particular of planning a military budget. what equipment are you going to want 5, 10, 15 years from now? .ost: we will leave it there marjorie censer with "the washington post." before we say goodbye, the michigan's congressman will not seek reelection to congress. that does it. we're back tomorrow morning. go to the brookings institution center for 21st-century security intelligence, where they are talking about this very issue, the future of land power and u.s. ground forces. thank you for watching today. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014] [captioning performed by national captioning institute]

>> good morning, everyone. welcome to brookings. peter singer and i are the scholars here who work with the 20th century federal security on intelligence. peter runs that. i am a senior fellow.

today, we have the pleasure hosting a great group of army and rain course specialists on the broad subset -- subject of the future of land power and warfare. today's news bulletins and the initial leaks on where the defense review and where the president posses new budget proposal will go are helping us create obvious links to the importance of the issue. sudden, we'ref a hearing the future of the u.s. army in particular may be further curtailed with the possibility of even -- even deeper cuts depending on what happens to the budget in the next couple of years. we know from two years ago the pentagon put out a defense strategic guidance, which basically argued the future of land warfare is changing and that large scale missions of the type the nation recently led in iraq and afghanistan are coming to an end and we have decided this as a measure of -- matter of policy sitting in our office in washington and this raises interesting questions about whether we can assist --

dissociate the work -- the future from confines inside the beltway or not, but, more importantly, it raises the question of how the army and the u.s. marine corps, how these organizations think about their future, what kinds of missions they need to be ready for. us, they have already been thinking about .hese questions members of the task force we have here on this first panel. a quick overview and i will get right to the discussion and we will have your questions later. we will spend one hour with his group and then we will immediately swap without a break and peter and i will change roles essentially. and we will talk more generally about the future of land warfare. in the first handle, we will hear from participants in the task force. if i could briefly let you know have two armywe

generals and one rain kernel. the kernel recently joined the group, has a distinguished career, and has been part of a very established marine corps plans andt and future scenario development for many years. also considerable con that experience. the major, a great deal of combat experience as well. you can see from their bios it is not completely confined to iraq. they have deployment experience in places ranging from sinai to korea. their careers have artie got them thinking about the future of not necessarily big land wars in these places, but various kinds of places that could involve ground power. we know quickly by way of introduction, the u.s. marine corps is obviously in many ways a ground force but in many ways also a naval force.

it thinks of itself very much in an expeditionary model. it is different from the army. it is not just the smaller second ground force but also does great things with the army on the ground. appropriate we have marines represented with us today. what i would like to do now is immediately launch into a couple of rounds of questions where i want to get some thoughts on the table. we will begin with major general hicks because, in a sense he has background in special operations but he is a conventional army representative here today on the strategic task force as well. get toask him, before we a second round of more detailed comments, to's plane -- explain a little bit what is being done and work out with three uniformed officers in round two. everyone, thank you for being here. what is the purpose? what is your mission with the task force and how long is is -- is it

supposed to go? where do you see this heading? >> the first thing that is important is the idea originated in dialogue between the chief staff of the army and the admiral commander. with the, they engaged general. this has been ongoing for a little over a year. it really focus on a number of things. we all recognize we have got to theitutionalize, not forget hard learned lessons of the last decade of war. i said that collectively in terms of interdependence and integration, the way we have integrated across formations and operated on the lands. purposes intersect on land.

that is a recognition we have got to carry on the the lessons here and substantiate going forward. we do not need to relearn those later. was acond key driver determination to ensure we re-centered not only our own thinking, but the defense department's and hopefully groups like this, thinking about the understanding of war and its immutable human aspects. we were having dinner last night and my colleague here to the right said of course that is true. if you go through and look at an -- anddoctrine as policy statements, you will see the word human, influencing human behavior and changing decisions of leaders, peoples, militaries, etc., is absent from much of the thinking and frameworks in which we operate. that is the second piece we are move forward on. another aspect is a recognition

over the last 10 years that combat overmatch and technical excellence does not always equate to the achievement of strategic outcomes. we're going back and doing a postmortem on where we were successful and where we were not, and understand why so we can carry that forward. the last area that really drives things is a recognition partly related to the overmatch issue. we have got to collectively move manpower into the realm of a strategic instrument that delivers on national and coalition strategic outcomes. this is particularly true given the environment we are entering. it is not all looking backwards. we are taking stock of our experiences collectively and we are looking very much forward trying to get a better handle on

the future operating environment, particularly what we term the velocity of human interaction, driven by can -- by connectivity. particularly announced on land, where you see the cyber environment, from google to hackers and everything in between, and the forces that operate on land. that is a very different environment that speeds the velocity with which events importantlyprobably , there are events that drive us a better account forward. >> i last you to comment before we go, but i also want to put this to a little bit of a focal point. for some people are saying the future of warfare is about special operation. drones, cyber, small, precise uses of force,

decision, and not about the conventional army. was there anything unnatural about the forcing together of these different groups into the same task force? some people would say it is the conventional army we all recognize or that some people want to argue is sort of fading from relevance. special forces and maybe the marines are still there at the forefront. is there any of that kind of sense in the task force? are you intellectual competitors in the task force or is it completely a unified effort if you see what i mean? to hear aboutng dirty laundry. obviously, intellectual tension and debate is healthy. whati am asking is, to extent is that part of the initial mandate of the task to see if special forces and drones can do more instead of less? >> to address the first part of your question, it has not been ourtural and it has been

agreements on most of these issues, or, certainly, much more than our disagreements. we do not completely agree on all the definitions and we are working through that process today, but we have been sharing the same battle space here for the last decade. operations, force continuedeginning and to this day. same with our partnership to the marine corps. been a highly cooperative effort and as the general said, this generated out of discussions between the chief staff of the army and the commander. from a so calm perspective, what we are trying to pitch -- to contribute to the task force, i would highlight basically two main areas. the first goes to your point,

which is, institutionalizing conventional force integration, interoperability, and interdependence, by reviewing and looking at the lessons learned over the last decade of work, where we have shared battle space and fought together. we are taking a deliberate and to codify the lessons learned and institutionalize that across hopefully all of the services. we are also very focused on returning to humans at the sensuality of our operations. timee are spending some developing the concept of a human domain, where individuals, groups, and populations, what are their beliefs and perceptions? are helping to contribute to that task force and,

particularly, those key areas. >> excellent. thank you again for joining us and thank you for a marine corps presence on the panel. what perspective would you immediately say is unique to the marines in this effort or that you feel marines bring to bear most acutely? insight any particular and set of lessons from the recent past or broader cultural perspective where marines are already offering a different view than the army? how do you see the marine corps role in the task force so far? >> thank you. i would first like to agree with say theelists here and marine corps, this is a perfect fit, to be involved in a strategic task force. we want to capitalize on the cooperation we have utilized with the army and special operations forces over the last 12 years. we move post-conflict into

think the marine corps as an amphibious force has special capabilities and characteristics that could complement the army and special operations forces and this is a perfect fit for us. engaged andyd and ready for crisis and response is what the marine corps is all about. those are our core competencies and we do not see that going away in the future. we think those unique capabilities the marine corps brings and offers can complement the army in the special -- and the special operations forces in the future. >> him around the four we go to all of you. i want to ask a big question about what the task force is orrning, or underscoring relearning. one big lesson you think is the most important. this country is either in danger neworgetting, or something

