close down half of manhattan. it wouldn't have costed $200 year.on a and the defendants would be on as we speak. we did not go down that road for that were largely political. and i think this is an example politics ppens when gets into matters that ought to andimply decided by lawyers by national security experts. >> which brings me to libby tried in the federal court. expect that ou trial to last? what are the expectations for the case and is there anything that you can share about it? >> a pending matter. want to be careful about any comments that i might make, obviously charges have been charges.ry serious

the defendant is charged with the participation of a worldwide has a number of separate acts, including the ombings of our -- of our embassies. it is our intention to hold him totally accountable as we have are parts of that -- who were part of that conspiracy. and i think that the process get intelligence from him and still have a vinyl free case is an indication that the article system is a very effective tool holding people accountable and at the same time at getting intelligence from people who poe selsz it. -- possess it. this long do you expect to last? case that's been four years or longer. do you expect it to be just as half the time? >> just as long as -- case as -- >> just as long as -- >> if you look at the history of you le iii prosecutions,

will see that they don't take nearly as long as those that military system. which is not to say some cases should not be brought in the indicated stem as i on the day i announced the determination. we heard some to the military commission process. you look at the hundreds of cases that you brought to the article iii courts, we've shown that we can effective. we can do them relatively quickly and we can get the results that are consistent with facts. we hold people accountable. we hold people accountable.

>> tried to construct the case we'll be ablethat at a share as much information -- not just make an much cement, but share as

information as we can with regard to that determination. >> one more? >> one more. prison ate hearing on reform? what would you like to see congress pass to change the way operates?ystem >> i talked about that in a peech in san francisco in august. august. broken.he system was didn't just mean the federal system. we immediate the deal with criminal have in the system. deal with deficits. release ple better and them to become productive citizens and focus on re-entry as el with.

we need to have sentences that are consistent with the conduct the particular defendant is convicted of. the 's been a tendency in past to mead out sentences that are frankly excessive. the resource constraints that we have, as i look at the justice department and the that the bureau of prisons consumes, we have to rethink our priorities. we

substantial nature, you would something. >> barney, you're nodding your head. i disagree completely. even then, president bush was democrats voted no and it still passed. they voted no -- the house republicans. >> not the senate. >> 100 foot walk for you the other way. >> the difference between -- just the members of

congress, there was a great difference between the presidential candidates. let's be clear. we weren't stupid. we knew what was happening. go down in will history as the most successful unpopular thing the federal government has ever done. we knew that going in. we didn't know how successful it be.d frankly i think it worked out we thought. there's a fundamental difference between the house republicans, ot so much in the senate, it takes longer to turn it over in the senate, and the democrats as ofthe belief in the function government. the belief that the government ought to be going forward. it's inconceivable that the republicans said, hey, ould have responded in that way. and it's probably more partisanship. t's probably more democrats frankly believe more incumbent government. that's one of the political disadvantages of the time noif government in the government party. ut, again, a majority of the house republicans even after the

stock market fell by 700 plus no the second time around. just -- when we were in the room with hank in that side room off of the room -- was you, hank, myself, and barney. republicans. house they didn't actually believe in it. nd barney gives the fact -- first time we went up for the vote. market.t drop in the and they still voted no. so i don't know what you think a sudden ess all of to the more amenable crisis than the congress -- partly, partly fundamentally ideological. are members of the republican party at the time who yeah, i want's a bad thing but it's government intervention opposed to it.

