gentlewoman from florida, ms. ros-lehtinen,

we have been very clear with the government not only at my level, but the secretary of defense's level, secretary of state's level and other people who have been in contact that any further serious efforts by the government to repress their own people will be met with a firm response by the united states. >> and would sanctions be one of the considerations? >> as i said, senator, that and other tools are on the table, yes. may i just make a point about the choice that ukrainians have to make? i think we're all making the same point, which is, it is in the united states' interest to help the people of ukraine preserve the opportunity to have a choice for a european

future, and that's what we have to do, basically as we head to these elections that's about seek out against further violence, that's about supporting a free, fair media environment so that they can actually judge this government -- >> so it's not a tug of war. it's standing up for the principles of we want every free people throughout the world to be able to determine their own future without being, having demonstrators beaten up, without embargos, without energy card being played to cut off energy in the middle of the winter, as has happened in the past. this is all about mr. putin's desire to restore the old russian empire, and he's done the same thing in moldovia, lithuania, estonia, and all around the periphery of russia. it's part, as senator corker pointed out, of the very

aggressive behavior that ladimir putin displays, and we with funny ecretary the gag gifts. i don't get it. i'd like to recognize boris and so the ukrainian ambassador, who is here also. again, i'd like to ask you, secretary nuland, do you think that there is a path now for them to allow a free and fair election, and what do you make of the decision of the upper court that says that klitschko is ineligible for running for president in 2015?

>> again, senator, when you ask how we can help, how the e.u. can help, it is to focus our attention on ensuring that the electoral environment is free and fair. that is going to be a very, very difficult task given these moves that we're already seeing to intimidate journalists and to constrict the free media environment to manipulate local electoral counts sills, these kinds of things. the assistants that we are putting into you're krein, and we are increasing it in the areas of free media and electoral support will all be in the direction of trying to prevent efforts to pervert the electoral environment before 015. with the regard to the ongoing

court situations for mr. klitschko, this is a very familiar playbook in this part use the ld to try to courts to manipulate the slate of opposition candidates, etc. we are watching this case extremely closely. we had observers today from our embassy. >> thank you. mr. chairman, i want to say that we thank you for what you . d in the ukraine i was proud to join senator murphy on what was, for me, a truly unfortable experience, nd we thank you. >> good to see both of you here. thanks, senator mccain, for allowing me to join him on what was really an amazing visit to see hundreds of thousands of

people on that square. also knowing those actors were in the tens of thousands before the crackdown, and it was in the faces of that brutal activity from the administration that people poured out into the record treet. i want to echo the comments of senator mccain. i don't think yanukovych can win a free and fair election, no matter what he may do. it's truly an open election, and our most important task here, if we want to truly support the ukraine people, is to do everything within our power to track these individuals witness they go back home to make sure they aren't quietly spirited away so that they don't participate in he 2015 elections.

yanukovych is wrong to believe there are no strings attached. he claimed it was too high, and he perceived that there's a lower price for him in the short run to do the deal with russia. of course, that's not true. ultimately russia may not impose strings at the outset and will start to meddle on a weekly and daily basis in the affairs of the ukraine once they get their financial mitts into the country. it strikes me at some point during this process, both the e.u. and i am i am have acted as if there wasn't a choice for the ukraine to make, they were sort of used to doing deals in -- the i.m.f. were used to doing bailout packages and financial packages with countries in the e.u. that did not have a choice.

there was a lecture on all of the abuse that the ukraine has frain the e.u., and most of his itany was without merit. is there more that can be done on behalf of the e.u. and the i.m.f. to try to work with the ukraine in the coming months to answer some of the concerns, which they may have that are legitimate, recognizing that this is not a zero sum game, that they do have an alternative, and that will continue to get sweeter and sweeter as the conditions get tougher and tougher from the i.m.f. and the e.u., and what does the united states do to work with the i.m.f. and the e.u. to try to help answer some of the legitimate concerns that may come from the ukraine? i really do believe that having