you are discerning in the future, what is the one big idea ? the same order finishing with peter. i would ask peter to combat the general and what he has heard. , what worriestion most about what we are doing wrong? it is already too low. personally, that is about what .'ve been recommending are we deluding ourselves into positionshe big large

could be declared to be over because we are tired of them? it may be a question you want to comment on, the basic notion the counterinsurgency is a thing of the past. it is something we declare every 30 or 40 years and then have to relearn later. i do not want to put your words -- words in your mouth. what worries you? there is one last provocation and then i will turn to you. there was a review last summer at the pentagon, which there was a possibility raised that the army would be cut to 380,000 active-duty soldiers. this presumed the possibility of prolonged sequestration. we may still end up with prolonged sequestration. it is not clear the nation will be able to sustain more than 380,000. to what extent would that were you? in the cold war, we had 800,000 1990's, we -- in the had half a million. we went up 560,000 during the

wars of the last decade. we have been headed down toward that willey will say be 450. the last 20 years, and the movement has not been huge. you start talking about 380,000 or less, it gets to be bigger. you is the one big idea want to put on the table we should be appreciating about land power and what is your one big worry about where you see signs in the debate we should be more attentive to that may suggest misguided thinking in this country? idea, pivoting off a trend i've are denoted, the velocity of human interaction, if you take what eric has written in his book, the new digital age, he talks about the fact there will be more evolutions more frequently in the future. we are seeing the beginning of that and the powers of connections of people now able

to organize around information and, in many cases, act in scales globally that we have not seen before. that operateorces on land in two areas that are very important. the first is, we have got to be engaged around the world. if yous more noise, and are not out there engaged with people, and this is something where we are complementary, we specialen say operations has got way more than they can do and we sometimes expect them to do things where their core competencies are not anymore than conventional. there is a complementary aspect to engagement. you see it in africa right now. chris was the commander there. if you are not engaged, you will not be able to separate the signal, the indicators of change

, precursors of instability from the noise of the world. you will miss it and then you are trying to react and chase after events rather than be able to influence them. the other piece of that, which the general has highlighted since i came back from afghanistan over the last two years since i've been in this job. importance of being expeditionary in our response. anyone oft owned by the services and commands represented on the stage. we all have capabilities that complement each other in that regard. if you are engaged, the manner , informedou respond rather than reacting, having more people who have a sense for regions or are better culture rated to the human domain, and ask the right questions, allows you to more intelligently offered vice at the senior levels, plan more effectively,

and, most important way, apply force, whether in violence or prevention operations, to mitigate the effects of change in the world. there are a lot of people here who can recount that more effectively than i can. that is the big idea. worry, history always seems to intrude when we it has been discarded to the ash bin. what worries me is we do not appreciate the fact that, again, there is a consummate reset of capabilities here. one of the most important things the united states army does is things from happening. there is an under appreciation of that contribution, speaking particularly about the conventional army, about 70 or 80% of special operations

command our u.s. operations soldiers. do not want war in northeast asia, you must demonstrate the capacity to and it so belligerents in that region takes stocks of their ambitions and does a cost-benefit analysis. in one instance -- one incidents, the second, third, largest economies in the world, we would go right, and train if we had a war. that has ramifications for everyone. in the persian gulf, it is not that we have to maintain a significant footprint, but we have to demonstrate the capacity to respond in a manner with forces that are operationally significant that can compel behavior. not because we want to but because we have the capacity, those things do not happen and you prevent the global gas station from being inflamed. with dire consequences to our own interest. the aspect of convention is an

area i am concerned we give short -- two. short shrift to. >> to look and take a rigorous tactical andur operational activities are not always producing strategic success. force is looking at developing new ways of thinking about how land forces operate. both together in cooperative certainly for special operations community, either independently or indirect support of joint force commanders. is the big purpose. as general hicks said, we can

new and innovative toions and recommendations our policy and to our senior leadership. that is really the big idea behind the task force. riskier to look at some of the recommendations, there is potentially some high-cost to the defense community. certainly right now, there could be modest investments that would contributionsnt to the future way we operate as a land force. that is the big idea from our perspective. >> thank you. colonel. >> it is incumbent upon us to from theons learned counterinsurgency fight and roll those into our doctrines to make sure the lessons are captured and that is not lost.

but, the lip -- the way we view land power goes beyond counterinsurgency stability operations or large land power operations. the gamut from disaster relief to humanitarian resistance, security cooperation, all aspects of land and something we can work together very closely with our special operations forces partners to further in the future. it is something we need to make sure we get right. time toevoted spending the study and development of this human endeavor. >> thank you here thank you for your patience. peter singer is best known in andnt years for his books now more recently on cyber security and cyber warfare. before that, he wrote he does very important books on messy ground force operations.

one about such -- child soldiers around the world and one about private military contractors. he has very much wrestled with the new age, but also the on the ground messy stuff. peter, any opening -- opening stuff? >> sure. it is an honor to be on the panel. i realize my role to be the provocative civilian. toss one thing -- they know it is coming. we had dinner last night. both the opportunity and the challenge of the agenda for the bothforce, it is important, but we need to be careful we are not bringing together related but different things. one is a question of, how do we past and veryg recent strategic level mistakes and not factoring in the human part of warfare sufficiently? that is related but different from a question of, how do we the new forces and

challenges in land warfare today and moving forward in the 21st century? my part of it and you were giving a hint that, we are i think weut this, are right on emphasizing the human, but we are wrong trying to distinguish it as a separate domain. that is, when i think about the problems that have been laid out primary document, they are not, at the strategic level question, they are not specific to land power, whether we are talking about the use of a stone or a drone, political will is still at the center of it. the velocity of human interaction, that is still whatever domain you're talking about, even siebel -- cyber weapon, and new digital it was designed to go after human will. and challenged their

sense of what they could accomplish. and we say and read in the documents that land power is different because it is the human domain, i would argue it is not a separate domain. space warfare, cyber, those all involved that central part. the second is the challenge of weaving in the human side, and some of the things we mentioned here are not specific to today. they cut across history. the tactical overmatch issue, if we were having a panel in post-spanish-american war, we would have said the exact same thing. if we were having a panel after vietnam, we would have said the same thing. how do we do strategy better? that is one part. effort to try to make sure we do not lose the lessons of the past, but what i hope is that it does not get locked into just the land power discussion. it is equally relevant to make sure it is woven into how we space warfare were

cyber moving forward. it is related but different to the question of, how do i deal with new forces and challenges that land for -- a land warfare faces. just to kick off a couple from the article that got me invited on here, we have questions of the changing context of land warfare itself. the fundamental shift over the last generation and humans on land, is that we have gone from being a whirl to an urban species. i do not know where we will deploy american land forces in the future, and we will be, and i do not know whether it will be a humanitarian disaster relief, or a large combat mission. i will take the gamble it will be to an urban zone. we are well over 50% urban. that is where much of the conflict is and we will move forward becoming a 70% urban species. what makes an urban zone different is not just that you're fighting so much within

the people, but it is also a space where you face multidirectional and multidimensional threats. another challenge moving forward is, how do we manage how it, human talent, at a time of defense reductions? we were chatting last night about how on the one hand there will be pressures to make a lean force, and on the other hand, it may be better for you to be top-heavy so you are not losing that knowledge from the past generation of experience. another question is, are there thatilities in land power we will need more and more in the future, but that we veer away from because of our own choices? tacticale would be level air and missile defense. we love talking about strategic level but tactical may be more important moving forward, particularly as we think about proliferation threats and the like. the marines are delighted to work with our partners on teaching them to do amphibious

