all of them, and have been for many years. host: why did you make that decision? guest: the decision was made to create a collegiality in the department and between departments. when a person has been on our staff 45-6 years, they reach their peak salary. most of our staff are paid the same amount every year which creates a degree of collegiality, less competitiveness, and helps us focus on the needs of the patients without financial distractions. do you accept medicare and medicaid patients at the clinic? guest: absolutely. more than 50% of our patients or

medicare or medicaid patients. dose to 60% of the work we is in this population of patients. -- i do notpendent know if that is the right word but i'm going to use it -- how dependent is the u.s. health care system on the federal government and moneys from medicare and medicaid and other sources? medicare represents about 23% of the $2.4 trillion spent every year in health care in the country. .edicaid is another 16% i think the latest figures i have seen are about 39% of the $2.4 trillion is medicare and medicaid. it is a major component of the health care spending. >> how would you describe the relationship between the mayo clinic and the federal government? we have had a long

relationship with the federal government. many, many decades working closely with them to advise them on policy and regulation and sharing our model. we believe our model of coordinated care focus on the patient provides better efficiency, safer care, better outcomes, and overall with lower cost. we have sure those messages with the federal government for a long period of time. we continue to work very closely with the federal government on these issues and we advise the government, as many other groups andabout new policy changes the direction the government got to go. currently, we are in very deep discussions with the senate finance committee, house ways and means, energy and commerce. with electedmeet officials to discuss our model and how our model might be of and perhaps might

guide some of the decisions made in washington. we have had a very long relationship with the federal government. opinion ofis your the affordable care act and its current implementation? guest: the affordable care act is primarily about extending access to insurance for americans who are uninsured, uninsurable, or underinsured. primarily an extension of medicaid eligibility. it is an insurance access bill. there are some steps in the bill to move us toward more coordinated care. the countable care organization -- a countable care organization is in place to foster innovation about providing higher-quality care at a lower cost. we do not believe there is enough to move forward with modernizing medicare, but it is a step another or many more

steps that need to be taken. we see them primarily as health insurance reform. that is the phrase you heard the president use a couple of nights ago in the state of the union address. he did not talk about the affordable care act, but he talked about health insurance reform. that is the major focus of this first piece of legislation. when you talk about modernizing medicare, what do you mean by that? what would you like to see done? two or three steps need to happen in the short term and a very important series of steps need to happen in the long-term. in the short term, and this is where we are working, it is moving the payment system to focus on outcomes. care,care, more efficient state-of-the-art care, and paying for results, rather than

paying for activity. the current fee for service system that is in place has not been modified in any meaningful way for decades. that is the first thing. reward, recognize, and motivate groups to work together to pay for safer care and better outcomes. the second key component to modernize medicare is to take advantage of the explosion of technology to use technology to help us combined care to urban areas, rural america, using some of the innovations in technology. medicine,ine, e- sharing knowledge at a distance, helping patients monitor chronic diseases at a distance. currently there are very few payment mechanisms to move that forward.

licensing requirements get us at cross purposes. if you will. i am blanking. forgive me. um. hhs? are you talking about guest: the way the military is paid. forgive me. i am having a senior moment early in the morning. host: you were talking about military health care? what is it about the way the military health care works? guest: yes. sorry. thank you so much. been able to practice across state lines when they're working with the v.a. system. excuse me, the v.a. system. host: the v.a. system. what do you say to people who complain about the increasing

cost of health care? intoit costs to even check the hospital, visit a doctor, the cost of technology. well, the way pricing is done currently is a system that has been in place -- >> i want to welcome you. i want to welcome our live c- span audience as well. i want to introduce our distinguished panel. [no audio] my colleague, a senior fellow at hudson. he directs the center on islam democracy.

the coeditor of islamist ideology. to my immediate left, a senior fellow on the council of foreign relations and adjunct professor at georgetown university. ray tous great -- ask give a five-minute introduction. then there will be another brief introduction. then mr. durand will do the same. then i hope we will launch into a casual conversation, galvanizing, id trust. then we will move to a 20-30 minutes question and answer. period at the end. i hope you will derive different points of interest and questions to ask your panel. ray, if you would begin. a i will begin by discussing little bit -- i hope everyone can hear me -- the joint plan of action. i do think it is a complicated agreement.

people talk about the joint plan of action as, i am for it, i am against it. it is complicated and it has a number of provisions that one has to be aware of. for one thing, i would say, it is an unusual agreement. although it is interim and some of the measures it prescribes, it does have probably the most consequential page of the joint plan of action -- the last page. or they agree on some principles that will define the final deal. some of the measures that are interim, such as suspension of iranian 20% production, a greater degree of transparency -- they are to be welcome and i think they are important. they inject a measure of otherwisein iran's undisturbed nuclear trajectory. want to get to the final steps, it is suggested that the joint that whatever the

final deal is agreed upon in the next six months to one year, that final deal will have an expiration clause. at the conclusion expiration of that clause, iran will be treated as any other member. in essence, that means that if the letter of the agreement is followed through, that iran after a keyword of time and that period is being negotiated, they tol have the right indigenously enriched uranium and do so on an industrial scale. of the interimt agreement, which i think is characteristic of most arms control agreements to be fair, is that there is no provision for enforcement after the final agreement is signed. it is suggested by the agreement that all sanctions are to be lifted. i think the language it uses is comprehensively lifting of sanctions.

if most of the agreement is it will be difficult to reconstitute the sanctions regime which has taken 10 years to build across two administrations. no arms control agreement has provisions for enforcement after the agreement is signed. i would suggest that those two provisions need to be re- examined. comprehensiveer restrictions are negotiated, it should be doable and not subject to that clause. i would try to introduce some measure of suspending the sanctions, not lifting them. so that they can be reinstituted. say about whether there was a final agreement possible or not, the way the new iranian team negotiates, president rouhani -- i think what they are mostly focused on is the duration of the comprehensive agreement.

i think they would be willing to , perhaps evengs dismantling things, in order to get as brief of a clause as possible. therefore they can move to on industrial sized capability. if that is the calculation, and i think it was the calculation -- they an interim deal agree to those restrictions to get the long-term principles that were beneficial to them -- if that is their approach, then there might be a comprehensive agreement. between the two sides. i do not think it will happen in the next six months. a thick iranian officials have hinted at that. the deputy foreign minister hinted that they are unlikely to get to a comprehensive agreement in six months. mechanism trigger where they can have another six months. if the iranians get the right

terms of thers in expiration clause -- that is what they're focused on. >> thank you very much. >> thank you. speak about the following. planok at the joint action in light of what we are seeing today in the middle east as a whole. how that might relate to past history. how it might -- what it might portend going forward. i thought it would begin by offering a certain view with a quotation. it goes as follows. you have a schism regarding the middle east. a schism between sunni and shia throughout the region that is profound. ore of it is directed abetted by states who are in contests for power.

