that deals that we do with iran are basically a precursor to doing a large deal with iran, not just on the nuclear issue, but recognizing iran as having a regional role. saudi concern is akin to peering, that we will begin to treat the iranians as we did in the shaw's time, a major partner in the region. it is fair to say that is not something that is around the corner. i have a hard time envisioning that we would do any deals that comes at the saudi's expense, so what are the concerns that the saudi's and israelis have about the first that deal, and how might they be addressed? one concern they raise is that the leverage we have on iran will erode and when we have not negotiated a final deal. the conference of deal that supposedly we are now looking at

as part of the first that, called for to be concluded within one year's time. there are ways to address the concerns of the sanctions. the administration worked closely with the israelis on identifying the sanctions that most mattered, identifying the possible ways to avoid sanctions, identifying how you could close loopholes, working to ensure commercial activity and those that might engage in it understand the high reputational cost. we could again engage in that work with the israelis and we can do that with the saudi's as well. we could do something else. i see that i am coming up on my concluding time. we could do something else hear the administration has made it very clear that no deal is preferable to a bad deal. while i understand very well the

desire not to hire -- tie our hands in terms of giving away bottom lines, one thing we can do is make it clear, what do we mean by a bad deal? we have not spelled that out. in private with the saudi's and others that may have concerns, we could let them know what we consider a bad deal to be. a bad deal would be a deal that leaves the uranium's in a position where the kind of nuclear structure they attain would be one that would permit them to break out of nuclear weapons capability at the time of their choosing. with such a relatively short window of time, we would have a hard time detecting it and doing something about it. so a bad deal would not roll out in terms ofucture centrifuges to a relatively small number from the 21,000 they have now, would be one in which the iranians would have more than a bombs worth of in rich uranium in the country, one in which the iranians would have

a heavy water plant which has no utility for producing electricity. it is the least cost efficient way to pursue if you are interested in producing electricity. a bad deal would be one in which you did not have the transparency measures that would allow you to have high confidence that you can verify the restrictions you are imposing. point is to say that there is a lot of concern about our staying power in the region, moves towards increasing energy dependence. does that mean that we will retain a high level of impression in the region? perhaps we can discuss in the q&a why we do not have less influence in the region and we could be doing more in others. all these areas where there are particular concerns, there are ways to address those concerns,

but we have to do so systematically. we should be engaged in more strategic discussion to identify those areas where there are concerns that some of our friends have and where we can highlight for them the clear areas of commonality that we continue to maintain. >> thank you very much. pick up exactly with iran and the asian pivot. there are many ways to read the recent interim agreement with iran. given a troopbe withdrawal from iraq, coming troop withdrawal from afghanistan, this is part of a process to set our middle east house in order to some extent, which could give us more leverage to pay attention to another area. the asian pivot, which has been much ballyhooed -- i will talk about asia and europe in my 15 minutes. in terms of the asian pivot, it was actually considered in a way

24 years ago when the berlin wall fell. when the berlin wall fell, there was a lot of interest and discussion at the time about emphasizing asia. a few months later, saddam hussein invaded kuwait. we liberated kuwait. then the navy and air force got tied down in a no-fly zone over iraq over the next 12 years. then 9/11, then afghanistan, then iraq. headingre out of iraq, out of afghanistan, back to asia. so it is a natural, organic it is also an aspiration rather than a declaration. it aspires to put more emphasis on an area, but it only aspires east so, if the middle allows, and the middle east does not always allow. little bit about what is going on in asia from an historical perspective.

in past decades, in the 1960s, 1970s, 1950s, many asian states were in internal turmoil. china had the great leap forward, the proletariat culture, internally focused. malaya, which became malaysia, and vietnam, were involved in internal wars. japan was in a quasi-pacifistic state as a aftershock after the militarism of world war ii. on lines was focusing in the bluewater about who controls what, because nobody could project power out words because they were focused internally. moving ahead a few decades, you now have china with three decades of tremendous economic growth. it has build a real world-class military, naval, air, ballistic -- cybersiebel

warfare. if you believe in linear thinking, it is building the greatest land-based navy. that probably will not happen because linear thinking often does not. if you project ahead in that and vietnam is totally consolidated bureaucratically, institutionally, the same with malaysia. they have both been investing big-time in the navy. there is a saying in asia that submarines are the new thing. everybody wants them. china has 62 of the quietest diesel and electric submarines. they will surpass us. vietnam just bought four new ones. the philippines went from a world war ii navy to a 1965 navy with the acquisition of some coast guard -- american coast guard cutters.

