. .

>> it feels a bit big brother-ish that at any given moment the government knows where i am.

>> as one of my colleagues said, the more serious problem is little sister, not big brother. it is companies knowing and tattling on you, sharing your purchasing history. aere was a famous story about father getting very angry wondering why , his young daughter was getting pregnancy literature. pregnancy testing literature. it turned out her browsing habits suggested she was pregnant, and she was. >> before we go on. a different type of question. there is now no secretary of homeland security for the united states. nobody has filled your job -- there is no deputy secretary of homeland security. washington seems totally dysfunctional, we cannot even fill jobs in washington now. is that a problem? >> it is a problem if the process is broken down. the processes have, in many ways, broken down. it is not a problem because, in the particular case of homeland

security, because they are filling the positions on an acting basis. i have a military background. the leadership rotates all the time and everyone is expected to be trained and ready to step into a leadership position. in that case, it is not a problem. to your broader question, i don't think anyone would accuse washington of being a weld oiled -- a well oiled machine at the moment. >> how are innovations affecting our privacy? >> i must respond to one thing. we have to worry about the -- big brother. it is not just a matter of companies engaging in this kind of intrusive activity, but the states. surveillance by the states has never been greater and is never lacked as much transparency, as we have learned as a result of

the snowden revelations. let us not suggest that surveillance by the state is not a serious matter. it is increasingly serious. it threatens our freedom and our liberty. the preamble to the constitution is "we the people." it is about living life that is free and free from surveillance. i am not talking about not getting the bad guys. everyone agrees we want to get the bad guys. we have to find a way of doing surveillance and law enforcement and counterterrorism and privacy, not to the exclusion of privacy. that is something we have developed called privacy by design. it is all about getting privacy protection into technology, business practices, operational processes. working with the government to do this. if you think that is a pipe dream -- i was invited to speak at the pentagon in march because

they were attracted to privacy by design. privacy and surveillance. privacy and counter terrorism. they invited me back in august and we had a full day's session on how do you do privacy and counterterrorism. there was a lot of interest in this. we are working on this. let me put this on the table. it is not do not worry about the state. worry about the state. let's do something to assure that our privacy, which is the underpinning of freedom, it is a fundamental human right. it is just a personal thing. it is not -- it is the underpinning of freedom. it has a enormous societal value. sorry, innovation. >> when you talked about, in your papers, you talk about it not being a trade-off. it is not either or. you can have privacy and security by using technologies. you just touched on it a moment ago. explain how those technologies work. >> we talk about abandoning the zero-sum model where it is one

or the other. where you have what we consider unnecessary trade-offs. you abandon the trade-off. this is where innovation comes in. privacy is essential to innovation. privacy or is a necessary, but not sufficient, but necessary condition for innovation because it breeds new ideas and creativity. biometrics are a great example. we have biometric encryption, you can get the values of the biometrics, facial recognition, fingerprints -- but it is encrypted, so that the only way in which you can get any access is if you are properly authorized. law enforcement -- >> if i walk through grand central they are picking me , up biometrically, if they need to trace me, they would have to get a court order to do that. >> yes.

you need reasonable and probable grounds to access the kind of information by law enforcement. we have done that with video surveillance cameras. you can encode encrypt the video stream such that only when it is properly required and traditionally authorized -- and judicially authorized you can have access. we have done this in toronto. >> jane, really quickly, would that be fine with the people of homeland security? >> it is already in place and -- in homeland security. more people than there are on the planet has moved through 10 -- through tsa systems. more than 7 billion people. data acquisition is never the point. there's never been a privacy breach in tsa with that kind of information. what -- i guess i am endorsing the notion that you can have privacy and security. they can travel together. >> you got a bit worked up, i was going to ask more philosophical question -- why is

privacy such an important good? when i was growing up, if i walk to the drugstore in new orleans and bought a pack of cigarettes, it would take seven to 10 minutes before both of my parents would know that. i had no privacy, in that regard. i think sometimes people confuse or say privacy, which is a word we all love, which -- what they mean is anonymity. you get to do things anonymously in society. for 2000 years, years we have not had anonymity. if i go do something in my town where i grew up, my community, people kind of know. without anonymity, we tend to behave better than we do with anonymity. do you feel that we need to preserve anonymity as we go about our lives? >> let me respond to one thing before i answer that.

