its military and administrative control and the problems persisted ever since and resulted in ethnically cleansed parts of north caucuses. the czechists were he chechen and others were loaded into cattle cars and sent to north kazakhstan and central asia. under stalin, the tatars were equally ethnically cleansed by the stalin regime. these things have an interesting tendency to not disappear and not go away. terrifyinge today is and despicable as it may be, terrorism against a civilian population, has its roots in russian history. i have a paper on the heritage

another longer, monograph coming on the north caucuses with the u.s. army war colleges looking in depth at the military and security aspects and the history of the cob conflicts in north caucuses. but as he mentioned, this is now a conflict not just in the russian context, not just in the regional context of the north caucuses, not just in the russian state-wide context but it has global connections. just recently, a salafi cleric issued a fatwa, a religious ruling, justifying in the in vol ct the attacks fwmbings enbrad and exchanging that attacks on the russian

civilian population is justified because the population is not standing up against the russian government when it's persecuting muslims. therefore, he says, any russian citizen, and he doesn't even -- he mentioned christians, orthodox, but doesn't distinguish the probably 20 million russian citizens who happen to be muslim, that these civilians, women, children, and be ly, are all allowed to murdered in terrorist attacks. before that, the spiritual guide of the muslim brotherhood movement who resides in the gulf issued a fatwa or commented that russia has become the number one enemy of muslims an ashes,

meaning the sunni muslims, because of its support of the syrian regime. his kind of attack by not just salafis but also the muslim brotherhood raises a question, why is it that the russian government is not seeking more anti-terrorism cooperation with the west? why is it continuing anti-american propaganda about somehow -- we somehow are supportive of the terrorists in russia which i personally believe is absolutely not true. the russian logic is of course that if american allies, such as saudi arabia or qatar, are support i of the sunni radicals in syria and elsewhere, then by

definition, we have to be supportive of such sunni islamists and radicals in north caucuses. there is a deep, deep logical and analytical flaw with this kind of analysis. so to wrap it up and open for discussion, i would say that sochi to me is an inflection point for russia, it is a huge test for its leadership, for mr. putin who invested so much in producing and paying for the sochi olympics and of course the russian people were paying for it because of course this was not mr. putin's personal money. i think that from here, russia can go one of three ways. one, it can muddle through and continue pretty much along the

lines it did so far. number two, it can crack down, as a lot of people are afraid it may do, either after sochi or after the g in june, or -- or, i think the least possible scenario, it may move toward a systematic reform. i would challenge my colleagues here, with a show of hands, to see if anybody thinks russia is going to move to systematic reforms. in fact, very little of these reforms were tried or at least talked about under the medvedev administration and affect we know what happened next -- nothing. worse than nothing. there was a crackdown after the medvedev term. so this is a trying time for russia. i think these are trying times for the united states. the obama administration gave utin a wide berth.

we probably were happy, i mean, i was not privy to discussion at the white house but i'm pretty ure that the syrian gambit was greeted on the highest level and the support we saw to it indicates it was greeted at the high level by the white house. plus proach that g5 germany took on iran indicates the white house is willing to work with russia as well as our european allies on bringing -- trying to bring iran back into limited and we are very minimalist policy on the ewe crane and other former soviet countries. the question is, is this policy working? is f -- if -- ukraine

eventually going to -- going by way of the customs union, if this is going to be the end of the road or beginning of a new road. usually, in foreign policy and strategy, if you successfully -- to use senator cruz's chess metaphor you eat one piece you get your appetite whetted and you want to eat another piece and then another piece. and i'm surprised nobody mentioned here the famous say big mr. putin that the collapse of the soviet union was the great geopolitical catastrophe of the 21st century. you can think that a some form of union, soviet or otherwise,

will be the great challenge of the 21st century. this is something the united states need to think about but i do not see evidence that we are thinking about that, let alone doing something about that. again, this brings me back to ukraine and to the fact that we barely reacted when armenia joined the union and i think that the discussion of russian phere of exclusive interest as president medvedev called it, that discussion is lacking in the city. the policy is not formulated, we have to formulate about national security interests in that part of the world. again, i think, after sochi, we'll see how that particular line of foreign and defense policy is going to develop. i'll leave you with that and thank you very much for your

attention. >> thank you very much. >> i'm sorry, they handed out doughnuts. >> cookies. >> cookies. that was the problem. >> now we have a few minutes for some questions an answers we have microphones so when i acknowledge you, please identify yourself and hopefully within two sentences i'll hear a question mark at the end of the second one and you can otherwise i'm going to ask you to sit down this gentleman right in the front here. >> thank you very much. good morning, or good afternoon. my name is andrew jensen, currently with harr yard university, formerly with the department of defense. i have a question. you referenced a growing domestic dissatisfaction with the putin administration on behalf of the average russian citizen. what's your perception of the average russian citizen's views toward the upcoming olympics?

is this, as i'm sure president putin is hoping, a mark of achievement for his administration? is it a reinforcement of ongoing corruption? what's your take on it? >> i think the corruption issue has really been dominating, especially recently. despite obviously the full blackout on the official media and state television channels, let's not forget that 50% of russia is now online. russia is now the largest internet consumer in europe. the interneat reach is between 70% and 5%. that wall of censorship imposed by putin's government, that wall of censorship is being breached just by national progress. so the biggest issue is corruption, though you wouldn't

hear a about it on television, it's common knowledge. maybe not some of the examples we've discuss bud the yen jd -- but the general idea that this is a festival of crupping. there's a russian word, it means using state money for your own private purposes. the festival of corruption, that's how it's referred to on plogs, in the internet community, what remains is the independent media. that's the major perception of it. so if -- as i mentioned, putin's target audience is the free world, leads of the world's democracies who we wanted to come to the ceremonies to sit alongside him he didn't want to sit next to his k.g.b. and oligarch friend, he wanted to barackh angela her tell, obama, but it looks like they're

not coming. so his goal in that sense was not fulfilled. his domestic audience is certainly not -- the domestic audience is not his target audience for sochi. since these protests began, i guess, now, going on in the third year, the kremlin shifted strategy. their line before was putin was president of all the russians, he was a national leader a phrase they came up with in twovepb describe him. kind of the father of the nation sort of thing. out, theprotests broke ggest in two decades, they shifted and started to use the divide and rule tactics to modern to oppose the middle classes against the traditional mases of the population, in their crew. that's been their line for the last two or three years. for now, the figures are in

their advantage but the demographics and the internet, the spread of just the consciousness and real growth of civil society we've seen in the last two or three years in russia. the trends are not in fair favor. putin to 22% want stay on as president after his term ends. that's not a good figure to have. >> it will be interesting to see an m sure there will be effect on the voters of the ukraine. alarmed in is no doubt t what happened. there was an internet map yesterday, a very yeared map of where the people have taken over

and thrown out the bombs, there was a red mark in ukraine and a blue mark in the north caucuses. i think they are paying attention. >> microphone, please. >> hi, sharon novak, voice of the moderate. just for the average person that i'm doing an article for, would you see that it's going to affect the athletes? normally there's a home court advantage but when we talk about security threats and patriotism now going back to the 1980's, would you say that's going to affect the athletes? has there been any discussion about that aspect? >> are you talking about american at lees or russian at lees? >> mostly american. >> the challenge for the athletes is not to worry about what they can't control and

focus oner that performance. those who care about gay rights will probably be insecure because of the russian legislation and the public campaign on that issue. i think that the worst that could happen is actual attempted attacks or successful attacks and i hope and pray that it will ot happen. as i mentioned, this is probably e most security-challenged olympic games ever and when people were surprised like in 1972, in munich, when palestinian terror cell massacred the israeli delegation, that was a horrible stain.