malaysia established new submarine bases. of course, we have south korea and japan, which have been not asmuch enlarging so much modernizing their militaries. japan has four times as many warships as the british royal navy. even though it is an island nation that emphasizes air-see warfare, it has more tanks and germany. south korea, too. i could go on and on and bore you with details. everyone is projecting power of words, not so much with old- fashioned auxin, land armies, honest to goodness postmodern 21st-century navy and air force's. low and behold, they had disagreements over who controls what in the east china sea and the south china sea, etc. is, nationalism has been somewhat passé in

europe until recently. for most of the cold war, you could argue europe was in a post-national phase. asia is very different. nationalism is alive and well in asia. american meat and potato cents. you have strong ethnic nations, there is not a nato to enact the region. you have nationalism, military power, you have consolidated internal nations, and you have capitalism, successful decade upon decade, which ultimately leads to military acquisitions. when a state is successful economically, it acquires interests all over the world through trade or at least in the region, and it needs to defend those, so to build a military. china looks upon the east and south china sea much as the

americans looked upon the caribbean in the 19th and early 20th century. chinesenumber of offices tell me, why do you criticize us in the south china sea, what are we doing any different than what you did in the caribbean? was not aboutrine kicking out the europeans. it was about freezing the status quo because the europeans had already left. wasr the munro doctrine promulgated, the u.s. and british navies cooperated over the slave trade in the caribbean. thans much more new ones the classic comic book version of the munro doctrine. it was about not allowing the europeans to not -- dominate the caribbean while cooperating with the europeans in every other fashion possible. that is what china is trying to do in its neighboring marginal waters. it is trying to become the dominant power while at the same time not destabilize its

relationship with the united states. states has to steer between two parameters, which the obama administration is trying to do. on the one hand, not let china dominate the south and east china seas because china's geographic centrality and demographic and economic emerging power would make them too dominant in the region, more dangerous in the region than the u.s. has been over the past few decades. at the same time, it cannot let china dominate, we cannot get into a war or into a real fracas with china because of the philippine -- vietnamese and filipino nationalism. equity,too much trade, global warming, this that and the other, to allow any of this to be threatened by local nationalism. god that werrow

have to ride through. looking long-term, we have to accommodate chinese military power to an extent. we will not have the pacific base in an american lake, and american naval lake, the way it was following world war ii. it will be more of a nuanced multi-polar order, but the u.s. needs to be the first among equals. now i will pivot to europe. i think europe is underrated. very much underrated. it as the fiscal boring debt story. it is much larger than that. or romanian inol the mid-1990s, the world looked great to you. you had escaped history, you had a path to the eu which was robust and strong. you are in nato or joining, and

they were strong as heck, and russia was conveniently week and chaotic under force yeltsin -- boris yeltsin. now fast-forward to now, if you romanian, ah or minister or defense chief, the world looks bleaker. the you has had five years of sustained, deep economic crisis which has weakened its geopolitical bandwidth in central and eastern europe. nato is just coming off a decade long involvement in afghanistan which many could argue was lost and did not perform well in and identity crisis. meanwhile, russia is no longer weak and chaotic but led by someone, whether you like him or not, is a serious geopolitical thinker who is expanding the boundaries of russia in terms of influence.

vladimir putin knows he cannot re-create the warsaw pact. that is not his goal. the warsaw pact collapsed because it was too expensive to maintain. what he seeks now is more of a traditional, soft fear of influence in central and eastern europe that is sustainable over the long term. the russians are buying up infrastructure, they are buying up banks, they are entering oil and gas pipelines. they have direct pipeline routes to germany and the low countries so that they do not need: for that. meanwhile, poland is dependent on russia for natural gas through another pipe. poland, bulgaria, the baltic states, they all depend on russian natural gas for 90% of their energy needs. romania is an exception because it has its own energy. it only gets 30%. we are not seeing every creation of the warsaw pact.

this is a more new ones, subtle of differing shades where the eu is less dominant, even though these countries are eu.ers of the if you were to ask me who is the most interesting leader in the world right now, you could say president rouhani of iran. let me give you an obscure one to follow. the prime minister of hungary. he is an interesting man, very capable, sharp. hungaryving demonstrably in the direction of neo-authoritarianism with more restrictions on the media, more restrictions on the economy, but then you have to ask, why is he doing this if he is so smart? he is closer to brussels geographically than moscow. he is in the heart of europe. hungary had a happy transition

to democracy and capitalism in the 1990s. maybe he knows something that others do not, that the kremlin is more influential and brussels is less influential, and he has to protect his equity. he is planning for the future. he is like the canary in the coal mine, so to speak. eu crisis that goes on for five years with 40% on implement rates in certain countries is one thing. for 8, 10hat goes on years is quite another thing. attrition of the same adds up to big change. you have a real disaffected youth population in western europe, less influence of the west in central and eastern europe. you have an authoritarian russia . you have europe that does not end at the mediterranean but at the sahara, so it is affected by the instability in libya, tunisia, etc.

europe is not just an economic story. it is geopolitically interesting and requires greater and greater attention by the obama administration. with my last two minutes, let me talk about the caucuses. the caucuses are interesting. in the 1990s, armenia was pro- russian, but was not a russian satellite. , andia was pro-western azerbaijan, because of its emerging energy bonanza, was able to play off various blocks, so to speak. armenia is now a hard-core russian satellite with thousands of troops on the ground. it just became a group of the customs union, like belarus and kazakhstan.ext

even despite its massive energy bonanza, its ability in previous years to play the israelis against the iranians and the turks and this and that, has to pay closer and closer attention to what vladimir putin wants. there is a lot going on in the world, in other words that is not specifically focused on the changing balance of power in the middle east, but is affected by the changing balance of power in the middle east. thank you. a second i thought that we would actually agree, that you would say europe is far more important than we realized, something that i have been

