since we were talking about lng exports, and i'm sure is obvious going to be a question about this, so i would have a slight -- slide on it. that is what about roddick exports -- product exports? the u.s. is knowing that exporter of petroleum products. the numbers right now roughly 3 million barrels a day of raw that exports -- product exports, and a smaller number of product imports. we are in that exporter of -- as we were in 2012. the black line shows the crossover point of being a net importer to be a net exporter. as we move out, in the next two years we're seeing product exports moving up to be up toward one million barrels a

day. plateauing a little at that level, and then moving up more as u.s. production continues to grow, and u.s. demand plateaus off. motor gasoline, one of the interesting things about the ability of refiners to export things like distillates, which are getting a very good price in the international market right now, is it is resulting in high refining utilization rate. they're running now on the upper 90's, and what that means is products are being produced in surplus, in fact gasoline, there's enough gasoline around in the u.s. now that prices have actually been relatively moderate, or below last year's levels at this time.

i wanted to and this brief run this brief run through of our major conclusions with a thought on energy related co2 emissions. we think that they will remain below that's 2005 -- that 2005 peak that you see when we then plateaued briefly at roughly 6 billion metric tons. this can, combination of several different things. per capita gdp came down. we know that there was an economic downturn in the u.s., and that had an impact on energy consumption, and therefore output. but more importantly, in digging -- in thinking about this going forward, we are assuming that

economic growth in the u.s. will run at about 2.4% are your growth, but even with that growth but we are not seeing anything near that in terms of growth in co2. the reason for this is a combination of less carbon intensive fuels, so natural gas, continuing to substitute for coal in the utility sector, and growing efficiency in the consumption side, like comedy -- things like how many miles per gallon a car can get them and how that is late to the -- what it does to consumption of petroleum fuels. a combination looking forward of improvements in fuel efficiency and continuing substitution of lower carbon fuels for higher carbon fuels, including renewables, makes a big difference to u.s. carbon dioxide emissions.

with that, i'm going to, well, let's see -- i have -- let me just go through a couple of these things briefly and then we will end. we will have plenty of time for q and a. this shows u.s. dependence on imported liquids and the difference in domestic supply. -- the difference between consumption and domestic supply. this is not just crude oil production which is above 9 million barrels a day. you have to add 2.5 million liquids, iay of think -- a little over one million barrels of day of

refinery gains, that is a volumetric increase that you get in refineries when you put crude oil through and get white products like gasoline and at about a million barrels a day of biofuels. natural gas liquids, refinery gave bad biofuels, we're going to push up total liquid production in the us to not quite a bit close to 60 million -- close to 15 million barrels a day of fuel supply and supplies somewhere 20 million barrels a day, that is going to shrink the imported portion of our liquid fuel supply to a number that is closer to 25% around 2016, 2017, from numbers that as recently as 2005 for close to 60%. this shows that break down of the total oil production

numbers, and you see the big impact of the yellow line by the tight oil output. other crude oil production holding relatively steady, and the net import number, including biofuels import, that dark black space at the top, shrinking over time. other thoughts in the transportation area is the growing possibility that we are going to see natural gas in use as a transportation fuel. natural gas in the transportation sector is expected to grow quite a bit of output, finding its way into freight trucks as lng, as well as rail and marine uses. continuing use of compressed natural gas in light-duty vehicles and buses. on the left-hand side is

trillion btus, on the right-hand side we have put in some numbers on billion cubic they today. -- feet a day. so reaching something like 2.5 billion feet a day of use from numbers that are currently literally an order of magnitude less than that, fairly impressive growth expected there. thinking about natural gas, let's look at some of the numbers there. we're seeing an increase in our projection of natural gas prices from levels that are near four dollars a day reaching five -- today reaching five dollars roughly, a little bit under, by 2018, and moving up over time. we see brent crude oil prices going up faster, and the net result of that is the oil to gas

