sea, adiz, taiwan claims to have an adiz -- they overlap. typically, the way a lot of typically a lot of the way this operates, you notify the controllers. with the east zone was it went far beyond that in terms of traffic passing through. younderstanding is when plan on landing. correct me if i i am wrong, this goes beyond that.

in terms of the operation, we are probably going to see more naval and non-the literary chinese ship operating in this near-term. aboutfrankly am not sure how the chinese will use this military operation, training, in the area of the islands. -- aaised a quick question great question about japan and the way it is dealing with its third oil disputes with the republic of korea. to talk about some of the territorial and maritime issues. they try to use the law of the sea, and the people's republic of china i do not think it is in gauging the park -- in the .roper u.n. bodies

to the extent we have regularity, there are opportunities for using judicial bodies to bring clarity. politics domestic plays a huge part. andhe extent we believe have that norm where these things can be litigated over and move towards the greatest extent possible, there have been these sorts of disputes that have been resolved. there is oil in the north sea, and now we have joint development there. the far future there are opportunities, but not in the near term. the question about possibility of japanese-south korean disputes, the same sort of thing we see in the east china sea between china -- japan and

korea. i do not think you can discount it, but my hope is the united states in that situation would be held among the spokes and do what it can dramatically. it is easy to say in the abstract, and it can be an emotional issue, but my hope is the united states could find a way, because a message i kept hearing, frustration about japanese-south korean itagonisms and that -- understand there is a lot of deep history there. beliefre is a consistent that if these two countries could find some modus operandi here that there is so much upside and the possibilities. , japan and south sign anre about to

agreement just a few years ago, which would have been a huge hurdle in hopefully normalizing some of these relations. for political reasons, it fell through. my hope is that in the next few years that these sort of issues can be revisited. they provide sort of a landing zone to try to build more. >> thank you. larry'sw up on questions about territorial disputes. it seems like to be a zero sum with all the countries involved, particularly in southeast asia, and using international legal means is not a way to resolve these issues, what do you see as the possibility of a solution from a prc perspective or the isippines, malaysia, --

there room for compromise, and is there a solution other than a or takesuntry claims right of ownership of these territories? it seems to me we are at loggerheads and no countries will give up their claims, so there is some kind of middle ground. any discussions throughout the region, would anybody take less than full ownership of these territories? dr. great question, maxwell. what you often hear is with least to resolving or at finding a way forward on some of these maritime and territorial disputes. but for some countries, for example, the philippines and china, that is a difficult issue because of how hot that problem has gotten, and this is why you have seen the philippines which the military cannot compete with

a country like china and in toch the united states -- enter a huge military conflict i think would create controversy. it would be hard. that is why you see the philippines moved through legal means. processs been a long toward what was hopefully a code of conduct in the south china of move tohina sea, to some sort of binding conduct that can help create -- because your question is right on point because this is a tension that is probably inherent, it will be there for a long time, and is like a scab you can keep poking at it. it will not heal, or you can find ways -- this is a terrible analogy -- but to bandage it in

a way to move forward and see whether you can have actual win-wins. it is easy to talk about these in the abstract, but in domestic politics that is where it gets really messy. >> now the floor is open. >> thank you -- >> close to the microphone. >> thank you. [indiscernible] [inaudible] true toto say it is not

call it in terms of at ease. the gentleman has said other countries have -- for many years. japan for over 40 years. not -- it is not the right of china to declare of at ease, but a matter economic. our at ease, the israelis notified -- but other parties made a adiz.ion to set up --

sentecond is that someone adiz is covered, disputed your tories, as admitted by other countries. islandsuntries include -- which china has been claiming for more than several hundred years. one party -- no, never. partial reflections of their policies. we have beendiz, made very clear this report that china will set up or declared to have adiz in the south china

seen. our spokesperson has made it very clear china has the right to do this, as other countries have done. we will do this according to -- of the east china sea. we did not. we will not tolerate any threat from the region in the future. seniorn somebody, officials in the united states, made the remarks that based on -- the remarks or the news report --the i am just sort of annoyed. e are requiredr to make some remarks on some

,uestion that is hypothetical that is not true now, maybe something is not true, it is not relevant. why come to the idea in the united states? why so manyerstand senior officials start off to ake so much remarks -- it is very inconsistent position. gentlemens that the have a very pessimistic narrative that china -- been involved in the china-united states, asia-pacific dialogue for --eral years,

that am very confident with more conversation from --na and united states [indiscernible] find resolutions to our disagreements, but it is thatrous to hear reports china is onbe that a collision course. i can never accept that. china and the united states are big powers. solvean find a way out to the conflicts. there may be withdrawing from other parties.

thank you. >> thank you very much. from the chinese embassy >>. thank you for your comments. i have been at these sorts of offense where you will be talking about china and it is refreshing to have someone from the chinese government to express their point of view. in the united states we pride ourselves on the ability to have multiple points of view and to be able to disagree about being disagreeable. i hear you and i heard your inments, and my remarks back terms of of you said people do not always see it from the chinese side. that is why i'm glad you are here and able to articulate it. my hope is when these issues are discussed in china and elsewhere that we see the same sort of reciprocity. matters ofms of the

the adiz and how this is normal, i do not think anyone in the united states opposes adiz. you and i will differ in terms adizether the scope of the and how it operates and how it was notified. you and i will disagree about whether there was adequate edification beforehand. i have heard from other interlocutors that they did not view the same sort of notification and transparency. it certainly was not a consultation. isnderstanding with adiz there is a lot of consultation in terms of designing them and the like. that said, i do not think anyone opposes china's right to do adiz. it is all about how.

