are we supposed to know -- now -- as long as the hearings are legitimate and have good explanations on whether the zone is eight feet and consensual or 35 feet and different amounts of sidewalk, when does it become up to them? we are not legislators. we don't know the situation in massachusetts. how can we do more than that? >> on this detail, what i think the court should look for, the state said they did not even convict a single person of one unconventional -- >> we all understand that. it is one thing to try to prove an intent, particular when people are in good faith. it is another thing to actually stop the congestion and protect the interest of the woman who

wants to have the abortion, maybe in a fragile state of mind , and this kind of thing could interfere with her health, etc.. there are two interests. we know that eight feet with the bubble is ok. we are not sure about 35 feet, and they have an evidentiary record. >> a few things. the reason this court gave for allowing that eight foot no approach zone was it about protecting unwilling listeners. it did not stop discussions with willing listeners. >> do you accept that the record shows it did not work well in the sense that justice breyer -- >> not at all. >> all it says is that the police found it difficult to apply a bubble, eight feet or whatever it is. they did not say that massive obstruction in protests are

occurring, preventing people from -- that was not the finding? >> that is why i asked you that question. it happens that the police testify with some evidence that the ep doubled is not work. -- the eight feet doubled does not work. they have some evidence for thinking that if you want to have a conversation, you have to convince a woman to walking the. -- eight feet. the difference is about half -- they have some evidence that we can't enforce this colorado thing very well. >> i agree. if you send me 35 feet further back, you might hear me but i would suggest you would perceive it differently. i would suggest that would be a significant difference.

>> i'm not denying the difference. i am asking you -- i want you to explain what it is in the record, from your point of view or lack thereof, that means that the constitution intervenes to prevent massachusetts from doing it. >> the constitutional narrow tailoring test requires that not restrict more speech than necessary to serve the government's interest. >> how long does it take from when you enter the buffer zone until he reached the clinic entrance? >> i assume 7-10 seconds. >> so the conversation can go aon before the 7-10 seconds. there's not much you can do. >> the evidence in this record

is that the inability to speak people -- two people close to the clinic has a dramatic effect on their ability to reach the audience. if they happen to be walking in the same set of the zone, you may have a shot. you may have a shot if you are the right spot. >> and if you know they're going to the clinic. >> places like worcester and springfield, where the only chance to reach the audiences by standing on the public site this -- sidewalk, if you have to stand 35 feet back, the evidence shows there is centrally zero chance to reach the audience. >> isn't that just the function they have a private parking lot? they drive into the parking lot and you can talk to them anyway? >> i don't that is a fair characterization. there is a public sidewalk on

which you had the right to engage in speech. the right -- the fact that the law pushes you 35 feedback is what makes it impossible. many people don't want the information. but some do. and they have acted on information. this law makes it harder, almost impossible in places like worchester. >> is there a size where you would -- say it is ok? >> as the zone gets smaller, the imposition on the speech rights gets less and less and better and better. it would still be a problem to have zones on the sidewalk where no one is there, but it is a criminal act to have a conversation. >> that goes back to justice ginsburg's question. how is the law supposed to deal with the fluctuating conditions at a particular site? >> this is not something that should be addressed but the statute like this, this is something that should be addressed with the statute for large crowds or dispersal

statute. the amicus brief talks about how concorde new hampshire and los angeles deal with these problems. >> it is the case that not only abortion counselors are excluded, everybody gets -- everybody is? anybody who wants to talk to anybody? this is a dead speech zone? >> in many respects it is. it is no different than the speech free zone and the jews for jesus case. it's a place where the government claimed that can turn off the first amendment. >> it is a conduct free zone. you can't sell hats there.

you can't make. -- they do their. -- beg there. >> they have agreed other things, but also speech. they have eliminated speech on the sidewalk in the jews for jesus case. >> employees are permitted to speak within the scope of their employment. >> they have eliminated speech for all people. >> that is a consistent point. the attorney general read this to mean that they can do their jobs and leave their jobs. it does not include speech activity. >> i don't think that interpretation does very much. >> determines scope of employment. in this statute, it means getting to work and leaving work.

>> the attorney general says it is more than just getting to work. i don't believe that they have the authority to do that. i don't think they could go arrest somebody who happened to speak about abortion when they work for an abortion clinic. even if they could limit it to doing their job, you end up with a problem with that the ninthcircuit ninth circuit found. the government says that is a valid use of our public sidewalks. the state says, mrs. mccullen says may i offer you an alternative? that is content-based. the government doesn't get to decide that you can make decisions based on content. >> am i correct that the attorney general's regulation made this even more content- based?

>> i agree. that is one reason that interpretation is unconstitutional. the government can say to people who work for planned parenthood. , -- who work for planned parenthood we won't arrest you , unless we -- you talk about abortion. that mirrors the state's exemption of people walking through the zone. you can walk through, provided that the individual doesn't do anything else such as express their views on abortion. >> it's that you can't talk about anything. the content isn't based on abortion. it says you can't talk about anything. >> the intervention about employees is speech about abortion. >> if you're going to the zone just to get somewhere, not to get to the clinic, and you are walking with a companion, can't you speak with your companion?

>> the attorney general has taken multiple positions on that. in the lower court, it was that you can talk about abortion or partisan issues. they said you could not wear a cleveland indians shirt. either way, the government doesn't have the ability to say who gets to speak and does not get to speak. >> thank you, counsel. ms. miller? >> mr. chief justice. petitioners can and do protest abortion in massachusetts. they can do it in the public spaces. >> this is not a protest case. they don't want to protest. they want to talk to the women who are about to get abortions and try to talk them out of it. i think it distorts it to say

what they want to do is protest abortion. if it was a protest, keeping them back 35 feet might not be so bad. they can scream and yell and hold up signs from that distance. what they can't do is talk the woman out of the abortion. it is a counseling case, not a protest case. >> i would say the congestion case. certainly they can have those conversations right in front of the abortion facility. they are moved back a few feet >> 35 feet is a ways. from this bench to the end of the court. if you imagine the chief justice as where the door would be, as most of the width of the courtroom. it is pretty much this courtroom. that's a lot of space. >> as a factual matter, i did one of point out that in boston, the doors recessed. -- it is a private entrance.

the 35 feet never from the door. it is only about 20 three feet. >> i thought it was two car lengths. >> exactly right, your honor. >> if we can go back to scalia's question. he was saying is not a protest case, it is about conversation. that is what i want to know. does the evidence show that? the evidence upon which massachusetts based its decision. the evidence show that what was involved was common conversations between one person trying to counsel another -- or does it show something else ? >> it showed something else.