saying for 30 years. of course, and then you said it is far more interesting because the eu is falling apart and it eu parts that are strengthening. we will differ there. i am guessingte, that you, as many others were saying five years ago when the euro crisis started, that the eu would not survive to today. has itsthink it problems, but is still more important as the largest economy in the world. you left me the rest of the world, which would be africa and latin america. what i will do is instead try to talk about the whole world but from a different perspective, which will cover some of those areas but also look at some of the areas you will have talked

about. i should start by saying i am --ighted not only to be here the first foreign policy panel i have done in a while -- but to be here with our partners at the aei.r for the new america, in 2009, i wrote an article called "america's edge: power in the network century." was january 2009, just after president obama was elected. for all the focus on the decline of the u.s., we were still using an outdated geopolitical frame that looked at the world in terms of big states and smaller states, but above all, separate states. in fact, in a deeply interconnected network world, what was most important to be a global power was how connected you were to all other entities,

nodes, countries, companies, groups around the world. from that perspective, the united states was the most connected power in influential ways, and if it built on that, had a much brighter future than anyone was projecting. the firstnow analyze four years of what the obama administration has tried to do from that frame and then look at five challenges from that frame, if you think about the problem as being in a deeply globalized interconnected world. how do you enhance your position node, but asntral one of the most important? plane.bout being on a pulling out that airport magazine and looking at

the hubs with all of the airline routes coming away from the hub, or just think of a map of the internet and those huge central powerful. are so if you look at it from that point of view, economically, what the obama administration is trying to do is to make us once again the central trading and manufacturing platform of the world, which sounds like an almost delusional idea, if you hing that weeveryt pickup that says made in china or now increasingly made in vietnam. however, as you look at the future of manufacturing, whether it is 3d or much more automated manufacturing, the united states, as you have read, you are starting to see a re- shoring, the company started to come back. what the administration is looking at is -- the united

states energy self-sufficient, low cost of gas, much lower than certainly in europe and elsewhere, with an educated population that is completely , and particularly by the two trade pacts they are trying to conclude, ttp across the pacific and ttip across the atlantic. if you think about that, they are thinking about a huge free- trade zone. we are all members of the wto. but a new trade agreement into asia and europe, with the united states, and more broadly, the americas, in the center with lower cost, high value manufacturing. to come back to europe, lots of european businesses now are wishing that they were exploiting their own natural gas

. there is obviously a big environmental debate. but they are seeing the u.s. become more competitive because of the lower price but also because of our technological advantages in various places. that is the first thing i would say. the administration has put a lot of energy into two very big trade agreements, and also thinking of us as a manufacturing platform and as energy self-sufficient. from the political point of view, thinking of us as the most central power, how we have been of theg on a vision united states as the central powers in a world of regional organization. this is again something people do not pay much attention to. how much we have invested in existing regional organizations and building new ones and now coming to asia, we still have a hard time getting to the asian summits. this last time because of the government shutdown.

this administration has poured a lot into the east asian summit. president obama came in, henry kissinger said the one part of the world where he is not institutionalized at all from a strategic point of view is asia. had hong kong and taiwan, but that could not be a security situation. now with the east asian summit, it can and does address security issues in east tennessee, radically imperfectly, but at least there is a form there and we are part of it. building the african union, which we have worked with more effectively, and in the middle east. and the gulfue cooperation council are imperfect, but i think ambassador ross would agree they have played more of a role in certainly the libya crisis and in syria, even without direct impact yet.

there is an entity to engage. the idea that what we are thinking about is a world of strong regional organizations that we are directly connected to. in the americas, oas is still a weak organization from that standpoint, but we started the summit of the americas, thinking about beginning and energy community. looking at this from the military point of view, to be a more central node, part of what we had to do was bring our troops home from afghanistan and from iraq. again, if you think about bringing a large deployments of troops home and then investing more in the war of the 21st century and again as a central node in the groans, cyber, special forces that we can send out anywhere in the world, and

on the more institutional side, nato as the central node of a global security network, which is again this architecture that was developed at the 50th anniversary meeting of nato. from a social side, and this is very important in a networked world, the united states is deeply connected to every other country in the world through immigration and technology. immigration we have always had. , ask any washington taxi driver, when they called or skyped home, it will have been within a week, the last time they were physically at home, 18 months. our immigrants are linking back to their home countries. immigration reform is absolutely essential there to maintain and build upon a world in which your immigrants really are connections to their countries back home. finally and perhaps most

importantly -- and i will come back to this on the challenges -- technological centrality. we invented the internet and we have been absolutely the most important central node in internet governance, internet and again, from the obama administration, for the cause of internet freedom, to have a global open internet, to have a right to connect. in that world of a global open internet, we are well advantaged as we move more and more online. conceptual, global power point of view, from the united states as the most connected nation in the world, you can look at things that the administration has tried to do on the economic side, political, military, social, and technology. now let me come to the challenges.