s tohere are future adiz' begin, in which everyone can agree it will be a constructive, because countries have rights. in terms of the south china sea report, i hear you in saying it is a groundless report. i hope it is true. i cannot only speak to what motivated the guest and the assistant secretary of state denny russell to speak to this issue. i assume it is begun -- beyond news reports, and it's not that is a different issue, but i do not think they will have raised this issue to the level that it has on news reports. license is they may have other means of -- my sense is they have other means of cause to be concerned. constructiveays

paths forward, and this is the i am alwaysn a -- glad to see our friends from the chinese embassy to speak and offer their views, and i respect very much where you are coming from. thank you. >> thank you, bobby. any comments from the russian embassy? japanese embassy? korean embassy? know i did not have, but i will say something about not about --r talk, but i think the danger might happen if we do not resolve early enough. what i am thinking is i think the u.s. government's new strategy position has been making it really worse. i understand that secretary of state wants both countries to

resolve the issue, but do not say which side is right. that is a real problem in many ways, because, for example, japan east china sea issue, the siding withs is japan, and when somebody is trying to take over somebody -- you guys, and resolve the issue, that is a prolonged invasion. i am concerned that unless the united states understands the form about what is right, then we might reach a wager point eventually. >> thank you. ok, bobby? that point, and i do not have much to add --

>> [indiscernible] all right, any other comments? you have something on your mind? thank goodness. >> no further questions? up to thestand microphone, speak louder. communications law student at george washington university. i have two questions. from what it seems like in your speech, there is an inevitable escalation of conflict because of a natural military progression. it seems like an issue would arise anywhere he where they are

in a competing military environment, competing economically, culturally, and the u.s. has not chosen sides and their competing alongside those people in the east and south china seas/ -- . there's obviously territorial , and there was a discrepancy because -- between how they wanted to resolve a, international justice or on their own terms. to you think there needs to be a consistent political workaround on that kind of issue where not we, but the united states or any other power, takes a certain stance consistently with each view, or do you think it is a sensitive cultural issue and needs to be taken on a basis?-case >> thanks, joshua.

thank you for your question. first, i will say if i came across i thought that conflict or military conflict is inevitable in the east china sea and the south china sea. no, i do not think it is inevitable. oft said, the temperature the area is rising, which is to say the possibility of conflicts, the probability could be increasing, and we have seen friction. my worry is at least in the next year or so we could see more friction. ofhink a worry among i lost -- a lot of u.s. defense analysts is there could be a direct military confrontation in the east or south china seas due to some miscalculation, and accident, and unintentional consequence. that is always a possibility. there is always a possibility that is a premeditated decision.

i do not think that it is inevitable, but the more we speak honestly about what is going on and frankly air out our differences, it is helpful -- again, i am delighted that the representative from the chinese embassy is here, because it is good to talk it through, and it is not easy. second, i think you asked about some sort of general approach. i think in theory it sounds great, but in practice and for anyone who has served -- i was in congress as a staffer, lots of friends who work with the executive branch -- they do not like a one-size-fits-all approach. at the end of the day you end up talking about and ofssues in

themselves. you can look to other things as looking -- is for cannot figure out the word -- but you can refer to the pass, but should not guide how you go about the future. generally, i worked in nuclear nonproliferation. the more you can be consistent, even for the public to understand, sure, but in the real word, domestic politics ends of compensating things, so it is not easy to be consistent. >[applause] >> we have five minutes for a quick break. thanks very much. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2013]

[captioning performed by national captioning institute]

>> this discussion for the corean-american studies. earlier we covered the comments from vice president biden and president obama from cambridge among maryland. we will show you those later. the president on his way to california. he will be addressing the

drought situation. he will be talking about some federal aid and meeting later on this evening in southern california with king abdullah of jordan.

now, come to order.

ladies and gentlemen, ok, i will introduce mud of my -- one of my associates, an attorney by training. daniel will introduce our next guest. >> thank you for this opportunity to introduce our featured speaker, mr. sidney seiler. it is my great pleasure to

introduce the strip sidney seiler. having a career that has expanded over 30 years, he has covered both halves of the korean peninsula in the administration. his service includes post at the national security agency, the directorate of operations in the cia, and the foreign broadcast information service. he spent 12 of those years in south korea. he joined the service when it was first established in january 2006. he served at the national clandestine service for the cia. he received his masters of arts young statethe

school, and is a graduate of the defense language university. book, which covers rise of of kim's power. ler gave a presentation during a 2010 symposium. today presenting the north korean challenge going forward, ladies and gentlemen, please welcome mr. sidney sieler. >> thank you, and daniel. it is ironic. i'm glad you mentioned the fact i was here for years and people remember four years ago to the day was snowmaggeddon. i got stuck on my way home for an hour in the snow, taking a

act out lay down somewhere in washington, d c, and i will never forget the opportunity. the other interesting is at the time it was a very slow news weekend, so this presentation got repeated coverage. people had nothing else to do but stay home and watch a relatively boring, an exceptional speech at the time on the north korean nuclear program. i came in as an analyst town, and now i come at that -- as the head of a policy maker, so i will resist a temptation to get into and over analytical piece. there is an adage that goes you do not gknow where you are going until you know where you had been. when you deal with the difficult issues like north korea, you face a challenge of having a set of policy direction and define a set of principles to undergird

day-to-day decisions. the truth of this adage becomes strikingly clear. not too long ago i used the expression predictably unpredictable in describing the use of surprise as so ingrained in the diplomatic table, and it is no longer should be surprising. let me suggest that for the policymaker, north korea may be termed transparently open take, transparently opaque. north korea is an actor whose efforts to use mystique as a poetic force are -- as a solomatic force are established they are not particularly mysterious. i went in my archives to find the 1999 korean central broadcast system commentary on the revolutionary exploits of termed his, switched

skills and leadership as being mysterious beyond imagination, adding it is no accident even the enemies call the general's political art and legendary. i would assert after 20 years of and 40 yearsh bprk of sustained action -- this is what people forget when they look at the history of the interaction -- 40 years of sustained interaction up to that point to the mechanism of them are mrs. -- of the armistice commission that we have amassed since his -- sufficient evidence to not be back footed by opacity, baffled by or blinded by black holes. today i would like to take a hit of a richer suspected look and examine the future of north korea and our policy within the context of where we have been and how that impacts the roots of polls of our policy in the