price ratio done in btus continues to favor natural gas. you end up with a number that is over three in the forecast and what that says is that natural gas per million btu is only a third of the value of oil on a btu basis. that is what's leaving to the the whole idea of substitution of natural gas into the markets that would have typically been liquid fuels. let's look at the supply demand, and net export numbers. we still forecast that the u.s. is going to be a net exporter of natural gas. i think last year we thought that it would be roughly 2020 when that would take place, now

given higher natural gas production numbers, mainly, even s mucht crossover point id sooner than we expect -- even with consumption growing, allowing for the ability of exports. by the time we get to out to 2040 we are looking at fairly significant levels of lng exports. let's take a look at where this gas is going across the u.s. economy. again, growth in natural gas being used in electric power, in

the industrial sect or, and particularly manufacturing, although it looked in our models that there was a fairly healthy spread of natural gas conception -- consumption in the industrial sect or her across the entire group in consumption. growth in transportation and the growth in the commercials like sector. the only flat would be residential use of natural gas. one of the reasons for that is areric heat pumps becoming more efficient and taking market share. let's talk a little bit about electricity. the main point to be there is that the growth in electricity

demand that we see looking out towards 2040 is still relatively low, and little bit less than one percent. you can see the left-hand side of the table from 2013 to 2040 it is .9% are year. -- per year. one of the things we have done here is shown in electricity use, that is the blue line, and the dark blue trend line along with gdp or u.s. gross to met product and the trend in that. we see three distinct periods in this charge. -- chart. the time from 1950 into roughly the mid-1980's when electricity demand was typically outpacing growth in gdp. the time from the mid-1980's to 2005 where they were going close

to each other, and then does time since 2005 where we see gdp growing faster than electricity demand. there are a number of interesting points to be made in this. despite new nuclear capacity, the share of nuclear power in this declined slightly, and we will see that on the next slide. but that one percent growth in consumption does not allow for a huge increase in renewables or other fuels, unless you push something else on the system, like nuclear, or coal, or natural gas. so let's look at that length, -- split, and here is the

split, apple grass growing from about 30% of electricity generation -- natural gas growing from about 30% of electricity generation to about 35%. renewables continuing to grow across the entire time. termflatish in the near but coming down in percentage terms, over the timeout to 2040, and nuclear essentially doing the same thing. what about non-hydro renewables? we continue to see very strong growth in wind and in solar. we are going through over the next month or so take a look at the solar numbers to try to better understand improvements in solar costs that have been going on, to see if we might be not overestimating but possibly

underestimating growth in solar solar power. one of the things that keep these numbers looking relatively low in comparison to some of the other growth here is that tax credits keep going in and out. the renewable tax credit for both wind and solar, and the changes that get made, and the treatment of solar at the regional and local level will be another important factor. i am now going to stop, and if you will come to join the, we will see what kind of questions you all have. how we might be of further help to all of you here.

if possible. >> we will have some mics coming around, i believe. we ask that you would identify yourself for asking your before asking your question. down here in the front? >> brookings. >> hold on one second. >> charlie from brookings. the dramatic reduction of oil import bills and the industrial

renaissance we see in some of your chart, why do you think it is gdp might not be able to grow faster than the 2.4% you used on average over your timeline? >> well, i think the answer to that depends on what assumptions you make about the spillover the -- spillover of the benefits associated with the increase in to the rest of the economy. there are sort of two different camps in this area. one says that oil and gas is a percentage of the u.s. economy that is still relatively small, and therefore increases in oil and gas production don't completely change the nature of the u.s. economy.

the economy is continuing to move structurally away from things like manufacturing, and so that lower percentage is part of the reason. i'm very reluctant to say that it is small, and therefore doesn't matter, because that phrase, a journey of a thousand miles starts with the first up, -- step, anything we do in terms of improving out but -- output ultimately has to show up in gdp numbers. i think that the modeling of - -this is just beginning to get underway. stay tuned.

