it shows efforts on programs to try to keep substance abuse under control. with that, i again i appreciate your coming out today being part of this hearing.

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[captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014] >> some may argue that the lack of enduring u.s. troop presence in iraq has contributed to the resurgence of violence, especially sunni terrorism related to al qaeda. but let's be honest, the dire security situation in an bar province is much more about iraqi politics than it is about the united states. in any case, the direct use of u.s. military force in iraq is virtually unthinkable at this point. we've withdrawn from iraq and we aren't going back. although we no longer have boots on the ground, however, the u.s. maintains a huge stake in iraq's security and i think we should

continue to provide assistance to the iraqi military in the fight against iciss. but we should recognize that the current situation in an bar cannot be resolved through military means alone. an all out assault by fallujah on the iraqi security forces will play in the hand of isis that they have been victimized by prime minister ma la ki's government. the government must take a page out of our play book in the iraq war and moderate sunni fighters in the fight. vice president biden discussed this with malaki trying to get him to incorporate the isis in the security forces and compensate those injured or killed in battle. by taking these steps, i'm hopeful he'll be able to bridge the gulf in iraq.

in an bar also linked to larger regional dynamics. we saw how al qaeda in iraq expanded the franchise to syria and we see knowledge of that war spilling back to iraq. it's strengthened isis and served as a vehicle for thousands of fighters. the slow bleed in syria has been a hindrance to the progress in iraq. iran's nefarious influence in the region contributes to instability. it's well known that senior iraqi officials have some cozy relationship with iran and iraq has not done near enough to prevent overfights liberate hezbollah and syria. in order to stablize iraq, the government will need to be more responsible actor in the region chairman royce and i made that -- emphasized that point when we met with mr. malaki

several months ago. we want to encourage iraq to give sunnis a meanlingful stake in the country. the influence and hopefully reducing the violence in syria. i would like to thank deputy assistant secretary bret mcgirk, one of the foremost experts on iraq for being here today to address these issues for us. i look forward to your testimony and our discussion. i yield back to you, mr. chairman. >> thank you mr. engle. we hear from the chair of the middle east subcommittee followed by mr. ted deutsche followed by the ranking member. >> thank you. the biggest issue is we don't have al qaeda on the run, there are two issues which i continue to be concerned about. first is the safety of the residents of camp liberty. they still have little

protection when last you testified, mr. mcgurk, 192 t-walls were up. the big progress is that 43 t-walls are up, in addition 17,500 t walls. they save lives, put them up. number two, the iraqi jewish archives ted deutsche and i and many other members are concerned. i don't want them to be shipped back. the iraqi government incorrectly states these papers are theirs. that is not true. we hope you continue to work on that. the bigger issue that brings that together obviously since the departure of the troops, al qaeda's reemergence causes iraq to take a turn for the worse. and al qaeda safe haven so we've got to rebuild our influence there. thank you, mr. chairman, for calling this hearing.

>> thank you, ms. ross slay ton. mr. deutsche of florida. >> thank mr. chairman and ranking member engle for holding this hearing. in the stability in the iraq government and the syria conflict, the number of al qaeda affiliated fighters in iraq has reached levels not seen since 2006. the off-shoot is now the primary perpetrator of violence. al qaeda disavowed the use of violence in syria for the use of tactics deemed to be too violent. al qaeda, one of the worst terrorist groups has disowned the group for being too extreme. an bar has turned the page from simply labeling this a spillover to a full-scale insurgence in iraq. particularly concerned for the 140,000 who fled their homes as

rockets were indiscriminately fired and need for humanitarian aid. it's too great to ignore deputy assistant mcgurk. i hope you can shed the light on what level we'll provide to the iraqis and the comprehensive strategy for the threat. i yield back, mr. chairman. >> thank you mr. deutsche. now lastly we'll go to judge ted poe of texas chairman of the terrorism subcommittee followed by brad sherman of california, the ranking member of that subcommittee. >> al qaeda in iraq is back, certainly not on its last legs. the united states paid a high price to help liberate iraq from the menace of al qaeda. it's frustrated that al qaeda is gaining a ground back iraq. al qaeda's resurgence is directly related to prime minister malaki's mishandling of

his government, incompetence and corruption seem to be the norm. centralized power, alien ated the sunnis, and brought back hit squads. he allowed operatives to kill iranian dissidents on seven cases without consequences. the last time you were here you testified before my subcommittee. i predicted there would be another attack. seven days after you testified in december, camp liberty was attacked again. all this chaos created an environment ripe for al qaeda. al qaeda is re-establishing a safe haven to plan and launch attacks outside of the region. that's a totally unacceptable trend. the question is what is the united states going do? and i yield back the remainder of my time. thank you? >> thank you, mr. sherr ann? >> in the 1940s we occupied countries no one doubted our

right to occupy. we took our time, we created new governments and those governments created new societies. at various other times, we invaded countries achieved a military objective as much as could be achieved at reasonable cost and we left. the first example of that have was thomas jefferson's military intervention in libya. in iraq and afghanistan, we established a bad example. the world and even some of the united states doubted our right to occupy, so we hastily installed karzai in afghanistan and in iraq, we installed a structure which is now looked over by mr. malaki. it's not surprising they continue to be problem since we hastily handed over governance to those who were ill-prepared. iraq is not the moste greej yous stake.

in iraq, it is important in part because of the proximity to iran, which i believe is one of the greatest threats to our national security. finally i agree with several of the prior speakers that we need to -- with regard to camp liberty and the t-walls and i yield back. >> thank you, mr. sherman. this morning we are pleased to be joined by mr. bret mcgurk. prior to this current assignment, mr. mcgurk served as a special advisor to the national security staff. and as senior advisor to ambassadors ryan crocker, chris hill, and james jeffery in baghdad. he also served as a lead negotiator and coordinator in bilateral talks with the iraqi government back 2008. without objection, by the way, your full prepared statement will be made part of the record.

the members here will have five days to submit any statements or questions or any other extraneous material for the record. and mr. mcgurk, if you will please sum rise your remarks and you'll go to question. >> chairman royce, ranking member engle, and members of the committee. thank you for letting me discuss this with a focus on the offshoot of iraq. the brief statement will discuss the threat from isal, the threat from fallujah, and how we intend to help the iraqis combat it. it is well known to us. it was the focus of iraq security efforts over many years, beginning with zarqawi more than a decade ago. the current leader is a designated global terrorist under u.s. law and we believe is based in syria. his mission as clearly stated in

his own statements is to carve out his own governing territory from baghdad to syria to lebanon. the syrian cob flikt provided a platform to gain resources, resource and safe havens. the national of director intelligence last week testified there are likely 26,000 extremist fighters in syria, incluteding 7,000 foreign fighters. many are affiliated with isal. the earlier incarnation, aqi, inflikted mass casualties in iraq. but not until early last year we began to see a significant increase in its attacks, most notably suicide and vehicle bombs. suicide attacks are all attributable to isal and all are foreign fighters who enter iraq through syria. to give a notable statistic iraq saw three suicide attacks throughout the country. in november 20613, it saw 50.

first, they're attacking key civilian areas to rekindle civil war. these are the vast majority of attacks. second sunni areas to eliminate rivals in one territory. in one 30-day period, isal suicide attackers attacked three small towns in anbar province. isal likely staged and planned many of the attacks in remote encampments in western iraq. the iraqis began to stop them late last summer but unable to attack them effectively due to lack of equipment which is needed to deny safe haven. today, thanks to close cooperation from this committee and the congress, we have begun to address this problem as i'll discuss in more detail. in the end of last year vehicle

and suicide bombs matched levels not seen since the summer of 2007. overall, violence remains far lower because shiah officials yet to respond to isal provocationings. the risk arise as the attacks arise. also, in the course of 2013 political instability and continue wows unrest in sunni areas enabled but did not cause isal's rise. a protest movement began after a number of bodyguards were detained by iraqi security forces. these protests placed on the national agenda a number of demands and ensuring criminal due process. we supported the legitimate demands and we worked with all parties to shape the package of legislation to address them, which is now pending in the iraqi parliament. on going violence is making it difficult for shiah to support this legislation. over the course of the spring and in to the summer, the protest movement became more

militant, with al qaeda flags spotted in protest squares. this accelerated a vicious cycle. isal exploited it but no longer reforms further out of reach. this brings us to where we are today and how we intend to help the iraqis fight back. on january 1 2014, convoys of trucks find the black flag of al qaeda, enter the cities of fallujah and ramadi. they wanted to destroy the police and secure biways. the domination of the central cities was the cull mill nation of the 2013 strategy to establish islamic rule. in fallujah, isal declared the city part of the fate. in ramadi, hours after isal trienl leaders organized and

asked for funds and arms to retake their streets. the government responded with money and assurances that they would enjoy the full benefits of any soldier in the iraqi army. means prime minister malaki and other leaders i impressed on this emthe necessity of mobilizing the situation with isal. i discussed it directly with tribal leaders in anbar province. the coordinated efforts continue to get results. local leaders report that the central cities recently secure that tribes were working with the iraqi leaders. >> the situation of fallujah is more serious with hardened isal fighters. one week ago, isal fighters captured a group of iraqi soldiers paraded them around the city, and executed them,

further complicating the situation, some tribes around fallujah are supporting and others are fighting isal and many others remain on the fence. the hardened fighters inside the city are seeking to draw the army in a direct confrontation. thus far, the army has not taken the bait focusing on the outskirts and keeping the tribal fighters in the lead. the government of iraq working with the full coordination with the local leaders and population has a responsibility to secure fallujah. under the plan that's being developed as explained to us by local and national leaders late last week, tribal fighters will lead this effort with the support we needed. the united states is prepared to offer advice, make recommendations, and share lessons learned based on our deep experience in this area. general austin in a visit to baghdad had a series of candid oh conversations with commanders about the importance of patience b and planning.

