one of my fondest memories is the graciousness of the korean people overall. in my view, they are the most gracious people i have ever dealt with individually and collectively. skip and jd, when i go back to korea, i see friends i have established over a long period of time. and they come here, we get together each and every time and, in the interim, we communicate by e-mail or other means. when you think about the roc alliance, what has the command bread? with bread relationships with stance friction over time. you always come back to those relationships. that is the fondest memories i have. >> i would like to mention one

more thing. whatimportant to recognize the republic of korea has done to honor our veterans that fought there 60 years ago. i know of no other country in the world that thanks veterans like the republic of korea does. the thousands that the republic for toa that have paid have them come back to the country to see how their successes have developed over the past 60 years. to all koreans, we are all really thankful because you remember the past and you remember what the sacrifices of veterans of the united states and republic of korea and the u.n. nations from around the world did 60 years ago. that is to be greatly congratulated. >> very good. other questions? right over here.

>> good morning, gentlemen. i worked with two of you and his rate seeing you. -- and it's great seeing you. in the event of a crisis on the peninsula, that results in the korea,tervening in north you have the chance of the prc intervening as well. have intervened in north korea, how do you keep the alliance from unraveling in this situation because of differing perspectives on how prc intervention should be handled so that you cannot a compass the objectives both sides want?

-- so that you can accomplish the objectives both sides want? >> the assumption there would be intervention may not be correct. first of all, i don't see the rok and the u.s. alliance unraveling. providing information and discussion with the chinese leadership before any event which lays out the intent of the event mightore the bettere, for lack of a description, and incursion into instability or a crisis. i believe in coordination before the fact, discussion before the and at least enunciating the intent of the alliance under

different scenarios so they do not perceive that we are moving up to seize and hold territory. i don't know if i can say it any better. i agree that we need to be working now with china to look through various different scenarios that could happen in north korea to make sure we've got a clear line of communication between the alliance and china to make sure the intentions of where we are going and what the stakes will be are clearly understood. countries, ihree will include japan, also, the four countries could work together to resolve the situation as quickly as possible. that is absolutely critical to be able to do now. >> i would just add a couple of things to that -- where you run into a problem is

when there is a surprise which breeds mistrust. today why it is important with specific rebalance is an military relationships so there is better understanding of true intentions. when you don't know the intentions of something, that breeds speculation and it causes uncertainty and it causes a lot of anxiety. i would agree 100% -- understanding what your in-state is going to be up front, when you get involved in any military -- use of military force has to be paramount. if it'son't understand going to be reunification of the peninsula or whatever, if you don't understand we were are going, that could cause a problem. i am confident that the alliance

can work through that just like these other two gentlemen are. and we will stay close. ordination --ose coordination and information exchange that can be protected. >> all the way back there. >> good morning. i am from the republic of korea. thank you for sharing your ideas. u.s.-rokthen there is an, inclined level of threat to create a dilemma into the arms race3 . is there any prospect of washington that north korea would strengthen its military

capability, especially making more nuclear bombs or chemical weapons? i think we had a hard time hearing what you are asking. you are asking -- anything the north koreans could do -- north koreaect of would strengthen its military capability? >> strengthen u.s. capability? >> yes. prospects -- let's broaden this to a question on the u.s. nuclear deterrent overall for the republic of korea, the strength of that deterrent and anything that could call that into question. what prospects do you see for proliferation or what

the u.s. might do to strengthen that deterrent if necessary? >> i think there is an agreement between the republic of korea government and the united states and the united states will protect the republic of korea. there is a nuclear umbrella. is there a need to strengthen that? i think the agreement is rock. i think there have been discussions between various and theials presidents of the republic of korea and the united states. i think it is a rocksolid agreement right now. shouldre asking me - there be nuclear weapons laced on the peninsula themselves, i would say absolutely not. >> i agree.