you said in your small town, your parents knew where you were. absolutely. but what did not happen is that that information was not tracked forever. right now, the ability to track information, your whereabouts, your mobility, the ability to retain this information and have it used in ways you never contemplated, and in ways it was never intended, that is one of the fundamental differences. the reason we need privacy is -- it is such a basic concept. privacy is like breathing. you take it for granted until you desperately need it and you need air and you are being deprived of it. if you look at states that has morphed from democratic societies into totalitarian states. the first thread to unravel is privacy. academics have studied this.

without privacy you cannot have freedom. >> why? >> the opposite suggests that the state should know everything you do. >> but let's not go to the extreme opposite? >> that is where you morphed. >> why would you have to morph? >> people often say, if you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear. nonsense. the presumption is that somehow the state or the departments of businesses you engage with have every right to have access to information about you. i am not talking about your house or your bedroom, but all your activities that you engage in. it is an absurd proposition. privacy is about control, personal control. that the individual has the ability to control the information. and the uses of that information. >> should i be able to travel privately on an airline? >> it is not about concealment, is about your choice of how you use information. about yourself. >> if i travel on an airline, should that remain private?

>> i am not saying that there are not lots of places where you are required by law to give information. you give it gladly or you do not engage in that behavior. if you fly, we all have taxes, the irs. this is all acceptable. we know the rules. but those are legitimate uses of that information. the protection of that information by those organizations, dhs, irs, is tightly controlled. >> what about buying a gun? should i be able to do it privately? >> we can get into the gun debate. but the point is laws has to be followed. the converse to that is that the government departments collecting that information are only permitted to use that information for a narrow purpose. they are not intended to use it for secondary purposes. unrelated to the purpose of collection. it is very narrow. privacy is about freedom and your ability to largely go about your activities as you wish subject to limited exceptions and subject to law enforcement.

>> i agree, i am just asking questions. let me ask you. you say it is for limited purposes. do you feel we are using that information for purposes for which it is not intended to that -- today, right now, say in jane's department. give me some examples. >> i am not going to comment about james department. i do not know her personally. >> homeland security. >> homeland security, i have worked with them. there is no issue. i will point to the nsa revelations. in canada, the same kind of thing. that has revealed the massive scale of information about law abiding citizens being collected. let me point you -- if you want the reference i will tell you, an article on false positives. a false positive is you are identified as being a potential terrorist and you're not. a false hit. the enormity of the false positives that have resulted from these searches is

staggering and should be completely unacceptable to free and democratic societies. it is unacceptable. those people are not off the list. there are these false positives, and until they are cleared, you can go through enormous problems and anxieties. it is outrageous. >> let me let frank get in. go ahead. >> i feel like a visitor from outer space here. the crime story in new york is in two respects a distinction from the ordinary privacy and municipal problems story. in the first instance, it is as close to a solved problem we thatht was intractable ever existed. the homicide rate in new york this year will be down 86% from the homicide rate in the same city with the same

population and the same structural problems 30 years ago. that is astonishing. the second thing is that the changes that took place are relatively low-tech. they are all located in public places. this is going to be important when we center the conversation on privacy. the changes that took place were a computer being able to identify for the police force where crimes keep happening and where public drug markets are located. that isn't rocket science even circa 1975. it was a change in policing strategy and it worked very well. now, what about privacy? well, in a funny sense, if you're talking about public places, you're talking about a

serious problem. but i think privacy is the wrong word for it. the reason for that is public places are too dangerous for the autonomy we associate normally with privacy. so for instance, if you want to talk about 700,000 stops and frisks in 2011 and 2012 and the fact that they keep happening to the same people in the same neighborhoods and the false positive rate is hovering around 98% as ann expressed, you have a serious cost, serious problem with serious benefits. it's not about privacy. what it's about is government having to respect the dignity and autonomy of people in the streets even though they know things about them that require

a relationship between government and -- >> how has technology and the new command center we're going to see today change that? >> it doesn't change that. that's the relationship between individual people. if machines could stop us and frisk us, that does happen in the airports, folks that are going to travel. in a funny sense, the indignity in the process, the power competition when two people with too much testosterone are on the sending and receiving ends of the stops and frisks doesn't happen. this is human relations and i think as soon as what you have is a polite use of government, a polite use of technology. and some notion that the

