condition i've seen it in for a very long time. it goes down from the leaders. joe alluded to the unhappy beginning with chancellor merkel. you're just a candidate. you can't hold a rally at the brandenburg gate. this did not go down well with the president or his aides. ever since there have been problems. there were huge problems over syria as gideon pointed out. history means that privacy as central and cardinal value in german society that may be hard for americans to understand and as a result, the whole nsa scandal has had an impact in germany unlike elsewhere. so i think there's a, a lot of work to be done in trying to repair that german-american relationship. i think foreign minister

steinmeyer has had some interesting ideas. he has talked about the fact that, you know, while the atlantic alliance may resonate for people of our generation, we have to think about how german youth -- snowden is much more popular among german youth i would submit than president obama today. i mean obama was a rock star in 2008. if there is a rock star in germany today, it is edward snowden. and that is a serious state of affairs, ladies and gentlemen. and it needs addressing. stein meyer has proposed a kind after cybersecurity summit or conference or dialogue and i think more than ttip or these far off ideas we need something in the nearer term that really addresses these issues. because young people in europe need reminding of what, of what

the transatlantic -- the most successful at liance in human history. what it has achieved, what it means and why it's important in light of what president putin has done today. has done of late. there needs to be finally, i think, some real focus on just helping ukraine out right now. the country is in financial chaos. and there needs, there needs to be a program of assistance and it needs to be coherent. and for that the united states and europe must work together. john kornblum who is sitting right here, reminded me of a breakfast that when the president went to berlin last year he made a speech in which he mentioned the european union not once, not once.

and you know, this is noted and so there's a lot of work to be done, not only in redressing the u.s.-eu relationship but this whole sense that the united states under the obama administration simply lost interest to a large degree in europe. the president did the dutiful minimum. he did what was dergere and he didn't do more than that i think we're seeing part of the price today of that, i think, somewhat foolhardy disregard for this pivotal alliance in global affairs. thank you. >> all transatlantics said, amen. we have, about 20 minutes or so before a coffee break for some good questions. let me throw out a few. then we'd like to open this up,

if it is okay with the panel, why don't we gather some questions an we'll let you sort of have a final round and closing comments. we keep focusing naturally on the role of leadership here and you've just heard a very sobering assessment of the likely bandwidth politically, economically, for that leadership. so my question is, sometimes the moment makes the leader. they don't come to it willingly. can we foresee that this is a moment where the transatlantic leadership will come forward? i've been very impressed by chancellor merkel's statements, but again, we can do the rhetoric. that part we do fairly well and have done fairly well so far. we're very, not good at the implementation part. i think the weakness of what we are, you know, actions speak louder than words. in some way ways mr. putin's actions are louder than his

words although his words are very loud as well. i would like you, can this be a moment? what does the president have to say in brussels. he is planning a major speech which i'm sure now has been rewritten and will be rewritten on the plane there. so question one, what does the president have to say, what does europe have to say to move, to have this message of transatlantic unity? nato, nato is six months out, less than six months out from a summit on september 4th and 5th. prior to this nato was searching for its new purpose afghan began and wasn't finding it very quickly. secretary-general rasmussen was here. he was in washington. gave a speech yesterday. again, a very tough speech. does this repurpose nato? in some ways, putin i think, this is all about nato in some ways. this is all about nato getting too close to russia. there is lot of commentary. we've caused crimea. we've caused crimea. we've done this.

we pushed too far. we pushed too close to his interests. how does nato have to respond to this? and we're also going to select a new secretary-general of nato. what does that individual need to do? those are some thoughts for you to consider. and now please, colleagues, if you have a question, raise your hand. please identify yourself. speak very loudly in that microphone. because sometimes it's a little hard to hear. keep the questions short so we can get a few in. we're start here, carolyn, with mike. thank you. >> mike musetta, pbs online news hour. do you think these events will fores the e.u. into more strategic thinking? in washington their lack of strategic thinking in kissinger's columns and scowcroft's comments yesterday, the e.u. is a pinata to bash on. if not full strategic thinking,

will it at least increase communications which are formally nonexistent at the moment between two organizations that sit in the same city, e.u. and nato? >> great. we'll stay in this cluster. was there another hand raised? yes, sir. >> american university and transatlantic academy. actually myself posed the question to mr. rasmussen yesterday about the, about nato finding a new role in the world and he said that nato has no new role in the world. it doesn't have to reinvent itself in the 21st century as it did at the end of the cold war. i certainly agree with mr. cohen on the fact that the u.s. has to show to the european publics the vitality of the transatlantic relationship, particularly to the younger generation like myself who has come to a world where we take it as a precondition, we take it as something for granted.

but back to ukraine, i think, that it seems that the ukraine crisis illustrates a crisis of the transatlantic relationship because i think that e.u. underestimated the attractiveness of its own model while on the other hand the u.s. got very late wake-up call. had the e.u. put membership on the table we could have a -- of this -- averted this crisis i think. yesterday, mr. rasmussen called the defense summit something remarkable, defense summit in december. personally i think it was a remarkable failure. as we're heading towards the nato summit in wales and nato is electing a new secretary-general do you believe it is time to have a serious dialogue, a transatlantic dialogue when it comes to security and defense? and that we need truly strategic relationship between nato, the

e.u. and the u.s.? and rethink the relationship between these institutions in based on a pragmatic understanding of the european security and essentially don't you believe it is i am pertive the e.u. develop as new security strategy followed the failed and ineffective security strategy, outdated security strategy of 2003? thank you. >> great, thank you. i'm going to, let's sigh wheel take a colleague here. >> thank you. as it was said, it is clear that putin has a strategy and he has a vision and this vision is very clear and strategy is very simple. he wants to extend his empire based on the force. brutality basically. it's there. my question and, welcome meant, i don't know, is that what is it

that europe and the united states are proposing to this vision? all we hear today is talking about sanctions and i don't think talk about sanctions is the vision. it is kind of reaction. it is okay, you're a bad guy. now we're pogue to cut the whatever, freeze bank account of unenr important people. if it was important people it would still be the reaction. what this u.s. european summit should being exactly about this vision. whether europe is ready to extend the borders of free world as opposed to empire world that putin is proposing to that part of the world. is the ready to extend its borders what it is beyond today. my question to the panel whether, what do you think whether europe and united states are ready for this extension? or enlargement is announced and parts of that positive vision we

are looking forward from that part of the world where i come from? otherwise again what we're looking today is leader of one nation with a very clear vision, with a very strong strategic plan, moving ahead, year by year, picking up the piece that is he lost after that big political tragedy as he called it and there is no vision from the other side. and obviously not question just for this year's summit but it is happening right now. the statement you would expect today but also it is for the nato summit obviously. thank you. . .

