>> you have some significant experience of acquisitions. >> what you envisioned trying to install homeland security to improve our acquisition process and hold it accountable, number three, in terms of i.t., which is a problem for all of us in the federal government. it is two and a half times worse than that in the private sector. can you comment on what you ourd envision as firming up acquisition protocols and our capabilities -- and also holding people responsible for when they flub up. >> i think it starts with quality personnel.

at the department of defense i saw a statistic that suggested we are losing quality personnel in the acquisition community. reflected in some of the results we have. i think quality personnel, for starters. i.t. is a world we are getting into with increasing frequency. we have some issues there across the entire federal government. ofecognize the importance an efficient, quality acquisition program for the benefit of the taxpayer. i know it is something i am going to have to focus on. i have read enough about the problems teach us has had over the last 10 years, senator. thank you. >> i have a couple of questions. unableof our colleagues to be with us today is senator mary landrieu, whom i know you met with.

a hearing on a small business committee. she hoped to be able to come and ask some questions and express her support for your nomination. two issues that we really really drilled down on, one of those is cybersecurity. it is a very important issue. it is one i am not going to drill down into great extent they. i talked earlier about homeland iturity as a team sport, how is a team effort. cybersecurity is as well. it is not just the federal government, it is private sector's, state and local, as well as individuals. the department of homeland security does play on that field, as you know. we are working with the administration, working with the

private sector to try to charter a path forward. i think one of the smartest things via ministrations did when the president, gated his executive order on cybersecurity, almost a year ago -- in charge of the department of commerce. for are the best practices protecting our critical infrastructure? the private sector has been concerned there is good to be -- the government is going to tell us what to do and mandate our best practices. the private sector for the most part is not interested -- they want to be fully involved as partners. i think you're doing a nice job of that outreach. they're working on their framework, as you probably know. the conference of security several legislation says the

department of commerce is actually doing a good job. there are things the department of homeland security needs to do. we have been working for months on issues including security management, issues involving the ability of the department of homeland security to track the kind of skilled and talented employees they need in this arena. to better defend ourselves in the cybersecurity space. also how do we do a better job in sharing ideas so there won't be an attack on our electric grid or telecommunication systems, financial services systems -- financial service systems. once they have a chance to get confirmed and get your feet wet,

i probably want to spend some time with you to talk about that. it is real important, as you know. the other thing you raised in one of your comments, i worry about al qaeda, their affiliates, we all do. i worry about the folks that and go offcalized maybe to other countries and and oury come back here people face real horrors. that is a tough one to do what's. usually when i concluded hearing like this i will ask the witness if they have any opposing comment they would like to make, something that has come to mind. you have had a chance to reflect on what we haven't asked. if you would like to make a

closing statement, this might be a good time to do that. i will say some words i am supposed to state that supposed to say at the end of the hearing . any clothing -- closing thoughts you would like to share with us? >> think you for your time and attention. it has been a real pleasure. all the staff of this committee have been very professional. i have learned a lot from the withesy visits i have had members of this committee and their staff. some people think this process is a formality, a burden. i actually believe in this because you learned the issues that congress is concerned about, what is on your mind, what your priorities are.

occasionally you are able to extract certain pledges from the nominee, which is perhaps a good thing. if i am confirmed, i pledge to have a very open and transparent with the chair and ranking member of this committee. i will dare to predict that after my tenure, people on this -- i hope you say will vote to confirm he. >> to final comments. one of the things i have noticed is when we get somebody in that position, as citizenry have an administration turnover we lose them.

it is theing -- consideration of staying there, if in fact there is another administration, 2016, so that we do not lose the tremendous experience and grain have -- and gray hair. i don't expect you to make a commitment and that. i want to put that in your mind to think about. when we see quality people and quality positions, it should that that it should not matter what party they are in. we need to take advantage of what they have learned and their leadership. i would have an alternative viewpoint and i will present what i think should be your reading. you have probably already read but i would

appreciate it if you take a look at it. it is what we have looked at on homeland security. so i have a present for you. and at this so much point that is all them. >> as i was watching your life carefully, watching i thought she was saying, "don't you dare." [laughter] i remember when we have a -- she wasn hearing younger than your son and daughter. , take a lookying at your children because this is the last time you're going to see them until christmas. they kind of latched.

they weren't sure. this is a real important job. he has -- that is saying a lot. you have fallen into good people. anton does not like to say that about the people that appear for before us -- and tom does not like to say that about the people who appear before us. we need to go to work to get the team around you. >> you need all the help you can get. there is a lot to do and a lot to do beyond all of that.

we are grateful to them and to you. you. great to meet all of i look for to doing good things for our country to the security of our homeland and our people. morale is not good. and we're going to work hard to make sure it gets better. and make sure they get some credit for that. up -- ad out a call call all across the place. mary chairs the appropriations committee. she is a huge piece of this.

just to see how we're doing, see if we can do better. i think this may be a great value for you. i am supposed to go to the official closing script. filed responses by graphical and financial questionnaires and answered prehearing questions and had his financial stations reviewed by the office of government ethics. without objection this information will be made without section -- without exception of the data. objection, the wreck will be kept open until noon tomorrow. unless you have anything -- all right, i know it is not christmas yet.

thank you very much. good luck, god bless. >> c-span's wrote in the white house coverage continues today with two events. governor martin o'malley is the keynote speaker at the new hampshire democratic party's jefferson jackson dinner in manchester. we will show you remarks earlier in the day by 2012 vice presidential candidate paul ryan. the wisconsin republican is speaking at a birthday party fundraiser for iowa governor kerry branstad. all that and your calls beginning live at 7 p.m. eastern.

>> on the next, washington journal, the future of the health care law. weekly standard staff writer, michael warren. then an update on the negotiations of iran's nuclear program. feinberg, the chair of the john f. kennedy library foundation. he looks at the life and legacy of the president ahead of the 50th anniversary. watch and to journal is live every morning from 7 p.m. eastern. -- 7 a.m. eastern. >> i started with teddy roosevelt. i needed another story. out theigured difference between the two, it was teddy's public leadership.

i started reading about the progressive era. these guys stood at the center of it. historians would say these are the people of the vanguard of the progressive movement. he came into my life. >> roosevelt, taft, and the muckrakers with doris kearns goodwin. >> and now a hearing on a bill that would require data disclosure from the national security agency on the data it collect some american citizens. minnesota senator al franken, the author of the surveillance trance parents see act of 2013, chaired the hearing. -- surveillance transparency act of 2013, chaired the hearing.