autonomy of the false positive -- if everybody who is stopped and frisked is treated as if they were guilty, then you're going be 99% wrong. on the other hand, i don't mind going through a machine if i'm one of 100,000 people who is coming to see the president of the united states and there are people who are trying to make sure that none of the 100,000 are armed and dangerous. >> let me open it up, if i may, if we can turn the lights up a little bit so i can see. raise your hands, questions? sure. >> back to your innovation comment? >> yeah. and this gentleman here. >> let ann get one quick comment there. >> i never answered --

the question about innovation. i will make this really fast. the reason privacy is so important to innovation, i say this as a psychologist, we have limited cognitive bandwidth. we have a limited ability to focus on various things if we're living in a society we think we're constantly being surveyed. , everyone isthis watching us all the time. imagine you live in the time of nazi germany which is, of course, nonsense. if you live in the society where you were constantly being surveyed and watched? what do you do? engage in self protective behavior. attempting to shield their behavior. not because they're doing anything wrong, but they don't like to be watched and surveyed. what happens is -- the focus shifts away from creativity and risk taking which you need for innovative pursuits. because there's limited amount of what you can focus on. the notion of cognitive

bandwidth is important. we want to encourage freedom and the notion that you're not constantly under surveillance. one of the professors here at columbia, a leading economist. he had a book about how important freedom was to innovation. he was worried china wasn't going in that direction because their freedom is restricted. innovation was coming to a halt. that is how i tie it to how , notcy is an essential sufficient, but essential to innovative pursuits. >> i am not going to sit here and listen to comparisons to nazi germany. >> she didn't mean it that way. she pulled it back. we get her pull-back. >> i meant no disrespect at all. nothing like that.

what i say is if you look at countries like that and you look at what changed in those societies during a time of heightened surveillance, what changes is people alter their behavior. they automatically shield -- almost instinctively -- and what goes is innovation, creativity, and freedom. >> what's happening right now, three norms are emerging, not only in this society, but globally. people have expectations of inclusivity. nothing about us without us. they have expectations of transparency. what's going on? they have expectations of reciprocity. if it's good enough for you, you are making me do this, are you doing this as well? in response to this. so this is -- there are global movement incidents and reactions to excesses. the privacy community is not the only one outraged. by some of these revelations. >> yes, sir. >> mayor of portland. we had an officer involved shooting in portland that was resolved because a young couple held this over their window and filmed this. a couple weeks later, i tried on the google glasses, i realized if we gave one of these to each officer they could just say start filming.

this is the beginning of a very important discussion. we in cities are going to have to figure it out. anyone think that the federal communications commission is going to keep up with this pace of change? >> there is no fcc commissioner, either. add it to the list. >> so we have to figure out what the boundaries and protocols are for the use of technology and public safety. because it's exploding quickly. i would be interested if any of the panelists have any thoughts on who the regulator might be if not us at the municipal level, then whom? >> frank first. >> i can tell you how regulations will be involved. that is if the security device is useful, it will be tried at the municipal level and if there

are any norms that are going be invoked to limit it, they will probably be in different levels. we're sitting here in a city where there's an ongoing conversation now with the police department that innovates with security, and a federal court that tries to protect when there are costs imposed. but the point that i think i want to make is that first of all, cameras are so cheap now that in public places, if what you're concerned about is the right not to be filmed, game over. we now are going to be living lives of record in public spaces. >> everything you do in public space will be on youtube at some point. >> it can be on youtube. someone has to be interested in it. >> i've watched youtube. that's not true. [laughter]

>> you don't like cats. >> correct. >> okay. the truth is, the issue that's going be crystallized in public space isn't privacy in that world. it's dignity and autonomy. it's regulating the way in which power is used rather than removing the power. and that's going to involve balances, obviously. but it's not a technology issue so much as a human relations and political issue. you have got to be comfortable with it. >> go ahead, ann. >> i don't disagree. but i think it's both. human relations and technology. if i can just respond -- i work with my police chief all the time in toronto, canada.