special weapons to the quarantine line. jack kennedy was highly criticized for weakness at the bay of pigs, but somehow he found the strength to say, this far and no further. about hear him talk article five, i do not need to hear anything else but that word. are we prepared to defend article five this far and no further? thanks, terry. we have two, three questions here, so one in the back and then one there and there. and then we'll wrap it up. >> thank you. my name's -- [inaudible] vietnamese-americans. would this be an opportunity for the u.s. and e.u. and nato to work to expand the energy market

for the u.s. so the u.s. can help to establish oil and gas through ukraine and help to supply the e.u., especially germany and britain, great britain, with oil and gas? that way we show that we supporting our allies, and we also show to russia that it's only weapon, energy to the e. u., is now being shaken if it doesn't shape up its own actions if thank you. >> stanley kober. we've said that there has been no forcible change of boundaries in europe since the second world war, and that's true. but there was in asia. the vietnam war. north vietnam sent practically its entire army south and conquered south vietnam, incorporated into united vietnam. we have reconciled with vietnam.

we now recognize it, presidents have visited. what are the lessons of the vietnam war that would apply today? >> thank you. [inaudible] united american diaspora. mr. cohen said perfectly, i think, the trial run in 2008 with georgia, i think the bucharest summit where we needed to make clear on enlargement we failed. in ukraine i think we're seeing the mistakes with georgia and hopefully those are not happen with macedonia. but i do want to know last month 40 members of congress sent a letter to kerry urging clear support for integration for macedonia, a partnership for peace with kosovo. where do you see the u.s. position on this in light of the nato summit? will we see a clear decision on nato end largement? --

enlargement? >> well, panelists, that was a wonderful array of questions. so i think, gideon, if you're ready, i think we'll just work our way down the line. >> okay. well, lots of questions, i'll try and answer as many of them as i can. on the question that was asked -- [inaudible] does nato need a new role, i guess they're beginning to look at their new role as their old role. it comes back to the question of how do you deal with russia. nato enlargement, i think people will be very cautious about that in the current mood because we're suddenly realizing, we are focusing on exactly what article v means. are you prepared to -- in the end, you have to fight for these countries, and you have to ask yourself, are you prepared to do that? i think that they will -- my guess is they won't rush to expand nato in the current mood. be things get much worse -- if things get much worse, then

maybe there'll be a sense that that is a step that has to be taken, but i don't think it's high up the agenda right now. the question of the e.u.'s strategic failures, and you said that it's fashionable to bash the e.u. here which puts me in an unaccustomed position of trail trying to defend -- actually trying to defend the e.u. i think there's a misunderstanding of what the e.u.'s all about. to see it simply as a kind of geostrategic player, actually, for most people merchandise the e.u. that are operating or citizens of the e.u.; that's fairly low down the list of what the european union's about. it's common markets, an area of free movement of people, and it's a currency area. its goals traditionally have been cupid of economic and social. -- kind of economic and social. the strategic aspect is relatively new and not to really been thought through, you're correct about that. and i'm not sure that we necessarily want to now -- one

thing the europeans are really good at is spending years on agonized debates about the purpose of the union. i'm not sure now is necessarily the time to have a debate about the e.u.'s strategic purpose. i think they toe is -- nato is an institution that exists and that works and really that, i think, is the institution that's going to have to do the strategic thinking about how to deal with this, with the kind of military aspects and the strategic aspects of all this. the question of e.u. enlargement to ukraine is felt, i know here, as to the massive missed opportunity by the european union. why didn't they do this years ago? viewed from european capitals, the answers are quite, you know, simpler, that there was very little appetite for further enlargement amongst the populations of the european union after the last enlargement that the, what's actually involved in incorporating a country into the e.u. is massively complicated, and it's

a process of many, many years. so i can see what the scowcroft and the kingennier -- kissinger's are getting at, but it is more complicated than it seems from this side of the atlantic. energy and gas, i think that's going to be very important, and i think that could be one very positive thing about this crisis if it gets the americans to kind of resolve the debates about the exports of the clear energy bonanza in the u.s. that would be good news i think, actually, for measuring as well, but also certainly for the your boons. and just a last concern europeans and just a last thought on, you know, this theme that's underlied a lot of what we've been talking about, that putin has play 3 a fantastic hand and we've been, you know, hopeless and don't really know what we're doing. i mean, i think it's too early to say this is a master stroke on the part of putin. i mean, it seems to me if you

look back at the history of the last 20, 30 years, one of the lessons is that countries that use military force generally it looks quite good the day after or the month after, it often doesn't work out too well. so for russia going into afghanistan in 1979 was arguably the death knell of the soviet union. i'm not sure that the interventions in hungary/czechoslovakia look so great in the light of history. he may get away with crimea in the sense that there's an element -- it's a strongly pro-russian area, so you may not get an insurgency. if he goes into eastern ukraine, i think that would be a disaster for russia in the long term even though it might look strong in the short term. and even for us as we think about our responses to this kind of thing, you know, obama's not wrong to think, actually, american military interhavingses in recent years -- interventions in recent years haven't worked

out so well and perhaps one should think about other responses before you start rushing to put on your military fatigues. and so i think that, as i say, that he who uses force in the modern world, it's kind of a certain are the row thrill, but it doesn't actually work out that well generally. >> great. roger, we'll just walk down the line. >> thank you. well, on nato i have colleagues on the op to ed page -- op-ed page who have argued this view that is a great mistake after the end of the cold or war or was extending nato eastward. this gave russia a sense of being corner ld, and here we are. my view is more or less exactly the opposite. i think it's the greatest achievement of the post-cold war years was precisely extending the protection and security of both nato and the e.u. to these

