it is therefore worthwhile to remember how much bipartisan work, and work by professional bureaucrats, has been involved in directing the coalition we have today as we contemplate what diplomacy we need to sustain it and sustainable -- momentum behind it. >> these things in washington often follow me. from the point of view of the governments --di let's talk about the israeli government.

why should they praised this deal? what is in it for them? why should they say anything good about it at all? even if they thought it was a good deal on the merits, why should they say so? i do not see anything in it for them. they have both sides of this deal. they can denounce the deal the u.s. still has important military relationships with the state of israel that are effectively unperturbed by this that willugh continue, including undertakings and understandings about what the u.s. will do to protect our common security interest rates that might be threatened by iran that are unaffected by the israeli denunciation of the atlomacy that helps them home and hedges against things that might go wrong in that diplomacy. they noticed a lot of other people who were concerned about iran and making statements that say, "i do not trust iran" in

effect. who does? the policies of this and the percentages in the different place. i have some empathy. say theywhen people support new sanctions, but the sanctions would be made conditional on waiting to see whether or not we failed to get a final deal and the sanctions might then be put on a suspense so they would go into effect after efforts to get a final deal. if you study what is involved, you will see how much iran's good faith will be tested by all of the activities that will be put in play for the interim measures. i understand the current debate. i view it somewhat philosophically. i think the real rift geopolitically between the u.s. government and some others is , which is theoint

u.s. is currently demonstrating in syria that if it's wmp concerns can be settled effectively, the u.s. will take military intervention in the conflict off the table. syria is becoming a test case for the proposition and watch closely by everyone in the middle east, including iran. in effect, the same messages being communicated on iran. concerns andhe wmp take them off the table and do so in a trustworthy way, we are prepared to let you come back into the national community and draw sanctions and confident that the internal handicaps will limit effectiveness in that realm. point, ieopolitical think there might be some disagreements with some of our friends in israel and saudi arabia.

they regard a world in which the nuclear threat is removed, iran is integrated into the national community, and is free from crippling sanctions. they prefer ideally would be one in which iran is indefinitely crippled by sanctions and the nuclear threat is held in advanced. a key variable is that the sanctions regime is extremely stable and can be relied upon to remain durable regardless of what happens in the diplomacy. i do not share that optimism. have the obama administration spurned a deal like the one they expected, it would do difficult to hold the sanctions regime together. if this ancient regime begins to collapse, options will narrow. we will find ourselves on a path in which the option of war becomes increasingly evident. by the way, some of the others involvement in this debate have quirkily -- perfectly analyze

this dynamic and have come to their positions. that i think what has been agreed in geneva is a first step in a first step only. it is not a comprehensive deal and it should not be judged as such. the real purpose of what has been agreed in geneva is to ensure that while we try to negotiate a more comprehensive and permanent agreement with iran to prevent its acquisition of weapons and get it back into compliance, while doing those negotiations, they are not continuing to make progress in the nuclear program. they're not charging ahead in cash and amassing more rich material in building a plutonium reactor and so forth. . roll back the program and put some time on the clock.

philip said, it is taking this first step in being willing to negotiate is absolutely essential to maintaining the unity of the international community to oppose sanctions and to keep the pressure on. if the u.s. appeared simply unwilling to take the diplomatic route seriously, it is a fantasy to think that we can maintain the sanctions that we have so carefully and successfully constructed. in my view, whether or not we will get a good deal is is still that possible, but still unknown. we will see over the next six i anticipate will be very tough negotiations and that those negotiations will be helped in my view by the continued threat of making the

sanctions regime even more punishing if negotiations fail and by keeping all options, including military options, on the table. that threat of coercive measures iran'so be clearly in mind to continue to get them to be serious at the negotiating table. the very minimal relief that has been provided of access to breakingsets is not the sanctions regime. the financial sanctions and the oil sections that have wrought the iranian economy to where it is today will remain in place. people have to understand that. there are that concerns in the region about

