online and see that at www.c-span.org. we will send you right to the senate armed service committee for the committee is considering a number of nominations, including when we talk about today's show. michael rogers, to be an admiral and direct your of the national security agency. have a good tuesday. >> i will use my own experience right now. we have a continual outreach to the broader commercial industry sectors in an attempt to identify what technologies are available that we could use. there is an aggressive effort to

do so. >> we have expressed many times our concerns about iran and the threat that they pose to us and as farr intelligence back as 2007 indicated they auld have a capability of weapon and delivery system by 2015. it was even more forcefully by oured in a report intelligence and 2010, referring -- reaffirming their suspicions. i have been concerned about that. we have a president that somehow think there is an opportunity to get them to joining the global community and reform their ways. an article suggested that the iranians were able to

successfully infiltrate the navy commuter -- computer network. it raises questions suggesting it ran was able to access the bloodstream of the navy network. i will quote from that report. 's infiltration was far more extensive than previously thought. it took the navy about four months to purge the hackers from its biggest unclassified computer network. geopolitical consequences of such an attack should be profound. what this unclear administration will do in response to such behavior. byt a similar penetration americanarplanes into airspace be treated with such ambivalence? your currentrs, in job as commander of the fleet, you are the one responsible for

defending navy networks. this happened on your watch, correct? >> yes, sir. >> what are the consequences? >> as a matter of policy and operational policy regions, we have not categorized who penetrated the network. i would be happy to discuss this with you in a classified session. discusseds has been in an unclassified session for sometime. >> not to my knowledge. i apologize. ourifically, a segment of un-global unclassified network was compromised. in response, i generated an operational requirement for not just pushing the amount of the net work, but i want to do a foundational review of the entire network, to use this as

an opportunity to drive change within my own service. >> what is the ministrations doing in response to this attack? >> i am not in a position to comment on that. testified laster year -- with the number of cyber attacks doubling from 45,000 in .011 to nearly 100,000 in 2012 that is not very good. does that concern you? my current position is air mobility commander. we have taken action to secure our networks. the nature of our network that commercial providers of transportation requires us to have access to the information from their networks as well. working diligently with those contractors and commercial providers to secure those networks. the number of attacks is not

equate to the number of intrusions axle traded. is confirmed for the position of trance, commander, i will continue to work that issue with general rogers' team as well as with the 24th air force team, which is the unit that provides external security for our networks. inwhen we had a hearing -- general alexander and i have become good friends. we have had a lot of personal conversations. he was asked when a cyber attack andn act is an act of war to explain what sort of actions an adversary might take and crossing that threshold, he answered that he believes this and attack destroys military or government networks, or impacts our ability to operate, you have

crossed that line. rogers --nk admiral do you agree with his characterization? >> do you agree they have crossed that line? they that you are referring to, sir? >> when general alexander was asked when a cyber attack does cross that line and become an act of war, he said that ability to operate, you have crossed that line, do you agree with that characterization and that we have crossed that line? >> i do not believe we have crossed that line. >> do agree with the statement that was made by general selva that the number of cyber attacks against trans con doubling from 45,000 in 2011 to nearly 100,000

in 2012, does it properly express our deterrence against attacks? does this concern you that we have doubled in that period of time in the number of cyber attacks on us? i apologize. is your question to the general or myself? >> it is a question for you. general fraser testified that the number of cyber attacks on hasce, -- transcom increased. are we not doing the job we should be doing? >> it is reflective on the level of investment that the department is making. we face challenging budget times and this is one of the departments where we remain committed to growth in capability. believe a lot of the things

i have gotten from an unclassified media and classified that iran is very active in this area. i am concerned about their capabilities and i have expressed that concern. " if iran seizes this opportunity and chooses to join the global community, we can chip away at the mistrust that exists." we need to be talking about the fact that we have an enemy. he has demonstrated that clearly. this new capability -- a few years ago, no one knew what a cyber attack was. we all understand it can be just as critical and damaging to our n attack with weapons on this country. i think you all agree with that. >> senator udall. >> thank you for your

distinguished service to our nation. admiral rogers, i want to turn to you. responses,ed policy i noticed you stated the government could continue to access phone records through phone service providers repositories. that could serve as a viable alternative to the current records collection program. i was glad to read that. you wrote that the business records 215 grew out of a desire to identify cap after 9/11. a gap after 9/11. aw anoted that the nsa solv call, but could not see that the call was coming from an individual in the united states. i am concerned that a program such in 215 could have prevented 9/11.

as the 9/11 commission pointed out, the commission knew about .lmodovar i don't know why the nsa could authorization to determine if this member was in contact with anyone in the united states. i don't see wobble collection authority would be necessary. the constitution is not an impediment to our security. it is the source of our security. andan and bulk collection of infringe on the rights law-abiding americans. the president acknowledged what i have been saying. the status quo must change. i look forward to working with you to make those changes. looking ahead, i want to turn to the 702 program and ask a policy question about the authorities under section 702.

the committee ask your understanding of the legal rationale. you replied the nsa's court-approved procedures only allow using identifiers for intelligence purposes. the statutes written to anticipate the incidental collection of americans communications in the course of collection the communication of beeigners believed to overseas, but the focus of the collection is clearly intended to be foreigners communications, non-americans. declassified court documents show that in 2011, the nsa sought and obtained the -- sought and obtained the authority to conduct warrantless searches for the communications of specific americans. have any of those searches ever been conducted?

>> i am not in a position to answer that as the nominee. if you would like me to come back to you in the future if confirmed, i would be glad to do so. >> director clapper was asked this question earlier this year. forum not believe in open was the appropriate setting in which to discuss these issues. the problem i have is that we have tried ways to get an unclassified simple answer. we want to have an answer because it relates to american's privacies. can you answer the question before the committee votes on your nomination? thene of my challenges as director, if confirmed, is how do we engage the american people and the representatives in a

dialogue in which they have a level of comfort as to what we're doing and why. that is no insignificant challenge for those of us with an intelligence background. one of the takeaways from the situation over the last few months has been as an intelligence professional and later, i have to be able to communicate in a way that highlights what we are doing to the greatest extent possible. if it comes to the how we do things and the specifics, those are best addressed in classified sessions. inave to be able to speak broad terms in a way that most people can understand. i look forward to that challenge. >> i will continue asking that question. i look forward to working with you to rebuild the conflict -- confidence that the public has.

let's turn to cyber. before i ask a specific question, i do not want to steal senator mccain's funder, but he has a creative idea in setting up a special committee on cyber security so we can cut through some of the jurisdictional tensions that exist. in a more specific context, you we have to work to develop and train a significant number of highly capable cyber personnel to meet them nation's needs. there is no doubt that we have to have those personnel. we have done it in the physical world and the genetic world. we can do it in cyberspace. genetic world. we can do it in cyberspace. cadets the ability to fly small aircraft and their

college years. they are familiar with the fundamentals in the field of flying an airplane or helicopter. level oft giving that attention to cyber training programs. should we invest in more hands-on, real-world training for the next generation of cyber warriors? >> yes, sir. as a navy component commander, i ave worked with our navy to academy. minimum i look -- >> i look forward to working with you. again, both of you, for your willingness to serve in these important positions. >> senator mccain. >> i think the witnesses for their outstanding service. when i asked,

because of the overlapping jurisdictions of many committees of congress that he thought that toelect committee investigate the entire issue which covers a wide spectrum would be a good idea. do you have a view? if you have a view on whether we should have a select committee are not. i'm not used to autopsy station fucation.e are you on track to remove all of the necessary equipment and armaments from afghanistan by the end of 2014 that you are tasked to do? >> yes, sir.