the ideological resolutism is today. r in the house >> and the senate. >> george bush gets credit for the ideology of his party. >> not going to get too many here.in neil will probably get none in. but i do believe -- i think it was directed at you, not me. believe that rewest are still governed by people who better lieve in a america. in confronted with a crisis of extraordinary proportions, pearl harbor or the fiscal equivalent, they will step up. looking on that hard. hold that thought for a second. you'll is the last thing be saying -- >> no, that's okay. i just want to get to o'hare. > we're going to listen to every word you say now. you worked on a document called the glass plan in

april of 2008 several months before welanded in the student. you met with ben bernanke. you had a plan in place. turned out the be close to the plan. given that you saw it. were t credit that you seen on the horizon, maybe not to the magnitude that you appreciated. think there's a lesson in this that you should have could have gone to congress then. for t.a.r.p., if you will, but for some ability to try to wind down a financial institution. is the lesson in all of this that you have to get there earlier? > the problem is the politics as my colleagues on the panel are talking about. we knew -- go back -- look at history. think of one example when our a bad cy has presented outcome. our democracy is great at a mess. up how hard it is to get people to agree whether or not climate so, who ists and if

should change for preventing it. the calculus for us is when do send the trelzry secretary and the chairman of the fed to the congress because they have their right hands and say if you don't give us the inhority, withe ear going be the great depression. imagine, they say that, the that crisis , no, of confidence triggered by the very ask could precipitate the trying to we're prevent. so the calculus was, we can only when you have maximum chance that you're going to get the authority. unfortunately, it wasn't a grand strategy but it took a ehman-type event to get congress to act. >> just that he was talks about this. was chairman of the subcommittee, i had just become the secretary in 2007. y republican colleagues forget that they ran the congress until i was in the 4, minority. tom delay was not consulting me very regularly. i talked about this. was, i don't think we

could do it. it wasn't just partisanship, ideology on the part of these people. jim hesterling, a deeply man.ervative i spent much of 2008 defending hank and ben over bear stearns. wanted to have hearings and drag them up there and denounce them over bear stearns. a hard enough thing to get done. there's no way -- i agree. there was no way the kind of resolution procedure, etc., with significant government intervention, remember what we have in there. if things getz bad. is going to put them over. we'll put them in conservativeship. not have flown. we sometimes make a mistake of anating washington like it's autonomous bubble. it's driven by sperpgss of voter

sentiment. the t.a.r.p., great success, the hate. we politicians leave a lot to be desired. bargain s are no either. and i used to say that when i was in office. >> barney had a quote -- you may great, the 'm so constituents aren't so hot either. hat's why we never let them near freshmen. >> here's the deal -- you had ideological -- tremendous intervention by the government. step in, get rid of the board of people s and you fire and you take the shareholders' money and you do all of these said, it was a hard enough job for me as -- i an of the committee never wanted to put to a vote being so active. it would have failed in committee. mr. mayor, you famously have now said you never wanted a crisis to go to waste.

i believe christine roemer made a comment earlier. there's a big debate on who made the comment first. we'll give you credit for it. asked, a, what did that mean? b, they wanted to know -- it sounded pithy. >> got to cure that myth. years n that we are five after a financial crisis, given in the country? given the fact that barney said been a.r.p. would have successful but deeply unpopular, would the cry vis go to waste. was there something that should have been done but doesn't. >> i made two points -- never a good crisis to go to waste. the opportunity to do two things would not herwise have done. we're here to talk about the financial crisis, but landing on president's desk is also an auto crisis. went to seeition, i

president bush and josh bolten and they worked out we're going $24 billion to the auto industry out of t.a.r.p. which was really only for the financial. auto industry but that's ime the g.m. and all the runway they're going to get. auto bailing out the industry at that time was as as bailing out the financial sector. we have a all of the data from obama administration including michigan, hugely unpopular. ow, we cleaned up the auto efficiency. a 16 million cars produced year, they were unprofitable. they're profitable now. there are more people working in the suppliers today than before the crisis. there's all of the decisions to be made from

rationalizing suppliers, making sure that the financial and ttee as well as the -- the -- and the organized labor. everybody had skin in the game. everybody had a hand, so to say, on the bloody knife. the auto industry today for lot more a competitive than it was prethe crisis. used as a crisis that was to resolve decades-long decisions that were deferred, and finally made. and so on the financial side, we're far better than we were in the beginning. the ford auto plant added a 1200 job, 900 suppliers. the plan exports 67 countries of that facility more than any other ford facility in the united states. retooled autoted,

