sure. debate thatlearly a will continue for some time. we will all be watching closely. in the meantime, please thank our panel. [applause] >> tonight on c-span, president obama's speech from earlier today on changing government surveillance programs. then we will go to the phone light and see what you think. we will have a conversation on twitter and facebook as well. and there is a former cia analyst. president'sshow the remark from earlier today. he talked about changing some of the surveillance programs and monitoring other world leaders and u.s. allies. [applause]

>> thank you very much. thank you. thank you so much. please, have a seat. at the dawn of our public, a small secret surveillance committee born out of the sons of liberty was established in boston. the group's members included paul revere. they would patrol the streets at night, reporting any signs that the british were preparing raids against america's early patriots. in the civil war, union balloons reconnaissance tracked the size of confederate armies by tracking the number of campfires. in world war ii, codebreakers

gave us insight into the japanese war plans. they intercepted communications, help save the lives of the troops. after the war, the rise of the iron curtain and nuclear weapons only increased the need for sustained intelligence. in the early days of the cold war, president truman created the national security agency, or nsa, to give us insight into the soviet block and provider leaders with information they needed to confront and avert catastrophe. we have benefited from both our constitution and our traditions of limited government. u.s. intelligence agencies were anchored in a system of checks and balances with oversights from elected leaders and protections for ordinary citizens. meanwhile, totalitarian states like east germany offered a

cautionary tale of what could happen when vast unchecked surveillance turn citizens into informers and persecuted people for what they said in the privacy of their own homes. even the united states proved not to be immune to the abuse of surveillance. in the 1960's, governments spied on civil rights leaders. additional laws were established in 1970's to ensure that our intelligence capabilities would not be misused against our citizens. in the long twilight struggle against communism, we have been reminded that the very liberties that we thought to preserve could not be sacrificed at the altar of national security.

as the fall of the soviet union left america without a competing superpower, emerging threats from terrorist groups and the proliferation of weapons of mass distraction placed new and in some ways more complicated demands to our intelligence agencies. globalization and the internet may be spreads more acute as technology a raised borders and allowed individuals to protect great violence, as well is great good. these new threats raised new policy questions. while few doubted the legitimacy of spying on hostile states, our framework of laws was not fully adapted to prevent terrorist attacks by individuals acting on their own or acting in small, ideological-driven groups. the horror of september 11 brought all these issues to the forefront. across the local spectrum, americans recognized that we had to adapt to a world in which a bomb could be built in the basement and our electrical grid to be shut down by operators and ocean away.

we were shaken by the signs we had missed. phone calls were made to extremists. they traveled to suspicious places. we demanded that our intelligence community improve it's capabilities. and that law enforcement change practices to focus more on

preventing attacks before they happen rather than prosecuting terrorists after an attack. it's hard to overstate the transformation america's intelligence community had to go through after 9/11. our agencies suddenly needed to do far more than the traditional mission of monitoring hostile powers and gathering information for policymakers. instead, they were now asked to identify targets, plotters and some of the most remote parts of the world and to anticipate the actions of networks that by their very nature cannot be easily penetrated with spies or informants. it is a testimony to the hard work and dedication of the men and women of our intelligence community that over the past decade we have made enormous strides in filling this mission. today, new capabilities allow intelligence agencies to track who a terrorist is in contact with and follow the trail of his travel or his money. new laws allow information to be collected and shared more quickly and effectively between federal agents and state and local law enforcement. relationships with foreign intelligence services have expanded an art capacity to repel cyber attacks have been strengthened. taken together, these efforts have prevented multiple attacks and save innocent lives.

not just here in the united states, but around the globe. and yet, in our rush to respond to a very real set of threats, the risk of government overreach, the possibility that we lose some of our core liberties in pursuit of security also became more pronounced. we saw an immediate aftermath of 9/11 our government engaged in enhanced interrogation techniques that contradicted our values. as a senator, i was critical of several practices. all too often, new authorities were instituted without adequate public debate. the action by the courts, increased congressional oversight, and adjustments by the previous administration,

some of the worst excesses were curbed by the time i took office. a variety of factors have continued to complicate america's efforts to both defend our nation and uphold our civil liberties. first, the same technological advancements that allowed u.s. intelligence agencies to pinpoint an al qaeda phone line or an e-mail between two terrorists also mean that routine medications around the world are within our reach. at a time when more and more of our lives are digital, that prospect is disquieting for all of us. second, the combination of increased digital information and powerful supercomputers offers intelligence agencies the possibility of shifting through massive amounts of bulk data to identify patterns or pursue leads that may fort impending

threats. -- thwart impending threats. that is a powerful tool. the government collection and storage of such bulk data also creates a potential for abuse. third, the legal safeguards that restrict surveillance against u.s. persons without a warrant do not apply to persons overseas. this is not unique to america. few spy agencies around the world constrain their activities borders. the whole point of intelligence is to obtain information that is not publicly available. america's capabilities are unique. the power of new technology means that there are fewer and fewer technical constraints on what we can do.

that places a special obligation on us to ask tough questions about what we should do. finally, intelligence agencies cannot function without secrecy, which makes their work more subject to public debate. yet, there is an inevitable bias, not only within the intelligence community, but amongst all of us who are responsible for national security to collect more information about the world, not less. so in the absence of institutional requirements for regular debate, and oversight that is public as well as private or classified, the danger of government overreach becomes more acute. it is particularly true when surveillance technology and a reliance on digital information is evolving much more quickly than our loss. for all these reasons, i maintained a healthy skepticism

towards our surveillance programs when i became president. i ordered that they be reviewed by my national security team and our lawyers. in some cases, i ordered changes in how we do business. we increased oversight and auditing, including new structures aimed at compliance. we sought to keep congress continually updated on these activities. what i did not do was stop these programs wholesale. not only because i felt that they made us more secure, but also because nothing in that initial review and nothing that i've learned since indicated

that our intelligence agency has sought to violate the law or cavalier about the civil liberties of their citizens. to the contrary, in the next row nearly difficult job, one in which actions are second- guessed, success is unreported, and failure can be catastrophic, the men and women of the intelligence community, including the nsa, consistently followed protocol to protect the privacy of ordinary people. they're not abusing authorities in order to listen to your private phone calls or read your e-mails. when mistakes are made and which is inevitable in any large and complicated human enterprise, they correct those mistakes. they are unable to discuss their work with family or friends. the men and women of the nsa know that if another 9/11 or massive cyber attack occurs they will be asked why they failed to connect the dots.

those who work at nsa and other intelligence agencies throughout this pressure have the knowledge that they play a central role in the defense of our nation. now, to say that our intelligence maybe followed the law and is staffed by patriots is not to suggest that i or others in my administration felt complacent about the potential impacts of these programs. those of us who hold office in america have the responsibility to our constitution. while i was confident in the integrity of those who lead our intelligence community, it was clear to me in observing our intelligence operations on a regular basis that changes in our technological capabilities were raising new questions about the privacy safeguards currently in place.