economically, the biggest challenges i see are getting the two trade deals done. that is enormous. it would be very important with respect to europe in terms of really strengthening the eu, but above all, strengthening us and the eu. together of course we are over 50% of global gdp. even as china rises, that is a big number. ,hen integrating in services and something that is never talked about, integrating in terms of standards. our lunch around the world in terms of global standards for obvious reasons. it is a very large entity, and that hurts american businessmen or mislead. if you are using the eu standard unplugs rather than the american standard, that is a big problem. integrating and getting common standards is enormous. accomplish they can ttp and then leave open the possibility of china hope in --

joining, that would ultimately be like a regional wto where we are strongly connected to all the countries in the region, and the americas. and variousexico other latin american countries are a part of this transpacific trade agreement. that is an enormous challenges that we have to be able to bring home. the second is addressing the problems created by the nsa spying, by prsm. economic threat that has not been talked about or focused on particularly in this town nearly enough as an economic threat. if we cannot address the political fallout from the nsa, starting with germany, brazil, and many other countries, we are going to suffer diplomatically but also much more importantly our companies are going to be seriously disadvantaged.

the germans are talking very specifically about creating a german internet so it -- intranet so that not all data from germany is not broken up into packets and sent around the world, which is how it happens it travels only to germany, so we would not have access to a lot of that information. brazil is talking about doing the same thing. if you imagine the division of the internet along geographic -- i recommend bob kaplan's book on the return of geography -- that is a disaster for all of our companies that assume data global flows. china is excluded but most other countries are still a part of the global internet. for google and facebook and all of our internet companies, including ge, any company doing big data storage, which is a

growing number, that is an enormous challenge. politically, the biggest issues that i see at the moment -- i would be interested in --assador ross' point here how we lead by putting civilian power first, which is what we are doing with iran, working with regional organizations, diplomatically, how do we do that without credible that of -- threat of military first? i am a believer in diplomacy first. i do not believe that diplomacy works very well without the credible possibility of some military action. i think that is what you saw in syria with respect to the chemical weapons. the chemical weapons. the minute a look like we were serious about using force, things changed quite dramatically. it is interesting that what israel is dealing up -- gearing up to do is to say to the arena

and, if you are not going to take a deal, we are going to take action. president has not found the right balance between leading through diplomacy, but still making incredible that we would use our military where our most interest -- important interests are at stake. another area where we have a huge challenge, we are no longer seen as leading on global issues. are thinking about the centrality of the united states in a globalized, connected world, where are we on climate proliferation, i think if we get a deal with iran , that is something he strongly believes in, but right now, it is --. going to lead on development issues, human issues. i cannot emphasize what

ambassador ross said about syria. it is going to be the role on the of our time. rwanda of our time. have been there, say it is the worst conflict they have ever seen. you're talking about war reporters who have seen bosnia, no shortage of horror. the united states is not being perceived as doing anything that makes a difference for syrian's on the ground. of view,military point i think the biggest challenge is for this administration to think about rules governing the next generation of warfare. we are investing in drones and special forces, but so is everybody else. have are 80 countries that drones already. i do not think we want a world

in which other countries can imagine taking out their enemies the way we have done with our own, without some kind of global rules. on cyber, we are thinking about that. social challenge, getting immigration done is critical. domesticatter of politics and it is critical to building on what is one of our greatest strengths as a country -- having immigrants from all over the world and remaining connected to them back home. huge, end on this technological challenge. partly our hubris and the sense that everybody spies, so we do can do it, we will do it. we will collect data first and then target individuals later -- the rest of the world sees this

very differently. many americans see this differently. it is real. weis not the same -- protest, but we spy, too. the europeans are very upset. i understand that. you don't bug your friends' cell phones. thelays into a vision of united states that is a very negative one. it has a real repercussions. followtries decide to china, china does control its own internet. if you imagine other countries ,ollowing suit, the whole world the democratizing power of the internet and innovation and growth that comes from new back.logy could be pulled

the pulling back of globalization would happen first in ways that would make the united states much poorer and make the world very dangerous. i am over. that is plenty to chew on. >> thank you. everyone was very disciplined about the time. just a reminder, this is being carried live by c-span. in richardg to bring and tom to ask our panelists additional questions and then throw it over to our audience. bob kaplan forto a minute and then the others. i am interested in the connections between what the administration is trying to do and what it is trying to do -- in the middle east, and what it is trying to do asia.

dialback iraq, you dialback afghanistan, you have more available for asia. the quality of your security commitments and diplomatic engagement will bleed over into the way you are perceived in asia. i am interested in your thoughts on that. in a you get involved ground war, that is going to deplete your attention elsewhere. the iraq and like being afghan wars. onmeant less attention dealing with the u.s. and china. theeant less attention on u.s. top policymakers in terms of military deployments. set good examples in one region, it affects another region. becausets your world nations can only judge you on your past actions. if your past actions are not

impressive, you're going to have less respect. there something else we are missing. we are prisoners of cold war area studies. of these hard and fast divisions between the middle east, south , southeast asia, east asia. there is a collapse. organic a fluid, with new exemplified pipeline routes, highways that are connecting south asia with east asia. you see china more involved in afghanistan and iran in terms of mineral exploitation, buying more hydrocarbons. you see more heart -- hydrocarbons flow from the persian gulf to east asia. regionsections between is becoming -- is increasing

little by little. because it is a gradual development, it does not make a news story. the indian ocean is the maritime organizing principle of this. you cannot deal with the middle east unless you understand russia and vladimir putin. energy anddeal with asia unless you understand the persian gulf. the fact that china and india are going to need more of their hydrocarbon resources from the persian gulf while the u.s. may need less and less. there is less of a distinction. in the extreme cases of getting somewheren a land war or setting a bad example that leads people elsewhere to question your power, the assumptions of your questions are correct. >> i want to follow up on that. that thereperception

