essentially corroborate their point of view. both the defense nuclear facility safety board and the department's own safety inspector inspectors found that hanford maintained a culture that at best thwarted the ability of employees to come forward, and at worst has threatened their careers, and livelihoods. the fact that with respect to dr. tamosaitis and miss busche that they were fired after this issue has gotten so much attention by the independent observers, by you, as our chair, senator mccaskill, and myself when i was chair of the energy committee, in my view, underscores the fact that nothing has really changed at hanford. and that's what we've got to turn around and i will just say to the chair and my staff wrote these really long address, i think i can maybe spare you the fulfill buster and just thank you very much for what -- what

you're doing. this is important for our part of the world, but it is important because all over the country at other sites this is being followed and employees are saying what are the consequences of coming forward and speaking the truth, influential policymakers. i thank you very much for your work. if you as chair senator mccaskill have any questions, softdball questions are especially welcome but i better get back pretty quick to finance committee deliberations, and i just thank you very much. >> absolutely. thanks for coming. >> thank you. o >> dr. tamosaitis? >> the retaliation against me started after i raised technical issues that had nuclear safety implications. my concerns centered around the buildup of hydrogen gas, which could cause a hydrogen explosion, the buildup of plu tone upat the bottom of the

tanks which could cause a criticality and the plugging of pipelines which could render the plant inoperable for years. the issues i raised not only had nuclear safety implications, but could have major impacts on the plant design. and i believe that is the root of the problem. the issues stood in the way of bechtel and urs earning their award fees, and more importance, getting additional funding from congress. the problem of the wtp, i would offer, is not the complexity of the process, or actually how the process should operate. there are many good people at hanford that are working very hard on it. the problem is, the mismanagement. the management's objective, the contractor's objective is to keep the project moving, and get their funding, regardless of whether they're moving behind, moving backwards, moving forwards, or standing still.

as long as they're there, they get their funds. the concerns i raised led to my firing from the wtp by bechtel. i want to say that this issue is much bigger than me. and i don't want the issue to be judged solely by my input. by firing me, putting me in the basement, and then releasing me, urs firing me, both bekting and urs are sending a clear message to all employees, don't do what walt did. and from what i hear, from people calling me, talking to people, they're doing a dog gone good job of getting that message out. urs claims they laid me off for downsizing reasons. i can tell you that i see no difference in how i was handled when i was fired from the wtp by bechtel versus being, quote, laid off by urs. and urs held my severance pay hostage for me to give them legal immunity, and we are

talking a significant amount of money. i did not sign the agreement to give the legal immunity so i foregoed my severance pay. i consider the withholding of my severance pay by urs to be akin to extortion. with the contractor's focus on profits, the employees received punitive treatment, and retaliation if they raised safety issues. because, it could impact the plant. the contractors then, if they cannot blame doe, bear the cost of the repairs. their performance decreases cost and schedule performance. and there's nothing wrong with making money. the companies need to make money. but when the focus on profits trumps safety, quality, and building -- doing the right thing, you have a problem. and i would submit that you have a major problem in the wtp when

the cost goes from an initial estimate by bekting of $4.6 billion and today the estimate would be over $25 billion for hire. the start-up was going to be in seven years, '01 to '08. and now the start-up is talking about being in the late 2020s. i mean the plant would have been further ahead, closer to start-up, if they'd have done nothing. they'd be only seven years from start-up with the '01 to '08. but nothing gets done with the contractors despite that abuse. because they continue to get the funding, lobby congress for additional money, and they continue to get their funding and stay there. their objective is to keep the funding coming. the contractors, especially bechtel, will use intimidation and pressure to get the answer they want. this is evidenced by the information we found in their dealings with the savannah river national lab. they also put tremendous pressure on bechtel and the

pacific northwest national lab. their ceo -- mr. ogleby, of bechtel corporate, leaned on dr. wadsworth the ceo of betle in order to get betle to give the answer they wanted. betle's ethics prevented them from doing that. to make matters worse, the government is fuelling funding and supporting these contractor actions. now is the time, in my mind, for congress to make changes. all the companies in the doe system are watching to see what happens. with the visibility of my case, donna's case, the cost growth, the schedule overrun, it will be katie bar the door if no action is taken to rein the contractors in. as an example, of how congress is funding the contractor

performance, all legal expenses incurred by bechtel and urs to fight employee legal actions are reimbursed on an ongoing basis via taxpayer money. then if the company is found guilty, they may be asked to pay back. well, what do they do? they settle before they pay back. they're not found guilty, no payment. all their attorneys and the people that are here today will be reimbursed for their expenses to come here. and that comes from taxpayer money. so what do they do? they -- they have no incentive, the companies have no incentive to do the right thing. let the employee file a concern. we'll drag the thing out. the government's paying us to fight them. they hire outside attorneys. the outside attorneys are paid by the hour. they have no incentive to settle quicker. so the system provokes, supports, the contractors doing what they do, and continuing to

get paid. there's no incentive to do the right thing or to settle quicker. and guess who pays for the cost of us, for our legal expenses? us. another problem in the wtp is that the bechtel is the design agent and the design authority. that means they decide what they need to do, and how they need to do it. and then they're rewarded for cost and schedule performance. that's akin to giving the fox the henhouse. i would even say it's worse. it's a license to steal. to keep the project going. to keep that funding stream going. and if somebody raises a technical issue, and it could stand in the way of their funding, they're going to retaliate. they're going to take punitive action. and that's what happened with m-3, the mixing issue, back in 2010, when not only was there a $5 million award fee on the

line, but behind the scenes they were lobbying congress for an extra $50 million in funding, of which they got because they quote closed m-3. but today, as senator wyden said, the department of energy's conducted surveys, they supported and found the negative culture. the defense board, in an in-depth study, and found -- and found issues and issued two recommendations, outside groups have identified issues, and if you don't believe all that, and say you know, that's all kind of hoo-doo, we don't believe old walter, sector of energy, former secretary chu, shut the place down. so the problems are well-known. but the contractors continue to get their funding because they misrepresent and mislabel the information. my termination occurred on the heels of secretary mennees

issuing a statement for harassment free workplace. he issued that statement about the third week of september. i was fired by or laid off by urs, quote, laid off, on october 2nd. less than two weeks after he issued that statement. now, with the visibility of my case, several lawsuits and mennees issuing that statement, if urs would blatantly just lay me off, dismiss me, get rid of me, right after the secretary issued such a cultural statement, what does it say about what they would do if there was no statement. i mean, they will, if you stand in the way of their progress to keep the funding going, there are problems. and with that i'll say, in my mind, the wtp and the doe culture are at a tipping point. now is the time to make a change. if no change is made, i feel

real bad for the future generation of workers. because i don't want anybody to go through what i've gone through. it's tough. >> thank you, doctor. mr. carpenter. >> thank you for inviting me. my comments today, thank both of you, senators, for supporting whistle-blower rights. i know you're strong advocates and we really appreciate that and this hearing is -- is very welcome oversight on what's happening. my name is tom carpenter. i'm the executive director of hanford challenge. our mission is the safe and effective cleanup of the hanford site. for both present and future generations. we work with insiders, we hope they don't become whistle-blowers, unless they need to tell the truth. but we don't want employees to become whistle-blowers. these folks didn't want to become whistle-blowers. they simply were doing their jobs. and that's the case for most people out there and then

suddenly they're finding themselves on the wrong side of their company. we'd like to change that culture so that concerns are welcomed. addressed. and we move on and we have a better plant because of that. it's the third anniversary of the fukushima accident today. and i think it's fitting and appropriate that we're here talking about protecting nuclear whistle-blowers, and talking about nuclear safety. at the fukushima plant, engineers there wanted to build and recommended the building of a higher tsunami wall. to protect the plant against that event. and they also recommended that the emergency diesel generators be moved from the flood plain to on the hill behind the plant. engineers tell us that the earthquake itself did not cause the fukushima accident. it was the tsunami. and so, because the utility that

runs fukushima didn't listen to, and suppressed the testimony of these engineers about the tsunami effects, we have one of the worst nuclear accidents, still raging out of control. we still have three meltdowns in process there. two spent fuel pools have had hydrogen gas explosions, and there's 300,000 gallons a day of radioactive water pouring into the ocean. we can prevent that kind of thing happening in our own country, at the hanford site. but only if we listen to our experts. it's not just donna dushy and walt tamosaitis who are both acknowledged experts with good degrees, the top in their country. it's why they were recruited for these positions. donna the manager of safety. walt the manager of research and technology. but you sls on record the chi engineer of the facility a guy named gary bronson who recommended the shutdown of the waste treatment plant until the

safety issues are resolved. that did not happen. he resigned in protest. you also have don alexander the chief scientist for the facility raising safety concerns, going to "usa today" and trying to find some avenue, and eventually these folks did get through to secretary chu, the former energy secretary. he listened to their concerns, and that resulted in the suspension of all nuclear work at the plant. and that's been that way for a year and a half and it remains that way. we're grateful that that's happening. however, it could have been earlier. it could have been years ago, when these folks were listened to, and right now, our major concern is that the treatment of these folks and others like them have sent a message throughout the safety culture that it's not safe to raise an issue. that's a message that cannot be allowed to stand. and it's really up to the department of energy to make

sure that that message is countered. because right now we see that bechtel and urs are winning the battle to silence employees out there. and people who are younger in their careers, who see a safety issue, they need to be encouraged to raise those concerns and the system does not tolerate that right now. so, we're asking that congress take some action to subject -- do some independent oversight for nuclear safety. we've been doing this now for 25 years trying to get the department of energy to take steps to protect whistle-blowers and to have a better nuclear safety culture out there. it's not working. they're not going to. there needs to be independent oversight for nuclear safety, and for the safety culture at the site. so we'd like to ask congress to consider taking some steps in that direction. in the practice of reimbursing attorney's fees. the public shouldn't be reimbursing what amounts to a

legal retaliation against whistle-blowers out there. it's not in their interest. it's in the interest of the public to hear the safety concerns, not suppress and silence them. so i'm hoping this committee also takes on that challenge. and, we're also looking for meaningful remedies and protections for whistle-blowers. right now there's really not much there to avail for these folks to avail themselves of protection. thank you very much for considering my statement today, and i'm happy to answer any questions you might have. >> let me start with asking, was there ever any issue documented issue on your job performance? either one of you, prior to you saying things out loud and publicly that raised safety concerns concerning hanford. >> you want me to start off? i received three letters. the first one was titled corrective action letter, where, in summary it told me to be nicer to people.

