uranium for bombs. really put off. the disposition of this plutonium production reactor, they could not agree on that. of the finalff deal. the disposition of this underground uranium enrichment facility off to the future. the next six months will be very hard negotiations. the president just the other day said he gave it about a 50/50 possibility of actually reaching a final deal. i think it is a very promising first step. >> i would ask you -- is this a good deal or a bad deal? where are we? what do you think of it? >> i think it is a good deal considering the context in which it was being pursued and considering the legacies of less number of years in which the relationship became increasingly antagonistic and dominated by

suspicions, some very justified, and in which the alternative of course in the absence of the would have been some sort of a military collision, a military collision which in a short sort of sense, we would probably initially when but would probably plunge us into a much more prolonged, much wider regional conflict. so, yes, i think this is a good beginning. as we were just told, it has a long way to go and the difficult parts are just ahead. i think the thing to keep in mind is i think the sanctions regime -- we have probably enlisted as many people as we are going to enlist in the age of ahmadinejad. led in theehran was

last decade by a president who was so obnoxious, so file -- so , a holocaust-denying really bad guy. easy or relatively easy to maintain, the international sanctions regime with iran headed by this type of person. he is gone. he is replaced by someone much more sophisticated, and foreign minister much more adept at dealing with the west and the world. have thenk also we last iranian election, which is a precursor to all these negotiations. so iran had a presidential election in which the supreme about six men guy

to run. their names were mr. black, is to black, is to black, mr. , mr. black, and mr. light black. iranians figured they would go with mr. light bla ck. i am actually told it was 64%. he was a little more moderate than everybody else and really wanted to try opening with the west. with the external conditions in the internal conditions in iran right now, it was the ideal moment to test, a legitimate test, whether iran can be a partner for a secure deal that allows them to enrich at the level of their electrical needs and nothing more. >> i was very interested that i read in "the atlantic" that rouhani has more cabinet members

with phd's from american on hisities, more cabinet than president obama. [laughter] staff wasef of formerly the head of the chamber of commerce. iran's chief negotiator -- chief trade negotiator. >> but does that really make a difference, dr. brzezinski? is rouhani a different kind of leader? tom is talking about black, and lightck, black, black. >> i think that sort of defines it. he was part of the revolution. he appears to be also a person who has evolved with time and who has begun to think in somewhat of a different fashion.

i think that is worthy of exploitation. moreover, and i think it is even more important, iran is changing. iran was swept up i a revolutionary passion -- by a revolutionary passion. resentment on foreign expectations, wrapped extreme interference in iranian internal affairs that united them in a nationalistic passion and self-assertion. 20 years following, misery and frustration, fundamentalist extremism, a significant part of the iranian population increasingly began to view this as a kind of reactionary counterproductive self- destructive regime that needs to be altered, preferably peacefully. and these elections are in a sense a signal that there is in

a population -- now perhaps a majority even, certainly in the urban areas -- at once to be like, for example, turkey. i know iran a little bit, i know turkey even more. my senses iran has a strict -- my sense is that iran has a stronger chance of being a democratic nation. who, then, is driving this in iran? are the generals doing it, or is it these more enlightened people that are more familiar with the west? is it the theocrat? the bureaucrats? who is the driving force there? ? the driving force is the sanctions. that is the intent. that is why iran comes to the negotiating table. why 51% or 64% of the

iranian people voted for rouhani. reefgn minister javon's a -- really felt that their country has become a pariah. they did not want to become isolated. they wanted to be part of the international community. when you saw pictures of the terror on airport, -- the terror ohran airport -- were happy because they saw pictures of the american secretary of state and their foreign minister shaking hands and smiling at one another. i think there is a large community of the special young people who have had enough of this isolation and want to be part of the world again. >> why is israel so much against this? or are they? i mean, we know what netanyahu is saying.