industry where the crisis forced decisions you could not do without a crisis. >> in retrospect, i ask that of the panel, was there a way to make t.a.r.p. palatable.cally i don't know if it would ever be popular. but given everybody on this think, suggests that the t.a.r.p. was a success. public does the not. >> no question. you have done t differently? sticker i bumper thought about using in 2010 but said, ded not to that things would have sucked worse without me. hat's the political slogan -- that was true. but not helpful. things. -- two people thought would have been helpful. we're proud of the work we did in a bipartisan way.

one was whether we didn't go bonuses.e salaries, the >> compensation. >> it wasn't controllable. biggest point when anger almost overwhelmed us was were aig bonuses announced that -- the mobs were with pitch treets forks. i worried about our capacity to govern. so i think we could have done about that. the other one -- hank felt it was important to get the must be butand you would burn this, the second thing people have you use that dn't money for mortgage relief? i had helped sell this bill to who said we would have mortgage relief. we had to get the money out. it with the insistence that the banks do downage relief, we'll slow and cover wit a difference of opinion. he first 350 went out without

that. i said, hank, i'm on the hook here. we need more money for mortgages. said, well, as i remember, i tranche for the second if obama says okay. one thing that political look at is theld extent this was affected by the fact that some of the most decisions taken by the american government were taken in a transition. i asked the obama people, paulson said do what you ask for. the response was we could only have one president at the time. overstatedhought that the number of presidents we had at that time. i was chided by both. but here's the deal. wish we had done for the public policy standpoint more. was eople who think that necessarily popular are wrong. once again, a strong -- hey, i e argument pay my mortgage. going toe hell are you

take the money -- there were ictims of subprime loans, some bought a house. went up in equity and they took boat.loan and bought a in the end, i don't think it would be much more popular? disagree?both you're nodding your homicide heads i think no. fundamental american belief of fairness. you take a risk, you bear the consequences of that risk. had to violate that in order to save the economy. beliefs,olate the core it leads to great anger. the question of whether they be able to act, the fact polarized ess was so in 20208 and we created this by actions that we had to take for the u.s. economy. mr. mayor? >> no way to take a bailout of the banks and make it popular. that's not a dog that will hunt,

to quote bill clinton. not possible. going to stay ugly. ompensation, mortgages, window ressing, fundamentally ugly because you thought the end goal was more important than the politics. >> could i get one thing briefly. in the defense -- this terrible vote was taken as close to an possible. s >> exactly. the other thing is this congress is not part of this. this congress practices black arts and reformer. redistricters.gh representatives pick their voters. upside ned the system down and it doesn't work. >> on what we could have done. shouldn't have picked a

four-letter word to be the acronym. took on a state of being for itself. the time frame was so condensed was so acute, we didn't have the time to do the around the vote. could ad the time, we have made a case that the folks on main street was what this was about. banks. the fact if they were going to go main street, they wouldn't have enough money to open. wouldn't have gone to the banks to get their money out because the banks would be closed. this question is for rahm. >> i would like to give my time to neil. he hasn't said anything. back in one second. at the time the vote went down, the president and then enator were magnanimous about wanting to pursuit t.a.r.p. and support t.a.r.p. the g talked about popularity of t.a.r.p. or not,

there could be an argument made later on once the president became the president, he made a number of comments calling the fat cats, making a umber of comments that were somewhat prejudicial around and the recipients of argue . that some would made the program less popular. do you buy that? >> not at all. wouldn't have i agreed in what i said a minute some d i wanted to have consistency for three minutes. the program was not popular. are two months before an election. i'm a proud democrat partisan. put all of my quote/unquote political aside -- you were there. we were there trying to pass a election a national and the entire house of representatives up. the sense ofact in