there was -- it wasn't written as a written warning from a standard human resource perspective. it was just titled, corrective action letter. that was in 2011. i received nothing until 2013. so there was a silence between 2011 and 2013. i received another letter that said i was basically late on assignments. and it listed four of those. and then the final letter was i sent inappropriate e-mails when i requested human resources, had they done an investigation to -- because an e-mail by itself, without the context of the conversation, is just an e-mail by itself, and my supervisor and the manager of human resources admitted oh, this was just based on the e-mails. and those were the three letters i received. >> and those occurred before you -- i'm trying to figure out where the performance issues with you, if they -- if there were any that were documented prior to you giving testimony in

a public way that they didn't like. >> no. no prior to that i would say i received above average raises. very good bonuses from the executive compensation pool. had received numerous letters of, you know, thank yous from my supervisors. >> so it wasn't until you gave answers that made the companies uncomfortable, that was when you first started receiving some kind of documentation about your job performance? >> yes, ma'am. >> and what about you, doctor, was there anything prior to you raising concerns about technical issues of safety at hanford, had you gotten any performance issues brought to your attention prior to that? >> no, ma'am. not at all. >> okay. how long did you work there prior to you raising concerns publicly that -- that the contractors disagreed with? >> i would say probably 14, 15

months. i started in march 2009. the fortuitous meeting was july of 2010. or the latter part of june 2010. up before that i received, you know, really no negative -- lots of accolades that i was doing great work at the waste treatment plant. >> when you -- was there ever a time that you felt pressure to change anything you had written or testified to by the companies? >> yes, ma'am. >> and would you delineate what those were and when? >> in the public meeting convened by the defense nuclear facility safety board i think it was october 7th and 8th of 2010, i was requested to sit on the panel. during the second panel discussion, which was the first day was really the controversial, where i took positions technically. immediately after that, i was admonished by, at that time,

em-1 and dr. triea -- >> explain what em-1. >> environmental management. so in the department of energy environmental management is really the government part, that flowdown of who is overseeing the cleanup of hanford. and so after that particular meeting when i walked in to the debrief room, you know you're shuttled back and forth, i made a comment that i was out looking for a gentleman, because i figured i was off his christmas card list so i was trying to relieve tension, and i was admonished that if my intent was to piss people off, i did a mighty fine job that day. so i left the room. the next morning i chose not to go back there because it was quite, you know, 40 people not being kind. i was met outside by frank russo, leo sang and bill gay requesting me so frank russo was bechtel. leo sane and bill gay were urs requesting me to change my testimony. and i told them i could not. and i went and, you know, basically went inside. during the actual third panel

session, shirley owinger from the department of energy was actually passing cards to lee yo sane with handwritten notes to change the testimony that i had given. so -- >> so, it was bechtel, urs and the department of energy that were putting pressure on you to change what you were saying publicly? >> yes, ma'am. >> and what about you? >> there are -- there are several very distinct cases. i started raising issues when i got there in 2003, because that was my job responsibility. in 2006, i chaired a -- led a very intensive technical review chartered by secretary bodman at that time, secretary of energy bodman. upon issuing that report, a bechtel manager craig albert called me and said he wanted to edit the report. and i said, no, as you know, those were the ground rules, those were included in the ground rules, that there be no editing by management of the report. he said to me, who do you work

for? and i said, well, you know, i think i know who i work for. he then went on to say, well i talked to jim at doe and jim said it's okay. and i said, well, if it's okay, i'll call him and confirm it. and he then recanted his story. and the pressure then began retaliation on me from '06. in 2010, there were many times when my urs manager bill gay took me aside and said quit raising issues. don't raise the issues. leo sane, the vice president aiken, south carolina, told me walt, bring the issues to me. and i'll take them up the line. and i said, leo, you're in aiken, i'm 3,000 miles away. my job is to do that. no, no, you bring the issues to me and i'll handle them. then at the end of june 2010 i tasked pacific northwest national lab to issue a report

and my immediate two urs bosses bill gay and richard edwards both tried to have that report squashed because they knew that that report would conflict with bechtel's approach to the technical resolution of the problem. so i've had many -- >> of the mixing problem. >> yes, senator. >> okay. finally, i want senator johnson to have an opportunity to ask you some questions and i may have a couple more. in your -- you've already said that they wouldn't give you your severance pay unless you signed documents resolving -- on solving them of any legal liability surrounding the way that you were treated. on your nondisclosure agreements, was it clear in your nondisclosure agreements that they had no legal authority to keep you from doing what you're doing today, making reports to either inspector generals, or to congress, as a whistle-blower? was that clear in the

nondisclosure agreements that you retained those rights? >> you mean when we signed on with the company? >> right. >> wow. i would say i do not remember any such verbal or written statement, and since the time i filed suit in the past over the past, almost four years, i have never heard that referred to. >> okay. >> so i don't know anything about it. >> i would say the nondisclosure, because i've read it numerous times, i would say, is not -- would not supersede some of the department's regulations to provide factually accurate information. so when a defense nuclear facility safety board, whether an attorney, or a board member would ask me a question, i believe i'm obligated to tell the truth. >> senator johnson? >> yes. you know, i come at this from a perspective of a business guy who's managed construction prong ingts in the past, and there's a lot of things that i just -- this is a real head that this is a real head scratcher. a number of different

perspectives. first of all, i'm not sure in terms of -- obviously we have a dispute between yourself and the company. i'm not sure this is the best place to adjudicate this and to be done in a court of law. there's real issues in terms of whistle blower protection and who is getting reimbursed for legal fees and who is not. you know, as a business guy i avoided attorneys, no offense, and the judicial process like a plague, and, you know, taking this kind of action, they would certainly understand this is going to create an awful lot of heat. putting that aside, what i want to get so is having managed construction projects. having been a customer, it's always the -- it's the -- having been a customer and a supplier, it's always the customer that's in the driver's seat here. and the customer in this instance is the government. and i read in part of the briefing that the companies are

require to notify the government if they're going to be laying off or dismissing the safety employee. okay, so were you one of those key persons? >> yes, i am. and as of yesterday i'm still listed as a contractor. >> where were the notifications given? >> there was a letter to my knowledge. i won't speculate. but i know there was a letter sent january 14th to the department of energy requesting to change key personnel. that letter has been labeled sensitive in the system. so there's a lot of gossip, so people brought it to my attention. i could not get a company. my understanding is the department of energy did not approve that or the significant reorganization of my job department at that time. so today i don't believe they've made a decision one way or the other, and i'm still listed in the contract. >> i think the government should be in the driver's seat of making sure and putting controls

in place to make sure, you know, that type of system should be honored and respected and followed. what other things are there that the government has in place to be in charge of this process that they're maybe just ignoring or not following through on? does that make sense? do you know what i'm trying the to get at? >> i think so. in my view the department of energy is outnumbered, outmanned and outgunned when it comes to deal with the contractors. at the wpt, it's about 100 if not 150 to 1, the ratio of contractor employees to doe oversight. doe has to rely on the contractor for what the technical situation is. and when i was in -- as r&t manager, there was not one engineer in h the doe change between my counterpart and secretary chu.