moreover, after an extended review of our use of drones in the fight against terrorist networks, i believe a fresh examination of our surveillance programs was a necessary next step in our effort to get off the footing we maintained since 9/11. for these reasons, indicated in a speech at the national defense university last may that we need a robust public discussion about the balance between security and liberty. of course, what i did not know the time was that within weeks of my speech an avalanche of unauthorized disclosures would spark controversy that has continued to this day. given the open investigation, i will not dwell on mr. snowden's actions.

i will say our nation's defense depends in part on the fidelity of those in trust with our nation secrets. if any individual who objects to government policy can take it into their own hands to publicly disclose classified information than we will not be able to keep our people safe or conduct foreign policy. moreover, the sensational way in which these disclosures had come out has shed more heat than light, revealing information to our adversaries in ways that we may not understand for years to come. the task right now is greater than simply repairing the damage done to our operations or preventing more disclosures from taking place in the future. instead, we have to make some important decisions about how to protect ourselves and sustain our leadership in the world while upholding the civil liberties and privacy protections that our ideals and

constitution requires. we need to do so not only because it is right, but because the challenges posed by threats like terrorism and proliferation and cyber attacks are not going away anytime soon. they're going to continue to be a major problem. for our intelligence community to be effective over the long haul, we must maintain the trust of the american people and people around the world. this effort will not be completed overnight. given the pace of technological change, we should not expect this to be the last time america has this debate. i want the american people to know that the work has begun. over the last six months, we created an outside review group on intelligence and communication technologies to make recommendations.

i've listened to privacy advocates and industry leaders. we considered how to approach intelligence in this era of technological revolution. so, before outlining specific changes i've ordered, let me make a few broad observations on this process. first, everyone who has looked at these problems, including skeptics of existing programs, recognizes that we have real enemies. we cannot prevent terrorist

attacks or cyber threats without some capability to penetrate digital communications. whether it is to unravel a terrorist plot, to make sure that air traffic control systems are not compromised, or to ensure that they do not empty your bank accounts. we are required to have capabilities in this field. moreover, we cannot unilaterally disarm our intelligence agencies. there is a reason why blackberries and iphones are not allowed in the white house situation room. we know that the intelligence services of other countries, including some who feigned surprise over the snowden disclosures, are constantly probing our government to listen to our conversations and view our e-mails and compromise our systems. we know that. meanwhile, a number of

countries, including some that loudly criticized the nsa, privately acknowledge that america has unique responsibilities as the world's only superpower. they themselves have relied on information we obtained to protect their own people. second, just as civil libertarians acknowledge the need for a bust intelligence robust intelligence capabilities, those with response abilities for national security readily knowledge the potential for abuse as intelligence capabilities advance. after all, the folks at nsa and other intelligence agencies are our neighbors, our friends, and family. they have electronic banking medical records like everybody else. they have kids on facebook and

instagram and know more than most of us the vulnerabilities to privacy that exist in a world where transactions are recorded and e-mails and texts are stored and our movements can increasingly be tracked through the gps on our phones. third, there was a recognition by all who participated in these reviews that the challenges to our privacy do not come from government alone. corporations of all shapes and sizes track what you buy, store and analyze our data, and use it for commercial purposes. that's what you see those ads pop up on your smart phone. all of us understand that the standards for government surveillance programs must be higher. given the unique power of the state, it is not enough or leaders to say trust us and we will not abuse the data we collect. history has too many examples where the trust has been

breached. our system of government is built on the premise that our liberty cannot depend on the good intentions of those in power. it depends on the law to constrain those in power. i make these observations to underscore that the basic values of most americans when it comes to questions of surveillance and privacy converge a lot more than the characterizations that emerged over the last several months. those who were troubled by our existing programs were not interested in repeating the tragedy of 9/11. those who defend these programs are not interested in civil liberties. the challenge in getting the details right is not simple. over the course of our review, i have reminded myself, i would not be where i am today if it were not for the courage of people like dr. king were spied

upon by their own government. as president, a president who looks at intelligence every morning, i can't help but be reminded that america must be vigilant in the face of threats. fortunately, by focusing on facts and specifics, rather than speculation and hypotheticals, this review process has given me and hopefully the american people some clear direction for change. today, i can announce a series of concrete and substantial reforms that my administration intends to adopt administratively or will seek to create with congress. first, i have approved a new presidential directive for our intelligence communities at home and abroad. this guidance will strengthen executive branch oversight of

our intelligence communities. it will ensure that we can taken into account our alliances come our trade and investment relationships come including the concerns of american companies, and our commitment to privacy and basic liberties. we will review decisions about intelligence priorities and sensitive targets on an annual basis of that our actions are regularly scrutinized by our senior national security team. second, we will reform programs and procedures in place to provide greater transparency to our surveillance activities. we will fortify the safeguards that protect the privacy of u.s. persons. since we began this review, including information being released today, we have declassified over 40 opinions and orders of the foreign intelligence surveillance court. including the program targeting

foreign individuals overseas and the section 215 telephone metadata program. going forward, i am directing the director of national intelligence and consultation with the attorney general will annually review for the purposes of declassification any future opinions of the court with broad privacy implications. they will report to me and to congress on these efforts. to ensure that the court hears a broader range of privacy perspectives i am also calling on congress to authorize the establishment of a panel of advocates from outside government to provide an independent voice in significant cases before foreign intelligence surveillance court.

third, we will provide additional perfections for activities conducted under section 702, which allows the government to intercept the communication of foreign targets overseas who have information that is important for national security. specifically, i'm asking the attorney general and dni to institute reforms that place additional restrictions on government's ability to retain, search, and use in criminal cases, communications between american citizens incidentally collected under section 702. in investigating threats, the fbi also relies on what is called national security threats letters which requires companies to supply limited information without disclosing orders to the subject of the

investigation. these are cases in which it is important that the subject of the investigation, such as a possible terrorist or spy, is not tipped off. we can and should be more transparent and how government uses this authority. i, therefore, directed the attorney general to amend how we use national security letters so that this secrecy will not be indefinite. so that it will terminate within a fixed time unless the government demonstrates a real need for further secrecy. we will also enable communications providers to make public more information than ever before about the orders they have received to provide data to the government. this brings me to the program that has generated the most controversy these past months. the bulk election of telephone collection of telephone

records under section 215. let me repeat what i said when this story first broke. this program does not involve the content of phone calls or the names of people making calls. instead, provides a record of phone numbers and the times and length of calls. metadata that can be queried if and when we have a reasonable suspicion that a particular number is linked to a terrorist organization. why is this necessary? the program grew out of the desire to address a gap identified after 9/11. one of the 9/11 hijackers made a phone call from san diego to a known al qaeda safe house in yemen. nsa saw that call, but did not know it was from an individual already in the united states.