both of you present in a bipartisan way on the square that weekend may have prevented iolence. nobody knows what the terms really are, because they were not made transparent to the public, and certainly not to the ukrainian public. and as we do with the ukrainians, draw your attention to the fact that one of the terms is that it will be renegotiated every three months ukraine could conceivably face default again unless it goes down the tougher medicine, but better reward track of the i.m.f.. if, in fact, we have a ukrainian government that is willing to come back into a serious condition with the e.u. and the i.m.f., what we need is

a phased road map of restoring raine to economic health, as the e.u. also works on how the i.m.f. deal and the e.u.'s deal might mesh together to ensthure ukraine has other options than its extreme dependence on the russian market. it requires some tough steps, and this government has not been willing to take them. >> something did happen, which moldova, rgia and under similar pressure, decided they were going to move forward with their association with the e.u. there's going to be a process where the ukraine looks to see

what happens in georgia and moldova. ukrainian citizens look to see what happens to their economies , nd look back other way here's a different decision. it was georgia and moldova to make sure they are a shiny example of what good can occur when you make the choice to join with the e.u. >> if all goes well for moldova and georgia, they will be able to sign both agreements, perhaps as early as next year, and certainly in the case of moldova, maybe even in the case f georgia.

that will completely transform the economic opportunities for those countries when people can trade freely, and it will also, we believe, have an impact on thinking in the separatist area ccupied areas as they understand that their governments are offering a path and an opportunity to work with europe that they hadn't had before. we are working with moldova to tray to diversify their economic base, even as the e.u. opens markets. we're working to open u.s. markets, and we're also working on energy dependence for moldova. secretary kerry made a stop in moldova made a stop there to give them a boost.

similarly with georgia, we are doe ocused on efforts to stabilize minority areas and other parts, which is part of the pressure playbook. i was in georgia about a month ago to encourage the government and the opposition, now that they've had good elections, to come together around the strong economic program and to take full advantage and speed up their integration with the e.u., including doing what they need to do to get these as free as possible. >> one last comment, which is that we are incredibly well rved by you, but also by our ambassador there. it is an advertisement for this committee moving quick on the nominations, because we were able to get him nominated, put in place before the summer break, which gave him enough

time to develop relationships that will come in very handy in he middle of a crisis. >> one last question. analysts have asserted that ussia is trying get critical infrastructure, ukrainian infrastructure, that is. do we have any information of whether the russians have acquired control over critical ukrainian infrastructure as a result of the putin-yanukovych deal? >> this pab part of the 20-year struggle for sovereignty efforts to resist outside purchase of key critical infrastructure. we don't have the details on his ukraine-russia deal.

we're not in a position to independently verify that. >> i thank you for your testimony and as much as i can see that your time as the spokesperson has honed the concisely of some of your responses. i look forward to engaging you in other parts of your portfolio. with that, you're both excused from the committee's hearing. we will bring up our second -- list who needs really

brzezinski y, dr. needs no introduction, certainly not to this committee. he cease the world as a grand chess board, as reflected in the title of one of his many books. he is, in my view, one of the world's most insightful foreign policy analysts. he brings to the table a clear political view. we appreciate your willingness to share your insights and your xpertise of the committee.

we invite to you share your houghts. i'm most impressed by the work you've been doing on this issue. earlier part of this testimony here, and it seems you all appreciate the history and i can strategic importance of the issue you were discussing. my own general message is simple. a democratic, sovereign, and european ukraine is what the you're -- ukrainian people want and deserve. such a ukraine will encourage russia to become an important post-imperial part of the west as a whole. that's a very important strategic point.