landings, which may not be exactly what we need in the pacific moving forward, whereas the skill set the army and marine corps actually did a lot more than amphibious landings, ma want my pacific parties to get better at. i want them to hold disputed island change, rather than them go out to see. another question is technology. it is pot -- part of why we have had a tap go overmatch, because we have had a technological overmatch. in the 21st century, it may not be the case moving forward. we will have land forces using a generation of i.t. that may be behind the google glass that the future insurgent we are facing out in the field. for the present model, it was designed for the last century. does it apply in this future

century? finally, and i do not begin when would argue with it, u.s. the question of what is the big idea. throughout the history of land warfare, it is not the size of your force or the tools you have . it is your big idea. your doctrine. big idea of land warfare in the 21st century, or is it that said -- something there ares together? two separate things and i want to make sure we do not miss that part in the battle to not lose the lessons of the past. we have new questions moving forward. >> thank you. i invite you all to respond to any of that simply to weave into any of your responses later. >> we respectfully disagree on the human domain concept and we it is critically important to add to the body of work and literature out there, add to the debate, about the importance of the centrality of human beings. toir beliefs and perceptions

the physical domains currently we would offer that literature or no studies on why the human domain is important. over the last decade, we have been not as effective as we should've been in addressing this aspect of warfare. we studied and understand it. warfare is a clash of wills and humans are important in this. applications to the of our combat power, our tactics and techniques and procedures, we have not been affected in addressing the aspect and we therefore see adopting this concept of the human domain will intoinstitutionalize this

our education system, our professional developed, training, planning, and equipment. across the areas we have. we discussed this last night. by continuing a pursuit of developing the human domain concept and getting it out there for debate and critique and refine it. >> thank you. let's now go to you. please identify yourselves when you get a microphone. two at a time. i will start with a two gentleman in the second row, and we will take both their questions and work down. is good to see you again. one of the things, and general hicks, you addressed this as well. a problem we had in afghanistan and iraq is we focus almost all of our special forces securities. in the past, where we had a special focus group focus on south america. the first is pacific, we

developed area familiarization. back toto start getting learning about religion, politics, and culture in those areas. of the army in the future being able to develop that same kind of capability? and general, where do you see us getting back to that? >> right over to mark. >> thank you. it is wonderful to have you all here today. a quick comment and a question. thisrmy learned about after the second world war. the army and air force spent a lot of time, especially with the creation of special warfare committees, looking at the idea of warfare. as you take a look at history and lessons learned, do not forget to look back at the time when the army and the air force

specifically looked to tailor connecticut effects, organizations, operas it -- operations, to have specific psychological impact at a strategic level. my question is a little bit along the lines of george's. it is about organization. as you think about the concept, as you look about the issue of how we fight, what is it we need to do to prevent bad things from happening, i am worried the land forces, the marine corps and the army, will not address the fundamental issue of organization. i will point you to another historical example. bookck and reread robert's -- his report. basically pointing out we organize in ways that are comfortable to us. even if only to reject, you should consider how the organization of land services impacts our ability to adapt to a different sort of warfare out

there, whether it is urban, ciber, or whatever. >> thank you. i me start with you and work down. asto answer your question, our operational requirements in afghanistan are reduced over time, we are and we have returned to being regional experts and our forces have always been regionally aligned. based on operational requirements in afghanistan and forces toad to divert the theater. what we are returning to that. we see some great opportunities if the army looks to develop, employee, and mature the regionally aligned for us, to have a greater understanding of the regions, as u.s. so calm and the army.

think we are returning, not necessarily to our roots. we are increasing that regional due tose that has eroded operations in iraq and afghanistan. did that answer your question? kernel, please. >> if i could address the organizational issue you brought up, which is a good point. becausehe marine corps, of the demands and the evolving future environment we find ourselves in, the marine corps is adapting to that and forming new organizations with and it -- within it. rotations, and trying to position ourselves in the best way to meet future contingencies in crisis.

>> we obviously should have bought your dinner last night. i'm kidding. the first thing that i think is important, i except the historical piece about human and physical. part of the concept work we are doing now is the idea of physical object is not tied to human objective are irrelevant. we lost our way in the enthusiasm of the 1990's, about the importance of the connectivity. so that i do not sound like i am walking away, we always talked about physical and metaphysical. we are looking to reconnect those two things. first amongst ourselves. we think it is important that collectively, we have a common view. ofm that position commonality, begin to work with the rest of our sister services and other commands on that issue.

begin that process, we are already in negotiations with joint staff to move this work into the realm of joint concept development so it takes on a larger focus. to your question about getting our forces more regionally as joeas the general -- mentioned, we have force manifestation, and it is 2-1 in africa. they have done everything from ofe small groups, handfuls soldiers in some cases working with academies or doing training with conventional forces in a variety of different african states. the army commander for africa has 96 different operations for them to execute in their time aligned with them. expand beyondill

africa. would note, just as special operations had to pile into iraq and afghanistan, we had to do the same thing at a conventional level when you have forces, and we had a very large presence in the pacific and have had for the last 80 years, we had to draw , ase forces into the fight our sister services and commands did as well. a greater regional awareness over time as we build the program out and push forward. we will continue to do it because our young leaders demanded. recognize the importance of understanding the social and also thects physical terrain and other aspects of the various regions. we, collectively, only benefit more from that as we go forward. in terms of the organizational we will help on that

with the reduction. note while we wrote about 450, we spent the last year and a half to do to hard analysis, which we thought the right answer was. we looked very hard at that. it is not the best in terms of risk but it is manageable risk and the force will be able to fulfill its responsibilities without creating unnecessary risk, even in the prosecution of a major combat operation. come ints normally threes. we have to anticipate the future. so, we have already undertaken a at a decade to transition a force to lean it out. it does not mean we will pull the leadership. the ratio always goes up in peace time because you have got

to maintain expertise and also capacity because just as we went to 560 this last decade, we have risen for every other conflict and there are normally several year timee of any 10 in history, there are 3-5 army and other forces are committed to. the right science and technology investments to the thatt we can, rebalance so we maintain the core capacity of the army and maintain the expertise and leadership necessary to allow us to expand, but also to educate, and train our officers in this transition time, one of the things people will mess, we have a very experienced force. that experience will disappear in the next 3-5 years, to a great extent, particularly at lower levels. the young soldiers will get out.