>> are you ready? hearing will come to order. welcome to the senate judiciary subcommittee. i am proud to say two weeks ago i'm being introduced this bill with senator dean heller of nevada. we will be hearing from him and a moment. this bill is urgently necessary. americans are also naturally suspicious of executive power

and americans tended to think that power is the nib used. this is -- power is being abused. months now there has been a steady stream of news stories about the nsa surveillance , igrams and yet right now law, americans cannot hit the get mostc -- cannot basic information about these programs. to this day americans don't know the actual number of people whose information has been collected under those programs, they don't know how many of those people are american, and they have no way of knowing how many of these americans have had their information actually seen by government officials as opposed to being just held in a database.

the administration has taken good steps in the good faith to address this problem. i am afraid the steps are too little and they are not permanent. have no way of knowing whether the government is striking the right balance orween privacy and security whether their privacy is being violated. i believe there needs to be more transparency. a bipartisan bill to address this will require that the nsa disclose to the public how many people are having their data collected under each key foreign intelligence authority. nsa estimate the how many of those people are american citizens or green card holders. and how many of those americans have had their information looked at by government agents. bill would also list the gag

orders on internet and phone companies. youe companies can tell americans general information. right now, as a result of those, many people think american internet companies are giving up far more information to the government than they likely are. the information technology americann estimates cloud computing companies could lose $35 billion in the next three years because of concerns of their involvement with surveillance programs. forresterics firm puts it much higher at $180 billion. companies have litigated and secured permission to publish limited statistics about

the requests they get. , too little and not permanent. my bill would ensure that the american people have the information they need to reach an informed opinion about government surveillance and it would protect american companies, losing business over misconceptions about their roles in these programs. i am pleased to say this bill is the leading transparency bill in the senate, supported by a strong coalition of tech companies and civil liberty groups. has gained the support of 12 senators including patrick leahy. i anticipate we will soon be adding our original supporters onto the new bipartisan bill, hopefully with some additional support as well. purpose of this hearing is to make the case before this --

to make this case for this bill and to improve it by getting the feedback of top experts in the administration, privacy groups, and the private sector. theve specifically asked office of the director of national intelligence and the department of justice to provide candid comments on this bill, especially any concerns that they have. i have already added provisions in the bill to protect national security but i want to know any further concerns they have. i suspect i will agree with them in some cases and disagree with them and others. i want to have an open exchange but the disagreements. i want to be clear at the outset that i have the must -- the utmost respect of the men and women of our intelligence committee. i think they are patriots and they have and do save lives and i look forward to starting this conversation. with that i will turn to our ranking member.

.> thank you i appreciate those that will testify today. this is the first subcommittee hearing we have had. i suppose given the rate at which technology develops, this would be an important subcommittee as we go along to try to strike that balance you talked about between privacy issues and national security. hearingorward to this to see if we have this legislation of this bill before us. himme to this hearing with -- with an open mind and realize that this is a struggle the congress goes through continually. i was around when it -- when the patriot act was passed. some said the provisions needed to be dealt with later.

we are continually developing to strike the right balance. leaks havey undermined the confidence that the public has and what we are doing here. forward to more transparency, whether in this legislation or some version of it, or in some other way to make sure people are confident that their public officials have transparency and the best interest of the public in mind here. you.ank this is the first hearing of this subcommittee in this congress. i am happy to have you as the new ranking member of this subcommittee.

i am pleased to introduce my colleague, senator heller. ago we introduced improved versions of this build. i think senator heller's support for this bill speaks to the fact that transparency is a bipartisan issue. some of the best work in the judiciary committee comes from our chairman and others, working with folks like the ranking members center grassley and many others. >> i am pleased to be here today . i want to thank you for holding this hearing and i want to thank you for your leadership. this is a strong bill.

minnesotans and all americans should be provided access to reports that explain the personal communication records. by now most people are aware of the bow collection practices by the federal government that are authorized by the sections of this patriot -- of the patriot act and by amendments of the act. i'm confident the judiciary committee will have a robust to date on the collection practices and whether or not this program should continue. i believe that the bulk correction program authorized under section 215 of the patriot act should come to an end. to joinntly i agree with judiciary chairman lay he is a principal sponsor of senate early of the usa freedom act. while there is disagreement on program continuing, i am

confident all of us agree that these programs deserve more transparency. senatorwhy have joined franken to introduce the surveillance transparency act of 2013. this legislation would call for a report from the attorney general, detailing a request authorized under the patriot act and fisa amendments act. the reports would detail the total number of people whose information has been collected under these programs, how many americans have had their information collected, and how many americans actually had their it -- actually had their information looked at by the nsa. are the more, this legislation will allow telephone and internet companies to tell consumers basic information regarding the fisa court orders they received and the number of users. it will clear up a tremendous

amount of confusion. that is why transparency is included in multiple nsa reform proposals. the usa freedom act introduced by tenets that by senator leahy and myself and the fisa improvement act introduced by senator feinstein. any of us agree on the need for more transparency. we are talking about the --lions of americans stuck of americans as calls stored by the nsa. my constituents can determine for themselves if this program is continuing or not.

thank you for the opportunity to have me testify. thank you very much for your leadership on this issue. >> i am looking forward to working together with you on this. your panel is adjourned. now i would like to introduce our second panel of what mrs.. by unanimous consent in 2009, before the joining the doi, he was a partner with the law firm of arnold and- porter. he worked in the department of justice where he served as deputy assistant to the attorney general in the criminal division. brad is an attorney general for

national security at the department of justice. he served as a career attorney for the past 17 years am including positions at the state department, department of defense, and national security council. he is focused on national security and international law am including intelligence activities and counter proliferation. gentlemen welcome joint written testimony will be made part of the record. if you have five minutes for any opening remarks you would like to make. >> thank you. thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss this very important issue of how to best inform the public about sensitive intelligence activities insisted with the need of national security. thent to say i appreciate support you have shown for the

intelligence community over the last few months. the recent unauthorized disclosures have led to a public dialogue about intelligence collection activities, particularly those conducted under the foreign intelligence surveillance act. that critical to ensure that public dialogue is grounded in fact. we agree it is important to help the public understand how the intelligence community uses the legal authority that congress has provided. the president directed the intelligence committee to make as much information as possible about certain intelligence programs available to the public. since then the director of national intelligence has released thousands of patients of documents. we are continuing to review

documents and release more of them. these documents are all authorized by law and subject to vigorous oversight. it is important to emphasize this information was properly classified. it is being declassified because only in the present circumstances the public interest in the classification outweighs the national security concern. we still have to take those national security concerns into account. in addition to declassifying documents we have taken significant steps to allow the public to know the extent in which we use the authorities under fisa. it is appropriate to find ways to inform the public about this, consistent with national security. --we set out in more detail the government is going to release a gnat -- the total number of issues of fisa authorities.