in a rare audio statement, isal's leader directed the fighters, quote, to be on the front lines against the shiah and march towards baghdad. were there any doubt of potential risk for the united states, he added what he said was a directs me s mes me s mes me -- message to the americans. quote, soon we'll be in direct frontation, watch for us we'll be with you watching, end quote. we take such threats seriously. we intend to help the iraqis in the effort to defeat isal over the long term. here's how. first, we're pressing the national leadership from the highest possible levels to get a strategy to isolate extremists from population. incorporating the local fighter and committing the april elections to be held on time. second we're supporting iraqi

forces through military sale, training, and information sharing. the iraqis have aircraft to fire hell fire missiles denying the isal safe haven in the western desert. such persistence is pursuant to a wholistic strategy. we made clear that security operations, a necessary condition for defeating isal are not sufficient. third, we are actively encouraging an aggressive component to mobilize the sunni population against isal. in the five weeks since it entered ramadi and fallujah, it allocated payments to fighters. throughout, the message is firm, despite your differences across a host of issues, you must find a way to work together when it comes to isal, an organization that threatens all iraqis. this is true for prime minister malaki who as head of state must take extra measures to reach out and draw critical mass into the

fight. thank you again for allowing me to alleged dress this important topic. look forward to protecting you throughout iraq and throughout the region and we look forward to your questions. thank you. >> the first question i was going to ask you related to something that happened last summer, there were militant camps and training grounds spotted in western iraq so we could see this brewing. yesterday, we heard the cia director note before congress that there are camps inside of both iraq and syria that are, in his words, used by al qaeda to develop capabilities that are applicable both in theater as well as beyond. you noted that the iraqi government could spot these camps but did not have the ability to target effectively. leaving safe havens just miles from population areas in your words. if these al qaeda camps present

a direct threat to our interest and the iraqis can't deal with it then why weren't we doing more against these camps? why -- you know, how would this gap that the iraqi capabilities obviously can't meet be close? how could you effectively move them? >> thank you, mr. chairman. let me kind of walk through the last four or five months. really, late last summer the iraqis spotted some of these camps. they tried to target them. they flew bell 104 helicopters out there. the helicopters were shot up by pkc machine guns. they tried to send the army out there. the army was ieds on the roads, heavily booby trapped. they were not able to target camps in the remote areas and the special forces could not operate in those areas. that is when we began to

accelerate some of the foreign military assistance programs and also information sharing to get a better intelligence picture. so two notable developments over recent months, first, the iraqis have begun to be effective in the hell fire strikes and we heerling them in the fine fix and finish mission which they're undertaking. second we believe we've had many good discussions with this committee that the apache helicopter platforms are a critical platform for denying the safe haven for these areas in the long term. i want to thank the committee for helping us with that sale. it won't be immediate and until later this year that the first helicopters get in the country and are operational. that's a long term solution to this problem. >> the other question i was going to ask you was in your testimony you call suicide bombers a key data point we track, and noted that the suicide bombers in iraq are foreign fighters that have come in.

where are they coming from? close to 1,000 have come from europe. some from the u.s. i was going to ask you, how do you assess the threat to u.s. personnel, not only that threat to personnel and our interest in the region but also here in the united states? >> mr. chairman, the foreign fighters in syria are coming from all over the world. this is a problem we faced in the years 2006 to 2008 when foreign fighters are coming in to syria and also making their way toer iraq in the al qaeda and iraq network. they're coming mainly from the region. but we do assess from our best intelligence assessments that the suicide bombers are foreign fighters. right now, they do not impose a direct threat to us or our personnel but pose a direct threat to the citizenship of iraq. the suicide bombers 12 a month to now 30 or 40 a month has a

pernicious effect on the discourse in the country. car bombs, the iraqis have been able to protect against car bomb ms. you don't see mass casualty car bomb attacks that you used to see. a lot of bombs but casualties are lower, the suicide bombers are able to get to funerals, mosques, populated areas and cause mass casualties that has a devastating effect on the country. a serious problem and a regional problem. >> last in the remaining moments, we're meeting in baghdad. you state that you detected for the first time acknowledgment that government of iraq missteps may have made the problem worse. and as i noted in my statement, this is not the feeling that ranking member engle and i received when we -- when we raise this issue with the president of iraq in our

meeting. so, that was a few months ago. i am somewhat encouraged by this but how encouraged should we be? because our concern is long been that this lack of reconciliation is compounding the problem, seriously. >> i have found frankly, mr. chairman, an attitude among the iraqis similar to the tactics that we use in the early part of the war that the security problem is simply a security problem and not a problem fused with politics and economics. we had a series of conversations over the course of last year as the isal attacks increased in which iraqis saw this mainly as a security problem. i can say i've been there twice this month since the entry of isal and to fallujah and ramadi. i heard from the prime minister on down that unless you enlist local sunnis in those area, you uh will never defeat and isolate isal. we've seen that now manifested

in the commitment. the iraqi cabinet passed a number of resolutions saying tribal fighters are given full benefits of the state. and most importantly tribal fighters who iced isal from these areas will be incorporated from the state, the police and the army. that the not happen with the awakening fighters that we worked with in 2006 and 2008le that's a significant commitment. we need to stay on the iraqis and make sure they follow through. >> thank you, we go to mr. engle. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> mr. mcgurk, let me ask you about al qaeda in iraq. it's been reported that the head of al qaeda has disowned the islamic state of i recall rack and syria. if that's true, what does it mean for the presence in iraq. how will this affect the rebel

fighting in syria now that there's the blessing of al qaeda. >> well, both isal came out of al qaeda in iraq. isal is al qaeda and iraq. the leader was the al qaeda and iraq leader since 2010. the other is a offshoot and focusing on syria. now there's this message that al qaeda is no longer affiliated. we have found that isal has such media presence, such a propaganda presence, and is able to self-sustain itself by patrolling facilities in eastern syria, oil facility, and extortion rackets in the cities in western iraq that it will be able to maintain its cycle of operations. in terms of those that are recruited and come in to isal, it's their message -- it goes all the way back to zarqawi 10

years ago, that its's perniciously sectarian, shiah muslims in particular don't have the right to live and should be killled. those who believe that tend to gravitate towards isal. the other is more of an al qaeda central like message including a threat to us. but i think despite the new statement we've seen, isal is going to maintain the pace of operations and continue to be a serious threat. >> thank you i'd like to ask some questions about iraq and iran. when i look back to the war in iraq what really breaks my heart is in a we lost so many americans, so much american blood and now it's almost as if we -- we didn't do anything, nothing we did was positive. it's all been eroded.

and it really just breaks my heart for people who have lost loved ones there. we're the ones responsible in my opinion for making iran the hedge monic power in the region, because iran and iraq for years fought wars, checked each other. once we blew up, not that saddam hussein was worth anything, but once we blew up the minority sunni regime in iraq. and it seems to me that it's only obvious that the shiahs in iraq would gravitate to the shiahs in iran. and the sad thing is is that i were ran has more influence in my opinion in iraq now than we have. so there are reports. chairman royals and i raised this as iraq is allowing overfights as iran seems to arm

hezbollah. hezbollah is now fighting a war in syria. its he'sing hezbollah expand the presence in syria defending the regime. can you characterize the relationship that prime minister malaki and other senior iraqis have with iran. and how would you describe iraq's commitments to the u.s. in the overflight issue. does malaki understand how this destabilizes the region? >> iraq's relationship with iran is multi-facetted. we have found repeatedly over the years that iraq acts primarily in its own interest. we found few instances that we have seen iraq acting at the behest of iran which we did not see acting in its own dre's interest. you look at that in terms of iraq's overall oil production. you can look ate in terms of iraq radratifying the protocol.

the issue is something that the iraqis have not done enough. we've seen the number of flights go down. we press the issue. inspections go up, it goes down. its's frustrating. it's difficult for us to get a precise intelligence picture. we know that material is coming on civilian aircraft. so it's just a -- it's a problem that we focus on all of the time. it's the one area i can say iraq is not doing enough. >> i thank you. i want to make one final comment. that is it's my opinion that the chairman and i met with mr. malaki that he seems a good listener. but i didn't think he provided too much in terms of answers to the questions we had. one of which was overflights. i think he just came to listen. but really didn't come to put his head together with us and help solve the problem.