you have states that are just as functional. various warlords and thugs and criminals were trying to gain leverage or footholds so that they can control resources, populations, territory. this view sites some examples. syria, where you have an authoritarian, brutal government was willing to do anything to hang on to power. iran is funding terrorist organizations and developing nuclear weapons. this statement may be familiar to some of you. here and at home. it is a statement of president obama. characterization in the interview which was published about a week and a half ago in "the new yorker."

it is a rather bleak and distressing view. unfortunately, it does describe a good deal of present realities. it needs two or three supplements. first, it describes the situation in the contemporary middle east -- the chaos, violence, destruction as a shapeless mass. each of the various countries and conflicts and dysfunctions within the region have their own idiosyncratic features. which nowne aspect serves, in my opinion, as an organizing principle. that aspect is what the president began with. conflict.shiite this inter-muslim conflict is very old. it is also likely to remain for a very long time. the clauses f causes are very profound and visceral.

its long history, the conflict has had many faces and some have been more intense than others. this is one such phase. it is the most intense and several hundred years. another thing that needs to be from the perspective of the sunni-shiite conflict, sunnis have usually been the winners in such conflicts. they may still wind up to be the winners of the present conflict. , ledhe moment, the shiites by the islamic republic of iran, are winning. later to then reasons of success of iran and its allies. i will mention 2 here. they are the bearer of a revolutionary and hegemonic .mbitions which invigorated

on the other hand, you have sunni states which oppose it, which are very weak and very divided. the main sunni pushback is coming in the form of radical jihadist groups, with some help from sunni states. the third thing -- the third way in which this original statement needs to be supplemented is the clause -- cause. that pertain to the behavior of outside powers. the american power puts it scales in favor of the sunni states. it at the moment, america is disinclined to do so. there is one other outside power operative in this sphere at the moment. that is russia. since russia is supporting iran, that further tips the balance to the shiites. moment tom ahe

this is the general trend and it is being augmented but the negotiations themselves. on, i thinkhey go the more this will be the case and still more it will be the case if an agreement is reached which leaves iran with a substantial nuclear weapon breakout capacity. the net effect will be to consolidate, if not legitimate, the victory iran is seeking in the role iran claims for itself. a consolidation, both in the eyes of iran and of its enemies. what will follow from this? it is obviously too soon to tell. onell close by offering recent consequence in the form of an event this past week. this week, the prime minister of

turkey paid a visit to tehran. he has been there before. but i believe the last time he was there was early on, if not before, the syrian civil war. the prime minister of turkey has been in conflict with iran over syria and civil war. in the present case, he did not go to iran -- tehran to try to persuade the iranians to reduce the support for assad. rather, he went there to sign some new agreements, trade agreements, perhaps in energy agreement, negotiation about the price of oil and gas that is purchased from iran. proposal that a

political, strategic ordination council be set up, and turkey irancoordinate -- in which and turkey will coordinate. he declared that iran is my second home. it would appear from this remark and the circumstances of the iranthat he thinks that has essentially won the struggle with this phase of it and that he must make his peace with it. other statesmen feel the same. >> think you very much. mike? >> i would like to talk a little bit about the strategic perception of the obama administration, as i understand it. i think there has been a kind of revolution in american politics -- a quiet revolution for the

middle east -- that has gone completely unannounced and it is worthy of more debate than it has gotten. i would characterize the revolution as the gutting of iran containment. the abandonment of iran containment, region-wide. the nuclear agreement is part of this wider shift in our iran policy. if you go back, not too long ago, just a few years ago, and the bush administration and even through into the early obama administration, there was a view in washington of the region as being divided between two different alliance systems. for the sake of convenience, let's call it the horizontal alliance and the vertical alliance. the horizontal alliance was iran, syria, hezbollah, and hamas. the vertical one would be saudi arabia, jordan, turkey.

heightenede two were , their differences were heightened in the came together in syria. this is where they clashed. the united states, for the last 35 years, has seen it as its role in the region to contain iran. the rhetoric of the obama administration continues to talk that way, if you look at the state of the union address, the president talked about hezbollah and the need to contain actsllah and iranian throughout the region. if you watch what has been happening in syria, a major muscle movement by iran and syria, a major intervention into the conflict i hezbollah -- by hezbollah, and there is no record of serious american

attempts to counter it, even public statements against it. the iranians are not just facilitating hezbollah on the ground in syria, they are taking iraqi shiites to iran, training them, and sending them as militia members to fight in syria. with no pushback from the obama administration at all. we have the rhetoric of containing them in the region and the reality of not really doing anything about it at all, in fact turning a blind eye to it. why is that? i think there are two major factors at work there. one, it is a simple decision that the president made very early on, exactly when, we do not know. tom donnellan, the former national security advisor, said that they ran a review of middle east policy and they determined that the united states was overinvested in the middle east.

so the obama administration decided to pull back. exactly how far is not clear. , also notat way clear. it is in the body language of the administration and specifically with respect to syria. the one line of continuity in the syria policy is the desire of the president not to get involved. that is the only organizing principle of what we have actually done, as opposed to what we have said in syria. the president does not want to get involved. sayminute you say that, you we are going to tolerate a lot more disruption, a lot more conflict in the region, then you have to answer, what are we going to put in its place? you look across the region. you think, there is iran. you can see, objectively, we have overlapping interests. we are both opposed to al qaeda. we want stability in different countries. doesn't iran want stability in iraq?

doesn't iran want stability in syria? maybe we can work with them. make iran a more responsible player, this would be a very good thing, he said. i don't think he is just musing out loud. that is actually the policy. the policy is to bring them in, make them a stakeholder, make them a part of the regional security architecture. we are not at the point where you can say there is an entente with iran, but there is a probing effort, an investigation to see whether it isn't possible to come to some sort of understanding with them. the second factor that drives this is the focus of the administration on the al qaeda threat primarily. what is the major threat to the united states from the middle east? they say it is al qaeda and the sunni jihadist and perhaps we can reach an agreement with iran

about that. whether it is a lot of decisions made willy-nilly or whether it is part of a coherent strategy to reach something with iran, it does not matter. it represents a jettisoning of traditional containment as we have seen it. we saw ourselves as the leader of an alliance. we were allied with the vertical towers. theiring to advance interests against the interests of iran and its allies. interestsis -- their align almost perfectly with the horizontal powers. we have moved very much against what the israelis, with the saudi's, what other members of that axis think we should do with respect to iran, not just on the nuclear question, but also on the regional issues. it is a major change in our policy. i do not understand why the

administration feels that it is going to work out in the long run. as i look at what is happening carrying out the wholesale raising of ofghborhoods -- razing neighborhoods, torturing children, raping women. he is the greatest engine of al qaeda that there is in the middle east. the idea that we can somehow reach an accommodation with the iranians and assad seems to me to be a completely losing strategy. one more point. ,s i understand iranian policy historically they do aspire to hegemony in the region. what they see as the united states, they see setting themselves up as the dominant power in the region. i do not think that a conciliatory u.s. policy is going to do anything to tamp , which in theions