recognizing that it is important for the companies to reassure their customers about how often or more precisely how rarely the company's actually provided some -- weation, we started agreed that the legal demands they received each year and a number of accounts affected by those orders. i would be glad to discuss that with you in more detail. to the surveillance wensparency act of 2013, have reviewed the bill and shared the goal of providing the public with greater insight into the government use of fisa authorities. we appreciate the effort you made in this bill to try to accommodate transparency and nationals -- and national security. consistent bills are

with the steps we have taken so far. we do continue to have concerns that some of the provisions raised operational problems. set out inrns are more detail in a written statement for the record. i will summarize here and now that they follow two broad categories. while we believe it is possible to reveal information about the number of targets of surveillance, counting the number of persons whose communications are actually collected, even if they are not the target, is operationally very difficult, at least without an extraordinary investment of resources. possiblele, it is not to determine whether a person receives an e-mail is a u.s. person. the e-mail address is nothing about the citizenship or nationality. even in cases where we will not be able to make the

determination, doing the research and collecting that information would perversely to -- theperson person's privacy. it is for these reasons the inspector general of the national security agency and the intelligence immunity have stated in letters to the covers that this kind of information cannot simply be reasonably and paint that reasonably obtain. providing that information could provide a detailed roadmap. reporting wee already agreed to provides the right balance between transparency and national security. -- theto emphasize

president is committed to this, the director of national intelligence is committed to this, general alexander is committed to this. we are open to consider any proposal so long as they do not optimize our ability to collect the information that we need to protect this nation and our nap -- this nation and allies. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you for having me here today. >> we agree with what bob has just explained. we support transparency efforts. billhares the goals of the that you have prepared. concernsome technical about how those proposals can be implemented. i guess i would say a couple of other things.

this is an area where the details much -- details matter. we want to support transparency but do so in a way that is consistent with our national security needs. we have seen a number of documents declassified over the last several months. from the outside it looks very .low these documents involve a lot of detailed classified information and it takes a lot of time to go to the documents to determine what can safely be revealed and what cannot. there are a lot of equities and different components of the intelligence community that have a stake in the information. our transparency efforts are a work in progress. we are trying to work forward in a careful and deliberate way. i don't doubt to the outsider it looks as if it is slow. that is because we are trying to protect national security while also promoting national security goals. the other thing i guess i would , i wouldddition

contrast these two foreign governments. we have, in response to these unauthorized disclosures -- that has memos been the case with other government read i do think we are working in good faith to try to be more open about our intelligence collection. >> thank you. you submit a joint testimony. we appreciate you taking every minute of your time here. there's nothing permanent about what you are doing. what we are trying to do is create a framework where people have a little bit more

confidence people can understand for themselves. iu indicated that both he and may lack the technical ability to -- i find this troubling. we give the intelligence committee broad legal power to conduct surveillance for cicely because surveillance is supposed be targeted -- precisely because surveillance is supposed be targeted. many of the laws that have been explicitly say that you can only use this law to target foreign people. we cannot use it to target persons. nsa --t a bad thing that

it expressly prohibits targeting americans. to preface everything here by emphasizing i am a lawyer, not an engineer or computer scientist. everything gets filtered through that prism. >> we would have you working on something else. >> it is important to differentiate between the concept of who is targeted for collection and whose collections are incidentally collected. because of the legal requirement under section 702, the nsa only targets non-us persons. the research necessary when they have a target to determine if that person is or is not a u.s. person. they need to be able to make that determination.

we are going to look at all of the communications that are collected and we are going to evaluate every single party to every one of those communications to determine whether or not that is a u.s. person. ability to trye to make the determination as to whether somebody is or is not a u.s. person for the purpose of targeting the person. >> i think it estimate can be made through statistical stapling -- statistical sampling. i would like to add to the record two pieces of testimony that suggested that the an assay could be able to estimate how have had their information collected under foreign intelligence authorities .

testifiedexander, you that the nsa employs over 1000 mathematicians, more than any employer in the united states. the princeton professor and former technologist for the federal trade commission said yes to mother government has the ability for the number of citizens. to the number associated by the companies. you want thatony, -- company by company disclosure -- this concern makes sense. i have difficulty reconciling your testimony with the

government's actions with respect to major companies like google. the government lets google published the national security letters it receives each year and the numbers -- the number of users affected. director of nsa and cia gave a speech in which he "gmail is the preferred internet service provider for terrorists worldwide. -- worldwide." that is a verbatim quote. it seems to me of the former head of the cia and the nsa does not think it is a problem to let everyone know that terrorists just love gmail, why do you companycompany by disclosure threatens national security? he evidently doesn't. >> a couple of thoughts on that. he didn't talk to us before making the statements. i don't know that we would have

authorized this statement be made. i just do not know what was done there. if we allow the companies on an annual basis to publish these statistics, it is simply going to provide additional information out there as new companies come online and pop up. you may have a company for a. of years -- a period of years that shows orders, and that conveys messages that we have the capability to collect this now. the more detailed we provide out there and the more we break this down by authorities and companies, the more easy it becomes for our adversaries to know where to talk and where not to talk. agreed to let the companies do is report the aggregate number of times in which they provide information about their customers to the government. that seems to me an adequate way of providing the information

what they need to know about the miniscule proportion of times in which that actually happens in breaking it down further in our view crosses the line of the appropriate balance of transparency and national security. >> we are going to have some testimony from privacy people and from google to talk about that aggregation. i don't think that aggregation is all that helpful because you really are not giving people an , you are mixing apples and oranges. to me it does not create the kind of transparency that creates the kind of knowledge of the american people. the american people a way to judge the program. , i havesk something

nine seconds here and i will try to answer questions. i understand that you think that my bill requires too much detail and government report. i'm going to way that feedback very carefully. i do want to point out that when i drafted the government reporting requirements and modeled them after the wiretap reports at the department of you look at last year's report it breaks down the number of wiretaps not just nationally but by specific jurisdiction and then breaks down those numbers by the nature of the wiretap. there was an order for mobile phones 48 times before 2012. is a wealthreport of information. nobody is arguing that criminals in manhattan are reading the wiretap report.

they're less likely to get their phones tapped. my bill would not even require anything near this level of reporting. any time a number of americans the reporthan 500, would say fewer than 500. why wouldn't this raise national security concerns if the far more detailed reporting wiretapents in doj's does not raise public safety concerns? >> that is a good question. the regular wiretaps don't involve classified techniques. there are platforms we use an intelligent context. it is unknown to anyone outside executive branch as to whether we can collect on a particular medications technology.