what we had were pro-choice advocate squaring off and screaming at pro-life advocates within the upper zone. you had people jockeying for position. >> you could have a law against screaming and shouting within 35 feet. or protesting within 35 feet. is that more narrowly tailored? with these people want to do is to speak quietly and a friendly manner, not a hostile manner. >> experiences show that even individuals who wanted to engage in quiet, peaceful conversation were creating congestion. >> there are some people who are peaceable, in which case i would except justice scalia's suggestion that this is a counseling case. you said other evidence that suggested there were other

people who were screaming, pushing, and shouting. that's a like a protest case. the reason they found it difficult to write a statute that distinguishes one from the other is what? why do people write statutes that sometimes do not make these fine distinctions? >> didn't make a fine distinction because it didn't matter whether they were being peaceful -- >> could you have written a statute that would work? >> it would have been difficult. >> white 35 feet? >> experience showed some amount of space needed to be open. then it was a question of looking at past experience. prior injunctions. in planned parenthood v bill, which is cited on page two, there was a 50 foot buffer zone imposed. we knew that a 15 foot buffer

zone would be acceptable if responding to a similar problem. the legislature was aware that some amount of space needed to be created. it shows 35 feet as a reasonable response. a reasonable amount of space around the facility. >> is there anything in the record -- the activity is combing old -- co-mingled? there is too fine a distinction. i knew you were going to nod your head? is there anything in the record that suggests it is too tough to say whether they are counseling

comedy -- somebody or screaming at somebody? is there any evidence in the record that would suggest that? you should say yes. [laughter] >> and i well -- will. the best description is commissioner evans's state of goaliesioning like a crease. estimate to be true that an elderly lady was quite successful and had meaningful communication with over 100 women going into the clinic, she was unable to talk to even one after the law. assume that is true. does that have a bearing on the analysis? and on justice breyer's question ?

about whether the law can be written to protect that kind of activity but prevent obstruction and blocking? >> nobody is guaranteed any specific form of communication. there is no guarantee, as a doctrinal matter, to close quite conversation. the question is, are there adequate alternatives? in this instance there are adequate alternatives. >> you say there's no guarantee of talking quietly? you will meet a right -- you want me to write an opinion that there is no right to converse on an issue quietly? >> i would give you an example. that right is tempered by the state's interest in making sure that the public sidewalks

function as they should. >> i still don't know -- this goes to justice breyer's question. you can't write an ordinance that says obstruction, intimidation, blocking is prohibited, and still of the kind of conversation i described earlier and i want you to assume to be true for the purposes of this question. >> we couldn't hear. that was not the problem. the problem was making the fine distinction. >> in these cases, when you address one problem, you have a duty to protect the speech that is lawful. >> you do as long as your section is narrowly tailored to your interests. >> it is impossible to write the type of statute we are discussing now according to you .

>> it would be enormously difficult to write a statute that addresses the problem and interests here where you are making that kind of distinction. >> let me ask you about questions -- about a different distinction? a woman is approaching the zone. an employee of the facility approaches her and another is not. the first says, good morning this is a safe , facility. the other says, it is not. under this statute, the first has not and the second has. the only difference between the two is that they have expressed a different viewpoint. once is a safe, the other -- one says it is safe, and the other does not. how could this be considered

viewpoint neutral? it distinguishes between what those people are doing. says, if she is performing her job escorting the , person inside, and not cluttering up the buffer zone, which was the reason the statute was enacted, that person could say that. you judge it on what she is doing, not what she is saying. >> what she is doing is what she is saying. one says it is safe, the other does not. they are the only people in the zone. they are the only three people on the zone. the differences of viewpoint difference. >> what the legislature has done is created a circle around these entrances. it has only permitted particular conduct in

the buffer zone. to allow people to get in and out and traffic to move. unless you have a purpose to be in the zone, you cannot be there. that's what the statute is addressing. >> is it a permissible purpose to save the this is a safe facility? but not permissible to say it is unsafe? >> the statute is not focused on the person's speech. it is focused on what they are doing in the zone. >> the consequence is what is described by scalia. are you saying the consequences are relevant? -- are irrelevant? >> i would not say that. >> it seems to me you should answer his question. >> with regard to viewpoint discrimination, it allows people to in and out. and people to go back and forth on the sidewalk. it allows snow shovelers.

>> you could have created a completely silent zone. i don't know whether that would be permissible, but that would be a different question. you could say, nobody can speak here. they can go in and do maintenance, but they cannot utter a word. that would be a different statute. the statute says there is an exception for employees of the facility, if they are operating within the scope of their employment, and coming up and saying it is a safe facility is within the scope of their employment -- how do you justify that? one can speak and say that during the other cannot. >> i would argue that speech in that circumstance. the employee doing her job and not unnecessarily cluttering the zone. that speech is simply incidental to the permissible conduct. it doesn't make the statute on its face, it doesn't make it

viewpoint discriminatory. >> what if there is a real question about whether it is safe? that is incidental? >> is incidental to her performing her job he read if it were circumstance where that kind of speech were habitual or widespread, or touch on advocacy, petitioners would have a chance to challenge the statute as applied. they have not begun to make a case there is viewpoint is cremation happening in the buffer zone. >> it is hard to credit the statement where the implication is if an employee says, this is a safe zone, that is incidental to their function.

>> it is incidental to the permissible purpose for which they are allowed in the buffer zone. i should point out -- they actually changed -- trained their escorts not to engage in that kind of speech. they only operate in boston for a couple of hours. they don't work at all in worchester or springfield. >> that raises another question. i assume that is true because the crowd and obstruction are with -- at one facility, is not all 10 of them or for certain periods of time. not all day every day. why not narrow it that way?

>> experience has shown you do have problems in worchester and springfield. they do center around the driveways. 85-90% of patients approach by car. the only sidewalk is a slice between the road and private driveway. that is the only opportunity that individuals would have to protest. what has happened in the past is you would have pacing across these driveways. you'd have individuals stopping and standing and refusing to rue -- move. you would have literature thrown into cars. you would have hands and hands -- heads thrust into open windows. there was at least one accident. there was conduct that was a problem. it was not a couple of loan protesters. there are events, regular protesters there every week.

the crowds get larger at the semi annual -- >> i object to you calling these people protesters. that is not how they present themselves. they say what they want to talk quietly to the women who are going into the facilities how does that make them protesters? >> the problem that the statute is looking to address is not with protesters per se. it was with people who had a desire to be as close to the doors and facilities is possible to communicate their message. the result of that was congestion around these doors and driveways. it wasn't a concern about the protest. it was a concern about people being able to use -- >> i would think that if you tried to do a statute that distinguish between protesters and counselors, that would be

content waste more than the statute through cracks -- and that would be content-based more than this statue is. >> i would agree. >> i am hung up on when you need so much space. >> we have had a long history of crowds around these doors. even violence. we have had law enforcement and others who have viewed the crowd on a regular basis and have described the activity as being so frenetic. so many people there. the bad actors and good actors. so many people congesting the same space. it effectively blocks the door. >> can i ask you this question? suppose the state legislature had hearings and they said there

is a history of violence and obstruction at sites where there was a site -- strike and replacement workers have been called in? could the state has a statute that says there is a zone around every location in the state whenever there is a strike? could they do that? >> labor actions are protected by federal law. >> could federal law do that? >> this court has repeatedly upheld restrictions on labor activity. the answer is yes. the first amendment would permit regulation. >> in every case? it would just be a flat rule? it would not matter whether was any history or an indication of violence? a zone around every place there is a strike? >> it would be an easier case to defend if there was history as we have here.

as there is here. >> you don't think there is a history of violence in places with strikes and replacement workers? >> i don't think they're the kind of sustained violence. this is an almost unique record. >> my understanding -- >> is there any abortion clinic that has not had a problem? >> there was a survey submitted when they were considering the statute. that reviewed the experience of the 10 facilities in existence in massachusetts. six of them said they had certificate problems. eight said they had at least regular protesters. there were two who did not report there was a significant problem. >> this is testimony by the clinics themselves.