>> since the prime minister's trip, you ear meeting with them other meetings he had on the hill, he spent two hours with president obama in the oval office. we got a direct message on a number of issues. and we have seen some changes from that visit. i want to thank you for the meeting that you had with him. i think you made an influence. some of the issues discussed in camp liberty. we've seen some changes. and in particular, the need for wholistic strategy to defeat isal and enlisting the sunnis in the fight to the local level, we've seen dramatic and significant changes from that visit. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you mr. engle, we go now to ross lehtinen. >> thank you so much, mr. chairman, the iraq jewish archives, you have been in

discussions on iraqis with this issue and your staff spoke with representatives of the jewish community as a whole. but could you give us an update on progress of these discussions. have there been alternative plans proposed? on the issue of t-walls in camp liberty. why have there been only 235 out of 17,500 t walls put up. why have we only seen an addition of 43 since our november subcommittee hearing. can you please commit that you will put extra effort in saving lives there. and thirdly, as far as al qaeda's resurgence, a large part of the this is due to the failure of the iraqi government and the iraqi leadership since we left the country. the national elections after april, we were successful after the surge to getting the iraqi government to participate in a more inclusive power-sharing

government that mollified the sunnis of iraq and left al qaeda marginalized. after we left, the iraqis took another step backwards, now sunnis are marginalized drawing more of them to al qaeda. what steps are we taking to make sure that the sunnis are participating in these elections and that iraq can return to the power-sharing government we saw in postsurge iraq and continuing with the sunni-shiah issue we've seen in the last few days that the iraqi military has been bombarding fallujah, taken over by al qaeda late last year, presumably preparing the way for a ground assault? however, the shiite dominated malaki government cannot successfully take fallujah on its own without the help of the sunni tribal leaders in the region. canoff describe the current relationship between the malaki government and these tribal leaders? and do you think malaki will be able to gain their support given his crackdown on sunnis in iraq

for these past few years? thank you, sir. >> thank you, take the topics in order. on the jewish archives. as you know, this is a sensitive topic. i've been working directly with the iraqis on this. i was in iraq and raised it with those officials that are charged with the file. we are engaged in the extensive negotiations with the iraqis. in the coming weeks, the director of the archives are coming to the united states, and, again, i hope to report progress on this. we're engaged on the negotiation. i will keep you fully informed of those talks. on camp liberty, on the issue of t-wall, i made a number of trips to iraq, every time i go, i raise the issue of t-walls, t-walls back in to the camp earlier this month. they stopped. i raised it again last thursday with the iraqi national security advisor, i understand the t walls are moving in to the camp again. i visited the families and

survivors at camp liberty. i told them i would do everything i could. that meant they needed to do what they could, which meant go inge to the meetings to move the t walls into the camp. on the mission of elections and sunni protection, i said we're focussed on holding elections on april 30. this is the third full-term election for a full-year government, first one, december of 2005. then in 2010 and then this year. as you may know, the head of the head sunni coalition was in the united states two weeks ago. meetings with the president, the vice president, the secretary of state in his home. we're focused in making sure that the elections happen, that they produce a genuine and credible result and they allow a government to refofrm that reflects the makeup of the iraqi society with all represented. in fallujah, as i describe in my testimony, the plan is to have the tribes out in front but with the army and support. because the army -- they face

isal is an army. they have heavy weapons, 50 caliber sniper rivals, well trained and fortified. the sunni tribal local people out in front. but they will require security support. general austin was in iraq last week with direct talks with iraqi military commanders advising them the best we can, building on the lessons we had in these areas and to make sure that civilian casualties are minimized. >> thank you so much. i know how hard you have been working and to paraphrase ambassador crocker everything about iraq is hard all the time. so please keep making progress. thank you, sir. >> mr. sherman of california? >> thank you. it was bipartisan support for leaving a residual force in iraq, that required a status of forces agreement with the malaki government. the status of enforcements

agreement would have had to include immunity for our soldiers so they would not be subject to iraqi courts. we ask our soldiers, marines, airmen, etc., to take many risks. one of them we don't ask them to take is the idea that their actions would be held up to judgment in a court in iraq or afghanistan, for that matter. we didn't get a status of forces agreement. some -- one theory is that the administration blew the negotiations. the other view is that the malaki government was in place when this administration got there. malaki didn't have to give immunity to our troops and chose not to. we've seen that these immunity agreements are difficult for a host country to provide.

karzai isn't providing them. and there are several elements of iranian history going back 70, 80 years with the shaw held up to ridicule for providing such immunity agreements. did we fail to get a status of forces agreement because we blew the negotiationings, or given the political reality starting with malaki, was there simply no way to get the immunity? >> first, your history is important here. the history of immune tip agreements particularly in this region is what colors the entire debate. the negotiation in 2007 and 2008 took almost 18 months, while we got those two agreements passed, the security agreement which allowed the forces to stay for three more years with immunities and a permanent strategic framework agreement, they barely passed. they passed on the last possible time and almost by the skin of their teeth.

i was working on that issue with ambassador crocker for 18 months. >> this is passing the iraqi parliament? >> yes. >> our legal requirements in 2011 were that another follow-on agreement would have to go through the iraqi parliament. it was the assessment of the iraqi political leaders and our leadership that it was unlikely to pass. and therefore, the decision was made that our troops would leave by the end 20611. we have a permanent strategic framework agreement. it provides a strong basis for providing security assistance to the iraqis. it does not provide a basis for having boots on the ground, a training perennials. but we do train iraqi special forces under the office of security cooperation through the embassy and in discussions with regional partners. for having a training presence. >> i want to move on to another question.

has there been discussion of the u.s. air forces or naval air forces bombing these al qaeda camps rather than us providing huge amounts of weaponry to malaki so he can try to do it himself? and has there been discussion of u.s. air force's preventing overflights by the iranians since they can't control the air space? >> no, not a discussion of a direct u.s. role in the air space or targeting the camps. we're focused on increasing the iraqi capacity and they've proven effective in recent months. >> i point out if onliedy edwe were bombing al qaeda camps in the years before 9/11, we would have a different history. we see the evidence of the camp,

52 killed last december. in september, another four killed. the secretary of state appointed a special advisor on the resettlement, what is the status of protecting these folks while they're there and insisting that iraq meet its legal obligations to do so. and finding homes for outside the region for some of the residents. >> let me make a couple of points. when i was here in november, i explained that there is a cell we believe trained by iran. and it is dedicated to attacking the mek in camp liberty. we had cells by iran dedicated to attacking us with a military presence in iraq. we did everything we could to root the cells out. it was very difficult. the only place the people would be safe is outside of iraq. that's why our focus as you said has been appointed to this issue full time to find a safe, secure relocation for the residents of camp liberty. while they're there at camp

libber the i, the governor of iraq has an obligation to do everything they can to keep them safe. that means t-walls protection, that's something we raise constantly to make sure that they're getting as much protection as possible. you mentioned other notable development ms. there's international tension to the surge in the humanitarian crisis. first, the resettlement fund. we have notified congress for $1 million to put in that resettlement fund. inner remarks the iraqi government authorized $500,000 to be reallocated to that fund. the united states appointed a full-time basis to focus on resettlement. we're getting some progress. i look forward to working with you, the committee and the congress to try to move this forward in the coming weeks. >> we go to chris smith of new jersey. >> thank you, mr. chairman and secretary mcgurk, thank you for your service and thank you for being here today. just a few question kwes.