partisanship. >> i agree. >> thank you. >> i wanted to put -- number in the first dent speech to congress said if he needed to, you forget this. it out, e you pointed he said he would ask for more not if it was necessary just on the t.a.r.p., additionally, we had a big the white house we were at a point given the stress test and everything else, we may have needed more money. what the market needed to hear at that point was that he was willing to go and get more money need of the the need pre of crisis that he that.d he came to the defense of the financial system as a whole, the financial not system. don't confuse the two. political ing to capital on the thing that's additionalnd ask for

resources than necessary. he's done that with the first united states congress and the senate. the first address to the country. issue he brought up with compensation and bonuses, it was an issue. that n't say anything hasn't been said to those prior to him. >> i think you have the cause backwards.fect the angeron -- the -- money given to the banks, enormous. at the same time, a large number losing their homes. intervening was a much more controversial issue than people thought. people said don't give them money. they don't deserve it. moralying my mortgage and hazard, what if i stop paying my mortgage. months inp people six arrears. why should i pay on time. so here was obama having giving. this policy of

but giving as long, money to the people who had been part of the problem. criticism was probably a political necessity on his part. t was -- an effort to kind of drain off some of the anger. and i will say again, somebody this.one through i am sure in my own mind, we here.two periods it's pre and post the aig bonuses. this from chris. chris got unfairly blamed because he tried to stop the was told he se he couldn't do it retroactively. all of the anger really i think unleashed. political demonization appened, i go to neil, when t.a.r.p. was conceived, you was there for ey

how long? the question is they gave it quickly., very that was not part of the plan. >> our entire goal was to economy from collapsing. we wanted to put as much capital in the financial system and have there. so we designed it to be there years. the rules were changed because of political reasons, the fear the pitch forks came out and they paid it back quickly. there was like the patient the medicine back. the medicine has to work its way through the system. lot of us were concerned when the banks started to pay back as quickly as they did. the was in response to politics. >> the notion that these poor anks that we hurt their feelings, the very rich, well protected people. get over it. i was appalled by their hypersensitivity. business where people say rude things about always the time. that two of the

things we thought were necessary to alleviate public anger, one that drove them. one compensation restriction. people want to be free of compensations. wanted the damned airplanes. the struck by how much ability to fly in your own plane meant to those people and the to rictions on being able -- it was also a political thing. the resident supported it, outgoing president too, a great to nt on george bush's part defy his own party. thesen't occur to us, oh, poor people, people are attacking them. this was not stimulate bid the politicians. a genuine public anger. >> keep in mind, though, a point f fairness, the house republican leadership stepped up. cantor, paul eric ryan. you all -- >> well, actually -- >> they replaced their because they wanted

it to be participants. negotiator. t have >> they had spence and replaced him with blount. came in. >> they had a majority voting against them. >> i understand. give credit where it's due. >> i have to say in my xperience when the republican house leadership really cares, they do the better than the minority of their own party. right. >> i've got serious reservations about that characterization. i think a lot of people went to on monday and voted no because they felt the leadership bill.e votes to pass the they left the floor quickly so they couldn't be gathered back in. that was true on both sides. >> not so much on your side. >> but -- --fundamental >> nobody ever passed political votes on your side. --no >> evading the point. >> on this one -- on this one -- essential points.

>> it's politicians and about politics and that may upset because we're supposed to be talking about finances. since you ask political you're two months before the election. a freebie on the incumbent party. a free shot on goal without a box.ie in the goal the democratic party in the majority -- not unpopular after the fact. unpopular when we debated it. t was unpopular when it was implemented. it was unpopular. you can't put lipstick on that pig. overwhelming. >> if our party voted for something with the incumbent of the other party that would solve a problem and the majority of the republican ongress voted against it even with the president -- their own president in party. that's a political vote two election.ore an if you don't think that's true, you don't understand how the nteraction of economics and politics worked. >> i'm stunned you're not a more forgiving person.

