>> today on c-span, officials testifying about worldwide security threats to the united states. the eric holder appearing before the senate judiciary committee about oversight at the justice department. later, a joint hearing of the details of the iran nuclear agreement reached in november. >> watch our program on hillary clinton today at 7:00 p.m. eastern on c-span and live monday night our series continues. >> i wrote about this extensively in my book. the whole time i was in the hospital, not injured, i had a cut on my leg and a broken ankle, i was praying that the other person in the car would be

ok. the other person in the car was one of my best friends. i did not know. i did not really recognize that at the site of the crash. i think because i prayed over and over for him to be ok and then he wasn't. i thought nobody listened. god was not listening. my prayer was not answer. i went through a very long time of not believing. not believing that prayers could be answered. time and a lotng of growing up to come back. >> laura bush monday night at 9:00 eastern on c-span and c- span3 and c-span radio and c- span.org. who grew up inne the office. he was badly burned by the bay of pigs experience.

he had listened to the experts. staff.oint chiefs of france.to see should surround yourself with the smart as possible people. listen to them. hear what they have to say. day, you havethe to make up your own mind. he remembered what harry truman buck stops here. " way what they were telling him. at the end of the day, he was going to make the judgment. he was the responsible party. you see that. it was abundantly clear when you listen to all those and read the

transcripts of all those tapes during the cuban missile crisis. he was his own man. he was making his own mind. they wanted to bomb it. he did want to do a. >> an inside look at the kennedy administration. >> directors from u.s. intelligence agencies testified on their annual assessment of worldwide threats to the united states. witnesses included john brennan, james coney, and retired lieutenant general james clapper. from the senate diligence committee, this. -- this hearing is one hour 45 minutes.

>> you're fired for lying to congress and the american people. >> the meeting will come to order. i will say at the outset that we hold this hearing to provide information to the public on the intelligence community's assessment of threats facing our nation. i ask that everyone in this room remove any signs you may have and refrain from any disruption during the hearing so that the committee can conduct the hearings and people sitting behind you can see. i will ask the capitol police to remove anyone who disrupt this proceeding. this committee meets today in open session to hear the annual report from the united states intelligence community on the threats to the nation security and let me start by welcoming the witnesses.

they are the director of national intelligence, james clapper, the director of the central intelligence agency, john brennan. the director of the federal bureau of investigation, jim tommy, the director of the defense intelligence agency, lieutenant general michael flynn, and the director of the national counterterrorism center, matt olson. every year at this hearing, members and intelligence officials alike talk about how the threats to the united states are more varied and complex than ever before. this year is no exception. rather than listing all the sources of instability and proliferation of weapons capable of causing physical and computer damage, i would like to focus my opening remarks on the threats posed by terrorism.

thanks in large part to the efforts of the men and man of the intelligence community, there have been no terrorist attacks against -- in the u.s. homeland since our last thread hearing. and numerous plots have been prevented. i am concerned that this success has led to a popular misconception that the threat has diminished. it has not. the presence of terrorist groups including those formally affiliated with al qaeda and others has spread over the past year. while the threat emanating from pakistan's tribal areas has diminished due to persistent counterterrorism operations, the threat from other areas has increased. in fact, terrorism is at an all- time high worldwide. if you include attacks by crips like the taliban against the

u.s. military and our coalition forces, according to the nations consortium for the study of terrorism and response to terrorism, at the university of maryland which is the source for the state department's official tallies, there were more than a thousand 400 terrorist attacks. the instability that spread through north africa and the middle east this leads to an increase in the terrorist presence and terrorist safe havens throughout the region. libya, egypt, and molly continue to see regular violence. recent terrorist attacks and controlled parts of western iraq are of great concern. well governance has improved, they continue to find safe havens in these countries where they

remained very ill and. al qaeda and the arabian peninsula remain intent on attacking the united states and al-shabaab which merged with al qaeda in february of 2012 continues to plot against western targets in east africa. but i think the most notable developments since last year's hearing is actually in syria. which has become a magnet for foreign fighters and for terrorist activities. the situation has become so dire that even al qaeda's central leader has renounced the activities of one group as being too extreme to countenance.

because large swathes of the country of iraq are beyond the regime's control or that of the moderate -- of syria are beyond the regime's control or that of the moderate opposition, this leads to the major concern of the establishment of a safe haven and the real prospect that syria could become a launching point or waystation for terrorists seeking to attack the united states or other nations. not only are fighters being drawn to syria, but so are technologies and techniques that pose particular problems to our defenses. i think i'm also concerned about afghanistan and the drawdown of u.s. and isaf forces. the committee has heard the intelligence community's

assessment of the likely outcomes for the future. especially of the bilateral security agreement is not signed in the u.s. is not able to commit significant personnel and resources beyond 2014. i am particularly concerned that the afghan government will not be able to prevent the return of al qaeda elements to some parts of the country and the taliban's control over afghan territory will grow. the vice chairman and i were in afghanistan in 2012 and he has just returned. i saw schoolgirls walking home with their white headdress and brilliant smiles on their faces on the streets of kabul. i also met women serving in the afghan parliament. i saw their courage and devotion and i am deeply concerned that in the years following 2014, if

president karzai or someone else does not sign a bilateral security agreement among all the gains for democracy for women's rights will evaporate. i am going to skip some of this and put it in the record. as your testimony makes clear today, there are numerous confounding and complicated threats out there that need devoted attention. the intelligence community was has been through a very difficult time. i would like to thank the men and women of the united states intelligence community for their service to this country. it is very much appreciated by this committee. i also would like to note to colleagues that director clapper came before us in closed session two weeks ago and went through a series of classified matters and we discussed what the ic is

doing about them. he and other witnesses are available to answer classified questions in closed sessions but the point of today's hearing is to focus on the unclassified details of the threat we face and to provide the american people with a better sense of how our intelligence community views them. >> thank you. we cannot let afghanistan suffer the same fate as erect. we must not withdraw from the fight before we finish what we went there to do. recent press articles suggest that we may week behind a force of eight to 12,000 american military personnel which would likely require continued support from the intelligence community.

we have come a long way denying a safe haven to al qaeda. and building up the security forces of our afghan partners. we must not commit the same mistake of losing what the president termed a must win war. i implore you to convey our thanks to the entire intelligence community and those that serve under each and every one of you. a tripntly returned to to jordan and afghanistan where we met some of the men and women of our military and intelligence community. isolatedserving and units in very dangerous parts of

are conducting very important missions. it became very clear that we sufferlet afghanistan the same fate as a rack. we must not withdraw from the fight before we finish what we went there to do. recent articles suggest that we may be behind a force of 8002 2,000 personnel -- 8000 to 12,000. we have come a long way denying a safe haven to al qaeda and building up the forces of our afghan partners. we must not make the same mistake they must win war. assigned a have bilateral agreement we must ensure that afghanistan has military assistance to ensure that it is not quickly go the way of a rack. as we continue to pressure core

al qaeda, the growth of local and regional affiliates remains a big concern. the reason we went into afghanistan in the first place was remove the safe haven that if the taliban provided to al qaeda. the instability in the middle east and north africa seems to be fueling a new breeding ground for terrorism, especially in places like syria. as we fight these changing threats, we must not lose sight of the national security challenges caused by our desires -- adversaries. as he looked to the intelligence committee to give us a clear reading of what is happening now, we also expect that you will look over the horizon to tell us about the impending threats. in this context, recent discussions to limit your abilities to gather information are troubling. i would like an honest assessment from each of you the potential impact of these decisions.