you mentioned 72 to 100 trucks entered fallujah and ramadi. was that a tactical surprise? on the part of the isal? or did we have intelligence suggesting they were mustering and about to move and did the iraqis have that intelligence? if we did, what was done with that? second lip, you talked about how the suicide bombers in a turn of twisted logic has become the most precious resource. and you point out that in november of 2012, there were three suicide bombers -- bombings that's gone up to 50. what's the kaleidoscope on that. do we expect it to be 100 by the end of next year? or does that -- if you could speak to that issue? and third you point out that

isis set their sights on the south. you quote abu bar albugadi. how serious is that threat to baghdad? fourth if you could, point out the isal execution of iraqi soldiers that the malaki soldiers did not take the bait, the army. is that something that's ongoing. executing police holding prisoners in certainty city, fallujah, the central part of fallujah? when it comes to the issue of christians, the -- you report the -- the commission of religious freedom points out that the iraqi government continues to tolerate systematic ongoing and egregious religious freedom violations. that is against a number of the smaller sects, many of them going back 2,000 years, including the assyrians. what is happening? what kind of pressure are we

trying to put on the government to get them to mitigate and hopefully completely end their repression of christians in iraq? and finally, we talked about the low boil type of insurgency that this represents. are we looking at the possibility of another syria in iraq? >> let me address these first to fallujah and ramadi. we see the encampments moving around to the isal forces and trying to relocate the entry en masse on new year's day was a surprise. it was a tactical mistake on isal's part. this isn't going to turn overnight but there's been a response. in ramadi, the response developed rapidly to expel them from the streets. in fallujah, going to be far harder. one thing sunnis in anbar

province may not like the government, may not trust the army. but they don't like the foreign jihadist fighters, so we're trying to gather common cause against them. in terms of the suicide bombers, the average now is 30 to 40 a week. i don't think it will be an exponential rise. i'm hoping 50 might be a cap. we saw this problem and phenomenon in the past. what we did in 2006 and 2008 was a very concerted regional wide effort. how do you get the people with the one-way ticket, flying with damascus, the military aged males taking damascus off of the airplanes. we're effective in draining the flow. one thing is increasing security in western iraq. going to try to re-create that strategy throughout the region isal's strategy to attack the south. they are trying to attack the south. i wouldn't be surprised if they're on the same playbook of 2006. you may remember that election

in december of 2005. late february that al qaeda attacked the mosque which really kind of led to the sectarian violence which you saw in the next two years. that have eel try to attack high profile targets in the south, particularly religiously symbolic targets. i hope, i don't think they'll be successful. iraqis have those areas well protected. part of the strategy. in terms of fallujah, yes. we do believe iraqi soldiers are being held in fallujah. and as i said, these extremists, the fighters, are trying to goad the army in a direct urban confrontation. so far, despite some rhetoric you might see at stormy fallujah that's not the strategy, it's under way. but the government has responsibility working to local people to secure fallujah. there will be fighting in the outskirts and later in the central city and we'll try to make sure its's as contained as possible. on christians, a very good question. we're focused on the plight of christians in iraq and

throughout the region. when prime minister malaki was here, he acknowledged in the public remarks the importance of taking care of the christian community. in october, he met with the head of the caldean church. i try to meet with christian leaders when i'm there. i met with archbishop werda and rabil a couple of months ago to focus on the land disputes. the cabinet passed a legislation to carve out a christian province to allow them autonomy and security. this is something we continue to develop. i'll be meeting with an iraqi christian leader tomorrow in my office. we're foe cussed on it. it's an extremely, extremely difficult issue. christians are threatened by the extremists as are sunnis, shiah everybody. >> thank you. >> thank you mr. chairman, thank you for being here. you know, i -- as the ties between iraq and iran, it seems to be getting closer.

they signed a defense -- to have a defense treaty that supposedly they put together. i am concerned that maybe the safety of the people at camp liberty. the iraqis are not making the effort they really need to secure these people. if i'm making a contract with a treaty with iran, why am i so intent on the safety of the people? in september they keep fire rockets into in camp. so how sure are you that they're making the best possible effort to bring security to this camp? >> congressman, the issue remains extremely extremely difficult. there was a rocket attack in the camp earlier this month. and i remind you there was a rocket attack at camp crocker near camp liberty. we took casualties there as late

as the summer of 2011. we had 70,000 troops in the country trying to stop this kind of activity. it's very difficult to deter and to root out a well-trained team with rockets. and that is why we're trying to move as much protection into the camp as possible. that's why i went to the camp myself, to see it, to meet with the residents, to true try to assess the security and protection. it remains a very difficult issue. mek doesn't like the iraqi government. the iraqi government doesn't like the mek. it's a dynamic issue. all we got to do is stay on the mek to do everything they can to cooperate, to move the residence to a safe and secure location and stay on the government. every time i meet with the leaders of the government, i mention this issue. despite all of the other issues they're dealing with, i mention every single time. as i said, i report this morning that t-walls are going back to the camp. they're going to continue to move back in the next day and the day after. >> how concerned are you about

the treaty between iraq and iran, the defense treaty. and the arms going into iraq. >> the iraqis are careful to draw a line in terms of security cooperation with iran. so far, they kept that line fair lip firm. i've seen reports like that. but not taking it too seriously. iraq has made -- they made it clear they want a long-term relationship with the united states, they want the united states to be the backbone of their military. when when he sell a country in apache helicopter, not just giving them a tech helicopter, we're buying a 30-year relationship in terms of training pilots, logistics maintenance, that's why we feel it's so important. the f-16 program is the same. we want iraq to have a long-term institutional relationship military to military with the united states. in the visit to iraq last week, he knows the iraqi command tears. they bled together in the streets of baghdad and the outskirts and all throughout

iraq. we had deep, deep relationships. i was in the meetings. you could not get a deeper relationship than people who fought side-by-side. that's something we're going continue to develop. malaki is a prime minister now. he might be the prime minister after the coming elections, he might not be. we're focused on building an institutional relationship with the iraqi government and the institutions. the military, the parliament,soming is going to last for many, many years. >> the sale of russian arms to iraq, are you concerned at all about that? whatever it was? >> yes, i don't want iraqis buying russian hardware. and, i have to be honest, given the security situation there's a lot of strategicic competitors in baghdad showing up, knocking on the same doors we're knocking on and saying, hey, we're here to sell you an attack helicopter, write a check. we have a system through our foreign military sales system, a good system, that makes sure that the stuff arrives with long-term institutional relationship as i discussed. but it's slow and cumbersome.

earlier this month i was in saudi arabia bahrain, and other countries, a lot of complaints about the foreign military sales system is too slow. we heard the same thing from iraqis. i want iraq to buy u.s. equipment because that buys a long-term strategic relationship. so, yes, it's unfortunate they bought the mi-35s from the russians. but on the other hand, they kept telling us they were going to do it if we couldn't get them the apaches fast enough. >> in this consideration to get to the drones, right? selling drones to the iraqis? >> we are selling them unmanned -- unmanned uavs, not armed drones. but -- >> selling them -- oob. >> armed drones? >> no, not under consideration. >> okay, thank you. >> thank you, we turn to mr. rohrbacher for his questions. >> thank you very much. we're all impressed with your

knowledge level you're able to do this from your memory and we're impressed by that, i'm impressed by that. but that doesn't mean that i agree with your assessment. let me just say that the idea that we're talking about camp ashcroft it seems that fundamentally, you're suggesting that our approach to try to stop the massacre that -- the ongoing massacre of the people at camp liberty -- that we basically have to go to the malaki government and ask them and the problem is that they're not providing enough security. the malaki government is responsible for these deaths. i don't understand -- the -- the military -- the iraqi military invaded camp ashcroft and murdered people. these are the people under

malaki's command did that. they recently went in to their -- the 50 that were left in camp ashcroft tied their hands behind their back, and shot them in the back of the head. it was malaki, his own military who did that. we know camp ashcroft and their people were attacked numerous times by the iraqi military. this isn't malaki and his people are not protecting the mek. this is the -- this is a crime against rue manty. these are unarmed refugees in which malaki's own troops are murdering. we're not talking about, you know, rockets that we don't know where they come from. we're talking about actual -- by the way, i would suggest that they probably know those rockets as well. malaki, let's make it very clear, as far as i'm concerned and many people in washington are concerned, malaki is an accomplice to the murders that

are going on. and i -- as an accomplice, we should not be treating him, begging him to have a residual force of u.s. troops in order to help his regime. i don't understand why the united states feels like we feel compelled to be part of all of this. why do we feel compelled that we have to go in and be in the middle of a fight between people who are murdering each other 30 to 40 suicide bombers a month? thousands of people are losing their lives to this insanity. why should the united states, tell me, this is my question -- why does the united states feel that we need to become part of this insanity? and does that not instead turn both of the parties against us? >> congressman the suicide

bomber phenomenon, it is complete insanity. i agree with you. look at iraq, look at the region. you define our interests. and i don't go with any leader and beg for anything. but we protect in advance u.s. interest as we find them. in iraq, whether you like it or not, oil al qaeda, iran, vital u.s. interests are at stake in iraq. we need to do what we can -- >> why shouldn't we let them kill each other. let them kill each other, i'm sorry. if it means we're going to spend our treasury and more of our blood -- we spent thousands of lives of american soldiers. we've done enough. and i'm so happy that you now can report to us that your negotiations to provide a residual american military force in iraq was not successful. i'm happy we don't have a bunch of american troops in the middle of that mess. and we're not even capable of

letting malaki know that we're holding him responsible for the murderers in his own ranks, for the people in the military that he commands to go to camp ashcroft and camp liberty and murder unarmed refugees. this is a no-win situation for us. both sides seem to be evil. both sides are -- or all of the sides. one last question, i've got 30 seconds. who is financing -- you talk about 100 trucks and all of this -- this equipment costs money. bullets cost money. ak-47s cost money. rockets cost money. who's paying for all of that on the mayhem on both sides of this fight? >> congressman i defer to my intelligence colleagues. we think it's a source of funding, funding from throughout the region, funding from global jihadist movement. >> is that the saudis?