i really, really hope nothing of the kind will happen in russia. unlike munich, the russian authorities are much more awar of -- aware of the threat. but you cannot exclude it you cannot 100% rule it out. >> as a paraphernalia at the call aside, it's worth noting that a couple of days ago, one of the members of the u.s. hockey team said that his plan is to go to the olympics but he's asked his family to stay home because he opportunity want to be distracted, worrying about their security. which i think is is a large testament to exactly how insecure the athletes feel. they're going to go because they have a job to do. but are they comfortable? probably not. >> i'm going to ask a question because it ties these two together, the domestic perception, perception of the world, and the athletics part of this, is this -- are the sochi olympics, putin's behr len obimpic -- olympics? and who do you think is going to

be jesse owens? if you're not familiar, i'll let them think about it because -- hitler ran the berlin olimp exs as exactly this sort of nationalistic, everybody look at me kind of event and a young lack man showed him that the super race may not reside in berlin. jesnen comments on that? please. >> there have been many analogies made between berlin 1936 and sochi 2014. kind of the underlying attempt to present a repressive regime to show its quote-unquote friendly face. i think that's important you mentioned jesse owens we, i think what's important is that the western delegation, those from democratic countries, there are still some politicians coming. it's not a total political

boycott. enge it's important that they not do what every olympic delegation except british and american did in 1936 which is do a nazi salute to hitler. all of them did it. all the democratic -- >> the soviets did it. >> the soviets weren't part of he olimp exs until the 1950's. >> they were not in berlin. >> no the first soviet olympics was the 1950's in australia. so they were not there. >> live and learn. >> all the democratic nations except britain and the u.s. did it. i hope nothing like that obviously anything rahtively speaking, happens in sochi. it's heartening to see that so many leaders of western democracies are not going to putin's show. some of them exclusively said it's because of human rights issues, like some central european and baltic leaders. some didn't say but it's clear that it's kind of a step toward

the domestic audience to show them they do have concerns over the human rights record. >> just as an aside, i think given the sort of spotlight that's been put on the gay prop began ta law and all this sort of anti-gay and lesbian red rick that's been coming out not only from the kremlin but the kremlin's political allies, for example, in the russian orthodox church, media-wise you're going to see, not a disproportion gnat focus but a significant foe to cus on the athletes that are gay or lesbian and their performance and it's going to be measured against the standard, not that the world has set but that the russian government has set,, you know, where do they fit in the hierarchy of things? >> questions? >> i think, steve, without going to berlin you can look at china. >> yeah. >> you can also look at greece. but you can look at china and see that the political structure

f the regime does not preclude an efficient and successful olympic performance. i think russia just, as i said, the cost overruns for exorbitant. >> thank you very much for the presentation, i think it was superb. i personally think it's going to be much worse. i deal with aviation logistics as part of -- a very small part of the sochi issue and i think in term os they have inconveniences that the peculiar will experience, there are projections that a lot of empty spaces will fill with, you know, people. so the question is, considering that it is a showcase, what's your forecast? will the foreign media actually be taken in and show those

adoring crowds the successes? or do you think we can expect at least some critical coverage even inside of the cocoon that ? being created any ideas? and we are talk act the western coverage, obviously. >> well, just two words. i think if you look at the experience of the beijing olympics, i think the tendency -- i think the government put forward is what was accepted. but nothing succeeds like success. which mean this is only works if there's not a seg cant security disruption. if there is a security disruption and the russian government -- it's not able to

cover it up, it opens up line of conversation that otherwise the credulous media wouldn't been clines -- enclined to pursue. i think it's entirely up to the dynamics of the events themselves. >> i would distinguish between the sports coverage, the media sports channels, that will be focusing on sports, and the general interest channels and especially the social media who will try to provide a broader social context. be it the arrest and releases of people we discussed here, be it, and i think this is very significant and this was a miscalculation of major proportions when people were supposed to think forward about how they manage their image, including in the run up to the olympics, and i'm specifically

mentioning the lgbt issued. i think they shot themselves in the foot and they underestimated the influence and the solidarity inside media establishments, both major media establishments and in the social media and this became a huge issue. people didn't think about this. and this is, hopefully somebody will learn a lesson because it's always healthy to learn lessons, whether they learn a lesson or not, i cannot tell you. >> a friend of mine who works for cnn said they will cover the human rights aspect. my concern would be, they're so focused on the lgbt issue, and enge we're all in favor of tolerance, and they forget, as has been said, all these other human rights issues that are there every day, which are going on beyond the lgbt issue and we hear nothing about it. the plight of mygrant workers

building some of the buildings who are from the north caucuses who are routinely brutalized by russian authorities, i see very little about that at all. obscuring sue is everything else. until we hear these names -- and have you heard those lately? i haven't heard those names at wull. -- at all. >> i think -- i hope that the coverage isn't limited to buying the propaganda image fed to the media. it's important that we have discussions such as this, the global attention on russia inevitably has some good side effects of more focus on the general situation, i just hope there's more of it. and about the political prisoners. and about media censorship. but also about sochi itself. you mention the cocoon that is

sochi. not many people think that it's been turned into a de facto state of emergency zone, that the freedom of assembly is suspended. any big olympics or beg sports event car res a lot of security but this is going beyond that and you see, there's no freedom of assembly, no freedom of movement. in any previous olimp exgame you buy a ticket, you have your hotel room and go and attend the events. not enough for sochi, you need to have a passport of a fan part of the k.g.b. and in the last week we have heard of dozens of refusals to russian opposition activists, from the solidarity movement, russian citizens who can't go to the olimp exs in their own country because they're deemed politically dangerous for the regime. i hope these issues are covered

in the western media too, not just the big high-profile issues everybody talks about and certainly not scrust the sport methodals the but the fact that the sochi olympics have brought more ao presentation and a bigger crackdown. >> iminge going to exercise the moderator's prerogative because that was the a sobering -- it was the kind of note we need to keep in mind. the olympics are generally a time of excitement and enjoyment but there's a price with this particular olimp exs that others are paying right now and hopefully we can all keep that in mind as we watch, as we go forward. i ask you now to join me in thanking the panel for a great presentation. i thank you all for joaning us here at heritage. have a great day.

[captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014] >> the house is out for the rest of the week, the senate finishing up its work, working its way through amendment votes at this hour on a bill that would delay the premium increases for federal flood insurance. final vote expected at 1:50 eastern on c-span 2. president obama continues his post-state of the union speeches, he's going to be in nashville later today.

as obama's security detail prepared for the school visit, grief counselors were helping students cope with the fatal off-campus shoot og of a 15-year-old by a 17-year-old classmate. jay carney told reporters that the president will speak about that shooting during his speech focused on education. we'll have that live for you today at 5:20 eastern. in london this morning, british prime minister david cameron went before the committee on national security to talk about a reaning of issues. committee members asked him about potential damage done by edward snowdon's leaks. he's some of what he had to say. >> do you think the recent problems we have seen about the snowden revelations and the way in which they have politicized by some people are actually undermining confidence in our security agencies?

and if so, who is responsible or defending the agency, getting some perfective -- perspective for these suggestion discussions? in think first of all, response to snowden, i think what we have to do is make sure we're confident that the governance procedures for the intelligence services are robust, the intelligence security committee, intelligence commissioners, things happened under the law. i keep asking myself, do we have a god system in place? i think we have. in terms of has it dented public confidence in the work of the security services, i don't know the answer to that question. i haven't seen the opinion pling. but my sense is that the public reaction, as opposed to media reaction, is, look, we have intelligence, but it's a

dangerous world and there are bad people who want to do bad things to us, and we should support the intelligence services. what i've felt in terms of what people's reaction is has been pretty robust. who is responsible for defending the security service and explaining what they do? i think i have a responsibility, i feel i'm the minister for the intelligence services, i'm responsible to stand up for them, thank them publicly because they can't be thanked publicly as other emergency services are and try to explain what they do, i've dobe some of that. i think they are often the best spokesmen -- spokespeople for themselves. enge their appearance in front of parliament recently was excellent. i think the speech that the head of the security service made was very, very good summary of the threats we face. i don't want home to focus on the -- i don't want them to make a speech every week but i think