nations that had been enslaved within the soviet empire. and i think what we're witnessing today is how much tore sight and diplomatic -- foresight and diplomatic brilliance was shown in achieving that. if lithuania, latvia, estonia to name the most prominent examples and perhaps the most threatened nations by putin's vision of a reconstituted soviet space, if they were not within these organizations, they would be eminently at risk. and the if there's any -- if there's any sense left, sir, of this far but no further, it is precisely in article v of the north atlantic treaty alliance. and i still believe in it, you know? i think -- i don't believe the

united states will renege on that commitment. that is a treaty commitment, and whatever the retrenchment, whatever the wavering, whatever the araised red lines, that is a treaty commitment. i believe it's credible to has cow, and i believe the fact -- to moscow, and i believe the fact that it is in place toddy minishes the risks of this combustible situation escalating. i don't think we should allow any veto from moscow on the extension of the e.u. or nato to other nations further east, and i think it's the moment to make that clear. that doesn't mean that these things can be accomplished overnight, and they won't be. but personally, i'm in favor of leaving the door open because i believe that history shows us that that's the way you lock in

peace, rule of law, security, values to which many people on the face of this earth are deeply attached. yeah, the pinata of the e.u., you know, that's what it is to many people. in europe too, you know? e.u. bashing is a great british sport and not only a great british sport -- and the e.u. has had enormous problems as everybody knows over the last few years. nevertheless, i think countries want to get into the e.u., and it's not for nothing. serbia and kosovo have resolved their difficulties having been at war recently. why is that? because they both want to get into the e.u., and they know what they have to do to get there. so, you know, e.u.

communications are weak. the e.u.'s efforts to build its image and to have a global image that reflects its actual importance, weight and achievement -- and we've just been talking about this, is there a european narrative. americans know what they celebrate on july 4th. what do europeans celebrate? how can we revive this remarkable but amorphous thing? and i think those are issues going forward. just finally on the -- and by the way, macedonia, you know, what i said about leaving the door open, certainly, that applies to macedonia. there was a question about the vietnam war. well, nations and relations do repair themselves over time, and we've certainly seen that with vietnam. we also know that the cost of that war and the tens of thousands of american dead and

the imprint of it on the more than consciousness -- on the american consciousness is indelible and, i believe, in perhaps a little more of a minor key the experience of the iraq and afghan wars on the american psyche and consciousness will also be indelible. so we don't want to get into wars. wars are terrible things. we're speaking here on the centennial of the outbreak of world war i. but i think if the postwar decades tell us anything, it's that the way to avoid wars is through resolve. it's not simply through folding and weakness. >> thank you, roger. that's great. joe, you have three minutes to bring us home. >> i'll pick two questions, one about nato and one about cuba.

cuba is a very interesting analogy. first of all, nato doesn't act. it's governments that act. just like in the crisis it wasn't the e.u., it wasn't nato, it was various foreign min structures -- ministers that did. and in the past it was, obviously, the united states that acted. and if i had my druthers, i would, i would ask, suggest to mr. obama to do a repivot. go back to the central arena and do what president john f. kennedy did in '61 when he was challenged by khrushchev. he was a young man, i'm going to teach him fear. and and one of his responses was put, i think, 30,000 fresh american troops into europe. but again, nato and the e.u. don't act, and this is a nice little story which has the

advance of being true, the foreign policy representative was asked henry kissinger asked 40 years ago what's the phone number of the e.u.? she says we have a phone number, it's mine. dial the phone number, and then you get the computer and it says for germany, press one, for france, press two. of. [laughter] so the repivot is one word i would use. cue what is -- cuba is interesting because it was the reverse. it was when the soviet union challenged the united states on its turf. with the balance of strategic power, the balance of regional power and the balance of enters was clearly on the side of the -- of interest was cleary on the side of the united states. you don't want to challenge the other guy on your periphery. you want him to have to dislodge you from your center or which is what putin has done with the crimea. that's why it's going to be very difficult to dislodge. now, in the long run, yes, i

think in the long run history favors us. russia is what soviet union was, an extraction economy with nuclear weapons whose fate depends on the price of energy. the reason why the gorbachev soviet union went down was that the price of energy suddenly hit the same real level as before the '73 oil crisis. so that's on our side. putin has taken a giant leap backward from the global markets, from investment, from exchange, from technology transfer. not good for the economy. empire's costly. the mess -- you have to pay a lot to clean up the mess that is both the eastern ukraine and if he grabs it and the crimea. and, you know, within five or ten years there will be oil and be gas coming from the unite,

but don't think that -- from the united states, but don't think that's going to start flowing today. there may even be gas from the israeli fields in the mediterranean, but that's kind of medium-run consolation. the nice thing about history being on our side -- which i kind of believe -- is that if history's on our side, we don't have to do anything. we just let history come to fruition. the problem with policy today and tomorrow is that the time frames don't quite mesh. so i come back to the beginning. coalitions don't organize themselves. there has to be an organizer, there has to be somebody who assumes the cost, and that's why i demand from mr. obama, mr. obama, stop this pivot bullshit. come back to europe. [laughter] i don't think he will. [laughter] >> i like two words, resolve and repivot. i like it.

please join me in thanks our panel u.s.es for a -- in thanking our panelists for a wonderful discussion. [applause] president obama announces new sanctions against russia. friday, c-span has live coverage from george washington aiversity as they host discussion about russian intervention in ukraine and the reaction from europe and the u.s.. the panel includes visiting professors from ukraine and estonia. live coverage begins at 3:30 p.m. eastern.

