understanding education is a huge component of making it all work on a watershed scale. hispanic i encountered this issue as a political level working as a political consultant to the un assisting the afghan government and addressing the afghan national development strategy and the afghanistan compact in 2,005 2,006. and what i found is that there is a very high level of mistrust at the highest levels of the afghan government in the water issues and in particular, there was a proposal to put in the contact something about afghanistan signing agreements with its neighbors which is actually required under the international law to get the project and levels of suspicion was so high that i was removed

from the document. so i just want to emphasize the fact security, confidence building are likely to be necessary before we can move on to implement these ideas where there are good technical solutions that may be waiting that where the suspicions are extremely high and the stakes are very hi. >> if i can add one thing in afghanistan i'm sure you saw this. the different ministries play their cards close and hold them close to their chest the ministry of water and culture irrigation livestock, moral rehabilitation and development all have different interests and water and there needs to be different communication among them even in the united states we find those interagency dialogs. quickly i'm going to go to the audience. adjust your sense of what's going to happen next year.

whether afghanistan is going to make it after these elections and whether the u.s. and nato will be able to withdraw and peace. >> i've never claimed to be an expert because i've never been there. and i -- after what we've been through the past couple of months, i would hesitate to make predictions about the future in the united states. however, i am confident they will produce a result that will be recognized as a government. and that at least as long as the absolutely necessary financial support to the salaries of the security forces out of the government go a along. there will be plenty of political crises and other emergencies but there's not going to be a collapse of the state as you saw after the

soviet withdrawal. the regional situation is radically different. there is a regional consensus even including pakistan and strongly including china, which pakistan would like to alienate. there should be the taliban government in afghanistan. there are differences on what will become of him them should play in the future set up of the country. i would also add one other factor which is that i have extensive personal relations with the members of the political elite in afghanistan and of course there are many things they do that they don't tell me about. but i have observed a huge change in the past 13 years in their relations with each other something which isn't often commented on 13 years ago they didn't know each other. their relations were yelling at each other over the radio. now including the people who are

political, they all know each other and have worked together. prior to the election all of the candidates were running with each other and met each other extensively to talk about the rules for the game and how to resolve it and i'm confident that however disputed the outcome may be those people with their relations with each other and the right international support will be able to find some kind of a settlement even if many of them were not that happy with it. we have a lot of experts in this audience, which is great. >> thank you barbara and to the panel. i have a two-part question the first one directed to fatemeh talking about the pakistan iran pipeline. there have been concerns if and

when the pipeline is ever completed even in the first leg of the iran and pakistan if there will be enough gas available to put into the pipeline. if you could comment on that. the second question is addressed to both you and barney. this deals with the role of the groups in the region and whether there is still official support for these activities and what role pakistan plays in allowing these groups to address its territory as very clear-cut or is this something happening in despite of what the government of pakistan would want to happen happen. >> to the pipeline first. of course that is a fact that from any, you know, any

resources you would see that the scope is limited. the problem with iran is that they have failed to invest for 34 years. if 100 of what they have in the program and the ways and means to store the nuclear site they would be in better shape. one major problem is gas is evaporated from the south park because they don't have the means to restore it. so one way for them to -- the right way actually to find the

closest route and that was pakistan obviously that could have the major and very good project also involved. at this point, for every day that is delayed in delivering about, they are all losing something. not just money but the gas because they cannot just store it. i'm not an expert in the technical terms in regards to gas and oil, but they have other alternatives. they concentrated heavily. the targeted pakistan and afghanistan, india and obviously that is why i called it the lion's tail and mane. so they have done a lot

providing pakistan with $500 million to start the project and they are getting impatient. but i doubted they doubt they would do that. i personally think it would just go on and on and they would reach negotiations and to sanction would have a major impact on what happens with the peace pipeline. can i just mention -- the leader was hanged in 2010, and the manpower during the insurgent group is not clear. no one knows how many people they had. there is a fine line between being involved in drug trafficking networks and freedom. they haven't claimed freedom.

after the leader was hanged in 2010, almost 17 groups came out. the insurgent groups came out. they suspect -- they openly announced they have expanded and the iranians claim the group is by the saudis with stability in the region and to drive that instability to other parts of iran.