end are going to be, sooner or later, anti-american, anti-west, and anti-status quo. >> thank you very much. really establishing the structure in which i would like to have the rest of our conversation. you, let me start with then. if you believe that the administration is abandoning a 35-your policy of containment of iran and you believe that the new policy of engaging the is effectively balancing them against the saudi's is questionable, maybe we can look and say, containment did not work. the iranians are perhaps on the verge of nuclear breakout. why is this necessarily -- why do you see that this policy will necessarily fail? what are your problems with it? a number of problems. let me start with the nuclear

question. there is a contradiction in our policy. with respect to the nuclear issue, we are like a policeman who was pointing a gun at a criminal and saying, drop it or i will shoot. but our body language is like this. we are starting to run the other way. drop it or i will shoot. the iranians are getting that perfectly. we are incentivizing them to link than the negotiations -- lengthen the negotiations, to break up the coalition. we would have a better chance of getting what we want from the iranians if we put together a strong coalition against them. but we, ourselves, have split our own coalition. our president is going out and telling people in congress that want to be tough with iran that they are warmongers. he is signaling publicly that

biggestelis are the impediment to peace with the iranians. israelis, the saudis, the hardliners in congress are the problem. that is not good, whether you agree with the analysis or not. it is not good alliance maintenance, and it is not a good way of maintaining pressure on the iranians. fact, it is just what i said. irradiance aren't anti-status quo power. they are hostile to the united states and the international system we represent. their rhetoric continues to emphasize their hostility for that system. i think we're kidding ourselves if we think they will become our partner. >> ray, do you think this is the best deal we can get from the iranians? i think mike is suggesting we can do much better. you think u.s. policy

is and where are the iranians? >> i think to some extent mike is correct. mike is always correct to some extent. [laughter] i would say when the united states and others are looking at the middle east, there is an attempt to recalibrate and move away from it, so there is a propensity to wind down the existing wars, have a nuclear agreement with iran which imposes some restrictions on it. because if you want to step away from the middle east, you need to somehow resolve this issue in some way with some sort of agreement and also perhaps broker some sort of framework agreement with the palestinians and israelis. i think mike is correct in saying that this view is trying to be transplanted on the region which is profoundly divided

against itself. the middle east is always a region that divides against itself. the subject of this division are sectarian identities, which means these divisions are going to last much longer. i would say today what is defining the politics of the middle east, the political culture and political alignments, is syria. if you do not have a syria policy, you do not really have a middle east policy. if you do not have a syria policy, you do not really have a counterterrorism policy. in a radicalizing clinical environment, militant actors surge. if you do not have a syria policy, you do not have a human rights policy. we talked about the genocide taking place in the heart of the middle east. so long as this sectarian so long aske place, iranians and saudi's lineup on the district -- different

aspects, both sides will try to enhance capabilities. at a time when you are negotiating a nuclear arms control agreement, the region is creating a situation where iranians will have a greater interest in having nuclear arms simply because the iranians do not have the conventional military balance at their disposal. they do not have access to arms markets abroad that saudis to. they do not have an indigenous arms industry at home. the way they try to negate the advantages of others is unconventional weapons and missiles as delivery systems and surrogate forces. the region itself is behaving in a way that makes a motivation for nuclear arms greater, while at the same time you're trying to negotiate an agreement. that is the incongruity of this. the middle east can be viewed as a body that has cancer all over it and the doctor says i'm going to try to save that arm and leg.

the body is rotting away. unless some of the political complexion of the middle east changes, whatever they ares come about, not being planted on a durable foundation. >> one of the things that struck is even in the united states, we have debated this. we have debated the regional issue in terms of sectarian terms. sectarianism is an issue. does it have to be put in those ways? is there no way to transcend it? the saudi's might be able to make a reasonable argument that they are a status quo power or part of the u.s. backed status quo order of the region and the iranians are a revolutionary or

revisionist regime. why have we put it in sectarian terms? will it always come back to that? ways, we haves of understood it that way. there are a lot of powerful messages coming from the region as well from the iranians and maybe from the sunni side as well, more by a mission. -- by omission. >> if you look at it historically, there is a powerful internal dynamic that has led to the revival of sectarianism. verys always there powerfully. a dynamic that has led to its revival has to do with the failure of modernity in the region. we saw this primarily on the sunni side beginning in the

where there970's was the recognition that the new modern era nationstates were not madeioning well, which people very receptive to the claim of the muslim brotherhood that what was missing was islam. time, there came to be many other parties preaching the same message, except offering different versions of it. revolution in79 iran which also said the solution is a long -- islam, only our kind. that set inks in motion powerfully. vigor isgiven it great what happened going forward from 2011. you see that particularly therfully in syria where

sides are both sectarian. that hashardly anyone any weight on the scene that speaks in terms of it being a struggle not cast in sectarian terms. what powerfully happened is there came to be yet another phase of the notion that something new is coming to the fore. what it could have been, possibly a democratic reform. but what it seemed to be in many places was a testimony to the power of islamic movements. all of that has nurtured the force of islamic sentiments.

is sort ofme, there an agreement that islam is important, but disagreement about which kind. what is the case is -- i would borrow a bit from what mike was saying before. there was the architecture of that stillalliances existed and was looked at in a different way by one of the main leaders of the alliance, the united states. the tendency for us not to take cedes the dynamic to whatever parties are operating on the scene. >> i would add one thing to what hillel is saying. i think one of the consequences of arab spring which hillel

touched on is a new phenomenon, the erosion of state power. you see this in yemen, libya, iraq, syria, lebanon. when the state power begins to erode, these multi-confessional, multi-sectarian states, most populations tend to revert to their komori beall -- primordial entities, so that further causes division. when state power is being eroded, everyone is reclanning themselves. there are a lot of opportunities for them to try to assert their power in an asymmetrical weight. you support this tribe against this tribe and this community against this community. there is more opportunity for iranians to project influence. the saudis are getting into this game as well.