direction it will hit in the future. in the early 1990 hot when we first embarked on the sustained interactions with north korea following the armistice, and punjab,the confines of there was not look to -- not much to to look back on. we had no test that pyongyang's dependability to live up to agreements with the united states. at this time this warranted moving forward with what would not onthe framework, faith, but what might be called exploratory confidence-building principles or a test thereof. as you remember the agreed framework in 1994 came about about concerns over inconsistencies between north korea must nuclear activities as

they declared in 1982 and the result of the inspections once the inspections got on the ground. the intent of the agreed framework was to bring a halt to the production of fissile material and to the inspections resolve the differences between the north korean the coloration of 90 grams or so of plutonium obtained through reprocessing, three have full of damage fuel rods, and that of the initial inspectors found at the time and what observers found that north korea may have produced enough plutonium for a weapon. what itdamentally than speeded objectives were, the framework represented an effort thatst the proposition confidence could be built between two adversaries. i would sit a critical point of confluence is three major strategic arcs in the history of north creek. the emergence of north korea must demonstrated intent and

ability to produce fissile material, and pursue a nuclear capability, the second being the power transition we witnessed thei would sit a critical pointf confluence is three major strategic arcs between kim jongs father, and then finally the the emergence of a post-cold war era in the world. the north must nuclear ambitions were become clearer, its ation was inu transition, and its external environment was vastly change. the agreed framework halted plutonium traction for nine years, no small achievement. but what went on chain worth north korea -- word north korea plus nuclear ambitions. north korea never allowed the

axis of facilities and is -- the access of facilities. it continued to design and test high explosives during the duration of the framework. by the end of the 1990's, north korea appears to have pursued a uranium enrichment program declared. 2000's witnessed the six-party area, and aggressive and sustained diplomatic effort went into finding a way to create a framework where to complete the nuclear eyes asian, and also captured in the september 19, 2 thousand five, joint statement. during these talks, and spite of the fact that the talks were underway, the reactor continue to run, north korea conducted two processing runs, one in 2003, 1 in 2005. north korea advanced its

deterrent by declaring it was pursuing it in 2003 and by towing in 2004 net allies ternium. -- metallized plutonium. 2008, announcing its weaponize asian. with the joint statement's. adoption, north korea conducted its first test in october of 2006. we remember the distraction of a cooling tower that would come in june 2000 eight, an important symbol of the progress that was being made under the six-party talks, the dismemberment of the the reactor,of particularly the actions for the implementation of the joint statement statement. in the october 2007 statement covering second phase actions for the implementation of the

joint statement. it left unaddressed where the issue of getting north korea to discuss its continued undeclared ornium enrichment activities how we would get the verification necessary to address the remaining questions plutonium the north's enrichment programs. some of this is old history, but this retrospective work is valuable because it provides the context within which the administration viewed the north itea nuclear issue when inherited it upon taking office in 2009. the president took office going to extend his hand to countries like north korea as they would be willing to unclench their fists. within weeks, after the inauguration of president obama, john nine -- pyongyang began tests.

responded, north korea proceeded to conduct a nuclear test on may 25, just months after the obama administration took office. the second test had a profound impact on to those people who were otherwise would believe were nog's and dishes longer than a way to grab the attention of the united states. theseriousness with which world viewed the intentions were evident in the adoption of the security council resolution. the consensus grew on the need to impede growth of the wmd program and inflict a cost on that program, with strong enforcement neck and his and complementing the united nation's resolution. together these two resolutions clearly required north korea to

suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile program, which would include the conduct of launches, development of missile technology, a resolution demanded no further illicittests using missile technology, and called on north korea to dean terrorize -- denuclearize. as the diplomatic dust had begun the special representative made a trip to pyongyang in december of 2009 in an effort to get some type of dialogue jumpstarted with the dprk. north korea later again took an action that figuratively sank the prospects for resumed talks and literally ship in 2010. after demonstrating to the world that uranium enrichment

capabilities on november 12, as steve and i were going through the region, we went to seoul, tokyo, and beijing to brief our partners, some 45 or 60 minutes flew over the island, the island was shut. after the dust had settled, we embarked on an effort to test north korea's willingness to engage in negotiations, once again another test to see whether the north koreans could engage in negotiations with a seriousness of purpose. with close coronation with our six-party partners, we in 2011 tobe and engage north korea in meetings designed to bring a halt to its nuclear programs, missile

launchers, and in our efforts to restart the six-party talks create an environment conducive to such talks. after three sets of meetings, one in new york, geneva, one in february after a short hiatus following the death of kim jong-il, we understood with north korea and understanding that would become a lead they deal, and understanding that we would pursue a path of confidence building measures which would begin with the north halting its nuclear activities and would be reciprocated by confidence-building measures on our own, and yet again barely two weeks after this test in essence was administered, north korea announced it would proceed with a self-proclaimed satellite launch in clear violation not only of the united nations cil resolutions

banning such launches or the understanding we had. in retrospect the february 29 deal was a test test like the agreed framework and like the september 19 statement. these three tests may have been different in terms of the speed in which they were failed, and significant to this action, so soon in the era of the new leadership, in terms of the february 29th understand, what was -- was not particularly encouraging in developing authentic negotiations. most importantly, for us, to itrate 29 mistreated r was not prepared to reserve -- earizatione denucl

process. ,olitical seasons in seoul washington, and beijing were looming, and as north korea andhed the elections political activities in those three capitals, it began for another series of actions which would commence in december with another launch, followed with a nuclear test the next year, 2013, followed by a time of intense rhetoric and vitriol. the question then, how are we responding? what does the future look like, in terms of mass m." evidence in terms of north korea's intentions and growing capabilities? our north korea policy is focused on two primary goals. myy of you here from

colleague's presentation, and i am sure he touched on a range of activities we do it in the context of the u.s. alliance, our deterrent strategy, our joint exercises, our planning of mechanismsety that we have that feed our ministerial consultative meetings. as we explore long-term vision on how we secure the capabilities, develop the to counternd train the emerging threat and contingencies posed by north korea, the u.s. has with its close allies with the republic of korea and sure peace and stability on the korean peninsula for 60 years, the alliance is strong, and it will continue to be strong. we have known doubt about that. ization side, ar few principles in terms of our

diplomacy and policy. you have heard it said before, but it is one of the statements that needs repeating, perhaps every month or so at least. the united states will not accept north korea as a nuclear stand or standby while it thatops a nuclear missile can target the united states. it is worth noting the international community agrees with a series of united nations security council resolutions calling on the dprk to denuclearize. is theults of the tests international consensus, the undeniable consensus underneath form north korea to denuc learize. and number of principles guide our policy. first of all is the centrality of our allies, traditional alliance.