plus 1 thateal or p5 would sort of relieved the pressure on iran simply in exchange for nuclear compliance without giving enough attention destabilizing behavior throughout the region and support for terrorist groups from hamas to hezbollah and so forth. i think that is a concern. i think the administration is aware and they will continue to focus on taking action against iran's support for terrorism, as well as its nuclear activities. on, china's announcement of the east china at identification zone, does this increase the conflict --

the possibility of conflict over the islands? an alert from my desk in new york that a couple of bombers have flown over the islands in a show of force. any speak on that? a i understanding that it is heart of a plan of an exercise. part of a plan of an exercise. examplenk it is another of provocative behavior. my own concern is that it does raise the risk of miscalculation. to the extent of any real danger of miscalculation in recent years with regards to military in iran and china, it

has been in the air. there have been times when chinese air defense fighters have scrambled and in some cases operated in a very aggressive ofner that increase the risk -- fighterave chinese scrambling and consistently intercepting japanese or korean or other aircrafts and any kind of aggressive or sitter way, you are by definition increasing the -- or some other way, you are by definition increasing the risk of someone -- it then becomes a strategic crisis, another incident or something like that. i think this is an unnecessary provocation. what needs to happen is some

serious negotiation among the parties that make claims to these islands and steps to ratchet back the tension and not escalate them in this manner. ok. let me move on to the last question. in the defense strategy in the middle east and asia, should the united states slowly decrease its commitment in the middle east? at the same time, enhance or increase its commitment in the so-called pivot? that it firm believer is in the rebalance. as we have relatively more bandwidth available coming out too long ground wars in the middle east and south asia, we need to a more attention to that

asia-pacific. it is a region that will affect prosperity and security long- term. that does not mean we take our eye off the ball in the middle east. it does not mean we abandon our partners and allies there. u.s. has been able to walk and chew gum at the same time. we have vital interest in the middle east even as our own energy fixtures at home changes. we have to maintain our forces there for deterrence, crisis response, building capacity of our partners and friends. the rebalance is never cast as a pivotal way away from middle east to asia. it was a relative increase in our attention to asia and to the fundamental changes that are half thing there and adapting our posture to those changes while we still stay engaged in a

key region like the middle east. iraq asy we came out of we are reducing our posture in afghanistan, the number of ground forces will be changing. our air and naval presence ari to those keyments countries and should not and i they will change my expectation. what are the conflict scenarios in either the middle east or east asia? what is a relation of american defense posture to those scenarios? asiae middle east and east , i have concluded that i do not believe the u.s. needs to prepare its self to conquer, occupy, and hold large land areas on that land mass.

that does not mean it may not need military capabilities, but the notion that the u.s. would prepare for a land invasion of china and holding large territory in china in a serious military scenario -- nor do i believe the u.s. needs a plan to occupy or hold korea even in the event of a korean war. condo posturee you think of in the middle east. -- posture you think of in the middle east. i know it seems scary to even talk about these contingencies, but decisions involving billions of dollars will come from talking about contingencies. you had to think about what it is we want to be able to do or don't need to be able to do, at least not quickly.

what we need to do quickly in the middle east or in east asia, we need to have formidable military capability, principally on c and on and -- in air, that candy to her defeat any opponent largely with forces on hand or available within hours -- that or do to her -- detour defeat any opponent largely with focuses -- with orson is on hand or a available within hours. we need a base structure that is much more protected outwards. -- from as to get smart learner or structure. when you rely on one or two basis within a region, you

create stability and temptations to an adversary. when japan was contemplating its they looked 1941, around and said, if we wanted an against america in british and dutch alliance, we need to hit three spots. three. pearl harbor, the island of luzon in the philippines, and singapore. knocked out those three, and you knock out effective military in the asia-pacific region. they pulled off pearl harbor. when you narrow it down to that, it is remarkably slender and concentrated on one or two key assets. that is not a stable position for a conflict in which maximum readiness is ever more -- >> ok. great.