>> to the families of my , mike smith,nds ,udy resnick, ron mcnair christa mcauliffe, and greg jarvis, grace and i extend to you our thoughts and prayers to ,our families, to your friends at the time of this hour of your loss and our shared grief. program has been a marvelous program for america to horizons, knowledge,

and it will continue to be so in the future. the thirstman has for knowledge, we will continue to press outward and in the process, there is risk. that risk is taken by each one of us every day and that risk is understood by all of the members of the crew that climb into a loaded spaceship. beconcluding remarks would as we reflect upon this tragedy, a tragedy that this whole nation grieves, let's remember the remarks by someone who knew something about risk, a gallant lady named helen keller when she spoke of risk and security. this is what she said.

is mostly a superstition, it does not exist in nature nor do the children of men experience it. danger is no safer in the long run than outright exposure. listen to what she in with. life is either a daring adventure or nothing. and keep in the palm of his hand our departed brothers and sisters, daring adventurers, and god bless and comfort their families and friends. >> find more highlights from 35 years of house floor coverage on our facebook page.

c-span, created by cable companies 35 years ago. >> the special inspector general for afghanistan reconstruction discussed efforts to rebuild the war-torn country and how that effort is being hampered i corruption. he discusses his recent trip to afghanistan during a speech to the atlanta council -- atlantic council in washington, d.c.. market.

good morning, everyone. i'm the director of the south asia center at the atlantic council and behalf of my colleague and our president, i'd like to welcome all of afghanistan restriction, john f. sopko. as we all know the political and military transition has begun in afghanistan. this is going to be a very critical year. the issue of afghanistan, the issue of costs, the issue of the use of taxpayers monies has been alive in this town and other capitals around the world that have contributed to the actions in iraq and then in afghanistan. and there are in calculations out there on the number of

dollars that are being spent simply by the u.s. there's one particular site that has these meters that run regularly every second updating the cost, and that estimates the cost at about $10 million an hour for the war in afghanistan. of course there are different figures out there. there is the famous brown university study that calculated a cost of 3 to 4 billion roughly. there's been an updated overall cost estimate looking at opportunity costs as well as complimentary costs of the u.s. in these wars that go as high as 6 trillion. there's no end to the numbers. but inspector general john sopko deals with real numbers. he deals with the amount of

assistance that's going to afghanistan and how it is used. and so over the 12 years we've been talking about $102 billion figure for the reconstruction effort. so we will hear from him on how he sees this proceeding, how he sees afghanistan preparing itself for life after the u.s. and allied military presence in the country, and what he sees as the prognosis for the future in the areas of security, elections, governance, narcotics, construction, corruption, the economy as well as the guardianship of the international assistance funds. it's a pretty tall order but i can't think of a better person

to do it. he has a great deal of experience that he brings to the job. he came from an international law firm in d.c. he's worked for more than 20 years on capitol hill and also as a trial attorney with the u.s. department of justice. so a lawyer with a keen eye and an ear to listen to people when he's in the field. i'd like to welcome him and ask him to come and speak. and i also welcome our audience at home courtesy of cspan. inspector general. >> thank you very much. thank you very much for that generous introduction.

and good morning to all of you. it's the first day of spring and it doesn't look like it's snowing. and i think it's appropriate that it is the first day of spring because what i'll be talking about is really the possibility of a new spring in afghanistan, particularly with the new elections. it's a real privilege to be here at the atlantic council. for more than six decades the atlantic council has provided an important bipartisan forum to discuss the most challenging issues confronting the united states and its european allies. nothing in recent memory has been more challenging or more costly than the military and civilian mission undertaken by the united states. nato allies and other coalition partners to secure and stabilize afghanistan. i just returned from two weeks in afghanistan. i have traveled there six times since president obama appointed

me as the special inspector general for afgan stran reconstruction in 2012. as always i visited reconstruction sites and met with afgans and u.s. military civilian and state department employees implements programs in what has become the largest reconstruction effort of a single country in u.s. history. reconstruction has been and continues to be a critical component of the overall u.s. strategy in afghanistan. it is also extremely difficult and dangerous to our colleagues and usa i.d., the state department, military, the many contractors and ngo employees who are tirelessly attempting to carry out the effort. over the last 10 years congress has provided more than $102 billion to build afgan security forces, establish governing

institutions, foster economic department. and our mail tear and civilian leaders have been committed to the ideas that a stable afghanistan with a government able to defend itself as well as provide essential services and economic opportunities to its citizens would be an inhospitable terrain for terrorists. at the end of this year america's longest war will come to an end with the ongoing drawdown of u.s. troops. at most only a few thousand for training and quick response groups will remain. we still don't know the number. the reconstruction mission however is far from over. the united states and its allies agree that afghanistan will require significant international assistance for years and years to come. and it is clear from recent conversations i've had with senior officials in our embassy,

as well as icef headquarters that the united states and the international coalition do not plan to abandon the afgan people. it's my agency's job to provide vigorous oversight of those reconstruction funds. congress created cgar in 2008. unfortunately six hours after the funds had already started. but congress empowered them with a cross can agency jurisdiction to conduct audits and investigation to detect and deter waste, fraud and abuse of this increased funding for reconstruction. we have a staff of nearly 200 auditors, inspectors, investigators and support staff dedicated protecting the enormous u.s. investment by quickly identifying problems and making recommendations to improve program effectiveness. now we all know that 2014 is a

pivotal year in afghanistan. the uncertainties and risks have never been greater. the security, political and economic transition is underway. but they boil down, all of this boils down to basically three serious and important questions. will the afgan security forces stand firm against a resilient and persistent insurgency without the assistant of u.s. troops and coalition troops. will the afgan government hold sufficiently open and honest elections to facilitate peaceful transition? simply put, can the state hold together after the elections? and lastly, will the afgan and u.s. government reach a bilateral security agreement paving the way for the

international community to continue provided needed assistance. however what i really want to talk about is the issue that underlies all three of those questions. and that is the nagging issue of corruption. the consensus among everyone i spoke with in afghanistan over the last two weeks is simply this. allowing corruption to continue unabated will likely jeopardize every gain we have made over the last 12 years. in other words, rampant corruption may be the spoiler for 2014 and beyond. now, corruption in afghanistan is not new or is it unique. cgar has been highlighting concerns about corruption for a very long time. every one of our quarterly reports to congress has highlighted its threat, from the lewding of the kabul bank and the failures of the attorney

general to prosecute senior official to the depravation caused by land seizures, extortion of the people and the loss of support for the government accordingly. since 2009 they've conducted a number of audits of u.s. efforts to combat corruption. we've also pointed out that the united states still does not have a unified anti-corruption strategy for afghanistan. cgar has been sounding the alarm for quite some time about a problem that has only grown worse over each passing year. just how bad is corruption in afghanistan? well last year the general told president obama that quote unquote, corruption is the external strategic threat to