i think the alliance is moving forward in the right direction to strengthen the alliances capability to be able to deter and defeat a nuclear type of threat. if you look at what south anda's increased isr increased capability to strike into north korea, that is the right type of systems in order to be able to help deter the use of nuclear or any other type of weapon. i think it is moving in the right. forward, i think that increased intelligence sharing, especially with japan, is really critical. be aneve there should intel sharing agreement between republic of korea and japan and the alliance because of the capabilities that would bring in order to help detect what is going on in north korea. . done,aud what has been

biting lower tier type of systems. in the future, south korea needs to look at a lower tier system. that theompletely nuclear umbrella is strong and steadfast and we are prepared to be able to respond to a nuclear threat. we do not need nuclear weapons on the peninsula to make that happen. >> i would say the same thing. our policy of extended deterrence is the right policy. be anyoes not need to reentry of nuclear weapons on the peninsula. you are talking about a global and regional issue here that needs to really be looked at. i think the policies are right in regard to that. the rok think that government is making the right

investments in their lower tier missile defense. i remained concerned about the growing population. and how look at seoul close it is to the demilitarized zone, the greatest threat as long range military -- long- range artillery and missiles. the other thing we should be mindful of is a -- nuclear disaster of some sort that could occur at one of their test facilities. that is probably one of the greater threats. we have to be prepared to deal with it because it will not only affect the pen angela, it will affect the chinese, the russians, and the japanese and it will affect a lot of people. that is something that i think is a bummer ability we need to pay attention to for the future. >> the other vulnerability is proliferation.

if they could get hard cash from terrorist organizations, i'm sure he would do that. i will put you on the spot a little bit because you most recently left. there has been talk in south korea but not answer his government circles, about south korean nuclear capabilities. what is your sense of what that would do to the regional dynamic if the south koreans were to pursue their own nuclear capabilities? >> i think it would potentiallytip the scale on the ts and truedeterrenc intention. i think it would excite a lot of folks over there. i was asked several times about that. through the policy of extended

deterrents, there is sufficient capability. we talk about nuclear war and all that. folks need to really examine what that really means. and the threat of that. as you got the right mix of capabilities, that should be sufficient deterrents. our greatest threat would be if the regime is threatened up there to the sense that they will lose it all, that is something we better be very of what the young waiter may or may not do and the protection of that nuclear capability. what that young leader may or may not do in the protection of that nuclear capability. we have to remain absolutely village in but you should not put nuclear weapons back on the peninsula.

there is no reason for it. >> very good, all the way in the back -- general sharp has brought our attention to japan on a couple of occasions. i'm wondering if each of you could comment on what you have tried to do to improve the coordination with japan so we have more trilateral activity and how you have been disappointed by things that have not worked. i looked at it from a military or spectrum as a commander and i think we would all agree that if you have coordination and intelligence sharing between the republic of korea and the united states but also japan that that would greatly enhance the deterrents and the fighting capability.

specifically, we try to work through intel sharing agreements . that did not work. we tried to work with having more combined exercises with the republic of korea and the united states mainly around search and rescue and humanitarian assistance types of things in order to be able to establish the coordinating mechanisms between the militaries. think that needs to continue. we need to try to find ways to be able to work together. i understand the issues that are out there on the side of what presidentabe and others have done in the recent past and not taken responsibility for what that country did many years ago. i understand those concerns. continue are able to -- i hope we are able to work with japan in order to be able to come up with mechanisms that if we had to go to war, because

i am confident we had to go to work, jen -- japan would be on the side of the alliance. i would rather work through the details of how that would work in an arm of is that in an armistice rather than waiting until bullets start flying. >> i agree, you have to work it beforehand. ryu cannot have ad hocke during a time of crisis. the two capabilities would not only strengthen the alliance and strengthen the region and be very positive from the standpoint of moving ahead -- intelligence sharing agreements and an integrated missile where bothtem parties are threatened very seriously of both countries. in my view, to continue to pursue these things i think is very important for both the republic of korea and the united states and japan. agree.uld

it is important particularly in the ec area to do more trilateral military operations. that allows you to get a better common understanding. i spent a lot of time on missile defense over there just like both of these gentlemen i'm sure. the most important thing with missile defense to make sure joint assets, whether it be aging ships or your ground-based missiles or your airborne platforms are in the right place, you have to share -- you have to have conductivity. that is important not only for the peninsula but also important for the region. hasssile as an example that a 3500 kilometer range.