tom? >> that is a very good question. next question over here. [laughter] have enenoids mies, as henry kissinger said. even under, due to john, -- ahmadinejad -- they will always say this was not the right translation, that they did not want to wipe them off the map. it was a holocaust denier building a nuclear weapon. , think any israeli leader that itg ehud olmert, was proven for israel to take steps to try to engineer global sanctions, and even, if necessary, threaten war to

ensure that you ran -- that iran did not get a nuclear weapon. i do not think that is wrong or was crazy at all. i have been -- critical of the fact that i think that it cannot also be an excuse for not working on the israeli-palestinian relationship. it was a legitimate threat, but what you have in israel, a diversity of opinion about what israel should do about it. we know the former intelligence chief and many former generals have come out against any military option and really believe that now is the time to cash in on the sanctions. we cashediew was that in our sanctions too early, we should have doubled down on the sanctions, and to the point where iran would have basically evacuate the whole program. there is no expert i know of on iran, in this country at least

experts the majority of do not believe that. we have been doubling down on sanctions and iran has been step building its program, and there was every reason to believe they would have gone all the way, or one screwdriver away. i think the challenge for israel what iran not allow is trying to prevent, which is to be isolated, to be split off from the global consensus and be split off from the united states . netanyahu has quieted down a lot in the last couple of weeks because one thing he saw was, after sending two ministers here and trying to generate opposition with israel's allies on the hill -- at the end of the day, congress sided with the president this morning. for the most part. -- i thinkisraelis

there is the value of having a threat, a pistol on the table when negotiated with iran. you always want to have leverage on your site and should not take everything off the table, but we should let this play out now. i think that is in israel's best interest. >> if we have so much leverage now, why don't we put it to use, give it a try? maybe they will not expect it, but give it a try. there is a reason for that. iran has been the transition party, we have been the reasonable ones. if we ask for an outcome that no one believes is achievable, -- we have counted on being the reasonable side. if we look like we are not interested in a deal, then our partners in the international sanctions coalition will -- they will leave the coalition, and we need that pressure over the next to havehs to get iran

an acceptable final deal. that is one of the risks from going from a maximalist position. brzezinski, i notice you tweeted -- i did not know that you tweeted -- and you said obama/kerry, best team since bush/baker. >> well, i think there is something to that. [laughter] >> talk about that. >> we are all engaged in the numbers. one can only decipher what might be the motors of particular maneuvers. i think it is fair to say that prime minister netanyahu not -- ithe agreement

think he was surprised when it did. a lot of people were surprise. there was an agreement not just between the united states and iran, although those were the principal parties, but an agreement that involves russia and china and europe. , and i think that is a very important step forward, in the sense that it creates a in awork on which to build sense, it is an outcome that is vaguely being previewed, without being overly specific. i think we all have a common notrest in iran deteriorating as a total social failure, fundamentalist extremists, and a source of violence. that is shared by many israelis, and this is why the israeli public, as far as i can sense, is not all that enthused with netanyahu's tactics or assertions. >> i would point out that the

day after the agreement was signed, the tel aviv stock market went up. >> as you all know, there is talk in the senate of going ahead and passing a sanctions , and i would like to get a sense from each of you what the impact would be. would that be a good thing, or not? >> i do not think it would be a good thing. some sanctions are good, more sanctions must be better. i do not take more sanctions are even needed at this point. the sanctions have had at rippling effect. they have made concessions in the interim deal. they know if they drag their feet and they do not negotiate seriously over the next six months, the congress can pass new sanctions bill immediately

at any time. it will take 24 hours, less than 24 times to do that. why does it have to be done now? in thes a provision interim deal that says the u.s. will refrain from imposing additional sanctions. trickis a kind of delayed -- trigger on a sanctions law and does not take effect for six months, a b that is not inconsistent with the letter of the agreement. but it seems to be inconsistent with the spirit of the agreement, and that will be a violation of the agreement. hardliners in iran will take advantage of that and will undercut the negotiating authority of the iranian negotiating team. and i think it will make things difficult. we will have sanctions. if there is not a deal after six months ended the -- the iranians are not negotiating seriously, there will be more sections. you do not need to do it now. >> president obama and secretary

there' their reputations are on the line. tweets -- if iran cheats -- [laughter] you really got that into my head. i am so tired. they would be politically very role model. would have critics been proven true. let's give it a chance, a proper, clear lab test. dr. brzezinski, you do not think holding this out would make it easier to make a deal. this is already on the books. >> remember, the sanctions still exist. >> but this would be more sanctions if you do not go ahead and close a deal. >> at some point we have to ask