they can help set the agenda and explain what they do perhaps better than anyone. >> don't you think that there is potential danger that -- that lack of public support for what a government might feel is esen torble to in certain serks, , as far as rmined what we needed and a better explanation and shouldn't that be part of your planning when you're stalking tissue talking about your strategy, not just about the economic benefit but explaining it -- >> it's a fair point. i think if you're saying, should the prime minister, the foreign secretary who is responsible for the intelligence agencies, should the three of us do more to explain, defend, and give people a sense of why their work is so important? yes, i agree with that. we should do more. if we're worried about damage,

i'm worried about the damage he's done to our security. i'm very worried about what he's done. i would encourage the newspapers that are endlessly dallying in this to think before they act because, you know, we are in danger of making ourselves less safe as a result. another thing, i think the public reaction, as i judge it, has not been one of sort of shock-horror. it's been much more, you know, intelligence agencies carry out intelligence work. >> from the joint committee on national security strategy brings together 22 members from both the house of commons and house of lords, you can see the prime minister's appearance earlier today before that committee. it's easier to find than ever on c-span.org in our video lie brear. we're back to u.s. politics. house republicans are meeting today and tomorrow, their annual legislative retreat developing strategy and plans for 2014, a hearing from -- and hearing from

speakers. some democratic news today, henry waxman 20-term congressman from california, announced his retirement. he'll fin herb up the year, won't seek re-election he told politico, quote, i think it's time to let somebody else come in and take on some of these fights. he's retiring at the end of the year. >> so many people are of the opinion that if the members of the supreme court don't like something that's happening in the country, that it just reaches out and brings that in to the -- into the court and starts writing opinions on it which is of course as contrary to the fact as anything could be. >> friday, c-span radio begins a series of oral history interviews with former supreme court justices this week from 1971, former chief justice earl warren at 4b8g eastern. in washington at 90.1 fm, online

at c-span radio.org and nationwide on xm satellite radio channel 120. >> bringing attention to what women do or how women have contributed always returns to the question of the body. so for one thing, many people object to bringing women's studies or women's history into a middle school, high school classroom because there's an assumption that women's studies is only about sex, birth control, abortion, and actually, it's also about women in politics, women in law, women orking on farms, queens, prime ministers. and my job is to break down the fear many people have. what goes on in a women's studies classroom? >> sunday, women's history, feminist movement and the

anti-feminist back low pressure. women's studies professor bonnie morris will take your questions on "in depth." book tv's "in depth" on c-span2. and you still have a few days to weigh in on this month's book lub, "the liberty amendments," go to booktv to enter the chatroom. >> ahead of the next round of talks on iran's nuclear program, two house foreign affairs subcommittees held hearings. members of both parties criticized the obama administration's deal with iran, some calling for new sanctions. a former u.s. ambassador to the u.n. and a former deputy from the international atomic energy agency testified at the hearing. it's two hours.

>> thank you for being here. timing is everything. the joint subcommittee will come to orer. after recognizing myself, ranking member deutch and of course we'll hear from our foreign affairs full committee chairman mr. royce, we'll hear from chairman poe, ranking member sherman for five minutes each for opening statements and then due to time limitations we'll go directly to our witnesses' testimony and without objection, the witnesses prepared statements will be made part of the record and members may have five days to insert statements and questions for the record subject to the length limit eags in the rules. the chair now recognizes herself for five minutes. on november 24, 2013, secretary kerry announced that an interim negotiated settlement had been reached between the p5 plus one and iran on etc. nuclear program. the announcement contained the broad strokes but was short on

the details. the picture that was painted was that iran would agree to modest limits on its enrichment capabilities, increased international atom exenergy monitoring, the cessation of manufacturing sentry fuges and it would not fuel the arak heavy waiter reactor. in exchange, iraq would -- iran would rere-seve an easing of sanctions on some sales and on imports of metals for its automobile sector. no doubt the president will call this the ultimate deal, while others of us say hey, wait a minute, i don't trust the iranian regime. let's have a way to punish iran if they're acting unfaithfully. though the announcement was made

in nevada -- in november, it wasn't until january 20 that the technical details were agreed upon. the most glaring deficiency with this interim deal is its lopsidedness. iran got a sweetheart deal and the rest oaf world is not any safer from an iranian bomb than before. our closest ally and friend in the region, the democratic jewish state of israel has been very concerned with what this deal means for its security from the get-go. other countries in the gulf region feel slighted by our approach to this issue. but let's set aside the dangerous precedent that this setters in rest of the world and the bridges we have burned with allies to reach this agreement. remember, this agreement doesn't even hi up to the obligations set forth by the u.n. security council resolutions on iran and is a far and -- and is far from our policy of disarmament from only 1 years ago and focus on what iran is allowed to do. iran is allowed to keep its

nuclear weapons program infrastructure intact and will still be allowed to enrich. sure there are caps on the enrichment and it will have to convert some of its uranium to ox side but they maintain the ability, know-how and efficiency that if it decides to break the agreement it can continue oonly -- with only a minor setback in any timetable. it is a shame that we have acquiesced to iran's demands that it has some sort of right to enrich. iran abandoned all right of enrichment when it conducted a covert nuclear program and was in violation of its obligations under the n. perform t. and other treaties. it therefore must not be allowed to enrich and i fear that by starting out where the p5 plus one did here, iran will never be mushed off this stance in a

final comprehensive agreementle the interim deal focus os on the nuclear aspect and falls short on the weaponization efforts and its ballistic missile program which it now has more time to advance and there is nothing in the interim agroment that i a lous for the international atom exenergy agency access to iran's military sites. for me, that's really at the construction of the issue here, time. -- at the crux of the issue here, time. from announcement to implementation two months' time has passed this gai the regime plenty of time to continue to make advancements while the parties hashed out all the technical details. i don't believe this was done by mistake oner that part. they're experts in delayed tactics and double talks. in the two months after secretary kerry's press conference, tehran anouned it made advancements in its icbm

technology, designed new range of centrifuges and was ready to manufacture them and it would continue construction at its heavy water reactor in iraq. i envision a scenario in which iran may comply with this agreement for six months, but even if iran does violate the terms of the agreement that the in t commission established the final document has murky authority at best to conduct oversight, enforce compliance or impose strict cons questions. there's no mechanism to allow of this e decision deal. the threat that iran can create a nuclear weapon is all too real and where p5 plus one fails in his agreement.

with ian stating it will not dismantle any part of its program in any circumstance it leaves me fearing that the administration will accept -- has me fearing what the administration will accept in a final, comprehensive agreement. i look forward to hearing from our witnesses' testimonies and the views of my colleagues. now i turn to my good friend, the ranking member, ted deutch of fle. >> thank you madam chairman, chairman poe, for holding this hearing. thank you to our panel of very distinguished experts for appearing here today. we welcome your expertise and your insight as we determine the efficacy of iran sanctions under the jpoa and the next steps in reaching a final agreement to achieve our ultimate goal of prevent agnew clear armed iran. let me be clear from the outset. there's no doubt that resolving the iranian nuclear crisis through diplomacy has been the

preferred track of the administration and the congress. i think we all recognize the significant achievement of the u.s. efforts to breng iran to the table. but there are many members on both sides of the aisle that feel it is absolutely appropriate for congress, the body that built the sanctions architecture that brought iran to the table, to remind the iranians that full sanctions relief will come only when a deal acceptable to the p5 plus one and our regional allies is reached. this relief can only come if congress acts, so i would also suggest that it's important to send iran a remiper as well as to remind companies lining up to visit tehran a message of what is at stick if iran violates the term os they have joint plan of action. a deal is in place and if we're going to move forward with a final deal, we have to focus on while developing parameters. a ways into this plan and

while the caps on iran's current program are substantial, we know they cannot be the terms of a long-term deal. we must ultimately see serious, permanent rollbacks of the program, not just easily reversible freezes. we know that the joint plan of action sets the course for iran to mane tain a knew move chally defined enrichment program consistent with practical needs. iran continues to claim a right to enrich for nuclear power but we must understand that none of iran's current enrichment activities are useful for a civilian nuclear program. consider, iran already as a clear reactors in bashir running on imported russian fuel. in fact the russian deal requires russian fuel just as other nations' agreements are

ontingent on use of imported fuel from those neighs. it would take iran years to turn its fuel into power for a reoklahoma city or. we must remember that none of its current stockpile can be used in its nuclear reactor. to that end, most nations with nuclear power don't enrich they import from other countries. what does this all mean? the iranian stockpile is useless for their domestic energy program, however 19,000 centrifuges and seven tons of enriched uranium are highly useful when a nation is trying to build a nuclear weapon. we can agrow that nuclear science is complicated but it seems that even someone with thisa cursory knowledge of can see the deage posed by iran's nuclear activities. can we be sure that we're going to be able to see the manufacturing of all the various

parts that make up -- can we be sure that iran is not continuing to manufacture more centrifuges at other locations? moreover can we verify that they have not developed another site. the other two were constructed in secret until being exposed by the international community in 2002 and 2009. iran has long said it intends to have up to 10 enrichment facilities. iran may continue its reserge and development allowing them to continue work on centrifuge development. mr. albright, in your testimony, it could lead to breakthroughs in materials and methods that would strengthen a secret breakout effort. how concerned should we be that conditioned r&d will allow them to install sentry fubling six months or a year or five years? these are the kind of difficult questions that have to be answered if the p5 plus one are to reach an acceptable deal.