>> correct. thank you your honors. >> thank you counsel. >> mr. gershengorn? >> this is a regulation that does not ban speech but effectively moves it from one part of the public form to another. in this case, away from the small areas. >> which precedent governs this case? >> madsen upheld the 36 foot barrier. aside from that, a number of the pillars of the arguments are directly contradicted by the president -- precedent.

the idea that you have the right to choose the this mechanism is contradicted by heferon and frisby. this court said, you have ample communication channels. in frisby, with the protesters said was you want to target a house. the court said you have alternative channels of communication. that pillars of the argument -- >> what is the argument here? standing 35 feet away and yelling? that quietrnative is conversation and leafleting is permitted. it is the last 4-5 seconds when

they enter the clinic. >> how do you know who is entering the clinic? >> the testimony is to the contrary. they get quite good at and to -- identifying who is going in and who is not. some of what we are talking about is the last 4-5 seconds going in. >> is your concern that there will be physical obstruction to the entrance? >> let me just that. the answer is yes, but that is not all. >> how many federal prosecutions were brought in massachusetts for obstruction? >> i'm not aware of the number. there were 45 prosecutions nationwide.

they are for murder, arson, and chaining yourself to the doorway. not for the quiet counseling and picketing like this. >> the federal interest that you are defending is you don't want this statute to be misinterpreted. what is wrong with the physical obstruction statute as an answer to many of the problems massachusetts is facing? what i don't get is an answer. as justice scalia has pointed out, these are not the types of defendants who are at issue in the face act. that is talking about murder, arson, and chaining to doorways. the statute is getting at something different. congestion in front of doorways. those are specific intent crimes. both in the federal statute in massachusetts. >> even a dog knows the

difference between being stumbled over and kicked. you are saying that federal prosecutors can't tell the difference? this is beyond the realm of the law? >> what the testimony before the legislature was was that there was a congregation and massing of people. there were pro-choice road testers in the zone who are certainly not intending to obstruct. it was leading to congestion in front of the doorways. there were people handing literature to moving cars. accidents and near accidents. the kinds of statutes that are at issue do not get the kind of peaceful, quiet yet congesting and disrupting conduct that is at issue here.

justice breyer, i would urge you to look at the evidence testimony. there are specific arguments. the arguments that petitioners make is broad. the lower courts have uphold buffer zones around political conventions, circuses, funerals. the idea that you can defeat those buffer zones by saying, i would like to have a quiet conversation with the delegates as they go into the convention would wipe out a number of court of appeals decisions. >> how far do you think and what you think the state legislature or congress needs to find in order to establish his own around some category of facility which they have some evidence that there have been some disruptions and instructions in in front of?

there is a real ordinance somewhere that there is a buffer zone around fraternal lodges. >> i'm not aware of the history. >> what would they have to find? for slaughterhouses or sites where there are strikes? >> what they found around circuses and conventions is there is massing of people that prevents the orderly to and from with the facilities. this was not an isolated this is -- an isolated incident. they had tried other things. they had tried a narrower buffer zone. the testimony was, it was not working. the police were coming in and said, we cannot enforce it. why? because they had a hard time measuring consent.

>> what kind of record that they need? could there be a state law saying there could be no picketing? isn't that thornhill versus all bama? -- alabama? >> that was you can go anywhere near the facility and it was only one type of speech. this is content neutral. it is a narrow buffer zone. >> i understand the desire to create a buffer zone around certain sensitive facilities. what i'm asking is what requirements if any does congress or the state legislature have to meet before they can do that? if it is done, do we say they have a rational basis for it? so they can establish a buffer zone around any kind of facility?

if not, what needs to be established? >> it is hard to have fast and hard rules. you would need a history of serious congestion and other problems. some sort of showing that the alternatives were not working. that is what is here. this problem has been going on since 1994. this is not something the legislature woke up one day and said, in light of one incident, we will do this. they tried other things. the evidence supported this. >> what about the example to strike? there are labor violence examples and replacement workers. >> that would be hard to defend. if there were before the legislature, as there is in this case, the kind of congestion --

and the solution is narrower than the petitioners are suggesting. it is to clear out an area around the entrance. 22 feet in the entrance in boston from the edge of the doorway to the buffer zone. it is an nba three-point zone. >> go back to justice alito's first question. the regulation of labor is up to nlrb. a regulate picketing and what you can and cannot do. the courts have reviewed that. what standards do they use when they decide the pickets can go here but not there? you can do this but not that?

all this has speech implications. what standard does the court use? >> i am not aware of the standards they use. >> are you aware of any case where it has different from the ordinary standards? should we create a new standard? >> i don't think so, your honor. >> three minutes remaining. >> thank you mr. chief justice. several points. it is not impossible to draw statute to deal with problems. father -- 49 other states deal with the alleged problems. this will be the first prosecution in at least two decades. >> is this the only statute of its kind? >> is the lay state of this kind. there are few minutes poll kind -- municipal statutes of this kind. the police officers testified that they know the regular players.

they know the mall. if you know them all and they are congregating, you should get an injunction and get them out of the way. all the evidence that the u.s. cited, all of it, boston, saturday mornings. the claim that they can extrapolate from that to ban peaceful speech at boston at other times when the sidewalk is empty and at other clinics when the sidewalk is empty and save there is abortion, therefore we will make it illegal to speak there. the evidence is boston specific to read the first amendment requires precision. if that means police officers or dispersal laws. they ought to do that. but they should not imprison her for her speech.

>> is it limited to the situations? >> is not. i direct the court to do section c. i'm sorry, the definition section of the statute. definition for. physical obstruction. making entry unreasonably difficult. counsel said that they brought 45 cases across the country. zero in massachusetts. to the extent that the court feels the need to recognize that there are some situations that are so short marry that we -- so extraordinary that we should put people in prison for peaceful conversations on public streets, that ought to be an exceptional case where the statute has strict scrutiny. that is not the case here.

they did not say would be impossible, they said it would be hard. 49 other states do other things. the federal government protects peaceful speech. if somebody is in the doorway and they need to get out of the doorway, the answer is, sir, please get out of this wil -- out of the doorway. the answer is not dragging mrs. mccullen to prison. that is an extraordinary power to the government to enforce. thank you. >> think you counsel. cases submitted. >> political reports that the u.s.'s attorney office in new jersey has subpoena chris christie.

this is regarding documents related to the george washington bridge closure. they intend to cooperate. there will be a separate state legislature investigation. chris christie was sworn in for his second term this week. we will show you the inauguration ceremony this weekend. on facebook, we have been asking, has the media coverage of chris christie been fair? you can share your thoughts on facebook.com/cspan. sensationalism sells. patricia says, blame ourselves. we love sensationalism. facebook.com/cspan. addictions came down in nationwide protest.