that is a good distance. everybody is in that threat. it would be nice to be able to data links type of and information. i think that's important. i watched this come together several times whether it be a nuclear test or missile launches and we were able to talk to each other. it was not only inside the rok- u.s. but also with japan. that is something for the future we need to strengthen. there are some deep rooted mr. problems -- there are some deep rooted mr. problems but what i was conscious of -- there are some deep rooted historical problems. if there was some type of situation where you had to

rapidly reinforce the peninsula, i'm confident that will be available. that is one of the things in the future that i think we have to keep chipping away at and get past the oldest oracle problems out there. i know they are deep-rooted. historicalst problems out there. i know they are deep-rooted. i understand that you indicated you want some troops stationed in the region north of the han river as a deterrent. think the relocation plan should go on as scheduled and as agreed upon between the two countries? >> i can take that on.

when i looked at the relocation, again, i think it is all conditioned space. i think we have to be careful of setting a date on the calendar that says everybody will reposition at this time. you have to look at the threat. the fact of the matter, one of the most significant threats outside of missiles is the long- range artillery that the north koreans have. and more40 millimeters than one set of guns in close proximity. capabilities from a combined perspective i think is important. there is a timeline to move all that. maybe you have to look at when you move that capability. that youto make sure can protect the peninsula.

one thing that got my attention up runt when i read the terms of reference, the commander of combined forces command is held accountable for the defense and protection of the korean people, ks so you have to look hard at that. and younditions based need to examine that with the rok minister of defense and our department of defense and make the threatgot covered and got the right mix of kids abilities. that is a constant assessment. as a commander, you have to do a running estimate every day. you have to understand the threats about you and that you are living up to the threats. i think that's what this is all about. and having the right readiness

that is expected for the joint and combined forces that are operating on the peninsula. do one last question, please. right over here. >> in the event of a regime collapse in north korea, what role do you see the u.s. military playing and providing humanitarian assistance to ensure that there is not a greater human rights crisis on the peninsula? i will jump on this and pass it on. i think we always have a responsibility for humanitarian assistance, always. in our planning efforts, we always plan for that. if there is a collapse, i would

roks in thethe league because these are korean people taking care of korean people. where we come into play is making sure we have the balance right with the military capabilities. there is planning that goes on all the time with that. if there is a humanitarian crisis and the collapse, getting a common understanding of how bad the situation is is going to be important. what do you need? it might be medical capabilities or food -- it's a wide range. that is something i think we always need to be prepared for because we already know there are problems up there when it comes to nutrition. and medical. there is the threat of other diseases in man sort of business. >> i would agree, i think we

have learned in iraq and afghanistan that humanitarian day onece starts from when the bullets start to make sure the people, the common people, are best protected and taken care of. in a situation like north korea, even more important because of the androgyny nation -- because of the indoctrination of the north korean people. if we don't have plans, which i of going toplans destroy the north korea military or keep them in check at the same time we try to help the people and get the right information as to what our goals are in north korea, the alliance goals, it will be much more difficult to regain stability up there. i believe we have learned that.

we have forces that could help with that. many to be able to get supplies and information to north korea and it's a critical part of the plan and i agree it should be led by the republic of korea. you are both closer to the existing plan but i am very confident that every contingency starting with humanitarian support through crisis has been detail for in ultimate by the republic of korea and the united states in the combined force command. i am very confident that any contingency that might arise has been thought through in a lot of whoml and who does what to has also been thought through. is that part of any plan?