ourselves, what is it we can live with and be reasonably confident that iran is not in the position to use the nuclear weapon in some faction that gives it some benefit. this becomes the belief that the iranians are bent on committing suicide. the firstf they have of allegedly bomb, they will attack israel. one has to ask oneself, is the assumption behind that that this country is totally suicidal, that the leadership wishes for the country to be destroyed? that they are going to attack with the first assumed nuclear has 200 country that nuclear weapons and has the capacity to deliver them? at some point we will have to think about that dilemma. i am of the view that at some point probably over the course of these negotiations, as they are being finalized, we will

have to go more on record to say wet the united states, that will, under any circumstance of directed atm iran, israel, react the same way we would have reacted at any threat by the soviet reunion -- by the soviet union and europe, our principal ally, or the way we committed to reacting on behalf of the japanese and the south koreans if threatened by north korea. ist is to say that action tantamount to an action on the united states. this is further reinforcement of the situation in which iran may end up with a nuclear program, a nuclear program they always have essential for a breakout. reassurances the and it is useful to remind ourselves that achieving nuclear capability is much more to having the

theoretical capability of making a weapon. -- that theublic arranger months away from having the weapon. but the point is, having a weapon does not mean anything. you have a so-called weapon. first of all, you had better make sure it works. secondly, you have to have a delivery system. thirdly, if you are totally suicidal, which is hard to assign as a characteristic of a nation of 80 million people that has endured for 3000 years -- you have to have some sense that you want the capacity to retaliate if you were struck. all of that will take an enormous amount of time to achieve.

what i am trying to say, even if we are not in a position to achieve it, truly absolutely foolproof agreement with the iranians that in effect it precludes them from being coequal with a lot of other nuclear generated nations, we have that option. stability in the region and not just israel, which would be offended i think by us, but anyone in the region. whathen one final point -- we do not really pay much attention to, the fact is the real players in that region someone else. it is not a rant and it will not be in my judgment soon. pakistan. range of itse nuclear capabilities. that is food for thought. >> bob, let me just add something to the point he made. one of the weaknesses i have

a certain school of israeli analysis of the countries around them, they tend to relate to through newspapers israel has politics. netanyahu's hands are tied on the peace process. not install a kosher kitchen in the interior ministry, he is out. turkey has politics. israel has politics, america has politics. everyoneno politics -- there wants to get a bomb and drop it on israel the next day. that is what we are being told. politics as any other country in the region. if you open up the politics by

using the sanctions and reward the people who want to have greater outreach with the outside world and deliver something for them that they can leverage in their internal toitics, you also begin change the whole equation. that is very much part of the presupposition of this deal. bob, let me ask you this. let's say we make a deal. how can we be sure that the iranians are not cheating on us? are our capabilities good enough that we can be reasonably certain that when we make a deal we will know? the interim deal, we have high confidence that the international atomic energy will verify that. that is really not a problem. you have to do something more difficult. you have to be confident that

they will have a more covert, clandestine program. they had an enrichment program, enrichment facility. a dissident group, the any cake, how did it. they had another enrichment , western intelligence durings discovered it 2009. it has made the iranians a bit keep a being able to covert program covert. there is a very high price for those. the price they paid was crippling sanctions. their economy is in the gutter now. so they are going to be wary of doing this. we are going to have to insist on some very intrusive verification measures to be able to give some measure of that they do not have

covert facilities going forward. >> what do you think the best deal could be, from a practical standpoint? we know what prime minister he -- stopu says everything, dismantle everything. what do you think the best we could do is? orthe president has more less said it, but you reduce a iran'syou reduce enrichment facilities, down to the level required for the electricity it needs. you have intrusive inspections on everything else, and i think -- bob is a real expert on this and i would be interested in his and ats -- you put a year half between any breakout capability -- >> would that be the goal, really? to keep them a year and a half away? >> to keep them substantially away, yes.

bewhat i think we should trying to do, we want to be able , breakingany effort out of constraints immediately. that is why you have daily inspections. you want an enrichment program that is so tightly constrained in numbers, centrifuges, enriched uranium available so that recount timeline -- so that breakout timeline is long. you want that as long as possible. why? so that you can intervene and stop them from building a nuclear weapon. that is the critical thing. be threey it should months or six months or 12 months before they do it. it is kind of a subjective question. the real issue is, does the international community have the will to intervene once they have detected it? that is a key question.