before any long-term deal is reached, iran must come clean about all aspects of its program, including finally addressing all outstanding iaea concerns with possible military dimensions this edevelopment of nuclear explosive devices, procurement of nuclear related materials by the irtc and military activities at the parching site. the institute for science and international security describes the parching site as a huge site dedicated to the research, development, and production of ammunition, rockets and high explosives. iran must know at the outset that they will not be able to sweep these allegations under the rug. i look forward to discussing with our witnesses a way to halt this greatest threat to national security. >> now we turn to full committee chairman mr. royce for his opening statement. >> thank you very much, chairman ros-lehtinen. i thank you, i thank mr. ted

poe, chairman ted poe, and i e-- and also mr. deutch far very well reasoned argument that he just laid out and ileana, i think you laid out a come peeling -- compelling case as well. i think all of russ a little stunned. i think we're stunned that not only does iran continue to enrich uranium but they are very, very foe vokal about the fact that they're going to continue to research and development on faster and faster spin offering centrifuges. for them to be making this pronouncement in the middle of this interim agreement on how they're reaching this capability, to develop and spin these centrifuges at supersonic speeds, setting new records, implies a certain intent on undetectable nuclear breakout capability.

i think this is what members worry about. we worry that as you try to work out an agreement here and we talk thbt emue tone yum reactor, heavy water reactor facility at iraq, the point that they're going to continue performing work at that site. i think the large quantities of existing stockpiles, when they make the comment, no, they're not going to draw down on those stockpiles, all of this sends a message in terms of what their intent is and quite simply, these elements of a nuclear program which we're talking about right now, will continue to operate as the talks go on so i think for the members of the house here on the foreign affairs committee, we're a little concerned that unless ran is pressed to fully reveal

iran's extensive activities to develop and test a nuclear device, unless we get that out on the table, and as we hear today there's a great deal of evidence that iran has devoted much effort to this over the years, unless we have the details on that, i think we're left wondering about iran's clear intentions here and i don't think we want them to cover up that extensive evidence either. part of it is because we watch iran's actions, over 400 executions last year, of political and of religious opposition in the country, stoning is still going on in iran as a penalty. capital offense for things such as adultery.

as has been mentioned a number of times, a regime that's stoning women with one hand shouldn't be allowed with the other hand to get its grip on a nuclear weapon. i mean, this is just logical that we be concerned about this. and if a comprehensive agreement is reached, the threat of a nuclear armed iran is not going to be over for a couple of other reasons. one of today's witnesses estimated that even if we were to force iran to dismabtle 80% of its 19,000 centre fuges and they say they won't dismantle one of them, even if we were to force it to close its entire enrichment facility, even if we were to dismantle or convert its planned heavy watterer eactor to a light water reactor, inagree to a multidecade intrusive

regime, the fact is iran would still be sex months away from nuclear breakout. so if we are in a situation right now where they won't give ground on any of these points i have just raised, i think we have something of a problem on our hands. so even if the administration , re to achieve this agreement which increasingly many say may be a 50-50 proposition, i think that was the administration's assumption, especially now that we have let up on sanctions pressure, iran will leekly still possession -- possess the capability of very quickly produce agnew clear weapon. why do i say that? because when you let up on sanctions pressure you let up on the one thing you had that made it hard for them to get hard currency that might make the tie aye the la make the tough choice between compromising on a nuclear program or economic

implosion system of that's gone now, the message is out. you know, iran is open for business. you see the headlines, you know the next day in "wall street journal," businesses rush to iran to cut business deals. you see their stock market go become up, their currency go ack up in value, so we could end up, if we're not kearful, ending up on a track to have a -- to have us face a permanent nuclear threat from iran because we rehabilitate their capabilities. that's why i thank the chairwoman, i thank mr. poe, mr. deutch for their observations on this and i thank the panel of witnesses because our four witnesses today are true experts in this field. we look forward to the testimony. >> well put. thank you so much, mr. chairman. we now turn to the ranking member of the subcommittee, mr. sherman. >> the november agreement was supposed to last sex months but

not until two months after it was signed, eight months, it can be extended for another six months we're looking at 14 months. what happens iner that 14 months? er that 20% stockpile, half gets oxtized but it's still 20%. another half gets diluted and oxidized. more low enriched uranium is created and stockpiled, albeit in oxidized form. work on centrifuge technology continues, though certain of the entrifuges will not be used. this delay son-in-law for a short time. when iran would have a nuclear weapon because the 20% oxidized uranium can be converted back to gas quite quickly. iran uses that same technology to convert yellow cake into gaseous uranium. and at the end of this agreement, iran may be a little

bit further than they were in november from their first bomb but will be closer to a cache of five to 10 bombs because they will have all of the adegrees aloe enriched uranium that they cue rate during the deal. the sanctions relief has been very substantial because it changed the business climate. it's not just the content of the relief. there are loopholes in our existing sanctions laws, companies have been reluctant to exploit those because they figure the next sanctions law was around the corner. now it's not. and so we see a rush to do business with iran. the disagreement here in washington is actually rather modest. there seems to be agreement that we're not adopting new statutory sanctions until july or at least not letting them become effective until july. the administration significantly has agreed to enforce existing sanctions and would do that even if the iranians threaten to walk

out of the agreement. secretary kerry was in this room where witnesses are sitting now, he agreed that ehe would continue enforcing the existing law within a day they designated roughly a dozen entity the iranians walked out they came back. so we agrowed to enforce existing law well, agree no new laws will become effective until july. so the question is under what serks will new sanctions become effective in july? -- when will they two into effect and who will make that degrees, the president alone or the president with congress? will we -- who will decide that iran j just engaged in a delay program or that we've reached sufficient progress. i don't think congress should sur rend they are role because congress has been right and three administrations have been wrong. from 1996 to 2010, we -- congress didn't enact major

sanctions legislation. why? because three administrations sought so effectively, usually in the senate, to prevent the adoption of that legislation. congress was right. the house were more right than the senate and congress was more right than three different administrations. now we're being asked, oh, just don't do anything. trust the president. he'll do the right thing. the fact is that we're told by the administration we can adopt new sanctions in a nanosecond should we decide that that is important. what he means is, what the admgs means is we can adopt new sanctions in a nanosecond if the administration agrees with them. but this -- but if they don't, their capacity for dely and obfuscation for defeat of sanctions has been prouch. it was proven in 2009 and for the eight dwhreefers -- of the

prior administration. what are our choices? act now and adopt sanctions that will go into july and schedule a vote in july where congress could decide by joint resolution to suspend or prevpbt prevent the sanctions becoming effective and we would do so if adequate progress is made. we could have a compromise approach write in conference on the sanctions, schedule a vote in both houses of congress without further delay or obfuscation without further delay as to what the content would be and pass new legislation if warned in july and soon enough to prevent any pocket veto sense we go out in august. the final approach is what i call the narc leppcy approach. o to sleep -- the narcolepsy approach, go to sleep and wait until they wake us up. then in july we'll notice six of the eight months have passed and then you can be sure that this