of course it is, how it is executed has been planned for. >> that concludes our morning session and i will turn it back over to v. > v. .ictor3 >> i don't know if you generals are on social media but it was exploding and there are lots of questions. you will be happy to know that tweeting manynd re- of the things you said. [laughter] the first thing is that we will now take a break. lunch is served for those of you out on the concourse level. if you would just be seated, lunch will be brought to you, our guests. we will have dr. seiler joining

us for lunch. i want all of us to thank these four individuals on the stage not just for this morning's event but for their service both sued united states and the alliance. tribute to you guys for all that you have done. thank you very much. [applause] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014]

[no audio] >> i hope you had a chance to get sam to do even thank you for joining us for the second part of our program where we are happy to have with us dr.sid seiler. he is a good friend personally and academically. i want to properly introduce him for all of our guests because he does not get out much. in his line of work. is the director of the korea and white house detail. he is one of the most authoritative experts on korea in the current administration.

for the past 30 years, he has worked in multiple intelligence disciplines including the national security agency, the director of intelligence, director of operations of the cia, and the foreign broadcast information service. he spent 12 of those years in south korea. previously, he served as deputy director of national intelligence, manager for north korea having joined the service when it was established in january, 2006. prior to the dni, he served with the national investment service of the cia and is the author of a very good book. i read that book and doing the research and cited quite a bit for my own book. his am a inceived international studies and is a regiment of the crane language did histy and

undergraduate at university of maryland so it's a pleasure to have you with us today. we will proceed as follows. the doctor will have some comments to start us off and we will have a bit of discussion and we will open it for a couple of questions. in spite of this terrible weather, the rest of us will probably go home after this, he is going back to work. he has a full day. over to you. >> thank you for that kind introduction. i thought i would take the opportunity to go on some of the excellent discussions we had this morning to kind of look at the alliance going forward. within the context of two broad areas -- what we see with the evolving north korea threat, implications were the alliance, in its next 60 years, and we -- and what we have already begun to do to meet that threat and deal with that threat and to lay a course for future cooperation

to build upon the great work that these three former commanders of u.s. forces in korea have talked about. years haveve changeed, i think, a sea in the environment on the korean peninsula. it overlaps with the administration of president obama. ofoverlaps with the period when we last had a meaningful discussion. reflects the transformation of north korea that have been long planned but came about both in terms of capabilities and clarity of intentions. it's important to remember that in january of 2009 when president obama was inaugurated with an offer to raise a hand to

those who would then clench their fists, that the north koreans shortly thereafter responded by making preparations for a missile test. it was a launch that would lead to a residential statement of united nations security council which would then lead to north korea's second test. after the diplomatic dust settled and the special representative went there in 2009, in 2010, north korea turned its attention toward the republic of korea, toward the south. in 2010, as everybody remembers, we had the sinking of the rok corvette and the shelling of the island literally under one hour after i had flown over it with ambassador bosworth on her way to china to talk about the

north's uranium enrichment program. in three lessons -- three lessons emerge from these two years. on the security side, when you think about the events of nuclear test missile launch, the sinking of a navy vessel, the shelling of an island -- the alliance demonstrated its alliance and grew stronger. deterrents were secured. process, south koreans and people in the region were reassured in large part because of the strength of the relationship of the alliance. we responded to these events. the lesson on the diplomacy side just began to emerge. for the first time in many years, the traditional cycle of provoke, rushed back to the table, provoke, gain concessionsd frome-

nuclearization, it was only in appearance -- that cycle was broken. north korea was taught that it would receive nothing from threats and provocations, only further diplomatic and economic isolation. it's effort to drive a wedge ,etween seoul and washington it's effort to influence internal politics in the republic of korea, its efforts to weaken the republic of korea's north korea strategy all failed. north korea began to learn that it's that behavior will no longer be rewarded. at 60 years old, the alliance simply was too smart and too wise for that. the third lesson i would like to take away and focus on and what it says about the threat is the analytical lesson. i kind of risk taking off my

current policymaker hat and going back to my old analyst days. there is three real significant lessons learned from these events that i think will have implications for years to come. first of all, with a may 25 nuclear test, the second north korean nuclear test, it close the book on the question -- does north korea really intend to acquire a nuclear weapons capability or are they simply pursuing nuclear capabilities to gain the attention of united states and the world in order to engage in a dialogue? after the second nuclear test, nobody realistically believe the north korea nuclear program was nothing more than a negotiating ploy. the questions of north korea's intent and that regard were largely answered. the second analytic lesson was seen on the second launch. we have seen this with a number of other launches since then.