i hope i answered your question. >> did you want to say something quite. >> just briefly which opposes in the context where afghanistan, pakistan and iran meet. it's a largely nomadic people like many transported people they are involved in what we call smuggling and they call trade. and the relations with the government are ambiguous. afghanistan hasn't had an internal problem primarily because afghanistan has supported the rebels in both iran and pakistan. pakistan is now going through it as the insurgency in baluchistan which is a second nationalist insurgency which is in conflict with the taliban both ethnic and

ideological lines. the intensification of the ideological part of the regime under a minute led to more discontent among the populations of iran including. the united states may be supporting the pakistan, the baluchistan insurgency from afghanistan iran has charged that pakistan and perhaps the united states and saudi arabia may be supporting the iranian baluchistan inside iran. the truth of these very charges is rather murky. however as a part of our policy in this administration, one of the measures that we tried to take early on in order to send a

message to iran that the us presence in afghanistan was directed at the stabilization of afghanistan and not iran was to make it clear that the united states did not support, and though it took quite a long time to get the interagency process he was declared a foreign service organization in 2010. now bear in mind the wall does not require the united states government to declare any organization that meets the criteria a foreign terrorist organization. there's political latitude as to whether it is a good idea or not and there were people in the government argued that regardless of the empirical merits of the case that wasn't the time to do something that iran might consider a concession concession. he did do it but it was less than all the noise of the other us iran relationship ended in a function as a confidence building measure. in the current nuclear

negotiations however given the reactions that they are likely to cause in the saudi arabia and israel could very well be. perhaps you've already seen a factor in further aggravating the situation in particular because of the potential for the saudi involvement or the perception of the involvement. >> with the microphone and say your name, please. >> i have the american foundation right now former diplomat. i will start with water if you don't mind quickly. now, what's the situation looks like and i think that you have slid right to it there is mistrust and a lack of political will because afghanistan and the government feel vulnerable and they don't have the type of -- they don't feel secure enough to be able to address it. so i think that part of it has to do with the fact that we

don't have the capacities domestically to deal with this issue and especially at the top level of the government. and there is probably a lack of knowledge which translates to in action. nobody wants to touch this because they think it is a hot potato. and i have a question for barney barney. going back to iran. if you think that iran for example over the next few months joins russia china, india by not opposing and tolerating it what impact would that have on the conciliation of the taliban on the april elections as well

as the compensation forming the grouping of the governments concerned. as bad as far as the political will and the complications of the situation when he was the head set up some watershed organizations to help maintain a continuity across the watershed across the implementation of the plan it's very provocative and very hard with an even afghanistan. they have helmand province which is facilitated by the international forces and in opportunity to bring afghans together to discuss the

situation. in that meeting it was the first time that they had sat together to have this discussion. historically and culturally they were connected with kandahar. it was an interesting at the end of that meeting the people at home and who were upstream. we understand your concerns and we will form a committee and i think that was the last. >> i wouldn't predict a quick change in the position verbally because of the ideological role in opposition to the united displays and legitimacy of the

iranian regime. but the hard-liners have tried to rig a position to the united states almost into a sixth pillar of islam although it isn't mentioned in the holy koran. therefore, it would be hard to walk back from the verbal opposition. however, if the nuclear negotiations to continue to progress then the perception that an american presence in afghanistan is a direct threat to iran will definitely be reduced. and therefore, i would expect that regardless of the evolution of iran's policy it will not undertake active measures to dissuade afghanistan from signing the agreement or make life more difficult for the american forces. and i'm sure as the actions will be read clearly in afghanistan throughout the region.

within afghanistan's political elites in the current system as far as i can see there is a consensus in favor and even those who iran regards do not echo the position on that or i should say more precisely. from time to time one of them has said something to keep the money flowing from iran but they do not say it with any conviction. they seem to be mobilizing the followers that or anything like that. so, i think that to the extent that it is a settled issue and it is not part of the debate it will not be a factor. it's important for the taliban because the legitimation of the

struggle is on the basis of fighting the foreign occupation. if i can just summarize some interactions with people what does and what to say the peace camp in the telegram and the current negotiation they say similar to iran that the presence of the us troops what they political agreement about afghans impossible because they can't believe that there is a reasonably level playing field as long as the us and international security is supporting those who are in power now but therefore the troops should leave and then this would be very easy for afghans to reach an agreement. of course if the united states believe that that of course we don't believe that. i'm not sure the telegram believe it either.

so the argument back to them even is well we don't believe you. we don't believe that will happen. therefore as long as there is a political settlement. if there is a political settlement, then of course those troops are only there by the agreement of the afghan government. if at some point the afghan government doesn't want to of course i think the united states would be very happy to take them away. i want to emphasize the united states is not seeking that agreement totheagreement to have the projection capabilities and south and central asia. they have those military bases in afghanistan as the most expensive ways to have that. if anyone has ever tried to setup and manage a military base in afghanistan with no. >> i'm going to take three questions. the gentle gentleman in the front row.