we have to make sure that the community can effectively provide warning and protection for all of this country's national security interest now and in the future. it is a joint responsibility of congress and the administration to ensure that we prioritize our efforts appropriately. state and nonstate cyber actors and and ever evolving list of proliferators and criminals will continue to try to do us harm. at any given time the intelligence community has to know which of these threats presents the greatest potential harm. i look forward to hearing the details of what those threats are and what is being done to address them and how we as your partners in this effort can assist. thank you. >> i thank you.

i would like to announce that last night we announced the early bird rules would prevail today. i want to welcome the panel and director, it is my understanding you have a joint statement for the gentleman and yourself. these proceed. >> my colleagues and i are here to present the worldwide threat assessment as we do every year. i will cover five topics in eight minutes on behalf of all of us. this is my fourth appearance before the committee to discuss the threats we face. i have made this next assertion previously but it is more evident and relevant than today and i have not experienced a time when we have been he said by more crises and threats around the globe. my list is long. it includes the scourge and diversification of terrorism loosely connected and now the will bleed dispersed. the sectarian war in syria, this

attraction as a growing center of extremism and this threat that this poses to the homeland. this bill over in lebanon and direct, the destabilizing flood of refugees and the implications of the drawdown in afghanistan. the deteriorating security posture in iraq, the growth of foreign cyber capabilities and the proliferation of mass -- weapons of mass destruction. and a dangerous and unpredictable north korea, lingering ethnic divisions in the balkans, perpetual conflict and extremism in africa. violent political struggles in ukraine, thailand, and bangladesh. the specter of mass atrocities and increasing stress of burgeoning populations, the urgent demands for energy, water, and food.

the increasing this -- sophistication of transnational crime, the tragedy of human trafficking, the and sent -- the rot of invented synthetic drugs and the growth of drug-resistant bacteria. i could go on with this litany but we live in a complex, dangerous world and the statements that we submitted especially the classified urgent provide a comprehensive review of these and other daunting challenges. my second topic is what has concerned -- consumed time and energy. i am speaking about the most massive and damaging theft of our intelligence by edward snowden and the avalanche of revelations published and broadcast around the world. i will not dwell on the debate about his motives or legal

standing. or on the supreme irony associated with his choice of freedom loving nations and beacons of free expression from which to rail about what an orwellian state he thinks this has become. i want to speak about the cofounder damage his disclosures have caused and continue to cause. the nation is less safe. what he has stolen and exposed has gone way beyond his professed concerns with so- called domestic surveillance programs. as a result we have lost critical foreign intelligence collection sources including some shared by us -- with us by valued partners. terrorists are going to school on u.s. intelligence sources and tradecraft and the insights they are getting or making our job much harder. this includes putting the lives of members or assets of the

intelligence community at risk as well as our armed forces, diplomats, and citizens. we are beginning to see changes in the communications behaviors of adversaries. particularly terrorists. and then -- a disturbing trend which i anticipate will continue. he claims he has won and his mission is accomplished. i call on him to [indiscernible] to prevent even more damage to u.s. security. i want to comment on the ensuing fallout. it pains me greatly that the national security agency and its workforce have been pilloried in public commentary. i started and the profession 50 years ago and members of my family and i have worked at nsa so this is deeply personal to me. as the president noted in his speech on the 17th am a the men and women have worked to protect this country in a lawful manner.

sa plus job is not to target the e-mails and phone calls of u.s. citizens. the agency does collect foreign intelligence. the whole reason nsa has existed since 1950 two. performing critical missions that i am sure the american people want it to carry out. the effects of the disclosures has heard the entire intelligence committee -- community. critical capabilities in which the u.s. has invested are at risk or likely to be curtailed or eliminated because of compromised or conscious decision. the impact of the losses caused the disclosures will be amplified by the substantial budget reductions we are incurring. the stark consequences of this perfect storm are plainly evident. the intelligence community is going to have less capacity to protect our nation and its allies that we have had. i am compelled to note the negative impact on the ic workforce.

i very much appreciate the men and women of the intelligence community and we will convey that to all of them. this leads me to my fourth point. we are faced with collectively and i mean this committee, the congress at large, the executive ranch and all of us in that community, the imperative to accept more risk. if dealing with reduced capacities is what we need to ensure the faith and competence of the american people and their representatives then we will work as hard as we can to meet the expectations before us. that brings me to my fifth and final point. the major take away for us from the past several months as we must lean in the direction of transparency wherever and whenever we can.

the greater transparency about these programs, the american people may be more likely to accept them. the president set the tone and direction for us in his speech as well as in his landmark directive. a major hallmark of which is transparency. i have tasking in conjunction with the attorney general to conduct further declassification to it -- develop additional protections and modify how we conduct election of telephone metadata under section 215 of the patriot act and ensure oversight of sensitive collection activities. we will need your support in making these changes. through all of this, we must and will sustain our professional tradecraft and integrity.

we must continue to protect our crown jewel sources and methods so we can account push what we have always been chartered to do, protect the lives of american citizens here and abroad from them. it's a described at the beginning of the statement. i will conclude and we're are ready to address your questions. rex thank you. thank you for being so upfront. syria has become a significant location for independent or a qaeda aligned groups to recruit, train, and equipped the growing number of extremists, some of whom might conduct external attacks. could you respond to this, how concerned should we be about europeans or even americans training in syria and traveling back to the west to carry out attacks?

rex we should be very concerned about this. serious has become a huge magnet for extremists. those groups who are engaged in syria itself, 1600 different groups. we estimate somewhere in the neighborhood of between 75000 and 110,000 of which funny thing 26,000 week grade as extremists. we estimate an excess of 7000 foreign fighters have been attracted from 50 countries. many of them in europe and the mideast. this is of great concern not only to us but to those countries. and our recent engagements with foreign interlocutors especially in europe. of tremendous concern for these extremists who are attracted to syria, engage in combat and get training and we're seeing the appearance of training complexes in syria to train people to go

back to their countries and conduct more terrorist act. this is a huge concern to all of us. >> thank you very much. mr. olson. i would like to know what your assessment is of the threat to the olympic games and whether you believe our athletes will be safe. i would like director call me -- comey to respond to the level of cooperation between the russians and the fbi with respect to security at the olympic games. >> thank you very much. let me say i appreciate your leadership and your focus on terrorism and the leadership of the entire committee. if i may say, i agree with director clapper's assessment of

the situation in syria. as you made out in your statement, the accommodation of a permissive environment and extremist groups in the number of foreign fighters combined to make syria a place that we are concerned about. the potential for terrorist attacks emanating from syria to the west. with respect to your question, we are focused on the so chelan picks and we have seen in up take in the threat reporting regarding sochi. this is what we expected given where the olympics are located. there are a number of extremists in that area. a group which is the most prominent terrorist group in russia.

the leader of that group last july announced in a public message that the group would intend to carry out attacks in sochi in connection with the olympics. we have seen a number of attacks stemming from last fall, suicide bombings that took a number of lives. we are focused on the problem of terrorism in the run-up to the olympics. i would add that i traveled to sochi last december and met with russian security officials. they understand the threat. they are focused on this and devoting substantial resources. the biggest issue from my perspective is not the games themselves, the venues themselves. there is extensive security at those locations, the sites of the events. the greater threat is to softer targets in the greater sochi area and the outskirts beyond sochi where there is a substantial potential for a terrorist attack.