>> i am on a one-on-one basis. i'm very familiar to you. i was locked in the room with hours. 48 >> talk about what happens with bipartisanship at midnight. say?n i jud, you had your own view of your house colleagues where you now full well they were not acting -- forget the leadership, they were not leading their to defend a yes vote the economy. your views they were not olding up their side of the bargain even though some wanted them to. on have plausible denieblt that issue. >> okay. >> what i want you to do. it's in hank's book. maybe you can retell it for a second. you're in the room, it's close to midnight. there too. might be i think barney is there. >> barney. >> so is ram. i would like the deniability now.

this was the crux. the moment. this was going or not going. throwing up she was anxious about what was happening. >> he was concerned. rahm and i were with hank in the anti-room. barney. i went in with the last step was a resolution. the secretary made a proposal. he was in charge. in the afternoon, we were active on this. at 12:00, we couldn't reach an agreement. were throwing up our hands. the three of us in the room. you ahm saying, okay, and and rahm went in to see the speaker. and i don't think this story has been told. i thought it was over. i thought we lost it. e all knew we had to have vthe deal that night because the asian markets were opening the next day and everything went deal.f we didn't have the

ten minutes later, the speaker said, we're going your way, it's over. it's the deal is done. i don't think the speaker got credit. i don't know what happened in that room. me, if she had not done that, there would have been no deal. it. never got credit for >> for that reason, the flight is going to leave on time. let me go back a step. fundamentally, the difference a movement from a main stream conservatism of you, presidents bush to a group that does not accept the notion that the public significant lay a role. the parties at their best, there should be a public and private we fight about where to draw the line. >> that's not the majority of our party. function of our party. >> part of the party that's intimidated the rest of the house.n the

i agree with that. but i think it's the perception of many house republicans. that's where the primary voters would turn out if there was a -- --not >> but why did -- you just saw that happen. > you saw the speaker take it to the floor. >> after a great deal of crisis. with a it to the floor gun at his head. >> that was a pretty big -- head. gun was at his >> we -- >> you brought it up. >> i don't want to get us off on tangent. >> not a tangent. i'm sorry, this is not a tangent. this is not a small thing. have a serious problem going forward in the extent to which a roup of republicans in the house do not accept the legitimacy of the function of the government have the degree that they have. i think it was a factor. as 's very much -- as mar nancy pelosi is concerned -- in 2008, in january, george bush came to us and said we need an the mic stimulus because

economy is in trouble. now a plausible response would is in en, the economy trouble, an election year. let it go. agreed with ly that, but she said, look, we need a stimulus. he republicans won't support spending. they have to be tax cuts. most ill be the progressive tax cuts we have. a fundamental influence given the of the tea party on the sense of how much do you sacrifice with to keep the s government going. in the republican party in the today, there's a diminutive opinion. >> at the risk of not making my flight, you're resolve the president's role and bringing decision to the congress. a lot changed since '08. i are not ush and pals. i had never had a serious george bush.with

but when he sent pallson and ernanke to tell us things were collapsening, we responded not sh moozing with george bush. >> i'm going to go with you on this. barney. t to >> going to start with him and go down the line. of my ey borrowed some time. >> you're generous with that time. >> he's any former chairman. midst morgan is in the of a $13 billion settlement in art related to assets that he acquired in the financial crisis, bear stearns and washington mutual. publicly.aid i'm curious if your view has that d given the details have emerged about whether you're thinking the government fining the company for buying those -- not for buying assets, but for whatever sins happened to those accents purchased during the

crisis with a little bit of push not a lot of a push. >> i would say this. to my f all, washington mutual and bear stearns were not the same. voluntary for j.p. morgan chase and washington mutual. america was forced to buying merrill-lynch. one of if worst ideas he's had, differentiate. with regard to wamu, no. with regard to bear stearns. i think it would be not just unfair, but bad public policy to them for having act with yeszed from serious pressure takethe fnts shl people to over bear stearns.