nametags on and i will start over here. >> i'm a retired u.s. army. it would appear in today's paper that we are reliving the lessons of iraq as we try to negotiate afghanistan. some of us that participated in some of that would be -- are seeing this happen again. what would your advice be to the administration on dealing with the karzai government as we go forward in 2014? patience.s -- [laughter] maddening, but the important thing is to focus on what is in the u.s. strategic interest. ownershipm strategic

that supports the afghan state and afghanistan tunisians like -- anmed forces gaining afghan institutions like the armed forces gaining is in our interest for all of the reasons we have lived through 9/11. that can be done at a reasonable level of investment. i do believe and i share the view that if we are going to have americans on the grand in afghanistan, we have to have a security agreement that ensures that they are not subject to afghan law. that has always been a redline. i think it is inappropriate redline. people and most of afghan leadership, including just about

if not every presidential candidate that is running for election early next year once the u.s. and international community to stay. i would hope even if karzai persists in his very frustrating --tic in delaying, we will proceed. you have to plan for the worst case of total withdrawal. we will maintain some folks ability to work with the new government to quickly what a framework in place to allow what is in the strategic interest of both countries, which is a assistance,nce of to allow that to happen. good morning.

thank you to the institute. i'm from spain. i understand quite well that the u.s. strategy is going to be -- in theed on pacific. the pacificd from and asian countries. on the other hand, we have -- needs toink that nato be transformed? when i mean that, i mean transformed beyond 2014 once the isflict in afghanistan solved? if that is the case, what should be the role of the u.s. leaving nato -- leading nato? >> at the nato remains extremely important and relevant for the

u.s.. it is the first place we turn to for allies and partners and anything we do not rolling in europe than anywhere in the -- and not just in europe and anywhere in the world. do think the alliance needs to think about how we are to sustain a reasonable level of investment in our capabilities for the future at a time that is not popular for many inside europe. how do we get more bang for the buck? more bang for the euro? greater development and sharing and pooling the resources to develop the capabilities that we need. itsach member of nato cuts

or reshaped his defense portions -- reshaped its defense portions along national lines, you will sub optimize what the alliances as a whole have available. we have got to have a more coherent picture of the capability the alliance needs across the board and how to invest together to ensure that we have those even though not every nation may have -- may be able to afford every capability. nato is a creature of its member governments. it is not merely a vessel because it adds enabling capabilities and synergies beyond what an of them could do alone or without prior planning. i agree with her observation. fundamentally, comes back to what members of government care about. if they do not care about asia,

they do not care what does have an in a lot of other countries. meetings in brussels are not going to make them care. it has to do with the role that countries like spain and others in nato see for themselves in the world and the way they think the world to organize itself for common security. for example, in my paper i talked about defense is fast and slow. there are some areas of extremely capabilities where they might think they can make a contribution for a dip that purpose they share -- defense purpose that they share. notice those and analyze those. there are capabilities any together slowly. nato has been focus quite a lot on afghanistan.

we're are still early in drawing the lessons from afghanistan that we can use. yemeni and nigeria and in and somalia. countries where there is a mix of natural -- national contingents. , and concepts and learning about how to give advice and concepts andmmon learning about how to give advice and support. frankly, i think we are very slow in learning lessons from the last 10 years of bitter experience in afghanistan and iraq and thinking about the kind assistantent -- capabilities in the futures. those are not as well digested. this question is for michele.