is founded ony close and continuous cooperation with our allies. glyn davies and our team go out regularly to the region in close, continuous coordination. pyongyang's efforts to drive a l and between seou washington and washington and tokyo will not succeed because at the end of the day and you see this evidence in the north korea policy of our allies, we are not the only country that has learned the lessons of history that i just spoke to. second element is our close corporation with beijing. the united states and china agree on the fundamental importance of a de and weized peninsula, share common goals, we have open lines of communication and

continually consult with china on how to advance these common goals. we see u.s.-china cooperation is critical to have north korea international obligations. in this regard, china is a vital with its the dprk unique ties with north korea. the third principle is the principal of no rewards. will notd states reward bad north korean behavior, its provocations, it's rather -- it's rhetoric. the security and prosperity north korea seeks will only come when pyongyang changes it scores. it will not be rewarded for bad behavior. , spoke about briefly earlier there should be no doubt that

the united states will continue to take actions in our defense and that of our allies. this includes maintaining a regime onctions pyongyang. this includes strengthening our alliances with seoul and tokyo to deter and counter the north korea threat that we and our allies face. fifth principle is to maintain an alternative path. as we said to peter lee, the united states will continue to encourage north korea to choose a better path. we remain committed to a diplomatic solution, a dramatic solution based on authentic and credible associations, leading clearizationdenu actions. the united states is prepared to its north korea change course. it is prepared to sit down to negotiate and government commitment they have made. pyongyang must move its seriousness to take meaningful steps to show it has an intention to abide by its

respecton, international law, and engage in authentic negotiations. finally, and this may be considered our bottom line -- korea by its north actions and not by its words. this is more than a talking point. it is in a nutshell the prudent lesson of the years of dealing with the dprk, which i spoke about earlier. the challenge before us is clear. north korea inmate 2013 2013nced -- in may announced a policy to pursue construction and the growth of its forces. for the past two decades it can be argued pyongyang has pursued a policy that sought itsomic gains while dodging ncuclear obligations, but it is

party level strategic pause the lion clarity -- party line clarity. as my colleague has noted a number of times, it is a dead end policy. in this regard scott snyder , which i recommend highly to those of you who have not seen it. of the after the manager military region in an essay publication a entitled north korea den uclearization more in tune with interests, possessing nuclear weapons invite

international condemnation, isolation, and sanctions, leaving north korea unable to access advanced technology as well as aid for humaninternatio, isolation, and physical resources. this makes opening up the rest of the world difficult to achieve. the general goes on to note weapons usesclear a lot of resources, maintains a large-scale military fema which also uses a lot of resources from an overall perspective. concludes for the stability peninsula, -- this is united states policy as well. in this way and i say this in

closing, an opportunity is provided to sharpen north korea 's choices to remind north korea that the security and prosperity it seeks are only possible through denuclearization. i will remind you that the policy decisions the regime is making will only lead to greater diplomatic and isolation. to remind dpr k that there pursuit of weapons makes the country less secure and less prosperous, and remember that the true victims of north korea 's nuclear program are the north korean people and peace and prosperity they desire and deserve. thank you. [applause] now the floor will be open. thank you very much. it was a great historical overlay which is important for

that,understand, but with understanding the history, we are at a new point with the young leader with kim jong-un. i wonder if you could talk about your assessment of the stability , and if he iship going through the transition, he has not stabilized his leadership, what are the chances for things going down the wrong road? he is in a and when stable position, do you assess he will continue to follow the same path as you have outlined, which i really do like this transparent, opaque -- transparently opaque policy which is a useful description. if you could talk about the and theip's stability way had, i would appreciate it. >> thank you. it is not prudent to predict the

future, but that said, what we see in terms of if you look at -- and the reason i did this historical overview is to show that continuity of some of these trends over time and to kind of understand that what we have seen in terms of the actions of the dprk the past two years being entirely consistent with behavior that goes back two leaders, two kims ago, to that regard there is a jew agreed to which the continuity provides a sufficient framework with which to make smart policy, and that the transparently opaque formulation, to try to get over this idea that somehow north korea is a country that nobody knowy dance and we do not what they are going to do next and therefore we are handcuffed from a policy perspective. we have sufficient understanding

of the dprk to make solid policy. is transition period underway. it is an evolutionary process. you take a step act and you look at the events of the past two ofrs, within the larger arc where things were going when kim jong-un inherited this challenge know the inconsistencies and anomalies that would cause us to think somehow not sufficiently aware of the direction the regime is headed with its goals and intentions. that said, and this is why spoke divided, opportunities because the core of our policy has been one of sharpening choices for this the dprk, to ise clear that when the dprk

ready to commit to authentic and credible negotiations that have a series possibility of meeting clearizationdenu steps, the other five parties are ready to lead up to their -- the fundamental choice is to the dprk to make the right choice and to be intelligent and committed to sanctions and other actions that we need to take an hour defense and that of our allies to make sure that north korea knows its program cannot continue to grow unabated, that there is a dramatic and economic price to be made for the policy choices and makes and therefore to understand that downside sharpening the choices strategy. regardless of the direction that prk heads under its

principles, these principles apply equally. yes, and i agree with everything you said. i wonder, though, about our actions, and i agree north korea has had a playbook they have been following for 60 years, but than we act differently and we have in the past, and how that affects north korea. last year tossed was very,ce reaction very strong on like have it has been in the past. it supplies north korea. -- it surprised north korea. the alliance is strong and provides a foundation for everything that we do. shift gears and ask