afghanistan. dod repeated that judgment in its semi and report to congress saying corruption again threatens the sustainability of the afgan state. transparency international puts afghanistan in the company of somalia and north korea as one of the three most corrupt countries in the world. in a number of surveys, afgans themselves identify corruption as one of the most serious challenges facing their country. in a 2013 survey, 80% of afgans describe corruption as a major problem and 65% of them said it was worse than the year before. i had an opportunity to speak to integrity watch afghanistan on my last trip there. that's one of the best ngos committed to improving governance. and it's confirmed that afgans

consider corruption to be one of their biggest problems. and in a 2012 survey from all 3 provinces mirrored the findings and rankings of the 2010 survey which highlighted it as a very serious problem. while personal experiences with corruption had declined slightly in their last survey, the total estimated value of bribes paid rose 16% to $1.25 billion in 2012. and an amazing number equivalent to about half of the government's domestic revenues. about one out of every seven afghans or 15% paid at least one bribe in 2012. the average number was four. integrity watch just completed a new survey and they discussed with me some of their findings, but i'll let them -- because they will release it in a week or two -- tell you all the details. but i can tell you that the

problem has grown. they found it's grown. and they found that it's expanded into other sectors of their economy when they hadn't seen it before such as education and health fields. what does corruption really mean in practicing terms in afghanistan? two weeks ago, the u.s. military published a study that answered that question in one sentence. quote/unquote, corruption directly threatens the viability and legitimacy of the afghan state. the study entitled, and it's a catchy title, operationalizing county anti-corruption, was initiated by general dunford. the study went on to say, quote, corruption alienates key elements of the population, discredits the government and

security forces, undermines international support, subverts state functions and rule of law. robs the state of revenue and creates bear krarriers to econo growth, up quoe unquote. i command general dunford for ordering the doesn't. he doesn't full any punches. but takes a very hard look, and i highly recommend you all to read it, at the root causes of the pervasive corruption in afghanistan. including decisions made by the united states and its allies that have contributed to that problem. now, i'm going to spend a few minutes on just three of the study's main observations. they echo my auditors and investigators and what they have found over the years. in fact, some of general dunford's findings draw directly from sigar audits.

but they also illuminate three critical themes relevant to what we and the afghans will face for 2014. first of all, the initial u.s. strategy in afghanistan not the only failed to recognize the significance of corruption. remember, this is dunford's study, but may have fostered a political climate conducive to corruption. the second theme is massive military and usaid and international aid spending overwhelmed the afghan government's ability to absorb the assistance. that, coupled with weak oversight, created opportunities for corruption to grow. the third heem was ttheme was l anti-corruption strategy reduced effectiveness of all coalition efforts in this area.

let me address the governance issue and lack of political will together to tackle corruption. as the dunford report indicates, the u.s. military utilized proxy forces composed largely of warlords associated with the northern alliance to drive the taliban and al qaeda from power. however, civilian and military analysts pointed out in the report and elsewhere these warlords often used that u.s. support to rate with immunity and improve their political positions. afghan political leaders have built allegiances by cutting political deals that put such powerful figures in key government positions. these figures have in turn used their government positions to especial entrench and expand patronage that have traditionally been an important feature of afghanistan's politics.

in some cases these networks have morphed into criminal networks involved in everything from extra judicial land seizures and extortion to nar cottics traffic and money laundering. this is something that the noted afghan analyst sarah chase calls an integrated network that alienates the afghan population and ynd mines one of our key reconstruction goals of creating a legitimate afghan state that can deliver services to its people. the kabul bank saga exemplifies how this patronage system and the failure to prosecute people guilty of gross fraud and abuse is undermining the afghan economy and jeopardizing our reconstruction work there. before its collapse as we all know in 2010, the kabul bank was

afghanistan's largest private bank. but individuals and companies associated with the bank basically used it as a ponzi scheme and stole about $935 million largely through fraudulent loans. about 92% of that money stolen went to 19 individuals and companies. afghanistan central bank fortunately for the afghans covered those losses which were equivalent to far more than half of the government's entire revenue in 2010 and represented 5% of their gdp. now, more than a year ago, the joint anti-corruption and monitoring and evaluation committee issued a full report on the kabul bank scandal. that committee reported that the afghan attorney general's office

deliberately slow walked the kabul bank investigation and did little to recover funds or bring many of the main culprits to justice. underscoring the difficulty in reducing corruption in afghanistan is the fact that most of those culprits had very, very strong ties to powerful afghan politicians. the kabul bank crisis has had a profound impact and continuing impact on the entire financial sector. sigar recently issued an audit that found that afghanistan's banking system remains extremely fragile and poorly regulated. our and i had uditors concluded afghanistan is at the risk of another banking crisis. afghanistan must have a reliable banking system that observes and enforces internationally accepted rules in order to attract foreign investment.

and if you don't the attract the foreign investment, afghanistan will remain a client state. a welfare state to the international community. as well as to keep international assistance flowing, we have to have a working and safe banking system. failure to sufficiently reform and regulate the banking sector is putting that government's immediate development future at risk. for example, the imf's extended credit facility or ecf provides medium term assistance to low income countries at little or no interest. the loan agreement with afghanistan is contingent on government making banking and financial reforms that would increase transparency and accountability. the imf will not disburse any ecf funds without a favorable board review of the afghan financial banking systems. it has not disbursed any funds

since 2012 because afghanistan has not the made enough progress on those reforms. equally troubling, the financial action task force, or fatf, which is a body that sets the standards required to com p bat money laup tering, terrorist financing and other threats, just a few weeks ago again down graded afghanistan's status due to continued failure to approve the antimony laundering regime. if there is no improvement, experts caution afghanistan will be black listed in june.ey laun. if there is no improvement, experts caution afghanistan will be black listed in june. when they revisit the issue. a black listing could be devastating to afghanistan's financial sector and the overall economy. you now, this is serious. the afghan government has yet to

take it seriously despite our embassy and the international community's repeated efforts to convince them of its consequences to their long term need to attract investments to improve their economy. now, what i've described in the banking and financial sector is also true in other sectors. we don't have time today to go into each one of them, but in response to numerous survey, afghan citizens have described the judiciary, the police, the courts, and many other sectors of afghanistan as particularly corrupt. equally troubling is the issue of afghanistan's capacity to absorb aid and the donor's ability to oversee that aid. and that is another point raised by the dunford report. let's consider our reconstruction activities in fiscal year 2010.