this is not political war faye against russia, but favoring russia's long-term interest, and we have to keep that in mind, that larger framework. the union, such as the one that putin aspires to create held together by pressure and motivated by nostalgia is not a long-term solution for russia's dilemma.l economic nd sooner or later the current authoritarianism driven by imperial ambitions in russia will fail. not only because ukraine is hesitant, they're not eager to become camouflaged colonies. with that in mind, let me make just a few general suggestions

and some of them may be redundant, because i don't have access to all of them being discussed in the administration. first, my suggestion is we should encourage all e.u. parliaments to pass resolutions hailing the courage and termination of this new, younger ukrainian generation, which has shown itself to be so devoted to its new sovereignty, and we should express our strong support for it. and it should be done by other democratic assembles as part of the historical record. it is important for the ukrainian record to feel that hey are not alone. we should all deplore all forms of blackmail or pressure

designed to limit ukrainian sovereignty. our administration should be clearly emphasized and should be conscious of our identification with them. that i know some members of this committee have been there during the most dramatic moments. ukrainian national patriotism is a recently reborn henomenon, but it is authentic. putin overlooks one very simple fact. today's ukraine hearkens back russia, that ev's is to say, to kiev 1,000 years . o in which the kingdom

they proposed the princess, the daughter of the king of ukraine, become his wife, and she traveled to paris and ecame the queen of france. secondly, we should encourage the emergence in ukraine of a visible and standing committee for national unity and independence with politically and effective defined leadership that can engage if the opportunity rises.

we know for a fact that some oligarches who support yanukovych would be interested a dialogue with the pposition. in brief, we should not strive to polarize the situation in ukraine, but we should promote the opportunity for a serious dialogue with a political entity that authoritatively speaks for the will of the politically awake uped ukrainian nation and encourage them also to prepare perhaps for the free elections in 2015, though it is not at all certain

at this stage that they indeed will be free. third, the united states should use its influence, and i hope it is using it in i.m.f., in e world bank, in the various assembles to explore what could be done to help ukraine expand its relationship with the e.u., while remaining russia's good neighbor, even under the currently con strived rrangements. the e.u. should encourage whatever additional arrangements are feasible. we should be exploring ways, if there are any, by which the .t.o. could help to expose economic intimidation, which is not in keeping with its rules and communicate its sense of concern to the party

responsible for generating it. perhaps there should be some steps taken for access for ukrainians seeking to study and work in europe. fourth, we should keep in mind that the longer rush issue is what will russia become as former luences in the soviet central asia. we should keep reminding the russian people and their leaders that we respect russia's european identity and culture and that russia's true destiny is also to be a major european state, in a larger democratic best. in russia's evolution towards a

genuine democracy. one way or another that day will come. putin stands in the way today with his nostalgic dream of a new empire called the eurasian union. but the fact is that such a prospect is not realistic. none of the would-be members of the eurasian union truly desire limit their sovereignty, to cede it to russia, to participate in the creation of a new union which revokes memories of the recent union, not to mention the older still ussian empire. in brief, and i conclude on this, we need to structure it open-ended, long-term policy for ukraine, as well as a long-term option for russia that may follow. thank you, mr. chairman.

>> thank you very much for those insights n. your book, you suggest that russia cannot be a democracy if it's an empire, and it cannot be fully as an empire if it lacks control of the ukraine. is that a view that you think is driving moscow's behavior towards the ukraine now? >> yes, i think. certainly the leadership feels convinced that without ukraine the recreation of some form of supernational union or call it simply an empire is not possible. this is why it's such a strategic stake for putin. what he underestimates, however, in my view, are the consequences of 20 years of independence, consequences that result so dramatically and so admirably, with that younger generation of ukrainians will

grow up in an independent state , stand up and say no matter how cold or difficult or dangerous, we stand for understand pence because we treasure our independence. it's less visible that that kind of sentiment is such significant entities as kazakhstan and uzbekistan, but also in the other smaller former soviet states. to put it simply in very human terms, who doesn't prefer to be a president of his own country or a general in his own army or a foreign minister in his own government or an ambassador in washington representing his sovereignty rather than to be officials of an entity in which they are subordinate? this is a normal human reaction. nationalism is a deeply

contagious social force, and once awakened, it is almost impossible to sweep it back into the box. what we are now seeing in ukraine is a long-delayed awakening that was coming. one could see it during the 20th century. one could see it during the days of the ghoul ago and the starving to death of millions of ukrainians, but deliberate decisions in moscow. but now it's a pervasive reality, particularly among the younger ukrainians. they feel themselves to be ukraine i can't says, and this -- hy putin betrays displays such ignorance when he said just as did he a few weeks ago that ukraine and russia are just but one nation and the russians are the older brother in that nation, according to him. >> and the flip side of that, and i share your views, but the