> herman -- congratulations. you.can't hear let's wait until the screen goes up because i can't there anything with the screen going on. if that's working, herman, go ahead. >> congratulations on another excellent and very interesting set of forecast. i want to ask two simple questions -- one on the oil side, one on the gas side. on the oil side, how sensitive is the production -- tight oil to prices. some believe in intermediate. there could be a drop of 10% to 20%. how sensitive with the

production scenario be? the ratio between oil prices and gas prices remains pretty much in the range of three. -- decided to pessimistic based on that assumption? >> let's start with the sensitivity of oil production to prices. clearly there is a sensitivity. we are already seeing -- the forecast i had was for brent, the method prices -- first, west texas intermediate and now more sweet,y light louisiana selling below brent. we're still getting the growth in output. a number of companies and analysts have tried to look at this on an individual company basis, and there are analysts

that believe shale oil production in general is probably -- continues to be profitable below $90 a barrel, down toward $80 or $85 a barrel. it is going to vary from field to field, and company to company. those calculations are they stalling cost assumptions that continue to change as the check algae improves -- technology improves. as drilling rig efficiency get better, and as well productivity gets better, the overall cost structure for shale looks like it could continue to come down. that could make a difference. there are also geopolitical issues that might set a lower limit on oil prices.

life could get very difficult from a revenue standpoint among some of the big oil producers around the world about as oil prices drop. for some countries it is the total social cost of producing crude oil that is important, and those numbers are probably higher than what the cost of shale production is in the u.s. the other question that you had was doesn't that gap that three ratio in the etu cost of oils -- btu cost of oils, ursus natural case,nt crude, in that versus gas production in the u.s., doesn't that lead to incentive for further penetration of natural gas into markets that historically been

held by your oil? the answer to that is yes. keep in mind that since it is mostly in the transportation sector, certainly in the u.s., we're seeing the substitution taking place over time. getting the infrastructure in place to be able to use lng and compressed gas in the u.s. takes time. so the growth rates are likely to be slow, could accelerate as infrastructure begins to get built out. this is the first year, by the way, of the energy outlook -- the first year that we have incorporated a forecast for marine and rail use of natural gas, likely to be in the form of lng.

we know there are a number of shipbuilders and rail companies who are looking at this right now. >> good morning. david from congressman -- office. i had a question on your ethanol data there. the question is, if there was a demand or consumption increase, given the reduction of emt and the current regulation with ethanol blending, i just wonder if you could clarify that for me. >> sure. we will have more to say about that once the epa comes out with their 2014 figures. we are assuming that ethanol will grow a little bit in the motor fuels pool, mostly

gasoline, and we are basing it on a view that says that in the near term, getting past the blend wall is not easy, so growth will have to come in cars that are capable of using e-15 or e-85. the answer to that is similar to the discussion we just had with the previous question, getting the infrastructure in place to allow consumption of fuels higher than 10% ethanol gasoline is going to take some time and there are economic issues associated with that as well. so we will have more to say about that in side cases that would will be running in 2014 when that gets published next year.

>> thank you, paul connors. canadian embassy. last year the net liquids imports, 37% -- i think the -- gross imports or seven- something and gross import were five-something -- within a project -- projection of 42%, do you know with the growth in the figures are? >> i'll tell you what, rather than me trying to do the math appear in my head, i will let paul look through the tables and figure out what those numbers are. we could get back to you. it is clearly coming down. over the next three or four years -- crude oil production in the u.s. in december has just

gone over 8 million barrels a day. so we coul total level of consumption is, it's running at currently 18.5. >> low-level, net imports down to 4.9 million barrels a day. >> just under 5 million barrels a day. >> 7.5 today. that's net. >> 7.5 today. >> thank you for the eia's annual christmas present of a glowingly optimistic forecast for the future. i'm going to play the grinch who stole christmas by noting that the trend you have noted how

natural gas is replacing other fuel sources in many fields, but the trend this year has been for coal to increase its share in electricity generation, which is obviously related to the relative price of natural gas versus coal. we have some anecdotal evidence that the current price of natural gas is not sustainable or profitable for the producers. son, ceo of exxon mobil say that you are losing your shirt on shale gas -- and you yourself predicted the price of natural gas will go up, though only slightly. why is this not the trend of the future, at least in regard to electricity generation, where we return to increased use of coal? >> i will take the first stab at that. is alan here?

