating between republicans and democrats. each statement is limited to five minutes.

there is no early-bird rule. the next member will be recognized in the next available slot from their chame -- chamber. that's how we will proceed for the rest of the day. before i recognize chairman murray, i want to begin. i will hold myself to the five-minute rule. you notice there are three senators for every congressman. an even it, that's match. everything.to cover that's not going to be easy. today i'd like to talk about why we're here and what we need to do. we're here because we need to get an agreement. we want regular order. we want government to work. we want to get something done. for too long, both parties have ignored our growing national ebt.

everybody has to be part of the solution. to make an accurate diagnosis before you can write a prescription. we have an -- a mic problem so i'm going to say this. the debt has doubled in the last five years. it is only getting worse. 10,000 baby boomers are aging every day. medicare is going broke. the congressional budget office says, if we don't act, we will have a debt crisis. most t happens, the vulnerable will be suffering the most and the worst. this debt drags on our economy today. it is a drag in economic growth for our economy today. right now we are not doing anything about it.

can n't keep kicking the down the road anymore. we have to get a handle on the debt, and we have to get a hanled the on it now. from my speaker expective, just taking more from the american public is not the answer. we look at this conference as an argument if taxes, we're not to get anywhere. the way to raise revenue, from our perspective, is to grow the economy, to get people back to work. we need to write a tax code that oesn't stifle the economy. house republicans and democrats are doing -- are working together to do just that. focus our energy on a better budget. our goal is to grow family budgets . to do that, we need to get this

economy growing. over 90 million americans are on the sidelines. many people have not had a job in six months. household income is down significantly. e may disagree as to why the economy isn't growing, but i hope we agree that the status quo is not acceptable. let's work together to provide real relief for families. if we get control of our debt, we will help the economy, we will restore confidence in washington. the bar is pretty low right now. let's see if we can clear it. we'll restore confidence in our government if we do that. today the fed is keeping interest rates unusually low. if we lock in structural reforms now, we will help keep interest rates low, which will help our economy. this opportunity will not last forever. once interest rates rise, debt will eat up a bigger start of budget. al if we keep kicking this can down

the road, those payments might raise so high, they bankrupt us. we should act now to get a downpayment on this problem. no one has to abandon their principles here. instead, what we ought to do, is find where our principles overlap to find common ground. we all agree that washington isn't working. we all agree that there's a smarter way to cut spending, and we all agree that our economy can be doing a lot better for the people we represent. we won't solve all of our differences here. we won't solve all of our problems, but we can make a good start. we should, because we owe it to the country. let's focus on achieveable goals, let's find common ground, and let's make a downpayment on the debt, and let's get this economy growing paster faster. >> thank you very much, chairman ryan. i look forward to working with you. i want to thank all the members of this committee for joining us this committee and helping us kick this important conference

off. after seeing the partisanship and discomfort the last few weeks, i know many people across the country are unhappy with their elected officials and frustrated that we in congress did not get anything done. i believe this bipartisan conference offers us the opportunity to find a path to compromise and work together to create jobs and boost our fragile economy. it won't be easy. it will require both sides to step out of their comfort zone and ideological corners. we won't be able to tackle every one of our nation's challenges in these few short weeks, but i'm hopeful we can show that bipartisanship is possible. that we can work together to solve some problems, and that we can break free from the gridlock and dysfunction that's dominated our nation's capitol for far too long .

we have continued tackle this budget fairly. we will keep the promises made to our seniors and families. the budget that passed the house reflects different priorities, and finding the path to a long-term budget deal, won't be easy. i want to spend our time here focused not on our differences, but how we can work together to find a path to compromise. the american people saw the partisanship and intransgence that shut our economy down. they are demanding democrats and republicans work together and do everything possible to avoid another crisis. families across the country find ways to compromise every day.

they know it isn't easy, but it is the only way to make progress and work together when there isn't absolute agreement on the path forward. i agree with those that say, the very least this conference should be able to do, the absolute minimum, is to find a way to come together around replacing guest racial -- se guestration and finding a budget. if both sides are ready to come out of their partisan corners and offer up compromises, i'm confident it can be done. let's start with something we can agree on. democrats and republicans have said replacing sequestration should be a priority. with extreme cuts continuing to cost us jobs and slash investment in our children's schools, in cancer research, and in our nation's law enforcement officials, there is