he has a slide he uses with the police officers saying that we have to take a positive sum approach to policing and privacy -- that you do both. that of course there are cameras. we have surveillance cameras. there are ways to do it that heighten privacy protection. not to the exclusion of cameras. of course, they're everywhere. but when it's done by the police, the state, you can we -- you can weave in privacy protection. >> what about when it's not. everybody is talking about -- everybody is walking around wearing google glass? >> google glass is interesting. a big issue is that it can record you and do all those things. but unlike the camera where the person being recorded has no -- has some notion that you're doing it. you don't have that notion with google glass. they identified certain light fixtures that come on. when recording is taking place. >> you already have a way to hack so the light does not come on. >> point-counterpoint. don't think that they are not

aware of these issues. and they are actively trying to find measures to make google glass more visible and transparent. >> trust me, somebody will have a glass soon that's not transparent. even if it is not google. >> it's not that you can't up the ante. but the point is that it's not a zero sum game. you can have privacy and functionality. we have demonstrated this in dozens of other areas. >> we are talking about level,me fundamental security. security is something that their societies assigned to their governments to handle. we want a safe street, governments police. governments are being the -- governments are used to being monopolistic and they are, in all areas except cyberspace. governments have not given the

responsibility in cyberspace to keep us secure. as we look at these trends in technology, on the one hand, we have an intelligence community that thinks it's 1947 and information is hard to get and the technology doesn't exist. but the most powerful companies in cyberspace have demonstrated the highly reliable, highly lucrative, important information is easy to get. >> right out of time. let me get this one question in. >> hi, andrew from personal technology. if we asked the people in the audience how many times they read a terms of service all the way through before they click agree, they would have a small show of hands. we're addicted to these technologies and we're arguing today about the battle between how big brother or little sister are using our data. what's the role that the public can play in this debate? what can we do ourselves to insist on a mode of behavior, not only by big brother and little sister, but among ousts to -- but among ourselves, to ensure that we can ensure the

privacies and security. >> everybody gets to use that as their final answer. >> again, it seems to me that the question is about the use of power. and technology is a power. but it is used in human relationships and so the politics of sorting through its solution is going to be a politics of individual dignity in power relations. >> jane. >> it's the accountability mechanism of this country that's in the hands of the people that is the most powerful mechanism of keeping the government honest and keep the each other honest as we evolve a complex situation. >> you have to speak out, you have a strong voice. speak out and let your politicians know what you want for the first time ever, 6 out of 10 americans, ever since polling has been happening 6 out , of 10 americans have rated privacy and civil liberties are more important to them than public safety and security. that's never happened before. you have to tell the government that you expect transparency,

openness on their part, and hold them accountable. >> that's because 6 in 10 take security for granted. >> i would challenge that completely. privacy has traditionally been relegated to a lower category. now, with all of the revelations, as to how much the people don't know about what the government is doing, people are truly astounded and they don't want that anymore and they're fighting back. that's what i urge you to do. >> that sets up our next panel. thank you. let me welcome two people who are on the front lines of this. thank you all very much. thank you two people who are on the front lines of this. ray kelly, commissioner of the city of new york. [applause] we have talked about how crime has gone down. his friend and colleague ed davis, police commissioner of the city of boston.

thank you for joining us. [applause] >> good to see you. >> did you have any reactions to what you just heard? >> i did not hear. i got here late. >> when you get your your -- your command center. tell us how that works and tell us the concerns you have about how that might invade privacy or cause people to react against you for invading their privacy. the new command center that can watch somebody putting down a bag in grand central. scan their face. >> it is not a command center. it is the lower manhattan security coordination center. it has both public and private stake holders, police officers, and representatives of major companies. >> tell me what it does. >> what it does is it monitors an array of cameras now about 5,000 cameras. many of them are smart cameras. not all, but by smart, i mean

you can do video analytics on these cameras. for instance, if you want to go back 28 days, you want to see someone wearing a red shirt, you can, through algorithms, put will comen in and it up quickly. because after 30 days, it erases automatically. we put that in voluntarily. we worked with privacy advocates. we knew there would be some concerns as we put in a major camera system. we put in a protocol on our website that delineates the fact that they erase after 30 days. i do not think, and i have not heard major privacy concerns raised as we call lmsi,at

n securityattan t initiative. and i believe that a lot of it was forestalled by working with the privacy advocates before we put the system in. >> tell many a little more about what new technologies you're using and give me a couple of examples of how it worked even though some people might have concerns about it. >> as i mentioned, we have the smart cameras that have license plate readers that are now all over law enforcement. they're really amazing pieces of equipment. because you can drive down the street at 60 miles per hour with license plate readers on the patrol car and read the license plates on both sides of the street. it's an effective tool. we have radiation detectors now that aren't actually worn as pagers which will tell you specifically let's say where the radioactive material is moving. this is now sort of a state of the art.