>> would you tell us what you can about cooperation between russia and your organization? click certainly. the cooperation between the fsb and fbi has been steadily improving. we have ad exchanges at all levels especially in connection with sochi including me directly to my counterpart and we have a good level of cooperation there. it can always improve. we are looking for ways to improve it as are they. this remains a big focus of the fbi. >> thank you. mr. vice chairman. >> thank you, madam chair. core al qaeda has been on a downward trajectory since 2008 and their ability to conduct con plex dance complex and sophisticated attacks has been degraded. at the same time you assess that aqap poses a significant threat and remains on -- intent on targeting the u.s. and interests

overseas. i would like to have your first start off but i will -- i want kind of a general discussion about al qaeda. not just core al qaeda but there threat to the u.s. domestically and overseas. each of you have kind of a different interest. with respect to homegrown terrorists in the future there. these are the questions i would like for you to address. how would you characterize the probability of an al qaeda sponsored or inspired attack against the u.s. homeland today as compared to 2001? if al qaeda is evolving from a centralized core group to decentralized goebel movement of multiple organizations, capable of attacking the u.s., would you say the threat has decreased or increased? has the threat diminished or increased and what is the impact on limitations that are proposed to be put on sections 215 and

702 likely to have on the future of the intelligence community with regard to collection? director? >> thank you. while the ideological center of the al qaeda movement i think still remains in the font to -- fatah, the locus for operational planning has disbursed. there are some five different franchises at least in 12 countries that this movement has morphed into and we see sort of chapters of it. yemen, somalia, and north africa, and syria, etc.

many of these movements, while essentially locally focused him a probably the most prominent one that has an external focus on the root -- homeland remains a qap -- aqap which poses the most immediate threat to a potential attack on the homeland. the probability of attack now compared to 2001 at least for me is a very hard question to answer because this dispersion and diffusion of the threat whereas we are very focused initially in that time period on al qaeda. we are facing a much more dispersed threat. but we spoke about before, what is going on there may be a new fatah force.

what is going on and the attraction of these foreign fighters is very worrisome. aspirational he cannot pass aspiration -- aspirationally, [inaudible] i can't say the threat is any less. the ability to discern it is much improved over what it was in the early part of 2000. the us -- dispersion creates a harder threat to watch and detect because of its dispersion. it is clear as well that our collection capabilities are not as robust as they were.

because the terrorists and this is not specifically because of edward snowden's revelations have gotten smarter about how we go about our business and how we use tradecraft to detect them

and to sort them. as far as what impacts the changes that will accrue, hopefully, we can particularly with respect to 215 and tools we have, we can minimize the threat as we make these modifications and alterations. in general, this is bighand, little map. we are going to have less capacity than we had in the past and that is occasioned by the changes we are going to make as well as a the significant budget cuts we are taking and those two things together as i alluded to in my oral statement, kind of the perfect storm we will contend with. the bottom line is we will have to identify and be eyes wide open about identifying risk and managing it. let me turn to my colleagues. 's >> we need to rely on building capacity. the terrorists are becoming more sophisticated and they're going to school on that repeated disclosures and leaks. it has allowed them to burrow in

and made it difficult to find them and to address the threats they pose. when i look at the threat relative to 9/11 we have done a great job of addressing vulnerabilities that exist in the system and share architecture that allows us to move information quickly but you never know what you do not know. with the increasing diversity of the threat and gross of terrorist elements in places like syria and yemen, we have a number of fronts that we need to confront simultaneously. >> thank you very much. >> thank you. thank you for joining us today. i want to thank you for purchasing fading in this open hearing on worldwide threats.

i know it is not always easy to talk about some of these things in an unclassified setting but i appreciate your willingness to try. i want to publicly thank the men and women of the intelligence community who am a day in and day out, dedicate themselves to keeping us all safe. it is a thankless job that a simple expression of gratitude cannot capture but we fully appreciate their efforts. before get you my questions, i want to publicly note my continued disappointment with how the cia under your leadership has chosen to engage

in -- and interact with this committee especially as it relates to the committee's study of the cia's detention and interrogation program. recent efforts undertaken by the cia including, but not limited to, inaccurate public statements about the study are meant to intimidate, deflect, and thwart legitimate oversight. it only makes me more firm and my conviction that the committee should release and declassified the full 6300 page study with minimal reductions so that the public can judge the facts for themselves. i want to plug my colleague, senator rockefeller for making significant efforts to bridge the chasm between the committee and the director on some of these issues. it does not appear to be in the director's nature to accept these overtures, frankly. i think that is incredibly unfortunate. i am fully confident in the factual accuracy of the report and nothing in your response so far has persuaded me otherwise. director brennan, let me get to a few questions. on march 16 2009, 1 of your predecessors leon panetta announced the creation of a director's review group for rendition, detention, and interrogation. to be led by well respected senior cia officer and supervisor -- supervised by senator [inaudible] who passed away. do you know when and why the pen

review group was disbanded? >> first of all i respectfully but vehemently disagree with your characterization of the cia's cooperation with this committee. i am fully prepared to come forward to this committee any time it requests my appearance to talk about that study. i think related to the issue that you just raised in terms of questions, all committee members are in receipt of some information i have provided recently to the chairman and vice chairman on this issue. i look forward to addressing these matters with committee at the appropriate time and not at a threat assessment committee. >> i believe that is appropriate. >> it does not fully answer the question and i'm not sure that i

do know when and why the group was disbanded. >> i will be happy to address that question at the time when the committee leadership requests that information from me. >> thank you. i think that is appropriate for classified session. >> let me move on and change gears to edward snowden. the revelations by edward snowden regarding u.s. intelligence collection have obviously caused some tensions with our european allies. have our european allies ever collected intelligence against business people or those of other allied nations? >> they have. i could go into more detail on that in a classified session. >> that is fine. russia announced that it would extend edward snowden's asylum and not force him to leave their country. do you believe the russians have gained access to the documents that edward snowden stole which obviously -- many of which have not been released publicly,

fortunately? >> this might be last -- best left to our classified session. >> that is fine. thank you. >> thank you very much. the me start by saying that the men and women of america's intelligence agencies are overwhelmingly dedicated confessionals and they deserve to have leadership that is trusted by the american people. unfortunately, that trust has been seriously undermined by senior officials' reckless reliance on secret interpretation is -- interpretations of the law. the statements did not protect sources and methods that were useful in fighting terror create instead, they hid bad policy choices and violations of the liberties of the american people. for example, the director of the nsa said publicly that the nsa does not hold data on u.s. citizens.