flip side, so we understand the totality of the importance of this, is that, could we ever see or perceive a democratization of russia if they would be able to achieve their goals of having ukraine join with them in this sphere? >> well, i have no doubt that the ukraine is subordinated. it marks a turning point and russia becomes an empire. my own personal view is, first of all, i don't think that's going to happen in total, even if there's a regression today. and secondly, and obviously this is speculated when there's a question of judgment, my gut feeling is that putin's ostalgia for the past, which drives this for a supernational union is divorced from political and socioeconomic

realities. an a today is no longer imperially motivated entity mindlessly seeking imperial status the way the nazis did in order to compensate for their defeat in the first world war. an no longer driven by ideology which demands nationality as the basis for superpower status. there is a nationalist element in russia to which he is appealing that is progressive, but there's also a new manifestation in russia, which is gradually becoming, in my view, more significant, the emergence of an increasingly internationally connected, internationally educated in any cases middle class particularly in moscow, st. petersburg, others, a middle class which increasingly identifies itself with more common western values,

including democracy, freedom of travel, freedom to say what one desires, and freedom eventually to express one's political preferences. that is a new reality, and it's becoming stronger. so my gut feeling, and i've been a student of soviet and russian affairs now almost all for fe, is that this quest a supernatural union is directly linked to the longevity to the president of russia. and if he fades from the scene for one reason or another, politically or physically, i think there's going to be an accelerated turn towards a redefinition of russia's place in the world for two reasons. one, which i've already mentioned, the impulse of the middle class that sees itself as part of the west and is increasingly educated in the west in addition to traveling

to it. the significant rise in the power and significance of china, particularly now increasingly o in central asia. the russians are building new roads spanning the former russian central asia, roads, railroads, investments, increasingly matching and outstripping the investment in the real estate and in the natural resources of these newly independence states. these states are so huge and powerful, but at the same time, they know that they create leverage, which gives them room for assertion. i know the presidents of the two most important central asian countries, as act stan, extraordinarily rich in natural resources, and uzbekistan, the

center of islamic self awareness that's mixed with nationalism. neither of these two leaders wants to be a satellite. in fact, for that reason, they're very careful in maneuvering between china and russia, proposed to putin, and pickup inwas smart enough to accept that their original name of the eurasian union be changed to eurasian economic to , which was an attempt limit what that union really means. in other words, don't tackle, don't limit our sovereignty. of course, doesn't work that easily if you have economic nomination, the other one may be adversely affected. but my point simply is this -- there is some such for customs union and so forth, because it

can be beneficial two ways. but there is, above all else in the newly independent states, including belarus, which doesn't have a good democratic record, there is a commitment in all of them towards self-independence. >> senator corker? >> thank you, mr. chairman and doctor. it's always impressive to listen to you and to get your insights on issues that are happening throughout the world, certainly in this part of the world. you're quite an expert. thank you for your comments. i know you listed a number of things, steps that should be ken to reinforce the ukrainian people, and you've talked about the values that they share with the west, the values that the people in russia share with the west, and just the natural alliance that should be there. many of us have watched the

administration since august and watch as we deal with russia in ways that we do and understand that the russian people in many ways should be oriented towards us and that there are issues of commonality that we should be pursuing. it may be a difference to russia in so many cases and almost beginning with syria, tepping into their arms. i know highway we need to encourage the ukrainian people to continue to move ahead. we hope there are going to be free elections. i know the standard is for opponents to be arrest and had not be available for election, which makes it more difficult. but what would be your guidance to u.s. outward comments and

policy relative to ukraine right now and push back, and what effect does that actually have, if you will, on the ukrainian people there? >> i think we should learn from the experience of poland's he manslaughter situation from soviet control in the late 980's, early 1990's. they haven't institutionalized itself n. poland, it t became institutionalized in a so-called solidarity movement with a dramatic leader which may not have been the most senior leader originally, perhaps not always the most intelligent leader, but the most effective political leader, and it was under his leadership that eventually that movement forged the regime to negotiate an arrangement of accommodation.