something else we have been working with is facial recognition. which you may have spoken about here. that is very much work in progress. we have solved dozens of cases as a result of emerging official -- emerging facial technology capabilities. we have software now that enables us to do a whole host of things. an eye insert. you can see someone whose eyes are closed. put the eyes in. mirror imagining, half a face. you can do the whole face. that is moving along. >> at the earlier panel, frank just said that if instead of having stop and frisk, there was just a more automatic way. if you could detect people with guns that would be less invasive ,to personal autonomy. >>you have that technology? no. we are looking at something and we have been looking at it for several years.

working for metropolitan police and the d.o.d. research component. it is called terra hertz technology. what it does, in essence everybody emits tera hertz , radiation. and what it does is enables you to see someone carrying a weapon. the problem is so far that the device developed is too big. it does not have the range. we know what cell phones were like in 1986. and what they are like now. we believe that the technology will only get better. that would be a major breakthrough as far as finding weapons on the street. >> can you imagine, 10 years from now, that technology being deployed around the city, just like you have cameras recording where people go, you could notice that somebody with the gun is moving in a certain neighborhood? >> not without a major fight.

the legal -- i think our lawyers are looking at the issues of -- fourth amendment issues are involved there. but this is -- this is something that you do in increments. and i don't know if ten years from now you see them, you know, positioned all over. you have to develop the technology and i think they would be concerns raised by -- by privacy advocates. >> if you have privacy concerns in lower manhattan, you have advocates sitting with you, how do you do that? do you have in your department specialists in privacy and ethics issues? >> we do not have privacy advocates sitting down there. but we do have attorneys that focus on this, the protocols that we put together by our attorneys. obviously, we live in the most litigious city in the world. we have to be aware of potential and ongoing litigation.

certainly, privacy issues are among them. >> commissioner davis, walk us through how technology helps you after the boston marathon. >> i was at the marathon finish line before the bombs went off. after they went off, i recognized that there were thousands of cameras there. not just cameras along the street, which were basically owned by businesses. the city had very few cameras in that particular area. but we did have thousands of people who have iphones taking still shots and video of the finish line. it was my estimation based on what i was seeing that no one could move through the crowd without being observed. so after the bombs went off, our immediate focus is on retrieving as much video as we could get. the video with the business is extremely important. we went to crowd sourcing on the internet and asked people to send us every clip and video shot they had taken. they came in so quickly that the fbi computer crashed. we had to rely on twitter and facebook to retrieve some of the photos.

we got them all compiled in a hastily set up command post. at black falcon terminal, it started with one computer. there were 12 computers there at the end at -- they were working around the clock going through that information. >> you said you asked people to send them in, did you collect privately-taken photographs without people's permission but doing it from public sites such as twitter or facebook and others where you could say, okay, these are people who posted at the boston marathon, let us examine those photographs as well? >> we did. we looked at everything possible. >> do you have concerns about people saying those photographs were put privately on the facebook accounts? >> no, the state of law is what we operate under. that's missed in the conversation. ray and i operate off of what's constitutionally acceptable. the supreme court said if this

information in the public place, the video information in a public place, we can look at that. it's a little less clear as you get to facebook and twitter, right now, there are places that we can go legally and we go there. the problem with our profession is that, unlike the medical profession with medical ethicists, we don't have that here. we operate off of a supreme court decision that always happens after the fact. so we're always behind the curve when it comes to change like we're seeing right now. we need to -- we need to look at that. we need to start a conversation among police officials in the community to talk about what's right and wrong. george orwell was about 20 years off. but we are here now. it's come at us so fast, no one knows how to deal with it. >> the boston bombers, afterwards, technology kicks into action immediately. was there a way to use technology more effectively to know these are bad actors planning something?