i mean, all good degrees, but a law degree is not going to necessarily help with the design of the wpt. so the d.o.e. has to rely on the contractor ls. the contractors now want to keep their funding going, so they will mislead, misrespect the facts and i'll say sell a story to d.o.e. >> that gets to the point that the t government has to put in place the controls, recognizing the nature of the personnel versus the contractors. i remember the hearing we did have. that was a question i had. is could we, you know, could the government hire the people to do this type of project. and really the answer is no way. so the government has to rely on these contractors, have expertise in producing these one at a time. you know, once in the span of human history these types of projects, you have to rely on krrpts. but it's a matter of how do you

institute the controls. >> thank you very much for that. we do have models in the country for regulating nuclear energy in the navy. both have programs for instituting safety culture and making sure that the laws are followed. and of course, there is an element of independence there. and that is what is missing at the department of energy, for instance, the department of energy owns the site. they're subject to pressure from you guys and the state of washington to hurry up and get it done. >> that's justifiable pressure, right? >> it is justifiable pressure. >> we're already leaking -- >> absolutely. >> this is a big, complex problem. >> no question about that. however, you do have nuclear safety laws, and if you take shortcuts there to hurry up on the schedule, then you've got a problem. >> let me -- because i talked about difference of opinion. . you mentioned fukushima, and

again, i'm not a nuclear engineer. you said the experts said increase the walls to protect the diesel generators. the design change is going to be made as a result of that experience is to put a big tank of water on top of the nuclear reactor to cool it and can be filled by anything. i mean, you can get outside pumps to fill that. so the outside experts at that point, not having that experience, would have recommendeded raising walls s not the best design solution. . the best is to put a big tank of water. it is true that you've got differences of opinion of the best way to succeed. >> i want to go back i think to your original question. do i think the department of energy is responsible and accountable for the safe cleansnup. >> absolutely. >> it has to be. >> absolutely. i have no argument there. i also believe that the contractors who have signed written agreements and contracts with the department of energy

are obligationed to tell the truth. >> correct. right? so that's the business side. >> so what parts of those contracts are they violating? >> so it's fundamental that any documentation provided to the government be factual in all material respects. so when the department, when they exclude even differing opinions, people are making an uninformed decision on incleat facts. that directly relies with the contractor. so if donna is no longer allowed the to go to the senior management meetings with the department of energy, all we're hearing is they're good to go. the there are no differing opinions. their all solved. is it a complex problem? yes. but it's not as complex as people make it out to be. we're building two facilities and a laboratory. f those are standard technologies, but yet there are still systemic design flaws

because we haven't addressed the issues that are raised. >> am at some point people have to make decisions on ultimate approaches and ultimate technologies. i think those always have to be reviewed and updated and was it the right decision? at a certain point of time you go, okay. we have to make a decision. we have to move forward on this, and you can vsh i'm not saying -- you can have people potentially off the wall different ideas on things. at what point do you say this is a decision we made in conjunction with the government, we're moving forward on this, and -- you know what i'm say sng. >> absolutely. >> that's the question. that's the conundrum here. >> hang on one second. i was an executive. i do get the business and the profit and loss piece. i clearly understand that. we made the risks from 2003 to 2010. those risks were taken. management made the decisions,

and they turned out to be technically wrong. spo we have 6'0" concrete walls with commodities in the walls. >> so why isn't the department of energy -- they're the ones that should be saying this is wrong. and quite honestly it's a work in progress. nobody knows for sure. we all collectively made the decision. it was a wrong decision. now we have to change it. it's going to cost more money. we're not going to like that. dollars are scarce. so you have all these competing pressures making it difficult to move forward. >> i believe they have in a large portion for the very reasons that we and many other people raised. right? the question is how do you go forward? if you use the same business management models that make the same business decisions using the same process and same people, we're going to end up

ten years from now having the next discussion. >> putting your civic situation aside, which should be adjudicated in the court of law, which an appropriate venue, from our standpoint, what do we need to do to solve it? how should the department of energy as a customer, how do they institute the controls? what do we need to put in the controls so this is a process that's going to move forward, be as cost effective as possible? but also proceed in a timely manner, kwily, as requesticly as possible, but also in a safe manner? >> well, first let me offer that with a design in wpt. they designed the savannah -- plan. they operate it. urs operates it. urs operated the valley plan. and urs is operating settlefield england. those companies know how to

build a plan. f the problem is they don't come forward and say here's what we're going to do. let us tell you what this plant will do. what we're going to provide you as the customer as the department of energy. they don't do that. >> are there differences between these sites? there are, aren't there? >> no, no. it's nuclear waste with every element of the periodic table in it. >> so why didn't the department of energy say you've already got these, just give us a quote on the same process. f we've already overcome the technical hurdles at the other sites. why are we reinventing the wheel here? again, the customer should be driving the process. they should be in charge. >> i would concur that the department of energy plays a role in establishing those r50ir789s. but again, they don't have the technical background. . >> why not? >> good question. i would suggest that you need as

congress to give the defense nuclear facility safety board some authority to assure that the designs are compliant with the nuclear laws. that's what is missing here is that driver. the gao has done the studies. but mostly they identified conflict of interest. if you beef up the role of an agency already there doing the work but doesn't have the authority to, for instance, grant a license, then you have a problem. now you make sure that's a safe design until we continue being d d.o.e., the contractors have to do it with nuclear safety in mind. and that's going to improve the schedule and the cost. >> that only assumes that the government agencies have the expertise -- >> they do. >> -- that's at least as good as the contractors have. >> they do.

they've retired the engineers for the contractor community, from the nrc, from the nuclear navy. good question. we've been asking for that for some time. we would love you to do that. >> but that's a statutory issue. >> right. precisely. that's what we should get decided on. whatever this is. this meeting, which i appreciate, in hearings and subsequent hearings, we have to get to the point of what's the solution? what are the controls? what do we need to do from the government standpoint who should really be in charge of the process to solve the problem as well as provide the controls. >> absolutely. >> but for the purpose of whistle blowers, we need a forum that we can raise concerns. individuals like myself have an incredible amount of courage and some days i don't know how i went to work. but when you see very strong people that are treated the way we are and it's a deafening

silence when they have no forum to raise the concerns. and there is no check and balance in the system now. so with respect to whistle blower forum, i think we have a lot of work we need to do so we can raise concerns and they don't have to be adjudicated in the court of law for six to seven years while very legitimate safety issues are out. >> and might i add, the taxpayers are picking up an unfettered bill of millions of dollars for legal fees while they are scraping the to figure out how they can actually outweigh the paper barrage that will come down on their head from private defense firms who know the more they work it, the more money they make. their incentive is to build, depose, bill, bill, delay, depose, build, build, build, delay, depose. so the notion that this is somehow a level playing field is ridiculous. >> but it should be because the

adjudication process should reside from my standpoint in the department of energy. they're the ones that have the charge with safety, making sure those controls are in place, and you should be able to go to the department of energy, speak freely. from my stand point, the companies having laid you off is taking a pretty big legal risk. we'll find out how that all plays out. but the process and the controls have to be in the the governmental agency which always gives me pause because we see they're not particularly -- >> i did. i did go to the employee concerns program in d.o.e. when the manager listened to my case, he said, he told me this was above the ability of his group and i should go to somebody on the outside. >> that's what this is about. >> well, i'm encouraged to hear you're ready to increase the department of appropriations. >> i'm hap to look at the spending. >> that surprises me.

>> if we could enhance government and not solely rely on the private sector, especially when all the incentives are to not slow down the process for technical concerns. to not hay low the technical concerns being raised to get the prominence in the d.o.e. so i think there's an issue in terms of empowering d.o.e. so they can be a real player at the table. right now they don't have the manpower, the expertise or the resources. >> this is a priority of government. >> okay. >> so you will cosponsor a bill with me to increase appropriations to the department of energy? last time i thought you wanted to do away with the department of energy. >> where is the lower spending items that we justify seat that

wi -- that we offset with that? >> i'm fine with that. >> how about bonuses and fees for some of the contractors that haven't performed well out there. >> that's an old refrain that we have covered many times in sub committee. >> i think certainly one step forward would be congress setting the standard and empowering d.o.e. telling them the performance is unacceptable. d.o.e. is an operation. they want to move ahead. a lot of pressure on them for schedule cost. they listen to the contractors. you get into a cycle. the cycle can slowly degrade. it's degraded now. congress reenforcing the d.o.e. that the performance is unacceptable. and here are the things that need to change, just that, i believe would make a big step. i have advocated for the defense board to be given the authority so when they issue a recommendation, as mr. carpenter

said, they can also enforce it. steps like that can help. >> let me throw a caveat out there. i didn't just do business with the government because it wasn't worth it. and you're taking a look at it right here. there aren't many on. and i think from empowering d.o.e., kbu also to looking at

having this outside third, you know, everyone respects this board. everyone knows they know this very technical area. . giving them some third party oversight with the ability to make some pronouncements in this area i think make a lot of sense. there's a lot of private companies that deal tw the board now in this context. there's no reason this fa tillty shouldn't also be one of them. okay. thank you vur much. >> thank you. i'm going to ask the witnesses there now to leave and we're going to ask the department of energy to come up

first. they are -- do not want to be at the the same table with you today. i don't really understand why. but we're going to have them come up first. who is the person from the department of energy? who is the person from the department of energy that is testifying? hello? i'll give my opening statement. hopefully they will have shown up by then. this hearing will now come to order. the waste treatment plant is a nuclear facility in washington that is supposed to convert hazardous nuclear waste into a more stable and safe form for permanent disposal. last june i held a hearing on contract management by the