admferings like the preer administrations will be for delay, dilution, and defeat and we'll be in session only a few weeks between the end of july and the end of the year system of iran will get a full year of relief from sanctions in actually 14 months. i think the one thing for this hearing to establish is that we're not going to adopt the narcolepsy approach. that we're going to have sanctions that iran will know will go into effect if adequate progress as determined by congress is not reached. with that, enge our negotiators will be far more effective than in congress is regarded as on vacation. i yield back. >> thank you so much, mr. sherman. now we go to the chairman of the subcommittee, mr. judge poe of texas. >> thank you, madam cheer. the world powers surrendered to

the iranian's -- iranian nation's will. those are the words of the iranian president. it should be no surprise that the iranians see this as a win for them, a loss for us and a loss for the rest of the world. iran keeps its infrastructure intact bup keeps enriching, or it keeps its yellow cake and eat it, too. the u.n. has voted five times that iran has cheated in its nuclear capability and should not be able to enrich at all. in one deal, iran wiped away all of those u.n. resolutions. when the united states negotiates a deal that locks tough, we have a problem. none of the changes agreed to are permanent. hour after iran signed the agreement, their top negotiator bragged on iranian tv that they

could quote return to the previous situation in one day. and reality stilts suggests the iranians could achieve capability in six months. this agreement doesn't stop iran's nuclear program. the state department gave the mineral rights in exchange. this agreement bars iran from installing nuclear equipment at its heavy water reactor but allows them to continue to construct its nuclear reactor. the problem is that the reactor's size is too big for a peaceful reactor. experts say it resembles a nuclear weapon facility. well, no kidding. when asked if he thought it could be used for peaceful purposes, former state department nonproliferation official said yes, it could. a 12-inch hunting knife could

spread jam on your toast in the morning. in this deal, iran gets $67 billion in cash payments. and get billions more as companies sitting on the sidelines out of fear of the sanctions now say it's ok to do business with iran. this could inject $20 billion into iran's economy. the iranians know there is no enforcement mechanism because all sanctions will be lifted. despite what the white house says it will be nearly to restart punishing sanctions if iran cheats or lies. you can't turn on and off like a light switch. i talked to prime minister netanyahu right after this deal was signed. he is correct, this is a bad deal for israel and bad deal for the united states. the only leverage we had on iranian hard liners with tough sanctions that brought their

economy to the knees. by easing sanctions, we have blunted our sharpest tool to get a peaceful solution. this is a flawed deal that gave away too much to iran and similarly to chamberlain's announcement where the nazis boasted peace and we got world war ii. we will see this deal extended for another six months as iran continues to enrich and marches loser to a nuclear weapon. iran must dismantle their nuclear program, not just freeze it. the iranian supreme leader hasn't changed his goal. he has said he wants to destroy israel and destroy the united states. i think we should believe him when he says he wants to get rid of us. so congress cannot wait. we should passer tougher sanctions and not let up on sanctions at this time. and that's just the way it is.

>> thank you very much, judge poe. the bells have running but i'm going to introduce our witnesses and i think we'll have time to witness, ur first ambassador wallace. chief executive officer of united against nuclear iran, which he founded in 2008. his organization has been a leader in pressuring businesses to end their dealings with iran and promoted sanctions legislation to prevent a nuclear-armed iran. ambassador wallace was u.s. ambassador to the united nations on u.n. management and reform issues. next mr. greg jones, senior researcher at the nonproliferation policy education center. mr. jones has been a defense policy analyst for the past 40 years and great ex per test in the areas of nonproliferation and counterproliferation and

regimes attempting to acquire nuclear technology. hird, we welcome mr. ollie heinonen. senior fellow at the harvard kennedy school of government. prior to this position he served for 27 years at the international atomic energy agency, including deputy director general. he led the agency's efforts to identify and dismantle nuclear proliferation networks including overseeing efforts to contain iran's nuclear program. he has led nuclear program investigations around the world including to south africa, iraq, north korea and syria. welcome. last, but not least, we welcome mr. david albright founder and president of the nonprofit institute for science and international security. mr. albright has written

numerous assessments on nuclear programs throughout the world. your statements in full will be made part of the record and feel free to summarize them. we will start with you, mr. ambassador. >> thank you, chairman. members of the joint subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you once again. i'm honored to sit here on the panel with a group of very distinguished and committed colleagues. we hope that a comprehensive and verifiable agreement that rolls back iran's nuclear program is reached in six months but the prospects appear small and we must confront the difficulties with candor and bipartisan debate. the joint plan has provided disproportionate sanctions relief to iran by allowing them to continue an program.

it will not dismantle a sing the centrifuge. iran retains the ability to produce weapons uranium for a bomb in as little as two months and has not indicated it will end development. at the same time the sanctions architecture has been significantly rolled back and enforcement has fallen to a trickle. what is the acceptable scope and size of iran's enrichment program and will we permit them to operate the i.r. 40. if they sought a peaceful energy program there wouldn't be any need for enrichment or heavy water reactor. the international community has forgotten there are numerous sanctions calling for iran to suspend. the geneva joint plan declares any final accord iran will be permitted to enrich is at best vague. today you will hear a range of opinions of what acceptable

enrichment program would look like. we should all agree that extending iran's breakout time from its current 30 to 60 days to well beyond is the imperative. does any serious person believe that iran is prepared to dismantle between 15,000 and 19,000 centrifuges and forego the installation of far more advanced centrifuges? unfortunately the white house has described the sanctions relief provided in the agreement as economicically insignificant. we disagree. iran's economy is blossoming. it has increased in value by 25%. the stock exchange has increased by 100%. dozens of multinational corporations are returning to iran. iran's oil exports have ncreased by 60%. .2 million barrels from a low.

oil exports will increase further and if oil sanctions continue, its sales would have dropped to 500,000 barrels per day. importantly the administration has curtailed its enforcement efforts. in 2013, the united states treasury department designated 183 entities for iran sanctions violations. since president rouhani's election, united states has blacklisted 29 entities. the obama administration must hold to its pledge to enforce sanctions. the white house estimates that iran stands to receive $6 billion to 7 billion. the true value of sanctions relief is well more than $20 billion. calculate the sales of oil. there would be far less pressure for iran to make material concessions on its nuclear program. the congress must actively take

part in this process and make its positions known. this would entail capping a number of i.r. centrifuges to a small fraction to 20,000 that iran poses or more appropriately none at all. it must be kept ayear away from breakout. rouhani supports sanctions on iran in six months' time. congress should pass and should sign into law the nuclear weapons free iran act which has the support of bipartisan majority. it is wrong that the white house is characterizing those who question the joint plan as dishonest war mongers. in the 1990's, we entered interim a nuclear agreement with north korea. the agreed framework became the can that was kicked down the

road. this time congress must make clear if there is no final agreement after the joint plan, initial six-month term congress will adopt robust sanctions and we must learn the lessons of history and not repeat its mistakes. thank you for the opportunity. >> thank you very much. and the subcommittee will recess while we vote and come right back to hear the rest of our panelists. >> the subcommittee will come to order. thank you being here.