maps terrorists so that we can see who they are in with. we need to see who they may be in contact with as quickly as possible. this capability can also prove valuable in a crisis. for example, if a bomb goes off in one of our cities and law- enforcement is racing to determine whether a network is poised to conduct additional attacks, time is of the essence. being able to quickly review phone connections to assess whether a network exists is critical for that effort. the program does not involve the nsa examining the phone records of ordinary americans. rather, it consolidates these records into a database that the government can query if it has a specific reason. a consolidation of phone records that the companies already retain for business purposes.

the review group turned up no indication that this database has been intentionally abused. i believe it is important that the capabilities that this program is designed to meet is preserved. having said that, i believe critics are right to point out that without proper safeguards, this type of program could be used to yield more information about our private lives. it could open the door to more intrusive bulk collection programs in the future. they're also right to point out that although the bulk collection program was subject to oversight by the foreign surveillance court and has been reauthorized by congress, it has never been subject to vigorous public debate.

for all these reasons, i believe we need a new approach. i am therefore ordering a transition that will end the section 215 bulk metadata program as it exists and establishes a program without the government holding this bulk metadata. it this will not be simple. the review group recommended that our current approach be replaced by one in which the providers or a third-party retain the bulk records with the government accessing information is needed. both of these options pose difficult problems. relying solely on the records of multiple providers could force companies to alter their policies. any single company holding the

database could carry out what is essentially a government function with more expanses, expenses more legal ambiguity, potentially less accountability, all of which would have an impact on increasing public confidence that their privacy is being protected. during the review process, some suggested that we may also be able to preserve the capabilities we need through recombination of existing authorities, better information sharing, and recent technological advancements. more work needs to be done to determine how this system will work. because of the challenges involved, i ordered that the transition away from the existing program will proceed in two steps. we will only pursue phone calls that are two steps away from a known terrorist phone number. the database can be queried only

after a judicial finding or in the case of a true emergency. next, step two, i've instructed the intelligence community and the attorney general to use this transition period to develop a new approach without the government holding this metadata itself. and they will report back to me with options for alternative approaches before the program comes up for reauthorization on march 28. during this time, we will discuss the reauthorization of the program as needed. the reforms should give people greater confidence that their

rights are being protected, even as law enforcement retains the tools they need to keep us safe. additional issues require further debate. some who participated in our view, as some members of congress would like to see more sweeping reforms. we have to go to a judge each time before these requests. here i have concerns that we should not set a standard for terrorism investigations that are higher than those involved in investigating and ordinary crime. i agree that greater oversight on the use of these letters may be appropriate and i prefer to work with congress on this issue.

there are those who would like to see different changes to the court then i proposed. i'm working with congress to ensure that we build a broad consensus for how to move forward and i'm confident that we can shape an approach that meets our security needs while upholding the civil liberties of every american. let me now turn to the separate set of concerns that have been raised overseas. i will focus on america's approach to intelligence collection abroad. as i've indicated, the united states has unique response abilities when it comes to

intelligence collection. they helped not only our nation, but our friends and our allies as well. our efforts will only be effective if ordinary citizens in other countries have confidence that the united states respects their privacy, too. the leaders of our close friends and allies deserve to know that i want to know what they think about an issue. i will pick up the phone and call them rather than turn to surveillance. just as we balance security and privacy at home, our global leadership demands that we balance our security requirements against our need to maintain the trust and cooperation among people and leaders around the world. for that reason, the new presidential directive that i've issued today will clearly prescribe what we do and do not do when it comes to our overseas surveillance. to begin with, the directive makes clear that the united states only uses signals intelligence for legitimate national security purposes and not for the purposes of indiscriminately reviewing the e-mails and phone calls of ordinary folks.

i've also made it clear that the united states does not collect intelligence to suppress criticism or dissent, nor do we disadvantage people on the basis of ethnicity or race or gender or sexual orientation or religious beliefs. we do not provide advantages to u.s. companies or commercial sectors. in terms of our bulk collection of signal intelligence, u.s. intelligence agencies will only use such data to meet specific security requirements. counterintelligence, counterterrorism, counter proliferation, cyber security, force protection for our troops and our allies, and combating transnational crime, including sanctions in asia. in this directive, i have taken the unprecedented step of expanding certain protections

that we have for the american people to people overseas. i have directed the dni to develop the safeguards come which will limit the duration that we can hold personal information while also restricting the use of this information. the bottom line is that people around the world, regardless of their nationality, should know that the united states does not spy on ordinary people who don't threaten our national security. we take their privacy concerns into account in our policies and procedures. this applies to foreign leaders as well. given the understandable attention of this issue, i've made clear to the intelligence community that unless there is a compelling national security purpose, we will not monitor the communications of heads of state

and government of our close friends and allies. i've instructed my national security team come as well as the intelligence community, to work with foreign counterparts to deepen our coronation and cooperation in ways that we build trust going forward. let me be clear -- our intelligence agencies will continue to gather information about the intentions of governments in the same way that the intelligence services of every other nation does. we will not apologize simply

because our services may be more effective. heads of state and government with whom we work closely should feel confident that we are treating them as real partners. the changes i've ordered do just that. finally, to make sure that we follow through on all these reforms, i am making some important changes to how our government is organized. the state department will designate an officer. we will appoint a senior official at the white house to implement the new privacy safeguards that i've announced today. i will devote the resources to centralize and improve the process we used to handle foreign requests for legal assistance, keeping our high standards of privacy while helping foreign partners fight crime and terrorism. i have also asked my counsel to

lead a conference of review of big data and privacy. this group will consist of government officials who, along with the president's council of advisors on science and technology, will reach out to privacy experts, technologists, and business leaders and look at how these challenges are being confronted i both the public and private sectors. whether we can forge international norms on how to manage this data and how we can continue to promote the free

flow of information in ways that are consistent with both privacy and security. for ultimately, what is at stake in this debate goes far beyond a few months of headlines or passing foreign policy. when the country hears a noise, what is really at stake is how we remain true to who we are in a world that is remaking itself at dizzying speeds. whether it is the ability of individuals to communicate ideas, to access information, or to forge bonds with people on the other side of the globe, technology is remaking what is possible for individuals and for institutions and for the international order. so while the reforms i've announced will point us in a new direction, i am mindful that more work will be needed in the future. one thing i'm certain of -- this debate will make us stronger. i also know that in this time of change, the united states of america will have to lead. it may see some times that america is being held to different standards. i will admit, the readiness of some to assume the worst motives of our government can be frustrating. no one expects china to have it

openly made about their surveillance programs. or russia to take privacy concerns of citizens in other places into account. let's remember, we are held to a difference entered precisely because we have been at the forefront of defending personal privacy and human dignity. as the nation that developed the internet, the world expects us to ensure that the digital revolution works as a tool for individual empowerment, not government control. having faced down the dangers of fascism and communism, the world

expects us to stand up for the principle that every person has the right to think and form relationships freely because individual freedom is the wellspring of human progress. those values make us who we are. we should not shy away from high expectations. for more than two centuries, our constitution has weathered every type of change because we have been willing to defend it and because we have been willing to question the actions that have been taken in its defense. today is no different. i believe we can meet high expectations. together, let's chart a way forward to preserve the liberties that make our nation worth fighting for. thank you. god bless you. and may god bless the united states of america. thank you. [applause] >> we want to know what you

think. give us a call. let us know what you think be a twitter. #cspanchannel. our first caller is virginia on c-span. >> go ahead.