maybe we will have alan comment on that, so maybe we can pass the microphone over that way. you correctly stated that the relative price has changed between 2012 and 2013. we had very low natural gas prices in 2011 and 2012, and that led to a big hiccup in -- pickup in natural gas consumption by electric it to be inat found their interest to burn natural gas rather than coal. as natural gas prices came up, coal burning electric utilities recovered as well, and it's kind of interesting to think about it this way. the market itself seems to be making a lot of the decisions about what fuels get burned at electric utilities.

the longer-term, even with our increases in natural gas prices over the long term, we don't see a great deal of increase in coal, and alan can tell you more about that. there just aren't a lot more coal plants likely to be built, and some of the coal plants we already have could retire on an economic basis as the utilities decide what kind of capital investments they do or don't want to make an existing coal -- at existing coal plants. so we see that crossover taking place, where natural gas begins to exceed coal as far as electric generation is concerned. alan, is there a little more color that you want to put on >> absolutely right, and 2013, - in 2013 coal generation

relative to last or so far is up about six percent, gas is down around 12% or 13%. you have to remember that 2012 was a very odd year. 2012 was a relatively warm year so residential and commercial use of natural gas was down. it was a low electricity growth year. electricity was down. the net result of that was production of natural gas was soaring, the price of natural gas collapsed to under three dollars so a lot of coal was replaced by natural gas. we see that rebounding back. if you look at our projections, you will see that we see coal coming back in the near term, but we don't see the price of natural gas getting high enough to make new coal plants attractive. once you have utilized once you have, most of the new capacity additions will be natural gas and some renewables spurred on by other programs. so, gas just keeps growing where

coal hits a plateau and doesn't grow any more. >> one last thing i would add to allen's comments, an answer to a point that you made, i think the jury is still out on exactly how strong natural gas production can be at current prices. i know there has been a lot of talk suggesting that higher natural gas prices will be required to maintain output of shale gas and our model suggests that, too. but we do know from things like the drilling productivity report and other comments from industry that well efficiency and drilling efficiency continue to improve, which means that natural gas at current prices might be more profitable then -- than you would have thought a

year or two ago, and in fact, the longer-term natural gas price forecast in 2013 was higher than the 2014 aeo which higher than the 2014 aeo which we are publishing today, so our natural gas rise track is somewhat lower this year than it was last year. i think certainly from what we are seeing happening on the productivity side, that trend might continue for a little while. quick -- >> steve fine.

thank you again for the very comprehensive and excellent presentation. i wanted to ask you about the electric power sector and your view on nuclear power that is contained within the forecast. it looks like you have the share of nuclear power more or less holding steady through 2040. when we look at this, it looks like the large number of the nuclear fleet are going to be retiring sometime between 2030 2040 if you assume, depending on what you assume about license extensions on the existing fleet. a lot are due for additional renewals in that 2040 timeframe. we have already seen a tremendous amount pressure on plants have announced retirements, everything from california to crystal river in florida to the upper midwest to the northeast. i'm just wondering what your views are on nuclear power going forward, because that -- when you are talking about 45 gigawatts, it has a big impact

on overall share of generation in the power sector and on co2 emissions going forward as well. >> right, i think you're absolutely correct that we will -- one of the key assumptions that you have to look at projecting nuclear power, especially for the last 15 or so years of that forecast, from 2025-2040, is what happens with planned retirement. retirements. we are assuming that a number of companies will file for extensions, life extensions, and that allows those numbers to stay relatively flat as you go out towards 2040. if the aeo went out to 2050, i think you would see more of a decline. a lot is going to depend on what happens with that. the other thing that is