>> the disclosure would not be talking about technology other than it is on the internet or phone. demo we think our adversaries can surmise -- we know that there is a company that has a particular number of surveillance requests. that number is published. new introduced a capability, a new service they provided. all of a sudden that number goes up dramatically in the following year. is something adversaries could glean information from an surmise as to whether we have the information to collect on new technology. that is what i was talking about that is different and the wiretap. a basic phone cap is something you can do. your questioness about anna sells. the reason they are different

than other collection racket -- other collection methods, that is collection records. you are not intercepting to medications in real time -- in real time. >> thank you. i think the ranking member for his indulgence. please continue. >> that has been useful. if you could grill down a bit in terms of increased manpower and what it would take to actually make some determination of the whoentage of individuals are surveilled. how would that look like without revealing more than you need to reveal?

would that take to actually go through and determine what percentage? >> i can offer any sample to that. the chairman made a recommendation to the fisa court 2011,n we released from which involved a compliance collectionnder the in section 702. nsa did do a statistical sample to try to determine how many domestic communications may have been intercepted through one portion of this collection. -- adid ace this statistical sample where they reviewed 50,000 communications, which was a very small percentage of that. my understanding is it took a number of nsa analysts about two months to do that in that even in that regard there were a number of instances where the sibley could not come up with the necessary information and

that the actual information ended up with numbers in a wide range based on a lot of assumptions. that was actually an easier task than the one that is being asked here. they were looking for a holy domestic medication. if at any time they found a communication where there was one non-us person, they could immediately throw it out and not look at it any further. did go through and look at every civil parties every civil communication to determine whether or not it was a u.s. person. i think that example gives us a sense of the resource intensive ness that would be required and the difficulty, even if you apply all those resources, and coming up with reliable numbers at the end of the process. >> you maintain that it would probably lead a lot of resources away from the main task just to comply with this provision?

those mathematicians have other things they can be doing in protecting the nation instead of going through and tried to count u.s. persons. >> you mentioned they have a greater impact on privacy to actually drill down and determine who is a person and not. you have to search what other to medications of come to this person can you explain what you impact more on privacy and complying with this law? >> their mission is to collect foreign intelligence. it is not what they ordinarily do to try to find u.s. persons. them someose upon sort of obligation to identify a

u.s. person, they are going to take a female address that an e- mail address -- an e-mail address and find out more of what they can find from that person. >> we allow companies out there to reveal more than they were able to reveal before. google has procedures they follow. what other companies have taken advantage of the opportunity they have to reveal more information about what is surveilled and not? >> i would have to get back to and give you the list of companies. you believe microsoft has issued a transparency report with certain data.

facebook, i would have to give you the complete list did i can give you the information about which one are taking advantage of the government's offer so far. >> i am sure we will learn more in the next panel. it is to my understanding that all of the -- how universal is the request or the ability to give broader or more information about what is being surveilled and was being collected. >> i think it is fair to say that a lot of the major service providers do want to provide --e information about their about how their users are affected by government surveillance. we work with them on the proposals that bob described, which is that we would release the aggregate number of law enforcement demands. i think they found that useful at the time.

they put out press statements identifying those numbers and showing that that was a tiny fraction. in most cases, less than one 10,000th, it is a tiny tiny fraction of the total user accounts. that is what they wanted to be able to show to debunk the idea that we are engaged in some sort of dragnet surveillance. the opposite is true. it is a tiny tiny number. they were able to do that with the disclosures that we are arrived at that time. >> didn't back to what we were talking about before. in order to comply with this legislation, would you sometimes require more of the companies in terms of trying to drill down how many u.s. persons were affected here, might there be additional concerns from the ? might they bers

more uncomfortable with additional requests? we have minimization procedures in order to exclude u.s. persons. this would seem to be a lot more drilling down. what concerns do others have about this? and should they be concerned about more intrusiveness on the part of government to determine who is a u.s. person and who is not, just for the purpose of complying with the act? i do believe people should be concerned about the greater intrusiveness. i am not sure whether it would require anymore the companies were not. think more likely nsa would rely on its own internal resources. they need some additional -- some additional authority to go back to the companies and get subscriber information.

i would not sure -- i'm not sure it would pose an additional burden on the companies, which does not mitigate the intrusion on the individual. >> he don't anticipate having to go back to the companies and saying we need additional information in order to determine or comply with the law? >> i wouldn't say i don't anticipate it, but i am not sure that it happen or that there would be a way we could do it legally to get that information. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, and i will say we are going to have testimony from .oogle we will hear from them. senator blumenthal. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you for your leadership on this bill, thank you to our ranking member and senator heller. i am a cosponsor of this measure and i want to express my foritude to you

spearheading this effort. generaly embodies the truth that what you don't know cannot hurt you. with the american people do not ,now about much of what you do is an important and essential to andnational security undermine the trust and credibility of the entire program of surveillance and the americanwhat people don't know can hurt them if it becomes the source of mistrust and loss of credibility here and around the world. this bill is very important, albeit only a first step in i propose other measures such as a constitutional advocate that fits with the concept of this bill in terms of

pervert -- of preserving adversarial and accountability measures, as well as greater transparency and accountability in other ways. i would like to focus on the technical issues you have raised. don't these pale in comparison to the objective and are taser mandible with relatively few defined narrowly what those problems are? >> i would say no and no. taking your second point first, judgment of people who have looked at this, not only within the essay but to inspector general's who have also looked surmountables not with a relatively modest

application of resources. it would be very resource respect tond, with u.s. persons, would require additional intrusions on privacy. is that this is not the best way to try way to try e the balance between privacy and national security. understand the view that there is important information out there. but one of the necessities of conducting intelligence operations is that not all the information that might be of use to the public is going to come out in public. i think that our view is that the steps we have taken our appropriate ones and we are prepared to work with the committee -- >> i don't understand, and forgive me for interrupting, but my time is limited. i don't understand what resource -- you know, that is a code word.

is used to say it looks pretty difficult to do. it looks like it is going to cost a lot. how resource intensive, really, is it to accomplish these purposes? that we haveow done an actual cost estimate. the only yardstick i can give you is what was required to duties smaller and easier task that was done in connection with the fisa court opinion that , i believe, half dozen analysts two months to do, and still come up with an estimate that had wide ranges in it. maybe you can give me some idea of what those ranges are. >>if you give me a second. this will not come out of the senators time. >> it is a long opinion.