this is different from the 1950's that mike writes about. states still could command the ability to impose order on their multi-confessional communities. the state power erosion is a serious cause of internal instability that feeds external mischief. if you, i do not know wanted to respond, but i will compel you to respond because i want to put it in terms of something i was thinking. hillel gave me a strange look when we said we were talking about terms of sectarianism. why is the president of the united states talking in terms of sunni and shiia? mike tommy you said you find that problematic -- mike, you said you find that problematic. >> i would make a distinction

between what analysts might identify as drivers in the region or factors on the ground and things that the united states government should talk about and focus on, both in terms of making strategy and in terms of public diplomacy. mistake for aa president or american officials to talk in terms of sunni and shiite. you can just imagine it in a conversation if i said lee, catholics like you, the minute you put someone in a box and suggest your position comes from a primordial identity, they recoil. on that level, i think it is a mistake. it is also a mistake in terms of strategy. ray said about the erosion of state power, it is all true. in terms of strategizing, the

united states should be focusing on states. those are the elements with the most power and influence. that is the essence of international politics. that is what we need to think about. my own reading of our primary interests and threats focuses on iran because iran is a nuclear rising state. capabilities our intentions. -- capabilities are intentions. nobody has lethal capability married to nefarious intent like them, so that is where we should be focused. knotwhensrselves into we try to understand things in terms of sectarianism. anyone who has followed the middle east knows the alignments have a kaleidoscopic quality. a big event will change, and

people will move in surprising ways. who would have predicted saudi arabia and israel would be sending identical messages to washington like they are now? if you look at the sectarian rhetoric of saudi arabia and the identity of israel, you would say these powers can never be in alignment. they are in alignment. this happens all the time in the middle east. the iranians have allied often with sunnis, even radicals who hate shiites. they have been allied with thomas -- hamas. that relationship is complex. the track record is there. have aided elements of the taliban in afghanistan, even though they hate the taliban. they have had a working relationship with al qaeda in iraq. that has been well documented by our intelligence services. syria, also streamed

al qaeda fighters into iraq to kill shiites and americans. that --if we focus on these are not enduring qualities of the region. alignments based on sectarianism are not enduring aspects you can base a strategy on long-term. point, the president has said several times we will not get involved in syria because that is a sectarian war and we would be taking one side. we have branded our side, the saudi side, as the sectarian actor. we have given the iranians a pass on this. the assad regime is a profoundly and viciously sectarian actor. you only need to watch how it is slaughtering civilians wholesale to realize the depth of it. messaging, welic

end up the pacing and denigrating our own alliance partners to the advantage of the iranians. the statesme back to issue. if it is important to deal with the region in terms of states, in terms of american national interests, and the best way to understand the region, and if there is some movement from the white house to want to rehabilitate bashar assad in syria, that is one thing. the second thing is we can come back to the jpa. one of the advantages iran has is it is a state with state institutions. i imagine the white house believes because it has state institutions, it can be both unlike and deterred nonstate actors. you cannot really sit down with al qaeda leadership.

that is what drones strikes are for. they cannot be engaged or deterred the way a regime can. to come back to the deal again, is it a good thing just to have a deal? insofar as welem are strengthening the state system of the middle east? >> i will start out. i think there is a critical with then point here way washington looks at the iran issue. that has a lot to do about how you see the election of president rouhani. i think for many in the united states government and other there is a perception that president rouhani is interested in having a nuclear agreement with some restrictions that are pronounced

and is interested in using that agreement to strengthen the position of pragmatic forces at home. position ofnce the the pragmatic forces are strengthened in iran, perhaps iranian foreign policy could be moderating in the middle east as such. in that sense, you looking at the nuclear arms control agreement not just as a means of imposing some restrictions on iran's nuclear appetite but to rearranging the domestic politics of iran in terms of empowering a specific faction. therefore, that faction will have a more responsible foreign policy abroad. the threshold question is, how do you see the president of -- the election of president rouhani? in that sense, arms control takes a different perspective. i think it is very difficult for outside powers to try to adjust

the factional balance within iran because we do not understand it well. it is a country whose politics are opaque and elusive. you try to manipulate the factions in iran -- to try to manipulate the factions in iran is a difficult thing. and you come to the confused power structure and in iran -- in iran. i think president rouhani wants an arms agreement as a way of relieving sanctions and preserving as much of iran's nuclear assets as possible. at the same time, i think iranians are not sentimental about their nuclear diplomacy. this is a longer context. the american administrations going back to the 1970's have always viewed arms control and detente as join

together. the soviets could easily negotiate with the united states and invade afghanistan. they saw no necessary connection between the two. they are not sentimental about this. we tend to view arms control as flying open a different relationship with the country and the country in the region. that is the way we approach arms control. >> hillel? i was going to ask you something specifically. believe, thewe administration believes a nuclear weapons program makes the iranians more responsible? it calms them down? >> you mean an agreement? >> an agreement and program, having the actual bomb would calm them down and make them

more responsible actors? what is hard for me to say the administration believes. says is hardt it to understand altogether. say insofar as there is it wouldon -- piggyback in a way on your suggestion that we would be better off if there were still a vigorous state structure in the region, that iran remains such a state, and therefore there is a plus in trying to deal with it as such, and that we can deal with it because we have new leadership there. it seems the most recent version of a long debate about what iran is. wants.

been posed about every six to nine months by henry kissinger. says to the iranians, you have to choose between being a state or a movement. they have not seen the necessity of that as yet. on either ground, they have their one principal interest as a state and movement. to see their region, the be evacuatedicular, by foreign forces, namely us. way, the question comes they see it as a state, a movement, or a leader of a shiite alliance. the question is, is that in any

respect our interest? it could be if we have decided we no longer care about the region. in particular, no longer care about the gulf, do not see any particular reason why we should be what we have been for 70 years, the guarantor of gulf security, resources, and so forth. on that basis, you could see a deal. whether it is facilitated or not by a nuclear weapons agreement, i am not sure even the agreement matters. the motive for seeking the agreement is something else rather, which is for some reason or other this administration the interest it most vigorously states as critical our two -- are two. one is to protect the homeland

from terrorism, al qaeda, etc. the other is to manage a global regime which restricts the bmd -- wmd. i am not sure we would care on this basis about whether we reached an agreement with them on nuclear weapons if there was not this overarching claim that wmd matters to us. how you see the larger regional strategy right now? the white house wants the saudis and iranians to balance each other out? at firste tough going but you will eventually realize it is not in your best interest to slaughter each other. everything will calm down, but we are out of here. what is your sense? >> i think that is where they have come by default. the single most important decision they made was to pull back. once you have made that

decision, it means you're going to tolerate more violence. with respect to the agreement, my own feeling is there will be no final agreement. comments very interesting about focusing more on the sunset clause than on the actual terms about enrichment and they might be willing to dismantle a lot to say you get a five-year sunset clause. the negotiators could say to the supreme leader, in five years, i can give you a full-blown nuclear program free and clear. that is interesting. theypect the positions will have to take in negotiations and the minimum we can accept from them is going to a huge gap and the president will not be able to cut a deal.

i think there is nothing more permanent than the temporary agreement. the temporary agreement will be rolled over. >> until what? >> we will have to see. the two things that could force the president's hands are action by congress or an israeli attack. he will work to forestall both. as you saw in the state of the union address, he clearly told congress not to mess with my negotiation. the other thing that could forestall it is precipitous iranian behavior. if they overplay their hand and what the him, president needs to be able to say at any stage is there are negotiations going on. they are very difficult. they are bearing fruit. i do not want to give up this opportunity to reach an agreement and avoid war. you want more? -- you want war?