>> you know, i think we have been focussed externally. we looked at the security apparatus in the federal government to take care of terrorists. -- of terrorism. ray has done a tremendous job here in making it local. if you're dealing with boston, home grown extremists radicalized on the internet, a new system has to be thought about. and debated with the public as to what the role of local police should be in that environment, it's clearly a threat that we're facing right now. we need to do more. i wish there was a computer system that we could find that would say these are the guys. but it's more about connecting with the community and having good contacts in communities throughout the city. and being transparent and open about that. that is what you need to do. >> you keep talking about transparency and openness, it's come up three or four times. let me ask you a hypothetical question.

suppose all those edward snowden revelations, instead of edward snowden revelations, the government just said, here's what we're doing. we're going to make this public right away. we're doing these type of things. if you don't like it, call your congressman. would that have been a better way to approach it? >> i believe so. i said that previously. i think the american public could accept the need for that. and actually this was made public in a sort of bizarre sort of a way. it was -- well, you should have known about it. and we know how restricted it was in terms of access to the public. i think that was a mistake. now it seems like these things are -- >> how are you trying to be very transparent without compromising your methods and operations? >> obviously, we're not going to breach confidentiality as far as specific investigations are concerned. but we have people such as this group here will come in, take a look at the equipment we have, the processes that we use.

we have many community groups. i have a muslim advisory council i meet with. on a regular basis. we have a tactics and strategies committee made primarily of leading members of the african-american community in this city. we have a very good dialogue as far as processes and procedures. >> do you have a good dialogue with the federal government now? >> yes, we do. >> but we have some problems with the sharing? >> there's always going to be some friction. it's not necessarily a bad thing. we work with federal agencies every day. we get the job done. i think agencies want to do good work. they're proud of the work they do. and sometimes it creates tension. but tension is not always a bad thing. i think you want to see behind the curtain. i think we want transparency as far as what the federal

government is doing. i know ed has an opinion on it. if, in fact, there are things going on in your city, then your mayor and your police chief or police commissioner should know about them from the federal government. there should be a regular exchange of information. >> i agree completely. >> but, ed, what commissioner kelly has done is expand more than most city police departments a counterterrorism unit of your own where you even do interviews say in new jersey famously enough. have you learned from that? and do you think you ought to expand your counterterrorism in boston so that you're doing things that normally is given to the fbi to do? >> as it relates to home grown violent extremists, yes. i think there are people in our community that we should be working with and sort of keeping an eye on if they pose a threat. that's part of our responsibility to keep our citizens safe. however, we need to be

transparent about what we do and i don't think there's any agency in the country more transparent than the local police agency. we have "the boston globe" and "the boston herald" in our lobby every morning checking on what we did overnight. we have got community groups marching to the police station every time there's a problem. it's a very dynamic environment at the local level. the mayor from portland talks about police having cameras on their eyeglasses. when that happens, it will, i'll be able to put my internal affairs investigators back on the street. everything will be documented. >> when that happens, will you allow people to be arrested glass to film your officers? >> that's an important part of this conversation. more of that information we're collecting right now is exculpatory. everybody is looking at this as they're going to use it to put me in prison. it's going to clear a lot of people. it already has cleared a lot of

people. at what point in time if you want to pursue the goals of justice, at what point in time do you stop collecting that information? at what point in time do you get a license plate connection that might clear someone of a murder charge? this cuts both ways. people have to understand that. >> in other words, you wouldn't have problems if normal citizens videotaped police at all times in their action using google glass or phones? >> not at all. we have a court case on it in boston. i sent out a directive to my officers that if anybody videotapes you, it is public information, you can't do a thing about it. that is the right thing to have happened. >> one other quick thing. one of our crown fellows of the aspen institute created a shot spotter, is that right? james belvick, a friend of mine, how does that work? >> it is an acoustic collection device. we have microphones throughout the city listening for gunshots, and when they hear the report of the gunshot, they triangulate

the information and give you a precise location as to where it happened. it's extremely effective. it has saved lives in my city and led to arrests. it extensively deployed and it has been very helpful. >> opening it up for questions. questions for the commissioners? i can't see well. but waved a hand. >> we believe we are police commissioners. >> is the same true in new york about people who videotape? and is it exculpatory? do you encourage citizens to videotape your police in action? >> we don't discourage them. we've had issues in the past. but clearly it's the public domain. and it can be done. we've had some issues with the shot spotter because i think the topography of new york city has the effect --

>> yeah. >> what new technology is the most effective coming down the pipe that we don't know about? >> well, you know, the cameras are great. quite frankly. the first thing that police officers do when a crime is committed is to look and see if any camera is in the area as was said before in the previous panel, they have come way down in price. they are virtually everywhere. every commercial establishment -- can you monitor in realtime to prevent crimes that are about to happen? >> that's a very expensive do that, to have police officers. >> you need human eyes to do that or can you do it -- with artificial intelligence? >> you can do some of that. we have some live monitoring going on in our public housing projects that's going on on a limited basis. but generally speaking, the cameras are used for retrospective investigation or examination. >> yes.