if each of you individually could have done one thing the crisis, ing either before, after, during, i care, individually on your would it have been? start here. >> i thought about this a lot. i think communications the hardest thing to struggle with. describe it, we had

one microphone but two different audiences. we wanted to project confidence to the markets but wanted the congress to know how terrified we were. but honestly to cat lose them to move. if we let the markets know hower iffed we were, it would have destablized. i don't have a better answer for solve that, but maybe better communication with the congress so they could know how we were. maybe that would have made the political process a little easier. >> i haven't thought about it. fold of in my time things right in front of me. but that said, i don't know if but forcinge worked the house members to put somebody in the room with us so they would have ownership of the final product may have changed vote.ntext of the don't think if they had done that, it would have been accepted. >> jud? >> i have to be honest. i think for my part and my role

whichat i was asked to do was minor since i was just arrying senate republican water, i don't think there was my experience in governor -- we difficult dinarily times, five of our seven largest failed, for example. both sides k i saw working together. >> we got a friendship out of it. each other. we got a friendship out of it. we were locked in the room for a time. >> i agree. i want to make one important point. oh,ause people claiming now, bipartisanship is broken down. there's that problem. it's not systemic. we're not talking about 1920. we're talking about five years difficult times, our structure of government worked well. think the problems have been

political. what i would have done -- one of the things people don't understand are the the ations of being in legislature. you cannot lead from the legislature. analogy.a football the best blocker in the world his quarterback is not going to get the attention of the guy who leads the league sacks. you're supportive, they get credit. that -- i he lead regret not having to work harder or mortgage relief in the beginning not so much to make it politically acceptable but i believe it was a drag on the economy. that was a problem. the reason i didn't was this -- say yes or no. you can't say only yes. hardnviction was i push as

as i could, but i couldn't pull the trigger saying no. answer. s my >> thank you, barney. thank you, to the panel. >> can i say one thing? historic moment. barney used a sports metaphor. that t think i ever heard in all the time that i served with him. >> opening it up to the audience. a young man here with the bow tie in front. state your name. as david said, the question should end with a question mark. eric.name is i'm a fourth year at the university of chicago. i was wondering, i know while there were 435 members of 100 senators, not all of them are experts in economics. wondering what sort of impact that has on any sort of iscussion concerning the economy as a whole and how much that hinders public policy. i don't want to speak to that quickly. he other panel is alluding to

this, mr. schwab alluded to it. i don't think most people in it was coming. i genuinely don't think in my the senate anyone thought this was coming. we're doing business. and this have woke up is on top of them. fascinating situation. involved had been talking a little bit about it. but nobody saw it coming in the congress. reason was to some extent, you couldn't alert people that was coming without bringing it on further. that was neil's point, yeah. he way congress works is there's deference to experts. only a small number of experts issue. basically you know members of congress say as you get there, the igure out who are people who you trust, whose values are generally your values goals and then you go -- you follow them on the issues where they are experts. think is often the

case economic as well. he situation here was this transcended that. genuinely, each side has the people with the expertise. shots and the two sides follow. >> the congress theish the ouse, is set up to be specialist based on your committee assignments and the senate is a generalist. same kind ofve the distinction. a echo ink that there's of what barney said. few people -- colleagues will turn to for judgment and no background. i would say also this -- not a lot of people even outside congress that had major rience with the financial meltdown. the most recent experience as a was a sector called the industry.nd loan

without banks, investment banks, the financial system and insurance companies. congress, the expertise, we didn't really have it in the country. it didn't exist. be honest, guys, we're making it up as we're going on pants.at of our that's true for us in congress, he administration, as well as experts outside commenting. did well. e >> here at the northern trust. t.a.r.p. additions of were short on specifics, as memory served. a relatively brief document with a very large number in it. i have a question, first olitically as approval was contemplated, was this lack of detail one of the reasons why senses was ood difficult. and one of the pivotal moment lsz i think, as we think back on t.a.r.p., it had been intended first to purchase bad assets of investors nd find