>> i would have to refer to my intelligence colleagues for that information. a lot of it is private -- you know, private funding. >> private funds. thank you very much. >> thank you very much. >> while we're here on the subject. while when he -- while we are here on the subject, do you want to share any details on the returns of the attack of camp ashcroft and in your judgment who you believe is involve in that? that was the question at snand. >> thank you. mr. chairman i think the last time i was here, i discussed what we know. we believe it was the militia. we believe it was trained by iran. and that's really the primary responsibility. and we have since that very horrific attack, we worked to get the survivors out of camp ashcroft, which is about 40 miles from the iranian border and on to camp liberty. camp libber the i is not safe but it's safer. we have the un in the camp every damon toring the camp. and again, when i go i try to go to the camp and meet with the survivors and the residents

there. so we're doing -- >> you're making efforts right now to relocate the survivors? >> absolutely. yes. >> okay. >> going to go now to mr. jerry connolly from um, the authorization to use military force, the administration has indicated it would not oppose the repeal of that. is the issue the timing with respect to, say, pending elections in iraq? might it disrupt things you are doing in iraq if we were to do that now? >> congressman, i do not think there is much focus on that. i do not think it would make much of a difference. >> that is good to know, ok. elections in april. still on schedule? >> we, our team at the embassy is talking every day to the united nations mission in iraq. and the iraqi high electoral commission.

and the information i received recently is that elections remain on track. we have tens of thousands of displaced families from anbar province. we have been assured that displaced people will be able to vote and the vote will count. so we are still confident the election will be held on april 30, and our firm position is that those elections have to be held on april 30. there should not be a delay. >> what a novel thought. allowing people to vote remotely from the united states. fallujah. help us understand what happened. the united states has been involved now for 12 years. billions and billions of dollars. we've reconstituted the iraqi military, we have trained law enforcement forces. we spent our military's blood and treasure to gain a foothold, to gain fallujah.

and al qaeda's successful organization manages to occupy it. and if i understood your testimony correctly, we are now once again relying on tribal support to essentially dislodge the occupying forces in fallujah. how in the world, isn't that an indictment of the investments we have made in the iraqi military in its inability to hold its own territory securely? >> the iraqi military would have the numbers and equipment to go into fallujah tomorrow and clean up the streets. we believe were they to do an

assault like that that it would exacerbate the problem. >> excuse me. i do not mean -- before you get there -- how did this happen in the first place? how is it that the iraqi government was not able to secure something as symbolically important, if not really important as fallujah? >> as i try to explain, it was a series of events in 2013 including a protest movement that added to political instability in the region. in fallujah, it is an area, as we know, any outsiders coming into fallujah are resisted, and that includes the army, and it included us, and it includes these al qaeda extremists, we hope. we are where we are right now and we are helping the iraqis develop a plan. one that will lead -- i say tribal fighters. what we really mean the local people, the local population are able to identify the foreign elements and push them out. right now in fallujah, it is a mix of al qaeda, former insurgent groups, and former

bathist networks who are in control of the streets there. it has always been a very difficult place. so it is a very difficult territory to operate in. >> the tribal support we are relying on, what is their attitude towards the maliki government? doesn't some of that cooperation -- isn't that some of that a function of how they view the central government? >> yes, certainly there is tremendous mistrust in the area of fallujah toward the central government. no question. >> does that impede our ability to dislodge the occupation forces in fallujah? >> it does. it makes it harder. some tribes are working with the extremists. some are now working to oust them. and many others are on the fence . that is why it is incumbent upon the central government, through resources and through dialogue and communication to mobilize the population against them.

when we worked with the awakening, we did three things we trusted them, we funded them, but also significantly, we protected them. they thought they were going to win. the head of the awakening. we parked two tanks in front of his villa. and he was still killed by a suicide bomber. this is a tough area. but the tribal leaders need to know that they are going to be supported. and the believe they are going to win. maliki's commitment most recently to give tribal fighters all of the benefits of a soldier and to incorporate those fighters into security structures of the state, meaning they will have a livelihood to protect their people, is a significant commitment. one that has not been made before. we need to make sure that we follow through. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman.

>> judge ted poe from texas. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i want to talk about what you probably thought i would talk about today is the mek. the last time you were here and you testified before my subcommittee and the chairwoman's subcommittee, i made the statement that there would probably be more attacks on camp liberty. and unfortunately, i was correct. camp liberty was attacked again. four people killed, seven injured, one young man lost both of his legs. since 2009, there have been seven attacks on camp liberty or camp ashraf. during that time, 19 times members of the state department have testified. many of those were about camp liberty. in all those attacks, to my knowledge as of today, not one person has been captured or charged with any of those killings. not one. and they are still on the loose. as i alluded to in my testimony,

i personally believe that the maliki government is in cahoots with the iranian government who -- to let camp liberty, camp ashraf be subject to attacks. these last attacks to my understanding were where rockets came in that were three meters long. 40 of them. it seems impossible to me that a rogue iranian militia could sneak those by anybody and fire them over time and caused this chaos. and murder.

and i bring this up for several reasons. one, it has not been resolved. but this is become very personal to people who live in my district. i represent people who are iranian american. they know these people that are being killed. they are family, they are friends. and they come and they visit and they tell us it has happened again, judge poe. it has become personal. many of those people are sitting behind you, and may come up here wanting help. that is all they want is the united states has said that we have promised to help them. we no longer recognize them as a foreign terrorist organization. they want their loved ones safe. safe first from the constant attacks by, well, i believe the iraqi and iranians working together, but long-term they want to leave. they want to be safe. i commend you for going to visit the camp. did you see these, what looked like graves, but people in camp liberty are in such fear of their lives they no longer stay in the trailer houses here. they have dug themselves what looks like a grave to hide in

when the attacks come from the rockets. they dig these and they put sandbags around them and they are ready for the next attack. they jump in these things. some of them sleep in these things at night, even in the rain, to try to be safe. literally digging their own graves. it seems to me, this is fairly tragic situation when people live like this in fear of where they are, whether it is the iraqis or iranians or both. did you see any of these when you were there, what they use as now foxholes to hide them from the rockets? >> i did not see that, but i saw some of the bunkers at the camp. >> i'm sure you will see it on your next visit. but now this is what they have resorted to further own safety. i think that is an international human rights concern. it should be.

the t-walls. you mentioned t-walls are coming. i understand they have not had any today. 17,000 were removed in the short time. now they want to put them back in slowly. it is a safety hazard. they ought to move them in now. the other concern i wanted to mention is, the resettlement issue. they want to leave iraq. we want them to leave. the iraqis, want them to leave. i am not so sure what the iranians want. the west constantly says because the u.s. has not taken them, we are not going to take them either. when the u.s. starts taking them, maybe we will take them as well. why haven't these folks been sent to other countries? why haven't we taken some of them are all of them? that is my first question.

my second question is, when you visited with the survivors of the ashraf camp attack, did they tell you who they believed was responsible for attacking them and killing their families and their friends? those are the two questions i have. >> let me first say in terms of accountability, a shia militia leader who took responsibility for the attacks openly and was on iraqi television taking responsibility for attacking the camp, we thought it was ridiculous that this guy was walking the streets inciting people to attack the camp. he was arrested by iraqi security forces and is detained and is being investigated. that is something that happened in the last month. i agree with you that this is an international human rights concern. that is why as i mentioned earlier how much i find it encouraging that there is now the united nations focus for the resettlement fund. a full-time person to focus on this issue.