i do not want war, i want negotiations. as long as he can make the case, it will go on. >> i want to say something about the architecture of this conversation. so much of everything being said about syria and elsewhere has to do with your perception of american interests and american power. if you believe america's interests are vital in the middle east, you have a certain outlook. it is also about your approach to american power. thinking in the foreign policy intelligentsia in the administration is the exercise of american power in the middle east in the aftermath of 9/11 has caused instability, chaos, and disarray. in some way, the application and mobilization of american power

has been the source of instability. america has been presumptuous for too long telling local actors what their interests are and how they can resolve their interests, so we should pull back. that is one view. byt view is complement it the suggestion american interests in the middle east are not that substantial. historian, mike is an . all american presidents have been frustrated by the middle east and found the problems intractable and frustrating, but they felt the middle east matters. i think we are beginning to think the problems are intractable and perhaps do not matter. >> or less than we imagine. >do they have a point on that?

not insignificant but not what it was during the eisenhower period? if you are making a case for american engagement, you have to have two additional points. number one, this particular engagement in the region of this degree of chaos will be costly. you are embarking on a journey whose conclusion is uncertain. i think it will take a long time for the middle east to sort itself out. you have to make a case for a costly american commitment to the region in today's environment. >> is it worth it? you tong to ask both of answer that.

then i would like to move to a q&a session. >> let me follow on what ray said about long-term difficulties american presidents have met with. we thought it mattered. in particular, we thought when it became very dysfunctional we needed to intervene. 1990 andmoment was 1991 in the aftermath of the iran-iraq war, iraq invades kuwait. essentially, what we were trying to do was restore order. order.restore one canther hand,

which we stored order. it created another set of problems. if you look at it from that way, there is an argument to be said every time you try to fix things here it only creates another problem. the problems come closer to home. that may also be the situation we are in right now. can't live with it and cannot live without the engagement. one cannot say with great certainty that the problems of the region, even if we are withdrawing from it goes to us. these are in the form of terrorism. we have other kinds of problems.

in a way the mood right now is we can keep it away. we can withdraw far away from it. it seems the statement suggests that they're going to be this , let them go. >> thanks. that what we are describing to the president, he may or may not have this attitude that it is not that important? is that correct? >> let me just say it is certainly a politically winning position. it is remarkable. if you go back to syria, the question about whether we should quiet syria, there was a but palpable bipartisan

agreement that it was unattractive on the hill. it was an unattractive prospect. obviously, republicans and democrats express themselves differently on this. there is an anti-interventionist mood across the country. when really striking to me i talked republican audiences aw much the appetite for hi more forward leaning economy has been. it is also very striking to me. i talk to younger audiences. they have an attitude toward american power that is very different from my own. i am talking about even younger conservative audiences. they have a more libertarian, attitude than i do. no matter how

much foreign-policy experts may not like his middle east policy, it is not determining him at all domestically. i tend to agree. sooner or later the problems of the region will come after us whether we want into or not. that is my own view. i was a something a little different about the president. that is to the current policy. if we conclude that pulling back from the middle east is a good better think there are and worse ways to do it. i think the way that we are doing it is making it more likely that we are to have to come back in a unilateral fashion than less likely. the whole thing about building up alliances and partner capacity is so that there are tools and instruments that we can use to alleviate threats without the direct applications of american force. i think the way we are pulling back is strengthening the most

malign elements in the region, an and al qaeda. ray put it beautifully if you do not have a serial policy, you do not have a middle east policy. if you do not have a middle east policy, you do not have a counterterrorism policy. we do not have either right now. >> he said he did not care about human rights. [laughter] i get that all the time. >> the other thing, there are other consequences to this that are important as well. that is the effect it has on our other alliance partners elsewhere in the world. the japanese right now are very nervous about wondering whether we will be there if they find themselves in a pinch. if you're going to pull back, you have to do it in such a way that leaves your partners with a feeling that you're there for them and that you understand

that what you're doing is putting them in a difficult position. i do not think we have done that. >> i do believe we should be engaged. if you look at the american foreign-policy attention in the aftermath of the collapse of the soviet union, it is fairly , we tend to go into the cycle even during the cold war of intense activity and entrenchment. there's seldom a balance in america's approach to international relations. we are in a period of entrenchment. believe in a more robust engagement, yet to juxtapose that to we are in a and theretrenchment fact that it may be identified to the president as well. politicallylly that

-- politically available. the president travels to atlanta , his position is politically uncontested. that is what we ran. inare re-examining our role the national relations with that. america does go through these cycles. hyperactive. when hyperactivity get you in trouble you go to entrenchment. that is just where we are. >> i just wanted to add one more thing. this is a character of our disengagement. alliance responsible leaders toward our allies or former allies. what is very peculiar about this is if we do been to leave the region and we have good reasons for it, you can leave in several

ways. one of them is you leave your former allies to figure out how they are going to deal with the situation. you leave them free to do that. doing iseem to be leaving them to figure this out on their own. at the same time, blessing their enemies. -- i think iu know know what you mean. >> the israelis have to figure out how they are going to deal with the situation. the saudi's have to figure it out. the jordanians have to figure out. if the egyptians ever figure out what is going on domestically, they will have to figure it out. maybe they could come up with a strategy that would deal with iran to the satisfaction of their security interests. we are adding to that burden the legitimation of the rainy and

iranian power and its alliance. needis a burden we do not to impose on them. that is what makes this character role very weird and very bizarre. >> you can turn into the traditional allies as well? whether it is from acting regarding the nuclear program. >> if you just think it is terribly important -- >> why stop them if it is not that big of a deal to us? do not do that. thank you. why don't we open it up to just some questions and answers. have a we are going to microphone circulating. we do, indeed, have a microphone circulating. i am going to ask you please when he asked a question, you can keep it short.

i am with the networks. i'm a pentagon correspondent. for mr. ray and mr. mike. don't you believe that iran and done arabia have not both anything to preserve american interests in the region? they have both supported federalism throughout the last two decades. even through september 11. this.re thing is if we have free elections now with iran and saudi arabia, what would be the outcome in both elections? >> if we have free elections in the islamic republic, it is unreasonably confident that the islamic republic would be rejected. there is an unusual gap

between the ruling elite in iran and the larger public. they subscribe to and islamist ideology and has a certain vision. is a huge gap between the state and society in iran. electionsnow what look like and saudi arabia. i suspect in a free election you see the rise of and in moderate government. -- aboutspeak about this more authoritatively than i can. i do not know that complexities are saudi public opinion. i am reasonably certain that the experiment of the islamic republic launched in 1979 would be rejected goal. >> -- would be rejected. but know you do not ask me i'm always careful in asking that question. we hear this talk about going around washington a lot, somehow

the iranians are better allies. i think that one time that regime falls down, the iranians are naturally better allies. that does not make sense to me. we would not say that about any other people in the world that the iranians are naturally moderate than the saudi's are naturally extremist. if we are talking about different political issues, that is one thing. thinke that comparison, i that is a touchy comparison we need to rethink before we asked and answered. i am sorry. .ou have a question >> i wanted to note to see if you agree with this that both states that have supported federalism -- better is to groups -- federalist groups [indiscernible] saudi arabia has supported the taliban on.