>> you are on track right now? >> yes, sir. >> thank you. admiral, i want to bring up this issue again of the iranian hack of navy computers. according to an article, the computerhe navy's network to more than four months to resolve, raising concerns about security gaps exposed by the attack. the hackers were able to remain in the network until this past november. that contradicts what officials this pastublic september. officials told the paper that the intruders had been removed. deal -- iteal big

was a significant penetration." >> that is why over the past few months multiple updates to staffers on the committee. how do we learn from this and work to make sure it does not happen again. i conducted a response to that. it was much broader than to come back and say they are not there anymore. i wanted to use it as an opportunity to drive change. we put a longer-term effort in place then if i had just sent i want to remove them. i wanted to do more than that. >> the damage done? the interview said "significant." >> i would not say significant, but of concern. they did not engage in disruptive behavior. my concern was what if they had

decided that was their intent? >> i thank you. problem here, from the standpoint of those of us who feel that our ability to behavior of possible attackers of the united states of america is vital. some reallyhas done significant damage. s -- 57% ofpoll americans branded snowden as a whistleblower. 37% called him a traitor. ofox news poll found 68% americans were glad to know about the nsa program snowden revealed. thosesurvey found

disapproving outnumbered those approving. a significant number of mr. snowden as a whistleblower and many significant portion of americans as a patriot and approve of his conduct. what do you think we need to do to counter that impression the american people have, when i am sure we are in total agreement that this individual violated a solemn oath that he made to not reveal this information and has damaged our ability to defend this nation. >> i would agree with your assessment. the first is the idea of transparency. the idea that we have to have a dialogue that talks about what are we doing in the why.

we have to inshore strict accountability. we have to make sure that we follow those processes appropriately and when we make a mistake, if we fail to meet those requirements, we are up front about the how and the why. >> to having thoughts about the allegations that the pfizer courts are just a rubber stamp for the administration? >> i don't believe that to be the case. you believe they are exercising sufficient oversight? yes, sir. >> you appreciate the fact that we have a large number of we have a-- that significant problem with the pr aspect of the work that you and your organization will be doing? >> yes, sir. my personal opinion is that the

pfizer structure works well. we should look at a range of potential options to improve that transparency. >> if i had a recommendation for you, it would the as much as possible, given the aspects of national security that you maybe give some speeches in various venues where you could explain better to the american people --t you're doing and not perhaps on exactly what you're doing and why you're doing it. i don't think americans are aware of the extent of the is not onlythat

accomplished, but being attempted by our adversaries and potential adversaries around the world. ma'am i think you are correct. >> i think you are correct. >> thank you both for your service to our nation. thank you to your families as well. the white house recently announced the creation of a voluntary framework to establish a cyber security guide for organizations involving one of the critical infrastructure and this effort and framework standardizes the cyber security defensive measures to assist in protecting, detecting, responding to, and recovering from potential intrusions. how effective do you think this voluntary framework will be in

protecting us from cyber attacks and what additional measures should the senate or the nsa take? >> it is a step in the right direction. i do believe in the end, some form of legislation which addresses both the requirement and need to share information, as well as trying to address the issue of setting standards for critical infrastructure for the nation in the long run it's probably the right answer. if confirmed, i look forward to working with a host of other people that would be a party to that. i agree that legislation will be necessary. there have been efforts to achieve it. bipartisan efforts, i should emphasize. some of them have been opposed by representatives of the business community on the ground ,hat there is no need for it no urgency, or other reasons that i think are specious.

thank you for your offer of cooperation. i look forward to looking with -- working with you. >> it is only a matter of time before we start to see more destructive activity. that is perhaps the greatest concern of all to me. there areas of the private defense industrial base or even financial utilities and so forth that you regard as most vulnerable? >> there are core infrastructure that is critical for us as a .ation in unclassified form, i would be insights, butding i would be glad to discuss that. >> if the chairman at some point does have a briefing in another satisfying -- and other setting, that may be an area i would like to discuss with you. let me shift to the role of

national guard in cyber security. the cyber calm commander general -- cybercom commander general alexander talk about the resource and the role it could expanding capabilities. at the present, the department is in the process of doing the admission analysis to address that question. if confirmed, i will be a part of that process. i intend to dig deeper into it. is that thekeaways naval commander for general do you build an integrated team that harnesses the power and the expertise of every element of that team? >> united states is not have a

guard structure. apply itrked hard to in my current duties. reserveers of the naval bring capabilities, training, education, skills that are valuable? >> yes, sir. area if i may, the use of contractors following up on these very important questions asked by my colleague, senator mccain. here was a contractor who was entrusted with responsibilities that never should have been. many of us are concerned by the scope and scale of the use of private contractors, even to screen and evaluate other contractors. are you concerned? >> i share your concern.

i need to ask some hard questions. what led us to this, are we comfortable with the position we with respects in to the role of contractors? >> are there other defects you can see the need to be corrected? to mindng comes immediately. this has not been the same issue on the navy side as it has been on the joint side of the work. that concern shared widely in the intelligence community? >> i would believe so. general, if i can ask you a question. the chairman began by asking some questions about how quickly we need to make determinations about our presence in afghanistan. what is your assessment now about how flexible we are in determining our time frames

there? i would say we have the greatest flexibility that we have had in the past several months. our optionspasses, decrease. there is a limit to the capacity of the networks to bring back equipment and those personnel out. i will commit to consulting with austin of the specific limits of those networks. we want to make sure the transportation distribution layers of those networks is come -- prepared for the capacity of whatever comes at us. >> thank you for your helpful answers are it i look forward to working with you. thank you, mr. chairman. to both of you, thank you for your service and commitment to

freedom. make a comment for the record. admiral rodgers, with regards to comments that senator udall made, i don't want to leave a false impression with the american people that if we had had 702 and 215 in place in 2001, there is a strong probability that we would have that ale to determine major attack was going to occur. there is the probability we would have picked up on those inion between those that were planning the attack. knowing that he was in country versus knowing he was in communication with terrorists planning an attack are two different things. we did not have to 15.

we did not have 702. we knew that a phone call came from the night -- to the united states. we did not know it went to san diego. if we had had more information that we had gleaned from these programs, there is strong probability that we might have picked up on that. i want to make sure that the record reflects the actual facts on the ground relative to him. we discussed something that senator mccain discussed earlier. those with respect to trying to communicate these programs to the american people. it will be very difficult.