department, the waste treatment plant at hanford because the plant, which is under a design and construction construct in terms of how the contracts were given has a litany of cost overruns and schedule delays. today, however, we are here to examine another aspect of the plant. allegations of the department of energy and its contractors are engaging in retaliation against employees who raise concerns about the safety of the plant's design and construction. the department of energy has a specific nuclear safety policy that states, quote, it is the policy of the department of energy to design, construct, operate and decommission its nuclear facilities in a manner that assures adequate protection to the workers and environment. however, the federal agencies that have looked at safety issues at hanford have particularly found key safety weaknesses, including the safety culture and federal oversight. most recently the urs manager of safety donna busche has alleged that she was fired because she

raised concerns that basic nuclear safety fundamentals had not been considered from the beginning of construction. another official associated with the waste treatment plant, the manager of waste treatment plant research and technology, dr. walter tamosaitis who testified before the sub committee in 2011 also claims to have suffered professional damage, including termination, after raising major nuclear safety issues. these individuals and many more who have chosen to remain anonymous have brought their concerns forward to their employers, to d.o.e. and to congress. i don't think anyone wants to be a whistle blower. reporting your colleagues who may be your friends for actions that look like waste fraud abuse or others isn't an easy decision for most people. and life after you've blown the whistle isn't easy either, but the job that whistle blowers do is tremendously important and valuable. that's why when courageous men and women feel compelled to speak out, we do not want to

silence them. we want to give them a process that allows them to report that without fear of retaliation. before the hearing began, i took the opportunity that hear from miss busche and dr. tamosaitis. i also heard from mr. carpenter who represents many more workers. they describe an atmosphere in which they and other individuals face severe real grags for raising issues about han jr. ford. f whether they or any other individuals who have come forward to the sub committee is right about the science behind the stafty at hanford is not a matter at which i or the people in the hearing they will be able to reach a final conclusion about. but the fact that they were fired, despite being known to have raised their concerns has created the appearance of a chilled atmosphere to safety and the belief of employees that management suppresses technical dissent. that demands attention by congress, and it certainly demands attention by the people. today we hear from two witnesses

from the department of energy. we will also hear from the prime contractor at the waste treatment plant and urs, a subcontractor to bectel who was the employer of dr. busche and dr. tamosaitis. i thank the witnesses for being here and look forward to your testimony. we will begin with mr. eckroad and mr. mori. i will introduce both of you. you can take your oath. the reason i'm a little frantic is we're going to start votes at 11:30. this is going to prolong the hearing in a way that didn't seem efficient for me. and it's hard for me to accommodate what seems to me an antiquated notion that members of the government can't sit at the same table with the contractors. that flies in the face of reality that our government is

filled with contractors working side by side, sometimes undistinguishable from each other in terms of their work function and what they're doing. the notion that we have to have two tables to make sure the government people don't have to intermix with the company people seems to be a -- somebody holding onto some notion that makes no sense in terms of today's government and its operation. but i know you two are not responsible for that decision. so i won't yell at you. i will save my wrath for the person who actually made that decision. which will come at a later time. mr. eckroad is deputy chief of operations, office of health, safety and security at the u.s. department of energy. . he previously served as principle deputy chief in the the office of health, safety and security and director of the office of independent oversight. matt mori is in charge of environmental management at the department of energy where he executes operational safety and

awareness programs and oversees quality assurance programs. mr. mori previously spent almost 20 years at the defense safety board. which we referenced earlier, where he led the board's efforts to ensure the board of energy, nuclear stockpile and research operations met health and safety standards. thank you both for being here. it's the custom of the sub committee to this swear all witnesses. if you would stand. do you swear is that the testimony you are about to give before this sub committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you god? thank you both. we will begin with you, mr. eckroade. am i pronouncing your name correctly i hope? >> yes, madame chairman, you are. thank you for the opportunity to provide testimony regarding safety culture and related issues at the department of energy's hanford site, waste treatment and immobilization plant. i would like to take a brief moment to describe the unique role of the independent oversight program within the office of health, safety and

security, which has conducted safety culture reviews at hanford and else j where. ft the mission of the program is to provide management to congress and other stake holders with a independent evaluation of the effectiveness of daily policy and safety and security. this mission is accomplished by conducting performance balsed assessments designed to verify the department's security interests are protects, that the department can effective response to emergencies and protect the employees, the public and the environment. our team has completed two safety culture assessments at wpt. one in 2010 and one in 2012. these assessments included interviews with employees at the office and the bectel national corporated, as well as a detailed prereview of their safety programs, processes and procedures. detailed reports of the assessments and recommendations have been provided to the committee, and i will summarize the findings briefly.

in the 2010 assessment we found most personnel interviewed expressed their managers encouraged a questioning attitude and they were comfortable with raising safety concern ls. however, some individuals believed there was a chilled environment that discouraged reportsing of safety concerns, and some employees expressed fear about retaliation. our report contained a number of detailed remgtss for both orp and bni. among those that bni strengthened procedures for the regulation of nuclear safety concerns, identified mechanisms, strengthened trust in the workforce and better communicate information to employees. two years later in 20123 we performed a second comprehensive assessment. for this assessment, we engaged in external independent experts with extensive experience in safety culture reviews. to compliment the highly experienced nuclear safety expertise in our staff. that helped us more effectively diagnose the safety culture and attributes of wpt and learn things we didn't learn in our

2010 assessment. in 2012 we found most personnel believed that safety was a high priority. however, a significant number of federal and contractor staff expressed reluctance to raise safety or quality concerns, fear of retaliation was identified in some groups. employee willingness to raise safety concerns without retaliation is an essential element of a healthy safety culture. our conclusion was significant management attention was needed to improve the safety culture at wpt. we found while managers found support, they did not have a full appreciation of the current culture or the nature and level of effort needed to foster a healthy safety culture. l we are currently conducting a follow-up assessment of safety review. that review will be completed this spring and a written report presented to management. we look forward of sharing the reports of that assessment when it's complete. a strong safety culture starts with strong ongoing support by

the most senior leaders of the organization. i want to share with members of the subcommittee that this is a very high priority for the deputy secretaries. with permission of the sub committee, i would like to introduce if for the record of a copy of september 20th, 2013 memorandum signed by both the deputy secretary personnel health through leadership, employee engagement, and it provides a deep personal commitment to building an organization we can all be proud to work in. a vibrant and healthy organizational culture will help the department to achieve the national security, scientific and environmental missions safely and securely. we're committed to helping the department to achieve this goal. i would be glad to this answer any questions the sub committee may have. >> thank you very much. >> good morning. thank you chairman mccaskill, ranking member johnson and members of the sub committee. i'm here today to discuss the department of energy's efforts to improve workplace safety

culture. . in interest of time with your permission, i would like to give a brief summery of my testimony and submit my full testimony for the record. ft crea creating and maintaining a robust safety culture, including a workplace where all employees feel free to raise concerns is essential to achieving our mission at the hanford site in washington state and across the complex. as you mentioned earlier in terms of my background, i'm an engineer by training and have 3w0 years of experience in the nuclear field. including almost 20 years about the safety board. i also began my career as a nuclear training officer and recently retired with the rank of captain at the navy reserves. at d.o.e., my office executes safety and awareness programs. at d.o.e. we believe safety cultures best described as an

organization's values and behaviors that are valued by the leaders, internalized by the members and makes the safe performance of work the overriding authority to protect the workers, the public, and the environment. improving safety culture remains a top priority. in september of last year as mr. eckroade mentioned the deputy secretary reaffirmed their safety to all employees. the memo recognized that d.o.e. can advance the challenging missions only if it provides all employees a safe and healthy work environment and fosters a culture in which workers at all levels are empowered to raise

at hanford are extensive and varied. first, new leadership has been put in place. the new leadership has the qualifications, experience and safety values to put the waste treatment value on a sustainable path. second, the department clarified former rules and responsibilities for management in the waste treatment plant execute plant, which is the d.o.e. document that communicates to the contractor project objectives and how they will be accomplished. the department also revised the waste treatment plant contractor performance evaluation management plan to better balance the priorities and

emphasize quality and safety elements. third, d.o.e. implemented a safety culture oversight process at the waste stream plant. they will formally review the contractor's progress and execute the safety culture improvement action plan. . like wise, senior headquarters managers meet with o.r.p. managers to discuss their progress and the progress of their contractors. fourth, the department design training to assist in reenforcing a positive safety culture and engaged in an extensive effort to provide this training. beginning in december 2011, a team of federal experts for across the department began to design, develop and deliver a course on safety culture. and provided that training the to more than 1800 of our senior, federal and contractor leaders. rules and slogans don't drive culture change. leaders drive this change

personally. is leaders must recognize the message that their actions will convey to their employees. this course was designed to provide the tools necessary for leaders to improve our safety culture. finally the department is working stroenten the avenues to address issues raised by contractors and federal employees and comprehensive issues management system has been established at orp to ensure that new and previously identified issues are addressed. the department has also strengthened the employee concerns program, hired a new employee concerns manager at hanford and continues to administer to different professional opinion process. both of which provide additional avenues for employees to raise issues. madame chairman, with respect to claims of whistle blower retaliation by contractors, let me be clear, d.o.e. is strongly

committed to a workplace where all workers, both federal and contractor employees are free to speak out. they're free to voice concerns or lodge complaints without any fear of retaliation. contractors are statutorily and contractually bound to retaliate for protected whistle blower conduct. while i cannot speak to the specifics of the claims under review, d.o.e. was not asked to and did not approve miss busche's recent termination. this has raised questions about the potential of an improper revie sal for raising health, safety or other protective concerns. for this reasons the department has asked the office of the inspector general to review the circumstances surrounding the termination of miss busche, that the department will take appropriate action based on the outcomes of any i.g. investigation. . in conclusion, while the department has undertaken a broad array of activities to improve the safety culture,

there's still work to be done. we continue to move along this as we stroouf to improve. we recognize this is a journey, not a destination, and one which calls for improvement. a sifty people built on the principles required sustained efforts of the leadership and senior managers. the department remains fully committed to this effort. madame chairman, i are will be happy to answer any questions. >> thank you both. and thank you both very much for being here. we appreciate it very much. i very rudely blew right past my colleague and friend senator johnson's opening statement. so i'm going to defer my questions and allow him to go first in the spirit of bipartisan cooperation that we try to work hon in in this committee. >> nothing rude about it. i took no offense. i know we're trying to hustle through this. i appreciate you letting me ask some questions. mr. eckroade and mr. moury.

