and orders of the foreign intelligence surveillance court. including the program targeting foreign individuals overseas and the section 215 telephone metadata program. going forward, i am directing the director of national intelligence and consultation with the attorney general will annually review for the purposes of declassification any future opinions of the court with broad privacy implications. they will report to me and to congress on these efforts. to ensure that the court hears a broader range of privacy perspectives i am also calling on congress to authorize the establishment of a panel of advocates from outside government to provide an

independent voice in significant cases before foreign intelligence surveillance court. third, we will provide additional perfections for activities conducted under section 702, which allows the government to intercept the communication of foreign targets overseas who have information that is important for national security. specifically, i'm asking the attorney general and dni to institute reforms that place additional restrictions on government's ability to retain, search, and use in criminal cases, communications between american citizens incidentally collected under section 702. in investigating threats, the fbi also relies on what is called national security letters which requires companies to supply limited information without disclosing orders to the subject of the investigation. these are cases in which it is important that the subject of the investigation, such as a possible terrorist or spy, is not tipped off. we can and should be more transparent and how government uses this authority.

i, therefore, directed the attorney general to amend how we use national security letters so that this secrecy will not be indefinite. so that it will terminate within a fixed time unless the government demonstrates a real need for further secrecy. we will also enable communications providers to make public more information than ever before about the orders they have received to provide data to the government. this brings me to the program that has generated the most controversy these past months. the bulk collection of telephone records under section 215. let me repeat what i said when this story first broke. this program does not involve the content of phone calls or the names of people making calls. instead, provides a record of

phone numbers and the times and length of calls. metadata that can be queried if and when we have a reasonable suspicion that a particular number is linked to a terrorist organization. why is this necessary? the program grew out of the desire to address a gap identified after 9/11. one of the 9/11 hijackers made a phone call from san diego to a known al qaeda safe house in yemen. nsa saw that call, but did not know it was from an individual already in the united states. the programs maps terrorists so that we can see who they are in touch with.

we need to see who they may be in contact with as quickly as possible. this capability can also prove valuable in a crisis. for example, if a bomb goes off in one of our cities and law- enforcement is racing to determine whether a network is poised to conduct additional attacks, time is of the essence. being able to quickly review phone connections to assess whether a network exists is critical for that effort. the program does not involve the nsa examining the phone records of ordinary americans. rather, it consolidates these records into a database that the government can query if it has a specific reason. a consolidation of phone records that the companies already retain for business purposes. the review group turned up no indication that this database has been intentionally abused.

i believe it is important that the capabilities that this program is designed to meet is preserved. having said that, i believe critics are right to point out that without proper safeguards, this type of program could be used to yield more information about our private lives. it could open the door to more intrusive bulk collection programs in the future. they're also right to point out that although the bulk collection program was subject to oversight by the foreign surveillance court and has been reauthorized by congress, it has never been subject to vigorous public debate. for all these reasons, i believe we need a new approach. i am therefore ordering a

transition that will end the section 215 bulk metadata program as it exists and establishes a program without the government holding this bulk metadata. it this will not be simple. the review group recommended that our current approach be replaced by one in which the providers or a third-party retain the bulk records with the government accessing information is needed. both of these options pose difficult problems. relying solely on the records of multiple providers could force companies to alter their policies. any single company holding the database could carry out what is essentially a government function with more expenses more legal ambiguity, potentially less accountability, all of

which would have an impact on increasing public confidence that their privacy is being protected. during the review process, some suggested that we may also be able to preserve the capabilities we need through recombination of existing authorities, better information sharing, and recent technological advancements. more work needs to be done to determine how this system will work. because of the challenges involved, i ordered that the transition away from the existing program will proceed in two steps. we will only pursue phone calls that are two steps away from a known terrorist phone number. the database can be queried only after a judicial finding or in the case of a true emergency. next, step two, i've instructed the intelligence community and the attorney general to use this transition period to develop a new approach without the government holding this metadata

itself. and they will report back to me with options for alternative approaches before the program comes up for reauthorization on march 28. during this time, we will discuss the reauthorization of the program as needed. the reforms should give people greater confidence that their rights are being protected, even

as law enforcement retains the tools they need to keep us safe. additional issues require further debate. some who participated in our view, as some members of congress would like to see more sweeping reforms. we have to go to a judge each time before these requests. here i have concerns that we should not set a standard for terrorism investigations that are higher than those involved in investigating and ordinary crime. i agree that greater oversight on the use of these letters may be appropriate and i prefer to work with congress on this