--this uprising to phase defies any definition. we landed and drove toward the square. the military came down to the street. i stopped at a checkpoint and they searched the car. they told us, we are watching you. the country is exploding. they said, come with us. we just want to talk with you for a while. i went to a place, i do not know the location. you do not know who is interrogating you. at a certaint point, it was a dvd that i had in the car. i had to get rid of it. i tried to destroy the dvd by breaking it apart. i don't know if you have ever tried to break apart a dvd, but it is a part. i shoved it down the drain. i went back into the interrogation room.

evidence that could possibly keep me there for a lot longer than i wanted to be. later, theminutes guy comes into the bathroom with a piece of the dvd in his hands. with the director of an academy award nominated ocumentary, "a square." >> c-span launched a c-span schoolbus in 1993. of howes awareness c-span covers politics and government. later, we are on the road. we are on the campaign trail, visiting festivals, history events, and will. look for us on the road and online. c-span.org. you can also all us on twitter.

university students will get their chance to visit the c-span bus and join us live on washington journal as we hit the road for the big 12 conference to her. the brookings institute released its recommendations for 2014. on iraq, a discussion afghanistan, russia, and the u.s.. this is one hour and a half. >> good morning. welcome to brookings. i am the acting director and vice president of our policy programs here. welcome to today's event.

we have for policy recommendations for the president in 2014. in five days, president obama will stand with congress and the american people and deliver his date of the union address. -- state of the union address. he will mainly focus on domestic and political issues. this reflects the rising concern for nationbuilding at home. there is a declining interest among the american public and getting involved in other nation's business. president obama came to office in 2009 on a wave of optimism about his transformational presidency. five years later, it is fair to say that the mood had our. hope said didn't. -- the mood has soured. hope has deemed. -- dimmed. profound political and social changes have aspired against him. there is growing polarization,

gridlock, dysfunction in our government. despite these challenges at home, the president has afford an ambitious list of i when it comes to foreign policy and national security. refocusing the fight against terrorism, reducing nuclear weapons, negotiating with ironic -- iran. restarting direct negotiations between israelis and palestinians. he also faces enormous challenges goes by the uprising around the world. he faces the continued rise of china and the unpredictability of north korea. the foreign-policy program at brookings is releasing its own assessment of these actions and the steps president obama's administration should take to make the most of his remaining three years in office.

we are excited to present our flagship publication. as we did last year, we have identified the big staffs the president should make to advance u.s. security interests in the world. we have set for five areas where the white house should double down on its previous bad and move the agenda forward. -- on iran, cuba, syria, and asia. we have pointed out a number of black slots. low probability, but high impact event, that could derail the president's lands. we have added a new category of nightmare scenarios. we have also pointed out several areas where the president should hold his cards and they the course. before introduce the panel, let overarchinge or two points that bob kagan made in the introductory memo.

in our view, over the last year, the global situation has deteriorated. america's role looks more uncertain and tentative. americans are disillusioned about our traditional leadership role, and cuts in defense and foreign aid ending are raising questions about our international system. the revelations about u.s. intelligence collection in our own country and around the world reinforces a sense of doubt about the underbelly of u.s. predominance in the world. to restore u.s. leadership, president obama should reinvest in the global order in which norms are not only articulated and endured, but protected and enforced wherever possible of stop this means doubling down on higher standards in the trade arena, rolling back nuclear weapons development.

and protecting civilians from the ravages of civil conflict and authoritarian violence. it also means making new bets on rules for governing the internet that would protect our profound interest in an open information system. we should also make the most of regional and international peacekeeping efforts in africa and protect our investments in a more stable afghanistan. while pursuing these opportunities, the administration must mitigate potential damage posed by the turmoil of the arab world, fraying alliances, and provocations from russia and china. dedicated that with presidential leadership, properly resourced by congress, these threats could be managed and the united states can remain the leader of the liberal global order.

let me now introduce our panelists. david sanger. currently the national security correspondent for the new york times. he has reported from new york, tokyo, washington on a wide variety of issues. globalization, nuclear proliferation. he has also been part of two reporting teams that won pulitzer prize is. he is known for his work in tokyo. he has also worked in southeast asia. start working in the economics arena and the business pages of the new york times. podium moderate from the and will pose questions to our panelists. let me quickly introduce them.

in no particular order, maybe the order in which they're sitting. bruce is a senior fellow here at our center for 21st-century security and intelligence. atalso have a senior fellow the center for 21st-century security and intelligence focusing in particular on afghanistan and illicit networks around the world. steve is a senior fellow with our center for the u.s. and europe. he directs our nonproliferation projects. is the director of a center on middle eastern policy and also a senior fellow who will cover all the various things going on in that part of the world. suzanne senior fellow at the same center and she runs on iran project. she will speak on iran.

we also have a guess just off a plane from korea. he will be our expert on asia, china, the koreas, etc. we have the director of the china center near. thank you for your attention. >> thank you. >> thanks very much. it is great to be here. it is wonderful to see such a big crowd. his is one of my favorite events your brookings. really -- itbook is one that i keep on my desk all through the year. i refer to it. friends,lk to my many i see what they wrote. sometimes it is welcome and sometimes it is not. i have two observations from

reading through his year's entries. it is about half as big as last year. the official explanation is that laster year was the beginning of the second term. the unofficial explanation is that this group has also many of the world thought problems -- so manymany -- solved of the world cost problems. if you read through the somatic way, what really jumps out -- somatically -- the magically -- what really jumps out is america's contribution to the world. through many of the other issues, their recommendations for what the president should do and then the frustration that the united states right now,

despite its status as the world's largest military and economic power, and its biggest diplomatic power, needs to have a heart -- has a hard time convincing other nations of what is in the world's interest, america's interest, and their own interests. advanced questions to each of our offers, and scholars, -- authors and scholars, i want to focus on the question of where american leverage is. if it is gone, where did it go? i thought i would start with you. you have written a fascinating short paper here on egypt. write that the u.s. cannot prevent the radicalization of the muslim brotherhood. can seek to mitigate the effects of this radicalization. thought ago, we all

that the muslim brotherhood appear to be in command of the country. was, could be moderate them as leaders? from a warerate them against the military that unseated them? it was interesting to note that you wrote that before and eight -- or and eight cuts cuts put into effect had no effect. .ell us why that was tell us why you think we could create some leverage with the egyptian in the coming weeks and months. ofon the narrow question u.s. foreign assistance to egypt

, i think one reason why that decision, which was made in october, and did not have much impact, is because it took so long. reports, chuckws hagel, the secretary of defense, had won the egyptian military prior to their takeover that are eight would be at risk if they took that that. they were not dissuaded. in response to the coup, the u.s. did not immediately cut off assistance. there is a provision that suggested that that was what they should do. having failed to exercise -- having failed to establish the credibility of the threat that had made, the administration, when it finally made the decision to suspend certain forms of assistance, was just trying to draw a line under the problem. i do not think anyone here or in

cairo it acted it would have that effect. the broader problem that you identified of reduced american leverage is not about the choices that have been made here in washington. it is about what has gone on in the region. it is about what has gone on in egypt. and then to fail to compromise when presented with a mass uprising against that governance, those choices are driven by the political competition taking place in egypt. and at this point, the brotherhood and the military feel they are engaged in a struggle. the military believes they had no choice but to carry out the cue -- coup and protect the stability of egypt and that's

what they see at stake and the brotherhood is facing the wrath of the military in a full-on crackdown and believe they are fighting for their organization's survival. in that context, there is very little outside actors, even the united states, could do to affect things. given that, what can the u.s. do to protect its own interests, because radicalization of even a small percentage of brotherhood supporters or members would present a significant upswing in the violence in the region. what the united states can seek to do in this region to mitigate is to set limits on its own involvement and culpability in what is a very far-reaching campaign of repression and suppression in egypt, which is extended not only to the

brotherhood, not only to the violent extremists that are a real problem to the united states and egypt and the region, but has extended as well to all kinds of peaceful political dissenters. so the united states at this point i think, needs to correct its fundamental error in the three years since the egyptian revolution where it has overinvested in each leadership, the military council after the revolution, president morsi and the general, let them not repeat that mistake and instead can collar file u.s. interests in counterterrorism extend to threats against the united states and u.s. interests and we are not going to engage in a wholesale investment in an egyptian war on terror that is defined to include all of its political opponents.