he mentioned doing speeches and that is part of the. -- that is part of it. what can we do to show more transparency to let the american people understand how these programs work. >> we can be a little more communicative with why we are doing this, what led us to these kinds of decisions. it is important that the dialogue needs to be more broad than the director of the national security agency, regardless of who that individual is. there are more aspects to this discussion than just the intelligence piece. in the end, it boils down to an assessment of risk. a terms of our security as nation as well as our rights as individuals. we value both. we have got to come up with a way to enable us to ensure that

both sides of that risk coin are addressed. we should never forget that there is a threat that aims to do us harm. that does not have the best interest of this nation in mind and wants to defeat with this nation represents. >> you are right. it is unfortunate that general alexander was put out there on a limb by himself by the administration to seek to explain these programs. he did a very good job of it, had the president with the bully pulpit been out there with him, i think we would have already had a better understanding on the part of the american people. number one, the misrepresentation of the facts regarding what information is collected on individuals, what is done with that information, and how very difficult it is to be able to access personal information on any single

american. it is extremely difficult and requires the same process, virtually, that you would have to go through if you were a u.s. attorney seeking to get information on an individual american. the fisa court is not a were stamp. all you have to do is look at the makeup of the court as well as the decisions. some of them will be made public. i think that is a good idea. as long as we do not real sources -- reveal sources. administrationhe did not give general alexander the kind of support that they pretty discerning on my part. i am hopeful. yesterday,ned to you

i have expressed this to the administration. i hope they will give you more support in explaining these programs than they have given to general alexander. i have confidence that maybe they will. let's talk about information .haring we have been working on a cyber bill for years now. we are getting very close to an agreement within the intelligence committee between the chairman and myself on a cyber bill. provisions and the last remaining obstacle we is the immunity provision. would you talk for a minute how importantnion liability protection is to companies that will share privileged and personal information if we are going to have a program that works

relative to cyber? >> i am not a lawyer, but my sense is it is a critical element of any legislation. to be successful, we have to provide the corporate partners that we would share information with some level of liability protection. firms will are to survey in the sharing of information if they are not granted blanket liability protection? >> i think they would be much less inclined to do so without a. >> thank you so much. >> senator donnelly. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you, admiral, and your families. the chairman mentioned an article and i thought one of the interesting quotes was where they said why would somebody want to be the head of cybercom now? >it reminded me of the movie

apollo 13 were they said this might be one of the worst things that could happen to us and they said this could be the best. this could be the most amazing time. we have more challenges may be than ever before. we are giving you the football and expecting big things from both of you. you, general, in regards to what we have seen in ukraine and the dealings we have had with russia before, are you making alternate plans in terms of transcom as to the work we do with russia? are you gaming out worst-case scenarios as to how we proceed in the future? >> if confirmed, that is a priority. -- airair, opponent component to transcom, that we have been building alternative lands.

the distribution network that flows to russia consists of five different options of how we move cargo in and out of afghanistan. we will have to look at other options should the conduct in the ukraine continue. get would recommend we working on that right away in light of what we have seen going forward. look at what you happened with mr. snowden, i know we have done reviews. and you continue to look ask what if about this or that in regards to where we are now to make sure that we are not going to face this again internally? >> as the nominee, i have not done that. >> have you thought that through? >> if confirmed, we need to ask ourselves -- given this

compromise, what are the indicators that would highlight compromise. how are we seeing changes in behavior and how will we have to stay ahead of that threat that faces the nation? >> you will determine what policies -- where did we go off the highway, how do we fix it, how we squared away? one of the areas of interest to me as contractors. in a position not why do we have contractors in those positions as opposed to military personnel or other government personnel who are expert in those areas? is it a lack of individuals who can fill those positions? >> i can't speak to the specifics of mr. snowden.

it is reflective of a trend over the last decade or so, whereas we look at the size of the government and workforce, some decisions were made in some of be solved bycould using a contractor. you should use contractors for the functions that are either so specialized that you do not have the capability or skill resident within the government workforce or it is prohibitively expensive to try to achieve that capability. core operation functions, those need to be government. snowden'srds to mr. area, will there be a review through all of the contractors as to what is core to what we need to do and when we regard thereview expense, i guess

next question is, what is the expense of what we're dealing with now? >> i do not know the answer to that. just trying to lay out -- here are some things as we move forward that we look at. mr. snowden remarked that the u.s. government has no idea what i have and will not know what i have and they will find out as a goes on. when we look at ukraine, one of the concerns that has to come up putin'such of mr. actions may be based on information given to him by mr. stoughton. -- mr. snowden. analytice an in-depth

effort going on to determine and ask that question. i have not been party to that review. i have seen some of the initial work. we have tried to identify exactly what the implications are of what he took. that operation is ongoing and will take some time to finish. >> in another area, it would be remiss of me not to ask you about supply chain integrity. it is of concern to me. how are we going to partner with to work together with our intelligence officials and others to secure the integrity of the supply chain of what we have?? ande see counterfeit parts missiles and planes. it is an extraordinarily dangerous situation. what are your plans as we move forward to try to get this squared away?

in transcomation is to work directly with the defense logistics agency on the issue of supply chain management and integrity of the supply chain. it is out of the lane that i have been in. it is one of the areas i have committed to spend time with. it is more than just the data. it is the ability of counterfeiters to bring to that market parts that appear to be genuine, but in fact, are not. it is a physical issue as well as a data security issue. it goes right to the heart of our industrial capacity. >> i would ask you to make that a priority.

we are one counterfeit part away from disaster on a constant basis. thank you both for your service and to your families. >> senator ayotte. >> i want to thank both of you for your service. let me start, general selva. with regards to the dod refueling capability, how important is it to our military capabilities and our national security? mobilitypacity of air command to provide refueling around the world is critical to being able to move our forces to where they need to be and when they need to be there. the air force talks about global vigilance, reach, and power. tankers are what makes us global. , the 157leased

neweling wing, the hampshire air national guard, it has been chosen to receive the new tankers. we had a very positive public hearing for the basing of the 5c46-a. 46-a. what is your assessment of the refueling wing, how they perform, and how important is the garden all of this capability? uard in all of this capability? >> they are one of the units to which we have appended an active duty associative unit. the unit is performing well. in an areanit exists of high demand for tanker services. their performance speaks for

itself. they are a great unit and we look forward to base the pegasus at these, subject to the environmental impact statement. supportnk you will get and having the new tankard there. it is important to our national security. i also wanted to ask you, i know center dot lori -- i know senator donnelly asked you to issue of the northern distribution network with regards to our retrograde from afghanistan. in light of what is happening in the ukraine, we are -- many of us are pushing for further economic sanctions, other types of sanctions against russia for their invasion of crimea. if the russians were to take retaliatory action as a result of that, to shut down the

northern distribution network with regard to the transit operations of those roads, what impact would that have to us and how would we address it? it is something we have to understand and be prepared to address. >> if they were to take action --constrain our action access to the northern distribution network, we have other options. the singular item that moves across the network that would concern me at this point is the subsistence cargoes in the form of food and noncombat articles. i am told about 20% of the subsistence cargoes move through the network. we would have to use another option to get it in. is, for some reason, we would

be prepared to use other options if we had to and could do so? >> yes. >> thank you. thank you for tanking on at a challenging time this important position. russia is using cyber attacks against the ukrainian telecommunication system to block the ukrainian leadership from assessing -- accessing the country's phone networks. to what extent do you believe russia is conducting cyber attacks against ukraine and what do to help. defend itself against attacks on russia? >> in an unclassified form, i am not prepared to answer in specifics. it is becoming a norm.