all the extremists throughout the middle east. >> i would make a distinction between iran and saudi arabia. inould say that saudi arabia the middle east over the last decade, two decades, three has been ae decades status quo power. iran has not since the been dedicated to overturn powers in the middle ease, in particular the order we represent has been attacking us. our allies in the middle east are extremely attractive. do they have systems in keeping with our basic values? no. there still are allies. there is a fundamental difference. there's do such thing and saudi arabia to the [indiscernible]

there is no arm of the saudi state that does the things power, ash as much much focus and the state. it is interesting. it is not just the iranian press . one of the funny things that has dealned since the nuclear or since election of rouhani is betweenalent not just saudi arabia and a ramp between our political system and the but the difference between our political system and the iranian. tois a very difficult thing calibrate somebody else's politics through a foreign

policy. the other thing is middle easterners manipulate us all the time. every middle eastern state has what i call are very and hammers -- handlers -- or berrien handlers. -- barbarian handlers. and orow as backwards words. they are very good at presenting their non-democratic processes as a mirror image of hours. we are suckers for it like you would not believe. >> if you could just hold on with the microphone. >> i am sorry. >> webster university. the doctor was raven up to

somehow predict that there will not be a final agreement and the gpa would be renewed at different cycles. commentso ask you on his insights, all the things he has said. the process is working. if you do disagree with his insights or prediction, what would you see if a deal is not reached? what kind of aspects would we terms of the relationship? >> if i understand it, you're asking me to comment on the fact that you do not believe a final deal is enhanced or could be reached in six months to a year. >> and that i am braver than you. [laughter] get theit the iranians

right sunset clause they may be willing to make concessions on the technological character of their nuclear program. those restrictions will evaporate in a matter of five years or seven years or what have you. i think i would focus on what caused the duration. then those restrictions are interim restrictions. eat and rebuild facilities -- then you can rebuild facilities. that is what they have got to be looking at. whether the international community will give them the sunset clause they are looking for, it have agreed they should have. it is unprecedented. the question is how long should it last? if they get the right one, there could be a comprehensive agreement. the comprehensive agreement will lapse at some point. the iranians and members of

five plus one see no alternative to the negotiations. the table has been in existence since 2002. it has been in existence when there is no progress. it has been in existence when there has been progress. it has been in existence when they have changed. international community does not want to revisit or visit the option of what issue diplomacy is viewed as failing. i do not think iranians want to leave the table because it does have some advantages. potentially at the table they agreementan satisfactory to them. they can essentially divide the international community and perhaps he wrote the sanction regime. so long as they're at the table, they shall be nuclear program for military revivals in the state. we are in a situation with both sides having an investment him

perpetuation. both sides want to make progress. has always almost been independent of progress. now there is a perception of progress. there will be more incentive in his prolongation. i think there is the possibility of a comprehensive agreement. with the right sunset clause. in absence of that, i think the negotiations are likely to perpetuate. no one wants to contemplate an alternative. i wanted to ask ray a question. anyway, michael agrees with you that it is attractive. they will stay there forever. from the iranian point of view, mightsee why me -- why we

want to keep it at the table if for example the interim agreement was the permanent agreement. it would allow us to say that we have constrained the program. we would be hovering in some zone fairly well-defined of the breakout capacity. how would the iranians feel about staying there indefinitely? what would they gain? what would they lose? when the been curious negotiations have not happened. both sides have tried to increase their leverage for the perspective resumption of negotiations. they have been trying to attempt for more sanction regimes. if there is a breakdown of negotiations, that does not mean

that everyone promptly walks away from the table. everyone goes back to the pre- existing conditions. in the united states and the international community will try to enhance it. the idea is that they cannot return to the table. breakdown, that does not mean that the table disappears. it may reappear when both sides decrease their leverage. the two sides have been increasing their leverage. in the case of the iranians, it counts to two medically greater nuclear program than they had in 2002. if the negotiation does not break down and everyone walks away from the table, they're walking away with a close a breakout capacity. that remains a fighting prospect here it >> it would be more enhanced.

agree four of you seem to that america is pulling back from the middle ease. his focus andlain passion for the palestinian/israel thing? that.ried to elude to there are two problems that the united states wants to deal with. it is the irani an issue. the question is whether they can be adjust. save an arm and a leg in a body riddled with cancer. it is true that they have made a lot of trips to the middle east.

they will continue to do so. it is a diplomatic attempt. i think it will be difficult to resolve in stabilize. >> i would at a question about have try to sell the three problems they have identified. to toeems to be direct what they identify as the word problem, the terrorist problem. as you said before, they do not have a serial policy that could effective. -- the others may fall down partially because of that. that itld just observe is a contradiction in the policy.

they give explanations as to why they are doing this. it is not really add up to a coherent deal. a couple of points. it is interesting that those two issues in the israeli/palestinian issue, those are the two issues that are most concerning to american voters. if part of what you want to do is to reassure an american electorate that pulling back is not going to harm things that they care about, then remaining active would be a good domestic strategy. i'm not suggesting that is all it is but it is an interesting aspect of it. the question is really kerry'son of secretary own personal agenda as much as it is the president's agenda. this is the assumption well the parties.ll

he went to the president. he made a pitch to do this. the president has attempted to solve the issue and came to the conclusion that neither party really wanted to do what he thought was necessary. he decided to pull back from it. the president gave him that rope to see what he could drum up. >> there seems to be one other item. >> i'm sorry. is there a problem with the microphone?

sorry about that. there was frantic waving from the back. >> the tenant to solve the syrian chemical weapon issues is separate from the problem as a whole. this seemed to be similar in a sense. it was trying to sell something and portman -- selling something important. it was the base of the issue. the president mentioned in the state of the union presented it as a success. just recently the administration has a talking about some of the problems in that agreement, the fact that the syrian government

does not seem to be as cooperative as it had been. the pace is very slow. i'm wondering if anyone has any comments about what they made at this sort of change that happened around that agreement. >> do want to start with that? administration was very while it was criticizing the outside regime for not delivering more weapons, it is very careful to not suggest there's any threat of force coming from the administration. the way i read the deal for moment one was that it was a way for the united states use the battle -- to leave the battlefield with honor. boxed himselfhad in where he had to take action in syria, which he did not want to take and which nobody in congress really wanted him to take. he's going to lose the vote in congress as well.

putin very deftly offered him a way to leave the battlefield with honor. he claimed this threat of force had resulted in a very disarming of syria. until that moment, syrian chemical weapons were not the keyed by anybody as national security interests in the united states in syria. they were a concern but not the central thing. it suddenly became central. deal ended up being was a legitimation of the outside regime. it became our partner in this disarmament effort. a represented as backing off, legitimating them the ally of the irani and. i see this as part of the general pattern i describe. our rhetoric is saying one thing but our body language is saying a tilt toward the ran.