it was transformed into a democracy, a western type democracy of poland today in the e.u.. ukraine needs a clear-cut national alternative. i know there are a number of outstanding ukrainian leaders who have participated, some with great personal courage and sacrifice. but the biggest sacrifice that needs to be made is that all of them but one have to agree on a one that they disassemble, because you're dealing with an entrenched regime which can use force and bribery to stay in power. you need to have them figure that aspirations symbolizes you and becomes a focus of global attention. he second part of your question pertains to russians.

i know what i'm about to say is controversial, but frankly, i think that russia's nterference in syria to some extent made it easier for to us avoid slidely in direct participation in a war, which would have been very damaging to our interests and probably would have spread more widely and more quickly. so that's the question of judgment, and we may disagree on that. but i think in any case what it illustrates is something more basic than that. our relationship with russia during the cold war was one of hostility, a nonzero sum game. we win, they lose. they win, we lose. today in many parts of the world the relationship is much more fixed. in the long run, i would like to become like ukraine and ursue the same path.

we do need them in the middle east. in fact, i think the advances of stabilizing the middle east, including the fort coming conference, are greater if in the process we have with us not only the europeans, some of whom are very disliked in the middle east as former colonial powers, but we also have with us the russians who are not so disliked. the chinese are increase going being an influence in the middle east and they have a growing stake in a stable middle east. that kind of a coalition i think gives us a greater opportunity to pursue arrangements that mitigate and minimize the danger of conflict spreading out and certainly reduces the necessity of us being involved in these conflicts directly, because the fact remains that if we become involved directly, some people

may applaud us, some people may rub their hands with glee that we're getting stuck, but none of them are going to help us. and i don't think the united states is in any position now to duplicate the wars in iraq or in afghanistan with a direct military engagement in the middle east. so we do need some accommodations, wasn't russians on some issues, just as we disagree with them on other issues, today, for example, regarding what we're discussing. >> i appreciate your point of view. but as it relates to ukraine, hich, i mean, was just outward economic extortion, obviously that's not something that we in any way condone regardless of the complexities of any situation, and therefore, and yet we really didn't speak to that. i think in some reasons it's because of the other elements that you just alluded to.

i mean, i understand that relationships are complex and there are many other things that are occurring in regards to how you view those. i understand that they come into this. but when it comes to an issue like ukraine, where there's no question it was black and white xtortion, what should the u.s. do in those cases, because it appears to me that we did not much, if you will. >> i tend to agree with you on that aspect. this is why i mentioned, for example, in my testimony that we should take a hard look at w.t.o. rules. there are some countries that have behaved that fashion, and we don't need to name them right now, but we know who we're talking about. we should look at the rules and see what is not acceptable in terms of formal behavior of w.t.o. members who benefit from the fact that such organizations cent to more fluid trade flows and greater access, and we have

opportunities for limited boycotts, limited bans and so forth. i agree, it's not either black or white. you can have different combinations. but we have to have a sense of balance about it. i don't favor the rei go fighting, reigniting the cold war, for example, with russia, the kind that we had in the soviet union, in part because we do need russia in some other parts of the world, and partly because russia itself is changing. you heard from me a very sharp criticism of putin. i know he's authoritarian, and i know what he wishes to create is not good, and i believe it will not succeed, but i also know that today in moscow you can read criticisms of the government. you can read newspapers that blast official policies. you can watch skits on television that ridicule the rulers and so forth. we're dealing with a more omplicated russia today than

the soviet union of the past. >> well, thank you, and appreciate your service to our country and your continued involvement in helping us think through these complex issues. thank you. >> for all his faults, yanukovych is a pretty savvy politician, and he seems to be under the impression that he short-term manage a transition to economic aid in russia with an eventual long-term association with the e.u. and further seems to be under the belief that he can manage at to worth without severe repercussions from russia. maybe they won't notice.