.bout president parks policy the importance of her policy or the ability of her policy to succeed rests on the strength of the alliance. i'm wondering if you could talk about the relationship of our ?olicy with president park >> we first reached out to the election during the political thatign and it was clear it was built upon many of the same foundational for and suppose that we had, flexibility to talk, to explore, to probe, but a strong commitment to the nuclearization -- denuclea rization.

onk would have to be founded these principles. to allow humanitarian aid to also hold the north accountable. but we have is an extremely powerful partnership. this was attributed to personalities to the u.s. rok relationship. it is built along the shared approach to a common thread that .s enduring

whenever i hear an administration official then this goes back to the bush administration, not just the koreat, talk about north or read statements in the there is a topic that hardly gets mentioned. only is, it is mentioned in passing. that is the proliferation activities especially in the .iddle east

i have seen and i have written about literally hundreds of published reports quoting european intelligence sources, israeli intelligence sources, and japanese intelligence sources describing a deep, collaborative relationship between iran and north korea both in the development of missiles in the development of nuclear warheads. a south korean official was quoted in one of these. top missileg experts to north korea in the second half of 2012 -- iran sending top experts who assisted north korea in preparing for the successful long-range missile

tests of december 2012. there were reports that iran paid a very handsome sum of levelto set a very high -- send a very high-level delegation of experts to the february 2013 nuclear test. unwritten this is the , un-talked about problem that i think, given all of the information that has come out in ,ecent years with north korea this a deep involvement between -- andorea and he ran iran. we also have the wiki documents describing how secretary rice

instructed our ambassador in strongly torotest the chinese government over aircraft from kamran and andgyang -- tehran pyongyang unloading weapons in beijing's airport in transferring between these -- tehranrom toronto and pyongyang. it evidently bore no fruit. cangoing to ask you if you tell us anything about this north korea-iranian relationship . what is the substance of it, if you can say anything about it? i know there are intelligence sensitivities here but how much of a problem will this be in any future diplomatic intercourse with north korea on the nuclear

.ssue >> those are excellent questions and they are difficult because they do touch very directly on some of our more sensitive intelligence as well as the diplomatic activities and our efforts to try and halt, present, rollback north korea's outward proliferation as well as the proliferation of technologies into north korea. this is a central purpose, actually, of the entire range of councilcurity resolution sanctions and others we have put on north korea to not only impede the growth of the program to the import of technology and the cash they earned from sales but to actually prevent the outward movement of those technologies. me say aegard, let

number of principles. first of all, proliferation is a of thisinterest administration and really any administration. we know the threat we face, the dangers that we face and north korea has an established record of willingness to engage in these types of activities is known to everyone in this room. it's a top priority issue when we sit down with the north koreans with the february 29 deal, the six party talks. whenever we engage, this is a top priority. an area ino say it's which our international cooperation has grown markedly particularly since the 2009 nuclear test and the 2012-2013 activities. a number ofith countries, china included, and a number of ways that help to deal with the flow of material -- cd, sea, air,based --

land based --and it is a paramount concern to us as we execute this issue. was a fascinating and depressing history lesson you gave us on how many times north korea has violated its international obligations. stated we should judge north korea not on its statements but its actions. it seems to me the same standard ought to be applied to our negotiating partner, china. china continually uses the language that you used about and yet nuclearization it has participated in north korea's program beyond what and was involved in original proliferation in pakistan that ended up in north

korea. one could make the case that china is not only a proliferator of wmds but a proliferator of proliferators. it emanates from china and has spread in the middle east and asia. respectfully question the assumption of u.s. government policy or at least stated u.s. government policy that china shares our goal, our objective of the de- nuclearization of the korean peninsula. china's number one priority is not the nuclear program but north korea's so-called stability. rather than taking any kind of economic or other actions that would put pressure on the north korean regime, they would prefer a leading them proceed with the program as long as a buffer between the democratic south korea and

china. if that's true, that seems requires a bit of honesty in our public policy. secretary kerry yesterday reiterated that one year ago, china made all of these commitments to increase the pressure on north korea. the only pressure that has increased his rhetorical. there has been hardly any tangible efforts and yet the north korean regime would collapse tomorrow if china were to tighten any of its sanctions on fuel, energy, economic, let alone diplomatic protection. it seems to me this is the elephant in the room that we no china hascuss, that been a facilitator of the north korean threat and we should question what his motives are in doing so. >> i don't want to be a spokesman for the people's republic of china, they let me speak to some of the elements of our cooperation.

having the privilege of flying out to beijing once every couple it being verynd in-depth, productive work on this with six party talks, a lead negotiator, and our colleagues here at the embassy in china, china publicly articulates its commitment to the de-nuclearization and a desire in northeast asia and both of those clearly overlap with the interest and desires of all of the parties in the region , the united states, the republic of korea as well. the prc has been a cooperative partner in the united nations. it has been enforcing security council resolution that has other parties. it has put a lot of work into .he six party talks

the joint statement from 2005 and all of the diplomatic efforts undertaken place over the last nine years. this is a difficult issue. it's an issue that any times when we sit down and try to brainstorm over where the solution is to this, what are we failing to do, failing to find, we need to step back and remember it is pyongyang that is the party refusing to return to authentic and credible negotiations. as you mentioned, the prc does .ave a unique relationship we work very closely with the people's republic of china on this issue. issue that did not come up overnight nor will it be resolved overnight but it is an area we feel strongly committed to. our two leaders

discussed this at the summit at sunny lands, st. petersburg, the vice president when he visited and most recently secretary kerry. we continue to believe that resolution of this issue depends upon sustained efforts to cooperate with china. >> thank you. i have a question. immigration today, the attitude of north korea to south korea, is it changing? the south end of north korea agreed to allow reunions of separated families. later this month, it is

during the joint exercises during the same time. , one, do you think the changes are just political or technical? feel anyd, do you change of north korean attitude towards the united states and is it same towards south korea? thank you. >> we welcome the news that came about theht willingness of pyongyang to go forward with the family reunions in spite of the fact that there is a small overlap with the annual key resolve exercises.