is not another actor like the united states . act,e united states is not it is not clear who will act. if it looks like we are looks like wef it establish red lines but do not act on them, that does send a message. the point you made about the increasing dependency upon andgy from the gulf area the understanding that we are the ones who have been made sure that the sea lines of communication have remained open leave us?es that there is a desire for us to be smart about how we use our power. there is a concern that if we appearo retrench and we that our dependence on our end

up -- it is not a source of great reoccurrence -- reassurance to those in asia. one other point i want to throw putin has, it is true been playing effectively on the chessboard. i would also note that if the price of oil is high, that is good for putin and russia. particularly given their economic situation. if it is low, that is bad for putin and russia. you don't have an effective rule of law there because companies cannot know what they can repatriate him because the capacity to innovate and russia is not what it ought to be. we have increased

by about 3 million barrels a day what we are adding to the global energy pool because of what we are doing with our own developments, one of the reasons the price of oil has been relatively stable at a time when there is a lot of disruption within the middle east and because with -- because of what our policy has been, has been because we continue to increase. if you put iran to the side, in not increasing the way we anticipated, other disruptions like nigeria, if some of those disruptions were to disappear and are continuing from here, energy russia will not be in a great

position. i am not sure he is as well positioned as he rephrased to the rest of the world. >> he is playing a good game now. the next half decade looks good for him. after that, it gets more complicated. every party has to have a pooper. conference, it is cassandra. i will be the knuckle dragger. if you had to compare, from my perspective, one of the measures for comparing the united states and the world today to five years ago is that there is much and thattary power there will be less capacity, less capability, less modernization. we are not substituting in an

adequate way more modern systems for obsolete systems. even things like the asia have , there may bevot a larger slice of the u.s. navy in the pacific, but the overall size will be so much smaller that there will be fewer ships. in doing our tour, we have not looked at ourselves and our toacity to achieve the goals remain something of a guarantor or a balancer, whether it is in and if theeast pacific pivot is to mean anything, it should begin with

establishing a more or less ad hoc set of security arrangements than currently exist. if bob is right, we have to worry about europe again. that in ang we solved lasting fashion. essentially, we do not have the capacity. as we change the character of our economy at home and what we spend money on, our inability to mobilize -- our ability to mobilize will take longer. i wish you would look at the questions of american capacity, particularly military capacity and ask -- and answer the question -- what will the middle east look like without much

american power there if the pivot does not materialize. it is not like we have a lot of ships in the indian ocean in the first place. i think we have 11 aircraft carriers and the chinese have one. >> not even one. it is a ukrainian piece of junk. >> 11 aircraft carriers takes a long time. what do you imagine war would look like? >> whatever the capacities allow. any student of military history would not rule out a particular kind of war. we have always thought that technology was going to change the character of war. it never does.

fieldof the early rounds -- rumsfeld years. they came into office saying balkan will not escort schoolchildren -- they ended up --a large nationbuilding what was the endgame in syria? the idea that we could've have launched a couple of cruise missiles. the indians announced a week ago that they are going to build their third aircraft carrier. they will be doing much better than the chinese. their ambitions, or lack thereof, has any impact on what --have just discussed

>> they are building missiles to try to destroy our carriers. they are developing means to project their own power around the region. the first order of business for trump our investments. it is not so much surface power, it is undersea power where the chinese are surging ahead. the indians, regardless of what their position is, they help balance against china. there is something we are missing in this discussion. we are talking about our vulnerabilities, not other vulnerabilities. look at china. if you were to ask me what the single biggest question is in the world today, i would say that the direction of the chinese economy. muchnk their economy is in

more dire straits that has written about. ,hey are on a credit bubble they have ghost cities, expansion is slowing down. you can't breathe the air. there may come a point when their economic slowdown causes social and political unrest that crimps the advance of their military budgets. that is why i said do not believe in linear thinking. it is interesting to know, but i do not -- to say that the chinese are going to have the greatest land-based navy in the is a stretch. things will happen to intervene. it is not just our vulnerabilities. it is china's. the threat in europe is not going to be a new cold war.

eu iss happening is the different trading -- differentiating. the further away you get from germany and the low countries, the worse the economy tends to be. the threat in europe is not going to be the cold war threat. it is a much more specific new wants threat such as may be protecting poland and the baltic states and things like that. nobody else can project power the way we can. of,dy else has the kind mostly because of the experience of last 12 years where we fought these wars, we have a capacity intelligence with battlefield management, fuse our capabilities because of our experience the way that nobody else has.