both of you are talking about studies and processes and all kinds of -- no offense -- bureaucratic gobligook, what i want to get to is find out what kind of controls are in place right now. you're the customer. you should be in in control of this process. what should someone like miss busche do? what course of action sh should she be taken? what courses of actions are available to her in the department of energy currently? mr. moury? >> well, she should be, as i mentioned earlier, the department is fully committed for her being able to raise any issue. >> what's the first step she should have taken? is there somebody in the department of energy, somebody at the site, that somebody like miss busche can go to and speak very freely and be able to establish, i'm a whistle blower, i need some protection? >> well, there's certainly a series of steps she can go through to elevate her concerns. first starting with her line organization.

the people that she works for. . if she doesn't achieve satisfaction through them, i mean, clearly the best position we would be in is if the department took the issues and communicated the closure of those issues. >> okay, but that didn't happen. so if you're in a position as a whistle blower, you end up having to go to the customer, the government, what system is in place right now to stop that type of situation? >> well, there are a number of different programs that are available. >> well, there's a problem right now. . a number of different programs. is there one specific approach that she should have taken? sh there somebody in the department of energy, overseeing that contract she could have gone to that everybody from the contractor base knows that i have i have a serious safety concern, i go to this office right there to get this taken care of? >> well, the next step would be to go to the employee concerns program that is out at the waste treatment plant. that is run by tp richland

office. it's a combined employee concerns program. we expended an incredible amount of time upgrading that program, as i mentioned earlier in my statement. so that would be the next step. how she pursues her issues is really up to her. it's up to the individual. she can then take it to headquarters and go through the department of energy's program, or she can go directly to the department of labor, if she feels the need to raise her issues through those programs. >> do you know has she availed herself to any of the programs? >> i am not aware of her availing herself of the hanford employee concerns program. i do know that she has used the department of labor's program, but other than that, i have to get back to you with more details. >> mr. eckroade, can you add anything to that? >> in the past years they have used the program a number of times. i'm familiar with a couple of

different employee concerns that she has sent forward. most dealt with her concerns with actions of her managers that appeared to be retaliatory in nature. but she didn't use the mechanisms that were available to her to share her concerns, and i was aware of some of those as well as other managers in the department of energy. >> was she in a unique position in terms of safety within the site where her management, those contractors had to consult with the department of energy? that the customer prior to her dismissal? >> the department was not consulted nor did we pay prove the termination. >> but was she in a position where according to the contract, according to the rules that she was supposed to -- that the department of energy should have been notified prior to her dismissal? >> well, i'm not an attorney as i mentioned before. i'm an engineer, not a contracting officer. i'm not aware of the specifics

of what was required prior to the urs terminating miss busche. >> well, that would be a pretty significant control, i would think from the contractor. if you have key safety positions, if one of the safety officers is raising an issue prior to any termination or any type of action being dealt with by the employee, the department of energy has to be consulted and braulgt into the process. >> i'm not familiar with that element. what i would like to do with that is to take that question for the record and provide you with an answer. >> mr. eckroade, are you available of a particular governing of these contracts, of employees of the contractor having a heightened status.

they must consult with the department of energy prior to taking any employer action against an employee. >> just like my colleague, mr. moury, i am not a lawyer as well. i'm not familiar of any departmental policy that would govern the provision that you just mentioned. >> okay. can you point -- because we've talked about all the studies. we're going to say specifically this is what was done. i didn't hear specifics. i heard studies, processes, former review systems. i mean specifically what kind of controls are in place to to thwart whistle blower protection? to be sure the people who have legitimate safety concerns, those concerns are adequately aired and addressed? >> u i'll just talk about my office. the one thing that the department has done is really become aware of the importance of a healthy safety culture in its organizations. and a few years ago we kind of had the the awakening when mr.

tamosaitis had his issues and was removed from his position, and that was the beginning of my office's first review of safety culture. . we learned a lot about safety culture and how to assess it. but the department is growing. as we understand the results of the safety department reviews, we bring in people who are really helping us understand the very aspects of safety, including things such as behavioral sciences that help inform us about interfacing the communities much better. so although the department has not reached maturity in healthy safety culture, we are clearly learning the importance of it and growing in our abilities to manage it. >> the department has been around how many years? department of energy? when was it created?

decades, right? >> and it's been overseeing these nuclear waste sites for how many years? >> well, over 50 years. >> and so now you're saying that the office of health, safety and security two years ago were just really coming into understanding and dealing with safety and security issues. >> the whole department has had an awakening since the 2010 time frame. we didn't stick our hands in the sand. we ventured out to learn about this. and we are learning and growing. but we are not mature. >> i appreciate you had the awakening two years ago, but what is shocking, literally, and i've kbn in business -- trust me, frequently because of governmental actions, things like osha. businesses have been concerned about safety security for decades. it's been a top priority in the private sector. it's mind boggling and jaw dropping within tp department of energy overseeing an incredibly

complex -- i'll give you that -- very difficult issue. and it's really been the last couple of years that we're pulling our head out of the sand saying we ought to look at these concerns. >> just one comment if i could, sir. the energy department has a very strong technical safety program. we have our own internal regulations that drive a lot of very good aspects of the occupational safety health of our employees. we had that awakening really 20 years ago. the issue of safety culture is very different. f it's a new part of kind of the study of safety, and this is an area that we are late to. >> and what i'm saying, business, the idea of after safety culture is not new, not by any stretch of the imagination. you have to have specific controls so the employees working with you know exactly what to do so they can be

addressed very quickly. that's what has to happen. thank you, madame chair. . >> thank you. assuming -- there's ten minutes left on the vote. so i'm going to go ahead and do -- that would be great. she was a key personnel. she's still listed on the contract as key personnel, miss busche. and as key personnel she could not be fired without d.o.e. approval. we know that happened. we know she was fired without d.o.e. approval. what is the recourse d.o.e. has against the contractor for doing that? >> well, they provided to the department a letter that said they were going to this be changing the key personnel list, adding to and removing one. however, having said that, at no time was the department asked or approved the dismissal of miss

busche. and as i mentioned before, her dismissal did raise concerns for reprisals for the fact that she had been raising issue. that's why the department has taken a step to engage the i.g. to take a look at the circumstances surrounding her removal, and if in fact reprisal is found to exist, then the department will take action. >> and what would that be? >> i don't know exactly what the actions would be. they would be dependent on the results of the review. i can get back to you with the specifics about the steps they could take. >> dutz it surprise you that they, what, two weeks after the secretary, who i'm a big fan of, two weeks after he signed the memorandum about safety and

culture of safety that they would choose that time to get rid of dr. tamosaitis, and then just a few months later fire miss busche? does that seem to be the actions of a contractor that's concerned about a culture that welcomes whistle blowers? >> i don't know the specifics of mrs. busche's termination. i believe you'll have to ask the next panel. >> i'm sure they will not get into the specifics. i'm sure they will say it's in litigation. >> we have certainly made it ear clear to the contractors that reprisals against whistle blowers is totally unacceptable. we have different pross available to us if we find retaliation has occurred. >> that's what i want to really

watch carefully. you did the report in 2012. now you're doing another one. meanwhile, the money keeps flowing. costs keep escalating. performance bonuses keep being given. at some point in time, the customer here, needs to do something other than ask for another report. because clearly it doesn't appear that even the secretary of energy issuing a memorandum had much of a chilling effect on the company doing what they had to know was going to be too high profile dismissals. there's no two people at that plant that had a larger profile for having the courage to standup on technical safety than those two people. would you disagree with that statement? either one of you?