as we were to partner with others to develop norms of behavior and expectations for what is acceptable and what is not acceptable, examples like this highlights what is not acceptable. as we work with the ukrainians and other nations to figure out what is the best way to address them, whether it is ukrainians ask for specific technological assistance, i believe we work on it on a case-by-case basis. >> we should be active in this area. cyber attacks or otherwise. -- thed to ask you about department of defense's vulnerability to a cyber attack. --january 2000 team, a task in january 2013, a report

concluded that the united states cannot be confident that our critical information technology systems will work under attack from a sophisticated in row -- and well resourced opponent. we are not confident that many of our mattila terry -- our military systems would work. assessment andat how can we make sure the ideas more resilient to cyber attacks? >> i share that concern. that is why creating a defensible architecture has got to be one of the most important things we do. i have watched the challenge across the entire department. the jie is so important. we have got to get to a

defensible architecture. talk about a lot of edward snowden today. do you believe the disclosures --made have put americans potentially put at risk the lives of americans and our allies, or at greater risk because he has released this information? >> yes, ma'am. >> yes is the answer to that? >> people need to understand that. .e has put people at risk that is very important for people to understand. thank you both. you, senator ayotte. senator kaine. it is good to see you again. if i was in an airplane out of atlantic, the 101st

could take care of you quite adequately. as you look across a broad range of commercial assets that transc om employees across the globe, what are the greatest risks and m toerabilities to transco execute its responsibilities and how about the more ability of -- the vulnerability of commercial attacks?to cyber >> there are two things that worry me the most. we havet is -- once completed whatever retrograde operation happens in afghanistan, whether we have a residual force or no force remaining behind, the demand surface and air will diminish significantly.

we have seen nearly a 50% reduction in requirement for sustainment cargo in afghanistan. that has an implication for our , sealift, airlift, as well as surface and for our commercial partners whose networks we access to make that entire distribution network work. that decline in requirement, a return to a more stable has some negative implications across the enterprise. we are studying those in all of and commercial sectors of the market to understand those implications. they have significant impact on the commercial cargo carriers. >> what percentage of assets are organic versus commercial? difficult number to

quantify, but i will take a stab at it. roughly 40% of our capacity as organic. about 50%, if we access all of the available assets through the civil reserve air fleet will be brought to us by commercial partners. i do not have the specific statistics. >> as demands of afghanistan to ansh -- diminish, is there industrial base here in terms of the commercial carriers? ,ill they find other business is there a risk of not having the capacity when we need it? dynamics thatwo play in that dynamic. the health of the airline cargo ands a whole, commercial passenger carriers. the two segments within that industry, the charter and scheduled carriers. the decline in the demand signal on those commercial carriers

will change the economics of that industrial segment. the second thing that is changing is the nature of commercial charter cargo. with the introduction of large aircraft with large cargo bays below the passenger decks, we now see commercial passenger carriers three and trying the charter cargo market. that has changed the dynamic of our civil reserve air fleet partners. we have to understand the impact of that change in economy on their capacity to be with us in crisis. >> we will have to watch that as it evolves. >> yes, sir. we have an ongoing study that we are about a year into working with our commercial partners to understand economic dynamics of what is changing in the cargo and passenger markets. we are in a bout a three-month period of understanding what they have done.

>> thank you. admiral rodgers, i am going to ask a question you are not prepared to answer. i may ask it again in a year. i have been in a number of , cybers on cyber issues command, an essay. how can you do both of these jobs? >> there is no doubt it is a challenge. i will be in a much better position after i have been confirmed to tell you what the challenges are. to not do it this way would create real concern. i say that in my current duties on the navy. i worked for general alexandra as cyber -- alexander as cyber command and nsa. >> over the past year, both jobs

and grown in responsibility you have to be a spokesman, you have to manage, i think it is something we are going to have along with the administration going forward. i understand the desire to have it in one person, but i would think running the nsa is more than a full-time job. >> i will be busy, sir. major issues we have been discussing for the past year and a half, and the years before i was here, is the necessity of cyber legislation that allows better coordination between the private sector and the government. how do you assess the importance of that kind of legislation coming out of this congress? >> that legislation is a key for our future. we have got to change the current dynamic. >> i hope people are listening around here.

ever since i have been here, everyone has been saying that, -- my doesn't seem father used to say if you drove at the pentagon, it seemed to get further and further away. i hope you will work with us to try to develop that legislation. i believe one of our greatest vulnerabilities is a cyber attack. the next pearl harbor is going to be cyber. the problem is, we are more vulnerable than many other places. we are so advanced in terms of our linked-up network to society. how do we prevent -- what are the tools and are we where we should be? i don't want to have a set of hearings about why we were asleep at the switch. >> we are not where we want to

be. we are generating capability, capacity, and those are positive steps in the right direction, but in the end, we have got to get to some idea of a cyber arena. >> i think you're right about that. we have the whole strategy of deterrence on the nuclear side. we have to develop it on the cyber side. if someone comes into our network, they are going to have some serious problems with their networks. thank you, admiral. king.nk you, senator >> thank you for joining us today. admiral rogers, thank you for visiting with me in my office. i appreciated the opportunity to discuss important issues. there has to be a balance struck

between achieving our national security goals and protecting the constitutionally guaranteed rights of american citizens. i agree with my friend, senator udall. properly understood, these two things are the same thing. our security lies in our constitutional protections. we cannot overlook constitutional protections in the interest of national security. in our well intended efforts to recover and move forward past september 11, 2001, we have at times tied -- tried to strike a balance in a way that i find troubling. as i stated before, i have some pretty deep-seated concerns with some of the things that have

been revealed in recent months , things that previously were known only to members of congress and two with the right security clearance within the government. i worry about the nsa's metadata collection program and the risk tot such programs could pose the constitutionally protected rights of american citizens. the fourth amendment stance to safeguard those rights. even if one assumes, for purposes of this discussion, that currently the only people employed at the nsa are people with only our best interests at risk, eventill run a if that assumption is made, that at some point in the future, whether it is a week from now, month from now, you're from now or 10 or 20 years from now, unless we have the right

safeguards in place, those powers will be abused with respect to american citizens and given the fact that the nsa related to foreign intelligence gathering, we need to make sure we protect american citizens and their constitutionally protected rights. admiral rodgers, if confirmed to this position, how would you were to protect the constitutionally protected rights of american citizens while doing your job? >> yes, sir, i would attempt to be as transparent as possible to the broader nation as to what we are doing and why and try to ensure a sense of accountability in what the national security agency does. if confirmed, the nation places a great deal of trust in this organization which is an incredibly important mission. it's a mission that involves

attention in our society given the fact that the fundamental rights of the individual are so foundational to our concept of the nation. i welcome a dialogue on this topic and i think it's important for us as a nation. i look forward to being part of that dialogue. as you and i have previously discussed, i am committed to being a good partner in that effort. >> i understand that a certain level of confidentiality must almost unavoidably surround many of thensa programs that might be of concern to the american people to ensure their ineffectiveness -- their effectiveness and keep our enemies from working around our systems. developed aas certain distrust of many of those programs. in discussing this concept with senator mccain a few minutes ago, you mentioned there might be a range of options available to us.