it has contributed to the point you are raising. prepared to continue to spend the kind of money on the military that we have. we will have to think about what that means for our place in the world. it is not the first time we have had a. of -- not the first time we have had a period of entrenchment. some of them may come back. it is hard to imagine right now because there such a sense of wariness and weariness with being involved in conflicts that look messy. they never quite produce an are suggested they will. it leads us being cautious about what we want to do in the rest of the world. the question becomes -- let's not focus on the current

snapshot. i do not think things will remain static. i think the chinese have enormous strengths, but they have enormous vulnerabilities. one of the jobs i had was in the office of med assessment. one of the things that you focus on is how do you compete? where are the vulnerabilities of those that you are competing with? there are different measures of power now. you, i am not prepared to write off the role of military power because sooner or later, it has a place. does diplomacy work without the credible use of coercion to back it up? it is hard to find examples of

six -- success without that. aret becomes clear that we not capable of projecting power because we have become too hollow, it is going to have a diplomatic consequence. is there isrry nobody out there who fills that vacuum. vacuums do get filled, and not by useful forces. an hour in five minutes and then we have not mentioned the world -- the word al qaeda. that is a form of victory. we have a group of very serious people who do not mention it. >> it is, although had i had 18 minutes, i wouldn't have mentioned it in large, but i would have mentioned it in syria. those whollusion for

think syria is a humanitarian catastrophe, which is, i think the pitcher -- picture is much worse than anybody knows. the stories of torture being used against babies in front of their parents is so unspeakable. it is not even out there. the bigger strategic worry that we should have about syria is thatthe number of al qaeda are going to syria because andar al-assad is a magnet the idea that somehow they will not embed themselves, i think that is an illusion. what can be done, other than

recognizing it as a problem? what can be done now? what is a reasonable thing for the obama administration to do? is it a waste of time? >> i will follow you up. to start on your al qaeda point, i think we have to continue thinking that anywhere there is a major power vacuum, it is basically we should be thinking of it as a place where al qaeda or affiliates can set back up. and it is aork network where you can suddenly have a more active node. never not pay attention

to ungoverned spaces. i just meant in terms of the kinds of forces we need, we are going to need the forces that can fight those networks more than huge, land-based conflicts. i think our best hope in syria for humanitarian reasons as well as strategic ones, it is a disaster on both fronts, is something like geneva where we can broker a political settlement that includes safe n. forces to police them. i only thing that can happen if the united states and other countries make clear that if we cannot get that agreement, we are willing to use force in some way. whether it is using force to cripple the regime, i understand

the dangers. i understand the dangers of doing that, but my point is, we -- we have gotten nowhere unless we say to assad -- you have to remember from the beginning, it was not a secretary in saying -- secretary in thing. thing.etarian weretook bullets, people -- snipers, the works, before they set up their own forces. secretarian to be a conflict from the beginning. he did everything he could to fan the flames. ariant is a secret conflict. you will not get anything unless you make it clear to him that

the other side may not win, but he will not win either. we are willing to take the measures that will stop him from doing what he is doing. then you get to a political settlement that can be enforced. if there were good answers, we would have done something. i think the alternative to that is watching this thing go for years and possibly looking at the changing borders around syria and turkey, a rock -- iraq and much worse. >> al qaeda seems to be preoccupied with killing shiites xd is less focused on larger, essential american threat. that could change on a dime in that years to come.

cannot imagine any kind of agreement in geneva that does not involve putting large-scale troops on the ground to police it. todo not see how you get orchestrating a peaceful istlement in a country that war-torn, divided among dozens of groups, with 20 million people. think -- that is why said you and troops -- u.n. troops. i agree with that. >> i don't see how you produce a political settlement unless you change the balance of power on the ground power -- on the ground. it is shifting in the wrong iraniann because of backing assad. syrian's use all of their

firing power from a distance. if you don't change the balance think he issad does winning. he cannot put syria back together. tosome point, we will have define an objective in syria. we want a political outcome and that is the best result, but it is impossible to produce it unless the ballast -- balance of power is change in the ground. that it is ensure clear that assad cannot win, that those that align with him know that he is not going to be the future, and that there can be assurances for them if they split from him. if we can do that, the war will continue to grind on. at some point, they will embed

in parts of syria and then we will face in syria what we face in yemen today. it is a matter of time before it gets to that point. you are looking at a war that will grind on. have 600,000 syrian refugees in jordan. it has a huge effect on jordan. lebanon.a million in is raising the level of violence in iraq actually was in 2008, sharpening the divide, withg it harder to come up a lot of understandings within iraq. this is a cancer that is not going to be contained within syria. unless the objective becomes , which itself

requires building up localized leaderships within syria. you make a decision to ensure that the reality of localized ine produces fragmentation syria, but then you invest in localized leaderships and have them become buffers. even that because -- even that requires safe areas. i was struck in the reporting on the timeline aspect of the , it put aiations lensesnt set of colored on our serious strategy and arguably our strategies more broadly. if a nuclear deal with iran becomes the prime directive, how does that affect our approach to syria? ,oes that constrain our ability

our negotiating position in syria if these things are linked? we cannot afford to tick off the iranians as we are trying to lure them to their nuclear destruction. >> i am a believer in negotiations. you cannot achieve anything if you do not have leverage. if it looks like we are prepared to concede what iran might seek in syria, i wonder, those who think -- in the arab world, i like to say that conspiracy is like oxygen and everybody breathes it. there's this big fear that we will do a deal on the nuclear issue and in turn will give the

iranians what they want in the rest of the region. that, no, weear have a set of clear objectives in syria and elsewhere. we're going to do things with our friends. we will shore you up because we are committed to that. iran becoming a threshold nuclear state is not acceptable. if there is a diplomatic way to achieve that, we ought to try. understand that they can have civil nuclear power, and we are prepared to accept that, but the way we approach that is not going to be linked to everything else. if we link it to everything our ability to negotiate would disappear. >> with all the various conversations about the iranian deal, i have heard experts saying that syria is getting out