it's encouraging to see that they recognize this as a humanitarian issue that need not be tied to these annual exercises. i would note that if one were to take a look back at both inter-korean policy, six party party talks, the conduct of these exercises is not necessarily .iplomacy-blocking event because they are entirely defensive exercises, they come manually and overlap with their own military training cycle. they are not in and of themselves -- there is no inherent in linkage to home these. we are very encouraged by them. trite,risk of sounding but it is so crucial, we need to judge north korea by its actions and not by its words.

we have seen tactical shifts like this. while we remain cautiously optimistic, we are also very realistic in terms of what this fors, the prospects sustained, real, substantive inter-korean approach meant in the possibility north korea is beginning to turn the corner on more bellicose rhetoric and actions and hope lead they will soon see the value of returning to authentic and credible de -nuclearization, stations. -- conversations. >> korean broadcasting systems. [inaudible]

what is her governments stance on that? could it be helpful for the nuclear problem? can you deliberate a little more on that? terms of the signal that prk may have sent in willingness to engage in de -nuclearization talks, we have seen nothing that they are prepared at this point. we know they made a national defense commission statement in the middle of last summer. was moretant proposal recent but in none of this do we see any indication that north korea is interested in talks at

this time. we remain open to that. the united states remains open to credible dialogue and we hope the positive signal that pyongyang may be sending is agreeing to move forward with family reunions represents a type of shift in their attitude and behavior that we've all been waiting for. >> i'm with the korean freedom alliance. i'm kind of a chronic pessimist about the north korean nuclear issue. i had a great time as a north

korea analyst some time ago and -- i'm so glad to be with him again. thingscribed many good like the u.s.-south korea alliance. we will not get into any talks for the sake of them and so on but it looks like when you say we are not going to talk unless you are ready to talk seriously, we keep wasting our time, it looks like. current getting together -- --keep losing some words >> [speaking korean]

>> separated families getting together is good news but it does not give me any help about the nuclear issue. no matter what comes up, we will keep losing time. looks like we are waiting until north korea accomplishes the capabilities to reach alaska and beyond. goingt see anything else at this point, so can you kind of help me relax my concern? thank you. although i did not give extreme good amount attention to the first part of it, but to this idea of deterrence and the nuclearization efforts, these of the prudent steps we need to take as north korea has a

strategic goal in the pursuit of a nuclear force as it develops increased missile capabilities and doesn't openly threatens us with them that we would take the that was discussed a lot in the areas of activity in terms of missile defense, extended the term of us, the entirety of our discussion with alliance.h the our trilateral cooperation with japan is crucial on this. japan is a partner in missile defense is crucial on this. a variety of ways in which we in essence deny north korea the value of its so-called nuclear deterrent by making it irrelevant in light of our ability to counter it. taking it very seriously, not irrelevant in a way we can ignore, but eating sufficiently postured to do terror and defend

as necessary in light of this capability. discussionpart of my , which maybe i should have developed a bit more, but if you look at this with some degree of understanding of the history of and and've been, talks of themselves have no inherent value particularly in slowing the program without the types of actions like sanctions, counter activities and continued pressure necessary to ensure that north korea pays a price for its program. just simply talking for the sake of talks does not necessarily slow the program. people are inclined to look at status of the dialogue and say in the absence of dialogue, the program is growing in the make a

there.ausal relationship we want to have dialogue. we had dialogue with the first and second phase action statements led to the disabling in themegawatt reactor processing facility, led to the collapse of the cooling tower. reduce, ata path to least quantitative, in terms of plutonium recovery and yet north and theyke out of it are now taking steps to restart the newtonian program in the iranian enrichment continues to go on. i appreciate the frustration which is why we see a sense of urgency. we do continue with a relatively deust pace of the

-nuclearization policy. with our allies in tokyo and russia as well. come to the microphone, please. >> thank you very much for your excellent presentation. learn that you studied very much the history of the conflict and are well aware that it is the current situation is the result as you putse ends it, the policy now is changing due to dprk's choice. they will pick nuclear over

economic improvement because we have seen that they are willing to let millions die of starvation before loading up on .heir regime i want to ask whether this avenue of fresh or could be considered. it would probably have to come from the ngo as opposed to a thee but to press for indictment of kim jong-un from the international criminal court based on the jurisdiction that the republic of korea encompasses the full korean peninsula as it states in its constitution. that is one of the

examples of the loose ends from the unresolved conflict. i cannot imagine any other to look fresh or to have greater effect on kim prospect of the criminal prosecution based on should notthat dprk even exist. what do you think about that as something to try to bring something new in terms of thesure and to shake up change more? there's not much you can do but he will learn very quickly that he's not getting anywhere with the game he's been playing and his predecessors have been playing. question.ting

, ofme start by saying course, sometimes in our focus issue,e-nuclearization we have a special envoy, bob kane, dedicated to human rights and a special representative, glenn davies, who looked at the larger policy. at times, people forget as we talk about uranium enrichment, theiles, proliferation, plight of the people of north korea. that is absolutely not the case in the white house as we look at this issue holistically. we continue to be concerned that. we want to bring the north korean people the same peace,

and respectfreedom, for human dignity that their brothers and sisters in the south and joy. -- enjoy. look is a sense when you at the broader arc of history that the forces, the trends of history are inevitable. the president spoke of this at the university of foreign studies during his state visit. you touched on this during his own speech during the december visit. our support in particular for the unification strategies, which themselves are jordan by desire that the north korean people would one day be free of the situation that they are in continue toe will create an environment and we

believe we have put an alternative path for the leadership of john yang to choose. there are paths before it and there are conditions we can create to lead them down the continue toand we need to do that. ngosourage, in particular, to keep that front and center. as we found in the past, voices from the outside matter. to thee encouraging people. perhaps more so than if they attitude- caused the to change. this is the right thing to do and we will continue to put the focus we have on this human

rights issue continuing going forward. >> please, come on up. >> i'm very new in this deal. professional.ical since you debuted the history of north korea -- >> the no ancient history or medical. the first kim, end of the second kim and taking power. senior, but there was no way to fight anymore. son does not like it? kill him. his son takes over.