important to have to know, but of course you can't, is what the situation will be in terms of operation and maintenance expenses at these nuclear facilities. there has been a relatively steep increase in costs over the past few years, whether that continues could make a big difference to the forecast, we are assuming somewhat of a slowdown in costs as we moved out into 2025-20 30 time frame. so, the combination of knowing what operation maintenance will be an knowing what the life expansion answers going to be ultimately gives you the answer. in our side cases, where we look at low nuclear, what we find is that the bulk of the difference

would show up in greater consumption of natural gas. alan, is there anything you want to add to that? >> i think you are exactly right. low natural gas prices and slow demand are challenging everything right now. utilities are looking very carefully at expansion and retirement plans. that is true for gas, coal, nuclear. in our reference case, we project natural gas price to gradually rise to the point where it makes it attractive to maintain and keep most of these plants around, but that is a very uncertain future. many of the things adam pointed out about demand growth and all those things could affect that and we will be running, and we have for the last several years because the uncertainty makes us look at alternative cases.

what if it doesn't make sense to keep the plants running another 20 years beyond their 60 year life? it is a big issue, and if it is replaced, it will be replaced by very efficient natural gas. the emission impacts, although positive it is not as large as , one might expect because of that. >> a question on nuclear if i may. based on what you said, is it correct to surmise that your forecast for nuclear includes no additional new construction? beyond the four or five lance currently? >> no additional new construction. there are couple of plants that are already under construction. >> there are four, and there are one or two more -- >> [indiscernible]

>> but i think it is probably fair to say that you are not going to see a huge increase in the overall capacity numbers for nuclear, that new growth is going to be just about enough to offset the retirement. it adds a little bit. i think those numbers -- last year we had nuclear expanding by a little bit and i think this year we have nuclear contracting by a little bit. >> a question on carbon dioxide emissions figure. i think you said we are down nine percent now from the 2005 peak. i'm just curious why 2005 was a peak year, considering it was two or three years before the economic downturn. what caused emissions to decline from 2006 onward?

in your projecting forward it , seems almost like the zero growth in co2 emissions. when you are forecasting that, what assumptions did you make on the regulatory side in terms of what they epa may come out with on power plants, etc.? >> in terms of what epa might do, we don't have a projection for that in the reference case, because the reference case is based on existing law and regulation. so we do look at side cases, won't be published until early next year. on the question of what was so special about the year 2005, i would have to actually go back and look to see if there were any weather effects, light was a -- like, was at a cold winter?

i can't quite remember what was going on in 2005, but i would say generally speaking, that was in the run-up -- we had a fairly decent time of economic growth from 2001-2005, and there was a lot of consumption of fuels in general, including oil and coal, that would have added to the growth in energy related carbon emissions. howard? >> the only reason 2005 was cited -- 2007 and 2005 are virtually identical in terms of carbon emissions. it's just that the 2005 is a reference point that is often used in the united states. we think it is a useful -- i think some of the government statements had mentioned 2005, so we think it is a useful reference point, but

2007, you get the same kind of result, and that is immediately before the economic downturn that occurred. i wouldn't read too much into that. >> thanks, howard. >> all the way in the back. >> i want to follow-up on the question raised regarding ethanol. i appreciate your earlier clarifications because the 5% figure doesn't seem to align with the volumetric requirements that are 36 billion gallons after 2022, which is more than doubled where we are now. a large part of that growth is supposed to come under current law through the increase of fuel -- cellulosic biofuel production. i'm just wondering if you could speak to the forecast in that realm. >> eia has been saying i think for -- since 2007 or 2008, that

it was going to be very difficult, if not impossible, to reach the 36 billion gallons number. i testified that up on the hill, and i think at least two eia administrators prior to me have done the same thing. what we are looking at in our reference case forecast, what we think can practically be achieved through the combination of what can go into the gasoline pool and what can be produced in terms of cellulosic fuels. there will be more on that coming up. john maples, who does a lot of transportation work for us, is here. howard looked at these issues in detail. i think either one of those would be happy to speak with you after the session here, but