it was said at the beginning of the second term that chuck hagel was selected as defense secretary and you were not in this viewse there was of the president that the administration that they wanted to move away from a military a new more toward militarization anybody forward leaning point of view as it was perceived whereas hagel was seen as of a different view. is this assessment accurate? second, what has happened in the ensuing months in terms of where they have gone on policies from iran to afghanistan? morethat reflect this far diplomatic and must military approach? i do not have a window into

the president's decision-making, but your explanation does not ring true to my ears. i think chuck hagel has been a close associate of president obama since their time in the senate. he served on the president's intelligence advisory board. i think there was a lot of discussion the first term about finding a place for chuck hagel in the president's cabinet. i think that discussion was naturally renewed when there was an opportunity to bring new people into the cabin in the second term. that is the president's friendship and respect for chuck hagel that drove the decision more than anything else. i'm not aware of any other factors in that. ,> if i could quickly follow-up

does the posture of this administration in terms of demilitarization of foreign policy concern you at all? just to be clear on my own views, i'm not a big proponent of the militarization of u.s. foreign policy. i'm a proponent of having a strong military instrument to support our foreign-policy goals. r, becauseeriod of wa you have tens of thousands of americans in harms way on the ground, the voice of the department of defense in foreign-policy decision-making naturally becomes louder relative to times of peace when you do not have many americans in harms way. it is appropriate. voice beorted of the heard when so much is at risk.

-- it is important that voice be heard when so much is at risk. senior leaders in uniform would agree that the military voice should not dominate those circles. it needs to be heard and informed in the debate. in my experience and the three , this is ae served president with no problem hearing dissenting views. ish be to the person who scowling in the back row. you will be called upon and asked if you have a dissenting view or if you look like you have one. this is a president who seeks out the full range of views because he believes he makes better decisions that way. dod has ant important voice in his deliberations. i do not know anyone who believes that itch be the

dominant voice under any circumstances, including mean. -- including me. >> a two-part question for phil. pointo follow up on your on expanding and not contracting the u.s. global structure, it is very compelling. talk about the politics and policy dimensions of that. africana does not have the headquarters in africa because it is hard to find a stable place to host. by the is influenced presence of -- other than the expansion of military presence in australia, how would you work the global politics? a second question be, how do you describe the strategic

environment of next 10-20 years? we have gone to a bipolar cold war to a moment. are we back to what is described polar environment inwill be confronting defense and national security planning? >> [inaudible] for structure is mainly driven by areas where you think , ready forcesful nearby. then you want to look very hard at all of your options in those two regions. without going country by country and island by island. what i can say is this -- what

you look at is, do people in the region one your help? do they think it is in their interest to have powerful, highly capable forces nearby? them with aprovide measure of security that they think they need in partnership the two? if the answer is yes, opportunities begin to arise for all kinds of discussions that can evolve over time in different configurations and in different ways. again, the u.s. is not going to be helping to provide additional security in regions where no one wants america's health. -- help. i do not think that is a case for the two regions and mentioned. your second question has much to do with the concept of what it means when you talk about defense. i think the dominant problem, it issues in this phase of world history i are increasingly transnational rather than

international. they are defined less by blocks of powers as a were overmuch of the last three and a half centuries. they defined by issues that crop -- that across societies and a night easily categorized as foreign or domestic. they present a domestic face to people in the countries. cross-border crime that is killing thousands in mexico or transnational terrorism that is killing hundreds in a canna stand, those sorts of transnational public order problems -- in afghanistan, those sorts of problems --l public that is a different kind of for structure with different kinds of needs for overseas presence and political relationships. frankly, i do not think we have even enough thoughtful attention

to what the ideal force posture to achieve that. , we should footnote be careful not to equate u.s. posture overseas with u.s. permanent basis. in fact, most of the innovation that is cap name with the theersal of our posture in rebalancing within asia from being concentrated in the --theast is now coming down it is things like a great access agreement and use of joint exercises and planned increasing the tempo of our interaction our partner capacity building and so forth. building measure should not we a permanent basis. it is the work that we are doing and the rotational ace of forces that are passing through our