it is going to take me a second to find the right place. >> sorry. i should have marked this in advance. as i said, the issue was to what were wholly domestic communications, which as i said was a different task. review, theyf this determine that there were between 1000-5000 communications . so you have a five fold range there. there are other estimates here that say it would not be any greater them this number, but it is all based on assumptions and estimates. i don't know that there is any number that we could accomplish

this with any degree of reliability. >> you have given me a number for the communications, but not a number for the dollars, to put it over simplistically. how do you measure resource intensity. >> you have to look at the number of people who would be required any amount of time required. >> and can you give us some idea -- >> like i said, the only metric required,the number and my understanding is it would be six analysts in a certain time. you would have to multiply that across a larger sample, a much more difficult task, and additional size authorities. of are talking some number man years that would be required to do this. you.ank let me just move on in the interest of perhaps anticipating the testimony we will receive from the next panel. i don't know if you have had a

chance to review that testimony, of itr example, a lot concerns the impact on internationally. i wonder if you could comment on the very compelling testimony need for transparency the trust and credibility that is important for communications worldwide. had a chance to review the other testimony. i think we have a lot of sympathy for their position. the unauthorized disclosures that have come out have put them in a difficult position. it is one of the many things we regret about these disclosures. said that, as brad mentioned earlier, we are prepared to authorize companies to release the total number of

orders that they get to disclose customer information and the total number of accounts affected by those orders. that is going to be a miniscule number. as brad said, it is a fraction of one percent. it seems to me that that miniscule number is sufficient to meet the company's needs, and it really does not advance things anyway when they are .001%d to disclose that of their customers accounts are affected by orders to provide information to the government. it does not really advance their .0 001% wereell pursuant to this authority and .00 03% were pursuant to this authority. customer ofis any google or any company, there is only an infinitesimal likelihood that that person's information is ever going to be asked for by the government. >> thank you. my time is expired.

>> thank you senator blumenthal. i am cosponsor of your constitutional act. senator lee. thank you mr. chairman. thank you for being with us here today. much of the testimony we have received today highlights the consequences of unchecked government intrusion into the private lives of citizens and their interactions with private businesses. senator franken's bill would take important steps to increase the transparency of government requests for information, and they very much applaud those efforts. fact, senator leahy and i have incorporated the vast majority of senator franken's provisions into our bill. reforms to ther pfizer protections.

oversight andase accountability and ensure that american rights under the fourth amendment are protected. the reporting provisions in these bills guarantee that we have an accurate understanding of the scope of these information collection .ctivities it is time we started adding more sunshine in this space. , is your support a direct result of a formerly collection process or do you think disclosures are inherently beneficial and should be sought out? >> i think the answer to that is

that aggregate disclosures are a good thing provided they don't compromise our ability to collect important information. i think in a situation we are in , the director of national intelligence has already declassified certain programs and how they operate, it is entirely appropriate to have aggregate disclosures of these activities going forward. for other important intelligence activities, i am not sure we have reached the same balance, but to the extent we are talking about these particular disclosures, we do believe they strike the right balance for now. i know this is perhaps not considered a discrete thing to do, but i do want to take issue that we aregestion

on checked. we are very checked. highly regulated and highly checked. be under the illusion that we are operating without any checks on what we do. >> that is a fair point and i understand your position. what might well be handled by responsible people today to not -- tomorrow might not be. we do not know if it will happen a week from now or 10 years from now. in a sense, we have seen this before. we know how it ends. too much power to it will surveillance, eventually be abused. if i understand what you're

saying, prior to the classification that occurred recently, this might have .riggered your concerns but since as of now been declassified, there is no reason not to do this. and i understanding that correctly? >> yes. >> thank you sir. thank you mr. chairman. >> thank you, sir. i want to thank you gentlemen -- not just for your testimony but for your service. you made the comment that there are checks, but what you do -- that doesn't mean what you do is always appropriate. that is what you we are trying to get to hear.

and now i want to call our third panel. so thank you, gentlemen. kevin banks minute senior counsel and director of the free expression project at the center for democracy and technology. mr. banks and is a longtime advocate and litigator on privacy, civil liberties, and internet policy matters. mr. banks then organized and led the coalition of companies and civil liberties groups that called for greater transparency and then now is advocating passage of this bill. paul rosensweig is the founder

branch consulting and the senior advisor to the chertoff group. deck05, he served as the -- deputy assistant of policy and he teaches at the washington university law school. richard salgado is google's director of information security. a federalas prosecutor in the department of justice, where he specialized in technology related privacy crimes. he has taught at stanford law school, georgetown university law center, and george mason university law school. thank you all for joining us. your complete written testimony of the record.rt you have five minutes for any opening remarks you would like to make.

>> chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of a nonprofit public interest organization dedicated to keeping the internet open and free. ofm from the broad coalition advocates that came together this summer to press for greater transparency. we are grateful for the surveillance transparency act that would require the government to publish basic statistics about how the government is using national security surveillance authority. we believe the level of transparency about what you do and don't do in response to government demands is critically important for three reasons. first, the american people and policymakers have a clear right to know about this so that they may have a more informed debate about the appropriateness of the

government authority and to make sure that those authorities are not misused or abused. the right to have tell us this information. the government gag order that thisnts you from sharing data is clearly unconstitutional. in fact, you will see that at work today in this room. even though everyone in the room understands that google has received this, google is the one representative in the room who cannot say they have received it. third, our industry is projected to lose tens of not hundreds of millions of dollars on the base -- hundreds of millions of internationally based on the surveillance practices. numbers show otherwise, we must take this opportunity to

reform our surveillance laws to better protect our rights as well as our national security. there is concern that reporting will reveal which services have not been targeted by the u.s. government. however, it has always been the who have the companies not received secret national security demands can say that they did not receive national .ecurity demands the second argument is that reporting will reveal which services have been targeted so that users will avoid them. concern rings somewhat hollow such as when keith alexander repeatedly and publicly announced their area believe that they

terrorists are using. saying someone on a service is being surveilled is very different from identifying who won that service is being surveilled, knowing the latter is dangerous to national security. therefore, the less transparent alternative to the bill is necessary to protect national security. on the government reporting side, the dni has announced he will voluntarily publish new statistics regarding how many "targeted" been under various surveillance authorities, but such limited reporting would actually be misleading. for example, the dni reporting for 2012 would only have indicated that around 300 people had their data targeted under the patriot act, but we now know that the government has used section 215 to obtain the phone

records of every single person in the country. such falsely reassuring reporting would do more harm than good. on the company reporting side, advocates for what i will call fuzzing and lumping. that kind of fuzzing and lumping ford be a step back national security, especially considering the companies are already engaged in detailed reporting about what they have received and in some cases are able to produce rounded numbers. no one has ever suggested that that reporting or the detailed reporting the government has done for decades about wiretapping has ever disrupted an investigation. neither would the reporting required and allowed for under this bill or that of -- that provided by the transportation