that was obviously untrue. justice department officials testified that section 215 is analogous to grant subpoena authority. that statement was made on multiple occasions. they suggested the nsa does not have the authority to read americans' email without a warrant. for purposes of trying to move this dialogue along because i do not think this culture of misinformation is going to be

easily fixed, i would like to get into several other areas where the government's interpretation of the law is still not clear. director clapper, lob abiding americans -- law-abiding americans want to protect the privacy of their communications and i see a clear need to strengthen protections for information sent over the web or stored in the cloud. declassified court documents show that in 2011, the nsa sought and obtained the authority to go through communications collected with respect to section 702 of the foreign intelligence and surveillance act and conduct warrantless searches for the communications of specific americans. can you tell us today whether any searches have a written -- have ever been conducted? >> i think at a threat hearing, i would prefer not to discuss this and have this as a separate subject.

there are complex legal issues here that i do not think this is the appropriate time to discuss. >> one with that time be? i tried with written questions a year go to get answers. we were stonewalled on that. this committee cannot do oversight if we cannot get dreck dancers. when we give the american people and unclassified answer to that question that relate strictly to their privacy? >> as soon as we can -- soon,

sir. >> what would be wrong with 30 days? >> that is fine. >> thank you. that is making some progress. director brennan, question with respect to policy. does the federal communications computer fraud and abuse act apply to the cia? this is a yes or no question. >> i would have to look into what that act calls for and its applicability to authorities. i would be happy to get back to. >> how long would that take? a week question mark rex i think i could get that back to you am a yes. >> very good. i would like to ask you about the government has authority to track individuals using things like cell site location information and smart phone applications. last fall the nsa director testified that week, the nsa, identify a number and we could give that to the fbi. when they get there probable cause, they could get the locational information they need. i have been asking the nsa to clarify these are marks but it has not happened yet. is the fbi required to have probable cause in order to acquire americans' cell site information for intelligence

purposes? >> in all -- almost all circumstances we have to obtain a quarter to. we have to show relevance to the investigation. >> you do not have to show where noble cause. is that standard different if the government is collecting the location information from a smart phone app rather than a cell phone tower? >> i probably ought to ask someone who is smarter on the standards that governs those. >> my time is up. can i have an answer to that within a week? >> you sure can. >> thank you. >> i inadvertently skipped over your name and called on senator wyden. it is your moment.

>> good morning to you and thank you for being here. i want to make it clear how much this committee respects and admires the hard-working members of the community. everyone keeps this worldwide threat assessment handy. it is not reading that put you to sleep. it is reading that gets your attention.

i want to thank you and your team for putting this together. i did want to pick up on senator heinrich's questioning. we are back in operation here. you know the long history of this committee's study of our detention and interrogation programs. i would like to put my statement in the record that walks us through that record. i did want to focus initially on the cia internal review. some people call it the panetta review. were you aware of this internal review when you provided the official response to this committee in june of last year? i do not have much time, i would appreciate a yes or no answer. >> it was not a review. it was a summary. at the time, i had not gone through it. >> it strikes me as a bit improbable given that you knew about the internal review and you spoke to us and stated that your obligation as a c.i.a. director was to make sure that the cia's response was as thorough and accurate as possible. in that context, let me move to the next question. does the information in the internal review contradict any

of the positions included in your june 2013 response to the committee? >> i respectfully would like to say i do not think this is the proper format for that. discussion -- for that discussion. i look forward to addressing these questions with committee at the appropriate time. >> let me make sure you understand. are you seeing -- saying that the officers that were asked to produce this internal review got it wrong, the committee got it wrong. we had a 6300 pages, 6 million documents, 3000 footnotes. >> i said there were things in that report that i disagreed with. they were things they agreed with. i look forward to working with the committee on the next steps in that report. i stand by my statement. i am prepared to do with the committee to make sure that we are able to address the issue of the rendition and interrogation program at the appropriate time. i look forward to it.

>> i still have two minutes remaining. let me move to the snowden disclosures and what i think has been a clearly out lined as [inaudible] this committee was created to address the severe breach of trust that developed when it was revealed the cia was conducting unlawful domestic searches create the church committee went to work and found that to be true. i want to be able to reassure the american people especially given what has been happening that the cia and the director understand the limits of their mission and its authorities. we are aware of the order. it prohibits the cia from engaging in domestic spying and searches of u.s. citizens within our borders. can you assure the committee that the cia does not conduct such domestic spying and searches? >> i can assure the committee that the cia follows the letter

and the spirit of the law in terms of what the authorities are in terms of its responsibilities to collect intelligence that will keep this country. yes, i do. >> let me finish on the snow. we have an important opportunity when it comes to this vital review that we undertook. we can set the record straight. america is at its best when we acknowledge our mistakes and learn from those mistakes. it is clear that the rendition and interrogation programs of the cia went over the line during the first decade of this century. i do not understand why we cannot work together to clarify the record, to move forward and in so doing, acknowledge the tremendous work of those you lead and those that were tasked in this committee to oversee. i am hopeful that we can find our way forward on this

important matter. thank you. >> i hope you can, too, sir. >> i want to apologize to senator collins. i did not indicate initially that we would go back and forth. the list is who got here first. it is senator mikulski next and then senator collins. >> i would be happy to yield to senator collins. >> the chairman of the appropriations committee always goes first. >> please proceed. >> first of all, to those here at the panel and other members of agencies representing the intelligence community like homeland security, i want to echo my thanks and support for all the employees who work in the intelligence immunity. general clapper, i want to say to you i recall last year's

hearing. you asked for flexibility for the intel committee as we face sequester. during this intense hearing today, i want you to know that oath the chairman and the vice chairman supported by the entire members of this committee worked with me to try to get flexibility for you. they were stopped by the house of representatives during the cr to get you that flexibility create i want you to know today we were united to try to get you, and therefore the intelligence committee, that. we are on the side of the employees facing furlough and sequester and so on. thanks to the budget agreement and will were able to do and the consolidated appropriations, we think that part is behind. we look forward to working with you as we listen to those needs.

i want to come to the employees and no group of employees has been battered more than the many the men and women who work at the national security agency. because of the illegal leaks, nsa has been battered and by de facto, so have the employees at the national security agency. we are all well aware that the morality extremely low because of budget impacts and the impact of snowden. let me go to my point. the men and women who work at the national security agency truly believe that what they do, particularly under 215 and seven juror two is constitutional, is legal, was authorized, and was necessary. they felt they were doing a good job defending america.