basically, what we are saying is that here is what we think is doable in our reference case, and we are as eager as everybody else to see what epa will do with the 2014 ruling coming up. >> also in the back, far right. >> thank you. berkeley research group. i wanted to summarize some of the things you did today that were different than what i remember from last year and then ask you questions about those trends. if i have the numbers right, you have about 20-22 bcfd of demand growth when you factor in 10 of exports, seven or so of

industrial growth, three or four of industrial and maybe a little less of power. when you add it all up you got 10-12, maybe 12-13, something like that domestic and about 10 for export. on top of 65-67 bcfd market it's , about one third growth, quite substantial, and more than you noted in the past. on the shale oil, you have declining -- a plateau and then declining production profile. the shale gas just keeps going and going. you like we and many consultants in the business see this sort of constant ability of shale gas to keep feeding demand and serving the growth, but as a matter of scenario analysis, maybe this is jumping at to where you will be in the new year with scenarios, but what other risks that that story doesn't play out the way we are forecasting, and the

plateau does reach -- or it just starts to constrain the amount of demand growth possible. >> let me see if i can summarize the question and then provide some thoughts on it. is it possible that the growth that we see in shale gas production will not be a strong as we are suggesting? sure, that the possibility. it is also a possibility that we might see more oil production than the rise and plateau and then gradual decline that we are seeing on the oil side. one of the things that we do know is that the resource base for shale gas in the u.s. is very strong.

in fact, the resource base, in terms of the level of production that it would support for gas, looks better, at least at this point, to us than it does on the oil side. john and michael who are here today worked very closely with advanced resources international in looking at shale resources both in the u.s. and globally, and of course we also look at what work the u.s. geologic service does for the u.s. and other countries. we do know physically that natural gas molecules are smaller than crude oil and condensate molecules, so when you hydraulically fracture one

of these continuous resources, shale or other, it is not always shale. there are cases where hydraulic fracturing is being applied to geology that differs from shale, but the low permeability formations, very high water pressures open up crack in the rock. they are typically sand that are part of the hydraulic injections, and sand keeps the crack from closing back up again. it turns out that it's easier for natural gas molecules to squeeze their way through the crack that you get from hydraulic fracturing that it is for oil molecules to do the same thing. so that's one of the geologic reasons that we see a rise, let

plateau and then fall for oil, but we don't see the same kind of constraint associated with natural gas. i can think of at least three things that could make a difference in the forecast that our knowledge of the geology changes that gives you either higher or lower numbers, that rules on hydraulic fracturing change that could add to the cost structure associated with producing oil or gas from these continuous formations, and that could make a difference. finally, there are timing issues associated with things like infrastructure. one of the reasons we are beginning to see this big pickup in marcella's production is not that there is a whole lot of rigs drilling right there. a lot of the riggs left to go to

eagle ford, but what is happening is that wells that have already been drilled that weren't producing are finally being hooked up to pipeline infrastructure that is being built, so infrastructure issues could lead to higher or lower numbers, depending on how all of that works out. one thing i'm pretty sure of is that the technology and prices really, really matter when you look at what the likely production numbers for oil and gas are going to be, and that it's not just trying to estimate what the resource level is in the ground, but rather what is the price signal giving you and allowing in terms of capital investment, and what kind of progress is being made on the technology side that might lower the cost structure.

>> we can take one or two more questions. in the back. >> wondering if you could talk a little bit about true exports, -- crude exports, not from a policy perspective. i know it's not your department, but the report shows an increase in exports of refined products, which is one way of u.s. crude reaching a global market. does it see that as the only way, or do you see an increase in crude exports to canada or swaps of one type of oil for another, which are currently allowed? thank you. >> one thing to think about on the oil export side is, first of all, eia is not a policy organization, so i don't have a recommendation associated with whether there should be more or

less exports of products or crude oil. eia's job is to try to assess what we think the economics drive things towards and to show that within the framework of existing law and regulation. on the product export side, there really is not a whole lot in existing law that would prevent further increase in product export. there is kind of a natural limit in a sense that refinery capacity in the u.s., 17 million barrels a day, would have to be further increased if you're going to see rodda exports --product exports continuing to rise at the kind of level or rate that we have seen over the past couple of years. so there is kind of a natural