-- transparency provisions of the act that we strongly support. is nor transparency replacement for substantive reform of our surveillance laws, but it can serve as a key stepping stone toward that broader reform by allowing the public and policymakers to better understand how the government is using its power. thank you. franken, members of the subcommittee. i thank you very much for the opportunity to appear here today. is always an honor to present one's views to the senate of the united states. i should begin by saying that some of the work i continue to limitedhs means i have .hat i can say

that having been said, i will make four basic points. the first is that transparency is a good thing. but unlimited transparency cannot be our end goal. secrecy itself has its virtues in any number of circumstances. one can think of everything ranging from attorney-client privilege to any number of reasons why governments would --itimately keep secrets of that are subject to oversight in a classified manner, either through the oversight of their executive branch, legislative branch, or in some cases the judicial branch. thus, while i fully support the overarching sentiment of the , i think we have

to do it in a calibrated way. i think what we are in search of his greater assurance that activities are in conformance with the laws as we have set them out and not in ways that are in violation of those lies -- those laws. to my mind, the right answer to many of the questions you're asking is how will the transparency you are advocating advance that goal? with that in mind, my second point is that i think the proper response is to require a lot of disclosure of aggregate information. a lot of disclosure with respect to existing programs, but that

government officials are in a better position to know than i am. that further disclosures will disclose sources, methods, capabilities that have not yet publicly been disclosed. indeed, my single greatest constructive criticism with respect to the bill before you ideaey idea that -- the that the disclosure requirements are keyed to statutory programs themselves like section 215 or section 702 and seem to operate in the unstated assumption that we have already learned all the classified programs operating under those statutes. if that is the case, then the transparency keyed to those sections is to be welcomed indeed. i suspect, without knowing, that there are other programs that

have not yet been disclosed either lawfully or unlawfully, least -- it is at plausible that further numbers would lead to the disclosure of programs that have not yet made it into the public record. my third point would simply be that the most effective reforms, i think, are not just enhance transparency for the american public, but more structural reforms, things you can do that are not part of this bill that are part of, i think, what congress can do. nsags like making the inspector general of presidential appointment, expanding the privacy and civil liberties oversight board. those sorts of things don't sound as sexy as greater transparency, but i tend to think that in the end they will actually prove more effective than even the most detailed disclosure of individuated

numbers within various programs. with that, i will conclude and i look forward to your questions. >> thank you. >> chairman franken, ranking members, senators, thank you for the opportunity for the appear -- to appear before you this morning to talk about the surveillance transparency act. i am the director for law enforcement and security at google. in that capacity, i oversee the government response for user information. i am also responsible for working with teams to protect the security of our networks and our user data. mr. chairman, we commend you for introducing the term -- surveillance transparency act of 2013. we believe provider should be able to disclose basic statistics about national security demands we may receive. the revelations about the u.s.

government and other government surveillance practices over the past few months have sparked a serious debate about the laws governing surveillance. google recognizes that there are very real threats that the u.s. and other countries face today, and of course, governments have a duty to protect their citizens, but the current lack of transparency about the nature of government surveillance in democratic countries undermines mostreedom and the trust citizens cherish. it also has a negative impact on our economic growth and security, and on the promise of the internet as a platform for openness and free expression. in the wake of the press reports about the so-called prison program, governments around the world have been considering proposals that would limit the free flow of information. this could have severe, unintended consequences. increased costs, decrease competitiveness and harms to

consumers. proposals like data localization pose a significant threat to a free and open internet. if they are adopted, what we will see is the creation of a splinter-net, broken up two pieces with barriers around it -- broken up into pieces with barriers around it. this act would allow the u.s. to take a first step toward rebuilding the trust that is necessary. protection ared not mutually exclusive. we began providing more information about the volume and scope of national security letters we have received, although in broad ranges. there has been no intimation from the department of justice that publishing statistics has damaged national security. we approach the department of

justice about expanding our reporting to include aggregated statistics about pfizer request that we may receive. we were disappointed that the justice department refused. in june, we filed a motion for declaratory judgment. the doj repeated that it would allow companies to add the number of domestic law- enforcement and national security request to gather, and falling withinas some broad range, but this would be a significant step backwards for google users and the broader public. rather than promote transparency, this would actually ask your important information about the volume and type of all government demands that google may receive, not just national security demands. as i mentioned, google already discloses aggregate statistics about domestic law-enforcement demands and has done so since 2010. publishing future reports where we could only release this type of information in ranges would

provide less transparency than we have now. in addition, there would he know discernible benefit. toeed, google would continue invite continued speculation about the import of the range that we are able to report. we would also lose the benefit of national security letters that we currently enjoyed. short, the doj would not provide the transparency reflected in the transparency act. only one step among many are needed. google, aol, facebook, linkedin, microsoft and yahoo! called for broader reform that would include substantial enhancement to privacy protections and appropriate oversight and accountability mechanisms.

we strongly believe that governments throughout the world must revisit laws regarding access to private communication. this activity must the rulebound, narrowly tailored, transparent and subject to oversight. we look forward to working with congress on the transparency act of 2013 and other reform measures. thank you for your time and consideration. >> thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony. mr. banks and mr. salgado, you have heard witnesses say that it would be very difficult for the government to provide an estimate of the number of u.s. persons caught up in surveillance. do you agree with them? >> i would prefer to talk about what the nsa should be able to do rather than a debate about what they could do. intended to be

limited to monitoring communications of persons outside the united states and have special protections for u.s. persons. therefore, knowing how many u.s. persons have been surveilled, swept up intentionally or unintentionally is critical to understanding whether these are being used correctly, proportionately, and in line with constitutional and statutory limits. the fact that the nsa is claiming it cannot provide even a rough estimates as to how many persons have been swept up in this is quite frankly shocking and points to a need to recalibrate what we are authorizing them to do if they cannot even judge how their activities are impacting the american people. i am alsotantly, disappointed to hear that the nsa has more important things to do than ensure that it is not inappropriately impacting the privacy of u.s. persons.

that should be a core priority of the nsa, one that it should desmond -- should dedicate a reasonable amount of resources to. >> indeed, in the pfizer court decision of 2011, an had been violating its authority, right. and they were able to discover doing the kind of estimation that they did. those had been required earlier, we would have found out three years earlier beingmericans were unconstitutionally surveilled. >> mr. salgado. >> i think it certainly makes sense to explore all the ways we can increase transparency around these programs. we want to be able to do that in a way that is practical, and

reliable. i think it makes good sense to explore the different ways that that kind of an obligation could be satisfied by the government and to take into account the tot that may be necessary incur. certainly, the value of that sort of detail is significant. >> thank you, mr. banks. you organized an impressive coalition of dozens of technology companies and civil society groups all calling for greater transparency and endorsing my bill specifically. it is a broad coalition of the nation's leading technology and internet companies, including google, apple, microsoft, facebook, as well as many of the books. civil liberties could you just speak to why google, apple, microsoft, -- companies that normally compete with each other