i would like to come to the constitutionality and engage your support and get your views. there are several legal opinions about the constitutionality of these programs. as we engage upon the reform effort which i support review and reform, being led by many members of this committee, that we need to determine the constitutionality. because of it is not constitutional, that is it. would general clapper, would you, consulting with the department of justice, white house, ask for an expedited review by the supreme court of the united states to determine the constitutionality of these

programs so that we do not continually shop for the legal opinion that we want to my either one side or the other. >> i will discuss this with the attorney general. i am not up on what the protocol is forsaking a reading by the supreme court. >> is there a sense of urgency within the administration to seek such a constitutional determination? >> i think there is -- i cannot speak for the administration. i would think there would be. to your point, throughout all of this and all the controversy that we all felt and still feel that what we were doing was legal, was oversighted by all three branches of the government. there is a current fourth amendment ruling, when data is provided to a third party. >> there are 36 different opinions. 30 say -- 36 say it is constitutional.

i respect the appeals process. i think we have got to get a constitutional ruling as quickly as possible. i think the american people are entitled to knowing that and the men and women at nsa need to know that. those of us who -- need to know that. >> i could not in -- agree more on the need for clarity. they're trying to do the right thing. >> i would like to come to cyber security. target has been hit, neiman marcus has been hit, michaels, who knows what else. what i find is that there is a confusion now between cyber security and surveillance. npit is combing old. my question to you is, two things. is the impact of the snowden

affair slowing us down in our work to be more aggressive in the cyber security area, particularly as it relates to the american people by identity and the safety of their credit cards, etc. has the failure for us to pass cyber security regulatory efforts -- has it been a contributing factor to the fact that international crime is now targeting us? >> thank you. with respect to the work being done by the men and women in law enforcement to respond to cyber threats, especially those around financial fraud and thrift, we are working as hard as ever to

address those threats. what the storm around surveillance and the leaks has done is complicated the discussion about what tools we used to do that. in that respect it has made our life more complicated. the people need to realize that there is threat of fraud and theft because we have connected our entire lives to the internet and that is a place where we, using our law enforcement authorities, have to respond robustly. >> do you think congress needs to respond legislation? >> i do. >> is there an urgency around that or should we review as a starting point for negotiation? >> there is. one of the critical parts of responding is information sharing. the private sectors sees the bad guys coming in. we need to make sure the private sector understands the rules of the road and how they share that information with the government. >> my time is up. i want to say also during the sequester and so on, i read these wonderful documents that came from voluntary organizations associated with the fbi. it was called "voices from the field."

they were quite poignant and it shows that when they say the >> thank you. general plan, that inspired -- flynn, that inspired the there has been very little focus on the damage that edward snowden has done to our military. i have read the dia assessment, and it is evident to me that most of the documents stolen by mr. snowden have nothing to do with the privacy rights and civil liberties of american citizens, or even the nsa collection programs. indeed, these documents, and we have heard the number 1.7 million documents, are in many cases multi--pages. if you printed them all and stacked them, they would be war then three might -- more than three miles high.

i say that to give the public more information about how extraordinarily extensive that the documents he stole were. they do not just pertain to the nsa. they pertain to the entire intelligence community. and include information about military intelligence, our defense capabilities, the defense industry. now, you are the leader of military intelligence. you have also been deployed for extensive periods in iraq. can you share of the committee your assessment of the impact that the damage that edward snowden has done to our military , and in particular, has he

played -- placed our men and women in military uniform at greater risk? >> thanks for that question. we have a session in a way that will go through the entire report. the strongest word i can use to describe how bad this is is that it has caused grave damage to our national security. another way to address your question is, what are the costs that we are going to incur because of the scale and the scope of what has been taken i -- by snowden?

our nation, in capabilities that will have to --reexamined and adjusted the greatest cost that is unknown today but that we will likely face is the cost in human lives on tomorrow's battlefields. this has caused great damage to our national security. >> you would agree that it puts at risk essentially the lives of our troops?

>> yes. >> thank you. it is good to see you again. we worked together extensively. i want to turn to the impact of the snowden leaks on our nation 's ability to connect the dots and to protect our citizens from terrorism. you addressed this issue at a recent conference. have you seen terrorist groups change their methods as the direct result of the disclosures of edward snowden?

>> the answer to that is yes. the terraced landscape has become increasingly complex. we have seen the geographic diffusion of groups and networks. that places a premium on our ability to monitor communication. what we have seen in the last six to eight months is an awareness of these groups, an awareness of our ability to monitor communication. specific instances in which they change the way they communicate -- ourd oru sur surveillance tactics. >> obviously that puts us at greater risk of an attack. >> it certainly puts us at risk of missing something that we are trying to see. it could lead to putting us at risk of an attack. >> just to quote you, you said this is not an exaggeration.

this is a fact. you stand by that? >> i do. >> thank you. >> i want to start with what senator mikulski was saying. most of us have made these comments at the outset. some of our colleagues have had distinct policy differences. we need to continue to express our support for the men and women in the intelligence community who do these jobs and thankless ways. and in dangerous ways. they have been under challenges with concerns about the nsa program, and he snowden affair, the effects of sequestration. they are all across the country. we talked about ways to get them

some of the recognition that they are not often given. they are not recognized in the state of the union addresses. i hope we will continue to find ways that we can turn these challenging times around. they do extraordinary work protecting our country. i want to take a moment and follow-up up on what senator mikulski race. -- raised. the challenges around cyber terrorism grow. a report was put out one year ago about challenges in china and russia. i believe you stated last year that you thought that the effect cyber attacks on america had an estimated cost close to $300 billion in economic damage. that is damage in terms of direct attack, and i also think that we see time and again cases where intellectual property is

taken. people can enter the marketplace, leapfrogging over research and design, because the y steal our intellectual capital. we have seen a series of committees looking at some of the data breaches. we are talking about 70 million potential loss of data with target alone. they were disproportionately ill equipped. this is an indication that industry by industry, these attackers can find the weakest link and even companies who are doing the right thing, their colleagues in the industry are not keeping up to the standards

set and there is a challenge. is there a higher number in terms of the economic threat, the intellectual capital threat, or the personal information threat posed by these cyber activities? >> i think it is almost incalculable to figure out what the potential cost may be. this starts from the sheer difficulty of describing value to intellectual properties. the potential dollar value is inestimable. if you consider in its totality. i cannot give you a good number. we have a hard time coming up with one. >> does anyone want to add a comment? >> the question i would have continuing down this lane, i am coming from the telecom sector. there is a concern about additional government regulatory burdens.