-- to iran. >> if you would keep it short. we are running out of time. >> this thing here. i am a civilian. i am unaffiliated. the iranian nuclear negotiations go and some of the broader middle east policy issues if the republicans take the senate this year? conservative republicans. >> what we have everyone answer that? i am a uniter. not a divider. >> if you step back, you would see that iran policy that has taken place really up to the joint plan of action is largely a bipartisan policy.

the conceptual foundation of the obama ministration's policy was by copyrights to state department, the notion of to two tracks and separating the iranian problem to the nuclear issue. that was 2005 inception. was intellectual construct embraced by the obama administration all the way to jpa. if you look at the vote on the hill, there were 99, 0. there is a large bipartisan consensus. joint plan of action has created some divisions on that. right now you begin to see the republican party in terms of the senate votes largely skeptical of that. i cannot say this. there's nothing more permanent the continuity.

segments that large and aspects of the bush administration's iran policies were preserved by the obama administration, just sheer aspects mayi expect be preserved by a successor. skepticism.re this has gone on for so long. say it is i would there was a kind of shift over time in the bush , more restrictive demands with regard to iran's moral attitude. that has been. that -- thatthe has been carried forward into the obama administration. the net result of that is a

brute fact. the iranian nuclear program has now become really very substantial. cuts in two different ways. you have responsible people saying the only way to really stop and irani nuclear capacity is to insist on the following conditions. the removal of 16,000 .entrifuges for closure david albright group has laid out what they regard as what would be the minimum conditions and what they regard as fairly liberal conditions from the iranian side. haveuld permit them to now this. that is much harder to remove. it also makes the much more dangerous. 2017 a newt

have to askon would yourself are we, are you prepared to accept a nuclear iran or stop it? i have to agree with ray more than i want to on the same question of there being some kind of continuity between the and theinistration obama administration. it is true. i would not call it a bipartisan consensus. i would say there has been a lot of continuity among the foreign- thecy elites and in general republican electorate and the republican party is much more

hostile to this approach then is the democratic party. unfolded, ig has think that rink and phial -- that rank-and-file for the results of the approach is going to be on the republican side. be a major issue. how it'll actually on oral -- because of thear rand paul/libertarian strain of in the republican party. we will just have to wait and see how it goes. there is a greater benefits to the

united states on the republican side and a ran -- iran is one of the test cases of that. >> things to our c-span audience. thank you very much. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014]

>> if you missed any of this discussion on the iranian nuclear deal, you can see at any time on our website at c- span.org. governors across the country have been delivering their state of the state addresses to local legislatures. tonight we will bring you four of them. at 8:00 it is susana martinez, pat quinn, at 9:30 p.m. dave heineman and his state of the state address. we will wrap things up at 9:45 p.m. the south dakota republican daugaard.-- the gop is issuing a statement

of principles on immigration. secure borders, zero tolerance for those crossing illegally. and permit an entry exit visa tracking system. an electronic employment verification system. too calling on members develop a temporary worker program, the right opportunity or legal residents for those brought to the us as children and adult immigrants can live legally and without fear if they admit culpability. these are included in a statement of principles developed by house republicans. the senate has already passed an immigration bill. >> we're very focused on the sochi olympics. we have seen an uptick in the threat wording -- reporting. this is what we expect given where the olympics are located. there are a number of extremists in that area, including a group which is probably the most prominent terrorist group in

russia. the leader of that group last july announcing public message that the group would intend to carry out attacks in sochi in connection with the olympics. we have seen a number of attack stemming from last fall, suicide awnings. bombings. because vitamins were difficult for us to find them and adjust this. look at the threat relative to 9/11, we have done a great job of adjusting some of the vulnerabilities that exist in our system and putting together information sharing architecture that allows us to move information quickly. you never know what you don't know. attackprobability of compared to 2001 the very hard

question to answer. because of the very dispersion and diffusion of the threat. initially inocused that time on al qaeda. facing a much more dispersed threats. >> this weekend on c-span, the top intelligence chief on worldwide security threats saturday morning at 10:00 eastern. life sunday on c-span2. bonniells and, for morris. that is at noon on book tv hear it on c-span3's american history television, toward the confederate winter quarters of samuel magellan. span, we bring public affair evidence from washington

directly to you, but he do in the room at congressional hearings, white house events, briefings and conferences in offering complete gavel-to-gavel coverage of the u.s. house as a elixir is a private industry. created by the cable television industry 35 years ago and funded by your local cable or satellite provider. watch us in hd and follow us on twitter. likes a federal panel on sexual assault in the military voted yesterday to maintain the chain of command in dealing with assault cases. are that in 2012 there were [inaudible] theong testimony before panel including military commanders who favor and oppose taking the authority away from them. >> before we get started, i want to extend the thanks and appreciation to interim dean

greg and the george washington university law school for allowing the panel to use its facilities for this meeting. know, inf you may addition to being a brilliant scholar and professor of law here at gw, he is also a colonel in the united states army reserve who has served in many positions including pellet judge. know if you're in the room at thank you very much. the panel wants to express its dean ofo the assistant administrative affairs as well nataliey fields, -- -- andenter assistant her assistant. i want to thank all of you for helping us put this meeting together.

they had established the response systems panel to conduct an independent review and assessment of the systems used to investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate crimes involving adult actual assault and related offenses under the uniform code of military justice for the purpose of developing recommendations regarding how to improve the effectiveness of those systems. very importantr and challenging tasks, congress directed the panel to assess the role of the commander including initiatives to modify the current role of the commander in the military justice system. in addition to the panel's efforts, due to the vast scope of the task congress assigned to

us in the short time we have to accomplish our work, we have established three subcommittees. the role of the commander, in ammittee on systems subcommittee of victim services. it seemed the most efficient way to proceed and get as much done as he possibly could in the time that we have. serve onanel members each of the committees who are added in order to help us with our work. i serve as the chair of the role of the commander committee. at a subcommittee meeting earlier this month the members requested to hear from require -- retired former officers who both supported and opposed modifying the commanders authority to convene court- martial.

we heard from a number of retired officers at the meeting. i believe that was held on january 9, if my memory serves me. there is a transcript of it. it was fully transcribed we await getting it back in order to post on the panel's website. i'm sorry. it is already on the panel's website. we invited everyone who appeared at the subcommittee meeting to come and testify today at the full panel meeting which is a public meeting. of the same former officers who appeared before the subcommittee have been able to come back and accept this invitation to present their views to the full panel. we're also lucky to have some officers who were not at the subcommittee meeting.