>> no. >> and so after the secretary of energy, the most powerful person in the country dm regards to their contract signs a written memorandum, basically saying we can't have this kind of culture, they say, you know what, we're going to get rid of the two biggest, highest, whistle profileers in the whole hanford treatment facility. and then let me ask you about the next piece of this. have you all discussed, and this may be for someone other than the two of you. but this notion that contractors can litigate on our dime. do you know how much we forwarded them for legal costs at this point? surrounding the dismissal of these two people? >> i don't have that information with me. we can provide that to you at another time. >> you know, the notion that they defend themselves without telling you they were firing her. they sent in something that

they're going to try i'm sure me means they were getting rid of her. they didn't tell you that. they said they were changing key personnel. you know, these cases go on for years. millions of dollars in legal costs. and at the end of that, if they settle a case without admitting any wrong doing, then the tax p taxpayer stays on the hook, correct? >> i'm sorry. could you repeat that? >> at the end of a lengthy litigation with expensive lawyers being paid by the government, if they settle at the end of this or if they wear down the other side because the other side doesn't have the resources the united states government has, you can imagine if you're an individual trying to sue a company being bankrolled by the u.s. government. i mean, talk about hard. so, there's a concept in litigation you call wearing them down. papering them to death.

overwhelming them with the resources of one side versus the other side. so let's assume just a hypothetical case, not these individuals. but they wear someone down, five, six, seven years. finally the person on the other side is out of money. ful their life has been on hold. their careers have been on hold. and many, many times they settle. because they can't go on anymore. and if they settle, and the defendant does not have to admit any kind of wrong doing, then we stay on the hook. we end up having to cover all of those costs. should there be something that would incentivize litigants that we are funding that if it goes past a certain time or certain amount of money spent that they've got to have skin in the game in this legal fight? >> i would say, madame chairman, that the costs to the contractor

is not a done deal. it is up to the contracting officer to determine whether the legal costs are appropriate in the event that a case is settled, whether they would be fully allowable or partially allowable is up to the contracting officer. >> well, that's good to know, because i'll have some questions for the contracting officer on this case. what if we had a rule if you didn't inform d.o.e. that you were firing key personnel you had to absorb the key costs of litigation surrounding that firing yourself, and not ask the government for reimbursment. >> i mean, that's an interesting concept. i would like to spend more time thinking about it. and maybe we can provide you with additional details. >> there just seems to be something wrong with this. >> our system is also based on the presumption that our

contractors are not liable based on assertion by the contractors. >> of course not. of course not. and nor would i want there to be an assumption. i just know that in terms of resources litigation, this is not an even playing field. and the way it's set up does not incentivize a quick resolution of the dispute. it incentivizes lengthy litigation. and it seems to me we could work on doing something in that regard that might level the playing field slightly so that everyone had an opportunity to actually had their case adjudicated by an improper jury. >> i understand. >> the vast majority never gets there. >> i understand your frustration, especially with the length of time some of these issues take to be resolved. we do follow the processes that were set up by congress, and we are always looking for ways to

improve the department's processes, and the whistle blower is one that we're also looking at also. >> we have discussed earlier today the defense nuclear facility safety board. i didn't realize at the time that you had given sho maso man years of service there, and to your country, as in the military. is there -- can you give the perfect witness to ask this question of. why couldn't we give dnfsb some kind of jurisdiction as a third party oversight on a facility like hanford? >> this is a little bit outside of what we were going to talk about today, and i would say that the board, in all my tenure there, it was really focused on the role of the board to help the department complete their mission. and in that context, their

evaluations are based on the department's requirements. and evaluating the implementation of the specific requirements. so to give them a separate, independent role, i think it removes what the purpose of the board was put in place for when they were first established back in 1988. >> at the end of the day, this controversy boils down to technical concerns, highly technical concerns by two professionals in the field that had been given positions of great trust by your contractors. do you feel comfortable, mr. moury, that their technical concerns have received the airing that they should, and as somebody with your background, you know that they are not alone in the field with some of the technical concerns that they expressed? >> well, we have asked the contractor to put a consolidated list of all the issues that both

dr. tamosaitis and miss busche have voiced. i'm aware of many of those issues and many of those issues were being raised by other people and are being per sued. once we have that list we'll evaluate them based on the technical merits of the issues that they have raised and make a determination at that time, but those issues are being worked. i mean, many of these issues, since this is a one of a kind facility, it is incredibly complex. the technical issues are very complex, and they take a long time to resolve. so sometimes our failure is in the fact that it takes us -- we're not -- we have not in the past done a good job of getting the word back to the people that are raising these issues on where exactly in the process resolution of their issues stands, and that's one of the key things that we've been working on, and i think it's important to preventing this chilled work environment to make sure people understand where those issues are being addressed

and that they are not being ignored. >> do either of you, are you familiar with the people that have been tasked with their responsibilities now at hanford? >> could you be a little bit more specific. >> the two jobs that they were removed from, two very important jobs, one in the technical capability and one in the safety capability. they were both high level people at that facility. who has replaced them? do you know? >> i'm not aware. >> i do not know the answer. >> have you heard anything from either of those people about any of the same concerns? >> the people that replaced them? >> correct. >> i have not heard anything. i'm not sure who is replacing those two individuals >> okay. would it be a smart thing for the department of energy to go to their replacements and go through that list of concerns and see if they had the same ones, to take the impetus yourselves to ask those questions? >> well, i think it would be appropriate to certainly work

with them and go through this list of issues and to determine the validity of those technical issues. i think that's fully appropriate. >> if you did that -- if you did that, if you took the impetus to do that, that would remove the necessity of them being branded as whistleblowers and it would also give credibility to the concerns raised in the first place, that you were asking about the same concerns. in other words, you can't just replace these two people and have the concerns go away. >> that's correct, that's correct. in the real world, i mean, i understand the benefit that whistleblowers have provided to our country on a number of different areas. if we were in an ideal world, we would have very few whistle-blowers because when the issues are raised at the lower level, we would address them and we would track then the closure. we could keep them informed of how we were progressing, and that whole process is something that we have been expending a lot of time trying to

strengthen. >> i appreciate very much. i have to go vote. if you have more questions, great. if not, this is the introduction for the two witnesses that will -- you can go ahead. i've read their -- >> well, thank you. i guess i'll dismiss you two. whoops. >> if you want mind staying in case we have questions after the other two witnesses testify, we greatly appreciate it. >> certainly, yes, ma'am. >> okay. >> so, will the other witnesses come forward then. again, thank you for being willing to appear before our committee, our subcommittee. our first witness is james

taylor, senior vice president global management and operation services at urs corporation where he oversees strategic initiatives, business development activities and administrative and operations support functions. mr. taylor leads the business unit responsible for urs' work at the waste treatment plant in hanford. mr. taylor has 26 years of experience in the nuclear industry, including as director of the savannah river, mr. taylor, welcome. our second witness is michael graham, the principle vice president at bechtel national, inc. mr. graham has worked at four major department of energy sites across the country, and previously led a project to evaluate the impacts of hanford waste on groundwater in the columbia river. again, i think it is the tradition of this subcommittee to ask people to swear in, so if you'd stand. do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth? mr. taylor, why don't you start your testimony.

>> good morning, ranking member johnson and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. my name is james taylor. i am the general manager responsible for the environmental cleanup work under urs' energy and construction division. the role i assumed in january of this year. i am grateful to lead a team of nearly 20,000 dedicated professionals working at 18 major cleanup projects in the u.s. and abroad. my business unit is responsible for our work on the waste treatment plant at the department of energy's hanford nuclear site in richland, washington. i would like to provide you a brief introduction to the work we do at the waste treatment plant and discuss our companywide commitment to safety. i also want to be very clear. urs has zero tolerance for retaliation against

whistle-blowers. this is firmly embedded in our company's culture and goes hand in hand with the dedication, our dedication to safety. as you are aware, projects at the hanford site are to address once in a lifetime environmental challenges, and we'll eventually build a one of a kind facility. there are currently more than 56 million gallons of nuclear waste stored in underground tanks at the hanford site. the waste is a by-product of nine nuclear reactors that operated at hanford from world war ii through the cold war. some of these tanks were constructed as early as the 1940s, and many are well beyond their design life. when operational, the waste treatment plant will be the first chemical waste processing facility in the world with the capacity to separate and stabilize nuclear waste. our role at the waste treatment plant is to work with bechtel, d.o.e.'s prime contractor at site, to design, construct and

start up this treatment facility. we work under the direction of d.o.e. and bechtel. d.o.e. is charged with managing the hanford site and has the ultimate authority over the project from design to completion. it is imperative that we continue to develop and implement the technology needed to process this waste and complete the waste treatment plant as soon as safely possible. understanding the unique safety and environmental demands of this project, we listen very seriously to feedback from congressional leaders, experts in the field, our employees and members of the public, and we are always open to new ideas. i know how important it is to get this right from a national perspective but also from a local perspective. hundreds of our employees live and work in this community and no one is more committed than we are to the success of the waste

treatment plant. we are proud of the safety record that we have built over many years at many facilities in the u.s. and abroad. we know we need to remain ever vigilant to protect and extend that record which is why our corporation, our corporate culture makes safety our highest priority. urs encourages its employees to raise safety concerns, and we are methodical in addressing the concerns they identify. we work closely with our employees to promote an open atmosphere because the complex issues we tackle demand a questioning attitude and creative solutions. critical feedback and dissent are vital parts of our process which is one of the reasons we encourage employees to raise concerns and challenge the status quo. we address all identified concerns and value these important contributions to our