how you said it? what is the appropriate standard? not having some standard, for the good actors, it aims to be a real economic challenge. one of the questions i would have for you in light of the data breach at target and neiman marcus, what does this say about the ability of the private sector to keep data secure? >> this is a good question. to senator mikulski's point earlier, there was a lot of discussion and debate in congress about the need for

cyber legislation. there has to be in my view, and i will ask others to speak to this, a partnership between the government and the private sector. understanding the burdens that are placed, the regulatory burdens that are placed, on the private sector. the government cannot do all this by itself. the private sector, particularly if you are concerned about the piece of this that i am, for nation states like china or russia, which have the most sophisticated cyber capabilities, and the litany of other potential threats. there are nonstate actors, foreign and domestic threats. the civilian sector is our first line of defense. in my opinion, there needs to be

some way where we can depend upon that sector to report to us to enable the government to help them. i ask the director to speak to this as well. >> that is what i meant in responding to senator mikulski about the work we have to do to protect the american people. we are patrolling a street with 50 foot high walls. we can see that the street is safe, but we are of no use to the folks who need help behind this neighborhood. we have to find a way for them to tell us what is going on. we have to protect the american people. it gets caught up in this idea of the american and government , the government wanting american people to operate. we want clear guidelines to make communities safer on the streets and in the neighborhoods. >> i know my time is up, but i think there with you. we need to get this collaboration and information on that information sharing is

critical. the challenge that these retailers saw, when do they cross that line and report to the public? if the public had a full understanding of how often and how many firms are under daily assault, it would maybe pale some of their concerns that they have about other activities going on. >> senator rockefeller? >> thank you madam chair. i will make a statement. i will not ask a question. this is something i feel strongly about so i have to make a statement. the president announced metadata should no longer be stored by the government. he asked the director of the nsa

to work to come up with an alternative option. ultimately the decision rested with congress. this senator absolutely opposes contracting out this core government obligation. -- function. what seems to be lost in this conversation is that every day we face a growing threat. it could cost american lives. the terrorist threat remains a real and ongoing. the government wants to protect americans from terrorist attacks. the hard fact is that our national security interest do not change just because public opinion on the issue is fluctuating. collection and clearing of this metadata is not a private sector responsibility. it is a fundamental core government functions. it should remain that way. i am concerned that any change of our current framework would harm national security and privacy.

the president has made it clear that he understands our intelligence needs, but i do not believe that he can come up with a better alternative. he just through to you. and ultimately to us. here is why. practically, we do not have the technical capacity to do this. certainly it is impossible to do so without the possibility of massive mistakes or catastrophic privacy violations. there are hundreds of hundreds of telecommunications companies. they have their niches. the prospects are daunting. they are ridiculous. they do not want to become agents of the government. they do not want to become the government passed guardians. -- government's guardians. they are stressing that. the telecom providers themselves

do not want to do this. and for good reason. the telecom companies do not take an oath of allegiance to protect domestically and internationally. it is not a small matter. it is a big matter. they are neither counterterrorism agencies or protection organizations. they are businesses and they are interested in the bottom line. their focus on rewarding their shareholders, not protecting privacy or national security. i have served on the committee for 30 years. i know the telephone company sometimes make empty promises about consumer protections. i've been through many iterations of this. it is not happy. profits have sometimes trumps their holding to their public commitment.

my concerns about private providers retaining this information are heightened by multibillion-dollar data industries. telephone numbers, which are used to determine our personal information, one data broker holds as much as 75,000 different data point about each one of us. including our health and financial information. further involving the telephone providers would not only make the data subject to discovery, but there would be lawsuits and it would be vulnerable to theft by hackers. another powerful reason to be against private companies taking responsibility for a government function. additionally, the recent loss at target of consumer information does not reassure me. at all.

moving away from the stringent audits, which has added on amendments to do more, it makes it less vulnerable to abuse. i want to reiterate that they want no part of it. they had to. there was a blanket liability. that is a very different situation. this is not a foundation for a good partnership. under the existing system, there are only 22 supervisors. they are highly trained and skilled. there are 33 intelligence analyst who work specifically for this group.

they are professionals. they've have spent their careers preparing to do this job well. they work at an extremely controlled environment. they are subject to multiple overlapping checks and audits. these queries involve only anonymous numbers, no names. unlike many private companies, no one is listening to your conversations or reading your e- mail. the data is highly secure. the queries of the data are conducted only by highly trained professionals. the telecom companies do not have these i could not -- and could not train them for a very long time. last year, this committee works to significantly strengthen 215

oversight with the adoption of reforms to make the telecom providers open to being searched. there were a whole new range of privacy concerns. this will threaten, not strengthen, our ability to protect his country. it is an invasion of privacy. i use my time, that i cannot tell you how strongly i feel about this. the president is in an interesting position. he said he wants to keep collecting, but he does not want the government to maintain the metadata. then he started talking about another entity, a private entity. we have all agreed that that is an impossibility not yet created. what does that leave? it leaves the telecommunication companies and they do not want it. they should not have it. in the interest of national security.

>> thank you very much for that, senator rockefeller. i want to point out so that the public knows that senator rockefeller is chairman of the commerce committee. in my view, he knows what he is talking about. senator byrd? >> thank you for what you do day in and day out. the vice chairman said that he and i had the opportunity to be in afghanistan. we met with many people who work for you. they are doing a great job in a very challenging and difficult area of the world. we are grateful for that. over the last several years, the committee has had some difficulty receiving timely briefings after significant event. those briefings would happen within 24 hours according to you. moving forward, will you renew your commitment to the committee

to brief us in a timely fashion? >> yes, we strive to do that. without getting into sensitive sources and methods, how would you characterize the intelligence community's ability to provide tactical warnings? >> that is a complicated question. we want to provide that level of tactical abilities. the nature of the threat comes significantly -- has become significantly more geographically spread out. that challenges the community in collecting the information that would provide that type of tactical warning. the attack at the westgate mall in nairobi, that type of attack using small arms, a small number of individuals, there was a

great deal of pressure on us to provide a tactical warning. it is a focus of ours. we have increased our cooperation. as a community, we come together to do that. but as i said, it is difficult to provide levels of tactical warning that would provide the advance warning necessary to survive under those circumstances. >> thank you. >> without getting into >> without getting into sensitive sources and methods, how would you assess the counterintelligence capabilities of al qaeda? >> increasingly good. you have to do google searches for what has been disclosed or leaked.

they adapt their practices of accordingly. we are giving them the substance for their counter-intelligence programs. >> thank you. can you assure this committee and congress and the american people that the fbi has and will continue to pursue the individuals who killed four americans in benghazi? >> absolutely. you have that commitment as a top priority. a lot of people are working hard on it. >> the ability to share actions that the bureau might have taken in this case are limited. i think i speak for the entire committee when i say that any time we can be briefed on progress, i hope you will do so. >> i saw one of my colleagues asked about cyber security. i thought you had something you

wanted to contribute to that. let me give you that opportunity. >> i would just offer on cyber security -- one of the other aspects that was mentioned was state actors. what is a serious threat that we are paying close attention to are these non-nation states and groups, al qaeda is among them. many others are described as being transnational organized criminals. they are operating in the cyber domain. they have no rules. they are increasingly adapting to an environment that is actually benefiting them.

while we definitely need to pay attention to those nation-states that have parity with us, but we have to pay very close attention to the nonstate actors who are doing things that have been described today. that is increasingly a growing trend. >> i want to thank all of you for your willingness to be here. i yield my time. >> senator burr? senator king? >> do you have an intelligence assessment of the impact of the interim agreement on iran's

nuclear program? does it slow it down, pause it, will this have a real impact on the nuclear capability of iran? >> yes it will, senator king. it gets at the key thing we are interested in, we are concerned with the highly enriched uranium. yes, it does. >> second question. you told us back on the 20th, we judged that new sanctions would undermine the prospects of success of negotiations. the entire deal would be dead if the international community imposed new sanctions. is that your view? >> yes. it would be good to have them in reserve. we need them. but the imposition of more sanctions right now would be counterproductive. >> how do they remain in

reserve? >> the iranians understand our system. the point there is that if we had additional sanctions right now, the iranians would live up to their word. it would jeopardize the agreement. they understand that this is a subject of great interest in the u.s. congress. to me, that fact alone is a great incentive to treat clients with a bargain. >> you do not meet new sanctions? it is the knowledge that congress can impose them. >> that is my view, yes. >> thank you. another question for you. there been suggestions from outside groups and we hear it all the time, section 215 does not produce anything useful. we have had testimony.