can you describe what some of those options might look like in balancing the need for confidentiality on the one hand in order to protect our programs and the need for transparency on the other? >> i would be looking at the mechanisms we use to assess the value portion of this and how we can do this potentially in a more public way. fully formed my own thoughts in this regard but i think it's something that's incredibly important. i think it's very specific to the duties of the director of the national security agency if confirmed him of the ability to lead an honest and open dialogue about what is the value of these efforts as we try to move forward. not on the job yet. i need to get much smarter but i'm committed to doing so. >> the president has directed that the government start to transition out of having the government itself hold onto the

collected and thatg an update on how process is going and how it might unfold. >> as a nominee, i have not been part of that rossa so i'm not in a position to tell you how it's unfolding. the president said that on the 28th of march indicating he wanted feedback on how the best way to move forward was. that is among the many that is important to me as we as we try to figure out the best way is how we address the idea of speed and the ability to query the data in a way that both protects the rights of the individual but also enables us to get answers in a quick and reasonable time period. >> president obama stated in a speech in january the following -- he said i have directed the attorney general to work with the foreign intelligence surveillance court so that during this transition period,

the database can be queried after a judicial finding or in case of a true emergency. mighto you think constitute a true emergency in this context? >> potential loss of life, hostage, criminal scenarios. scenariose in those there would have to be a time component, and urgency component for that to qualify? >> yes, sir, i would think so. and not just an inconvenience to the government personnel involved but some practical reason that would make it impossible rather than just inconvenient to go to the fisa court, is that your understanding? >> inconvenience is not the standard intended here. >> thank you very much. >> senatormanchin. >> i want to thank both of you and congratulate you on your

nominations and you have quite impressive resumes and thank you serviceert just -- your to our countries for it i want to acknowledge the passing of one of your fellow air force officers and one of your fellow comrades to the air force of majornd the passing general stewart. we are very sorry for that loss. can, the equipment in iraq, where did it go, the equipment we should have taken out? how much did we leave behind and where did it go and what have we done with it and how does that lead to what we are doing in afghanistan? i heard there was so much stuff left behind. from the standpoint of state of west virginia and watching nickels and dimes, how is that fair? >> i'm not in a position to comment on what we left behind in iraq. is that because of security?

>> no, i was not party to that. i can try to find out for you. i will let you know that in the current discussions we're having on what we left behind yvette denniston, one of the issues is the residual value of the equipment and whether the cost of lifting it out of afghanistan is worth that investment. we have to do that essentially in a business case scenario. >> do we have any buyers in that part of the world for it? >> in some cases, the equipment would be disposed of military sales and others would be grants but i do not have the specifics. >> if you can confirm that, i would appreciate it. admiral rogers, give me an overview of the cyber attacks from russia especially with the ukraine situation we have now and how that escalates to

concerns and more activity for the former soviet union countries like cats extent and others and even poland. -- countries like cats extent and others like -- kazakhstan and even poland. >> that would be best shared in a classified situation. thatwould assume discussion has been had. my state of west virginia has gone through a water crisis, if you will, because of aspill. if anyone wanted to know the effects it has on population and the concerns and the hysteria and no loss of life, no one what a cyber, attack would do to the people's confidence, if you can come down and help us with that -- with that eating said, our most

vulnerability is our water and food and grid system. -- this isng privately owned are currently owned, are you interacting and how much are you interacting with those concerns to beefed-up security? that is not my current duties but if confirmed, that would be an aspect of the mission. at some legislation, we are attempting to do that on a voluntary and partnership basis. those partnerships in some areas work well and others are clearly not as mature as we would like. >> maybe you can elaborate more. hadow that senator keane mentioned this -- senator king - what has been thrown into the mix of what you are expected to bring everything together with the demands on the growth which is what we are concerned about.

should we still stand under one umbrella?ot -- one >> it's a demanding set of duties. i would also highlight the director of nsa, the commander of cyber command is not operate alone by themselves but operates with a strong team and i have worked with that team on the cyber command site and the national security side for the past 2.5 years. they are a strength for the team. it's amazing to me -- i don't see this in west virginia at all -- they are trying to lift a hero and he is basically a traitor and what he is done to our country and with that being said, there had to be a frustration level to where he felt that maybe that was the root direction for him to go because there was no outlet. are you able, in your new position, to look at how you can

-- you will have contractors involved and looks like you will have more contractors. are they able to have their concerns and do you have an outlet that would work with them so that we do not continue to go down this road? sir, there are avenues within the national security chain of command and avenues within the inspector general structure within nsa and u.s. cyber command is agencies. >> did edward snowden never take those avenues and air his concern? >> i don't know but in the ongoing investigation, as we review the particulars of that case, that will be one of the questions of high interest. >> yes, he just went down the sabotage route. some of the things he has done and has continued to do is irreparable. >> i'm not sure i said irreparable. i believe it has a significant risk, damage, and consequences. >> you would look at him as a traitor? >> i don't know that i would use that word but i certainly do not consider him to be a hero. >> thank you.

senator graham. >> thank you both for your service. i look forward to working with you in future. i have every confidence that you will be confirmed and these will be difficult but i think very rewarding jobs. general, on the trans patient what effect will sequestration have on the ability of air command to meet our defense needs over the next eight years? >> i think there is too significant impacts sequestration will have. the first is as an industrial funded organization wherever users that use transportation services pay out of that -- out of their operation maintenance accounts for those services, the decrease in the availability of those funds. the corollary to that is that will force our organic capacity, the training and seasoning of the people that do that work whether it is military sealift

command or air mobility command, to spend more of their dollars to achieve that training as a byproduct of moving transportation requirements around the world. there is a bit of a two-sided coin on the impact of sequestration on the readiness of that fleet. >> in simpler terms, it would be damaging? >> yes, sir. >> from an air mobility command point of view, how is eric airfleet then affected by the operational tempo of the last 10 years? >> we have had a fairly high ops tempo particularly in airlift and air refueling fleets. the fleets are holding up pretty well. doing continuous assessment of the structures in our large airlift aircraft but the tempo is showing its -- >> is it fair to say that when we accept each plane into the fleet, 10 or 11, that the operational tempo has been unprecedented since world war ii probably and when it comes time to evaluate our future needs, we

are flying the wings off these planes? i know they are structurally sound but i want the committee to understand that no envisioned this level of operational tempo before 9/11. we will have to make accommodations. admiral, are we at war? use the wordt "war" but there is no doubt we are in a conflict. >> if it's not a war, what is it? >? is it a disagreement >> i apologize, i did not understand the question. >> i said are we at war and you said no. you said i think something else like a conflict. how could you say we are not at work? or has a very specific legal definition and i don't believe we have met it. >> do you believe we are at war

with al qaeda and their affiliates? >> yes, sir. i apologize, i assumed you were talking in the cyber arena. >> absolutely, my bad. you don't want to go down that road -- i got you. but we are at war in terms of radical islam being the enemy of the nation? >> yes, sir. the nsa program is designed to protect us from the enemy who is hell-bent on attacking our nation at home and throughout the world, do you agree? >> yes, sir. that their fifth column movements are in the united states embedded in our country, sympathetic to the enemy? >> we have seen those kind of actions with people within the united states. we have thelieve nsa capabilities in effect in september of 2001 that we have today and is there a high

likelihood we would have intercepted the attack of 9/11? >> the potential would have been much greater. >> as we reform the program, will you stay in the forefront of your thinking not to take us back to pre-9/11 capabilities? >> yes, sir. > when it comes to monitoring content of an american citizen on the phone, the nsa program is very restricted in that regard, is that a true statement? >> very restrictive, sir. >> that the threat we face is very real. are you familiar with major assan? >> at fort hood. >> how could he communicate on aki internet a withnwar al in yemen and we not understand or not find out about that. do you know? >> no, sir, in general i believe he took advantage of the protections of our citizens. >> can you do me a favor and

evaluate how we missed major hassan? i believe in privacy and transparency but i believe that any system that will protect an american -- america from attack has to be able to pick up a communication from a major in the united states army to one of the leading terrorists in the world? if we cannot do that, something is wrong. would you please go back and evaluate how we missed major hassan and if we need to change the law to catch future perpetrators. i would like to help you in that endeavor. the boston attack, is it fair to an that our ability to take intercepted indications and identify the perpetrators fairly quickly gave us some late time about anything they may have been planning in new york? >> yes, sir. to being at war with radical islam, do you consider the homeland one of

their chief targets? >> yes, sir. >> if they could attack anyplace in the world, the top priority would probably be here at home? >> yes, sir. >> when it comes to reforming this program, how much can we talk about how the program works before we destroy its ability to protect us? >> there is clearly always an element there that we don't want to divulge sources and methods. >> would you say the discussions about how this system works have already helped the enemy in terms of being able to adapt? >> it has given them greater insights into what we do and how we do it. >> is it fair to say that when the enemy communicates uses commercial networks like the rest of us? >> yes, sir. >> if the only way we can detect what they're up to is to be able to access these commercial networks in a reasonable fashion?