are working together on this and what this means in terms of your business? >> yes, thank you, chairman. have seensures we coming out in june and since a great potential for doing serious damage to the competitiveness of these american companies. greatis the potential for damage to the internet as a whole, but certainly, what i think these companies and google recognize is that the trust that is essential to these businesses. it is very important that the users of our services understand that we store their data. we hold it responsibly. we treat it with respect, and that there is not any confusion around the rules where we may be compelled to disclose the data to the government. and when there are rules around that, that it is clear what they

are and that the interaction between the government and google and the other companies as well. this is essential in users ability to trust their data with us. the impact of the disclosures in june are manifest. an anecdotals matter, that customers who may be considering using the rich services available in the cloud are nervous to do so now as a result of those disclosures. this means that companies abroad and in the united states may not eat taking advantage of the efficiencies, security benefits, and all the other benefits of the cloud. it is a terrible result and one we need to address. transparency, among other steps, would help restore the confidence in the cloud and in american companies. >> thank you. i appreciate the testimony. salgado, you heard my

question as to whether or not some companies would be concerned, would share the concern that there would be increased privacy concerns with this -- were this additional information to be gathered. tell me why that doesn't make sense. tell me why you disagree. >> i assume you are referring to the u.s. persons step within the portion.t disclosure >> yes. >> i think i share mr. litt's view that it is unlikely that this would result in any more disclosures by companies to be evaluatione this that would be required -- >> so they have the data. they can simply throw down on their own data without asking you for additional -- >> that is what i would anticipate, sir. >> and revealing more drilling downout on u.s. persons doesn't concern

you as a company, to have that additional information out there that is required in this legislation? >> i think that as we look at the methods by which the intelligence community may address the u.s. persons makes sense to look at that. how do you minimize those additional steps, and do they in fact require intrusions where there were not any before, absent that obligation. banks, did you have any thoughts on that? for all of the general privacy concerns that they raised, there are additional concerns about privacy that would be raised by drilling down on this information. >> i think it is important to note that to some extent privacy is invaded and has been invaded when the government collects the data itself. to say that we cannot make a meaningful estimate of how may people's data we have, how many u.s. persons data we have collected because, to look at some small selection of it, to look at it

would harm privacy, it just doesn't make sense to me. some great, to extent, has already been violated. we are just trying now to get a gauge of how many people's privacy has been violated. >> mr. salgado, you mentioned the prospect of countries walling off their data. how real, how timely of the concern is that? have we seen such moves being taken by certain countries? can you explain a little about that? >> yes, senator, we have. it is a very real threat. we have seen propose legislation and jurisdictions to do just this. severalseen it in in flavors. there is the possibility of requiring data location to store data within a jurisdiction. thatee affirmative laws are often referred to as blocking statutes which would say that companies that operate in this jurisdiction are not cooperate with u.s.

authorities around data disclosure. you see different flavors of these things. they all tend to start to create a network structure, and internet structure that is based on political boundaries, and the idea of a global internet quickly breaks down. >> thank you. that is a concern i think a lot of us have. ability to go across borders that is so necessary for this communication would be disrupted. me just getig, let a general answer from you on this. is the value of legislation like this -- i can see the value of allowing companies to explain more to their users. is there as much value in this check?n additional

what is the greater value in legislation like this? i think the first value is the one senator franken expressed. regularizing that, institutionalizing that is of value. i think everything from four yet statutes.ors general my concern in particular would disclosuree that requirements don't wind up disrupting heretofore undisclosed programs that are of value to us, and that i cannot answer in a generalized manner.

i think it is a case-by-case pacific -- specific matter. and i think it is a decision that should be left to the executive branch in a classified discussion with this body and with the house of representatives. it, by its nature, cannot be a that involves the american people because that, by its nature, terminates the discussion itself. >> thank you. that is been very helpful. chairman leahy has arrived. i would like to add this statement by the chairman to the record. and then ask him to ask his questions. >> thank you. and thank you senator blumenthal. i think more and more people

agree or should agree that we need additional transparency about government surveillance. i think if we don't, we are not going to restore public confidence. i think center franken has been able to build consensus around transparency legislation. i think that deserves praise. i am glad google and other tech companies are planning to support the bill. i think the tech industry realizes we need more than just transparency. we need something substantive in reforms. microsoft, yahoo!, apple, facebook, aol and linkedin signed a letter today supporting greater transparency. they won substantial enhancement , greatery protection oversight and accountability. read that mr. salgado

i introduced a comprehensive ,urveillance reform bill bipartisan, and i appreciate these companies supporting stronger fisa work. mr. sabato, let me ask you, in you,-- legato, let me ask in just enhancing transparency, is that going to be enough to bring back confidence? if we need to do more and we don't do more, is it going to affect u.s. businesses? >> thank you. important stepn to have increased transparency. i do agree that more is needed than that. i think we need reforms to allow users and others to know that the intelligence community and its collection of data is done

under law, that it is rulebound, that it is narrowly tailored, that there is oversight and accountability, and of course, as we have been discussing today, that there is some transparency around it that can bring some trust. despite the reputation of the united states, if we don't do that, it is going to affect businesses. cited a coupleen of studies in the opening statement that reflected serious financial consequences. there is real concern around the entire structure of the internet if this is not addressed correctly. over what my biggest concern is about section 215, phone records. the legal rationale underpinning it has no principle. records arer phone

relevant to intelligence investigations, why wouldn't everything be considered relevant? if that is the case, companies like yours, concerned that trust thato not their data is safe from unwarranted intrusion, does google think about what that would do as far as technology is concerned? >> that's right. the confusion as a result of the june revelations and since then, and additional stories, i think, have led to a real concern both inside the united states and outside the united states about what it is that is happening, what are the rules of governance, what is the role of the fisa court, what are the decisions coming out of the accord, all of those have played clarity. the need for >> especially when nsa handles things so carelessly. they let a 29 or old

subcontractor walk out of their office with secrets, and so far as i know, nobody has even been reprimanded for that. think.ks what do you >> speaking generally, we think transparency is critical to restoring trust in the u.s. economy and the u.s. government. is not enough. substantive reform is necessary. we support the bill you have introduced, the usa freedom act, and we thank you for it and we look forward to working with you movese committee as it forward. >> i am worried about overclassification. is guiltynistration of this. it is easier to classify a mistake rather than try to explain it. can you tell us whether google has received any fisa court orders? >> i am sorry, mr. chairman, i would have to decline that answer until the bills we are discussing today our past.