>> from the afghanistan council i have two comments. one is that iran does have territorial problems in the west with iraq. they went to war and in south asia the problem created in 2,001 the treaty was a sensible pragmatic one from the afghan side. but surprisingly there was a true a few months later because the communists opposed to. when there was a re- approach but with the president then there was another coup which leads me to the point that it's crucial for 2014 for afghanistan to have a sensible government. and as a matter of fact i know of at least one or two candidates for the future for

this water negotiation. so it's there. it's not that it doesn't exist it just needs international backing. >> the former intern that wrote a paper that we cite. >> we also have two questions. first for doctor rubin. the way they are going to policy tends if the iranians then do get on the table how do you think the pakistanis and the politicians who had iranian money etc. but if you have the iranians and a small foot on the door -- in the door. and my question to the doctor mac is what are the international organizations because when you are talking about iran or any organizations

doing work on the ground or information exchanges between the two countries etc.? ....

>> to the rest of the world and no one is helping them out either. so the u.s. could potentially play a bigger role perhaps helping afghanistan. >> short. one of the issues -- i'm glad you brought it up is poppy crop. afghans have been involved in wars for decades now, then you don't know if you're going to be meeting the next five years. you just have other agriculture products which is something that profits and is basically short term and you would not use anything if you have to leave. so how did iranians trying to help trying to help afghans taking them agriculture communism switching to other

products. i don't know how close are following that but it would contribute basically to helping afghans, and helping afghans with water management would definitely help afghans switch to other, you know move away from poppy crop. that's actually one of the things iranians are asking a national commission to involve iranians because they claim they know how to do it. >> thank you for that question. as for the international groups working with the world bank, food and agriculture organization's to install so monitoring stations. problems of the monitoring stations get put in. there is not specific maintenance. you can collect all the data in the world but if you don't have any analysis plan, what's the

purpose? that i've been watching. a lot of times asian development bank seven funding as well as in just put in wells across the country. however, there are some ms. glenn metrics because many times those groups are interested in the amount of money they can obligate and the number of jobs they can create but the true sustainability of the project from representative, everyone instruments the project they want to do and there's no -- how you want to back that you may not have it. and truly finally other in national organizations that are working with the environment, as barbara alluded to very early in this, there is an internationally recognized wetlands area at the border with iran and afghanistan but however since 1999 timeframe is been severely degraded to a lot of this is because of climate issues. there's not water going into the system.

a lot of that is tied to management of water or mismanagement of water. >> barney, final thoughts? >> first just about drugs. just repeat what's been said before. the adoption of poppy cultivation and its concurrent trafficking is an adaptation to insecurity in afghanistan. that's what all the study show. it will not be eliminated as long as people are insecure. there are provinces with strong governors in afghanistan that have a limited optical commission. no one has a limited drug trafficking. it cannot be as long as there so much insecurity in the country. nice to meet you off the internet. if understood your question correctly, it was about whether pakistan would react negatively and perhaps disruptively to greater iranian involvement.

pakistan's involvement in afghanistan is not motivated by its concerns over iran. pakistan's involvement in afghanistan is motivated, first by its internal concerns by its own unity. second, i threat from india. pakistan's actions in response to those perceived threats -- in response to perceived threats have it generate an arena response the pakistan iran conflict is not the main issue. i think, i should also add iran's ambitions in afghanistan are limited. in contrast to pakistan i would say iran's means to influence events in afghanistan are probably greater than its ambitions, whereas pakistan's means to influence events in afghanistan has been considerably less than its ambitions and pakistan is therefore, going through a very

difficult process of trying to adjust its ambitions to israel capabilities. and a time when it's also internally and tremendous turmoil as well. >> thank you so much. thank you to our speakers. i think -- i've many more questions but i'm sure you all do. this is a great beginning. thank you so much for coming. [applause] >> [inau

why they're willing to negotiate. i mean, look, i was there and i voted for these sanctions. we voted for these sanctions in order to bring around to the negotiating table. now that they're there, you have to act in some good faith in an effort to be able to move towards the goal you wt to achieve. if, as their act of good faith, they freeze their program and allow us absolutely unprecedented access to inspection and do other things -- i'm not going to go into the list. but if they do the things we believe is necessary so that we can guarantee we know what is happening and we can move it back while we negotiate the end game, it seems to me you've got to do something that indicates your good faith.

now, the president has made it clear, he will not reduce or change the overall core architecture of the oil sanctions, banking sanctions. iran will still bend enormous pressure precisely to complete the task. i think there is a lot of hype d an awful lot of speculation about what is going on here when all that is happening is an effort through the sanctions congress put in place to get negotiations when those negotiations hopefully produce