we will be back to where the army was when i came in. later, the brigade commander and the berg -- and everybody else was not. we have got to maintain the expertise and continue those lessons going forward. one of the challenges in terms of the regional peace is getting the social cultural familiarization for our troops. i will not say we mastered that but we recognize the problem and are working at ways to do it more effectively and more efficiently. peer. >> three quick thoughts. with --is is a debate outside the confines of the panel, but among us, the issue is not human. it is domain. it is whether we consider it separately not. limitis not a push to that. in many ways, it is a little bit

like a religious discussion. that is the part for me. the success, ironically, of strategic land power task force is when the concept is woven into the other partners not appear on stage, when it is woven into national strategy. that is where i will leave it. my worry i putting it into the bucket right now of land power, we also put a cap on where it could go to next and where the need is. the question, i will say two quick things. ourhe regional alignment, challenge equally is something beyond the services control, which is that, if we want to figure out regional alignment, we cannot have a yo-yo effect of which reasons we care about. back, it was asia, the pivot, the balance, and what was the news story in my e-mail inbox this morning, the middle

is to be the focus of cutie are. that is part of the challenge there. i put that on other peoples soldiers. the second is a comment on, we keep saying our forces. in 21sthe changes century land power is who is the us here. you can think about this in three ways, three challenges. one is that every place we have deployed, and every place we are likely to deploy in the future, will be incredibly reliant on private contractor forces. if you are doing in next journal analysis, you would say, half of the land force is private military. we have got to think about how that is woven in. that is true whether you're talking about a large-scale operation to a humanitarian disaster relief, you name it. side, again, where every we are deploying, we are

bringing coalition partners. the challenge is, there seems to a far more mixed level of capabilities among our coalition level partners, so we do not are some of the ways we able to work together in the air domain. we have gotten more mixed in the land domain. i will leave it to that. third, to your point about bureaucracy doing its thing, the national guard reserves. itare seeing right now when comes to army aviation, how we are fighting even a modest kind of change, let alone bigger changes that are there. when we talk about us, the future land power, these are three keys that need to be part of that discussion. in others, we have to figure out how we keep them from changing. thank you. >> let's take two more. we have got jim over by the far left.

then we'll will take the gentleman here in the third will -- third row as well. >> many thanks to our panelists today. very interesting presentations. a quick question. in looking at the human domain, and i strongly support that, i will assert you are obviously asing to better us socio-cultural environments of the general population as well as the motivations of the adversary. are they fighting for a cause or a living? will they engage in sacrificial violence, that whole demand. at how weoking perturb the target? quite magneticwe have polities. we attract some people and repel others. some, they dot not love us for the right reasons. we have got to be cautious about

that. we could create winners and losers if we are not careful. oureter said, what recipient country may want is not what we necessarily think they need. a quick question on that. secondly, what is the lever -- level of interagency involvement in your work? i do not think this task force would want to leave it up to a local u.s. ambassador to say, here's what we think. that is terribly important and situations,dy say the ambassadors knew it would be very important, but to what extent are you helping to build an interagency consensus here? thank you. >> we will take this one right here as well. >> to ask an of noxious question, which is my job, and to put the kernel on the spot we see an army

special operations to start, a marine corps colonel. kernels are smart guys but there is a question about the level of commitment. i've seen all sorts of events and recessions, the marine corps is smaller and lower ranking and quieter. -- often fortunately not last in this case. i do not see any army national guard's out there. arguably, --g -- there is a lot of stress and controversy about what the role is in future missions. colonel, why is an 06 enough on this panel, or do you wish someone else was here, especially now. hicks, how dol

you bring in the guard and reserve component to this discussion and what their place is in this engagement and forward leaning? >> i will say a quick word and then maybe ask the kernel to begin but let me take the blame here. we chose a date and a time when a marine general was not available, not on purpose, but that is how life works out. thankfully, kernels impact is anything but a shrinking violet. i want to take the blame on any kind of issue having to do with representation of the u.s. army and the u.s. marine corps. >> we keep on hearing that again and again. on the regard reserve issue, this is one we want to keep talking about. i leave it to anybody who wants to comment further. specific voice one request and suggested to the broader security -- committee.

we need a detailed empirical study of what they did in the wars in the last decade. as far as i am aware, it is not currently being done in a way that i think is needed. i think we actually need more data to enter into these kinds of debates, not so much for the current round of cuts, but maybe for the next round with a round thereafter if there is such a thing. i want to volunteer those thoughts. we could maybe now begin with the kernel. >> thank you. just to dispel any myths on this, the marine corps is totally involved in the strategic -- i am now the official marine member to strategic land power task force. hereeneral was going to be today when we thought this would be in the afternoon. unfortunately, he had a conflict. general paxton was going to sit on the second panel. travel pulled him away. a marinem line is, as

corps, we are much smaller than other services. our people have a lot of commitments. i can tell you the marine corps is committed to this task force in all aspects and continuing to work in cooperation with the army and special operations forces. you will see more marines present at these get-togethers and a higher ranking as well. any comments? >> yes. i will take both questions. the answer to your first question is yes. we have to look at all aspects and step outside of our problem and not look at it just totally from our perspective. the collective understanding is part of what we are seeking. what we do not want to do is have another report after another major conflict that says, we ignored the generally correct analytical intelligence

that said, here are the social, cultural, political problems you will trip over when you enter country x or y or take the following actions. his other finding was we excepted technical intelligence at face value even though most of the time, we found it to be incorrect at the end of the day. that is one of the underlying lessons that guides us as we go forward. we have been engaging the interagency and have involved it in a number of our seminars and experiments. to date, we do not yet have pursued -- participation in the we want to make sure we at least have a common view before we bring in others, although we have invited and there is interest from both the navy and air force in providing in our events.

to sydney, first off, i had the as onef having marines of my subordinate units. from a national guard perspective, half of my unit in afghanistan, in the south when i was the only army colonel there, were national guards. i have an appreciation for the capabilities and capacities and the commitments of both our marine and guardsmen. the general note was -- in the fall with the chief and the admiral, that probably was an exception. probably the first time that ever happened, to have a panel like that. the third point i would make to remind you, when you are also participating in one of our experiments, and if there are other members of the press, we invite you to do the same thing, your member the general was

wase, and the front table special operations to star, army two star, marine tooth -- to start. mayuld say your perception be slightly skewed. the last point, i had the opportunity to be the emcee when we had a board of directors meeting with the admiral. i have to tell you, i had a tradition going into it, but the commitment and unity of thought amongst those three very diverse officers in terms of their experiences and the services it was veryme from, interesting to me and frankly reassuring that we had at senior have raisedssues we here. they had a clear understanding of why we're doing this and why we must do it and where we have to go. how is the part we still wrestle

with. in terms of the last point, the national guard, we are a total force. we cannot fight without the guard and reserve. the united states military at large cannot fight without it. we provide the depth and endurance for any operation regardless what the league is in that regard. in terms of engagement, we lean heavily on their state partnership capacity program, a very unique and hugely beneficial tool in our engagement strategy and in all of the theaters, not just in africa. >> final comments? >> if i could again addressed the issue of the human domain, two key points. although we have not agreed upon a final definition for it, we at the physical, cognitive, information, social humanal aspects of behavior, beliefs, perceptions.

singer'sack to dr. point, we do not want, in the long term, looking out to the iturity of this concept, for to be somehow stovepipes within land power land domain, with joint forces always seeking to find cross domain synergy, we see the human domain as being able to help in that regard and achieve some of that. to the national guard, certainly, our national guard forces within the special operations committee are little different than in the rest of the army. they almost mirror our active-duty force. modifyhat we change and and update within our active force immediately translates

into our national guard forces. separationsnificant andeen active duties national guard sf. >> any comment on this round? >> no -- well, quickly, i think the question is not the value of the national guard and reserve. of,s to the earlier point how organizations change. have activee tension right now between the reserve over a relatively small change in the grand scheme of things, where, and this is wenging army aviation, where cannot even transfer a couple of helicopters back and forth. that is the weight is right now. a question moving forward is when we are talking about bigger level issues, how we can make

so that valueless continues to be the case. the second is, again, all those , thes laid out as problems use of force and our ability both positive and negative and the like, every single thing you said would have applied to the air were campaign. us to just not want limit it to land warfare. but also, ironically, may be where it is least needed condit -- continuity -- cognitively right now, the challenges, the other parts of it. it is not the human side. it is the idea of, how do we make this more ultimately joint in the end. the dispute is not over whether it is this marine or not hear it it is the fact we should have all the