in order to assess this issue, which as senator rockefeller pointed out, the president has discussed, we want to weigh national security concerns and importance of the program against privacy rights and concerns from the public. there is large amounts of telephonic data in the government hands. is the program effective? does it make a difference? is it a good tool? >> it is an important tool. simply using the measure of this foiled is notlots necessarily a way to get at the value of the program. what it does is it allows us to eliminate the possibility of a

terrorist nexus in a domestic context. last summer, when diplomatic facilities in the middle east were closed because of various threat conditions, in the course of that we came across nine selectors that pointed to the united states. the use of the 215 tool allowed us to eliminate the possibility of a domestic nexus. that is an important way to consider the value of the program. >> do you have views on the significance of 215? this is not easy for this committee. the public is skeptical. in order for us to maintain it, we have to be convinced that it is effective.

and not just something that the intelligence community thinks is nice to have in their tool cap. >> i totally understand people's concerns. i believe it is a useful tool. its primary value is agility. it allows us to do in minutes what would otherwise take us an hour. i will explain what i mean. if a terrorist is identified in the united states, we want to understand, is there a network that we are facing. we take any telephone numbers connected to that terrorist attack and in the absence of 215, i would use the legal process that we use everyday. by subpoenaing each of the telephone companies, i would find out if there is a network connected to the terrorist. that would take hours. this tool allows us to do that in minute. in most circumstances, that would not be a material difference, except when it matters most. it is a useful tool because of the agility it offers.

it is a healthy discussion to talk about what might replace that. i want folks to understand what the trade-off would be in that diminution in agility. that is what matters most to the fbi. >> thank you. that is very helpful. >> thank you, madam chairman. i want to compliment you on how you put together your statement here. you have put cyber security at the top. this is the one open hearing we have every year. those of us on the panel spent a couple afternoons a week on that. the american public does not have an understanding of how important this threat is. i noticed you put it ahead of terrorism. you put it ahead of weapons of

mass destruction. you wisely did that. you said that the industrial control systems and data acquisition used for gas and oil pipeline and electrical distribution provides an enticing target for malicious actors. i could not agree with you more. except that there is a real understatement of what the situation is out there certainly, they are attractive targets. more importantly than that, we have chinks in our armor as you know. we do our best with firewalls. this is something that we have to get more diligent about. i bring this up because in my state, in idaho, there's nobody doing more on supervisory control and data acquisition. we also have the transmission and distribution center that we use.

we have a national user facility at an fbi laboratory. the problem that i have spent a lot of time there. the people there are grossly underfunded. that is true in all areas of government funding. we are all under tremendous pressure. we all know that. you have put this at the top of your priorities. i would urge you to review our priorities and funding and look at these particular operations. they are doing a lot of good work in this. this is an area that we truly do need to be more vigilant on.

it is unfortunate that americans cannot hear the kind of thing that we hear that are really quite frightening as far as what the possibilities are. i would urge you to consider that. i appreciate you bringing this to the forefront. >> thank you for that. it gives me a chance to say something about the entirety of the lab complex. there is technical confidence there that is unmatched by anywhere else in the intelligence community. we have been trying to rationalize the way that we convey funding from the national intelligence program. >> we appreciate that. we think the american people will appreciate that even though they cannot know all the details. the next remarks are directed at you. i have a constituent who is being held captive.

i want to publicly thank you for the exchanges and the information and the frequent interchange between myself and your office. it is impossible to sit here and think about what this family is going through. we say that we can't understand it, and we really cannot. without getting into the classified material, or saying something unintentionally, that would impact his safety, we will go a long way towards helping this family have some ease if would reiterate publicly as you have to me privately, about what a high area of concern this is for the united states government to return the sergeant to us personally. >> senator, thank you for reminding the american public

about this sergeant and his plight. every soldier that we have on the battlefield that is in a situation like that becomes our number one priority. there are 24 hours a day, seven days a week, there are dedicated resources doing everything we can to bring him home safe and sound. i would say to the family, i cannot imagine what they go through. they have our absolute commitment from all the leadership and i know i can see this table here when i can say that we will bring him home safe and sound. >> thank you. >> when i was at the white house, i had the honor and privilege of meeting with the sergeant's mother and father. it was a moving experience. i told him then that we would do everything possible to bring

their son home safely. he is somebody who is on the front lines, keeping this country safe. i know that we are doing that. our thoughts and prayers are with his family, as well as with the sergeant. >> thank you from the bottom of our hearts. >> senator rubio. >> thank you for being here today. i want to touch on something that was touched upon last night. on the one hand, we keep hearing about how al qaeda had significantly degraded. on the other hand, we see that their power is now growing in a huge way in north africa and lebanon and syria. in pakistan, there is a concern about fighters from syria returning to europe and other countries.

isn't this diffusion of their presence and power, does this mean they are bigger and a more complex challenge then when their core was centralized in one place? >> actually it is. because of the dispersal and the growth of the so-called franchises into many other areas of the world, that plus the fact that as we have also discussed today, they have gone to school on us on how we try to track them. the combination of those factors, the geographic dispersal, and the increasing challenges makes al qaeda in all of its forms, is a very formidable threat.

>> i agree wholeheartedly. it is important to think about the threat in a number of different ways. there is a core al qaeda group. that group brought forward 9/11. operation of that group is not what it was 10 years ago. it is the ideological leader of a movement that has spread. that movement that has read in -- spread in terms of the geographic presence and a number of other countries across the middle east, it has spread in terms of diversity of actors. a number of those actors have a largely local or regional agenda. they do not necessarily pose a threat to us here at home. it has changed in the way that the director has stated. they have innovated and carried out attacks that are less complicated. smaller scale attacks that are harder for us to detect. in all of those ways, it is a more complicated and challenging threat. >> the second issue i wanted to focus on bothers me sometimes.

it is the romanticized notion about edward snowden and what he has done for this country. we have read things in the papers about the 215 program. is it safe to say that he has not just compromised operations, but americans and allies who are at risk because of the actions he has taken? >> absolutely. >> are there men and women in the military who are potentially in harm's way because of what this individual has done? >> i believe there are. >> is it safe to say that the revelations he has made is the greatest violation and the most significant harmful revelation of american intelligence in our history?