as you correctly point out, very few countries around the world despite the international human rights concern, have agreed to take the residents into their territory. albania, germany, the total of 350. so we still have almost 2900 people in the camp. this is an international human rights concern, and it has to be treated with the utmost urgency. as you know, we are considering options to relocate residents in the united states in close coordination with the white house department of homeland security and other relevant agencies. any eligible residents would have to be vetted by the department of homeland security. that is something we are actively, actively considering i can assure you. we also, and i encourage those who care about the residents to lobby other capitals around the world, given that this is an international human rights concern to take residents into their territory, because so long as they are in iraq, they will not be safe.

and you are right -- four residents of the camp lost their lives tragically this month. 900 iraqis also lost their lives this month. iraq is a very violent place. and particularly the residents of camp liberty will not be safe until they leave. that is why we have a full-time person working on it. we encouraged the u.n. and they have appointed a full-time person to work on the problem. and we have a u.n. resettlement fund to in courage other countries to take the residents in. >> now we go to mr. ted deutch of florida. >> thanks for being here. thanks for your thoughtful testimony. last year, we wrote a letter to the prime minister about the overflights of iranian aircraft. there are reports that the number of overflights from iran has increased, that these are flights that iran sends to arm hezbollah to expand their influence in syria, to defend the assad regime even as it continues to slaughter its own people.

how do you characterize prime minister maliki's relationship with iran? >> let me say a couple word s about iran's nefarious role in iraq. just like al qaeda has exploited the grievances of the sunni community, iran is exploiting the fears and apprehensions of the shia community as they are attacked by al qaeda extremists. so it's a vicious cycle that iran takes advantage of. the most extreme elements of that regime. maliki, and we discuss this with him all the time, tries to balance all of those many issues that come at baghdad from the region and from internal -- he is under great pressure from his constituency, particularly among the shia who continue to

get attacked by extremist groups. but so far we have seen the government resist the iranian efforts to have a direct security role in iraq. iran control certain militias in iraq. but their activities are not nearly to the level they were five years ago. >> so they've resisted iran's efforts to play a more significant role in iraq, but they have resisted the efforts of many of us here to convince them to play more significant role in stopping these overflights. why don't they do it? >> we continue to raise the overflight issue. we believe some of this material is coming on civilian flights. we do have certain agreements would be iraqis, which we look forward to testing as soon as we have intelligence we are able to share in terms of catching a flight in the act.

>> i'm sorry. say that again. explain that. >> we have agreements -- it is hard to get a precise intelligence picture in terms of what is coming on a flight and when. it is very difficult. but when we do, and we have worked with countries around the region in similar circumstances, when we do, we hope to be able to work with the iraqis, to make sure we are able to deter that flight. >> here is what i'm trying to get at. it is difficult to identify what is on planes. i understand that. much of the frustration that i have on this issue is frustration generally with what is happening in syria and the ongoing assertion by so many that it is hard. so much about syria is hard. it is difficult, even as there are now more than 130,000 syrians who have been slaughtered. so this is one very small area where it is difficult, yet do

you believe that the maliki government, that the prime minister discounts the suggestion that there are planes flying from iran. full of weapons, that are flying over iraq with those weapons to be delivered to hezbollah, used to prop up assad and kill the syrian people? >> do i believe that he knows it is happening? i believe we have given him an enough information. >> how do we test these? when are we going to start testing? how do we do that? again, this is one very discreet i'm just bringing in everything else that goes into syria at the moment, which this committee has focused on extensively and will continue to focus on. discreet area, one very discreet point that is weapons from iran to hezbollah that flyover iraq.

it is one discrete area where perhaps we can have some, play some greater role in making it even slightly more difficult for hezbollah to help assad as he murders his own people. slightly more difficult. if our ally in iraq plays a more constructive role. so how do we test that? how do we make that happen? >> first, i would happy to come discuss in a different setting specifically some of the issues related to this topic. but i can put you in the picture when we have this conversation with iraqi officials. as soon as you mention syria what they talk about in syria is the threat that is coming into iraq. that is like their primary threat perception coming from syria. we explain that the reason the terrorists group are syria syria

-- are entrenching in syria is partially due to assad who is a terror magnet. as long as the regime is able to be strengthened, the vicious cycle will go on. the iraqis have signed up to the geneva one communiqué. they have done some things to put pressure on assad. i have been in iraq twice this month and never raise this issue specifically to get inspections increased again. the next time i am here, i hope to report some progress. >> thank you very much. >> we go now to mr. george holding of north carolina. >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. mcgurk, i appreciate your level of knowledge and facility with the facts. and your ability to communicate them. in numerous answers, you have detailed the support that iran is giving to militias and iraq

and to al qaeda-related and successor al qaeda groups in iraq who are proper getting this violence. -- who are propagating this violence. and undoing a lot of the good work that we were able to do in iraq. in addition to that, where the maliki government may be able to disavow it and say that we are not supportive of what iran is doing in iraq, there are other errors which are in contravention of the sanctions we placed on iran. such as in the energy area, the energy sector. it has come to light that in the basra province, iran and iraq are negotiating the building of

a pipeline to supply gas. in contravention of the sanctions. are we putting iraq on notice that this is in contravention to the sanctions and detrimental to what we perceive as our interests? >> very good question. this is also an ongoing topic of conversation. they share a 3000 kilometer border. so there is trade, cultural ties. it is impossible to stop everything. iraqis have been very conscious of trying to enforce, make sure they are working with our sanctions. in fact, they have not paid iran for years. -- they have not paid iran for our readers that they are owed for electricity payments because they believe in might be sanctionable even though the banks are not sanctionable. the iraqis have tried to go the extra mile, making sure they are

keeping with -- >> in regard with financial institutions, there is evidence that the nature of the relationship between iraqi financial institutions and iranian financial institutions go way beyond what would be permitted under the sanctions. >> maybe i could follow-up with you specifically on this because it is a very detailed topic. iraqi banks have cut off many transactions with iranian banks due reputational risk. iraq has also increased its oil output while iran has asked them not to do that because we have taken one million barrels of iranian oil off the market. again, this is constant, but the pipeline you mentioned is concerning if the pipeline goes forward. that could fall afoul of our sanctions. >> considering the extreme detriment to our interests from this iranian support of militant groups in iraq, is there any part of the deal that the administration is currently negotiated that would address these issues? put it as a condition, iran, you have got to stop doing this.

>> congressman, a nuclear negotiation is focused solely on the nuclear proliferation issues. but that does not mean that we are not also focused -- >> so we are not using any leverage or any of our capital in lifting sanctions for the nuclear enrichment part to solve some of the other problems we are having in iraq with iran. >> given the existential threat that a nuclear armed iran would have, we focus specifically on the nuclear issue. >> as far as iranian support of hezbollah, which as you pointed out, you have given malaki clear iki clear evidence as far as overflights go in the supply of hezbollah with iranian weapons. is there any part in the nuclear negotiations that we are doing now with iran which would address iranian support of hezbollah fighters in syria?

>> the nuclear negotiations are focused on the nuclear proliferation issue specifically. but that does not mean we do not deal with the other issues on parallel and separate tracks. >> again, we are not using any of the leverage that we have in the nuclear negotiations to try to address the situation we have with hezbollah and syria? >> we are not discussing this to the nuclear channel, no. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you, mr. mcgurk for your insightful testimony this morning. as you can imagine, offense and iraq are particularly difficult to hear about in light of the heroic sacrifices american heroes and the billions and billions of dollars of taxpayer

money expended in this region, and you acknowledge that in your written testimony. i thank you for that. i would ask you to speak to the difference of events in ramadi and fallujah. it seemed that the turnaround was quick in ramadi, fairly effective, and that is not the case and fallujah. would you speak a little bit about why that is in the extent of coordination between the tribal fighters, the iraqi government, and resource allocations between these two cities and any other factors contributing to different outcomes were different strategies? >> fallujah has always just been the most hardened part of the insurgency when we were fighting it, and it is just a different environment. if you look at the protest movement over 2013, they remain -- the protests in ramadi remain generally a moderate tone focused on legitimate grievances of the community.

the protests in the fallujah also taking place every friday were far more militant, far more extremist. it is just a different environment like different cultures and attitudes. >> if i could just follow up on congressman deutsch's question you said most of the foreign fighters were syrian? >> no, foreign fighters had come in to syria from the greater region, jihadist-minded people had come in. >> let me speak about what the relationship is and president assad. do they understand that why allowing these flyovers and potentially strengthening our prolonging of the assad regime they are undermining their ability to take back their own country from the same extremism? do they make that connection? what is the difference between the maliki and assad regime?