>> yes, sir. >> do you agree the only way to deter them is to prevent them from attacking us because killing them is not a deterrent. a welcome death. the best way to protect death against radical islam is to find out what they are up to and hit them or stop them before they hit us. >> yes, sir. >> is that the world which we live in? >> yes, sir. >> thank you. ,> thank you very much gentleman and your families for your devoted service to the nation. let me begin with general selva. one of the important components thehe civil repair debt to civil reserve air fleet and you are undergoing studies with relationships and what we do now so we reset after significant extensions in afghanistan and iraq. idea,u give us an

parliamentary at least, what we have to do to ensure the program supports there were time needs in any highlights that are ready for prime time? inside the relationship with the civil reserve air fleet, we have 28 separate carriers that provide cargo and passenger services, each with their own business plan and each with their own motivation for how they run their businesses. part of the study was to get at how the industry runs and get the broad macro economics of how the industry is going to involve overtime. we put those two big pieces together and we are now working with the senior executives in those individual carriers to come to some agreement on what contract mechanism might look like to incentivize their volunteer service in the civil reserve air fleet. as you may be aware, the policy that governs how we managed national airlift policy was last of dated in 1987.

this study is the first major post-desert storm to get at what the economics of the industry look like and how they affect our relationship with the craft. that thexpect volunteerism will continue. the question is, how do we make it a meaningful business incentive for them to do that. >> do you anticipate any legislative requirements that you would have that would help you achieve a more efficient outcome for the government? >> based on the preliminary work we have done in the study and their interaction with the carriers, i don't believe any legislative changes are required to the national airlift policy to make it successful. >> if they do, you will inform us? >> yes, sir. >> thank you. congratulations vice admiral rogers. havetwo huge possibilities -- cyber command and an essay.

-- and nsa. in your organization, are you going to have or contemplate or have now principal deputies that would essentially focus exclusively on one or the other? >> yes, sir, each organization has its own deputy and a complete operational organization. -- at there is no changes this time? >in those deputies? u.s. cybersay the changing in the course of the next few months but that is part of a normal routine. >> and part of the normal rotation. let me change gears. we have all recognized the growing importance of cyber in every capacity. i think the lessons of history suggest that the more we practice, the better we are when

the game starts. to my mind, i don't think we have had the kind of coordinated exercises between cyber command, nsa, homeland security and every other agency which basically would give us -- confirm what we believe it may be surprises about what we don't know. is that your impression? >> i think we have done a good job of exercising within the department while we bring more capacity online in the next major evolution is how we broadly across the u.s. government to apply those issues. >> there is also the issue of bothing out to utilities financial utilities and public utilities. is that something where you would need either funding or authorization or encouragement from congress? >> at this stage, i don't know. i do make the commitment that if i am confirmed, i will assess

that and if i do believe that money or authority or support from a legislative site is required, i will approach you. >> i would encourage you to do that because i think there are so many different moving parts in these issues that you are addressing. it's not just in terms of operational but privacy, constitutional policy, commercial enterprises vs governmental enterprises, not for profits -- i think this exercise would be hugely important. this is bubbly not the most precise analogy but when we saw and 1940,ing in 1939 we learned a lot in louisiana maneuvers. we discovered some very capable leadership down there at the junior ranks and rolled it over

to some others worry quickly when the war started. i don't sense we have actually done that in the scale we talked about. i would urge you to look very quickly and get back to us very quickly in terms of what we have to do to assist you. again, i think both of you gentlemen bring the dedication and service as well as your families and i think you bring appreciation that all of what we do ultimately is about the young men and women who wear the uniform who are in harms way and what you do for them, i thank you. >> senator wicker. >> thank you. thanks to both of our witnesses today. gentlemen bring the dedication and service as well as your families and i think youlet me . i want to talk j's from thec-130 air force base. dod wants to do another

background. often we hear defense officials liket's not going to be 2005. they say error days of spending lots of money and moving things around that will not result in financial savings, those days are over. force plan toir shut down the 815th airlift squadron and their active-duty air forcethe 345th squadron and move this quadrant of aircraft away from keesler air force base, it seems the reasons have never been fully explained. the official announcement came yesterday. i have a news report from wlox in biloxi, mississippi which says keesler air force base will lose 10 aircraft from the 403rd

wing under defense cuts presented to congress on monday and it plans to transfer the 10 aircraft to the newly 913th airlift group in little rock. willing to work with the air force in making overall savings. every senator will defend our own basis. if this will help the greater good, count me in to be your teammate. first, these aircraft were going to go to dobbins in georgia. the air force abandoned that and then they were going to send them to hope field to the 44th airlift wing in north carolina. that wing will be d activate.

-- d activate it. --de activated. we are newly reactivating a group in little rock and sending these c-130j's from keesler to little rock air force base, to this newly reactivated group. taxpayers have spent millions of dollars to provide keesler air force base with state-of-the-art , modern hangars and facilities. as a matter of fact, keesler has enough space to house two squadrons. yet the air force continues to propose to spend millions of dollars to move these aircraft away and i want you to help us understand at the committee level the reason for this. alsourse, the move would cause serious disruptions to the units arsenal and their families and that happens every time there is a move. i want to ask you three direct

questions, general -- how much will this move cost? >> my understanding is that the move itself is cost neutral to little rock. understanding is they move is cost neutral to little rock. savings on the order of 600 manpower across the air force return, specifically, as the air force reserve look at -- reserves look at this -- with the cost savings. >> ok. be anye going to military time needed at little rock to accomplish this move? >> not to my knowledge. i want you to supply me a statement, at the record and not to your knowledge. i want you to look is in the eye at this committee, and assurance

that at least not one dollar will be new to accomplish this move. >> i look into the cost of the -- withth a specific the specifics of what will be required at little rock, and not hope or any location -- >> it is your testimony that from theese aircraft base with there are the modern hangers and facilities, to a new base is actually going to save enough money, to offset the costs of making this move. >> senator, based on the consultations of the air force command and making the decision in recommending it to the air force, my belief is they will save up to $600 of manpower -- and this is a reasonable thing to do. >> i want you to get back to us

with a specific numbers. let me just follow up on senator anchin's testimony, you are not willing to comment on the equipment left in iraq. is that true? >> i was not part of the details of what happened in iraq because i was not part of the decision-making process. >> but you will get back on some follow-up answers regarding the equipment being left in afghanistan. correct? >> that will be left to general dunford, as well as the leadership. the comment i made was there is some equipment, that would normally be left in afghanistan as a result of the value of the residual value of the equipment being less than the transportation cost to bring it home. >> will you be able to get back

to the committee about the factors, or do you suggest that we look elsewhere. >> i would have to consult with -- >> this is a question for another time. it goes without saying, we are going to leave friends there, and hopefully we will try to continue to be successful in afghanistan. and there are forces that will need this equipment. be theondly, there would cost, to the taxpayers, of transporting, so this equipment back that is not going to be necessary for us to be successful. -- itld make him him would make no sense to spend the money to bring it back. if it is going to cost more. would that be a fair statement?