we will have another set of votes at 4:00 so we hope we can almost wrap it up. mr. jones, you are welcome to make your statement and your prepared remarks will be made a part of the record. thank you, sir. >> in early november, secretary of state kerry said of the ongoing negotiations with iran, quote, we need to get the right deal, no deal is better than a bad deal, unquote. unfortunately, the november 24 joint plan of action is a bad deal. this fact has been obscured by both mischaracterization of the deal's benefits and denial of the deal's great flau. president obama has said that the deal has quote cut off iran's likely path to a bomb, unquote. this is not true. before the current nuclear deal, iran could produce h.u. for a nuclear weapon in just six weeks. over the next six months the

joint plan of action will increase this to eight weeks. iran will remain close to a nuclear weapon. the joint plan of action allows iran to continue to produce 3.5% enriched uranium which is the key starting material for any effort to produce h.u. for weapons. iran's stockpile of this material will continue to grow during the course of this nuclear deal though several white house statements have incorrectly claimed otherwise. as the stockpile of enriched uranium grows, the number of nuclear weapons that iran could produce from it will grow as well. iran's stockpile of 3.5% enriched uranium is not supposed to grow. iran is supposed to convert the excess into an oxide form but iran can convert this material back once it begins to produce nuclear weapons. this fact is well known to technical experts but their input was either not sought or

heeded. the joint plan of action has some benefits and those who have argued that limited benefits is better than no deal. it permits iran to retain centrifuge enrichment. centrifuge technology puts any country within arms reach of h.u. the joint plan of action has already stated that when the follow-on so-called comprehensive solution has expired, iran, quote, will be treated in the same manner as that of any nonnuclear state party, unquote. that means in say, five, 10 years, iran's nuclear program will be under no special restickses and if the members have allowed iran to keep its program, not only could it build as many century fumings as it wants, it could import them as part of normal nuclear trade and could have a larger program and be closer to acquiring nuclear

weapons. what is worse, the joint plan of action will be setting a precedent for all other countries. if iran is to be treated in the same manner as that of any nonnuclear state party, if iran has violated it's safeguards by conducting clandestine centrifuge enrichment and defied multiple resolutions demanding that it halt, is allowed to retain this capability, on what basis can any country that has abided by the safeguard obligations be denied centrifuge enrichment. the joint plan of action is setting the stage for many countries to plie for them whenever they desire them. unfortunately, there are no good options to head off a nuclear-armed iran. any negotiated settlement would

require reductions, reductions that iran has said it will not agree to. further sanctions are unlikely to be affected because countries like russia and china will probably undercut them. military strikes could lead to a major war with iran. the u.s. needs to try to strengthen the nonproliferation system which appears to be unraveling. key to this effort will be to stop countries using nuclear activities to require the plutonium needed for nuclear weapons. the u.s. needs them to clarify what facilities it can effectively safeguard and which it cannot. a negotiated agreement with iran that legitimate mieses its enrichment program would be a step in the wrong direction. thank you. >> thank you, mr. jones. r. heinonen.

>> thank you very much for inviting me to address this hearing. i will concentrate on my remarks on the aspects of this deal, which was concluded on the 20 of november. highlight some of the implications and make some minor proposals for the way forward. the agreement is a small but important step forward which after a long delay could start on 20 of january. under this deal, iran continues .o produce low-energy uranium maintain centrifuge production capability including the work force and continues with

centrifuge r&d. iran will produce centrifuges . ly no centrifuges will be built during this period. some of the uranium and 20% of its uranium is converted to oxides. in terms of capacity when iran -- in other duce words, iran maintains its industrial capabilities. construction of nonnuclear is ermitted and it proceeds elsewhere. he production continues.

>> the details worked out in agreement by the i.a.e.a. and iran have provided them much wider access to this agreement. the 2003 undertaking included arlier access to the nuclear r&d. visit to was the tehran and component managed facilities and key material such

as high strength weapons. one of the challenges that they are facing is the material centrifuge manufactured by iran. iran commits itself not to construct new locations and will not construct any thing capable for reprocessing. , the he access provided i.a.e.a. is in their capabilities in the statements made to iran. preamble of the this, additional steps and final step which includes addressing the u.n. security council resolutions that includes

outstanding issues and of the iranian nuclear program. in other words, iran needs according to those resolutions to explain -- resolve the questions and certain high explosive studies and has to explain why it acquired that the document which has to do the manufacturing of nuclear warhead and verify the r&d activities with institutes and companies and has to explain the production of the components of companies related to the military establishment. without us addressing these questions, will not be able to come to any conclusion that all nuclear material in iran is in peaceful use which has instilled

-- in this i have given proposals of how to proceed in this way gradually to built up confidence about the peaceful nature of the program. then at the end, i would like to say this agreement serves interim states and should not be . end by itself without an end in sight. run the risk of proliferation consequences in the region when the states see iran not only maintaining its normal breakout capabilities but slowly advancing them in particular areas which remain not available inspectors. a. >> mr. albright. >> thank you for inviting me

here today. and great pleasure to be here and appreciate all your work that you are doing to try to sort through the proper oversight role of congress which i believe is extremely important in this situation. i think we have discussed the interim deal of the joint plan of action quite a bit and its strengths and weaknesses have been identified. the real test of a joint plan of action is negotiating the long-term rangements and that's the process that many are not giving a high probability of success. but nonetheless, this long-term comprehensive solution is going to have to create meaningful combined with adequate verification sufficient to ensure any attempt by iran to build nuclear weapons would be detect nd a timely manner and provide adequate time for international response. now the interim deal is an

important confidence-building measure and certainly has its weaknesses, many of which have been talked about and yesterday published an article on some problems and loopholes involving centrifuge r&d rather than criticizing the interim deal i would argue it has to be fixed in any comprehensive solution, that iran's ability to make advanced centrifuges has to be severely curtailed and the process that they are involved with centrifuge r&d has to be transparent and particularly to deal with some of the problems that olli has confronted. also i want to agree with what olli said, the interim deal should not continue past its lifetime. it is by no means sufficient. and if you can't get a comprehensive deal, the interim deal is not a substitute in any manner. also want to say that a real

test of iran's intentions i would say in the short to medium term how it's going to treat these issues involving the allegations of iran apast work on nuclear weapons and other military programs. iran has delayed the meeting. it was supposed to happen in january until february 8. is it going to delay it again? is it going to allow it to go to facilities and meet with people so they can get to the bottom of it. now on the comprehensive solution, my testimony and studies that i have outlined, what we see is a model and certain things have been talked about. certainly we want to see much greater breakout times to meet our national security interests. we think the breakout times should be measured in six to 12 months to allow detection time and response time and that's going to require iran to move 14

centrifuges. also some of my colleagues have mentioned the problem with oxides. the stocks need to be reduced, particularly the 20% stocks. putting them into oxide may work in the interim. the iraq reactor that the route has to be blocked. also, we haven't talked a lot about it but there needs to be much greater verification that's put in play. often iran says we'll accept additional protocol. we would argue it has to be the additional protocol plus and another set of verification conditions in this deal that are going to provide much greater transparency of the program. the other thing that is also important is to remember how long these conditions would last. the administration is talking

about 20 years. iran's talking about three to five. i think it's very important that 20 years be the minimum and that the administration be held to that minimum. i think if that's done and in a sense iran would be on probation for 20 years. that could provide the confidence that iran has turned acorn. one thing that the additional or this joint plan of action doesn't deal with is how do they come out of probation, that it is right now implied that the conditions would end from one day to the next and whatever the length is, probably some work needs to be done to make sure that the conditions are removed only if iran has satisfied certain criteria. i think i have talked enough about the verification, but i do want to re-emphasize that iran has been very tough on this. it has resisted all kinds of verification. it's resisting it today.

and i think that another test is going to be whether iran is fully cooperative and the effort to get to the bottom of its outstanding issues which are going to require much more intrusive verification and that would be played out over the next several months if the comprehensive solution is going to be negotiated by the end of the six-month period. allow me to just -- let me end there. i realize i'm over time. >> thank you very much to the excellent panelists. we begin with our set of questions. why is this deal in secret? why is it members of congress ave to go to a supersecret location, get smart kind of place to look at the deal? and our subcommittee staff director and i and it's an easy

to read document and one doesn't have to be an expert as one of our panelists is to understand what is there. i encourage all of the members to go there and read the document. you can't take notes, you can't take it out. why is this -- if this is such a great deal, so good for peace and diplomacy in our time, why is it held in secret? and do you worry about the details in this plan? do you worry about what may be or may not be in it? i just ask that as a general question, because having read it -- if the administration is proud of it, i think they should highlight it. i'll ask the panelists, what is the greatest worry you have about this deal? and ambassador wallace, last week there were reports that iran could use the money from