i am not going to do anything guilty. i am not going to do anything wrong. -- mind being watched. if people have things on their , they might have to be watched or listened to. you, virginia. michael is on the line for independents. >> i think the president did at admirable job. he went into surprising detail. the constitution does not have strong provisions for privacy. that it has really clear applications for privacy. thank you very much. >> thank you, michael.

tomorrow on the "washington aurnal" we will hear from writer and author who can give some more details and explain the various changes in the united states surveillance programs. we will have that tomorrow morning at 8:00 a.m. on the "washington journal" here at 7:00 a.m. we have a call on the republican line. obama keeps blaming his predecessor bush for just about everything. in the last state of the union address, he made a lot of promises but did not fulfill them. he is the president. a couple of tweets here. the white house does not have any clue about what the nsa is up to.

how can we have any trust of them, going forward? trust themet this, i to keep us safe. i also want protections for citizens of america. haven'tsays, if you realize that our country is headed toward a socialist, police state then you need to wake up. next is a call from new jersey. what do you think about the president's comment? >> everything he said, i agree upon. we need privacy. and things need to be better. >> jack? >> my name is josh. >> ok, josh, go-ahead. please turn off your phone. you have a little bit of interference there. what do you think about president obama's changes? >> i think it is ridiculous.

i represent democratic views. i think that his views are just uncontrollable. >> in what way? >> the fact that he just, i don't know. obama ishat barack just, with the whole health care thing, he is out of control. >> any comments though on the surveillance program or the data collection program changes? >> he is out of control. >> thank you, josh. peter is on the democrats line. what are your thoughts? >> my thoughts are that this is been going on for years. the only reason that he has come is that he has got caught.

he has been caught. what do you think about the fact that now he is trying to make some changes? >> this has been his story for the past few years. look at benghazi. there -- fair. he is like a little kid stealing. .e just pushes everything aside he goes on to something else. he is not being truthful. he has not been truthful throughout the whole administration. he is avoiding reality. when you avoid reality, it comes back and bites you. president obama

speaking here at the justice department, earlier today. he proposed new limits on nsa phone collection and data collection programs. he is calling for an end to the collection of data of americans. he'll ordered intelligence agencies to get special permission before collecting them. thelso defended intelligence agencies. he wants the american agencies to stop spying on friendly leaders. for privacyg protections for american citizens. barry is on the line. what are your thoughts on the president's proposal? the metadata fundamentally violates the fourth amendment and the constitution to protect us from abuses of state. a gives

the state enough power to suppress. the changes he made are not sufficient. the nsa has been accessing this approval.ut our prior advocates of the court will not change anything. if they cannot go public with it, and if many of the requests having to goe not through the court, as they currently do not. he did not address the fundamental question. collecting metadata runs the possibility of a fair trial. right of the defense. this information has a ready been used to spy on people in the united states, as is inevitable. the argument that this could be used for terrorism is ridiculous

because it has been used by the to spy on other diplomats and other countries. it is a ready been used for commercial services. lastly, but not least, it has been used in trials in the united states. metadata is inherently dangerous. it is dangerous to us. >> thank you. taking your calls on the president's proposed changes to the program. what are your thoughts? >> why don't they extend the unemployment that if it -- but benefits?- we live in maine. there isn't much up there.

days checkb for five or something, but then i'm off for two weeks. >> any comments on the president's surveillance program changes? >> the surveillance program changes... that is just the way it is. im worried about keeping heat in my house. , i dorveillance thing ire about it, but right now am worried about getting what i got to get. i need some money. i need some heat going on. i don't have anything. i'm about to get kicked out of where you live. >> michael, thank you. we appreciate the call. congressand members of

have released a statement. from new jersey, the chair of the foreign relations committee -- another statement. what do you think about the president's proposed changes? if he makes these changes, he knew they were dennis, but he didn't stop it -- doing this, but he didn't stop it?

who is going to be held liable? is anybody going to get fired for doing surveillance, which he says they wasn't doing. about the bad behavior that the u.s. government is doing? >> thank you. good question. j is on the line in tampa florida. >> what do you think? >> the president is doing a swell job. the republicans go right along with him. i think that he is doing a swell job. he needs to keep on doing what he is doing as president of the united states of america. >> for the next couple of

minutes we will get a few more calls and. presidentw the talking about the changes that he wants to see in surveillance programs, data collection programs. we have a call from indiana. go ahead. you're on c-span. >> yes. i appreciate what you are saying and doing. we want people to get back to work. these kids do need a lot of help in texas. the kids in the water and everything going bad, we need this straightened out. the state don't have to pay me anything. >> we have a call from freedom, california. what are your thoughts? >> i think he is doing an excellent job. he has been monitored to a certain degree.

suspect anybody of being , what i want to basically, is that the other countries are doing it to , he will lead us. we need more unemployment. we need to take care of the seniors. i just wanted to voice my opinion. thank you so much. i'm glad i am an american. we wanted to let you know that president obama signed the congressional spending bill. 1.1 trillion dollars that funds the government. the conversation about the nsa continues. you can see what other people of said about president obama's surveillance reform. there is a link to our video

library video of his remarks from earlier today at the justice department. on the "washington journal" tomorrow morning, there are lots of chances to weigh in, if you did not get a chance tonight. we will be taking your calls at the beginning and the end of the "washington journal". we will hear more about national security. >> yes, internet service providers are gatekeepers. gatekeepers,sided like any gatekeepers. there is somebody on one side and somebody on the other side. the situation is similar to the credit card situation. we all have a credit card. and then there is the credit card company. then there's the restaurant. it is very useful for restaurants that we'll have credit cards. it is useful for us that the

restaurants will take them. it is not so useful is the gatekeeper says so some of these restaurants we will not allow them to participate, translating that to the present, if the internet service provider were not all the people putting the content on their computers, we don't want them all to have access. there is a palm at the gatekeeper behaves that way. broadband and high spiel -- speed internet regulations. he >> part of three days of programming this holiday weekend. and we look at immense space and -- emancipation, reconstruction, and race. brookings institution,

we heard more about the proposed changes. from analysts from the cia. we will take a look at what they had to say. welcome to the bookings institution. a senior fellow in studies. i will be brief on the introduction side. i'm going to need as much time as humanably possible for the substantive discussions we are going to have here today. thanks for coming on very short notice. as you all know, the president gave a major address this morning on signals intelligence, the n.s.a., and reform of the authorities and policies in connection with the snowden disclosures.