the same thing happens over and over again. , the same path. if you know it is there, then you can beat him. you cannot involve international but there is a constitution that the authority has. they have power or control over what happened with any litigation.

setting a policy for the whole korean peninsula that they stay behind on their guideline. they have taken more action and we cannot do anything. thank you. >> this may bring me close to the borderline i said i would policyss moving from from analyst. the challenge with understanding north korea's motivations in 1994 as to why we moved just up to the death of kim il-sung, a korea put its nuclear

program under wraps, ias it were. ofhalted until the campaign 2003 and engaged in a diplomatic effort to improve relations with the new knighted states. they believe it was a sincere effort with the fundamentally better u.s.-dprk relations. the existed nuclear deterrent, as it were, was not sufficient to protect it from the forces of history that appeared to be and they felt it was the best way to guard against it . i think it's all very .peculative the challenge that we face is

the regime's inherent perception of the world in which it lives. the worldview, as i call it. we have tried many things in the termsrty talk process in of discussions on security assurance. the rule six party talks process provides a very hospitable diplomatic environment. were concerned about hostile forces from without threatening the regime's existence, it is a diplomatic environment there that should be very reassuring that the could be had by strengthening the path of

de-nuclearization. the regime lacks confidence in that in many to keep reminding the regime that there is an alternative path. that is going to be a process that if there is going to be a transformation in north korea, , by oure new leadership sharpening choices approach, we could continue to send that message and provide that alternative path and demonstrate our willingness to reach out our hands to those who will unclench their fists. to your second question, i think the transformational potential that lies in the policy towards north korea is imminently understood by president park and has been in the middle of her

trust policy and it is also the driver for the more recent emphasis on unification and foraring the korean people their aspiration. i think there has been some legitimate questions raised. i don't think it's worth exploring at this time considering some of the details, is asat is clear pyongyang looks at its surrounding environment, it would see a number of countries that are willing, ready to help them pursue other paths as it makes to digit choices.

>> i will just ask from here. thanks so much. two part question actually. outlined theave , itent approach to policy makes sense and there is a rationale and a logic. this is a question of clarification. meanwhile, the north is engaged in developing its nuclear missile capabilities. does this mean the current approach, does this mean that time is on our side and we can wait whether it is years, .onths, decades its time on our side? is that the assessment we have

made that has formulated into this calculation? r.o.k., question is the a pillar of the current policy the north toinduce change its behavior actions. this is shared with the other five parties looking at the other coronations happening among the five parties . other than the sanctions tool, how else can we try to induce a behavioral or actual change from directth without having contact with them, however you want to define "contact?" >> two great questions. in pursuit of the policy principles i discussed, i would

not to assume that we see time is on our side. in fact, we seem this as necessitating a sense of urgency. facilitated that with our fellow six party talk partners. there is no credible likelihood of leading to concrete fr de-nuclearization options but really making it clear to north korea. probably in the internal events of north korea, as the new its paths maps out that were consistent and principled and the choices that we provide.

we never said time is on our side. in fact, just the opposite is true. other partners and un security council resolutions, we can bring north korea to the conclusion that they have a better future through de- nuclearization and that is the path we continue to believe is best not to reinforce past best thead behavior but induce type of change you mentioned as the policy goal as president park and the republic of korea. sanctions and the specific actions that we can put in place , this north korean stated policy that it will continue to pursue nuclear weapons in spite of its international obligations

, in spite of the international community census that it will continue down this nuclear path , wevering in this economy need to be decisive and resolute in sending a strong message to pyongyang that it simply is not possible. that can range from specific actions and measures taken to things not done. seen if you dove travel advisory dprk and look at the number of countries that have strengthened their travel advisories in light of the events and cases that have bae andd with kenneth

others sends a message that it is not a good place to travel to. an economic development strategy based on tourism that really brings and questions [speaking korean], enticing foreign investment as they move through ,he provocation, nuclear tests not a conducive environment one would think to be needed in order to bring in international investment. this is the type of consensus that i think is built internationally. it may not be an in your face " de-nuclearization or else" threat, they hear a unanimous voice and the leadership should be more inclined towards a type

of behavior and a type of decision that our policies are designed to elicit. >> ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much. [applause] >> this is a small liberty bell from philadelphia as a token of friendship. thank you very much. very nice, thank you. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] >> the meeting is adjourned. thank you very much. >> one of the things we worry

about, cyber attacks and physical dangers. what i always think is what keeps me up at night when i think about what can happen next . i wonder what your greatest fear is as to a physical attack here in our country, general. would answer with two things. on the cyber side, an attack against critical infrastructure would have potential damaging effects, transportation, health care, clearly financial is an area to pay very close attention to. on the kinetic side, there is a range of things that keep me up at night. when you see these mumbai-style attacks and what happened at the mall in nairobi, the boston marathon, does the kind of things we have to continue to work together in the

intelligence community to make sure we are working as seamlessly as possible to share on theing we have levels andate, local that's really an important aspect of what we are trying to do to work on integration of our intelligent systems. >> this weekend, senate armed services looking at worldwide threats, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction. on "book tv," the savannah bancorp festival -- savanna book festival. as part of presidents' day weekend on american history tv on c-span3, the american presidents in the national portrait gallery monday night at 8:00 p.m. the white now to house. earlier, we had a briefing from press secretary jay carney talking about aid to farmers and

ranchers hurt by the recent drought out west. this is just some of what he had to say. is the $1 billion support something the president to do through executive administrative action? >> information provided to you this morning made clear that his budget would include a new $1 billion climate resilience fund then this is part of a broader approach to dealing with the challenge represented by climate change that the president put forward in his climate action plan. visit to fresno will demonstrate his concern that communities across california struggling with the impact of one of the state worst droughts in over 100 years and the president is committed to ensuring they are doing

everything they can to help farmers, ranchers, smoke unities -- small communities being affected. the president will announce efforts to provide support and relief to those feeling the pain of the drought. full list of these commitments but among them, speeding up the delivery of up to $100 million in livestock disaster assistance. while these livestock programs took over a year to get out, the usda is committed to cut that time by more than 80% in begin sign up in april. also the team million dollars in targeted assistance -- and also $15 million. also to help families that may be economically disadvantaged by the drought. president, does he think anything the administration has been able to