of control, even for iran. iran supports hezbollah, has below supports -- hezbollah supports assad. starts destabilizing other countries and it is not a can --. that iran one thing that we do know is that iran wants to be recognized as a major power. i would agree with no linkage, but i imagine that if you can get a deal and it is a real deal , we can then engage iran, the prospect of them being part of negotiations on syria and on other key areas is something

that seems to be leverage. that is something iran wants. that is at least think about. -- thinkable. >> as long as they are prepared to play by a set of rules. if they won a set of rules that gives them hegemony in the region, that is not an acceptable set of rules. it is one thing to have a respected place in the region. they have a set of interests. that possible to accept they can have civil nuclear power, but they cannot be converted to a nuclear weapon. they can have interests respected by others, provided they are prepared to accept interests in the region. you open up ae dialogue with a big power that

you are estranged with does not mean you neglect your other allies. once you do that, you lose the leverage. right after dealing with the chinese in beijing in 1972, henry kissinger flew to moscow. beijingugh his deal in was against the russians, to reassure the russians. i would imagine in the coming months, if secretary kerry were make -- were to make a trip to tehran and then he were to fly to tel aviv -- >> i would suggest he needs to go to those other places first. first, is to tehran will put it this way -- surprise in diplomacy works if it is such a transformational surprise that

everyone sees the benefit. surprise in diplomacy does not work if it is anything less than that because your friends will read the substance of what you are presenting through the lens of their suspicion. they will already have their defensive worries built a very high and what they hear is interpreted through that lens. they may not hear what you are saying. they will hear only their fears. duende to throw it to &a to thence -- q audience. we will start with this gentleman here. b-55 bombers just through over the east china sea. china just announced the air defense identification zone.

could you tell us how you think about the motivation of the the --tion and what is behind china's annoucement. ofld this lead to escalation tension between the three biggest economies of the world? >> they are from which country? >> from long, i would assume. assume.guam, i would growing that china is at a faster rate than other countries in the region, it would make sense for china to wait and delay and not start crises and incidents. the longer it goes on, the more

the balance of power shifts in china's favor. that is not happening. why did china declare an air defenses own? -- air defense zone? morehave emphasized nationalism, more central control. the chinese economy is struggling. tensions are more fraught than they were before. much noteworthy how nationalism has been dialed up in japan as well. if this is correct, i am taking it, if it is correct, it is a struggle of force independent -- in defense of japan. it waste house thought

serious enough that it merited a u.s. response in defense of japan. happened, this shows how insecure the area is. if you have to go to the trouble to send your bombers over an area without -- normally you should signal this without having to do it. if you actually have to do it, it shows how much more severe the security situation is in asia. a region where we had taken stability for granted for too long. we saw for decades that asia is a business story. it is for fortune forbes magazine. it is gradually becoming more than that. dangerous the most possible crisis we can imagine. japanesee when the

captured the chinese fishing cap and -- captain. somebody thatger, had the japanese or chinese fired, the united states has to come to japan's defense. we are doing is aimed at japan as much as china. we're saying to china, do not think you can do this and we will not be there. we are also saying to japan, do not respond, we are here. that is important. we do not want japan to respond in a way that could escalate. i would see that message as well. , part of what we have not talked about -- domestic politics. they just announced and enormous set of reforms. if he can carry them out, they are being looked at as

fundamental as some of the original reforms. talking about liberalizing parts of the chinese economy that are going -- that need to be liberalized. he is going after corruption. that is going to cause domestic troubles. nationalism is partially a way of buying off the p.l.a. space forcreate himself to be able to do this economically. he is trying to juggle those things. this may not be something he wants to dial up, but that he has to. >> this lady over here. hello, lori watkins. i haven't heard anyone mention turkey, except a brief mention. major actor in the region, especially with syria. and itled to the area

will break your heart to see some of the refugee children that have traveled there. turkey is taking care of one million people, refugees. think the opposition to assad would be if we were to developments more and what you think of turkey's position, playing in that region? early on in this incident, this started off easily in syria. dominated byn was those who were non-secretar ian.

what has happened over time is that you have had radicals come to dominate the opposition from the standpoint of fighting capabilities. is in no small part because they had money and arms. the issue is whether it is too late to try to support the free syrian army in a way that would make it possible to shift the balance of power. one of the things that has happened is that there is a kind of collaboration between the free syrian army and the radical left -- radicalists. haves made it difficult to confidence that if you provide arms you can count on confidence that you know where the arms would end up. if you want to do something to change the balance of power, you would have to decide that you were going to support the free

syrian army. you would have to do something that we wanted the opposition -- you need those who are providing support to the opposition -- you need to have it coordinated. you need to have everything challenged -- channel. you need to have training. that has not been the case. the question is, whether it is too late for that. i am not sure it is too late. it needs to be part of what might be an integrated strategy towards trying to affect the balance of power. turkey has a huge stake in this. of dissonanceue within turkey itself. asked about the role of turkey and then you morphed that into focusing on syria. turkey had a foreign-policy that

slogan zerod by a problems with neighbors. today, they only have problem with neighbors. to rethink what their approach to the region is going to be. you may have noticed that egypt has hermetically downgraded its relations with turkey. if you look at what is happening to the muslim brotherhood across the region, they were very strong in opposition. has been it ineffective everywhere it has been. it is not a rising force, it is a declining force. k.p., these the a. are sister parties.