region and bolstering deterrence and reassuring allies and so forth. >> we have about 10 minutes left. what i will do is take groups of questions. let me hear from gordon adams and sean. ask your questions and we have another group of four. >> thank you. think the fundamental question is i am increasingly curious about the relationship between budgets and planning and planning and budget. i'm wondering if where we are is really taking both of these fully into account and the context of a new world. what i mean by that is specifically to what we have been talking about. il to talk about

for a safer and more secure world that he describes is consistent with what seems to be a relatively aggressive and forward leaning posture of putting american forces even more forward. i would like to hear more about that. the second thing is, i'm curious about language in terms of planning, especially in constrained resources. talkt to ask michelle to to this a bit. the meaning of the word shape. in doingis word freely defense planning and general national security mining. it is not clear how useful it is either improvising a guideline for policy and budget or whether it is a realistic capacity that the u.s. has vis-à-vis the other regions of the world in this new world. the third piece is readiness for what? i would like you are you both talk about the readiness for what?

for what is a question that is slightly addressed. yesterday i was in a meeting at csis. one of the comments made was when we have a state department plan and a defense department plan, how do we get a national plan? i want to build on what gordon said about language. there is a retired navy admiral. how would you change the navy? if not for a moment and said, language matters. in the navy, we manned the ships. you start with a ship and then you figure out what you might do with it. i'm passing that on. my question is a plea for

specificity and some of the comments you have opened with. michele, had you avoid a hollow force? -- how do you avoid a hollow force? and make the necessary cuts? where i come from, a reduction in plant future increases in spending is not a cut -- planned future increases in spending is not a cut. , could you be more specific about how you get from here to there? what changes other than the basing of readiness? what does that mean in terms of a force structure?

or world is there for the army and that rapid response or's scenario? -- force scenario? thank you. >> i will organize may answer this way. you obtain a national plan when you have both leadership and a clear vision of what you're trying to do. otherwise, the agencies are on their own. am sitting next to -- and i never saw a better model of how to do national planning and what different agencies do hear it and learned that his name -- learned at his knee when i was just out of bridges. -- britches. [laughter]

you have to have a certain flexibility in what you are preparing for. that said, not all regions of the world are of equal concern. the reasonorld and that is consistent with the kind of budget approach are talking about it is a matching a force that is ready or notes overall structure is smaller -- that is structured is overall is smaller. i'm imagining a world in which we invest in your strategy and your structure while times are saved so you are readier and have a more useful structure when times are not safe. sean's point, does that mean i'm specifically calling for the abolition of the u.s. army? i'm not.

by remarks are no more radical than those by his secretary of defense robert gates literally standing in the throbbing and beating heart of the u.s. army. my paper, irough make some arguments about implications of gates. >> gordon, i would agree with shape anto international environment. most important elements are deterring adversaries and reassuring our commitment to with partnersng to build their capacity to contribute to regional international security. i grew with a lot of his comments of readiness.

we cannot give specifics. the u.s. has been fairly consistent in being able to and so forth.on that is a sampling and not the full list. i agreeoint about -- with importance of thinking whole government are from a national and strategic basis. the one practical wrench i will throw in the works is that when you have balances between , you have the defense department on steroids, at least it used to be and not so much anymore, but a defense department on steroids and state on life support, you get these -- you might have a beautifully integrated plan at conception, but when it goes up to the hill to a resource, you get a third of the resource that you asked for and 110% of resources you asked for on the military side

and the plan does not look so integrated or core hand anymore. on a hollow force, i do think there is a lot that needs to be done in that defense reform. reducing taxes overhead and taking down the infrastructure that our military leaders do not contain need any more. and overhauling the acquisitions system to get more bang for the unsustainableting cuts. aboutve a force that is 1.3 million today about the size it was in 2001. that same force because of unsustainable omb cost twice as much as it did 10 years ago. we cannot stay on that trajectory. that is the first place i would go to battle a hollow force. >> lightning round.