congress appropriated the president obama's request for horn $16 billion to rebuild afghanistan idea. this did not include the tens of billions of dollars also spent that year on military operations. according to the world bank, afghanistan's total gdp in 2010 was only $15.9 billion. so reconstruction assistance alone amounted to more than the country's entire estimated gdp. since 2010, congress has provided nearly $63 billion more in reconstruction programs. now, many afghans and u.s. officials and scholars have asked, and i do, too, how was afghanistan with its very poor economy going to efficiently absorb such largess.

and why would krumt officicorru and others looking at the floods of poorly from viced cash and annen certain future not take advantage of the opportunity to take a cut for themselves. to compound the absorption problem, sigar has found that the u.s. implementing agencies have exercised limited oversight on this spending. sigar has cataloged a lack of planning, contract management and quality control. consequently, sigar has found schools that have been built so badly they are in danger of collapsing, clinics with no patients bs patients, or clinics with patients but no doctors or clean water, bases that are not useable, potential of ghost workers in the army and police, and roads that are d disintegrating faster than we can rebuild there. there are many valid excuses.

lacks of security tops the list. then there is the high turnover built into our hr systems of the military and civilian, some working there. it's amazing. when i go there, i've seen people -- i've only been there two years and i'm like the longest serving person in theater. i see people who give me beautiful descriptions of what they're going to do and three months later they're gone. how can it work on such a turnover that fast? there is also a lack of integrated system to track reconstruction projects. we don't even know what we spent and where we spent it. 12 years into this. that is the frustrating thing p i just approved asking for a list of where we spent their money. we still don't know. now, the bottom line is, and this came very clear from my latest trip, is that u.s.

implementing agencies had no more capacity to oversee the assistance than afghans had of absorbing it. the united states and its coalition were unfortunately slow to recognize that danger. it was in 2010 that sthey startd to focus on it, a concerted effort to establish a number of task forces to try to identify and deal with the corruption. during that same period, the u.s. embassy circulated a draft comprehensive anti-corruption strategy. but it's never been approved. as i mentioned earlier, the united states still does not have a strategy to fight corruption. now, although the u.s. government and its allies have been slow to address the challenge of corruption, and

despite what i've said, i do not believe it's too late. we have a tremendous opportunity with next month's presidential provincial elections. we have a new and unique opportunity to help the of a beg afghans tackle this problem. all the major candidates say they want to combat corruption. so let's really help them.tackl. all the major candidates say they want to combat corruption. so let's really help them. to protect reconstruction, the united states must make this a real priority. as cigar oig has been saying for some time, we must have a comprehensive civilian military anti-corruption strategy backed by political as well as financial will and capital. likewise as a number of the coalition ambassadors told me just last week and cautioned, this approach must be unified and coordinated so corrupt afghan officials cannot play one

country against the other. now, on my latest trip, i was told we must also be tough. we must demand that the afghan government become a true partner in all of this, the new government must begin p by complying with the international agreements that it has already made to undertake the reforms promised at tokyo and chicago and elsewhere. we must also embrace conditionality and pragmatic incentives. the united states and other donors must set realistic meaningful conditions orr incentives in areas we're willing to enforce. in other words, the conditions must be achievable and worthwhile with incentives geared to incremental achievements. but ultimately i was told we and our allies must have the courage

to risk saying no. to the afternoon begghans if t comply. my work the significance car has convinced me that the united states must consider the following to help fight corruption. we must hold our own employ crease and government contractors accountable. we must also insist the afghans hold their government employees and their contractors accountable. we must continue to support u.s. and internationally funded anti-corruption efforts such as task force 2010, afghan threat and finance center and others. we should care less about burn rate and more about how funds are actually being spent. by this i mean we must focus on

outcomes or impact of our programs and not on just outputs. we need to recognize that too much money spent too quickly with too few safe guards is a recipe for reconstruction disaster. we need to insist that the afghan ministries develop and maintain good internal controls to receive u.s. and coalition funds. and lastly, we must continue to provide support for afghan civil society groups fighting corruption such as the mec, integrity watch afghanistan and nascent independent afghan media. now, i come away from every trip with concerns. but i also come arouway with ho. the hope comes from seeing and

meeting the hard working and extremely dedicated americans whether military, sfo, civil servants or contractors who put their lives on the line every day to help the afghans build a better future. but this hope also comes from meeting with afghans. and before closing, i want to say just briefly something about afghan civil society. afghanistan has a growing number of organizations and individuals dedicated to exposing corruption and fostering the rule of law. it has the beginnings of a robust media that is highlighted and reflected afghan d dissatisfaction with corruption. it also has organizations who are working to raise awareness and increase accountability of afghan governing institutions. likewise, my investigators and auditors have worked closely with many brave and dedicated

afghan law enforcement officers and public servants who are committed to the rule of law and the economic and social development of their country. we should never forget them. we should never abandon them. in conclusion, i believe we have a window of opportunity to tackle corruption. if the elections go well, afghanistan will have a new government. however, this new government will be dealing with an international community that has far less patience for corruption than before. so it must act quickly to prove to the international community that it is serious about attacking the problem. united states and its coalition allies must speak with one voice on the issue of corruption. we must set achievable conditions for assistance. we must also carefully reexamine each and every one of our

reconstruction programs to determine whether their objectives still make sense and are realistically attainable. i was very pleased to see that isaf in particular was doing that with every one of their reconstruction programs. the costs in afghanistan both in lives lost and moneys spent have been enormous. it if we don't take advantage of this opportunity and get serious about corruption right the now, we are putting all of those fragile gains at arriving. risk. this is our longest war. if we get it right, we can create a model for future contingencies. and help the afghan people build another country that does not become a safe haven for terrorists.

thank you very much. [ applause ] >> thank you very much. as expected, this was forceful and detailed. and we are grateful that you took the time soon after your visit to afghanistan to come and share your views with us and with the audience at home courtesy of c-span. last year we hosted your counter part for iraq, stewart burn. at that event, he released a book about learning the lessons

from iraq. and one of the things that came up was why the united states has failed to prepare for these kinds of stability and reconstruction operations. we've gone in a number of times to different countries around the globe and each time it's groundhog day. we try and create things on the fly. and as you said, the momentum is created to have an extensive burn rate and not on thousand justify the spending or to make sure the money stays in the country. why do you think this is the case, and if so, where does that responsibility lie in washington? >> you know, let me answer the question a little differently.