>> given the talent we have on this panel, i want to do one quick lightning round. one we will swap from panel two panel two. the man in the fourth row and then he and near the back. made graduate student. dr. singer discussed management talent in the armed forces, especially as you go for the 21st century. does this seem like a good opportunity for you to reevaluate the career track and plan we have gotten most officers on right now? is this a good opportunity to reevaluate what those officer need to do? just to ask whether fighter capabilities -- ciber, is not digitalted, but through

challenges, -- digital channels, how does that impact the organizational construct? >> so, has some service like -- socom hasies some service like responsibilities and we are reviewing certainly the senior noncommissioned corps and did aware of how we best manage these regional experts we are developing on a daily basis. and placeretain them them in a position where this regional expertise and knowledge they have developed over their careers as a special operator can contribute to the advice and

we forward up to our national command authority. we do not see radical change in how we are managing our special operations officers and ncos, , and this task force will help inform that, how do we modify that management of personnel? he goes we are not of service, we look to the services to help and assist us in that. >> good question. debate lastively night over dinner, but i want to emphasize at the marine corps, the marine is our most important asset, whether he is enlisted or an officer. we will make sure we are selecting and training the right people, and pick up the talent for the future success of the marine corps.

that is first and foremost. i would just note to my colleague, pete singer, seamlessness comes from a lot of wrestling. this is not something that's going to happen immediately. time, it took us a long time to get an 11 page paper out. but at the end of the day, the three for starters, which may be unprecedented, sign a piece of paper. but for people who want to read that, how can they find it? >> it is on the website. here andhe mcr reps they will be happy to brief you. >> for the c-span audience, what is it called? >> strategic land power -- winning the clash of wills. >> in terms of talent management, we are an institution of people enabled by technology.

technology does not define the army anymore than it does the marine corps. technology are tools that you and to soldiers. people are central to what we do. in terms of how we rethink the development of our leaders, as we came out of iraq, particularly now that we're drawing down in afghanistan, we undertook a program called the army profession, which sounds very bland. we surveyed about 44,000 officers, ncos and soldiers about what were their views about the united states army. wey came back to us and said have to re-baseline our leadership and talent all stop we are a profession and have to get back to basics. they told us that. this was a bottom up piece which is important because they understood the gravity as you

come through reasserting and reacquainting with your profession. you need knowledge, army doctrine, etc. these are learned behaviors over a long time, not just something you come to on a weekend. i think that is a key part. while the army is often accused of being an -- being a high town, i'm an army strategist which is a unique and small career field, yet the army has decided to promote me and a couple of other army strategists in the general officer corps. it is indicative of the fact the army has changed. it's not that we need a lot of people with my skill set and experience, but we recognize there are unique capabilities we have to bring forward all the way through the ranks.

point on cyber, as i mentioned at the beginning, one of the key areas we are focused convergence of ciber, land, and human. what does that mean in terms of how conflict unfolds, what that means at the tactical level. one of the challenges we have conceptn our army development is the capability to take local action for local effect and not be reliant on what is currently a principally strategic arm that comes out of washington and the approval process gets consumed inside the national security council. so you don't act at the speed of war in cyberspace as your opponents are.

it used to be said it was easier to kill people than spend money in iraq will stop it is easier to take an attic action against people operating in cyberspace than it is to take cyber action in cyberspace that has a better and more enduring effect will stop -- injuring affect. tools, you'll have new ways of operating. if there is a human domain battle, to me it is this last question. this issue around the talent within the forces today and tomorrow and how do you recruit and retain it? you can think about the challenges in this base that are somewhat uncomfortable, and they should be.

one for example is the issue of how do you told up talent -- had he you build up talented areas that haven't gotten the attention over the last couple of generations will stop tactical air and missile defense, where we may be going through a shift in the 21st century where there will be threats at the tactical level that we have hollowed out some of our capabilities within our land forces because of the assumption the air force could control for all of them. thetalking about proliferation of small uavs and missiles and the like. a -- that is a career field question as well. how do i give them promotions and opportunities? we have the multiple services appear represented but they have very different approaches to promoting below the zone or not. essentially how you reward meritocracy.

army does, marine corps does not promote below the zone. how do we deal with that? it becomes more of a challenge when the force is shrinking, how does top talent it may not have the promotional opportunities, how do you keep them in? another link to the cyber question, it's a new area, it is sexy, but we have an established with a long-term career track is for people in that space. problemsretention because of how great paying jobs are outside of it and maybe the opportunities to be more operational if you are outside the military. isther way of doing this thinking about history, young officers today will be going to the same kinds of questions that cuts in and john k hair did

about 100 years ago. patton is someone who loved force calvary. they both went to west point. the tankose to go into corps and it's a good thing for america that he did. unfortunately, he languished in midcareer lank -- midcareer ranks but john stated the horse calvary and rode all the way up to a two star general. ultimately, he was arguing to congress as late as 1939 not one more course will i give up for a tank. we've got this same question in the junior officer corps today. it's not just size, how do we find the talent and put them in the best places and make sure they stay in the best places? it is a great thing we have inquisitive minded two star generals today rather than we are not going to repeat some of the mistakes -- that's the

difference -- the attitudes you have seen. -- >> please as we swap appeared, it join me in thanking these three. [applause] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2013]

>> we are going to roll right into the next panel here. one of the fantastic aspects of tos topic which links back

the prior ending point of the last panel is the human capital issue here is not a problem. expertisewealth of cause such that rather than having an eight hersen panel, we have a second and we are breaking the conversation into two parts. we have some great folks here. mcmaster, who hr by all definitions of the terms is a true warrior scholar. point,graduate of west he's gone on to serve his nation in places that range from a rack there,multiple decades as well as afghanistan and elsewhere. a lengthy list of commendations, including the silver star. he's also known as one of the top thinkers in the field. his book "dereliction of duty" is a must-read for anybody.

ofis presently the commander the maneuver center for excellence at fort benning but he deserves congratulations on some recent news -- events secretary hagel announced the promotion of four officers to lieutenant general, including hr will become deputy commander of the army capabilities integration center. we've got michael hamlin, who you've heard the last panel and now we will be able to unleash him on you and his different role. of researchrector and foreign policy programs at brookings. he specializes in u.s. defense strategy in foreign policy and is by far the most prolific space, including his most recent book -- "healing the wounded giant." if that wasn't enough, he has an upcoming book in may called

strategic reassurance -- about china and u.s. relations in the 21st century. finally the chair of the brookings governance studies program and former policy advisor to president clinton and a variety of presidential candidates. but most important he is a expert on domestic policy and political campaigns and elections. kick us off and go down the road here. article an important entitled the pipe dream of easy war. when you look at the trends out there, even more so the discussion we heard the first panel but more broadly out there in the media, what concerns you the most and how do you connect those concerns to not merely the discussion of the day on the

sides but the form and function of land forces? >> thank you. it is a real privilege to be here amongst some any friends who have clarity in thinking about national defense which is immensely important. is that wens me most will engage in wishful thinking motivated mainly by budget constraints. as a military officer here, our job is to do the best we can with whatever we are provided. people are army the willing to pay for in a democracy and it is our job to do our best with it. what i am concerned with is the emergence of four fallacies about the nature of future armed conflict that could set us up for difficulties in the future, either by not having the right valances across the land as part of interdepartmental efforts, but these fallacies give us easy