and marvin. in that order. philip, i want to pursue your historical analyses. elementsind negative the drawdown of the vietnam to a hollow the army. can you broaden your conclusions that the stakes and the drawdown are higher. the budget scarcity and the forces choices, it is critically important to get them right. , this isree with that sort of the question assertion, is the most important step we can take now is to get some kind of budget deal?

not because we need to get rid of sequester. but also we need definition in terms of budget planning and not just so that you deacon plan, but so it can force those hard choices because without that definition, people are always going to think relief is over and whetherget hill the institution would be unwilling to make those choices. >> thank you. i think you're absolutely right. look he on the frustrations of the day and see what are the strategic interest. lower their shoulders. no artificial designs will work.

i was in that nato foreign minister meeting when the soviet foreign minister was supposed to be there. the soviet ambassador raised his hand. he had an important announcement. he said the soviet union no longer existed. surprisedntinue to be and to prepare for the the. tois very difficult to go congress and parliament and ask for money when you do not know what you're asking for. context, there is a summit meeting scheduled for 2014. i think is tremendously

important that you -- ready to play the leadership role and trying to shape what is next for the nato alliance. i do not think the europeans would be able to do that. there, done that would be interesting. finally, there has been much talk in the middle east and asia for very good reasons. has there been made a speech on our strategy? it would be interesting to hear your comments on that aspect of it. thank you. to may be like somewhat bring that united nations into this. when i was ambassador to the on thed was briefed situation, it was a total basket case. they told one sanctuary in the middle of the countries capital.

criminals of all kinds control the rest of the country. within several years time, they are keeping force with help of the british and reestablish control the entire country. there are couple of other good examples. recently heard about this intervention force being sent into the eastern congo. it is a force with more than a peacekeeping mandate. my point would be, there would be a certain amount of condensation towards the capabilities and the utilities of the u.n. mr. rumsfeld started thinking, how do we get some cash out -- how do we get out of some of this heavy stuff we got into?

the cost of fracture would it cost to deploy u.s. force. it is an order of magnitude. be how muchwould time do we or should we spend institutionstor in like that united nations into our defense cluster? how much do we think about outsourcing? question. it seems to me we are discussing the future of the american defense. i'm wondering whether it you see with as a potential ally

whom cooperation becomes the norm or whether you see it as a rival against to the u.s. has to position itself in one way or another. >> i'm not going to try to comment on everything that was said. i agree with bill and what he noted. however, i simply want to note look at your-- institutional repertory and think of them as assets in the construction of the defense strategy, especially if you're looking at this low side of defense strategy. pointed out,le posturing is much more complicated than the old- fashioned extra chortle concepts that many people have -- extra- territorial concepts that many people have in their heads.

it is proving invaluable. if you do not like the united nations, we can think of two or three others that are doing good work, including an organization that is scooping nerve gas out of syria. toant to take a moment comment on the geopolitical question about the stance toward china. simpleer has only two parts. the first part is that since the chinese leadership themselves do not know how the country will revolve, how could i possibly know what? indeed, they are arguing amongst themselves as to what kind of country they ought to have and what kind of foreign policy they ought to have a what kind of attitude toward the outside world they ought to have. that is an unsettled argument inside china. that is .1. point -- that is point one.

how itwo -- if you care comes out, what are the policies that are most likely to produce a big three for the side you find more -- a victory for the site that you find more sympathetic? we want to welcome china into sharing global responsibilities and not containing or excluding them from global responsibilities. iis has been the view that and others have articulated for some time. byrefore the argument is giving them the chance to participate in global responsibility, by giving them a sense of being stakeholders, you do not ensure that china will dangerous andhing yet to do some things that hedge against that danger, but reduced the likelihood of that outcome and promote the likelihood and the factions that favor a different kind of approach to china's relationship with the