>> maliki and the top iraqi government -- there is no love lost with bashar al-assad. he was calling for him to be brought to a criminal court taste upon bombings that happened in august 2009 that they blamed on the syrian regime. they signed on to the geneva communiqué practicing there will be a transition without bashar al-assad. i will be perfectly candid. when we explained assad remaining in power is a magnet for terrorists coming into iraq, that is a train of logic that many officials do not agree with frankly. they agree that if assad left, the regime would collapse and make the problem worse. seeing the same picture we do, we believe very strongly in the secretary has said a number of times that bashar al-assad in power is a magnet for these foreign fighters coming into syria to fight the jihad. until he's removed from power we will be in this very vicious cycle which will have pernicious effects on all of the syrian

neighbors -- iraq, lebanon, and jordan. >> what tools do we have in our disposal that it is the case? we will be left in a position where they will continue to implicitly or explicitly support the assad regime's with a flyover or other efforts. >> i need to be candid. particularly heading up to the election, iraqis will be increasingly focused inward on their internal issues and internal politics. our hope is that after those elections with the new government up, we will work with that government to really get at those problems. >> that leads to my final question. is it clear to president maliki and to the iraq leaders in general that the responsibility to defend their country is their responsibility and that their

expectations should not be that the united states will fulfill that responsibility? after a very long commitment, they will have to take this responsibility of defending their country and doing the hard work of bringing stability to their own country. >> absolutely. when general austin was in iraq last weekend, i was in those meetings with him and iraq you i leaders, they all stressed four or five points. they want all of our support to be under this permanent foundation meeting institutional, military the military. they want training support and they were talking about doing training in jordan or the region. they want intelligence support and they want to let us know when they feel they need weapons or systems that we can help them supply. they also wanted advice and recommendations on how to actually plan effect really. -- effectively.

they do not want us to be in the lead of this fight. it is their fight. >> i yield back. >> the gentleman from rhode island yields back. i yield to myself. thank you for coming in. i appreciate your service to the country and dealing with these very tough issues. i'm obviously not very happy with what's happening and i've been very clear that i thought the withdrawal was one of the biggest stakes historically that will be shown the united states has made in modern foreign policy. i expressed concern with that. it is not directed at you but the decision of the administration. i am an air force pilot and i served in iraq and number of times and i remember specifically going there in two 2008 watching the environment

and seeing people hunkering down. there was still a threat of terrorism. our member seeing in iraq that had turned around and they thought they were serving a purpose there. they brought freedom. kids were out playing soccer even though most of the operations were conducted against iranian assets. iran is known to be responsible for directly or indirectly the death of about half of the americans including efp's. i might want to mention that we are now negotiating with iran in terms of giving them their ability to enrich uranium. another concern i had, i was getting ready to fly a mission into afghanistan back a few years ago when i heard the senate majority leader from the other side of this building say that the war in iraq was lost. he still has his powerful position, but he very quickly said the war in iraq is lost it is time to withdraw the troops and president bush made the brave decision to not only not withdraw but to actually surge in more troops and we saw a great deal of success. the reason it's important to revisit is not to beat the dead

horse but the fact that we are getting ready to face the same kind of decisions in afghanistan. are we a country tired of war and after deal with the shameful thing in fallujah in the equivalent in afghanistan? or will be learned lessons from the past. it's very important to learn those lessons. i have a couple of quick questions. there used to be a policy that anywhere al qaeda exists, they should know there is no safe haven. president bush said there was no safe haven for terrorists. we see in iraq right now, in essence they appear to be somewhat safe and hopefully they can push against them. we see the same type of situation in syria. i am very for intervention in syria. i want to be clear about that.

is this a change in the administration from the bush policy of no safe haven and now we accept safe haven because we just lost the political will to do anything? or is it still the bush policy of no safe haven for al qaeda? >> first, congressman, thank you for your service. particularly now, everyone who has served in iraq and has experience there, it's time for us to have a constant, ongoing dialogue because we can bring our relationships to bear at this very important moment. in working with the iraqis in terms of intelligence support and as i mentioned in my testimony, we are confident that iraq will deny al qaeda safe havens in western iraq. one reason we believe we saw the convoys moving into fallujah is and ramadi is because the iraqis started hitting their camps and safe havens in the remote regions of western iraq. i'm confident particularly as the missiles develop even more sophisticated ability to deploy them and also with the apache

helicopters, and the other things they are able to do with their iraqi partners that they will not have the safe haven in those areas and that's one reason they are moving into urban areas because it is harder to root them out of those areas. >> i have called for, i believe that the united states should help the iraqi government in a limited way using air power to take out these safe havens because this congress, this house, has passed a use of force agreement that says, i attack al qaeda. we have the responsibility to do that. that man rescue another brief question. dismantling what they decide as an advanced al qaeda plot within their borders. there is this strategy and a near war grand strategy. this is moving them in in the far threat would be in the u.s. homeland. do you believe the situation we are seeing -- and that it is the goal of aqi to want an attack on

the american homeland? >> my file is iraq, so i am focused on iraq. >> iraq has huge implications for the homeland. >> al qaeda is a real threat. it threatens our interests through the region. >> again, thank you for your service. i appreciate it. the chair now recognizes mr. vargas for five minutes. >> thank you very much, mr. chair. i appreciate it. for most americans trying to keep score at home, it's becoming very difficult to understand the situation and i think a lot of the nations are becoming somewhat confused and complex between iran, iraq syria. it's all running together in the issue of the sunni-shiite discord. what is very clear is the terrible price that americans have paid.

as you know very well, and again thank you for your service, but the amount of sons and daughters that did not come home alive and the number of parents, fathers, and mothers did not -- did not come home alive, and those who did brought the demons home with them that will on their lives. we paid a terrible price. today i heard from some of the other side that are saying, to hell with them. let them kill themselves. what should we be doing there? i don't hold that same feeling. the price we paid has to mean something and the sacrifice these people made, it has to mean something at the end of the day. we should do as much as we can. personally, i'm very concerned about the christian community. they've been slaughtered. there have been unified attacks against christians, 37 murdered

and now i think there are less than half for maybe one third of that. we are very thankful that they have been able to come to san diego and is a great immunity that continues to form there. i would like to hear from you on what we should do to help not only the christian community but especially other communities as well. what else should we be doing? >> i have visited some of these

chaldean communities and they are threatening christians muslims, everyone in the region. it is a regional problem. we are trying to work with the leaders to make sure they have the resources they need from also the kurdish regional government to make sure the areas are as secure as possible. in iraq, the chaldeans and other christian minority groups are located in the middle of planes. -- plains. we are working to try to make sure that local people christians, have the resources to police their own communities and we've made some progress over the last six months. in the north, when i was in iraq a few months ago, and as i mentioned with the archbishop, the head of the community there, we linked him up to make sure they get the resources they need. we're trying to make sure connections are made between the governments, provincial, regional.

to help the schools and everything else. >> a claim the central government is not doing much at all to help christians and in fact, just the opposite. they leave them exposed. could you comment on that? they have not been doing nearly enough to protect the christian community and especially the churches. >> a series of church bombings in 2009 or 2010, they have have really buttressed the protection of christian sites in iraq, but i see you mentioned, there are still attacks -- >> it has killed 27.

>> the prime minister is upset wanting to protect christians just like everyone else in this country, looking for ways to do that. the more communication the better from the christian community who have deep ties into iraq and with us, if your constituents tell you there is something they are seeing, we can work on those problems. >> thank you. i yield back. >> thank you, mr. vargas. >> thank you for your testimony. i feel like you've been sitting there in long time. you may need to get up and what are our military assets in iraq?

can you speak to that? >> under the embassy, they work very closely with the iraqi military. there's about 100 personnel and they do everything from advising, running the fms programs, and a very small contingent of half a dozen or so operators to train some of the special land on the training component. but that is all done under the embassy chief of mission. >> we have a very small footprint as far as americans there. what can we take from this to apply to the drawdown in afghanistan so we do not make the same mistakes or repeat what we've done there so we have the benefit of the effort and said both sides benefit from this? what can we do different? if you could write again the post-drawdown for the end date announcement, what would you do differently?