if you have great confidence that the u.s. or israel or somebody is going to intervene to prevent a bomb from being built, then it could be three months. if you have no confidence, it can be 18 months or two years. it is not adequate. that is a critical element of it. community hasnal got to reach agreement, that if it is a violation or a breakout, there will be firm consequences and predictable consequences. to me, that is the critical element. >> i have no problem with that except it is hard for me to imagine a firm commitment by the international community, that ifre would be consequences the international community would be prepared to do something. ultimately it would either be the united states alone or conceivably with someone else, but i frank we find it hard to imagine who that someone else would be. , think what we have to add

most of which i agree with, is this -- we have to operate in a fashion that a volatile millionl entity, and 80 nation, is not driven into circumstances in which it feels somehow or other its identity, self pride, status, requires them to engage a surreptitious effort to obtain nuclear weapons. that is political calculus. that, i conclude, leads me to the view that we have to be also sensitive to their pride and their status. -- we have tons be able to find some sort of measure that puts them somewhere in that category while precluding their ability to engage in a significant nuclear program, which is what they tried to do but failed to achieve, in part because it is not easy to hide.

it is not easy to hide. we have all of these additional inspections we will now be having. it will be increasingly difficult to do that. so we have to be careful not to which ano a position accommodation to the majority of iranians begins to look like a one-sided capitulation. >> i have something to elaborate on from earlier. if i were 40 years younger and back in college looking for phd pieces, it would be called , 1991-2003." it would be about what the un's sanctions did to basically crush iraqi society. find people throwing flowers at us when we invaded iraq. we found a society that had been devastated by international sanctions, and we are still paying the price today.

about -- that is why i think this is an ideal moment to bring the sanctions regime and test it. country.ot some desert this is a great civilization, has in norma's potential, given .- has enormous potential >> i think it is a very important point. i want to add to it the following. we have to take into account the iranian memories of recent times. during the iraqi-irani and war, the iraqis were using chemical weapons against the iranians. guess who was helping iraq select and hit targets. i don't even want to say it, but you all know what the answer is,

it embarrasses me so much. >> i want to go to the question. but let me ask one question and we will go to all of you for some questions. how does syria figure into all of this? who would like to talk about that? >> it certainly adds a complication because it is going to be an additional factor over the course of the next few months. -- ay, is it going to be situation where we have to be engaged in a forcible solution, where theron is on a limited scale more likely, or is it something under an international umbrella that is now extant and we will be able to achieve some sort of progress and therefore call down that aspect that otherwise could be very inflammatory to the relationship. >> your question really is a forgotten by some members of congress, that we actually have independent interests in this region, from

any of our allies or enemies. that we approach this region in a different way. we are ending a decade in which post-9/11 we decided we were in this try to do region directly with boots on the ground, and that has proven extremely costly to people there . we know the whole story. yet we still have an interest, even more of an effort, in a stable middle east. one way we want to stabilize the region is the traditional way, balance of forces, balance of power. part of the balance is between sunnis and shiites. it's not forget, because the iranians certainly do not. about thised sharif in 2002, that iran played a vital role in defeating the taliban, which was also there -- which was also their enemy. we want to get out of afghanistan, and we will need iran again as an ally.

so we have interest in this region and in in a written -- in a relationship with iran to balance the sunni part of the arab world and to deal with the northern nation, pakistan and afghanistan, in which we have a lot of shared interests. syria is a place of confrontation, but what has happened is basically the sanctions regime disguised the very divergent interests of all the parties underneath, particularly saudi arabia, israel, and the united states. saudi arabia once -- saudi nobia wants an iran with nuclear weapons. but it does not want a strong shiite-persian competitor, the second largest oil producer in the region. 34 years ago i ran -- 34 years ago, it was like big brother

iran walked out and slammed the door. we all got used to having our own totally monopolize relationship with uncle sam. day, 34 years later, knock knock, big brother is back. he wants his michael so -- he wants his bicycle, his tennis shoes, his relationship with uncle sam, and the region is freaked out. that is the psychology of what is going on. >> and you want to say anything? let's go right here. >> thank you so much, and thank you for your time today and for your service. my name is josh rogan, a reporter with "the daily beast" in washington. it seems pretty clear that the number one point of contention as this deal goes to congress, the tentative plan to negotiate iran possibility to maintain iran's ability to