behind them. then pivoted to being a bank recapitalization tool. what point was that decision made on? on what basis? sure.l, he original bill was three pages but never intented to be a full bill. that was a description of the we needed. that we sent it to authorities and say this is what we need. craft a bill. the interpretation of that in the press was this was the full bill. intended to be the full bill. moved in lightning speed two weeks for the gotority ultimately when we it, which was extraordinary. but two weeks, the market beneat our legs. we went in there trying to buy the assets. collapsed, we had to move much, much faster. o our credit and the congress' credit, we designed the authority to be broad enough to make those kinds of decisions if we had to without going back.

you mentioned spenlser bah chuls. he was the leader of the minority at the time. oneng up the assets, he was of the first to raise the notion of how about a capital infusion. consensus. no fight. let's give the secretary the ever, ty to do which boat, sub mix. we now there was a necessity to do something about compensation. the senate talked about the need for some kind of repayment. sublease, it became a little bit controversial. but the notion of going from buying the assets to capital out of the w conversation and there was general agreement. we don't know what will happen. to do the authority what's most sensitive. no criticism that i recall that -- when was the

decision made, as i recall, passed e bill had been and the secretary had the authority. >> shifted gears from a three-page document to a long document is when the decision senate bill the thursday morning. big mistake. we spent most of thursday trying to clean out the senate bill. to the flexibility. thatrecall, the only thing secretary asked of secretary paulson, he wanted a lot of money and total flexibility. those were the standards we were fight for. >> a couple more questions today. you have the mic. year in the majoring in sciencist -- they're regarded as facts where it worked for ronald ray work now.ll

how do you reck size the past ideologiologies into plan that's current and can help the current crisis and pass through the government. >> i'm troubled that we're not doing that. to about to submit a comment the residential mortgages very appears to bewhat the major proposal. we talked about it before. are in the process -- it looks like it, their favorite away with risk do retention and home mortgages and securitization. we set up three categories of mortgages. it pretty much impossible to make them. the great majority that you're keep 5% of the ribs. ones that are r

rez epaid and have no redengs. i don't know how people could a major otten what disappointing,was i think it was to change it. this, people. both the banks and the advocacy groups, nay ear channeling a "wall street journal" article attacked me from subprime keeping me from buying a conservative umbrella. to do n't found a way that effectively yet. >> neil mentioned democracy is ood at fixing problems but not good at heading them out. the panel talked about the issues of government involvement industry that are sort of ongoing. can you think of -- like

bravi -- is it a institutional issue. how should the government go about making sure that you have on the horizon now? is it possible? >> human civilizations are prone to mass delusion. it's funny but not funny. i bought a house in 2004 and 2005. i didn't see the bubble connelling. fw we had a camp -- i'm going on mortgage spending. members of the panel would be keptged their members were from the american dream and first time homeowners would have outraged. it's hard to see something when no one else sees it. uman history is full of financial crises because as a society, we're prone to delusion probably happen

again. your on't think so to question, take two events. in 1983, there was three months social security trust fund being able to pay. window the three-month to force a set of decisions that reagan and tip o'neill worked on. that is true hing at one level but i would misagree. i don't think our congress with photoed, ayed, more over time it would be more thoughtful. crisis to move. i think we all three -- maybe there's a consensus, maybe there all of those are in our own economic self-interest immediately and long term. how are we doing to resolve them? you need a moment to crystallize and force an action that when thoughtful, you can

see it in front of you. that is how the political seasonal works. on the other hand, this gets to what it provides a roadmap and a set of goals. move people toward. process works. creating that moment is what the leadership can create to actually come up with solutions a little ahead of schedule. >> in defense of democracy, i do not see it doing a much better either. i would not blame democracy but to the human foresight and being sure about what will happen. >> we are almost out of time. >> really quickly. neil, you made the point of invoking confidence in financial markets and here in congress. is that the lack of