these issues and the speech raise a -- just an incredible array of discrete policy and legal questions. there are the domestic authority questions, civil liberties questions, there are foreign policy diplomatic questions, there are internet governance, there are u.s. industries, which are losing very large sums of money as a result of loss of confidence in overseas markets, and there are privacy questions. we worked foreign policy program to put together this very quick event in which weather going to

offer a bunch of different reactions from different parts of the institution. keep in mind, the speech was only given very recently. it covers a wide range. so certainly a lot of what i'm going to say today is still relatively tentative, and some of my thoughts may be subject to change over time on that. so i want to be candid about that up front. relatively tentative, and some of my thoughts may be subject to change over time on that. so i want to be candid about that up front. what i think we're going to do, each of us, starting with bruce d cam and wallace and myself will speak briefly and give some overview thoughts, and then we will have a brief exchange and

then try to leave as much time as possible to go in what directions you-all would like to go. we have a twitter audience as well. people will be tweeting in questions. if you see me being handed little slips of paper, i hope those will not be things telling me i have been completely wrong and i should be correcting myself, but that they are questions. with that, i'll turn it over to bruce. >> i think we are trying to give a preliminary reaction to what is really a large amount of data. we have the speech, we have the we have bark grounders, and we have a lot of material to work with. i would characterize it as a good speech, i would characterize it as classic or vintage barack obama. this is a man that likes to be

thoughtful, deliberate, and likes to reach out to as many groups as possible, and i think he has done that. if there is a message, i would say it could be, let him spend more time in hawaii, it is very good for the delibtive process deliberative process. i think the emphasis here is on transparancy to the extent possible and oversight rather than fundamental changes in the collection programs that the n.s.a. is carrying out. those programs, as i see them, remain largely intact with a few fixes but with more transparancy, to the extent that is possible, in secret programs and program oversight. the president policy directive that accompanies the speech, ppd-28, is, in my judgment, unprecedented. in two hours i couldn't really check, but i don't think we have ever had a document like this that lays out the protocols,

principles for american intelligence questions. i think it is good for the american public and the global public to read it and see what those are, and it is good for the national security agency because the national security agency can see what we did was legal, it is allowable under pp d-28. of course, the second section question, we largely have a punt. the question of who will hold on to that data. this is a complicated and difficult issue. rightly called the hot potato of this problem. i'm not sure 60 days will come up with a solution, but i think 60 days is probably enough time to identify if there is a nonu.s. governmental entity with the capacity and the financial willingness to carry this out. one last thing i would stress from the overview.

as the president said in his speech, and as was made clear by his aides and backgrounders, the president has found no abuse of authority by the national security agency. he said that over and over again. his staff has said that over and over again. they found no evidence of an abuse of authority by the n.s.a. where they found mistakes were made, they also emphasized those mistakes were corrected rather quickly. that is a pretty important judgment to put out there. let me deal with a couple of questions that were on my mind before the speech was made and how the rpt responded to those questions. first was the qui, how did he portray the national security agency in particular and the national security intelligence in general. did he portray them as the security defender? after all, he's been five years on the team. did he support

them or did he distance himself from them? on this i think the president was clear and unquiff cal. -- unequivocal. he identified the national security agency as the spiritual son of the sons of liberty and paul revere. i can't imagine a better description in the eyes of fort meade than the one the president gave them. he called them the world war ii code breakers of today. the first five minutes of the speech is how the n.s.a. is protecting our securities and liberties. he even went further than that and said, they are protecting the securities and liberties of people around the world. a lot of people won't believe this. but if a is a powerful more al a powerful b is

antidote to what you hear about the demonization of n.s.a., how many tv shows have you watched that look like the n.s.a. is spying on everyone with no controls and willie-nilly oversight, and the rpt -- president said all that demon demonization -- is just hogwash. how did he characterize these programs? especially section 216. over the course of the last several months we have heard of them in the attempts of foiling arious terrorist operations. on here i think the president was on a bit more shaky ground. he said multiple attacks have been thwarted. the issue is raised, can you provide us data that backs that up. the only issue he launched into

was september 11. he said if n.s.a. had had the mega-data program, it would have realized that when one of the 19 hijackers called home to yemen, he was in san diego. the problem with opening up that pandora's box is, the c.i.a. knew he was in san diego. the problem isn't that we didn't know about it, it is that one hand didn't tell the other hand. i think this is one occasion when the administration will regret having opened up the discussion. it is not really crucial on the president's statement today. the third thing on my mind, is he going to mention edward snowden. it came up very clearly. the president made his views on edward snowden clear as he has

in the past. he is not a whistle blower, in the president's eyes. he's a man that violated his secret service oath. he's a man that leaked information in an often sensationalistic and inaccurate y, and he said snowden has harmed our ability to gather information for years if not decades to come. the president in effect associated himself with remarks from british intelligence chiefs who have asked the question, what has snowden done, responded, al-qaeda will be lapping it up for years to come. that's pretty strong words, and the rpt came up to close to the same area. the last question on my mind was, what about the so-called "no spy deals." are we going to expapped the so-called five-eyes agreement in hich the u.s., britain share

intelligence and agree not to spy on each other. there wasn't word on that. the question of whether another country would qualify to be in a no-spy deal did not come up. i'm not surprised. this president has specifically said forget it, we're not going to do that with anyone else. there is the idea that only the heads of state will not be spied upon, and we are told a couple dozen already fit into that category. i would suppose one of the great guessing games at various international summits in 2014 is, am i in the good guy category that doesn't get spied on or am i in the bad boy does get spied on. it is a very important question, really, not a trivial one. does behavior over time change whether you are in one category or another? what the president has done in

p.p.d., he's said there is going to be a constant review of that process at the highest levels of the nalt security bureaucracy. one last point i would like to make. i think it is important to remember that only a few months ago we had a similar big speech on drones. that speech on groans a few months later is a good one to look at in comparison to today. a lot of things that were talked about in the drone speech are still works in process. the transfer of drones from thesy say -- c.i.a., the department of defense, to be charitable, we could call it a work in progress. secondly, a lot of it requires the congress. for example, in the transfer of dropes from the c.i.a. to the d.o.d., they have said no, we don't think that's a good idea. we're not going to go that route, mr. president. so this is a stepping stone, this is a first step. there is a lot of material to

work with. a lot of this has to be translated into implementation, and a lot of it has to do with what capitol hill wants to do. >> for those of you standing in the back, there are a few rose in the -- and i would urge you to sit down and be a little more comfortable. cam? >> while i agree with bruce on the tenor of the speech, the president began with, as bruce said, a strong defense intelligence gathering, then ended it with a strong defense and the an values, importance of america upholding those values. of testament to the balance he was able to

strike there, is i can tell you that in the room with a sizable portion of law enforcement and community there as well as a number of privacy advocates, that both groups went way smiling. i focused on what this says to the international community, to our allies in europe in also around the world, and what it says for privacy issues, what it says for internet governance. because at the end of the day, as great as the impact on intelligence gathering may be, i impact on the trusting the united states government, trusting the united states industries, trust in the united states developed model of internet govenance has been far