it's an indication from north korea that it intended to pursue and improve icbm capability. it was an ability to take what ever device they were eventually ild and deliver it to the united states and do it under the cover of satellite launching and their attempts to try to check the boxes and they claim to be a peaceful, legitimate, sovereign right of in spaceto engage launches despite the united nations security council protests to the contrary. indicated incident that north korea continued to and sometimesn lethal provocation as a course of diplomatic tools. of intimidation and violence. the general sharp and general

thurman had to come to grips counter revocation challenge, it had an impact on the alliance. none of these three conclusions were particularly new or surprising very many analysts had long said north korea was not kidding when it said it would presume a nuclear capability. they intended to have a delivery mechanism and the provocations were nothing new to anybody watching the country for 60 years. clarity with which they have now become the defining elements of the north korean threat, the conventional manyt is still there, scenarios and the possibility of unification all remain there on the table. what we have seen as an evolution of the new capabilities and new intentions that the alliance would have to respond. i will go through these one by

one in reverse order -- in terms of provocations, as a tool of diplomacy, this demonstrated the importance of solid deterrence to determine these types of actions. perhaps even equally so, host rokegrated real-time us- cooperation. it is the challenge of gaining a shared situation or awareness. to or three people need gather in the room to watch a certain event and it has different ways in which they perceive it and how much more so when you have two large countries as integrated as we are looking at developments. a country as opaque as north korea coming to a shared understanding and a shared assessment and a shared conclusion of how to respond. reallyidents of 2010 -- weted for the alliance

pursued the counter provocation plan. in march, 2013 it was brought to a conclusion. here we have the two sides mechanisms in place, capabilities in lace, and ongoing planning that gives us an extra advantage, fourth multiplier, to have the experience on the ground with north korea for now 60 years in armistice but the spirits working together to respond to such type of provocations where the north korean attempt to provoke and our intent is to respond accordingly. the u.s. commitment here, i should add, can never be any clearer. ambassador rice mentioned this recently that there will be significant cost to future provocations by north korea. yongyang has a choice to continue this path and incur

more crippling sanctions or find a troop cap for peace and global integration. the evolving missile threat is an area in which the alliance had to work together more --sely to counter a threat when i first went to korea in 1982, it was three rockets on the ground. we used to say jokingly that we were hoping we were the target of the three rockets because their accuracy was so poor, we would be certain not to be hit. it was flippant but that's what privates talk about when they are young and inexperienced. the more are merging north korea missile threat is real. there is long-range artillery which has been an existing threat to the seoul metropolitan area.

this was the context in which the alliance met this challenge with the revision to the new missile guidelines. agreemente came to an that we have called the revised missile guidelines which allows ballistic develop new missiles. it committed to improve intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities so if you're going to shoot at a target, you have to know where it is and what it is. enhancements to our working together to command and control so that when we face the situation where we had to use these capabilities, we do this deliberately and smartly. we are developing and will continue to develop a comprehensive alliance approach on the north korea missile threat. this is crucial given its evolution. finally on the nuclear side, i overlappingis four yet reinforcing lines of effort

in how we deal with this north korea nuclear capability. the first is dean eyeing pyong yang the benefits of of nuclear coronation. onorth korean provocation any given day always has in the background that concern and that fear and north korea knows that. to the to stand up bullying on the playground -- to the bully on the playground who has the capability in his back pocket is to have transparency and coordination like we do in rok alliance so when we get into any. of heightened tensions, there is no splitting of the alliance and we deal with it smartly and the is stronglyngyang diminished. firm but calm responses -- the

word provoke means to elicit a desired response from your counterpart. the best way to deny north korea the value of provocations is to not respond in the manner they are hoping to get you to respond in. rok is where close u.s. and is so crucial. no rewarding bad behavior. value oferestimate the even these diplomatic areas of having strong value in countering the north korean nuclear deterrent. finally, to inflict political and economic cost in north korea for refusing to de-nuclear rise. arize. if wef my friends ask are being outmaneuvered by north korea?