i've been looking if he problem of bad government problems since 1982. i believe my staff is doing a wonderful job. what we are identifying is not new to the u.s. government. last summer we came up with a number of reports that i thought were yunbelievable. buildings that cost $30 million and they were going to rip down brand new. a school that was basically melting because it was so poorly constructed. and i remember calling up senator nunn and i said, senator, what's going on? and i see a former colleague of mine from senator nunn's office sitting in the audience.

and senator typical, and that's why it was so great to work with sam, he said let's get the old gang back together again. so john hamre, a bunch of the other people from the armed services and psi, let's get together and talk. so we went over to csis actually and sat down, had a nice lunch. and the bottom line was, and i remember he pointed me to talk to a couple of his friends who were former heads of gao, and they reminded me, and the senator reminded me, and head of gao reminded me, defense department procurement has been on the high risk list since 1991. and it's never gotten off. the defense department to this day cannot give you an auditable budget, an auditable books and

records. you look at all these agencies, i first was exposed to problems in the government by looking at chlt usaid programs in egypt which were horrible at the time. so this isn't new. what is unique about afghanistan and what is unique about traffic iraq is when you're in a war and th you're spending on steroids and money is going out the door. so i can't answer directly on doctor we don't loan. all i can say is we have many problems in how we procure, hire and fire employees and how we hold people accountable pl and it's a problem since i came on in 1982. i first started working with the government in 1978 and people were complaining aboutcame on i. i first started working with the government in 1978 and people were complaining abouton in 198. i first started working with the

government in 1978 and people were complaining about turnover and employees and all of this tha that. so i think the problem is we never make changes. we write a lot of reports -- i won't mention his nameso i thin never make changes. we write a lot of reports -- i won't mention his name because i don't like to burn my sources. . but a nice three star general had a very candid conversation with me. and he said, you know,but a nic had a very candid conversation with me. and he said, you know, i did this in the balkans, i did it in haiti, i did it in awfrica, i dd it in iraq, and you know i'm army and we write lessons learned. and we wrote lessons learned reports after every one of those engagements listing out all the problems. and he said when i went over to afghanistan the first time, he's been there two or three time, he said i figured it was all fixed. the problem is we write great lessons learned reports. we don't write how to apply

them. so you got to in-september advise. i don't want to filibuster the question, but one of the things that is unique about us.i don't question, but one of the things that is unique about us.advise. i don't want to filibuster the question, but one of the things that is unique about us. i took this job, and myself and my satisfy could have been fat, dumb and happy at other jobs. i recruited people in most of the senior staff and even some of the less seen jor, took a pay cut to come with me. we all have the view that we finally want to change this. and i'm picking on the way the government works. so this is my last hoorah probably in the government. especially after my reports who would hire me.

but we have to turn it around. i said one of the reasons we publicize the reports is to try to turn the ship around. yes, women be rk yes, we embarrass some people. but when you get embarrassed, many times you change what you do. and let's pot kid ourselves. most people in the united states today think the government doesn't work. the vast majority -- not vast majority, but a majority of americans don't support afghanistan. i think the fact that we have a very active inspector general, and i think no one will criticize us for not being active, appointed by the president of the united states, reporting to the people and congress, that is the most important thing out there that may save support for international engagements in the future. so i don't know if i answered your question exactly. i don't know what is in the american psyche.

we tend to go back -- we go in full barrels blasting away and put our money in, and sometimes we put it in faster than we can think. and maybe that's just the american spirit. but we're going to try to change that by trying to about pose the particular particular problems that cause that waste. >> yes, but you didn't fully answer my question. >> no, i'm an attorney, so --ro. >> yes, but you didn't fully answer my question. >> no, i'm an attorney, so --ar that cause that waste. >> yes, but you didn't fully answer my question. >> no, i'm an attorney, so -- >> the u.s. spirit is also one of problem solving. so why hasn't there been an institutional response? sigar and iraq inspector general's office all have sunset clauses so they fade away into the distant memory. if the issue is one of creating institutional memory and knowledge, why not have a permanent body which has plans in place and lessons learned and

a certain regularity about the staff so it's not a question of when, but whatever the next crisis occurs, that the u.s. if it goes in goes in with its eyes wide open. and that was my question, who is going to take the lead on something like that. >> the institutional bodies are already there. you have the dodig, state ig, usaidig, who are there who normally will carry on. '78 inspector general act created inspector generals. sigar was created because they were pouring so much money in and you needed something to look across the spectrum. our group was created to do the same thing. but as the money goes down, the regular igs and general accounting office can do this, i

caution the -- and the other thing is congress has and you would of all of our records. we report to them all the time. a lot of these changes that really need to be made are not at the level of the secretary of defense or secretary of state. we have to change the culture of procurement officers and people who manage contracts. a lot of these changes are not that difficult. and i always throw this out. and i realized this when i was working for senator nunn. we always kept running into the same problem of lack of cooperation between law enforcement agencies. that was always the finding in every one of our reports. there wasn't coordination and cooperation between law enforcement agencies. did anybody ever change the personnel rules? did anybody ever change the performance standards, the am performance standards for the employees to make certain that

cooperation was something they got graded on? i never really thought of that until i worked for the commerce departme department. and secretary of commerce made affirmative, a priority. so every senior executive got rated on what he did about affirmative action. and i tell you, you want to grab the attention of a bureaucrat? hold up his pay rise, hold up his performance review. and all of a sudden you see change. but when i talk about that on the hill and i talk about that to bureaucrats, they all say, that won't make a difference. but we've never tried. so this isn't rocket science. we just need somebody to start tinkering around. and i think you'll get people to spend more time on how money is spent than on just spending the money. my message to all of you you is

oversight is mission critical in afghanistan. and oversight should be mission critical in every government program. >> thank you. moving to a different topic which we raised in a report with a presidential candidate in afghanistan, wrote for us five years ago when we launched the south asia center. he raised the question of how many cents of every dollar that was spent in afghanistan was actually staying in afghanistan. have you made a rough estimate of the $102 billion that has gone for reconstruction if you know roughly how much was actually spent inside of afghanistan and how much left