>> thanks. tamara e, we heard from that our chances for influencing the egyptians are a, relatively low, and secondly that we shouldn't overinvest in the leadership. fortunately, we have huge influence and haven't overinvested in the saudis which you have written about here. what jumped out at me in youres a was that the saudis have spent $25 billion in the past year and will spend 30 this year in jordan, bahrain, in yemen, in pakistan. amounts that really dwar if ything we are -- dwarf anything we are spending in that region. for example, they were in full support of the coup in egypt that we were just discussing. o tell us a little bit about

where president obama is in influencing the saudis and tell us a little bit as well about what your concern is if the saudis become convinced that the negotiations with iran won't work. >> sure. saudis are deeply disappointed in president obama, as ted noted in the beginning, they were very optimistic, like everyone else about obama in the beginning. rihad is the first arab country president obama went to but the saudis have.com disillusiononned and they refuse to take their seat at the u.n. security council and argued that was a spite to the united states. i'm not sure most americans feel that way, but that was the saudi argument. they promised to give the

government of lebanon $3 billion worth of arms and to buy them from the french and that is also to be a spite to the united states that we won't get the arms from the united states and the media is filled with saudi anger and disappointment for the united states. but at the end of the day, the united states-saudi relationship is not broken. this is our oldest alliance in the middle east that dates back to 1945 and continues to function in many ways despite the public irritation and the reason it does and the reason we don't have that much leverage is we need each other. saudi arabia is not only important to global energy supplies and may not provide americans with their oil anymore but it is critical to the functioning of the global economy and without saudi oil being distributed, there would be severe energy disruptions. secondly, their soft power in the islamic world remains very

important. they are the home of the two holiest mosques in islam. they are very important to us in in attempts to fight al qaeda. the last two attempts were thwarted by saudi intelligence. they need us, too. saudi arabia's defense against external aggression is from the united states of america. no one else can provide them with that kind of shield and that applies to the iranians. we have a relationship where we both need each other and therefore can't push too hard the other way. what the arab awakening did was expose their fundamental values at the bottom of this relationship -- are not shared at all, that we don't have anything really in common with the house of saud with an absolute monarchy with their views that are other end of the spectrum. we support democracy. they make no pretense of

supporting democracy and we saw that vividly this year in egypt. the saudis were critical to the coup, to helping the coup take place. they were the first within minutes to recognize the new government and they orchestrated a multibillion dollar aid package to the government. the statements say, don't worry what the americans do, we'll outbid them. the americans give you a billion dollars, we'll make sure you get $6 billion. it's hard to have a lot of leverage on on a country that has this much money. when it comes to iran, my own view at the end of the day, if the united states in the p-5 plus one succeeds in getting a deal with the iranians which the six negotiating parties accept, the saudis will accept it as

well. they do not want to be the odd man out rejecting the deal that would be in effect the permanent five members of the security council and the iranians and don't want to be in the position where they are the odd man out standing next to netanyahu. nothing they hate more than being associated with israel and especially netanyahu on some global issue and very comfortable that they are being put in that camp. they don't want to be partners with netanyahu. at the end of the day, they will accept the deal and criticize it along the way, but at the end of the way they will come along to be part of the process. >> if there is no deal --? >> it's up to the americans to fix it. the saudi position will be you tried, it didn't work, now use force. and we will be happy to hold your coat. [laughter] >> would they be happy to go buy a bomb from the pakistanis?

>> one of the great unknowns is whether they have already got a deal with the pakistanis for a bomb. that's one of the mysteries of the contemporary middle east and south a asia. why does pakistan have the fastest growing arsenal in the world and producing more bombs by double or triple? is there some external partner who they have a commitment to. on this issue, there is a lot of smoke, very little fire, but if you ask my bottom line, i think there have been discussions between the saudis and the pakistanis and the saudis have the commitment to provide a bomb and you can take it to the bank and cash it for probably nothing. [laughter] >> ok. to steve. now steve, we don't have a lot of

leverage in egypt. we don't have a lot with the saudis. surely with president putin, we are awash in it. so you have written a couple of differentes as in here, but -- differentes as, but the two areas where we are concerned is the ukraine and whether or not putin will play or will foil the president's large objective at the beginning when he came into office in 2009 of truly bringing down the number of nuclear weapons around the world and you don't seem terribly optimistic about the chances of going beyond the new start deals. talk to us about those two elements. >> in the paper that possibly russia might go rogue in its neighborhood, this is the question about putin's concern

that the european union is intruding on his turf. with the association agreements that were with muscle dovea and georgia last november, the russians were pleased that the ukranians froze their process. as we look at this, the concern is that sometime in the spring, the russians might take punitive actions against them and if european union gets back on the track, ukraine could find itself in putin's target site. there is not a lot of lerge the united states has to exercise over the russians and it reflects a couple of things. one is the deterioration of the u.s.-russian relationship. it is a thinner relationship. we don't have much leverage to say, if you do a, we will undercut you on b. there is a huge balance in interests. for russia and putin, building

influence is the number one priority. it's important to his vision of russia as a great power and important to his domestic, being pucked in the neighborhood, having that influence is important with the constituencyy that he looks to for support at home and looks at the european union and says and says they are challenging my projects and i'm going to push back. in the case of the ukraine and we have -- we may have leverage there but it will be maximized if we can work with the europeans and won't be leverage used with the russians. and it seems to be moving in this direction a little bit. yesterday they announced that some ukranian visas had been revoked because they had connections to use of force. there is more to be played here in terms of threatening sanctions, both visa sanctions and financial sanctions against a group of people against that

inner circle, because if they begin to worry they can't travel to the west and here's where it is important to bring in the european union. the kids go to school and vacations in europe, they want to travel to europe. somehow if washington and europe can put that pressure, you may have an impact on events on the ground in ukraine that could discourage use of violence and b, i think this will be hard to do but prod him into a ood-faith effort to negotiate. i don't think the europeans and united states has with russia. i think barack obama would like to further reduce u.s. and russian nuclear weapons. you have to have a partner that is prepared to play. putin is not prepared to engage in furtherer nuclear reductions.