greater. that has had enormous economic and diplomatic fallout. there i think the president accomplished a great deal. i think he went further irthan -- than spkted -- expected in declaring we are going to extend proteches to nonu.s. persons, to non-u.s. nationals. egardless of where they are. that will be principles for intelligence gatherings. many of those principles have

been developed by the intelligence community. i know the first of its kind goes far beyond that, and i think it will resonate with the international community. it is a statement by the president in the highest levels of policy, and it is binding, and it is public. so those are all important things. the president and the ppings licy directive declares that -- the president and the president policy directive declares that everyone is entitled to their privacy, regardless of where they live. it also goes beyond some of the existing policies in articulating a set of criteria legitimate stitutes telligence gathering related

to nuclear proliferation, terrorism, et cetera. you know, that i think helps to not only provide some reassurance and trust but to advance the international digital n norms in space. that the president alluded to that i think sort of helped to kick that off, but i think what is important is that the united states has taken a leap in defining what is legitimate national security protection. that is a key piece of the national norms discussion. every country collects

intelligence. ok, what are the international norms that define legitimate national security protection? the president has put down a marker on that. he has put down a marker saying that the united states regardless of what other countries to -- do is going to bind itself to a set of norms. that is an enormous step. something i think will advance the discussion and help to repair some of the short-term damage, and in the long-term, to help to begin a serious discussion rather than a sort of larm discussion, but serious discussion about international norms. >> thank you. >> i wanted to draw attention to

the three things that the president really didn't emphasize in his speech and i think may have been significant for that. not necessarily a criticism. there are things that are deeply complicated, but i think there are things that will continue to festor wip the wider debate and to remind ourselves of them i think is an important part of situating the context for the peech. first is the organizational question which to some people's surprise is prominent in the review panel report. there are a few organizational proposals, again, decisions in ,he p.p.d., about the oversight changes to the committees that oversee some of the intelligence

gathering, but not so much focused in the speech as some had hoped on how the collection s organized. there were proposals in the review report. there was plenty of discussion the last few months about whether the n.s.a. commander and -- should be separated. that decision was clearly -- or that opportunity was clearly not taken by the president. pick upthat reflects to the point of the operational zanssquans of what the n.s.a. provides potentially over and above the potential

presentation. that may reflect the fact he thought he got those presentational benefits from some of the other pleasures that he took. -- some of the other measures that he took. the british system has not , is such a public issue he fact that the political party is not necessarily the person who has the benefit of the intelligence collected. hether you could designate n.s.a. as a security -- as ligence collecting opposed to defense. that was not brought up.

i think for the most part this was an endorsement to the intelligence community and its way of doing things. second was the question of cryptography and whether the national security agency evails upon this to weaken cryptography to make it easier for n.s.a. to spy on people, and there has certainly been a lot of concern in the community that this was a brief of trust on behalf of the u.s. government. again, and for example, a large number of quite significant security consultants have said they will not attend the r.s.a. conference in protest in the idea that r.s.a. may have taken month money to weaken some security standards.

the important thing to note here is that the internet is heavily dependent on the geeks outside government to -- in order to operate in undermining their trust on the wider side of the security community. i think it is going to be something the government will have to work hard to regain. that wasn't addressed here, and that probably is a reflection of the fact that there are no easy answers to this question between errorism and cyber-security. it has not been particularly explored in the public dialogue because there are no simple answers. again, i wouldn't expect to see that today, but again that'sy think this isn't the final issue -- word on this issue. this is going to be a crucial issue going forward this year

because of a big debate that was already going on about snowden, and countries that wanted to maintain athe oversight, and another set of government who is prefer a more governmental approach. think the concern with snowden, the governments sitting between these two were beginning to distance themselves from the united states. .here is a lot more to do but i also attend -- i tend to cam, that national security data is changed in

which foreign leaders or policies governing have failed. we have had some of those governments who themselves have engaged in signal activity and -- that may help them get and allow them to take forward a more public engagement. it will not alone solve all these problems. i think it gives a basis on which the u.s. government will change the dialogue and can reenter the norms debate in hopefully a more active and positive display. the bottom line therefore, this is a base system. i don't think it's the end of the story by any meavepbs means.

>> i'm going to do two things. i want to talk a little about the tone of the speech, am identify on some things -- amplify on some things that have been said already and then i want to geek out and talk a little about the substantive legal l areas the president has talked about. i essentially agree. i think the speech was sort of a surprisingly strong endorsement of the essential activity of the intelligence community broadly and of the n.s.a. in particular. i think surprisingly, not because the president is, you know, has tapped out on this in the past but because he has actually been under enormous pressure. the review groups that he appointed came out with a series of recommendations that were quite dramatic in the scope of

the reform they were proposing in certain respects. i think he really did have a choice to make todays, whether he was going to be somebody who essentially game in and, you know, saw an out-of-control intelligence community under his watch and was going to be the guy who reformed it or whether he came and described it as a situation in which there was lawful and important intelligence activity taking place in his administration. i.e., his administration, his intelligence community, and that certain changes were needed to increase the perception of legitimacy of that lawful ppropriate activity. i think he very solidly chose the second option. i think up until relatively recently, the one direction he was going to go in that was

somewhat in play at least according to news stories, and sort of other signals and trials . so i think that is a notable thing, this sort of high arc. in particular, i want to focus that ithing that he said think will have -- was i'm sure not an accident that he said it and really reflects an anxiety in the intelligence community that is pretty pervasive and pretty strongly held. i think it will mean a lot to a lot of people that he said it. there is a portion of the speech that i should have highlighted and just read it, but where he said these are people that work every day knowing that the next time something terrible happens, they are going to be asked why they didn't connect the dots. i think identifying with that dilemma. that when you talk about

removing authorities, the anxiety that this engenders is the anxiety of people who believe they will be held accountable for not having exercised the various authorities that were taken away from him. it was a rather zahavi -- savvy thing to include, and to identify with a specific dilemma that the ns intelligence community is in on a basically hourly basis when they decide what to use and what not to use and how aggressively. i want to talk briefly about three substantive areas the president discussed in his speech. the second is the 702 thords, and third, the total victory of the f.b.i. and the justice department on the matter of national security letters.

on 215, this is presumed the multion core of the political dwafmente it is the moulten cower that faces the civil liberties community. which is to say, this is a comprehensive collection program, but it is a comprehensive collection program aimed at a very narrow category of data. which is to say metadata. so its capacity to either do great good, as bruce describes, or frankcally,ing to do terrible damage in the civil liberties arena, is actually much less than either collection under 702, which i'll come to in a minute or section 703, it is not that broad-based a program in terms of what gets collected and analyzed and how.