accomplish has mitigated the effects of the california drought or the other climate impacts? >> we put in place a story fuel efficiency -- historic fuel efficiency standards that attest having a positive impact on carbon emissions than almost any other .olicy that one could imagine the president is not done in addressing the challenges. that was reflected in his climate action plan that he played out last year and the steps we will continue to take. resilience fund as part of that. weather and its relationship to both climate change,- local climate no storm, flood, drought can be said to have been caused by global climate change, but the science is clear that weather

everywhere is being influenced. we have always had droughts but the worst are getting longer and dryer. we've always had severe storms but instead of 100-year storms, we are having 100-year storms that happen every other year or every five. the severity of the storms, i think we all know from having more and seenem the reporting, has been significant. sandy is a perfect example. it is a reminder of the steps that we need to take and that this president is committed to take. > >> you can watch it in its entirety online at www.c-span.org. president obama is in california today and he will be meeting with king abdulla from jordan and talk about climate change and california with stops and palmgh, los banos,

springs. their reporting on the $1 fundon climate resistance that is expected to be released next month. the funding for research and new technology and new technology in preparing for climate change. california,aded to the president and vice president were at the house democrats retreat in maryland. we will show the president's remark shortly, but first the vice president. [applause] hello, everybody. shelby, how are you? please, please. you've had a long week. [applause] thank you very much. thank you. last time a group stood that

long, the guy in the back of the "keep talking. it's raining outside." sorry i could not be here yesterday. ajust want you to know i have deadline. i got off the helicopter and drove in the hotel and i was told, if you're not out of fear by 20 minutes until 10:00, the president cannot land. that's an incentive for everyone. [laughter] time, you'vehe been kind enough to invite me to your caucuses before, to this enjoyed itve always and i've always been willing and anxious to stay as long as you had questions. in order to get to the questions and have the discussions, i'm going to be fairly brief and what i have to say in my opening comments.

again to saye back thank you. i'm not being gratuitous. letter really, thank you. were it not for the house of representatives and how you stood by the president and particularly the leadership with nancy, this could have been a much, much rougher road. why werstand as well were reelected. u.n. this a lot of room, the help and effort you put in on our behalf -- because a lot of you in this room. i'm fully committed to putting every bit of effort we can to be of help to any of you. [applause] as jimmy flynt once said to me me, somestman said to places you help in some places do you hurt.

he said he would campaign for or against me, which ever would help. thank you to steve israel for directing me where he wants me to go. we had breakfast with about half a dozen of your pollsters and i'm anxious to help. i also want to thank debbie wasserman schultz. she's been one of the best spokesman we've ever had. [applause] debbie is always there, doing it tol, and i'm trying my best help you raise some money there as well. you are doing a heck of a job for us. i want to thank you. i particularly want to say thank you to shelby, her daughter. every time debbie comes over, i convince her to let shelby stay and hang out with me. look.

about america's prospect and about our prospects. really mean that. take a look at where we are relative to many other country in the world, we are so much better positioned than any other 21stry to the lead of the century. i love the stories about how the chinese are doing so well and they will eat our lunch. not do trade positions with any foreign leader for all the money in the world. they have more problems. we want them to work their way through them. america is by far and away the best position to lead the world into the 21st century both -- particularly economically. i know this has been steny's thing, by american, but now it is come home to america. -- buy america.

manufacturing is coming back to the united states of america. it is coming back for simple, basic reasons. we have the most productive workers in the world. they are three times as productive as the chinese. i want a chinese to do well. i just met for five and a half hours with the president and told him how much he wanted -- i wanted him to do well. we want you to be in a position to buy our products, but i really mean it. take a look around. take a look at why companies are coming home. we have the best research universities in the world. we are in a situation where we have a court system where we protect intellectual property. in ingenuity.th think about it. what product can you name -- how many times have you been making speeches for the last 15 years about how the chinese have

5, six times as many engineers as we have? where do you see a chinese brand anywhere in the world? folks, we are so much better positioned than anyone else that it always amazes me that we don't talk more about it. you know, i was recently traveling about eight hundred thousand miles so far as vice president and i was coming back from a trip that ended up being around the world but i came from india to singapore. i met with a man some of you have met with, one of the wisest men i've met, the only guy i've heard henry kissinger said he learned something from and that yu.leak one you -- li kwan he's frail but his mind is still extremely sharp and very

articulate. i sat with him for about an hour. book recentlyat written where there is a group of interviews with him about four countries -- china, india, the united states, and russia. i turned to him about 20 minutes into the conversation and i said, mr. president, what are the chinese doing now? he said something interesting. he said china is in the united states looking for that buried lockbox. i looked at him quizzically. he said, you know, like flight recorder boxes that contain the data. they are trying to figure out what it is that allows americans to be the only nation in the world to continually be able to remake itself. resumptionwhat wesley, i think i can -- somewhat presumptuously.

that box.o things in there is a steady, constant string of immigrants coming to american shores. [applause] who come arents self-selected. they have the most courage, the most sense of optimism, the ofatest sense of the ability day and fellow immigrants to make things new. many think about it, the strongest come. it takes a lot of courage to pick up and say i'm heading to a country that may not particularly want to me and i do not speak the language but i'm going anyway. it takes a special breed of person. that is the first thing. the second thing is in the united states, whether you are

naturalized american citizen or by birth, you are talking the time you are a child to challenge orthodoxy. we are the only nation in the world where as difficult as our elementary school education is and we criticize it and we want to make it better and it must be made better, no child in america is ever criticized for challenging orthodoxy. think about every other country including our allies. orthodoxy. orthodoxy is the holy grail. you cannot build something new and less to break the old mold. that is the magic of this country. when i take a look at our attitude about ourselves as a people, it always surprises me when we do not have the degree of optimism we should about the state of the nation. in spite of who is president or in congress, the american people are so much stronger, so much