limit that would come from capacity in the refining industry itself. on the crude oil export side, you are correct that exports to canada or permitted fairly -- are permitted fairly easily, as long as the oil is being refined or otherwise used in canada, so oil cannot go to canada for reexport from canada. it's got to be used there. that number has picked up recently. it had been running at something like 50,000 barrels a day and it has now moved up toward 150,000 barrels a day, depending on the month. there have been some reports of crude from texas going to eastern canadian refineries for example. the very first public talk i gave at e.i.a. administrator

last summer, what i said was the growth in light sweet crude oil production in the u.s. looked like it was going to to want rise, that the refinery configurations in the gulf of mexico especially so the gulf coast area were really set to more easily and economically process heavy higher sulfer crudes and that at some point policy makers might want to look at the possibilities of swaps with a country like mexico or others. typically you do it with somebody that is nearby on transportation issues so mexico comes up in that regard. might want to look at the possibility of whether it would make some sense to allow the

light sweet crude to go to refineries in mexico that need that and have more heavy sour crude from mexico come into the refineries in the gulf of mexico. so that does require a policy decision but you can see that the trends are pushing things in that direction. that's not the only thing. one of the things that i think that analysts in general, the public and policy makers need to realize is there are lots of things that can happen short of that. refinery configurations could change. you could build facility that is thatfining facilities would allow a topping or removal of the lighter ends and export of resulting products.

we're already seeing a huge change in how oil is being transported. there is oil light sweet crudes are making their way to the east coast to be refined in the refineries there, that like the light sweet crudes and similarly there is some making its way into california. there are also light sweet crudes coming down into the gulf of mexico and feeding into systems there. a lot of that is happening by rail. there is crude moving around by barge. whether you export crude or products or recon figure refineries or change the way that oil is being transported to get these lighter sweeter crudes to areas that are capable of using them are all fairly complicated infrastructure issues that require capital investment and lead times.

and i think the system is adjusting. ultimately if you think about the time frame during which the rules on many of the policy rules on crude oil were set was in the 1970's and early 1980's when the general thinking was that u.s. demand for petroleum would only go up and u.s. supply would only go down. so policy makers are struggling with the fact that the whole basis for a number of the rules that were put in place has been turned upside down and they are trying to figure out the best way to deal with that. and i will end with the

following, policy makers have a really hard job trying to think about these things. they've got to look at what the economic impacts are. they have to look at what the national security impacts are and they have to look at what the environmental impacts are in changing any of the energy policy that is they review. -- policies that they review. and that is a lot of issues to keep up in the air and to handle effectively. and i think it's just terrific that e.i.a. doesn't have to get into those policy issues. [laughter] >> i think time is running on here. i think we'll close at this point. you show great dexterity as usual taking a range of questions. you made it very comprehensive. >> thank you very much. and thank you to johns hopkins school. [applause]

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including an urban institute panel on health care enrollment and how it is working in the eight. 12:30 p.m. eastern. 2:15 p.m. eastern the senate intelligence committee will hold a confirmation hearing for cia general counsel assistant secretary of state for intelligence. in a few moments, a look at today's headlines, plus your calls live on "washington journal." 10:30 a.m. eastern, the senate homeland security -- will hold a hearing on the navy yard shooting. later, a senate foreign relations committee looking at violence in the central african republic. in about 45 minutes, a look at u.s. trade policy with sanford reback, global business director for bloomberg government. then we will discuss the cost and benefits of federal regulations with former senator blanche lincoln who now heads

the group small business for sensible regulation. and robert weissman, president of public citizen. "washington journal" is next. ♪ week seven, republican senators say they will vote for a two-year budget agreement today. debate,test of vote and a final vote expected tomorrow. and his ruling on an as they surveillance -- on nsa itveillance operations -- infringes on a degree of privacy that people enshrine in the fourth amendment printed in an appeal of the decision could take six months. washington journal for december 17, 2013. the folks at "the national jo