>> when i'm out of government, i may work to make comparisons but right now i'm focusing on the situation at hand and protect the interest as we face them right now. >> ok, let me switch over to a different topic. we have talked to veterans of iraq and afghanistan, and we have talked to members of the iraqi government. in the meantime, countries like china, japan, south korea, would -- are building infrastructures and trading. would it not benefit us to put more effort into that so we have

the economic trade? i know they're working hard on solving this problem, but if we could help build that infrastructure and work with developing trade? >> i agree with you 100%. the focus on this hearing has been the al qaeda threat, the policy is really multifaceted and one of them is developing economic ties and economic relationships. we do advocacy for u.s. companies. we are proud that boeing has signed a major contract to be the backbone of iraqi airways. we are proud that hill, an american company, has commissioned with basra to lead the effort there to try to modernize in a very long term project. general electric and others are doing very well in iraq. we need to get the private sector involved and invested in iraq and there are a lot of opportunities. >> that is where i would like to help focus our foreign policy

and i was asking if we could rewrite that. with fallujah, do you think we can defeat the ifil? do you think they have the willpower and the assets to do that? >> without the support of the local population, it will be extremely difficult. that is a lesson that we learned in iraq. >> the u.s. is the back bone of the iraqi military. were you meeting with our military assets? >> -- >> the chairman was asking about where the fighters were coming from. is there any estimate how many are coming in that go to syria and over to iraq? >> i don't have those numbers. i would have to get back to you.

>> thank you. mr. chairman, i yield back. we go now to mr. collins of georgia. >> i appreciate asking and answering the multitude of questions. the understanding relationship is something that i think is a mistrust that goes back generations and they've done very little to really relate or work on that relationship. we talk about al qaeda, the islamist state, and increasingly building alliances with sunni tribal leaders. and has adjusted in 2013 to win more sunni lyrical support.

how would that translate into the next round of elections? can we see a move from shiite to sunni? what will it mean for the region? after that, we will talk about iran's possible influence. just be to the elections at this point. >> thank you for your service. it's a very important insightful question. this will be pivotally and also extremely interesting. the first national election, there were three main lists, shia, sunni, and a kurdish block. there was a little bit more choice, two shia blocs, a cross sectarian list, and the kurds. everything is really fractured. you have four shia lists, three sunni lists, and the kurds are even on four lists. there will be a number of different permutations.

in terms of forming governments and coalitions. the hope is that this will give rise to the more possibility of cross sectarian politics emerging, as difficult as that will be. as i mentioned earlier, what al qaeda does very effectively is it targets the fault line which has existed for 1400 years. this is important discourse. they're trying to inflate and incite the sectarian issues. on the positive side, you have been shaping up with a number of different lists, and on the other side, you have the other side trying to incite and inflame.

>> there are reports dealing with the rest of the arab world than having to deal with this dynamic of iran and iraq. is there more push with the iran influence there and everything else we have talked about there? not discouraging discourse. >> the slow boil stage of the insurgency, the most maligned iranian influence was unable to gain much traction because it was in this low boil. we have seen an increase in shia militia activity which has given an approved to the most nefarious iranian act entities. this is something we continually have to work with, civil society leaders and everyone to isolate those extreme groups.

>> i appreciate that. as we look at the world of iraq right now and world of iraq right now and the issues in the fallujah and anbar regions and we need to maintain pressure here and with iraq whether it will be camp liberty or other things. this is not something that they will let go. we need to continue that we owe in large sense to what happened there. that's the concern that i would express. you need to do the process of this without the division. i think that's what we are expecting when we see stuff like what happened in the salute joe. it tells me maybe we're spending too much time doing that and not what will keep this on a path towards a sustainable future. i yield back. >> we go to randy weber from texas.

>> you are lost here in november and i think it's been something like 78 days. there has been all of this talk about 312 executions, four a day, 120 per month, 312 in 78 days. we have a regime in iran that is sending terror through its own citizenry. how many more executions do you think is acceptable before we take the iranian regime to task over executing their own citizens? >> i can address that from the iranian standpoint.

the human rights situation in iran is quite despicable. we have seen president rouhani and the former minister talking about improving the situation. but quite frankly, we have yet to see them make inroads in that area. >> we really need to be focused on this, even in our negotiations and the administration's negotiations on relaxing the sanctions. we are getting played for fools, quite frankly. i know you are here to testify about al qaeda and iraq. the residents of camp liberty, are they as dangerous as al qaeda? >> no, certainly not. >> we promised them that we would protect them and take care of them, did we not? when they were repatriated, so to speak, at the camp.

>> the agreements between the military commanders at the time that moved in during camp basra. -- camp ashraf. >> they have paid with their lives to live there under the agreement that we made. you are aware that they are living in graves now? there are paper thin walls and the attacks are coming in. you are aware of that? >> i was at the camp this month and talked about what it was like to live in a trailer when colleagues are being killed by rockets in trailers. >> the good news and bad news, most of them as i understand it are not living in trailers.

the bad news is they have had to dig out a three foot i six-foot grave to live in to avoid the rocket attacks. how long does it have to go on? should we not be pressing to get them out of the country? while we work diligently on that, should we not be getting them protection? how much longer do you estimate are going on? >> we need to do everything we can to get them out of the country. >> you were here 78 days ago. have that improve? >> more of them have moved to albania. and we should be gracious because they have taken about 210 residents and i wish there were more willing to do the same. >> i'm told earlier you may that the walls were currently being installed there? >> that the information i got this morning that they would again moving in today or tomorrow. >> we have had cell phone

communication from the residents inside the camp and the not the case. >> to my understanding there is a decision made to begin moving t-walls back into the camp. whether it started or not how i don't know. i can assure you based on the information i have received the we will follow-up in if they are not being moved in, that will be a serious matter and i will follow-up follow up as soon as i receive the information. >> how soon? >> i can follow-up in the next 48 hours. >> is there third-party verification? i'm sorry, for me they don't have a lot of credibility. it's almost as if the residence ts of camp liberty are the enemy and not the big guns that they -- the victims that they are. surely you're not saying that you will call them and they will say -- >> we will talk to our colleagues at the united nations mission in iraq and the deputy

there who is at the camp regularly. he will be able to verify with eyes on. >> as we watch iraq the sand, i -- descend, i hope you make it an extreme priority to get them out. >> we will do so. >> thank you. >> let me just begin by thanking mr. mcgurk not only for your time this morning the for your work on this issue. as you can tell, this committee is extremely concerned about the reemergence of al qaeda, the impact it will have in iraq, the region, and even here to us in the united dates. thank you for that. we look forward to continuing to work with you on the concerns we have in the house. there is one other issue that i meant to raise with you and that is just turning for a moment to discuss the inclusion of the

kurdish democratic party and the patriot act tier three designation. my understanding is this have become a catchall designation that has inadvertently mislabeled kdp and puk is as terrorists even though they have been a stabilizing force in the region and consistently loyal to the united dates for decades. as al qaeda and associated group expand across the middle east and beyond, it seems like a good time to take count of our remaining friends in the region and maybe take a look at this an appropriate designation and recognize it's harming are very important relationship with the kurdish peoples. would the administration be supportive of a legislative solution to this issue that would exclude the kurdish groups from the tier three designation

? >> mr. chairman, thank you for asking that question and allowing me to put a response on the record. as you said, the kurdish people, the puk, and the kdp are some of our closest friends in the region. we think they should be removed from the list as soon as possible and it is imperative. we understand it requires a legislative fix. there is nothing we can do by election -- by executive action alone. we are 100% supportive of an immediate legislative fix and we look forward to working with you and the relevant committees to get that done. >> thank you. the senate is working on this with the house and we appreciate, once more, your testimony here today. thank you, members. we stand adjourned. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014] [captioning performed by national captioning institute]

>> both chambers of congress return to session monday. the house will take up a bill altering the way the newly created financial bureau is funded and run. the senate monday begins work on a bill dealing with military pensions. it would repeal a 1%age point

reduction in the cost of living adjustments for military retirees part of the recently passed budget agreement. you can watch the house live on c-span, the senate live on c-span 2. coming up this morning on c-span, "washington journal" with the week's news and your phone calls and tweets. at 10:00 a.m. eastern our newsmaker's interview with kentucky senator and potential 2016 presidential candidate rand paul. and remarks this week of homeland security agency jay johnson on the 2014 agenda. on "washington journal" we'll speak with the president of the league of conservation voters for a look at the key environmental issues facing congress and the obama administration. then former pennsylvania governor and homeland security director tom ridge joins us to talk about global threats to homeland security and with janet yellen taking over as head of the federal reserve, we'll look at the central

bank's upcoming decisions with victoria mcgrain, a reporter for the wall street journal. "washington journal" is next. ♪ >> host: good morning the white house preparing for this week's prison from the french president which will include a visit to jefferson's home in monticello and tuesday night the state dinner which we'll have live coverage here on the c-span networks. it's sunday morning, february 9. a busy week in washington and capitol hill including two congressional hearings for janet yellen, of course the new fed chairman. ahead, the debate over immigration based on the comments by speaker of the house john boehner this past week. will anything pass this year,