solutions to the complex problem of future war. mightrst of these you call the return of the revolution in military affairs. it's like a vampire. of advanceshinking in communication, precision munitions and robotics and so changeds fundamentally the nature of war and warfare andwar can mainly be one while these are tremendous capabilities, they are not a strategy because we interact with the strategy and things we talked about on the first panel. the second fallacy you might call the zero dark 30 fallacy. all we need are true and is capable special operations forces who will conduct raids against discrete targets that we

can solve the problems of future war was something akin to a global swat team. immensely important capability but not really a strategy that can work when applied to the complex problem of future war. the third thing i call the mutual of omaha wild kingdom fallacy. for those of you old enough to rubber, marlon perkins hosted wild kingdom but he never really got hurt he with the wildlife. it was jim. we rely on other armies to do our fighting for us. and incredibly important capability but not a solution to the problem. the fourth thing that others me is this idea that you cannot doubt. this is a narcissistic approach that we can just decide ourselves and it doesn't give

any agency to our enemies, which and we is dangerous engage in that wishful thinking at our own apparel. the degree to which these fallacies gain traction, we risk decisions that would imbalance our forces and not give us the kinds of capabilities we need to andent and deter conflict what you want the army to do is provide that kind of deterrent -- provide that kind of deterrent and enhance regional and global security and send a clear message to our potential enemies and adversaries, that it is not in their interest to take action that threatens our republic or our allies or vital interests. to be prepared to respond as part of a joint multinational worst in a way

that integrates all efforts of international power to defeat the organizations and get sustainable outcomes. capabilities we need to build in our future force. we are working hard on that right now. ofh the hard-won lessons feature war and making this grounded projection based on and thentechnology shifts in geopolitics. so our forces will be ready across our doctrine, how we are going to fight, our organizations, we are training them to be more capable. emphasis on leader development and education. despite what you hear in the news, it is an exciting time to serve in our army because we are in this key transitional time.

>> i want to give you the exact same question as far as the trends and how you're looking at it. >> the main thing i would drive home at this juncture in terms of what i worry about it where we need to be motivated, we need to maintain what i would describe as incredible imagination. thinking about scenarios that could happen that are not far-fetched, but still required mental stretching to come up with like afghanistan 2001. who would have predicted that, and yet we did it and we are still there. some people say we never should have gone to very few people said that in the early years. became a warr that of necessity.

did notime, we anticipate it. i want to get away from saying any scenario you could make up is somehow valid. i don't want to invite people to suggest we should use ground forces anywhere and everywhere. god to my mind the ukraine crisis did not involve any consideration of these kinds of tools and i hope it won't. that should raise some interesting and tough questions about whether you can -- about whether ukraine or georgia should be part of nato. we doare some scenarios need to be careful about or rule out as far as future concerns for the u.s. army and marine corps, but there are a lot of other scenarios i can imagine that could involve u.s. ground forces. it's hard for anyone in uniform to talk about them because they require a degree of indelicate miss. i will give you a couple of

brief examples. what if india and pakistan wind up and were again and potentially even got to the verge of nuclear war? just five years ago terrorists out of pakistan attacked mumbai. i don't think india would show the same restraint if it happened again. maybe a nuclear weapon hits popped off against the air bases and all the sudden pakistan is worried about a general india invasion. what does the world do in that situation? let them fight it out? i hope not. i hope they would be willing to ask for help, not an invasion by the world, but perhaps some kind let's say ship -- cashmere was the catalyst and after a certain time of trusteeship, there's a referendum. or let's say nuclear talks with iran do not go well and we wind up using force to strike some

uranian nuclear facilities. do we think that is the end of the story? a lot of people say iran is going to have to bomb a hotel to show it's tough, but after that it ends. i'm not so sure. you may enter into a somewhat;, semi hot time and some of our brigades along the persian gulf may seem like prudent investments and deterrence of stop we can go into any of these into more detail. in point. case just because no one wants to be there now, do you think we can let this place low up? should we ever get to a piece deal, i think it's a distinct possibility. kinds ofo keep these incredible imagination scenarios in mind as we think about the future of our ground forces. one key part -- in sydney, you served in the marine corps as well.

this panel,nt to you specialize in the mystic outtakes. discussionsr these wheree of the scenarios, is the american public on this? >> thank you for this most unexpected invitation to be on this panel. when i walked into the briefing room this morning and the sun came through the window and glinted off the brass in the room, it just about pointed me. only describean as an admiral stockdale moment, for those of you who are member that 1992 presidential campaign. what the heck am i doing in this room at this time question mark i haden it occurred to me

one thing to contribute to the conversation. setting aside how words are parsed, the idea of the human to be at the ought very center of our considerations. the most important human domain is the u.s. home front. domain dwarfs everything else we have heard. that? you have already heard quoted the classic definition of war as a clash of wills, each side trying to impose his will on the other. has twoin a democracy dimensions. worried about that.

the will of the u.s. military has never been broken and will never be broken. i'm utterly confident of that of stop but there is a political dimension and that is a different matter altogether. mystics,t achieve our whatever you think of them, in vietnam because quite frankly the other side broke our will to continue the fight. much specify when that happened. panel, iation for this read a land power theorist to present a very interesting article with a short paragraph , the foundation of pax americana. we are not wrong and we never will be. one indication of that is time

matters. ii, our combat participation from beginning to end lasted three years and eight months. we have been in armed conflict now for almost 12 and half years. people will never sustain local support that -- for conflict that last that long. in wars in the american drug -- in the american democracy, time matters. time is a critical constraint on a viable strategy. friendmagine time is our when it comes to armed conflict. all of this goes to the question of what the american people are thinking right now. they think the wars in afghanistan and iraq have not been worth it, that those wars

failed their rough and ready definition of a caused -- cost-benefit test, and they are less and less convinced that we ought to bear any burden or pay any price to maintain our current global role. americans are in favor of robust economic engagement, but the question of whether we should remain a forward leaning role in the world as a global guarantor of this summit that, and the other is very much up for grabs. a sign of that is what is happening on the fiscal front. of the republican position on taxes and the democratic position on entitlements, we have stabilized the budget for the short-term by cutting the only other portion of the budget that is left, namely his cautionary spending. alitary spending right now is little bit under four percent of gdp.

over the next 10 years, according to the cbo, it's on track to decline to 2.6% of gdp. that's where it's going. i don't know of anybody who is comfortable with the idea that we can carry out our defense and global responsibilities with 2.6% of global gdp, but that is where we are heading and that's a political question. one last point. there are political reasons of the fallacies hr mcmaster put on the table. naval power is pretty clean. airpower, the way it is now conducted by the united states, is very clean from the standpoint of the american people. you can hope to do it without incurring a single casualty. land power is dirty.

the worst phrase in american politics right now is boots on the ground. we are, and this will be my final comment, we are in a time which to those with historical memories reminds me of the immediate post-vietnam time in 1973. it took us the better part of a decade to get over the psychological and political consequences. if i'm right, that's where we are after 12 and half years of war in the middle east, realistic thinking about our defense future ought to take the sentiments of the american people into account, and if you don't like them, figure out how to challenge them and change them. without't let that pass giving you to the opportunity to respond. why don't we just go act down the road. >> i would say two quick things.