so what the president did here, he basically adopted in a limited sort of way, the review group recommendation, which is to say, moved the program outside of government and allow it to be queried with an order of the fisa court. the problem is, that's actually very easy to say and very hard to do. so what he did, which it's clever, and the question is if it is too clever by half. he said, well, we'll implement part of it now. which is to say, we'll imentpleement the number of hocks people can take on their own. he also said they can do on their own if they get an order from the fisa court. i actually don't think that is right. i will be interested to see if the fisa court buys that.

i think the fisa court will say we have no statutorial authority to investigate these issues. then he says he will investigate how to move the data off site for the next couple months and then we will work with congress to figure it out. what that bhacecally means is reforms ono do minor my own, and if congress can design a system, or we'll give em some guideans, but -- guidance, but if not, we can keep living under the existing authority. so i think at one level, this is an adoption of the review group recommendation, but at another level, it does not seem to dramatically impede the ability of the agency, at least in the short term, to collect and query when needed the

appropriate recommendation. 702 strikes me as a bigger win. 702 is a massively important program. it is a bread and butter collection program devoted to overseas intelligence targeted at nonu.s. persons. cam is absolutely right that the president for the first sometime -- and it is a very important statement at a kind of spiritual level that we acknowledge that non-u.s. persons have privacy rights in the context of our overseas clecks. it is very hard to overstate the sort of spiritual importance of that statement. the practical importance of that statement may be dramatically less than the spiritual importance. and the reason is that the fns community actually doesn't collect and dissemimate llie-nilly stuff about

overseas targets that has no value. they don't not do it because it is illegal, but because it is a total waste of their time. when you have a program and you limit it and you say now foreigners have privacy rights in belgium or tejekistan and we're going to have minute zation rules that only cause us to disseminate intelligence value, i suspect that is not going to cause big problems in any foreign intelligence agency that's doing its job with inimal competence. so i think this might be an area where the spiritual significance goes a long way without changing very much. it will be interesting to see what documents, if any, get to proceed over a more granual

level. finally, one of the big surprises in the review report, because it wasn't a feature in any of the snowden leaks, involved the f.b.i.'s issuance of national security letters, which are demands in national security communication tozz turn over basic information. these are done without perspective judicious review and they are done at a very low level of the bureau. they are quite controversial. they have nothing to do with the snowden leaks. and the review level, i think it was the second recommendation quite high up in the review group reports said this stuff needs to be subject to prospective judicial review. this did not go over well at the f.b.i. and the f.b.i., unlike the 215

program, a few hundred queries a year, this is thousands and thousands and thousands of requests. so this is really part of the daily bread and butter of f.b.i. there was a real interagency squabble over this, and the bureau won. and the president actually sounded a lot like -- in his speech sound aid fair bit like the f.b.i. director did in a discussion that the "new york times" reported on or some other media reported on a few weeks ago and basically said it shouldn't be harder to get these phone records for the f.b.i. in a national security investigation than it is for a u.s. attorney or an assistant u.s. attorney to get bank records in a criminal fraud investigation. i think this was an area that was a little lower profile and doesn't relate to snowden but

ended up in a dispute and the agency came out pretty much where it wanted to be, i think. so i'm going to stop there. if you have questions, hold your hand up and wait for the mic to come. sir? >> thank you so much. martin from the "german weekly." bruce i heard you not mentioning the nonspy agreement means actually an awful lot. i do agree, i just listened to the speech at the justice department. but i have a question. what does it mean, the extension of privacy rights to foreigners? what could it mean? you said the spiritual effect

might be bigger than the practical effect, but what could it mean to foreigners? are they thinking of the privacy act of 1974? what could it be? >> well, there are several procedures outlined in the , sidential policy directive inute zation data re-- minimization data related implications. basically, by implication at least, limb takes on how data base yizzes are queeried where e operative -- bases are queried where the same policies will areply to u.s. and non-u.s. persons. that's where the operational significance will be.

because that is t.v.d. it is delegated to the director of national intelligence and the attorney general, to put those procedures together. i guess what i would add in the sort of broader structure of things is that one of the recommendations of the review board that the president adopted is ensuring that considerations of privacy and civil liberties, commerce, international trade, internet policy, are part of the discussion. that's embodied in the p.p.d. i can tell you as somebody who ove was the one raising those issues in discussions here that that's -- that is a -- an enormously valuable thing.

it is not that the people in law enforcement aren't receptive to these issues, but they are not built into the discussion. now they are. now they are as a result of the substantive criteria in the p.p.d. and they are there as a result of the review procedures looking at the intelligence gathering at the priorities at the targeting, you know, through the national security council, deputy's commi committee and principle's committee approval by the president. that ensures that a wider set of yes and considerings go into the implementation of intelligence gathering. those, i think, are important tems that -- you know, but to at pen said about this intelligenceat the

community has done, is one that is looked at from the perspective of those other issues, i think this came out in the right place, you know, in terms of the structure, in terms of the limitations. it's not everything that the review board recommended, or that some have advocated. where i think i do differ is on the significance of meta-data. it is potentially highly significant. one of the rich avenues of research these days is what you can learn from social networks. we came back here, one of the leading scientists from m.i.t. is going to be here to talk about his new book "social physics."

but what's key here is what do you do with that data? how will you manage it? that awill be made more robust. but i think the validation of what the intelligence committee is doing, because there has been a strong set of protections in place. qumming from a different perspective. at the end of the day, i would not structure a lot of the privacy protections that in the ly if i were i.s.a. making those decisions. really, because there are a robust set of proteches in place. they are being made more row bufment they are being broadened in terms of the scope of who they recover. in that sense, it is a validation of what has been done.

>> i just want to -- >> please identify yourself. >> rick rempert, merits professor. i want to mention that the devil is not so much in the details here as in the bureaucracy. i spent some time at the department of homeland security, n.s.f. to give two examples. obama issued an executive order on class identification which in essence said we were classifying too much and that we should err in the direction, if you will, of openness. i certainly have not seen evidence that the bureaucracy

picked up on that districtive in any realistic way. second example -- and this deals with the implications of applying u.s. privacy law overseas. d.h.s. in fact did that. at least in some experience i had, there was research we wanted to do, which would involve the collection of p.i.i., personally fiblee final information who said it was great to do this research. there were great delays. i think given if they really are applying to u.s. privacy act and its rules about what may be collected and held, there could be more significant effects, particularly in the relevant issues that hlm of would affect us.

>> i'm just making comments. this is the end of the comments. i throw it open. if you want to question how is the bureaucracy going to be able to transform this or will it be able to transform this? will this be accepted and followed? >> to clarify on the privacy front. the review group did recommend a d.h.s. like policy level plication of the privacy act to the extent of a policy matter to non-u.s. citizens. the president's speech does not do that. at least not as i read it. it talks about recognizing that nonu.s. persons overseas have privacy rights, but it does not do it with reference to the privacy act. so i think it is actually a bit of a step back from the recommendation of the review group.