if you want to do that, you have to solve nuclear defense. you have to solve prompt global strike, the russians have tightened up the knots but they aren't solving the issues. in the case of nuclear weapons, there may be an opportunity to move forward on this if the russians change their mind. until they do it, there's not much that president obama can do. he should not get into a negotiation with himself, although there may be a couple of small steps he could take. e is to accelerate the implementation of the start treaty. the treaty requires that be accomplished by 2018. that could be accomplished this year and could be something that the president could say, i have played a role in reducing nuclear weapons but you wouldn't do that without affecting the view in moscow and position the

united states to have some demonstrating deliverables at the conference, the nonproliferation treaty conference in 2015. >> steve, any possibility that the president could go down significantly below the new start numbers? he has plenty of studies on his desk that suggest 1,000 weapons or even fewer would be perfectly sufficient, that you could rotate some of these in and out and be on call at the same time, which is of good news that the people in the air force are having a hard time passing their exams. i'm running them, silos might help that process. what is the downside to acting unilaterally? >> the joints chief of staffs validated the president's proposal by a third and bring it down to 1,000 strategic

warheads. some in the administration say if that is the number that suffices for deterrence and suffices for america's war plans, why should we let russia keep us at a hire level. that is a minority view. i think there is probably going to be a stand in the administration that says let's see if the russians are prepared to engage. at 2015, if it is clear that the russians are stuck, there might be that discussion within the administration about do we do something union latleal with our force -- union late recall with our force structure. given where i think republicans are in congress, potentially provokes a fairly big fight with congress. >> on afghanistan, the big news in the past couple of days has

been the pentagon saying well, if we are going to keep a force in afghanistan after 2014, the biggest it should be is 10,000 and includes other nato allies, but we are prepared to live with zero if we can't get president karzai to operate with us. two questions for you. first of all, does it make any difference -- can 10,000 have any significant effect in afghanistan from either a security or a development view point? and secondly, if you go back to last year's report or other reports like this, you'll find discussion about negotiations with the taliban. the only one who seems interested in that right now is karzai himself. have we lost interest in that issue? tothe troop number is linked

leverage. importantly, the troop number is anchored with a critical triangle of the security, the elections that are coming up this year in afghanistan as well as negotiations with the taliban. i would say the tragedy of u.s. policy in afghanistan is that this is one mr. place that we have had -- is one place that we have had significant amount of leverage and chosen not to exercise and greater diss integration in afghanistan as well as u.s. relationship in afghanistan. nd indeed, the collapse of our security agreement, which is the deal that would allow u.s. forces to stay in afghanistan after 2014. our assumption heading into the negotiations was that it would

be obvious to the extent that they are kind enough to devote any troops to stay, they would jump on that and not miss the deal. and we have found ourselves perplexed that president karzai has refused to sign the deal and making up a variety of conditions, some of which cannot be satisfied and is himself turning by loss of the security agreement is what he believes is leverage on his part. to go back to your question, 10,000 troops make the difference, i would say yes. see where we are in the security situation in afghanistan. the afghan security forces have made great strides. they are far morrow bus, far more competent than they were a year ago. they had -- they are now providing security in afghanistan on their own for about half a year. the taliban over the past

several months launched a intense campaign that is sustained at the current level. afghan security forces have not budged and assured themselves of the tech any cool route that better than any of us thought. they are still entrenched and the afghan security forces are no where near to defeating it. and the advanced security forces are critically suffering from a host of key decisions. these decisions are not surprising our effort to stand up the afghan security forces. knew that they would be here in 2014 and since 2009-2010 we have been telling the afghan, don't worry, we will be embedded in the 10,000 force number and we are telling them, maybe not.

you are on your own. your logistics are deeply troubled. too bad. you have to cope. your intelligence capacity and do bad. we have been promising we would help and not we are not. we are both overestimating the troubles and difficulties that afghanistan is facing and jeopardy icing the potential -- jeopardizing to strengthen the real accomplishments that have taken place by prematurely pulling the plug on afghanistan. but let me come back to the number. i agree with the pentagon assessment. either we have a meaningful commitment that can help the advanced security forces tackle the taliban insurgency and other insurgency groups or we go out. if the number is somewhere in between simply for the show or

because the only hope to use the forces left to strike these targets but define these tarts such as al qaeda targets in pakistan, we are turning our troops into sitting ducks and provoking the relationship between afghanistan and pakistan and further justifying the taliban insurgency. so either we recognize we can still contribute and make the contribution meaningful that protects our interests in the country, in pakistan and in regional cooperation or we decide these interests are no longer worth and we go out. we come back to the elections. at the moment of profound uncertainty. a lot has been accomplished, but the future is deeply troubling

and uncertain. and afghans are watching what the united states will do. they want the afghans are hoping that the united states will have extension of military force but they are watching the elections. the elections are an opportunity to renew the deficiencies that have plagued the country for several years. there is opportunity to -- but the elections can go disastrously wrong. either through violence or extended political crisis and even if they do not go wrong, the process is likely going to be dragged out well into the fall of 2014, into october, november, 2014, even without a major crisis associated with the

elections. if we do not have a bilateral security agreement and waiting for the next government to sign a security agreement, we might find ourselves in december 2014 with zero bilateral agreement and the options defacto as opposed as a result of a structured decision on our part. my last point, however, is that the u.s. policy should get away from constantly badgering president karzai. unfortunately, it only makes him believe that his his move is a smart play that gives him leverage. we should reduce the pressure and lay our cards out. if this is a b.s.a., this is what our commitment would look like and not be selfish interests such as al qaeda targets in pakistan but it would

meaningfully contribute to afghanistan and up to them to sign it. as long as we continue in negotiations with president karzai, he continues to believe he has leverage and can milk more out of that leverage. and he unfortunately completely discounts the options because he is persistent because his strategic perspective is fundamentally different than the u.s. washington -- the united states government is increasing continually asking, do we have an interest or stake in afghanistan? is this through balancing to the east, to china. is this a key threat to foreign policy. karzai believes that afghanistan is the center of u.s. foreign

policy, that the occupation being the great game in central asia. and he has persuaded that the u.s. can never walk away from afghanistan and forever needs afghanistan as a strategic platform for engaging russia and for engaging with china. and there is a profound conception that leads parallels of the policy. >> let me to michael, what president karzai has in common with the kim family is they believe the center of u.s. policy has been about their country. we have had that discussion when im jung ill was alive. two questions about the north koreans, first did we get him wrong? two years ago, the intelligence

estimates that you were hearing about was that his uncle was going to be running the country and the military wouldn't put up with what they viewed was a spoiled untested leader? and second, did we get the chinese wrong here? while we understood they wanted stability more than anything else on the korean peninsula, did we believe that they would -- have the capability, the desire to rein in the north koreans that has been made clear during the bush administration and obama administration they simply can't do? >> very good questions. i think what the latest events in north korea yet again demonstrate is just how thin our knowledge is about the north, even though frankly, it's leakier than it used to be. in the case of the persian execution, the south korean intelligence, anticipated this and disclosed it a few days in

advance. not like there is no information coming through. but there this was a misreading in many circles of the way power is structured in the north, the capacity for a member of the kim family to dominate, because it is a dynasty. and the fact that he may have been a young kid, at the end of the day didn't seem to matter. even if he seemed in a lot of the actions to take on deeply entrenched interests. in a very short period of time, he has moved against, that is to say two years, moved against all of those core leaders who supported his father, including a number of people in uniform. he has had his uncle executed, which is extraordinary, and he has defied the chinese repeatedly. so there is something going on here that we still don't fully grasp.