it's a very nice analysis and hard to disagree. but i would say however if 13 years ago i said to you we are about to get attacked in new york and as a result, we will spend 30 teen years in counterinsurgency warfare, i wonder how many people in your profession or mine would have predicted that would have been sustainable. americans don't like it, but they have stuck with it. that gets to my second point on afghanistan which is we just had a presidential race and both candidates decided to leave the issue untouched. this largely confirms what you are saying but puts in a different perspective -- neither one of them wanted to be the cut and run candidate but neither of them saw any clinical hate to be made by talking positively about the war. saw anyer of them political hay to be made. that means political leaders for that war and for managing the broader war on terror have a little bit of space to do things

they think are needed for the national security of the united states and should not talk themselves out of the willingness to some modest things because of this conviction the public has already jumped off the ship. the public is tolerating it. it doesn't like it. on the war we are in now smaller operations around the world, the public is prepared to tolerate it and i would caution politicians not to go so far as to think we've got to pull out of everything because then they will be angrier than heck when something bad happens as a result of our disengagement. this is why i think what brookings is doing is so important. it's important to have this dialogue with the american people, the representatives and so forth will stop it is this sort of narcissistic approach we take to war and warfare that doesn't allow americans to understand what is at stake roughly in terms of national security or what is at stake in any particular conflict, like in

afghanistan. could namere today the three main taliban groups in afghanistan we are fighting, with their goals are, what their strategy is and why they are a threat to all civilized people? probably nobody. not nobody here but very few could name the enemy. we don't even really talk about ,hreats, enemies, adversaries so we don't understand what is at stake. a realistic understanding of what are the threats to national and international security and what sort of force you to eat to be able to deter those threats and respond to crises if our national interests are threatened will stop i think what you hear in the dialogue, the four fallacies i mentioned, it's largely based on the neglect of four main continuities in war and warfare which we neglect at our own

peril. is war is an extension of politics. it is this clinical competition where violent competition emerges from the violent clinical competition. to do is simplify war and looked only at military means and and really only look at targeting enemy organizations. targeting equals tactics equals operations equal strategies. when we talk about what to do in syria, debating whether or not to shoot cruise missiles and how may to shoot is not a useful debate to have because it masks what is most important, which is to understand the nature of the conflict, the degree to which our vital interests are at stake and humanitarian concerns are at stake. and then what can be done broadly in a conflict? then we talked about the human domain and war is profoundly

human. what is different about threats emerging to national security today is these threats are emerging from the least industrialized places in the world, whereas in the past, we were concerned only with the most industrialized places in the world. that means we will have a lot less warning about the nature of future conflicts. the mass murder attacks on september 11, 2001 all stop we need joint forces that are able to respond quickly to those threats because of a number of factors. the fact that these threats come from state as well of nonstate actors and the extension of military capabilities previously associated only with asian states to some of these actors. these are particularly destructive weapons that pose a threat to us and from nation states in the form of long-range , weapons ofssiles mass destruction, we can talk about that later.

the third thing we neglect is war is uncertainty. our record in predicting the next fight is perfect. it is zero. we have never been able to do it. one of the important things is to understand what potential threats are and to have balanced joint forces to deter conflict. we have had extended commitments and have been successful. i think korea is an example. we want worse to be fast come in cheap, efficient and quick. but based on the nature of war, it may take longer than we would like. the war does not have to have huge numbers over long time with a large number of casualties. extended commitments of land forces to regional security like that in south korea is an example of an important aspect of manpower. the fourth continuity we neglect

is that war is a contest of wills. ofs is an important aspect the public understanding war and warfare. it is important for civilian leaders to have this discussion and academic leaders and think tanks. our role in the military's to give our best advice, but not cross the line between advice and advocacy. nobody likes generals to make policy decisions in wartime. we need to give our best advice. we can highlight with the stakes are, describe the nature of our enemies and who we are fighting in wars in afghanistan and the connection between the stella man group's and groups associated with al qaeda. but it's going to be for you guys to help educate the public about the enduring nature of war and warfare, threats to national security and all we have to maintain minturn savard civility

to respond to conflict. >> can i ask one question and give ill the last response? -- give tilde last response. you wear two hats because you are also a historian. you have laid out you see these series of continuities. you are a historian who specialize in the parallel bill just made to that post vietnam time. i would argue there are two differences and want to get your response to them in terms of that time. threat.he scale of the so as bad as these three taliban groups and even up to al qaeda, because it is not industrialize, because it is not a state, what it can do and more importantly the way the american impulse -- american public interprets it is fundamentally different than the cold war, the soviet army, and

the like. do we see continuity or a threat of disconnect. the second is what your work is truly on, the profession of arms. the interaction between the american public is shaped i the fact we go from a conscript force to a truly professional force. as continuities or these new disconnects and how they manifest themselves? are both continuities and changes in the nature of the threat with which we are contending. the has changed is importance of nonstate actors, transnational organizations, and an effort toes is defeat those organizations in the context of multinational operations. these are groups that alternate -- that operate where a

legitimate state is very weak. it is important for land forces to be a will to operate as part of a multinational effort. ability -- made and excellent example. they responded in such a way as to defeat an enemy organization get to some sort of sustainable outcome internal in the country but hand off to multinational forces and so forth. powere other uses of land in recent months in the central african republic for example that demonstrate the need for us to be able to intervene where there is large scale communal conflict. syria, in a rack with the return of large-scale communal conflicts, and yemen, for example, in northern nigeria, in

the central african republic, recent operations and molly, you have a communal conflict where communities are pitted against each other in a struggle for power and survival. then you have outsiders to come in and portray themselves as patrons of the aggrieved parties and advance interests by trying to establish control over territory and people through intimidation, coercion, and perpetuating that camille conflict. there's an element of each of these conflicts in each of these others as well. the only way to really cope with that effectively is to break the cycle of violence and deal with the human dimension of war, understand tribal, sectarian, and ethnic i nymex. ethnic dynamics. then remove support for the extremists, whether it's the

islamic revolutionary guard in iran and their proxies, hezbollah, and then to get to some sort of sustainable outcome. you cannot do that without land forces. you can't do it. that is an element of discontinuity where these conflicts more often place our vital interests at risk and we have to be adept at coping with those. element ofee an continuity with those wars of the past because i do not think we can write off threats from nation states and capable fielded forces of nationstates. easy examples an but there are other countries developing nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction, and long-range didn't -- long-range ballistic missile capabilities. anti-access area denial that can keep us and our allies from having access. what we neglect is the offensive

capabilities associated with these long-range missiles and how it can place our nation at risk in a way we have not and at risk in the past. at least in recent years, since the end of the cold war. analogous toeat the v1 and v2 threat in london in world war ii, analogous to the scud missile test in the 1991 gulf war thomas analogous to the long-range rocket threat from southern lebanon in 2006 or -- >> let me intervene. you have listed examples for allies in the midst of war. if it is 1972, the american public is facing 25,000 nuclear weapons are getting it. that is where i think in terms of it may be accessed essential to those local actors, but in terms of the american public's viewpoint of it, that is the disconnect.