>> yes sir. that is how i would characterize it. >> i want to ask you quickly about asia. i returned from a trip to japan. they have made changes to their intelligence program. could you comment, whoever would be appropriate, and have it has -- how that has increased our ability to partner with them. how do you see the opportunities to fully engage with the intelligence sharing given their increased capacity and the protections now afforded by law? >> i was aware of your visit. i appreciate your engagement. the japanese are emerging as great partners. the passage of this new protection law is going to do just what you have and for.

it will enable us to do more sharing of data. we are agreed upon a recent intelligence sharing arrangement where they will share with us and i will be happy to go into more detail about this. they are emerging as great intelligence partners. this extends to the prime minister. >> thank you. >> thank you very much.

that completes the rounds. it is my understanding that members do not request a second rounds with one exception. that is senator wyden, who would like to ask a 10 second western. questions will be sent to the panel, and hopefully you will respond to them promptly. >> your 10 second is upon you. >> this is a question for the record. collection of these phone records by law-abiding americans, is it necessary to prevent terror. you said that it was because of its timeliness. as you know, the independent review condition that commission, said that it is not the case. they could get the data in a timely way without collecting all of these phone records from law-abiding americans. for the record, i asked this before as well, give us an example of a time when you have needed a record any relevant phone company did not have it? i want to say that that is possible within 30 days to have an answer to that. i have asked that repeatedly.

>> you had a long 10 seconds. be grateful. ladies and gentlemen, thank you. gentlemen, thank you very much. this committee appreciates the service of the people you represent and your service. we are turned. -- adjourned. [captioning performed by the national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014]

>> some prester set -- protest ers at this hearing. national intelligence officials will reconvene and be testifying before the house elected intelligence committee. we will stream that life. you can watch it on www.c- span.org. the winter olympics start next week. the deputy national security adviser under george w. bush talked about the olympics at the

center for strategic and international studies. here's a look at what some of he had to say is. >> i had the advantage of being in the government and having the , and thehe white house beijing olympics, to coordinate u.s. security and potential response to threats. i think it is fair to say, not from an alarmist standpoint, but simply an objective standpoint, given everything we have heard and everything we know, that these are the most dangerous olympic games since 9/11. given both the threat environment, and given all of the opportunities that the various groups that gordon laid out have in terms of this game. let me lay out how the u.s. might view this, and why i suggest it is the most dangerous context for the olympic games since 9/11. in the first instance, the u.s.

views the terrorist threat as serious. intent offined by the the groups that could threaten of games, the capability those groups, and the opportunity. let me go through that simply and quickly. that is often how the intelligence community and the policy immunity in the u.s. government thinks about, categorizes threats, and certainly in this context makes clear why it is the u.s. is concerned with threats. declaredu have the intent of groups to disrupt the olympics. it is clear. it has come from the seniormost leadership of the various groups , the caucuses in particular. important in the july 2013 statement is not just the call andattacks on the games massive disruption, but also lifting of the moratorium on attacks on civilian targets,

which is in essence a call to arms and opening of the target olympics,d the sochi and not just the venues, but also the transportation hub's and other venues that are potentially vulnerable and soft targets. in terms of capabilities, we have seen over the last decade plus, the ability of a variety of groups to hit not just in the caucuses but in the russian with not just efficiency but great devastation. we saw this in volgograd. and in particular with past attacks and in the description that gordon gave and is in the report, you have these groups that not only are motivated and have the intent, but have practiced the capabilities and have mastered a variety of vectors to attack. that do notoups

just specialize in one type of attack. these are groups that can plan a attack of ways to secured and unsecured sites. with cingular suicide bombers, coordinated singular truck bombs -- suicide bombers, coordinated attacks, truck bombs. you have seen the willingness and ability over the last decade to attack all sorts of venues that are vulnerable, transportation hub's. you have seen the metro attacks and the rail light attacks, attacks on air lines, school security sites, police stations, hospitals. that not onlyps have the intent, but demonstrated capability to attack from a variety of vectors and are well practiced in many ways it how to do this.

>> you can go online to www.c- span.org to watch all of his remarks and other security experts who spoke at the center for strategic and international studies about the security at the olympic games. monday, more on the u.s. relationship with russia and security concerns surrounding the games live from the center for national interest. we will have that at 12:30 p.m. on c-span2. bringing attention to what women do or how women have contributed always returns to the question of the body. for one thing, many people object to bringing women's studies or women's history into a middle school, high school classroom because there is an assumption that women's studies is only about sex, birth control, abortion. also about women

in politics, women in law, women working on farms, queens, prime .inisters my job is to break down the fear many people have. what goes on in a women's studies classroom? women's history, feminist movements and the antifeminist backlash. bonnie morris will take your questions live in depth. cspan2. attorney general eric holder testified on justice department policies and oversight before the senate judiciary committee. this hearing followed president obama's recent remarks about marijuana and the administration's announcement it would make it easier for banks to do business with legal marijuana sellers. the hearing is about three hours.

>> before we start today's , i know the public will act accordingly. i appreciate so many members of the public coming in. we try to have these hearings as open as possible. they are streamed live, so anybody can watch. rules of the senate prohibit any outbursts or clapping or demonstrations of any kind. this includes blocking the view of people around you. these be mindful of those rules. be mindful of those rules.

[no audio] restoring america's faith in the department. grassley --tor nor grassley nor i were there at the .ime the responsibility to protect americans. general ofttorney the u.s., not the secretary of justice, but the attorney general of the u.s., representing all of us. the department has faced many challenges, combating violent crime, fraud, corruption, enforcing our nation's laws. the last several decades, the mission of the department expanded to protect the civil

rights of all americans. years after the jim crow laws and poll taxes. i recently joined with representative sensenbrenner to introduce a bipartisan voting rights act. we also face evermore complex methods of criminal activity. along with these rapid changes, the challenge to remain true to our core values of liberty, responseand government to the people. we live in the digital age. the challenges are even more acute. generateamericans enormous amounts of information about their lives with simple, routine tasks such as using a credit card, sending a text

message, calling it friend, searching for directions on the web. as technology improves our life, the vast amount of data it revealing,remarkably formidable to exploitation -- vulnerable to exploitation. is there authority given in the constitution that empowers an executive agency such as the nsa to open, listen, or to see either the mail, phone conversations, or electronic communications of u.s. citizens simply by a blanket law? and from on, we treasure our privacy. -- in vermont, we treasure our privacy. governmentme wary of overreach or lax consumer protection in these laws.

show a need for congress and the department to act. we need to set appropriate limits. government cane collect vast data about americans, assuming we even have allow and to pass a law to allow any agency, any agency to do this. i'll continue to push for passage of the u.s.a. freedom act, as well as the electronics communication privacy act. i thank senators in both parties who have joined on similar legislation. we have to ensure the huge amounts of data that are collected, whether -- assuming that they have the right to collect it, which is a big assumption, that those are collected and shared and stored by businesses and kept safe from the growing threats of data breaches and identity theft.

and we're going to examine this issue in detail in the hearing next week. but it's also important the department continue to fulfill its core criminal justice mission. i know the attorney general and i shared an unshakable commitment to keeping americans safe, supporting the men and women on the front lines of law enforcement and help victims rebuild their lives. we work closely last year and i appreciate that. after we authorized the violence against women act. and the trafficking victims protection act. the critical improvements to protect all victims. after a three-year effort, last year the president signed into law my public safety officers benefits improvement act. it will make significant improvemto