safety culture. we also continue to improve the safety culture at the waste treatment plant through internal and external reviews. miss busche joined the waste treatment plant project in march 2009. on february 18th, 2014, miss busche's employment was terminated for cause due to her conduct and behavior. miss busche was not retaliated against because she raised safety concerns. given the privacy interest at stake and the pending litigation related to miss busche's employment, i'm limited in what i'm able to say about this matter. can i say with confidence, however, that urs counts on our employees working at the front lines to remain vigilant about safety. for this reason we have effective policies and procedures in place to encourage employees to raise safety concerns and a zero tolerance

policy against retaliation to protect them when they do. i am proud of the work we at urs do to address some of our country's most difficult environmental challenges. we will continue to work with d.o.e. and others to ensure the waste treatment plant is designed and constructed safely with the best available technology. thank you for the opportunity to participate in this hearing, and i am happy to answer your questions. >> thank you, mr. taylor. mr. graham. >> senator johnson, i'm michael graham, principal vice president with bechtel international corporation. bechtel designed and engineered the defense waste processing -- >> is your mike on? the little red button. >> oh, sorry. bechtel designed and engineered the defense waste processing facility at the savannah river site in south carolina. it's the only plant in the nation that currently converts liquid high level nuclear waste into solid glass, a process known as vitrification. this is the same process that

will be used at wtp. the waste treatment plant at hanford is being designed and built to meet a u.s. government commitment to the state of washington to immobilize the highly radioactive waste stored in 177 aging underground tanks. these legacy tanks of world war ii and the cold war date back to the '40s and 67 of these tanks have been reported to have leaked over a million gallons of radioactive waste. the plant will take that radioactive tank waste, mix it into glass and package it into robust containers for permanent disposal. this mission to safely dispose of the radioactive waste that has been accumulated over generations is a challenge that has been handed to our generation by our parents and our grandparents. it is and will continue to be a very difficult, costly and time-consuming venture. we owe it to our children and to our grandchildren to undertake this task and to bring it to

successful conclusion. an essential element of our success in completing technically challenging projects like wtp is creating and maintaining a strong safety culture that values a questioning attitude towards technical and safety issues. raising and resolving technical issues is an integral part of our fundamental work process. all personnel are expected to fully and collaboratively participate in the identification and resolution of issues and concerns. in most instances, differences in professional opinions are resolved as a routine part of interactions between colleagues and management, but if these interactions don't effectively address a question, there are multiple avenues for project personnel to raise issues and concerns. the first is the project issues evaluation report or pier process. it's a tool for managing wtp's technical issues and

opportunities for improvement. issues raised in this p.i.e.r. process are fully transparent to the department of energy. this readily available process provides a mechanism for the resolution of any and all issues, be they raised by a project personnel or an external reviewer. the next level is the employee concerns program, and it provides all personnel at wpt with an independent avenue for reporting and resolving concerns and yet another level is differing professional opinions. this process is a formal mechanism for wtp personnel to resolve questions and concerns about the at quasi of the technical design or there's a legitimate disagreement regarding the appropriate technical both. the dpo process provides a formal review of the disputed issues by a technically qualified and independent panel with overside by a dpo review board, so collectively these

represent a robust best in class process for identifying and tracking and resolving issues and concern. i can assure you that wtp project will not be completed until up a open questions have been resolved to the satisfaction of our team and the department of energy. the facility will then undergo a rigorous multi-year operational readiness review process, operational testing will use surrogate materials to none trait that the plant will safely operate as designed and will be performed before any hot nuclear operations can begin. this process took many years to complete when dwpf, the plant in south carolina, was started up in the '90s. finally, you've asked what role our company had in miss busche's dismissal. miss busche was an employee of urs, and urs alone made the determination for the dismissal of miss busche at all.

esmy understanding we were informed by urs that they were considering miss busche's employment for cause. i also understand that we were informed by urs that they intended to proceed with termination, and we received a letter from urs formally notifying us of miss busche's departure which we then forwarded to the department of energy. we at bechtel are extremely proud of our work at hanford. it is an honor to serve as the government's lead contractor for this vitally important project. we welcome thoughtful criticism as a foundational consideration for foundation for commitment to improvement. it's important to note there are many enormous successes at the wtp project and we're committed to reach that day when the plant is operating and successfully handling nuclear waste to protect the people of the columbia river and the people of the pacific northwest. thank you. >> thank you both for your testimony. let me first ask were either of you in the room when we were talking about miss busch?

>> yes, sir. >> anything from that discussion that you want to respond to? mr. taylor? >> yeah. i only heard the very end of her testimony. i can't -- i don't have any comments from that. >> mr. graham? >> was your question was i here at earlier session roundtable? >> correct. >> i was not. >> okay. there was let's say a description of i would call capture or basically that the contractors themselves are so overwhelmed the department of energy in terms of design and safety concerns that almost renders the department of energy moot in terms of their safety concerns. would you agree with that assessment? >> i would not. i think there is adequate oversight by the department of energy. i've worked at a number of the

sites and in partnership with d.o.e. to work on these very difficult problems. >> mr. taylor? >> i agree. i think there is adequate oversight by d.o.e. we certainly focus on our oversight of our projects. >> mr. graham, it sounded like you were informed by urs that miss busche was going to be terminated and then you reported that to the department of energy. is that correct? >> that's my understanding, yes. >> do you -- is that your duty under your contract? i mean, do you have -- is there -- because i was asking the folks in the department of energy. they didn't seem to be aware of any kind of contractual or legal obligation of a -- let's say a protected bunch of employees for a contractor dealing with safety to -- to notify the department of energy. is your understanding that there is that contract you'll obligation or legal understanding? >> it's my understanding there's not a contract you'll obligation for us to get d.o.e.'s approval if we're dismissing an employee

for cause. >> regardless -- regardless of what employee that may be in? >> yes, sir. >> okay. well, that creates a problem for a whistleblower if it's a safety issue because a company could always then, you know, not notify and take the position that you're obviously taking in this case, that the termination was for cause. is that -- is that a little bit of a problem in the control process there? >> i think this is -- this is a very interesting situation, and, again, this was a urs employee and urs took the action. we were informed. >> let me state it as i did in that earlier meeting. i don't think this is the place to adjudicate an employer/employee dispute and to a certain extent that's part of this issue, but you also have, you know, the very legitimate concerns of whistleblower protection, raising safety issues that i would like to think everybody working on this project is highly concerned

about. so, you know, let's go into the types of controls that should be in place. mr. graham, you talked about a number of steps that somebody who has a safety issue or concern can go through. at what point in those areas, because it sounded like, you know, the p.i.e.r. and then the employee concern avenue appealed to an independent body? i mean, what independent body? >> so if there is an issue that raises to a differing professional opinion, then resources outside the project with known exper sees in these areas are brought in to help resolve the issue. >> but who pays for those resources. >> my understanding, that's paid for by the project as an you a louable cost. >> so really it would be the contractor employing or contracting with the subcontractor to provide that

expertise. >> right. >> i mean there, would probably be some issues of independence there, wouldn't you agree? >> well, i think all of our processes are very transparent, and so, you know, just as we've done in the commercial nuclear industry, that first tier of the opportunity for people to raise concerns is a very low threshold, high-volume process, and so it has in there issues like they don't like somebody smoking at the work site, to you know, other concerns about -- about safety or other things, and those are all tracked to closure, and all those will be reviewed before the plant enters into any kind of a startup phase. >> reviewed by who? >> it's reviewed by the department of energy. >> okay. >> and by our management team. >> so somebody who has a real safety concern goes through these processes can be assured that the department of energy is

going to be well aware of somebodyration an issue. >> absolutely. >> i was certainly concerned about just differing professional opinions. we talked about the fukushima site where, you know, apparently the experts back during the design phase said we should have built higher, you know, tsunami walls to protect the diesel generators, the cooling generators. i've spoken with some nuclear experts in the past that that instance has resulted in really a different design idea and what we ought to do is put a big old tank of water over the reactor so it can be filled with any power source and to me that makes a lot of sense. now there's a difference of expert opinion prior to basically a continuous improvement project where you actually have an instant that says that won't work either. this works better. describe the resolution in differing professional expert opinions which can be pretty strongly held. i mean, how do you resolve those

things? who in the end is the arbiter? who makes the decision on what could be some very strongly held differences of expert opinion? >> well, i think, you know, at the end of the day we are the project manager, and we would take our recommendations forward to the department of energy, and we would gather the input from the best and brightest as we talked about. this is an incredibly complex plant, and so i think just to put it into perspective, the footprint of wtp is over 60 acres, and the pentagon sits on about 41 acres so it's a huge -- >> but in the end it would be the department of energy. if you've got a pretty close call, technical issue. >> right. >> there's a difference of opinion and a decision has to be made, is that the contractor that makes the decision on that, or is it the department of energy that in the end is the

customer who makes the final call? >> it would be our recommendation with d.o.e.'s approval. >> so you make a recommendation, but d.o.e. in the end has control of the process? they will decide between the alternatives based on the information you're providing them? >> and with a lot of input from external -- the defense board and others. >> the -- again, i understand the constraint here which is the reason this isn't a very good place to adjudicate the employer/employee issue here, but within that constraint, can you describe to me what is the area of disagreement between the two whistleblowers that we talked to earlier an bechtel or you are -- and urs and the department of energy safety issues. can you at least describe that. >> i'm obviously not steeped in all the details of that plant and these issues, but i can give you a landscape picture. the issues, as i understand it, have been raised by these