maintain some level of uranium enrichment. how can we be sure that some safeguards will be dependent on continuing monitoring and inspections and evaluations, that that will not allow iran to maintain status as a threshold nuclear weapons state? in other words, can a final deal that allows iran to have enrichment capacity really be final? my follow-up is for mr. einhorn. what about north korea? if they are ramping up their own uranium enrichment program, is there the possibility that could become iran's store of highly enriched uranium just stored in another location? thank you. program, inrichment think the iranians are going to be surprised at how token the the enrichment

program to be. the joint plan of action that was agreed talked about a mutually defined enrichment program consistent with practical needs. and governments view those practical needs is very limited. they have a research reactor in tehran that already has enough fuel for a few decades, and they have a fail -- they have a power reactor that the russians provide fuel for and they do not need fuel for that. on the drawing board they have other research reactors planned, but they have not broken ground on them. for the foreseeable future, they have very little practical needs. so the d5 plus one are in their rights for calling for a very limited enrichment program which would provide very little breakout capability. these north korean case, are very different cases. the north koreans have cheated

from day one. they have had nuclear weapons. they agreed with the south koreans not to have enrichment capabilities, and even if there is an enrichment program allowed on a legit -- on a limited basis in your ran, the north koreans -- in iran, the north koreans cannot have one, too. >> the israelis are really concerned, seriously concerned about the iranian nuclear program. perhaps they are more concerned psychologically, if we know they are the only power in the region chemical,ss nuclear, and biological weapons. the second of the world may be next to north korea. fromo direct

the main conflict, the main issue of the conflict to the iranian threat. so they make us believe that it is really the threat is not israel, that it is iran. that the world is buying a billion dollars in weapons, and yesterday talking about a missile umbrella for defense for the gulf countries only. thank you. >> i must say the microphone is distorting. up here it is very difficult. >> i had the same reaction. >> could you just say that without speaking into the microphone? give me the thrust of your question again. >> the israelis are really iraniand about the nuclear program. perhaps they are politically

but it is a way of directing the conflict at arab countries, the main israelit, the arab- conflict, to the iranian threat. >> if you talk to the arab countries today, they are a lot more concerned about the iranian situation than the israeli- palestinian situation. the alliance has been written about between israel and saudi arabia where they are both obsessed with the iran issue. one could argue -- and this is not provable -- each one has its interests in diverting attention from domestic issues -- the israel-palestinian thing, saudi arabia.

in the wake of the arab spring, not wanting people to focus on that question. but to suggest that the arab countries want to talk about the israel-palestine question and only israel wants to talk about iran, would be a misreading of what is going on in the region. alliance between saudi arabia and israel and they are much more obsessed about the iran issue right now. at the government level, then they are with the israeli- palestinian question. >> over here. >> thank you very much. hopkins, iat johns had the privilege of having an army general come in and speak to my class about the chinese- u.s. military relations. what he was finished speaking, i asked him what kind of trust exercise could the u.s. and china do together that would be effective? without skipping a beat, he answered, "pirate catching

yuriko applying that thinking here, what sort of trust building exercise could the u.s. not givedo that would saudi arabia and israel hard from ations, and politically as opposed to military standpoint, show the world that the u.s. and iran can get along in more ways than this? >> interesting. when i was involved in the negotiations with the irradiance for the last five years, they would come to us and say let's spend time in syria and bahrain, and we said we would not do it. we knew that our golf friends would be outraged if we started talking about these sensitive issues without their participation and without their knowledge. so we refused. on anti-aid let's work piracy together.

>> thank god for piracy. >> did you want to say something? right here. >> brenda schafer am a georgetown university. are these so successful because a number of allies took a big risk to join the sanctions yucca what is your advice to these countries that put their reputations on the line for the sanctions, and these countries are already getting payback from iran. what would be your advice to these states and to washington? >> the short answer to the question, they deserve the best deal we can get. we have to negotiate on the kind of deal that bob has been talking about. i think if we do, they will feel that their investment in this process was justified. we owe them that.

i am not uncomfortable with netanyahu out there doing his dr. strangelove thing. it is good to have a little crazy on your side when negotiating in that part of the world. i want them to keep the pressure up. i have no problem with that. >> right there. to dr. brzezinski -- it seems to me that the united states has and there is no direct formal relationship between the iranian nuclear deal and syria. on the other hand, i think it is inconceivable that it is not in ,ome way indirectly linked because if the deal goes forward , iran is going to have to think

about any move it makes in syria or toward syria, what impact that will have on the on the nuclear deal. so will the united states. is not ams to me there relationship. do you disagree with that? >> i agree there is a relationship. if there is some movement on the syria issue, it makes it somewhat easier to have some sort of arrangement regarding the nuclear issue, and vice versa. realizinge an iranian your country is in the midst of significant division regarding its future position in the region, and if you were concerned that the american disengagement from afghanistan might unleash new problems in the region, i think you would want to have the situation in which some sort of stable relationship with the united states is in fact a reality.