>> hi, my name is emma green. i'm from "the atlantic." commissioner kelly, how do you feel about the verdicts that came down on stop and frisk? and how do you think of the new -- how do you think this will change new york policing going forward? >> i didn't hear the second part, but the first part is how do i feel about -- >> how do you feel about the verdict that came down on stop and frisk? and how do you think it will change new york policing moving forward? >> i am a disabled veteran. i didn't hear exactly what the question is, but stop and frisk. it's first of all -- stop and frisk question. sometimes frisks in less than half of the cases is frisk, which is a limited pat down. i believe that this case -- the decision that was just handed by n, cries out for

appeal. i think the findings and the indictment of the entire police department calls for indirect racial profiling is based on the flimsiest information. the experts had in this case -- the experts the plaintiffs had in this case looked at 4.4 million stops over a decade. the expert on the plaintiff side found that 6% of those may be unjustified. the judge herself looks at and took testimony from the plaintiffs in this case, i believe there were four plaintiffs, it involved 19 stops. she, herself, found that 10 of the 19 stops were constitutional. the criteria that they use in my judgment and a lot of other people's judgment is totally unrealistic and involves census data in a particular area. taken to the natural conclusion, we would have to stop more women. we stop very few women because

the law -- the codified law says you can stop someone in a public place who you have reasonable suspicion is about to commit, is committing, or has committed a crime. and the majority of those cases, of course, are males. we have the most diversified police force in the world. we have police officers born in 106 countries, so it's kind of somewhat strange that we're found to be guilty of indirect racial profiling. majoritytment is minority in the police officer rank. so the 97% of the shooting victims in this city are black and hispanic, as are the perpetrators.

the criteria that was used as i said, we brought in the rand corporation to look at this in 2006. one said the number indication that racial profiling is ongoing is that the descriptions given by the victims of the violent crime -- of the perpetrators of violent crime. government is left out of it. now, in that case, in those examples, 70% to 75% of the perpetrators of violent crimes are identified as being african american. black. and our stops traditionally had been 53% african american. so our stops obviously or certainly comport to the description of violent crime. now, what we're doing in the city and i think they alluded to it, it's working here. if you compare the bloomberg years, the 11 years, the almost

12, the 11 full years of mayor bloomberg's tenure, you compare it to the 11 years previous. you have 12,000 murders prior to michael bloomberg taking office. 5,000 murders in the -- in the subsequent 11 years. so it's 7,363 fewer murders in this city over that period of time. and if history is any guide, the vast majority of those lives saved are young people of color, mostly young men of color. we think for a variety of reasons, this case cries out for appeal. it may not be appealed because of the city's change in the administration. the new manner -- the new mayor may decide not to go forward with the appeal. and i believe that would be a major mistake. >> yes. there. i'm tom barrett, the mayor of milwaukee, and following up on that, i'm curious about your thoughts on the mandatory

sentencing for violations, how violations, how it works, and the racial ramifications for that as well. >> a mandatory sentencing? >> in the gun violations and how that works in terms of racial issues? >> i don't like mandatory sentencing. in general. i think that in very few instances should we have mandatory sentencing. i would leave it up to the discretion of the judges. it has to do with the selection process of the judges. but not in favor of -- >> it is my understanding that here there are -- that the state of new york, if you are illegally possessing a gun that there's a three-year mandatory sentence -- >> let me tell you, in application it does not work. peopleppens is, they let plead guilty to possession, or or somepted possession

place in the process, there is a negotiation that takes place. so practically speaking, it has in my judgment, not worked particularly well. >> what do you think has been the most important effect here in reducing the homicide rate in new york? it's remarkable. >> i think a lot of things that we're doing. i can tell you one of the most recent programs that we put in the last year, year and a half, is something that we call crew cut. we did an analysis a year and a half ago, two years ago, and we determined about a 30% of our shootings were coming for what we called crews. these are gangs and a couple of levels below the bloods and the crips. these are loosely affiliated. we have about 300 in the city. we put in a program to take them on directly. we increased the size, we doubled the size of our gang division. we took advantage of the fact that these young people can't