sanctions relief to fund terrorism against us. what kind of oversight or mechanisms are in place to ensure that the proper and adequate use of sanctions relief and can we follow the money once it is released. the nature of the deal, why doesn't the public have it, why can't we have it in an open setting, your greatest worry and can we follow the money, whoever wants to get at that? >> my biggest worry about the deal is that we have significantly rolled back the sanctions architecture which both sides of the aisle have constructed and created the sanctions. mr. sherman said it quite well in his intervention, you have to have ever increasing sanctions for them to be effective. the moment you start dialing them back, they start falling

away. we have dramaticically cut the sanctions effort. at the same time we haven't rolled back their nuclear program in any material way. no one on this panel and true experts on this panel can show that a single centrifuge has been dismantled. if you believe in no enrichment or limited enrichment. it can have zero to -- that's the range of opinion at this table. what are the chances that iran is going to dismantle 15,000 to 19,000 of its centrifuges? i say none. i worry that the interim agreement becomes the permanent agreement. thank you. >> can i just say with regard to the terms being somewhat secret, this does bother me and not necessarily for the reason you

think. it appears to me that the administration has negotiated an agreement that doesn't fully understand and i don't understand how that can happen because obviously there are technical experts in the national labs who know as much as i, if not more, but it's clear there are various places d one is the 3.5% enrismed uranium stockpile won't grow, which is incorrect. another is is disconnecting the tandem cascades would prevent iran from producing 20% where we know they produced it with single cascades, which is what they would be left with. i'm left with the impression that the administration doesn't understand what they have egotiated and that i find most worrisome. >> about the document and secret agreement, it's not very

unusual. i think similar understandings at the time of the agreement with north korea. so we have seen those before. but i think -- when i look at , i technical explanations didn't see any reason technically to keep those in secret but there are some other ones that i just don't know because i have not seen the document and how big it is. but it would clarify a lot of areas if it is made public. and second thing, -- i mention my worries in my opening statement and this becomes final agreement or agreement which has a long life expectancy because we don't get an insight to the content of the iranian nuclear program with this deal. it is better than what it was a year or two ago but it's not the

final solution. and i want to remind from the verification point of view, every day that they don't have access to this so-called military facility, it would be more difficult for it verify what actually took place. >> mr. albright will have to wait for your statement in another set of questions from my colleagues. and i would like to encourage our members to please go and read the document and i encourage you to do so. before i recognize ranking member deutch, i hear his older brother is in the front row. >> that is correct. >> thank you so much, mr. deutch. > thank you, madam chairman, ranking member member sherman says he has more hair than his

younger brother. i wanted to follow up with mr. albright, if i understand correctly the quote that i referred to in my opening tatement about a huge site dedicated to the rockets and explosives owned by the military industry and has hundreds of building and test sites came from your organization? >> we looked at that quite a bit. >> if you could just speak what is i think the crux of all this entire debate. this is not about just the centrifuges that are spinning, this whole debate is about how to prevent iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and that statement seems to be right at the heart of this and yet we don't yet have the details -- you just alluded to this as

well, what do we have to see there? how likely is it -- is it possible for the iranians to have completely swept clean the facility and when we talk about iran coming clean on the possible military dimensions, what is it they have to provide and are there examples of other regimes in similar circumstances who have faced this country and what do we expect from them? >> there is a site there that is alleged to have been engaged in high explosive work. they have evidence of it and has to go 18 months and been denied and iran has significantly modified the site to the point where it may not be possible for them to take entl sampling and find something. the key thing is iran has to

allow the visit and allow the follow-up. not just a visit. they will come and do things that iran will have to allow them to do and give them access to the people involved based on the information at least and answer the basic question, do this work. >> when were the previous inspections? >> they have never been to this building or this complex. they have been there, but it was a long time ago and the information available was much less complete than it is now. so i think the focus now is on this particular -- this site of high explosives. there are other sites, too. sites involved where they allegedly made re-entry vehicles prior to 2004. they have asked to go there and has not been allowed. in cases where it's worked with south africa, the country

cooperates. and in that cooperation, you can see that it can work out and can do its job. iran has not shown that level of cooperation. one of the first things to look for if iran is going to settle this, is it cooperating. so they are able to get the information it needs and ask follow-up questions to get to the very bottom of this. >> but we're not operating in the dark here. we know who ---- the i.a.e.a. knows the people that need to be spoken to, correct? >> they know some, but won't know the complete list. it's not possible. in the case of south africa, there were people that you wouldn't have expected and provided important information. >> you don't get those other names until you start with the

ones we have. tell us about the discussions that have taken place thus far? have we identified those individuals we wish to speak ith and what's the response? >> those discussions are reflected in the reports in 2008, march 4, and then again or june 4, 2008. when we come to this so-called or possible military facility, we have the opportunity to discuss with the first director but unfortunately he was not able to answer all the questions. and we wanted to see his successor which never materialized. they have a good understanding of those and also the people who ve equipment used in those

experiments. so there is quite a good starting point. and then you look at the facts and go from there and see whom else might need to be seen. -- have we prepared this list and presented it to the iranians? in all of the talks thus far and is there acknowledgement that yes, those are appropriate questions and we'll make sure these individuals will respond? >> well, when you go to an investigative process, you don't get the whole list, you start with the keys and go from there. i don't think they have prepared a very long list at this stage, only the starting point and then go from there. but that kind of list exists. >> were those names included in the last report? >> only one name has been in the

reports because that's another reason they don't want to disclose for a number of reasons, the names. >> but that name has been disclosed? >> one name has been disclosed. >> since that would be a good place to start and he has been identified in the report, has he agreed to engage in these discussions? >> we met him i think twice, but at one point of time, the process got stopped and we never got to his successor. >> madam chairman, i hope later in his responses, he might be able to speak to -- elaborate on the comments that in 2003 there was much greater access provided than there is today. > can i add one thing? there are lists of names that have been made public. and i don't think any of them have ever talked about anything

to do with the military dimensions. one talked about work he did as a preffesor at a university but idn't talk about the physics research center. > thank you, mr. deutch. judge poe, it's just the way it is. >> i want to say amen to your comments about the deal being public, not only for members of congress, but for american people as well since it affects us. i'm perplexed why it's not. and i still don't know why it's not. iran is the mischief maker in the middle east. they have the military -- their military is involved in syria. they support terrorism throughout the world.

they're sending rockets to hezbollah in lebanon so they can be fired into israel. they are responsible for the attacks on iranian dips dents in iraq -- dissidents in iraq over the last several years. the supreme leader of iran wants to destroy israel, wants to destroy the united states. they are building intercontinental ballistic missiles and expanding their war capabilities. what are we thinking that they want to deal with us and cut back on their nuclear weapon development? what incentive? they may just not be telling us the truth that they will cut back. i don't think we should believe anything they say. contracts, deals are made when both sides agree and there are inspections or people acting in good faith.

iranians aren't acting in good faith. i don't see any evidence over the last few years that they ever acted in good faith. sanctions have worked and we're now backing off the sanctions. they have to be forced not to be able to build nuclear weapons. now i agree peace is the best answer, negotiations is the best answer down -- long-term, we have got to do that and don't want to be involved in some type of military action and we have to prevent that from happening. long-term, mr. albright, the long-term situation and look down the road, months, years, doesn't look good for the free world as far as nuclear weapons. they are being built to go west. ambassador and i'll let all of you comment on this, long-term, how are we going to resolve the problem that iran is determined

to have nuclear weapons? what's the answer to that question? >> i take the first crack at that. president obama said if we could have a nuclear deal with iran that it would resolve the sectarian tensions that are plaguing the region. i disagree with that strongly, particularly since the nature of this deal seems to not understand the nuclear weapon program. the u.n. security council passed several resolutions saying iran must suspend its enrichment and clarify the military aspects that olli and mr. albright were talking about. that hasn't happened. i think we are a long way away of getting to a point where we can use this nuclear file in a vacuum to deal with the problems in the region and the like and i remain greatly concerned that we