we do not view it as x essential. but i think that is correct. -- we doincumbent on not view it as x essential. >> that is correct. friendt to mike good michael hamblin who may have regretted extending me this invitation. point i was making does not pertain principally to the wars we are now in. willingnessto the of the american people over the next decade or so to enter into new wars of that character. whatevernt is reluctance americans have at kind of a baseline is now much higher. against doing it is going to be harder to rebut over the next decade unless it's

a clear response to aggression. that is point number one. say please don't shoot the messenger. >> i am not disagreeing with you. >> i am not any happier about this swing in public opinion. i recall years from 1973 to the early 1980's as an appalling time in american history. i pray we don't repeat it, but i fear we may. that is point number one. here is point number two. i can't believe a former marine sergeant is entering into a debate with general mcmaster, the hilluld go up against superior forces and say why should i change now? not the best method. >> we can talk afterwards. [laughter]

nobody said we are the smartest, but we are the toughest. the point i was making was not about extended commitments, because we have indeed demonstrated our capacity to extended, determined, focused commitments in korea, europe and elsewhere. i was talking about extended conflict. that is a distinction with a difference. the american people can go for months without noticing we have tens of thousands of troops in south korea. they can go for a day without seeing what's going on in afghanistan. they don't like it. lex do they even know? what is remarkable about afghanistan is it may be the most underreported war in beingan history and this the information age, in terms of is ability to gain access inversely proportional to the

amount of meaningful coverage available in the mainstream media. >> that links to the disconnect today, thetnam and thought of a draft based worth or not. media response to its consumers and their interests are elsewhere and it reflects because we don't have the same linkup. let's open this discussion up. please raise your hand that we will go from there. way back. >> thank you for the interesting discussion. i'm good by this -- i'm concerned by this whole session because it seems the military is becoming the surrogate to try to solve national and international problems that it alone cannot do. i like the panel to think about two observations. first, i would argue the single most interesting issue of the 21st century is the empowerment of individuals and nonstate actors which is challenging the

state centric system. that has really changed the strategic calculus all stop second, it seems to me the country with the best armies, navies, air forces and marines tied it hard-pressed to win against enemies who lack the sources. how would you argue that the future of military power when it seems the nature of the dangers are changing from state centric threats and we can deal with north korea, potentially a run, the list that michael comes up with but we are in a brand-new political environment in which military force may not only be necessary but it's far from sufficient. >> i would just say military force has never been sufficient in and of itself to prevail in a conflict. it has always taken the combination of all elements of national power combined in a way

that serves to defeat the enemy and also to shape environments and consolidate gains consistent with our interests. important is there is an increasing threat from transnational terrorist organizations, guerrilla organizations in -- linked to transnational crime. so it is important to connect what we're doing militarily to apolitical strategy and what we want to achieve overall. takent to make sure we this into consideration are planning scenarios and wargames skip over oftentimes that and look at the application of military forces as an end in itself. ast is immensely important we look at threats from nonstate actors is we have to contend on multiple battlegrounds simultaneously. we fight ernie well on the physical battleground. but if you look at what has been

difficult for us to consolidate gains or factors that complicate things in afghanistan is that our enemies are operating effectively on other battlegrounds -- the battleground of lyrical subversion. subvertingfective at state functions in afghanistan. we do not contend on that battleground as well as we could. these groups enjoy state sponsorship and support, safe haven support bases, how well do we do to isolate these groups from state support? there is also the battleground of perception and information. oftentimes we are not very effective on this battleground. criminalize and these people -- we are fighting some of the largest criminal organizations in the world who tried to cloak themselves in a religious ideology. why don't we expose that? murderers, drug

traffickers, they are hypocrites who send themselves -- to send their kids to school and blow kids up. better it's a integration of all of our elements of power and contending on multiple battlegrounds. the biggest area of opportunity is greater integration of law enforcement with intelligence and military operations where appropriate. look at these networks, we have so many things we can do to throughhese networks effective law enforcement tools, targeted sanctions, travel bans, there's a broad range of tools we can apply to these organizations more effectively. >> i would underscore the obvious which is that this is a strategiche future of land power, so we are allowed to talk about war. most crises will not and should not require the application of american military forces.

i'm happy there is no discussion of possible military response in ukraine nor in the future and that kind of crisis in that part of the world. the book that peter kindly mentioned is largely about how we try to the extent possible to d miller fries much of the u.s. china interaction going forward. army generals today say they have no objection to the army getting a little smaller in the next round of quadrennial road -- quadrennial defense review. it causes some angst and concerned but people are not fighting it a cousin of the reasons you mentioned. we need a strong economy, strong diplomacy and other powers to be effective and an overly large defense budget could get in the way. i take your point and would simply submit that is what is all on all of our minds. serious is the case i didn't mention. syria is the place where --

syria is the place where these worlds come into a messy mix. is that a classic problem or a new age problem? is that a jihadist group in power or is that bashar al-assad? maybe it's all of the above. what i am submitting is there may be a role whether we like it or not, whether we want to admit or two,t, in a year there may be a role for an international stabilization force. syria being a given itsor jihadist location is not necessarily one i can accept over the long-term. we need to have the capability for that kind of mission should we ever get to a piece eel that might -- peace deal that might international implementation. >> i would distinguish between two propositions. andosition 1 -- individuals

can exert more -- can exert more pressure on states now. i think that is incontestably true. thatition number 2 -- somehow demonstrates the obsolescence of the west valley and state system. you can believe in the first without believing in the second. i believe in the first, i don't believe in the second. fax one point on this motion is figuring out the maps between the threats and your responses to them in distinguishing when it's good for your budget and what it's good for national security. we have brought up ciber a number of times here and you see the art -- the army argue for a greater need for cyber capacity and to help defend american energy companies against attacks. i believe we need greater cyber capacity but i also believe defending american energy

companies against cyber attacks is the responsibility of american energy companies which are not doing enough on it. so we need to be careful. it parallels the escutcheon of nationbuilding a decade ago. is because the military has the organizational have to and budget, there are certain roles in the absence of other factors that moves into it will stop we see the same thing play out on cyber. when he these other tools to match with the dod is doing. let's get to the question in the front. >> thank you very much. i am garrett mitchell and i ."ite the "mitchell report i want to take one more swing at l's observation about the linkage between american public action,and the public the actions of its government.

and argue that for two if not i fear andns, , which iable break know bill doesn't. professionalst say army and no conscription means a statistically insignificant percent of the population has skin in the game from a public opinion point of view. the increasing domination of national dirty decisions of this sort at the white house and the growing irrelevance over time of congress. in weighing in on those decisions. i appreciate your

distinction between actions in as opposed to11 actions we would take with some less impetus than that. , and am concerned about that's why raise the question, i'm concerned about the fact that there is this break between what american public opinion is about war and the extent to which it can actually play a role in decisions made by the government, by the president, the administration. >> i absolutely agree that the movement to an all volunteer significantde a

difference in the relationship between the american people and the u.s. military. as having opposed that movement for precisely that reason. standpoint, a civic that trade has been an unmitigated bad. from the standpoint of military efficacy, the arrow points in the other direction. that raises some deep challenges. with regard to your second i guess my reading of history is different. whene for the record that was organizing the international community's response to the iraqi invasion of kuwait, he saw fit to go to congress. he did not claim he could do it

without going to congress. bush 43 was on the verge of already iraq, he had had decided to go to iraq in my judgment. he went to congress and there is a huge, full-scale public debate and senators of both political parties were required to declare themselves in the question. the idea that the white house and as to what it wants is not consistent with my reading of large military engagements. in the white house to smart innings on its own? -- smaller things on its own?