the irradiance, after all, -- the iranians, after all, are very much aware of the fact that they are living in a region where sectarianism is rising and can become totally destructive for the entire region, for most countries in the region, and has some sort of accommodation that involves china, russia, europe, gives them the option of becoming a more serious and more initive accepted participant the international process from which they have largely excluded themselves. i think it is the sense of sudden awakening to the overall consequences of what has been happening over the last 30 years that has stirred the more articulate iranian public into a an increasingly significant revision of their attitudes.

>> i am peter sharp. there isink that actually enough common ground for a deal. if you were mediating the negotiations, is there an outcome that would be acceptable to iran with its politics and to the united states with its politics and to our allies with their politics? >> who would like to do that? i cannot do better than the president. it is 50-50. are large. we have in mind a tiny enrichment program consistent with their minimal needs. nucleark about 20 big reactors, and aspiration that will never be achieved. arak the to keep this oniumm reactor -- plut

processor functioning. or turned destroyed into a water reactor. they haven't -- they have another that we one repurposed. there are huge gaps. one huge cap is the duration of the final deal. in thepapered over interim agreement, they agree to long-term. iran can have any rights that other nonnuclear weapon states party to the npt can have. the special restrictions go away. to be 20wants that years or 30 years. single digits.nt these are hard issues and hard offenses -- hard differences. >> there is a non-technical

answer. i think it is how you run chooses to define its future. does it want to be a big north korea or a small china? doesn't want to see its future as being a bigger, global outlaw. always a fighting if neighbors. to define itst power is unleashing its remarkable people in a way that enables them to realize their full potential with a little nuclear program on the side. i agree with tom. there is an american side. what we want to impose on iran and how far we are prepared to go with insistence on arrangements. in addition to be strict -- to strict, can be humiliating and the structure.

change with iran is in our interest, to make iran more constructive in a part of the world in which we have a variety of interests. all of which are increasingly under stress and may be increasingly challenged. i do not think any of us want to repeat some of the recent experiences we have had in that region. >> it is hard to think of anything that has damaged our interests more or caused more expense,more grief, and wasted energy than the iran- u.s. cold war -- 34 years. >> i am in favor of an adequate arrangement with iran. foolproof, failsafe parachute that has the effect of forcing someone to commit suicide and take us with them. >> right here. national security administration.

is it possible that iran's perception of its environment has changed to the point they have decided they might not need nuclear weapons anymore? >> it is possible. the question remains how much leeway do they have in having a peaceful nuclear program? how strict do we want to be to make sure that under no circumstances, ever, can they cheat. is that even when the inspections and everything else was much more lax, their attempts to cheat in secrecy failed. it is not simple. we do have opportunities to say hey, you are violating these arrangements. the spirit.g beyond and a return to an arrangement, including threats and sanctions. the iranians are not suicidal.

the whole notion that they are ready to commit suicide. the moment they get an alleged bomb. this creates a mental attitude that is self-destructive and precludes any possibility of a reasonable accommodation. that ultimately, the only way you get the sure, foolproof thing is when you have a change in the character of the iranian regime. part of this whole process is to initiate or enhance what has already begun. we saw that with the 2009 green revolution. nian rain effort -- an ira effort to change the character of their regime. we sell the soviet union die ,000 nuclear warheads. americans whoany do not sleep because they are worried about the soviet nuclear

capability. but they do threaten us. when the character of the regime changes, that changes the equation. that has to be part of a dynamic. made an't think they strategic decision not to have nuclear weapons. in 2003 1 leave a -- in 2003 aq, they putded ir on hold the weaponization. they deferred it until the coast is clear. the coast has not cleared and they saw there is a tremendous cost to be paid for cheating. question, it is on the shelf. our job in this agreement is to keep it far away from a near breakout capability. decision for them to cross the threshold and to keep deterring them from crossing that until there is a basic change in character and they can make that strategic -- >> this is a relevant point.