seemingly forgot the u.n. security resolutions which require clarification of the military dimension and in the agreement it says that iran will have a mutually defined enrichment program in the final deal. i thought that was unfortunate. that doesn't go a long way to answering your question. >> let me ask you this, is it orrect that iran is developing icbm's? >> we have seen a variety of that that they are looking the aspect of obtaining a nuclear weapon. we have seen a lot of evidence to this and this is an important part of the agreement that hasn't been focused on on, which is clarifying these other military aspects of the program. we haven't heard from iran about this. they haven't clarified that. those reports are very disturbing. >> mr. jones, gives us the long range answer. >> i'm the party pooper at these

things. i believe the ship has sailed. it is too late to stop iran. >> you think iran is going to get nuclear weapons? >> that's correct. and that depresses everyone who hears me talk, i can't see how there is going to be any agreement or the sanctions with the russians, chinese indians undercutting them are going to do any good. as you correctly pointed out, i'm not in favor of getting into another war in the middle east. >> we have the saudis and israelis working together. the saudis are worried about the nuclear weapon capability of iran. israel is and they are working together announcing this deal. >> it shows the level of threat and concern in the region. >> mr. sherman is recognized. >> thank you. if iran has nuclear weapons

america shouldn't feel they are safe even if missile defense worked because you can smuggle a nuclear weapon inside a bail of marijuana. this agreement remaining secret, it must contain wonderful pro--american provisions that hard liners in iran are not aware of. i know they looked to advice and information, but we have seen it. it doesn't. so it is peculiar that this agreement is not disclosed. nobody just wants one bomb. you are a nuclear power when you have several and confident enough to test one. in july, iran will have a certain stockpile of enriched uranium. it will have about half its 20% enriched with that being an oxide form. it will have its low-enriched uranium that it has today and

then it will have an additional supply of low-enriched uranium oxide. assuming they don't do anything with the yellow cake but looking at the enriched uranium they will have in july. how many bombs is that and is that uranium enough for weapons grade? >> i estimate around four weapons. >> and how long would it take them, knowing that they can spend the next six months doing experiments and engineering on their advanced centrifuges, but are not making any more centrifuges as i understand the agreement but they've got what they've got. they are learning how to use it better, how long would it take them to use this stockpile to make four weapons? >> just what they've got, first weapon in about two months.

four weapons, probably four, five months. >> four to five months. i'll go down the panel, everybody agree with mr. jones? you do agree. mr. heinonen. to add. d like most important thing is reduce the amount of unknowns, if there are enough sint try fugse and are there additional stocks. >> based on what we do know and one of the advantages of this agreement is we are inspecting a few things that we hadn't inspected before but answering the question, do you agree with four weapons in four months? >> i think it will take longer than four months. but the first weapon will be there in two, three months. >> in terms of the first one in two months, around that. but i think to get to four,

five, i would multiply that number by four, five. you are talking about eight months. and there may be -- >> four to eight. i point out if we lose this game, it's not because of who was calling the plays in the final quarter. we didn't feel the team for the first three-quarters. from 1996 to 2010, although this committee did everything possible to pass new sanctions, they were stopped by three successive administrations. e are -- our effective sanctions began in 2010. we are committed to this will goal line stand just a few yards from the goal line and it's not clear which play we could possibly call. but we have three. voluntary sanctions, which is

what we have now, that is to say we have the sanctions and can get other countries to agree to. and secondary sanctions where you threaten to cut off world trade if they don't radically change their laws. we have the iran sanctions act calls for that but we don't do it. and if we took military action, would we be able to turn into rubble the centrifuges? do on i have an answer? mr. jones. >> i discuss that in my written testimony. unfortunately, the centrifuges e quite resistant to bmb bombarredment because you have 96 cascades that can run. a bombing raid and we saw this in world war ii, you knock out the utilities, the plant goes down, how quickly can it be

back. >> the final possibility is we threaten to hit every oil field and industrial and strategic target in iran if they don't allow mr. wallace to go and just clean out everything. and i don't think i have to time to ask for your comment, so you can respond in writing. >> thank you, mr. sherman. i thought those were great questions. thank you for being here. i'm having a hard time figuring out what the united states got out of this. the iranians got a lot and got an implicit right to enrich uranium and we have allies that are begging us to be able to enrich uranium. we say no to alies but to enemies we give them the right to enrich uranium as a reward

for doing it the wrong way. i guess -- i'm having a hard time figuring out anything that the united states gained besides being able, i guess, for the next year, to go in front of the american people and say we won something but that will only be proven wrong by history. this is like the equivalent of a police officer pulling someone over for d.u.i. and the person in the car saying, mr. officer, i will be happy to pull over, but you have to let me have the keys in the car and with the engine running or else i'm not going to get out and the officer saying, that sounds like a good deal for me. i think back to what happened in north korea and i remember the agreement that was hailed as the peace in our time of the korean nuclear agreement in north korea, that they were not going to have a nuclear weapon. in fact, i remember reading some of the editorial papers that said that this was a huge victory against the war hawks and for the people that said

diplomacy could never work and then a year later, north korea has nuclear weapons and that's something we are dealing with today and that is a regime that as threatening as they are are less threatening than if the iranians got nuclear weapons. the sanctions went down -- and i know iraq is a touchy subject and not talking about the war in 2003. this cat-and-mouse game that occurred and everything like that. i'm trying to find out what the enforcement mechanism on our end and the motivation to stop playing the cat-and-mouse game and then the deal is off. but i get no indication that is the case either. i want to ask about the north korean parallel here and something we ought to be concerned with but when we have used sanctions in the past, times they have been successful

and times they have not been successful, pulling the trigger on relieving sanctions too early leads to unsuccess. do you have an example of that or counterexample of that, maybe pulling the trigger has helped and discuss the north korean parallel. ambassador, start with you. >> i'll go to the sanctions question and leave it to my colleagues on previous examples. we did pull the trigger well too early on sanctions here. i'm not a sanction apologyist, i run a group that engages in economic pressure but they don't always work. actually this committee and this congress showed that they were working in the context of iran. iran's economy was veering towards the red zone and i think we blinked unfortunately four to six months too early. there are many more examples of sanctions not working historically than they have worked. i would argue that our sanctions on iran were maybe the most

effective but we unraveled them too quickly. there are only four tools in the tool shed, sanctions, diplomacy, a military option and covert action. a serious foreign policy would engage all of them. sanctions were just about to have the great fundamental impact. >> if you look at those old 1980 shows when the investigator should punch the bad guy one last time and you know it and the bad guy gets up. >> "road runner" episode is coming to mind. >> much of what you said sounds like you were reading off of my sheet here. >> maybe i was. >> thank you. but on north korea, i want to point out how these failures are damaging u.s. credibility worldwide. i was discussing iran with some canadian intelligence analysts a while ago, and i gave my

pessimistic views on iran and one of the canadians said, but the u.s. administration said they aren't going to allow iran to get nuclear weapons and before i could say anything, one of the other canadians said, that's what they said about north korea, too. and these are our friends. >> i also think the administration would probably have never said that fallujah would be taken over by al qaeda when they left but that's another issue. my time has expired. >> coming to my mind, my discussion in 2003 with my north korean counterpart when we were kicked out of north korea, i said what's next, a nuclear weapon. he said don't worry, we will not build a nuclear weapon. plutonium is our weapon. this is the situation with iran.

>> we'll have you hold that thought -- because i have to be fair to everybody. i hate to cut you off. mr. higgins is recognized. >> let me go back to the elections that brought rouhani into office. there were six candidates running. rouhani ran against the policies that created international isolation. ran against the policies that created sanctions and he won the election. now iranian elections are not like united states elections. rouhani could not have won without the supreme leader willing it. in fact, in iran, if you don't get 50% of the vote, there is a runoff. rouhani got 50.6% of the vote. it tells us that either the upreme leader is trying to

bamboozle the united states in believing that iran is committed to reform or that the supreme leader is allowing rouhani an opportunity to negotiate a deal. but we do not know if it is a deal we can live with or that the international community can live with. there's three generations of nuclear proliferation in iran. the first one was basically a glorified national science project. iran 10 years ago had 164 centrifuges, which is basically uraniuminery that spins at supersonic speeds to reduce weapons grade fuel. 19,000iran has centrifuges. it has a multibillion-dollar atomic