>> is our country safer because you cannot answer the question. >> i cannot imagine the country is safer because of that. >> thank you. that answers my question. that comeere raised play by company reporting would tip off those we are trying to track, but there is a lot of report of criminal surveillance. his national security significantly different from criminal investigations that we have to have this kind of secrecy? >> i don't believe so, no. in the criminal context we are often investigating sigg -- sophisticated criminals and in fact, often investigating terrorists. thatve no suggestion

revealing information company by company has harmed national security. i think a mining numbers for targeted fisa intercepts with combining numbers for targeted fisa intercepts with the range of national security letters and combining that with all federal, state and local law-enforcement warns, wiretaps, subpoenas and other court orders leads to such a useless number as to be actually detrimental. it is like asking a doctor to attempt to diagnose a patient by looking at his shadow. only the grossest, most obvious abuse, if even that, would be evident. >> i apologize to the professor. i willnot had time, but submit a question to the record. please take a look at the question.

i really would like your answer for the record. it is important to me. >> thank you. >> thank you. >> thank you all for being here today. i was interested in a number of , particularly mr. salgado, that additional measures are necessary, especially in response to , torman leahy's questions not only provide additional transparency, but also ensure that it individual rights are protected. as you know, i propose there be , innstitutional advocate to effect, provide some at the serial process within the fisa court. you know, as lawyers, courts make other decisions when more than one side is presented. very few judges would permit a proceeding before them in which

is presented. the corehey know that principle of our judicial system is that it is adversarial and differingemerges as points of view. factual evidence is presented and that is one area where i the system can be made more accountable, if not more transparent. as well, disclosure of some of that continue to court. right now, it is a secret court that makes secret decisions and secret laws. one of few if any courts in the united states where there is any secret proceedings of this kind making secret laws. , let me elicit your comments

on those kinds of additional protections to our constitutional rights. from the perspective that you all have raised about our need for credibility and trust, .nternationally, in the system after all, the means of ,ommunication, the internet depend on international trust and credibility. it falls apart. so let me ask that somewhat open-ended question. >> thank you, senator. i will be happy to take the first swipe at that. there are a number of proposals being considered. right now, that is a very good thing. needs to be accountability and transparency with oversight. the rules are clear and are

addressed by the various bills. certainly, making sure that a court reviews applications for surveillance, has an opportunity to hear different ideas, different sides, that makes perfect sense. and it is certainly at the heart of most of the judicial proceedings we have in the united states. that is something i think makes a good deal of sense as far as the structural change to the current arrangement under fisa and the obtaining a fisa authorities. the same, of course, is true of understanding the interpretation of the law as it applies. there are certain ideas that i think and help restore confidence that the system works. >> i am actually a fan of the idea of an advocate. the reason we don't have an circuit warrant

application, for example, or in a grand jury situation is because those decisions are ultimately subject to ex ante revue in the criminal proceeding. defense attorney who presents an ad the serial review on whether or not the issue of a war and was with probable cause or things like that. inlack that systematic check becauselligence world of course it rarely if ever results in a criminal prosecution in which that kind about a serial process comes forward. -- of my mind, adversarial process comes forward. so, to my mind, i would want to distinguish between those situations in which the visor court was making a broad

law,mination like the 215 i would like to distinguish that from what i would characterize -- and i admit the line is hard to draw -- routinized applications of the settled law where the value of an adversarial advocate would be , and thenished procedural difficulties that would arise from the cost involved, the time delay, might very well be adverse to national security. couched in a way, i think that would be a fine idea. as for public disclosure, i would look for the same answer i gave in the other context, which is for fighting that we do not wind up with the adverse affect of disclosing here to for that , that asrly classified well would be an advancement in our understanding. i admit that as a hard line to

draw. probably in both instances, the answer would be to let the fisa court make that decision and to authorize affirmatively or direct affirmatively for them to make public disclosures when they think it would not adversely affect national security interests. >> the fisa court's job used to be pretty straightforward. it was a pretty straightforward statute addressing some pretty straightforward technology. now we have the fisa court addressing an incredibly complex and broad statute in the form of the fisa amendments act. we have a rapidly complex of fine technological landscape, and we have the fisa court, rather than simply making bad decisions, creating a body of common law on some of the hardest and most important

fourth amendment questions of our time, sometimes on the basis of what the court has described as misleading conduct by the lawyers in front of them. context, i do believe it is critically important not only to have greater transparency regarding decisions made by the court but also to have an advocate in front of the court who is there to protect the people. and as such, he does support your legislation, senator blumenthal, and we are working with your staff and chairman leahy's staff on the issues that that might bring to bear. >> thank you all. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, senator blumenthal. not to speak for you, but i think that the way mr. rosensweig describes the role of a constitutional advocate is very in line with your vision. --very much so, thanks for very much so, thank you. >> i want to thank all three of

you for your testimony. in closing, i want to also thank the ranking member, senator flake. i want to thank senator heller, , who have lent this legislation critical support, and i want to thank all of the witnesses, each and every one of them here today. we have heard a lot of valuable testimony. there was a lot i agreed with. there were some things i didn't agree with, but i want to leave everyone with this thought. there is no question that the american people need more information about these programs. there's no question about that. , the democracy to work citizens need to have a basic amount of information about the surveillance the government conducts over there a feeling -- over there a theory -- over their affairs. look forward to continuing to work with the administration of my colleagues to make sure we are getting it right.

we will hold the record open for one week for simitian of ofstions -- submission questions for the witnesses and other materials. this hearing is adjourned. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2013] will talk more about government surveillance and oversight tomorrow on "newsmakers." our guest is vermont senator patrick leahy. that is "newsmakers," sunday at 10:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m. eastern , here on c-span. >> c-span's road to the white house coverage continues today with two events. maryland's governor martin o'malley was the keynote speaker at the new hampshire democratic artie's jefferson jackson dinner in manchester.

following that event, we will show you remarks from earlier in the day by 2012 vice presidential candidate paul ryan. all that, plus your calls beginning live at 7:00 p.m. eastern, here on c-span. >> jacqueline kennedy's time as first lady was defined as never before by images, a young family entering the white house, international fame, and the tragedy of a grieving widow, all within three years. watch our program tonight at 10 p.m. eastern and sunday at noon on c-span. and live monday, our series continues. >> mrs. johnson as first lady love to show off her home. would oftene ranch gather informally here in the den. various heads of state came to visit.

one of the things she wanted to highlight was native american heritage in the country. eye for copper and collected various items through the years and had gifts from various friends. mrs. johnson gave a tour of the that you see here. she spent a lot of time here at the ranch, and it was very important because it provided such a respite from all the turmoil of washington, particularly later in the presidency. the johnsons could come home, recharge their batteries, and make the connection back to the land that they valued so much. >> first lady lady bird johnson monday night at 9:00 on c-span. >> now, federal reserve nominee answers questions

on quantitative easing in monetary policy, as well as on long-term budget and debt outlook for the country. this is about two hours and 15 minutes.