the counterargument may be about mr. kim is the fact that the extraordinary things within the north korean system have now been disclosed. jung s supported by kim il, but a signal to the people of north korea that maybe they are not all wise and seeing what goes on within their borders. some people say that it will. but for the moment, and i think probably for the foreseeable future, we see him consolidating his power and going his own way, building a ski slope, inviting dennis rodman. >> that worked out really well. >> as for china, the irony in the situation, the chinese have long inceased to us and to others that they did not have the influence that we believe

they could have or should have on the peninsula. and in this case, it may well have been true. there's very little to suggest that china had advanced awareness of what was going on, the imnens of the purge and execution, the irony here being that the chinese here over the last four, five years have invested in north korea in terms of a much heightened the presumption being in china stroke, jong-il had a that this was a moment the in time that they could in effect make their influence felt, and maybe this time convince the north to look at politics differently, to look at their future differently. they want to be prepared for their collapse, any of the of of. what it illustrates is the failures with respect to

intelligence and with respect to .olicy our collective failures no one has been able to get this place right or understand whether there are levers that can be turned in any kind of meaningful way. for now we are stuck am a but as i tried to argue in the piece, the question over time the chinese see enough of a risk and a danger in north korea that they can be nudged towards higher-level of cooperation with us and the south koreans. >> one last question and then we will turn to suzanne. you are just back from the region. the other interesting assessment the u.s. had last year was that the chinese would really be consolidating power by focusing on the domestic economy,

worrying about the slowdown in growth, and so forth. instead we have the uncertainties that come out of identification of zones, territory and the philippines. is it surprising to you that the chinese are pouring all that ?ffort into that this early xi is trying to do is reinforce his power at home. he is a different kind of leader and is less hesitant in demonstrating that. the chinese are juggling a complicated agenda, he and those around him do not want any suggestion there is weakness and vulnerability on china's part that others can take advantage of. the other access -- the other art of this is this is a

phenomenon -- the other part of this is this is not just a phenomenon in china, but it is all through asia, the rebalance. intent here was the united states could find a way to deal credibly not only with china but all the other states in the east asia in an effective way and give them a shared sense of cooperation, it has not turned out that way. that palpable tensions between japan and south korea, the issues between china and japan, the fact that you have more assertive leaders in all the could ago capitals here is not exactly what the administration had bargained on, to say the least. >> suzanne, one area is fairly clear that leverage has worked is it iran. the sanctions got ramped up. the sabotage of the a rainy and program got -- of the iranian

program got ramped up, and that along with election of a new leader brought about changes that a year ago many of us cap would have gotten this far. the question is, how much time do we have to actually strike a ieal deal here before rouhan runs out of running room with the revolutionary guard, before obama runs out of running room with congress? >> thanks, david. you are right in that what we have seen the success of strategy that was built on the assemblage of real and powerful american leverage, what we would like to see in american foreign policy, a long-term investment, not just as sanctions or covert programs you have written about eo widely, but also in thi assembly of a convention in isolating iran and isolating them to the system that was so

powerful in changing the leadership priorities there. there was also -- and it should be credited to the obama administration, just not as a long-term investment, but and exploitation of an opportunity presented it. pursuingistration was diplomacy, attempting to get engaged with the iranians when the pressure was ramping up through its highest level, at the time when the public image was of a strategy that was almost and tiredly pressured and little engagement. the fact that those efforts continued when expectations were lowest enabled the strategy to pay off once the opportunity of the election came through. i think in terms of time and opportunity today, that the balance of opportunity on the iranian side. rouhani was not an accident. he was elected as a shift in the

leadership to put forward a moderate the ship with the objective of getting a nuclear deal. everything since the days of june, and it was clear on the night that he was elected that this was going to be his primary mission. everything he has done since that time, the team he put in place, the speeches he put in place, the trade-offs he made in terms of his domestic priorities where he moved much less progressively than many who came had hoped.ets his investment is in the program, and the iranian leadership has given him an opportunity to make a deal. together it just comes in the interim agreement, not just that it was concluded with relative rapidity. discussed, we only this document. the idea that it would pay off within a span of 12 months, i

would have been laughed off the stage if i made that assertion. instead we got a comprehensive interim agreement in terms of what the iranians agreed to at as confidence-building measures. to agreee we seen them to sign on such a wide array of his constraints on their program, although it is nowhere near what we will you looking for in the final agreement. >> that takes me to my follow-up question. if you view as this as a freeze agreement, a tiny rollback, the final agreement mostly has to be about rollback, about withstanding the amount of time that the rains would need to raise a bomb. tell us how that will play inside the rainy and political theater. excruciating an negotiation. we saw how hard it was to move to the implementation program.

there were several attempts to the iranians to walk away from the table. it provokes a it of backlash in washington. in effect, the iranians have signed on at this point. they have gotten little in terms of sanctions or leaf. a couple of temporary billion dollars is important, but not extensional areas of their economy. that will not overcome the pain of their experience of the loss of millions of barrels a day of exports now for several years. they need to deliver this to their people on the xp patients that rouhani needed to deliver to the supreme leader because they have been given a certain amount of running room. it is not meaningless, not holy fictional, but it is not at the stage where it is likely to notr cover rouhani and will

help him unless he starts fiddling on the domestic agenda. i do not mean to understate the logistical constraints at head of us. if you read the piece by an experienced negotiator, you will see a nightmare scenario where rakes down. at this point the iranians are in it for the long haul because that is where the payoff for tehran is. the difficulty will be in washington because the administration has a fight on its hands with the congress that over.r where no obama has a fight with key allies on the region, and i do not think those disputes or obstacles to the administration here are likely to get easier in the short term.

>> the one word we have not brought up yet in this discussion is syria. to step in onk this for a moment. first on the question of given the incredibly warm collegial atmosphere at yesterday's opening in geneva, what you expect to come out of this. and on the question of how putin is going to play this. steve'scurious to hear answer because i think a lot of the american diplomacy pushing forward to this geneva ii conference has been remiss on the notion that u.s.-russian concert could create leverage over the actors fighting in syria that otherwise, that could

haves produce a negotiated end to this fighting, and otherwise there would not be a near-term end to this fighting. i have question that premise for a long time. i have been skeptical that the russians could we persuaded to change their view in backing a thought. if they change their view, would they be able to exercise leverage over assad? the reason this conference is happening is because assad is feeling relatively confident. he is feeling confident in his ability to persuade more and internationally, that the threat of sunni n syria isi sufficient to my that he is not the greatest threat to stability , and he's feeling confident militarily on the ground. the syrian opposition meanwhile

to the power to say no refuse to show up. reportedly, they ultimately did decide to come because they were threatened with the withdrawal of western assistance. this does not bode well for any concrete outcome from these talks, and as the conference has gotten closer and closer, the bar for success defined by those who convene it has gotten lower and lower. and i think the history of civil war has backed assad, sadly, the outcomes will be driven by the military else on the ground, not by negotiators in europe. to be ald have liked fly on the wall in the conversation yesterday between obama and putin on the phone. i think it applies to cerium you have a time now of three

months where there has been a degree of u.s.-russian cooperation with some success in terms of starting a process to get the chemical weapons out of syria and move toward elimination. but that corporation on them one part of the syrian problem should not the skies the fact that when you are talking about the broader future, there are that the united states and the russians look at issues. the russians do not want assad tossed out. they see him representing a degree of stability. the west, according to them, does not have a good answer to the question, what happens if ves?d lead thatthe military success assad has been having the last couple months, they are confident. toguess is we are not going

see a lot of conversions between washington and moscow as to what should come out of the conference, even if they are cooperating successfully on how do you get the chemical weapons out. >> great. we are going to turn to you. are there microphones around -- there are microphones a about. and you get a microphone, tell us you you are and please actually put a question mark at the end of the question. we will start with this gentleman right here. the mic is coming to you. >> hi. i have a question for jonathan. u.s. eatingbout the incentives to -- the u.s. having incentives to countries in the region. can you tell us what those incentives would be, and what of thee the new approach