thank you very much, good luck to both of you. >> senator david better. >> let me interrupt you for one second. -- is the first of four that are still scheduled. bidder -- vitter, if there are no other senators, i will ask senator kaine and has ahofnhofe -- who different plan. >> thank you for your service and for being here. admiral rogers, do you think the necessary support and policies and authority, and relationships and act, are all of those in place, and would you supplement any of those, what additional allah sees would you like to set?

and what additional policies would you like to see set? and what additional policies would you like to see set? >> i would like to see those in the cyber arena, those are going to be much more broad than the u.s. cyber command, that would be part of it. command,thin the cyber do you have the authorities and the policies to do all of that effectively. >> my confirmed need to be otherwise -- >> the level of expertise is required for potentially damaging operations, this is definitely lowered allowing achieve somes to level of success. how does this impact the allies and the foreign partners and our

ability to work with them. >> i think it increases the level of risk for all of our partners. >> is this in particular a problem when we have allies and partners with less capable defenses than we do, how do you handle that? >> yes, and one way we handle that is with strong partnerships. we have a strong dialogue with many of our allies and partners and we need to continue to build on that. >> i know that the pentagon wants more nato members to have more access to the unmanned aircraft. at there particular issues -- or vulnerabilities related to that, given these advanced toortunities for our enemies have this? >> there is clearly some risk there. and the way that we had you gets this risk -- we ask ourselves

how we can mitigate this risk. systems,t is physical what kind of tactics and -- to mitigate this risk. >> are those risks ever such that with regard to particular systems, we would not change our minds, in terms of the transfer to an ally. >> clearly this would be on the case-by-case basis. buy nothing i'm currently aware of. >> ok. last week the press reported that russia used cyber attacks against ukrainian telecommunications to hamper the ukrainian leadership, and the ability to access that. do you agree that russia has very sophisticated cyber capabilities, and if they use them, that could impart considerable damage to the

ukraine's critical infrastructure. >> i think so. >> i am going to move to the reserve -- admiral rogers. inot of us are interested better integrating and using leveraging, with reserve capabilities. trend, thatng-term the reserve is more in the middle of any efforts, and any fight that we have. what, specifically, is cyber crime doing to determine that the guard components are being fully utilized and maximized? >> cyber command is part of the broader departmental discussion that is ongoing right now that will be scheduled to be finished by july, to take a look at the mission analysis associated with asking what kind of reserve capability in the cyber arena that we need, how do we

structure the reserve component and maximize the effectiveness, and that part in this mission. u.s. cyber command currently has an ongoing series of exercises, with these units in the cyber arena. they also have an ongoing dialogue as part of a broader dialogue with governors, as we work our way forward to figure out the best way to maximize that capability. we have to maximize that capability. >> i would underscore and encourage that in regard to cyber command in particular, as i hope that you know, there is particular language in the last defense authorization bill, requiring maximization, the maximization of that in regard to the reserve. i would amend that to your focus and intentions. the final question, i think some of your comments have gone to the fact that the appropriate

leadership needs to make the case more fully, and publicly and persuasively, for the use of important authorities, that do exist and lay them out there in layman's terms, if you will, why this is important. and in that spirit, can you talk about the capabilities that have been very hotly debated, which is the use of a geographic -- geographic information regarding cell phones? >> to be honest, this is not an issue i have yet delved deeply into. this is one of those issues i have to be specifically smarter on, to be discussed publicly. that is part of the public discussion. >> if you would look at that and supplement the record in writing, with regard to your thoughts on that, i would appreciate it. that is all that i have. thank you, mr. chairman. , when you arene

done -- you have voted on this one. i would turn this over to whoever is next in line. i would appreciate it. >> thank you for your service and testimony today. my questions will primarily be for admiral rogers. i have a little bit of an or not -- unorthodox view of some of these challenges about nsa programs. many of my colleagues talk about these programs as if there is a solution to controversy and fixing the programs themselves. i actually think the bigger challenge is that many of these programs are being carried out pursuant to a vaguely defined moral conflict. twice during your testimony today, there was the notion of what we are in fact in. you indicated that you thought that edward snowden's revelations were wrong and cost american lives, but you

hesitated before using the word traitor to describe him. when you are asked by senator graham, whether we were at war, you said that we are in a hostility or disagreement, but then there was a misunderstanding about what exactly he was asking. you thought that he was asking about a cyber war. you understood that as the war on terror. my concern is that we are carrying out a whole series of mr. he -- military actions pursuant to the authorization for use of military force that was done on september 14, 2001 with no temporal limitations or geographic limitations and which has been defined as both the bush and obama administrations to extend to taking action not only against those who planned the 9/11 attacks but against the associated forces. that language does not appear in theauthorization, it is decision of both administrations about what that authorization uses.

we are currently in a war, but the war does not have a geographic limitation. it does not have any kind of a temporal limitation, it does not have an expiration date. this committee held a hearing on the authorization and use of military force in may. i asked witnesses from the obama administration, when will the war in and they said, they don't know, it will be 25 or 30 years. i asked the obama administration witnesses, somebody is born in 2020 and when they are 15 years they can join an organization associated with al qaeda, that only opened then and has no designs against the united states, does this authorization allow us to take action against that group? and the answer is yes. there is no reform we will be able to make any of these programs that lance of the questions of our citizens and civilians if the intelligence

gathering operations are done in a significant way, pursuant to the open-ended military authorization. and the questions that you have received about this nature of your job, you are part of a military command that is executing an authorization that has no imitation whatsoever. for all practical purposes. nsayou are also in the position where you are gathering intelligence. and i just feel that the challenge about limiting the nsa programs, or trying to find the right balance between fighting terrorism, stopping evil and protecting citizens rights, we can do anything we wanted within the four corners of the program. if we do not, as a congress, resist this with the 2001 authorization and try to put some sense of definition and scope to this, open ended, it could be a war for 25 or 30 years. we will continue to have witnesses, sharp witnesses who will come before us with

difficulty describing exactly what we are in the middle of because the primary job of congress is to provide a definition at the front end, in terms of what the mission is, it is the military and commander-in-chief that actually execute the mission. congress has given no definition of what it is we are doing at this point, and for that we will always have controversies, in my opinion, going forward. in your advanced policy questions, you asked about what constitutes the use of force in cyberspace in regards to the war powers act. with self-defense in the u.n. charter and the collective defense authorization. if you could just elaborate a little bit on that answer today, the use of force in cyberspace, and how, in your view, it triggers the war powers or other obligations, that the united states has. >> i apologize, with the 120 questions i was asked i do not remember the word for word

specifics. please accept my apologies. one of the unique challenges in cyberspace, war in what the hostilities are and the military action? >> on the policy perspective we are trying to work our way through these issues. applicable iss whatever we do in the cyber arena, international law will pertain. that if we find ourselves getting to a point where we believe that cyber is taking us down, in armed conflict scenarios, that the rule and the conflict- law of armed will maintain in this as any other. i don't think that cyber is inherently different in that regard. i think that those sets of procedures, for the policies and the nation, i think they represent a good point of departure. >> the phrase that you use is an issue.