if he enters into a road map to join europe. i wanted to rip the band-aid off, which that does not translation well in ukrainian. my point is, somehow you are going to have to deliver a tough message that you are going to join the e.u. and potentially, as long as putin is there, accept some of the very bad economic behavior that senator corker talks about coming along with it unless we can stop it. do you think he's right, that there is a way without our intervention, the ukraine to make the turn to europe in an overt way without raising the ire of russia in a way without doing great damage to their economy, or do you think that senator corker is right, we might be able to help manage that transition? >> well, we certainly should

try, and we certainly should y, and we should certainly encourage ukrainians to try. this cannot be resolved entirely from the outside. we can influence events, but we annot really dictate them. my guess is can yovek in his gut feels if he moves towards the west and part of it is also free elections, that he will ose. that's part of the difficulty. i'll draw an analogy to poland, because it's relevant. i mentioned poland produced a movement that produced a popular leader that eventually sat down with a communist regime, which knew it was losing, because the soviet

union was disintegrating, and they knew they had to accommodate the new reality, and contrived free elections, which were free. and solidarity won. and then solidarity agreed to e dictator in poland who had soviet union. in other words, what the ukrainians have to have is a viable source of political influence, but also political of gue, and some degree elasticity to deal with yanukovych, but it may not be possible. he may be too fearful. look how stupid and rigid he is on the case. he could have solved it just like that without too much fanfare, not just sending them

to germany for medical treatment, but simply saying i'm getting rid of her. all right, so she'll be outside the country. part of the problem will be olved. he didn't have the guts or imagination to do that, because he's a little bit frozen in his anxiety he might lose. but i think it's worth a try, but a lot depends on the maturity and flexibility, organizational skill and charismatic appeal of the opposition, including its willingness to play the game depending how it unfolds. one more sentence. and one point, putin's money is going run out. this is a lousy economy. it's an economy from which funds are fleeing to the west. the new middle class is enriching itself, but look where it's depositing its money. there should be a crisis in terms of what putin can do for

can yovek. he has to be careful not to use force on the ukraines. if does he, he'll discover very quickly he has bitten more than he can chew. these are tough people. they're not going to give up their understand pence. >> i wanted to ask about you the opposition. i know you won't want to comment on individual political leaders in the ukraine, but it struck me that there's a huge, giant portrait of tim she think owe, and yet when you're talking to individuals there, there's not a lot of talk of individual political leaders. they're there for a variety of reasons, most of which, as was mentioned earlier, are not connected to an individual political party. there seems to be a disconnect between what those were there and who have left want and what the political opposition is able to deliver. the worry is that if we're really counting on political ange in 2015 to ultimately

deliver on the salvation of the ukraine, folks out there may have expectations that the political opposition ultimately an't make good on. regardless who ends up being the standard-bearer, how do they capitalize on these fairly nonpolitical acceptabilities that are captured? >> well, first of all, by trying to create a broader it may that gue, be they don't to want talk to them, but there are a lot of other people that are not committed to the regime, nor are entirely game who can be talked to. i can give you the names of some oligarches who would engage in discussion with the opposition, in part because they're unease by the way things are shaping up.

they resent the fact that this was want theirs exclusive, but they have priority rights in what they claim to be their exclusive area. they know opportunities shine in the west. they may be interested in alternative deals. i'm talking about some arrangement whereby the election is delayed for a while, but with an understanding of a process that takes root and then leads to a transition, which is exactly what happened in poland. it lasted one year, and yet went peacefully in the end. there are many ways you can skin that cat, but the political leadership in ukraine has to be fan i mideastly mature, but also symbolic. i'm not going to mention names, but they can't all be running for president against each

other. one of them has to be, and they have to make a determination. don't forget, this movement is driven by the passions of the younger people who relish the fact that they are independent. theirs a whole new ychological reality, and the leader has to be in tune with that mood as to symbolize it most effectively. if that manifests i was, that creates a new ballgame. ok, they can perhaps arrest him. yanukovych can be under pressure from putin to arrest him, but might not work. don't forget, russia is changing too. i'm not sure that everybody in russia is crazy about trying to create some sort of a union in which there's going to be internal more opposition and china in the meantime gains influence. >> dr.