if you ask what is the biggest thing in the middle east since 2010.0, - -sinc -- since it has been a regionwide movement of young people throughout the muslim middle east realizing they were living in a flat world. they could see how every body else was living, they could see how far behind they were. demanding governments that enable them to realize their full potential. that is the biggest thing that has been happening. if you ask me what will define this region in 10 years, it will not be how many -- how much is allowed.ran it will be whether and how governments respond to that movement in a region where 75% of the population is under the age of 30. >> this will have to be our final question. >> my name is gret. g.

i wonder if the panel will comment on the internal dynamics inside the p5+1. and whether you have confidence that over the next six months, we will remain on the same page of our negotiating partners. under the best circumstances, this will be very challenging. the thematic objectives. -- diplomatic objectives. there was some reason to believe we had internal differences between main p5+1. curious to see what you think about how the p5+1 will work together going forward. administration has admitted that there was substantial bilateral interaction between the u.s. and the iranians in the run-up to the november 24 agreement. the piece of paper that was given to the p5+1

representatives by catherine ash and of the eu -- catherine -shton of the eu was a u.s. iran draft. this took a number of our p5+1 partners by surprise. they would like to have a greater role in the production of this document. that led to foreign minister ' public remarks. within 24 hours, they had a text . going forward and managing that group, it will be difficult. on the one hand, if there is going to be progress, it will be the result of u.s.-iran bilateral interaction. but they have a legitimate role. eu sanctions played a critical role in moving the iranian

calculus. you also have the russians and the chinese, happy with any deal. they are not going to be as fussy in a final outcome. management is going to be tricky. i think that by and large all of the participants in the own,ss, outside of your have a shared interest in the situation being resolved and not letting it slide into a state in takessome explosion place. and massive rates among -- and massive regional violence erupts. there is a subtle difference in the long-range interests of the europeans, the japanese, and us the russians.nd the russians view us as rivals in that area. they would like to regain influence. at the same time, they do not want to go too far.

they may be tempted at some point to take a deviant position. the chinese are basically interested in resolving this is issue so there is no violence, they are interested in oil at a reasonable price. the europeans have no choice but to go with us. even if they were posturing like the french dead. -- the french did. the russians might want to test us. the difference could arise over syria rather than iran. the russians feel they have historical ties with syria and a role to play. to some extent, it is a symbolic expression of regional influence. there's the potential tie between escalating violence in the region in syria and instability in the south caucasus.

russians feel vulnerable. this is what restrains them. in the end, if push came to shove and i had to say will they be helpful, i say they will probably be helpful. we all agree that we must not rub iran's nose in the dirt to get agreement. >> is a good question. two points -- something that has been apparent from the start is that that the sanctions disguised different interests of the parties. the minute you go from that to caching into a final deal, those interests are going to make themselves apparent. much, whatn is how trade-offs. i will venture a reckless statement. i think it is going to be very hard to get a successful deal if

we do not make some progress on syria. it is hard for me to imagine all of these actors agreeing on iran and then having a widening syria n civil war where many of the same parties are contesting one another. it is going to be hard. i hope we both use the six months to get an iran deal and to find some way to get a cease- soe at minimum in syria neither side sees himself losing ground. >> ladies and gentlemen, thank you so much for coming. [applause] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2013] secretary of state john kerry testifies before the house

foreign affairs committee about the nuclear deal with iran. span3 atsee that on c- 1:00 p.m. eastern. join the discussion on twitter and facebook. in a few moments, today's headlines and your calls on "washington journal." eastern, the memorial service in south africa for nelson mandela. the house is back in session at noon eastern. legislative business at 2:00. today's agenda includes bills concerning veterans issues. in 45 minutes, a look at the congressional agenda for the rest of the year with democratic representative john garamendi of thefornia, a member of agriculture and armed services committee.

for the business community's perspective on budget negotiations, we are joined by john engler of the business roundtable. you can call in with questions about hospital costs to elisabeth rosenthal of the new york times. ♪ good morning. it is tuesday, december 10, 20 13. despite most federal offices and ecb and closed due to the weather, congress is scheduled members session as scramble to wrap up legislation before adjourning for the year. the centerpiece of those efforts involve a budget deal that is expected to be released this week. in thathe key questions deal is whether congress will spend 26 billion dollars to expand the federal unemployment benefits. that is where we want to begin on "washington journal"