military ballots looking like in the new year, and in previous years there was too much emphasis on military components. and you were optimistic in the rebalancing strategy being well received. at your competing organization csi, they would like a 37% saying correctly that it was well-designed, and 39% said they did not. . different from what you described. and for it to be concluded sooner than expectation. thank you. is fair to say that in retrospect of the rebalance policy it was significantly oversold by some of the proponents that advocated it. that said, the essence of it i

think, as jeff and i tried to argue in our paper, makes sense. it makes sense because it is a economic, political, and security, that the united states would wish to operate in this most dynamic region. the problems are ones of internal dynamics in the region that have undermined the overall context within which states over -- interact. and many of the u.s. problems in terms of the dysfunction of our own government process, our preoccupations here, that among other things constrained and prison rented president obama to traveling to the region not so long ago, although he has now rescheduled a trip for asia. the issue at the end of the day is whether a policy can be based on the kind of a broad principle , or whether you need a sense of ongoing sustained engagement and

movement to get where you want to go. i do not think the moves are all bad here. if you take the transposition tnership, some of the goals were -- and the china government looks at this in a much more measured way now. the instinct was anti-china, but that is not what it was intended to do. really, the longer term proof of the policy will not be a one- shot deal. it has to be something more fundamental that it will only be revealed in time rather than some kind of bold, hermetic gesture, cause what is the alternative for the united states or anyone else question frameworko you find a within the states can are direct

-- can operate him more than you situation that is very complicated. but we can see a lot of the are much challenges more manifest now and that it has to be demonstrated not through words, not only through speeches, but through a capacity to really sell critical problems. on that the verdict is still out. >> gentleman right back here. the mike is coming back to you. >> hi. i am the correspondent for an austrian newspaper. about europehapter in that. i was wondering if that was because there was no success there, everything is rather boring as usual. the european parliament legends

where we could have -- parliament elections where we could have all members of parliament will which would turn parliament into a more dysfunctional organization than inhibithich would americans to come to a negotiation before. does that have to go through parliament? and why do you think the president used the opportunity of engaging with europe? he was that popular when he was elected at the time, and now he is really unpopular. >> who wants to handle the european issue? >> when you look at the big question for europe, these sorts of issues you talked about, upcoming elections, things like that, they are not easy ones for the american presidency. from that, there was

nothing you could write that would fit into the context. does appeart europe in a number of cases, example, when we talked about how you deal with russia, you need to work with russia acknowledging any success of leverage is going to be greatly increased and you can be on the same page with europe. >> let me build on that question. that the biggest outflow of the snowden revelations when you are traveling in europe have been diplomatic.c than they are unhappy with the bush -- the obama administration, just as they were unhappy for the bush administration for very

different reasons. it strikes me that all this discussion of segmenting the internet, watching out whether you want to buy american products because the intelligence agencies may have built in back doors that that could have a longer-term impact on us than whatever the diplomatic outflows. think the snowden affair illustrates something very important about residencies. you do not control the world. you do not control events. in this case, resident obama found his first year of his second term, and maybe the entire four years of the second term have been to a certain young hijacked i a very contract employee from booze out of the decided to spill the beans on american espionage activities around the world. there is not much that the

president can do to pull it back. it is all out there, and more of it is coming out all the time. he can try to present his point of view of who edward snowden is, that he is a thief, that he is maybe a treaty that -- traitor, but edward snowden can push back. the tvoing to be on tomorrow. it illustrates the limits of power not just of the united states, but of the presidency in general. we may look at the second obama thattry should of an event was something out of their control, which was reminding of the bush administration. the hurricane. he certainly did not control the hurricane. on the broader question of u.s.- european relations being damaged by this, you are right. europehe perception in

that the national security agency is listening to every phone conversation, is watching every text message. all of that is ridiculous. the nsa would have to have may be 2 million or 3 million more employees to be able to read that stuff, and that would be a waste of the american tax dollars. that is the perception that is out there. it is hard to put that perception back. it creates a dynamic in european politics that is working against us in serious ways about things like the u.s.-eu economic trade agreement. >> it is also the perception that high-tech american companies cooperating with the nsa is damaging to overseas countries who now say maybe we do not want to deal with those. >> and someone has. big -- was can the

president get out front of this to manage the damage from snowden, but also to protect american companies by working to preserve the internet that so far has been very successful for american economic interests. >> could you imagine in the next year a situation in which president putin comes to the conclusion that hosting mr. snowden is no longer in his deep interest, that he is gotten what he wants out of this, and somebody shows up at mr. snowden's door and tell him his plane is ready? >> no. whathatever reason, message does that send to any potential defector that the russians might hope to welcome in the future?

i think from mr. putin that would be the measure that he take to maket to life more complicated for his intelligence folks. related to question afghanistan. i think americans are perplexed because they see al qaeda now in , in yemen. they see the concentration camps. what is our real interest in maintaining a large force in afghanistan with respect to these other problems? >> you touched on this before. >> them large portion we are talking about is something like 10,000. we are not talking about maintaining a force anywhere near the level that is the

sustained. afghanistan significantly deteriorates in terms of elliptical processes and the chances are in negligible, this will enable the return of terrorist activity to afghanistan in two ways. first, the physical hostility of jihadivens for groups. negotiationsabout with the top on, and one question is, to what extent is the talibanut an -- linked to al qaeda in ways that it can operate change? it owes a lot of debts, including very survival debts to

support from external jihadi groups and to sever relations with al qaeda would be different. -- seniorzes that taliban leaders say that al qaeda was a plague to therir rule. they are playing a game, providing support for al qaeda, but it does not mean that they would limit engagement. one issue of visit: security. the other issue is the imagery, the psychological boost that would this would give to other selafi groups around the world. this should be the second time in the great power was defeated. they will portray it as defeated in afghanistan. there might still be a

sense that sufficient violence and coldly to people may pay off and might sustain and support groups. that does not mean we should fight every terrorist group everywhere in the world. it does not mean whice should use drones anywhere. leverage, it is about us being selective about picking commitments, but also delivering on commitments and upholding the promises we have made. to expand the question, because some of the issues raised with respect to al qaeda and the taliban in afghanistan have parallels in the broader middle east.

you in your question no did we see al qaeda popping up in yemen and syria, and there are al qaeda affiliates present in a number of spots in the middle east. there are a lot of localized while its extremist's who for one reason or other may see an advantage in embracing the al qaeda brand. whose concern and sources of support is localized. it is important the united states, as it parses these threats, continues to carefully takes discussing regime -- differentiations. when i look at the trajectory of in apolicy is headed middle east, across north africa, egypt, the levant, iraq, and down into yemen, where we do not have

a clear orientation toward the broad transformation that is occurring in the broader middle east, but we have a lot of worries about specific things we see, including violent extremism. there is a danger in responding to a by day to those urgent security situations, we re- create the paradigm that president obama came into office wanting to dismantle, of a broad-scale war on terrorism, that drives our policy and drives the way we are perceived in the region and drives the way we structure our relationships in the region that is undergoing tremendous change. while there are some real threats, it is important for us to be able to distinguish what are local, what are transnational, what is targeting us, and what is not. i would like to hear other people's views on that. >>