they thought what was going to ,e the rise of political islam it has to rethink that posture. turkey can play a significant role in the region. it is not playing the role that it in vision for itself and it has to rethink that posture. >> there is another point. turkey tried to manipulate the crisis in syria and iraq. it thought it could be a mid- level power. what happened is that it became embroiled with its own problems. the southeast quadrant of kurt -- of turkey is heavily kurdish. its own kurdish problem got in the way. turkey is ramped up against its up against its own

complications. they have built this pipeline through turkey, but whether they turn on the taps or not is questionable. that would hurt turkey's relations with baghdad. thickly -- ethnically to embroiled in the region to project power without complications with its neighbors. but one thinght, we pay very little attention to is that aired want just met with barzani. that is quite extraordinary to have a side-by-side meeting. this get some support among kurds across the country. one turkish experts said this would help in the election. he has done more with respect to the kurds in iraq.

it is a historic event. use thes been trying to kurdish issue within turkey as part of his effort as he looks to a change in the constitution, which would empower the presidency. if he were to swap positions and become president, he would be able to be president with power, as opposed to ceremonial. you are talking about the relationship in china between what is the internal posture and the external posture. theend to think about what relationship between our domestic and foreign-policy is. if you look at turkey, this is the centerpiece of what is going on. we are not unique in this respect. >> one more question. this gentleman here. thank you for the panelists. kanereminded of citizen

where he was asked about business conditions. how would you define the relationship between the president and his peers? on the low merkel -- we know how getpresident and mr. putin along. in had dr. rice here september. she is wrapping up a trip to afghanistan. power forgedsador their reputations. how is secretary kerry doing? >> we will have to have very short answers to those. well. >> that is an excellent answer. both ambassador rice

and power are in difficult -- in a difficult situation, having libya andactive in outside of office. in office, both supporting the intervention in libya and to benly, i think wanting able to act in syria. part of what has happened in , at every turn, it looks awful. the action looks terrible and fraught with uncertainty. how are we going to do this and how are we going to get out of this? we are better off not acting until a year later when it looks -- if we had acted six months ago, maybe we could have done something. if we do not act now, we are going to be looking at the middle eastern equivalent of the

30 years war. wishing -- weo be have to act now. if i were sitting in the situation room in the white house and the president said lee's lay out what it is we are going to do and how we are going to do it, i am not sure i would have an answer. kerry has shown himself to be a risk taker. he rolls his reputation on negotiations were the outcome is probably below 50%. he is doing it in several negotiations. , but with theiran palestinian and israeli one. this gives them more power than he is gribben -- given credit for.

he has been underestimated. diplomacy to be effective in if you are secretary of state is to be able have a calculated risks, high level of energy and tenacity, andand to know how to exercise patience. notay seem like it is consistent, but there is a key to effective diplomacy. he has the potential. he is showing a readiness to is a with it and that necessary condition for societies -- for success. >> thank you. today andfor coming

thank you to the audience for watching us. [applause] 1960's were different. [laughter] there were a lot of things , thening involving race breakdown of the structure of society, i was suddenly out of the seminary and in new england. there were no rules. things were falling apart. without structure it is very difficult to navigate. i was extremely fortunate to be at holy cross. i was extremely fortunate to ofll have had a residual the way i was raised in the structure that the nuns had

given me, the structure the seminary had given me. i was extremely fortunate because i had already been in predominantly white schools. to a school with very few blacks in a very difficult set of circumstances, academically and otherwise, i had a jumpstart. i was ahead of the game. i had something. it allowed me to continue to do well even though it was very difficult. >> your from two supreme court justices, clarence thomas followed by elena kagan. also, for days of book tv on c- span 2. the life and art of norman rockwell. 3, the 150th anniversary of the gettysburg address.

sentences president lincoln spoke. on many campuses, young women are taught that they live it -- society andchal then channeled into low-paying fields. in the workplace, they are cheated out of 25% of their salary, they face invisible barriers, and all sorts of forces that hold them down and keep them back home acute the back of the high echelons of power. this picture does not fit reality. it is distorted. support itlaims that have been repeated so many times they have taken on this aura of truth. late 20th century feminism and contemporary feminism -- she has been labeled antifeminist. authorestions for

christina hoff sommers live for three hours. looking ahead, join radio talk show host mark loven on january 5. levin on january 5. >> "washington journal" is next. president obama pardons the national turkey in a ceremony at the white house. in 45 minutes, the aviation reporter for "usa today" talks about the effect of airline mergers on holiday travel. amtrak ridership heading into the thanksgiving holiday. yahoo! motors gives an update on

the u.s. auto industry. host: good morning. a live view of the u.s. capitol as the rain continues in the east. with congress and recess this week for the thanksgiving holiday, it is a getaway wednesday as millions toward planes, trains, and drive to your destination. of the busieste travel days of the year. we want to focus on the terminals, the roads and the rail lines but carry freight and passengers. this question, is america's transportation infrastructure up to 21st-century first cent