world as they themselves are struggling to come to grips with a very new world than the one they grew up with. >> i would just add that i think it is probably the most important strategic question that we will face in the coming decades. there are currently both cooperative and other development's to the relationship. we need to try to not only apport china becoming more of responsible stakeholder globally, but also to incentivize them so that whenever there is a choice of the train choosing a more it inative path, they see their self interest to do that whether it is their economic self interest or the self interest understanding of the world and ability to influence events beyond borders and so forth. with that said, i do think that we have to have some hedge in our strategy against the

possibility that china may choose to compete or to use military force to pursue its interest in the future. we need to make sure we have a military that can operate effectively in the face of that. we want to do that in a way that is not feeding or fueling the more competitive dimensions of the relationship. that is a very fine line to walk. wholeheartedly share your hope that the u.s. will come to the nato summit in 2014 with leadership vision of where the alliance needs to go post-2014. i think this challenge of lifting our gaze from the last 10 years is a broader one. as we think about how to ensure that this is a pierod of innovation -- period of

innovation and strategic positioning for the u.s. as opposed to a time of decline, demands that we really sort of open and broaden our gaze and in some ways change the way we are operating to kind of incentivize experimentation and innovation and thinking differently down the very well-worn path we have on bash been on of the last decade. asould go on about the u.n. well, but i agree with you. >> thank you. it was a great discussion. with only 10 minutes over. thank you. [applause] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2013] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] aircrafts. military flew over islands in the east china sea. china says they have the right to take military action against aircraft over the islands.

the islands are also claimed by japan. here is part of the state department briefing. i know that the department of defense has commented on that specifically, which happened i believe earlier today. a -- an announcement that china has established and air identification zone. this unilateral action appears thee an attempt to change status quo in the east china sea. we have made this tastes -- case to china. u.s. concerns were raised with ambassador on november 23. there were also reiterations of our concerns in beijing. urge them to exercise caution

and restraint. this needs to be resolved diplomatically. is that increasing tensions question mark -- is this increasing tensions? >> we are continuing to encourage our partners. we don't support efforts that airstate to apply identification zone to foreign aircraft not wanting to enter its airspace. we have long talked about concerns about increasing tensions for the raising of tensions and the impacts that would have. at this point, our role is to

urge both sides to move forward with dialogue and express concern when we disagree with steps china has taken, which is a case we have done here. our position on the islands that this impacts as not change. >> the u.s. recognizes that japan for all intents and purposes does have control of [indiscernible] is the u.s. concern by declaring that his that china is trying to this inhington into washington might have taken the bait? >> i do not think there has been any bait taken. we have expressed concern. we have a wide ranging relationship with china. when there are concerns that need to be express, we are not shy about expressing them. i have just conveyed our views tot this is an attempt

change the status quo in that china sea. he have also expressed concern directly to the chinese as -- we have also expressed concern directly to the chinese as needed here. we have long expressed concern about efforts to raise tensions. this is evidence of our willingness to -- >> these flights were absolutely necessary? they should not be viewed as provocation? >> again, i have a specific content -- comments on them. a duty has commented on them. we will look more closely at actions as they continue. -- i have no specific contents -- comments on them. the dod has commented on them. we will look more closely at actions as they continue. >> in an hour, we will have a

discussion about women in politics. 8 p.m. eastern here on c-span. >> this is the rose garden at the nixon library. it was a special place for both of the nixons. mrs. nixon loved gardening and had a special affinity for roses. he was instrumental in opening up the doors. this is the pat nixon rose. it was developed by french designer. it is the only rose

this is the final resting place of book the president and mrs. nixon, steps away from the humble farmhouse. there is a great story behind nixon'saph on mrs. memorial site, which she chills herself. she wanted to meet the people affected by the devastated earthquake. one of the reporters said to her, what good will any of the still the people who you are speaking to cannot understand what you are saying e she replied, even when people cannot speak your language, they can tell if you have love in your heart. >> watch our program on first lady pack nixon. or see it saturday on c-span at 7:00 p.m. mondayies continues live as we look at betty ford. in -- >> this week on