>> if i could add one thing to that. i think it is an interesting question about bureaucracy. the big winner is the enhanced power of the d.n.i. when we think of it in historical terms, when the d.n.i.'s fiss was set up about a decade ago, it was clearly intended this was going to be a small office with a small staff without its own building which would largely be a coordinating role. here is one more step in the increase of the d.n.i.'s authority. the d.n.i. is on par with the attorney general in establishing all of the bureaucrat mechanisms this.ind of flow out of which means that the d.n.i. is not going to have a small staff, he is going to have a big staff. he's going to get into privacy issues he has not gotten into before. it is, as you said, it comes

down to how does the bureaucracy implement this, and i think it comes down to how aggressive will the d.n.i.'s office be? will be it able to work with other agencies? will the n.s.a. listen to it? i think it will. is a winner at the d.n.i. office, in short. >> gary? > we bring -- let me bring the microphone over to gary while ian is talking. >> the bureaucracy is going to be under a lot of scrutiny. the idea that commercial interests will be brought into the decision making. everyone accepts that will be a good thing for u.s. power more generally. but it is more important in this some perhaps, than 34

others. the private industry has to be convinced this is happening and if not in theory. if they don't, the u.s. will not be able to operate through the soft powers that the u.s. tech sector delivers. and that will be important in delivering some of its national security network through. similarly, i think the international community will be watching some of this very closely. i think obama has given himself the opportunity to change the nature of some of that international gay debate and move things forward. but if the sense of what is happening is not what he has promised, then they will move back from that and that will move without progress. so i think there will be a fair ability -- amount of scrutiny on this and that will keep them on

their toes. >> changes in the bureaucracy, one other thing that the p.p.d. does, is they say in will be a privacy officer at o.m.b., and the l office will appoint someone who will coordinate with d.n.i. that's something else that ensures there is additional perspective and brings one of the main points of contact with he tech community into the intelligence discussion, the intelligence oversight. >> i'm derrick mitchell and i write "the mitchell report." i want to not let a comment that two of the first two of you on he panel, bruce and ben, made.

i want to check. -- at you did a kind of the outset said, you know, doacht write this in ink. i'm going to need some time too think about this and my views sometime down the road may hange. i want to ask whether there is more than a sort of generic, wise, this all happened this morning, i need to get ready for e afternoon observation or whether, and perhaps i was a, prized, and b slightly swayed by or well he did what he did, were there components of what he touched on that raised some yellow flags for you?

i think pen specifically talked about fisa cord jurisdiction relative to skks 215 as one example. so was this sort of generic, were l hold on, folks, or there some places where yellow signs might be flashing. >> it is a very per spentive question, at least in the psycho analysis of me. i can't speak for bruce. so in my case, there are a mber of areas that i am at this point aware that i have not analyzed with sufficient thoroughness to know what my opinion is actually going to be. let me flag them for you. i'm not i'm entirely sure i understand what the implications

of the privacy rights -- acknowledging privacy rights for nonu.s. persons overseas is. and i'm not sure we will understand that until you hold 12333 against existing minute minimization procedures that they are going to have to write for this. and there is this phrase in there, as cam pointed out, these have to be the same as the minimization of u.s. citizens to the extent available. until you put all these puzzle pieces together, and i understand how feasible it is consistent with national security, how similar and how different they are going to be, i'm going to be a little tentative in how i react to that. in is also a part in the speech where the president says he

702 ts some reforms of vis-a-vis the use on non-u.s. persons. l give more nformation, but he sort of punts it. i would like to see, are those privacy rights essential or are they sort of unimportant? but you are going too see -- you chapter of see the headings here. what you see in the granularity of practice is different. it is also possible it is clear what it means, i just don't understand it yet. >> i'm not going to psycho analyze myself. i think what ben said applies.

i would highlight two other points. there is a fair number of places in the document where there is language which you could drive a truck through. for example, they can't seek out except in an emergency situation. what is an emergency situation? it is a judgment call. one of the points the president was saying about this whole thing is, we don't need to just think about the judgment of this president, we need to think of the judgment of the next president and the president after. when you have a lot of those rather loose formulations, it is a subject for worry. what would a next president do on something like that? then i think there is the other question of throwing into the

many congress, and maybe i'm just influenced because i'm reading bob gates' book right now, but his character zation of the congress as the uglier it is, the closer you get the more ugly it is, certainly applies to our current situation. and the notion that this congress is going too come up with creative solutions to some of these very, very difficult problems strikes me as the triumph hope over experience. i just don't see that happening. that is the worry. we could find out that instead of a path forward, that is a path to nowhere. >> i'm not going to psycho analyze either ben or bruce, but i would say, i have had two very similar conversations, but one after the event, and one with people there or and another with people preparing for this discussion both trying to parse

exactly what the president said about the 215 program and where it is going from here. that's going to take some many onal analysis of the -- lng of the speech, and some further explanation as well. >> other questions? >> yes, thank you. i'm with the u.s. department of state. i used to work with cam kerry. i continue to work on a lot of these issues. it is good to see cam again. i have a question again i'm voicing on behalf of bureaucracy, because i am a career federal bureaucrat, and it really goesing to congress' willingness to reform. to my experience, oversight costs money, transparancy costs money. if the president issues an order to improve trans transparancy but the size of the office doesn't increase, you get preath

pretty lack luster results. judicial review requires more judges and more people to argue in front of those judges. so we are hearing man zates on some of the very people that awork on some of these issues now. some of these people are working on furloughs. the independent review dwrupe was forced to stop working because of the government shut down. so from the congress, do you see any recognition from them that oversight -- the desire for oversight can be expressed with commitment of resources or is there a danger that we're going to see a new set of unfunded mandates and a requirement on remany assert the deck chairs in hoot way. >> the short answer is no. the congressional oversight --

and this is a very dangerous point in this area. because these are highly eelaborated, highly de -- they very dense statchtri schemes that were put together with enormous care over many, many decades now by congress -- congresses that worked better than the current congress does. the care and feeding of the fisa regime which has gone through a great many rewrites over a long period of time, current following changes so quickly, it actually requires regular revisiting not just for the oversight reasons, that you the be, but also because technology changes and it bhoims out of date. the point bruce made about congress is, it is -- it can be

devastating. it becomes harder and harder to reach a point where the congress with work in a bipartisan fashion, and this legislation always has to be bipartisan on a technically dense area of enormous legal complexity. when you create these oversight issues that the executive has to a work with, it creates huge burden, and it is actually an enormous problem. caps cans captioned by the national captioning institute --www.ncicap.org-- [captions copyright national cable satellite corp 2014]

>> the situation doesn't bother me, access bothers me. i had access to the information before. d.n.a. felt that the ow is from booz allen. we gave them too -- are we giving too much power to rporations to have the information? >> i was just handed a question from brandon andrews that says "do you think americans feel safer with information in the hands of private agencies or the u.s. government, and if so, why?" i throw that to any of the panelists. >> let me begin with that. as one of the a. tickets one of the administration's consumer privacy bill of rights, i