if we believe that cyber activity is taking us down the path to armed conflict in the international law, would it be your decision that cyber war, someone takes out our great emily take activity to respond war, if it can have a huge effect on human life, a huge effect of the economy of the two nations. unless it dimly starred conflict? >> certainly not. i think of the sense of distractive acts that have significant impact for us. theink we are getting in boundaries, of is this an act of war? we are concerned about the broad general spectrum. >> just that question, we do have some important definitional work to do, the absence of the cyber bill makes this harder for all of us. switch topics. yesterday at northern virginia community college -- i was fortunate to be there at a time when there was a meeting of the

bc -- based organization, cyber watched, -- d.c. based ,rganization cyber watch talking about the skills that the cyber professionals needed, as a workforce organization. interested that someone from the department of defense is not around that table, they may want to follow to say that this may be a good avenue of precipitation -- precipitation -- participation. general alexander was here, with the need for 160 cyber missions, and 300 sixty hwy personnel by 2016. as the leader of cyber command, what would be your approach on these issues? and second, the competition from the private sector is also very intense for people with this skill set. what would be your approach for stamping out this mission? >> each of the services would

take focus on this and the command of the cyber force, with the individual right now -- on the uniform side of our experience, we have exceeded expectations and been able to recruit quality individuals and retain them. this is something my partners pay close attention to with indicators to suggest that essentially this is changing. in some way, the civilian side represents a potential greater challenge. i think that we need to look at the incentive, whether this is the ability to focus with these individuals in particular areas for extended amounts of time, in a way that we don't do now. we will have to look at all of that. >> with the civilian side and doing the work of cyber command. it takes a lot of talent of service branch personnel but also the civilians. and there has to be a good mixture. my time is up, and all of you are here for the first rounds of

questions -- is there a second round of questions ranking member inhofe? >> you can continue and i know that sen. cruz is coming back and we are talking about something i was unsuccessfully trying to get at. that is this threat. i fail to see that there is a major difference between someone who is attacking us, depending on what kind of weapons they are using, and the weapon of cyber attacks. -- let me just ask admiral rogers. do you believe that we are deterring our rivals in cyberspace? wenot to the extent that need to. >> do you know what this looks like? >> that is the problem. >> there is not a lot of public out there that understands the significance of what is going on. when i talk to people about what iran's capabilities are and what they will be by next year, we

talk about the weapon and the delivery system, they understand that these are not cyber attacks. think, thehis and i senator from virginia is really onto something. the war is the war. we will have to elevate the threat, that is what we will be dealing with. most people are not aware of that. general selby, they use rail primarily for large training exercises that depend on the rail industry to be ready to meet the department of defense search requirements. what is -- what is your opinion rail meeting the department of defense requirements? >> i cannot give you a definitive answer other than saying that the recent work that

has been done to look at the number of available railcars. with the assessments division -- i will be happy to look at that once i have the opportunity to do that, to confirm. the area of my expertise would not be appropriate. rogers, i mentioned earlier that i got to know the outgoing -- man in charge, general alexander quite well. i had the chance to talk to them, early on in this stage. he has an excellent job. he informed me that you have a kind of background that will be able to do the same thing.

this is a different view of the public so they would understand how real that the threat is out there and look forward to working with them -- >> thank you, member in half -- inhofe. >> thank you senator kaine. general, admiral, thank you for being here. thank you for your long and distinguished service to the nation. i would like to talk about the nsa policies. with concerns about -- i have expressed concerns on nsa policies on 2 fronts. one of them is the overbroad intrusion for policy rights. two, number two is the pattern of not focusing on bad actions. and not focusing on the intention to prevent terrorist acts. with the intelligence and

with theommunity -- individual bad actors. i would like to ask you questions on both fronts, starting out with the citizenry at large. as you are aware, president obama' group for the intelligence community -- says that the bulk of data collected by the nsa should be held by a third party. the privacy and civil liberties oversight board has recommended ending the bulk data altogether. do you agree with either of these? >> in terms of pulling the data from the national security, there is a standard we could work to that would allow us to do that while still meeting the requirements of generating the intelligence that we need and ensuring protection of u.s. citizens. can you please repeat the second part? >> the privacy and civil liberties oversight board

recommended limiting -- ending the data collection altogether. >> i think that we can do this in a way that will provide protection for the citizens and generate value. >> but you believe this should not be held by the u.s. government. president's the decision to shift that from the national security agency. >> if confirmed, what is the timetable for implementing that report? >> i don't know. --m driven by the solutions -- >> are you committed to working with members of this committee or a solution? >> yes. i want to ask more generally. the fourth amendment protects the privacy of law-abiding americans. what is your view of the appropriate limitations of the ability of the government, for

e-mail communications. when you're not under suspicion of any wrongdoing. >> i don't think this should be done without the corresponding legal framework for the execution. framework with your judgment require the individual suspicion? >> it out -- it varies from the aspects that we are talking about -- which is one area that the data approach was taken to address that, to deal with no contrast or names, no geographic location to strike that balance. >> would you say the government intercepts content from telephones or e-mails requires with the fourth amendment, individualized suspicion in some form of judicial oversight? >> i would make a blanket statement again, i am not aware of the specifics of the law and

this is not an area of my expertise. >> i would ask after this you would answer that question in writing. but in relevance to the fourth in relevance to how you would implement the policies of the nsa, this is a question of great interest. and the government collecting metadata or the content of indications with law-abiding -- law-abiding citizens. this is something the constitution speaks directly to. it -- i would like an expanded answer in writing after this. i would like to shift to the other side. we have devoted far too many resources, with law-abiding citizens and too few resources looking at bad guys.

the tsarnaev brothers, we were notified by russia that they may have had connections to radical islam must terrorists. the elder brother posted an advertisement with his desire for jihad on youtube, not a clear, hidden communication but for the world to see. and yet, even though we knew this individual -- we had reason to know that this individual was a radical islamic terrorists, and he was publicly proclaiming his desire for jihad, we failed to print -- prevent that tragic bombing in boston. i would like to ask you, why do you think that this was, and what can we do to correct this so we don't fail to prevent the next boston bombing. i don't know the specifics of the boston bombing. this is not something i have

expressed direct knowledge of. withsecond example, deals major nadal hassan and the ft. hood murders. hassan had traded 18 e-mails ath radical islamic cleric -- known terrorist leaders any spiritual advisor of the 9/11 attacks. this is someone who is known to do -- be a serious threat to the byntry, we communicated e-mail with him and in spite of all the surveillance capabilities, we failed to prevent that horrific terrorist attack at fort hood that claimed the lives of 14 innocents. judgment, what do we have done better to prevent that? >> i would answer that question -- with senator graham. >> -- howard answer that

question to senator graham. >> lemmie ask on both of these, that it would be a far better allocation of resources in the nsa and in our efforts to prevent terrorism in general is much more resources were directed to targeting those who we have reason to know are dangerous. maybee reason to know radical islamic terrorists. and less resources devoted and less energy devoted to -- the speaker pro tempore: the house will be in order. the chair lays before the house a communication from the speaker. the clerk: the speaker's room, washington, d.c., march 11, 2014. i hereby appoint the honorable jeff denham to act as speaker pro tempore on this day. signed, john a. boehner, speaker of the house of representatives. the speaker pro tempore: pursuant to the order of the house of january 7, 2014, the chair will now recognize members from lists submitted by the majority and minority