i would just say that nuclear and missile capabilities aside, look at the diplomatic isolation and the economic isolation and the number of countries who joined in condemnation of the third nuclear test. look at the support the united nations security council gets after each and every nuclear test. disruption -- the when it comes to disrupting the progress of the north nuclear program, the united states uses a range of national multilateral sanctions. these sanctions target north and are designed to curtail profits from weapons export in response to critical technologies abroad. this has the effect of slowing the growth of the program. they will continue to be critical in impeding the qualitative and quantitative growth of these capabilities that north korea seeks. did terry -- that some -- a

we talked-- deterring about the importance of extended deterrents. 44thcm in october, secretary hagel reaffirmed the continued u.s. commitment to provide and strengthen extended deterrents for the republic of korea using the full range of capabilities. focus on full range and the united states. -- the united states. there's not much more to say as far as deterrents. you will get no better guarantee that we are prepared to meet the threat posed by north korea and its evolving nuclear met -- nuclear missile capabilities than what is represented by the wording and deterrent strategy. , the united states

capabilities. the fourth elements of our efforts against the nuclear program are what we do in the de-nuclearization diplomacy round. under the six party talks werella, all the diplomacy do with the people's republic of china, with russia, japan come republic of korea -- in accordance with the principles and spirit of september 19, 2005, work to negate, reduce and to tour the north korean nuclear threat. our work with china in particular has demonstrated thatit and the other four parties, three parties subtracting north korea, all of us are opposed to a nuclear north korea. all of us are committed to de- nuclearization on the peninsula.

consensusilt a strong in the continue to do so going forward. it will not get easier for north korea. it has a policy of pursuing in tandem both economic development and expansion of his nuclear forces. davies calleden this a dead policy. it will not have its cake and eat it too. that is broadly the way we are dealing with in the context of the united states-rok relationship. north korea will continue to test us. north korea will continue to push the limits. cycles that we go

in and out of, provocation cycles, we have seen them before. as i mentioned to a few of you during the break, it is not a trivial throw away talking points that we use when we say we will judge north korea by its actions and not by its word. inn we do so and continue the close cooperation we have demonstrated through these last five years as the north korea program has developed and its behavior has been so unpredictable, a strong u.s. -- rok alliance continues to be the best deterrent to the threat by the north. at that, maybe, some questions? >> thank you very much. we have a few minutes for questions so let me start us off. i don't think there's any that you are the guy

who knows the most about korea. havee past five years, you doing it at the higher policymaking level. and tellanalyst hat on us to the extent that you can, what do you think is going on there now with all the internal churn? what do you think is going on there? everybody calls of power consolidation but is this a path to stability or a path to instability? victor, the social silence it -- sciences and politics and formulations, international relations, if they could be that good at predictive analysis, we would be rich on the stock market and would have a more peaceful world. since kim jong-un came in to

take his position two years ago, i urge people to look at the continuity in north korean behavior particularly the strategic continuity. always employed the element of surprise in its actions and behavior. therefore, you could almost say north korea has always been predictably unpredictable. is no same time, there particular elements of north korean behavior that is entirely out of character with the historical precedent. there might be some differences in style. general, regardless of what is going on in north korea, that hasnothing there a significant impact as far as a critical -- as far as the critical issues and de-

nuclearization. north korea is largely consistent with what i call the strategic arc of their longer- term goals. their longer-term goals were actually clarified in the proclamation of policy last year. we always knew that north korea eventually was hoping that the world would simply just be worn out and tolerate and learn to live with a nuclear north korea and then it could begin to recover its economy and restore some type of relations with the outside. in other words, have their weapons and their economic development. that has been a longer-term goal. going forward, one would imagine that is what kim jong-un is shooting for. recent developments speculating on those -- i don't think it would be particularly helpful -- what is clear is we see no