individuals are -- as was stated earlier, issues that other people have also raised. i can assure you that at each of these issues is being formally tracked and will be tracked to closure in those systems that i described. >> mr. taylor, do you have anything to add there? can you get a little more specific in terms of what is the issue at hand. we heard some pretty things about hydrogen explosions and, you know, some relatively scary issues being raised here. >> senator, i, unfortunately, can't get into more detail. i just took over the position as general manager approximately eight weeks ago. i have asked my executive vice president to go investigate the concerns that were raised, the nuclear safety concerns at the site. he's investigated those. what i'm told is that all of the issues that have been raised are

being tracked and corrective actions put in place and that it's a work in progress. >> when you say tracked, this is going to be going through a process that's very transparent. the department of energy is well aware of these things, correct? or incorrect? i mean, is this just being tracked internally within the contract and subcontractor base, or is the department of energy fully engaged, fully looking over your shoulders in terms of, you know, what issues are being discussed, what concerns are being raised? >> i haven't been engaged in that level of detail to know the details of the list, but i've been told that they are being tracked. >> but, again, when you say tracked, that means full transparency in the department of energy would be involved in these? >> that's correct. that's my understanding. >> mr. graham, do you have anything to add to that? >> no, that's correct. >> mr. graham, you were talking about -- i think it was you -- well, actually mr. taylor you

were also the director of the savannah river national lab. one of the questions i had during the earlier session is there -- it sounds like those cleanup sites are progressing. the plants have been constructed. >> i can provide a little background on that. the hanford site had five different processes that they utilized to separate the plutonium through the years, and so the savannah river . . and so the -- even though the fundamental aspect of making glass is well understood and is

operating well within savannah river, these different processes in the early days of the manhattan project makes it a much more challenging project. >> would either of you be willing to or care to comment on your own evaluation in terms of the expertise that resides within the government agencies that are involved with you? does the government have enough resources, enough manpower, do they have the requisite skills of the people in position to -- to with transparency of a tracking process really understand what the issues are and be in the position that when you make a recommendation on different ideas in terms of how to handle these problems that in the end the department of energy is well enough versed and has the expertise to make the intelligent decision there? i realize that might be kind of a difficult question to ask. >> no, i actually -- i think

absolutely. i personally know kevin smith who is the head of d.o.e.'s operation at hanford for the office of river protection. i had the honor of working with him when i was at los alamos managing the cleanup of that site. i've had a lot of experience with the department of energy, environmental management over the years, and they have a depth and breadth of expertise that i know that the japanese when they had their issues with -- with fukushima turned to the department of energy here for support. >> mr. taylor? >> i think the department of energy has significant resources, number one. they are well-trained and qualified. many of the d.o.e. folks have worked in the commercial world, so they have worked for contractors like bechtel and urs, so i -- i would agree that they had the expertise to, you know, to work with the

contractors and provide good oversight. >> again, you're probably not the best people to ask this question, but can you think of anything the department of energy or the government agencies overseeing your work, any controls, that either in place that simply don't work that it's just burdensome could be replaced by better controls that would provide better transparency and certainly address and protect whistleblowers? >> i don't have anything that comes to mind at this point. >> one of my concerns is the disparity of just who pays legal fees, and as it was described in the earlier meeting, the legal fees to modern defense for the contractors is really reimbursed by the government. the whistleblowers themselves apparently, i'd imagine it's because they were terminated with cause, have no one in terms of paying for legal fees, which ends up being -- really puts them at a huge disadvantage.

do you agree with that fact that it puts them at a disadvantage? is there a better process for -- for whistleblower protection potentially right within the department of energy? >> i think we'd be happy to engage in those discussions, but i -- i don't -- i didn't come prepared to talk about that aspect of this situation. >> okay. mr. taylor? >> i don't have anything to add. we -- we could provide our technical experts inside our company to support you on that. >> i think that's really what we have to -- i think this committee really has to be taking a look at that and how can we offer the appropriate whistleblower protection, how can we ensure safety. to me the government is the customer. they ought to be in charge. that's certainly the way it was in my business. we had pretty well -- when a customer said jump, we jumped, and we did what was required, so certainly want to look -- but, again, i want to design these things to facilitate safety as a cooperative process as problem. i would like to just turn to --

from my standpoint a little bit of a conundrum certainly that i would be concerned about, trying to find any company willing to work on this project. this is a once in a lifetime problem. it's a very difficult problem. how many companies in the world could be viewed as viable contractors to do something like this? i mean, what is the universe, the known universe of potential suppliers here? >> i think if you look at the companies that have the expertise, the capabilities and experience to do this work, there are only a handful. i think that urs from an operations standpoint and startup and test of significant facilities like that were one of the leaders. i think bechtel in the same sense when it's doing the engineering, procure president, construction. they are known to be the best in the world, and if you look outside that, there are other

companies that operate similar facilities. for example, in france, there's arriva, and i know there are other companies outside in japan and other countries that also have that capability, but in the u.s. it's a very small group, and i would say that urs and bechtel are the leaders in that -- in this business. >> do you know of any companies that might have capability that has just refused to do it, or started working on a project like this and walked away out of sheer frustration and mounting losses? has that ever happened? >> i'm not aware of that happening. >> i'm not aware. i would just say that, you know, we are -- and i won't speak for urs, but we are fully committed to this really critical and difficult mission, and we've got thick skins, and we're going to stick it out. >> this is kind of harking back

to the hearing we had back in june, but just refresh my memory. talk about how these contracts are tailored, you know, what is the review process? how often are -- are they renegotiated? what's -- you know, what are the costs escalator provisions of it? can you really describe in detail how this comes about and how it's managed on an ongoing basis? >> well,ia yeah, and i was here in june when we discussed this, that, you know, the original contract for waste treatment plant was for to fast track a pilot plant to get on with the waste. that scope was expanded, and it now includes the future larger plant that was going to be a phase two, so it was to do it all at once. that change was managed through a very formal change management program for contract management within d.o.e., and so all

changes in scope, all issues associated with managing through these complex things are handled through formal change control. with approval of the contracting overs for the department of energy. >> and are all those cost-plus contracts? how -- how do you -- >> this particular contract is cost plus. >> and what is the plus? i mean, what do you expect above your costs, what do you -- and, again, your costs are fully loaded? i mean, is that a full costing system, then plus -- >> plus incentive fees or -- right. but the cost is our cost of our materials and people. >> so in terms of your contracts so far, how much have you been paid by the government? >> you know, i'd be glad to provide that for the record laterch i'm not prepared to answer that today. >> i'd appreciate that information. do you have any sense of just your percent of profitability? >> i don't. >> what is the plus of the cost

plus? do you know what that percentage is that's called out in the contracts? >> i do not. >> again, would i certainly appreciate that for the record. >> you bet. >> with that, madam chair, i'll turn it back over to you. >> thank you very much thank you for helping us to accommodate and thank you all for helping us to accommodate an aggressive schedule of voting at the same time that we're trying to have hearings with people who have disrupted their schedules to accommodate ours, so it's -- it's -- it's the chaos of the scheduling of the senate. i apologize for it. let me first make sure i understand both of your positions, especially urs -- thank you. mr. taylor, about notification of d.o.e., about removing two folks, both of you should answer this, about what you feel like your legal obligation is in terms of notifying your customer

over firings of two people who had had a very high profile in terms of discussing technical concerns relating to safety. do you feel that either of you have an obligation to tell d.o.e. that you are letting these folks go? >> out of courtesy, and i'll speak to miss busche. out of courtesy we routinely notify our customers if we have significant issues that, for example, in regards to miss busche we did have some individu individuals raise concerns about her conduct and behavior, and they were -- they were severe, and -- and basically the need -- i needed to notify d.o.e. to let them know that because donna is a key person, because these are severe, you know, claims against her, that i needed to let them know, especially given that she

is a whistleblower and urs absolutely we don't support action or retaliation against whistleblowers so we just needed to let d.o.e. know. so we felt because of that there was an obligation. from a personnel issue, when you're terminating an employee for cause, my understanding, and i'm not an attorney or an expert on the matter, but notifying d.o.e. is not formally required. >> so it's not formally required. are you saying that you did it? >> i'm saying that i notified my counterpart in d.o.e. that we have significant issues associated with an employee, miss busche, about her conduct and behavior and that they were severe, and it was just a notification. they were not notified that -- that we had actually done the investigation, that we confirmed

the findings, and then we moved to terminate her. they did not know that we had terminated her until after the fact. >> okay. and it's your belief that that's not legally required? >> that is my belief. >> and let's assume -- it may not be legally required, but do you think it might be a good idea to tell them that you were firing her under all those circumstances that you just delineated, just from a management perspective? what would be the reason you wouldn't want to tell them? >> well, from a human resources standpoi standpoint, and i have experts that basically informed me that we should -- these are private issues with employees. >> wait, you just said you already told them you had severe issues with her conduct. you did that? you weren't worried about her privacy then, that you had serious ongoing conduct issues so you weren't -- didn't hesitate to already poise on-the-well so to spk,