issue. there are those who would like to see different changes to the court then i proposed. i'm working with congress to ensure that we build a broad consensus for how to move forward and i'm confident that we can shape an approach that meets our security needs while upholding the civil liberties of every american. let me now turn to the separate set of concerns that have been raised overseas. i will focus on america's approach to intelligence collection abroad. as i've indicated, the united states has unique response abilities when it comes to intelligence collection. they helped not only our nation, but our friends and our allies as well. our efforts will only be effective if ordinary citizens in other countries have confidence that the united states respects their privacy, too. the leaders of our close friends and allies deserve to know that

i want to know what they think about an issue. i will pick up the phone and call them rather than turn to surveillance. just as we balance security and privacy at home, our global leadership demands that we balance our security requirements against our need to maintain the trust and cooperation among people and leaders around the world. for that reason, the new presidential directive that i've issued today will clearly prescribe what we do and do not do when it comes to our overseas surveillance. to begin with, the directive makes clear that the united states only uses signals intelligence for legitimate national security purposes and not for the purposes of indiscriminately reviewing the e-mails and phone calls of ordinary folks. i've also made it clear that the united states does not collect intelligence to suppress

criticism or dissent, nor do we disadvantage people on the basis of ethnicity or race or gender or sexual orientation or religious beliefs. we do not provide advantages to u.s. companies or commercial sectors. in terms of our bulk collection of signal intelligence, u.s. intelligence agencies will only use such data to meet specific security requirements. counterintelligence, counterterrorism, counter proliferation, cyber security, force protection for our troops and our allies, and combating transnational crime, including sanctions in asia. in this directive, i have taken the unprecedented step of expanding certain protections

that we have for the american people to people overseas. i have directed the dni to develop the safeguards come which will limit the duration that we can hold personal information while also restricting the use of this information. the bottom line is that people around the world, regardless of their nationality, should know that the united states does not spy on ordinary people who don't threaten our national security. we take their privacy concerns into account in our policies and procedures. this applies to foreign leaders as well. given the understandable attention of this issue, i've made clear to the intelligence community that unless there is a compelling national security purpose, we will not monitor the communications of heads of state and government of our close friends and allies. i've instructed my national security team come as well as

the intelligence community, to work with foreign counterparts to deepen our coronation and cooperation in ways that we build trust going forward. let me be clear -- our intelligence agencies will continue to gather information about the intentions of governments in the same way that the intelligence services of every other nation does. we will not apologize simply because our services may be more effective. heads of state and government with whom we work closely should feel confident that we are treating them as real partners. the changes i've ordered do just that. finally, to make sure that we follow through on all these reforms, i am making some important changes to how our government is organized.

the state department will designate an officer. we will appoint a senior official at the white house to implement the new privacy safeguards that i've announced today. i will devote the resources to centralize and improve the process we used to handle foreign requests for legal assistance, keeping our high standards of privacy while helping foreign partners fight crime and terrorism. i have also asked my counsel to lead a conference of review of big data and privacy. this group will consist of government officials who, along with the president's council of advisors on science and technology, will reach out to privacy experts, technologists, and business leaders and look at how these challenges are being confronted i both the public and private sectors.

whether we can forge international norms on how to manage this data and how we can continue to promote the free flow of information in ways that are consistent with both privacy and security. for ultimately, what is at stake in this debate goes far beyond a few months of headlines or passing foreign policy. when the country hears a noise, what is really at stake is how we remain true to who we are in a world that is remaking itself at dizzying speeds. whether it is the ability of individuals to communicate ideas, to access information, or to forge bonds with people on the other side of the globe, technology is remaking what is possible for individuals and for institutions and for the international order.

so while the reforms i've announced will point us in a new direction, i am mindful that more work will be needed in the future. one thing i'm certain of, this debate will make us stronger. i also know that in this time of change, the united states of america will have to lead. it may see some times that america is being held to different standards. i will admit, the readiness of some to assume the worst motives of our government can be frustrating. no one expects china to have it openly made about their surveillance programs. or russia to take privacy concerns of citizens in other

places into account. let's remember, we are held to a difference entered precisely because we have been at the forefront of defending personal privacy and human dignity. as the nation that developed the internet, the world expects us to ensure that the digital revolution works as a tool for individual empowerment, not government control. having faced down the dangers of fascism and communism, the world expects us to stand up for the principle that every person has the right to think and form relationships freely because individual freedom is the wellspring of human progress. those values make us who we are. we should not shy away from high expectations.

for more than two centuries, our constitution has weathered every type of change because we have been willing to defend it and because we have been willing to question the actions that have been taken in its defense. today is no different. i believe we can meet high expectations. together, let's chart a way forward to preserve the liberties that make our nation worth fighting for. thank you. god bless you. and may god bless the united states of america. thank you. [applause]

>> a look now from the in the washington post. of themer direct your national security agency says president obama has embraced the surveillance programs that were in place by the george w. bush administration. mr. hayden was speaking sunday talking about president obama's surveillance groups -- programs.