policy changes so far. to see policy changes but we have not seen any. >> how do you think we are doing with china right now? >> we have had some good cooperation with china. we had senior level interaction with the chinese last year. the vice president visited toward the end of the year. china has made it repeatedly clear that it supports the de- nuclearization of the korean henan sulla. -- tenant sulla. peninsula they know north korea takes destabilizing to the region and is not in their own best interest so we have been able to make progress with the people's republic of china. davies and i go out and

engage with their counterparts. there is a shared understanding of the challenge posed by north korea, shared understanding of the urgency of the issue. i think we have laid a foundation for cooperation going forward. say that the united states expects too much out of china. we look forward to cooperating and working with china that, at the same time, we know we will have to continue as we have over the past several years to take theon in our defense and defense of our allies like the republic of korea and respond to the growing nuclear threat of north korea. we will take a couple of questions from the floor -- yes? just today, china and the rok

announced a defense hotline as soon as possible. or the whiteu.s. house see this latest development? >> they announced a what? >> a hotline. >> we certainly encourage cooperation and communication between all the parties in the region. anything that contributes to the reduction of tension and the ability to have that type of transparency, ready communications necessary to respond to the various contingencies in the region is positive. there's no reason not to be positive about that. yes? thethere any plan for

u.s. government to visit north korea in the near future? is there negotiation under the table between the united states and north korea over the issue of kenneth bae? can you explain what the condition -- what the position is from the north korean government on kenneth bae? >> that's a great question. you should probably ask that to the north koreans. let me simply say that the united states has made significant efforts over the past year since kenneth bae was imprisoned. we have made a number of efforts , sustained efforts, for his release. sought tow, we have

have our special envoy for human rights travel to pyongyang so he can go in and secure his release. the north koreans have not been responsive to those appeals over the course of the year. we continue to ask north korea for their pardon for kenneth bae and will continue to work for it. anything beyond that -- we have to wait and see. with north korea is when they publicly articulate the desire for dialogue and yet, trying to sit down and have a conversation, meaningful conversation, or can at times be quite elusive. that does not deter us from robustly, to seek, the release of kenneth bae and

we hope the indications given by the north korea central television carrying the interview of kenneth bae over the weekend as an indication that north korea is considering moving forward with the progress by which kenneth bae can be pardoned and returned. >> i think we can take one more. you talked about the shared understanding with china about north korea. understandingared with china? [inaudible] that's my question. when i spoke about shared

understanding, i was talking primarily about the policy goals of establishing a de-nuclearized peninsula that is marked by stability and hopefully one day prosperity for the people of north korea when they choose the right path. de-s the correct path of nuclearization into the enter national community -- into the international community. goal, the policy shared outlook for the future of the korean peninsula, the shared emphasis on deed nuclearization is the basis upon which we can have a dialogue going on and begin to work very closely on this difficult issue. should i note how many hours you put on this issue and thank

you for joining us today. i wish you well, thanks again. [applause] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014] >> in a few moments, a look at headlines come alive on "washington journal." the march for life on the national mall at noon. at two: 30 p.m., kathleen sebelius speaks to the u.s. conference of mayors. coming up next, we will focus on the u.s. automobile industry with live coverage from the d.c. auto show. our guests include david shepardson and david strickland, former administrator of the

national highway traffic safety administration. we will also speak with representatives of general motors, ford, toyota. is next.on journal" join the conversation on facebook and twitter. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] >> good morning. it is wednesday, january 20 2, 2014. you're looking at of you of the washington auto show at the convention center, not far from our studio on capitol hill. we will take our viewers live to the floor of the auto show as we discuss a variety of issues impacting the auto industry. that before we do that, we will start with a look back on the federal government's $85 billion effort to save general motors and chrysler, which came to be known as the auto bailout. the government selling its final shares of gm last month, we