bears are available on the panel's website. -- beyers are available on the panel's website. -- their are available on the panel's website. i would like to turn out to our presenters for the first session this morning. speak in favor of modifying the role of the commander in the military justice process. as you can see, we have four presenters who are here in person and three who have joined us by phone. let me just start by thinking each and everyone of you for making yourselves available today. if we could, i would like to begin with general rainville. are you there? >> yes, i am. good morning. >> we'll be pleased to hear your comments. >> thank you very much.

you for allowing us to participate over the phone. i regret i could be there in person. duty ind on both active- the air force, the air force reserve and the national guard. 13 years of command time of the vermont national guard. said for basing decisions to prosecute sexual assault, another -- and other serial criminal offenses and moving them from outside of the command chain. i think the decision to prosecute or not should be based on evidence independent of ing command relationship. they deserve that due process.

believe in holding commanders responsible, that is a given. we should not confuse command responsibility with leadership. commander should always be responsible for command climate. this would allow the commanders to focus their efforts on command business and improving the command climate. me is an ability to inspire others. strategically well focusing on a mission success. i sensed even more reports have ofe out in the paper or o

undetectable actions by senior military officers, and this is the importance of what the subcommittee is doing in the recommendations you will be submitting and the importance for a visible change in the structure of the military response. decades up to the present time, the military department of gone through cycles focusing on the issues of sexual harassment and sexual assault in the military. some good actions were taken. the decision to put emphasis on it with the commanders and hold them responsible. and to educate the men and women on harassment, on acceptable

behavior versus unacceptable behavior. each time we measured afterward. low and behold, the cycle repeated itself over and over. changesnow with the that she has proposed in her legislation, they go further. opportunity to strike at the heart of part of the problem. that is to change the structure. to place the decisions to prosecute with trained military legal professionals. commanders focus on mission readiness and war fighting and inspiring and leading. backo be able to build that confidence in due process

within the military that we must demand of ourselves provided for the men and women who are serving. really thank you for addressing this. i will not repeat other things i had said before except just to emphasize that it is more important than ever that this is seriously dealt with and that we do not accept push back unchanged but really look for ways that will actually have a strong, positive effect on these repeatinghey keep themselves. thanks again for the opportunity to talk iphone. i will be listening and. >> thank you very much. i would like to turn now to -- to theve put

general who is with us here this morning. >> and give her this opportunity to appear before the panel. >> are the microphones on? i can hear you. i do not know if anyone in the back cam. >> we agree the little ones are not the best. >> if you cannot hear me, put your hand up. i want to make every -- make sure everyone can hear you. i come at this from the direction that i served on active duty for it 30 years as a commissioned officer, during the years of the women's army corps from 1969. process when the core was integrated into the army mainstream over a time of four decades. in retirement, they have the issueso work

that are concerning dysfunctional policies governing women in thee military and the issues of sexual harassment. i have very reluctantly agreed and have come to the conclusion that there is a problem in continuing to attempt to resolve sexual assault cases within the existing chain of command. i do support the effort to take this and put it under the appropriate leader authorities andrnal chain of command let commanders command. can -- commanded a woman's company in virginia 64-

66, we had an old girl network that was very effective from company to managers to women staff advisors at army level to the office of the jerk your back wethe training center in how manage commanded our army women. i only had five women assigned to me. of we major -- the remainder the women were assigned to the three separate commands, the post, and at students who were all billeted together simply because of their gender. i was there commander. in this particular arrangement i cmj authorityj -- u over all of the women. the chain of command was not the chain of command that adjudicated in cases of ms. hager with them. -- of misbehavior with them.

aberdeenafter the ground scandal rho chi was recalled to active duty by the secretary of the army -- active was recalled to duty by the secretary of the army. there is adverse public of the where a number of drill , and othersfficers sexualplicated in having relationships with women in training. when this happened, the secretary decided the way to really get into the heart of what is going on here was to have the panel go forth into the army and measure the human dimensions worldwide. in the next year, our panels, there were 40 of us, went worldwide to 65 installations,

interviewed or focus grouped or surveyed over 35,000 troops. family members also. we did a lot of wandering around were ever we were to find out what was the command climate in which we were operating there. in september of 1997, the final report was rendered. i will tell you. it was documented thoroughly. we had 98 behavioral scientist working with us to ensure that our research documents were valid and that the questions were valid. when the report came out and was delivered to the secretary, four major findings occurred. sexual harassment is in the army but sexual discrimination is the larger problem. program ofpportunity the department of army levels of

beautiful on paper. it did not work worth any. the soldiers do not respect it. the soldiers do not trust it. they felt that if they registered a complaint of sexual assault or whatever the complaint might be that they byld be are their victimized their peers or superiors for having caused this problem. number three, we found that most drill sergeants were very competent and doing what they did and they did it well in the training phase. number four, we found the major problem was failures and leadership from the very top to the very bottom, from the pentagon down to the squad. that leadership has not created the approach writ climb -- the appropriate climate army wives they were treated

with respect and dignity. this report went forward with a number of recommendations which included extending one addition a week, revamping the selection process for jill sergeant and instruct yours, changing their -- for drill sergeant and instruct hers, changing their training and reinserting into training in the army values and ethics and traditions, morality. thelso went forward with intention of filling every vacancy in the training base where there were sergeants who should we there in the office and the units for training. we are not there. we were involved in the vietnam war. that's it the priority. -- that took the

priority. fast forward seven years. the same problems we identified then are identified army-wide now. there has been no solution we can to ensure that handle this under the presidential mechanism we are using. that ior this reason have felt compelled to stand and say that we need to think out of the box. we need new direction. we need creative thinking. we need not to be so married to the chain of command, which i in, as the mechanism to command, manage, and the army in war and peace. when you have a weak link in the chain, it behooves us to take upt weak link out and come

with a different mechanism for handling the very complex cases of sexual assault. for that reason, i support joel brand -- gillibrand and i hope we have a thorough search for a better way to ensure a better army of the future. winky. >> thank you very much, general foote. next we will hear from admiral evans, u.s. navy. >> thank you very much. thank you for inviting me to me to the panel today. it is an honor for this retiree to be given the opportunity to testify. i served nearly 30 years on active duty in the united states navy. more than eight of those were

commander units in the united states and overseas ranging from 200 to over 6000 person now -- 6000 personnel. for six of the command years, i had the authority to convene general court-martial. i also had a one-year assignment the standing or of committee on military and civilian women. was tomittee's mission draw a strategy to change the climate of the navy and marine corps to value and respect women. we did develop a strategy. it was implemented. approached a get tough . and many changes to systems and

processes. here he are again addressing the same issues of accountability. i also served as a presidential appointee on the military board for five years. about watched the debate the military justice system and the military panel on the sexual assault cases for the past several years. from my perspective, this has always been, first and foremost, about readiness. recruiting, training, organizing, equipping, and, most importantly, leading america's i missed men and women to be ready to go into harms way supporting the nations interests. the number of incidents and the system of criminal conduct compels a new and improved approach. --recently as 1992, statis t