the country either you because of afghans or because of the way we have the contracting organized for such work? >> we have not done that study. and that would be a difficult study. we're just trying to find out how much money we spent and where we spent it in afghanistan. i'd love to do that. i think that's worthwhile. but we just don't have that percentage. i've heard that criticism. it's a criticism i hear all the time. we're concerned about that, but i just heard criticism from provincial government about the kandahar food zone. and again, we haven't verified it, but that was his complaint. all the money is being spent on the kandahar food zone, but it's being spent in kabul or spent in northern virginia. it's not being spent where it needs to be done. but again, we haven't verified

those concerns. >> well yor, i don't want to democrat nature t dominate the questions. we have a great audience here. i'll try to identify the people in the order i see them. if my vision isn't strong, please excuse me. what i would suggest is wait until the microphone reaches you and identified yourself and then please ask your question and we'll try to get as many in before 11:00. so we start here. >> trudy rubin, "philadelphia inquirer". listening to you and having listened to stewart bohen, it's morel to have to reinvent the wheel so i just want to ask two questions that are reinventing the wheel because they apply to afghanistan and iraq. firstly on the side of laying conditions and stopping money

flow if the afghan officials don't live up to them, afghan officials notably hamid karzai have used this as blackmail betting on the fact that the u.s. would be afraid to stop the money relest the government collapse. how is that going to change with a new government. and on the u.s. side, it has become clear despite hillary clinton's efforts some years ago to have civilian control of aid in combat zones that combat zones defeat u.s. civilians. officials don't get out of the embassy compounds. usaid doesn't get out of the compounds. they rely on contractors who don't get out of virginia. and so -- or don't get out of compounds. and it's the very rare case where u.s. officials are actually out there looking. so how in the world is it possible under those conditions to do anything serious about

oversight and isn't in a wthat burn rate continues to be the metric. >> let me address with the issue of just saying no. which i think was coined by somebody in the white house dealing with drugs, i think. you know, you said president karzai or whomever essentially blackmailed us because he doesn't think we will say no. well, you know, the new government maybe will have that attitude. but it takes two to tank tango here. we need to be able to take that risk. and not helter skelter. it has to be a planned strategic approach to this. it's got to be we're giving you the money and our congress and our parliaments or whatever will not allow us to get the money to

you unless you meet these conditions that maybe you agreed. we just have to have the political will to say it. there is a tendency to think that it's really to their benefit to take our money. and we're just so lucky that they are taking our money. and that is sort of a bizarre approach to this. we're giving the money for a reason. and if -- i know we don't want to get into a position where we're imposing our values, but we can't leave our values at the shore. and if we're giving money and we know it's going to be wasted, or it will violate our own internal law and regulations, i think we

have a problem with that. now, we talked about that in a recent audit on looking at how usaid handled some assessments they made on the various ministries. and it got some press not too long ago. and basically a.i.d. did a wonderful job, brought in accounting firms to look at the capacity of the ministries to use and protect that money. and in each instance, they found that the ministries could not safely and effectively handle that money. and under usaid regulations, they should not have given the money to them. now, they waived their opwn internal controls because they made the statement, the decision had made many to give direct assistance to the afghans. so we had to waive them.

now, we found no evidence that said you had to waive it, so we raise that hd that concern. so i think the reporter's question is very valid. sometimes we have to have the political will not the to be blackmail blackmailed. the question about civilian control of aid and who will give aid,he to be blackmailed. the question about civilian control of aid and who will give aid,e to be blackmailed. the question about civilian control of aid and who will give aid, to be blackmailed. the question about civilian control of aid and who will give aid,to be blackmailed. the question about civilian control of aid and who will give aid, who will give it is an area we're ver concey concerned abou. we were one of the first agencies to say we got a problem here. and i heard that first time i took the job. general allen told me that. my first meeting with general allen and my first meeting with the regional security officer in the state department in the kabul embassy said people here don't realize the world is change. we won't be able to get out. i didn't know what it meant. i didn't know anything about it hour of safety, we have to go 30

minutes out, 30 minutes back to a schedule 2 hospital. but they were concerned that a lot of the u.s. government agencies in the embassy com bound were not taking that seriously. so we highlighted that. now, i think aid officials would love to get out.o we highlighte. now, i think aid officials would love to get out. state department officials would love to get out. u.s. corps of engineers would love to get out. but all are faced with a security problem. does that mean we stop all aid? no. but we have to design a system that at least from where i come from, remember, i don't do policy, i do process, if this is your policy to give u.s. assistance, and ayou can't get n american out there to take a look at the project or to find out if would your subsidizing the salaries of all the police, are there police at the other end getting the money, you got for design a system that is effective. it's my job basically -- i'm like the canary in the coal

mine. when i fall over and die with my feet up in the air saying that's saying we got a problem. and when i've been banging the drum and my staff is banging the drum, we got a problem, guys. are you planning for it? what are you going to do to protect the u.s. taxpayers' dollars? we're not saying stop it. we're just saying design an effect differen effective plan. this isn't new. when i showed up, i asked a.i.d. and dod and state, and i said what did you to in some other countries. let's bring in the best practices from there. and i was going away talking to the german relief programs and talking to the canadians, norwegians, and i said they all have best practices. so we just held a symposium which is very rare. unique for an ig to hold a symposium off the record bringing in everybody from the

world bank, the u.n., state department, a.i.d., dod, you you name it, let's share best practices. because what i've been finding -- and it's not only now. it's been for again 30 years i've been looking at this. you won't talk to her. and she doesn't talk to him. and nobody shares the information. so we're going to be preparing a report on best practices. you can do it. it's not the gold standard. the gold standard is having an american auditor or p investigator go out there and kick the tires. but we're in the going to be able to do that. so do we stop all aid? i don't think so. but we have to do it smartly. >> thank you. next question over there. >> it strikes me that it will be harder for us to do this as we pull down either now or two years from now and the american public will get, you know, cl k

clinky about other things. these need to be done, but do the chances decrease that they are done as time goes on? >> there are two parts of that question. yes, it will be harder to do it in the future. because of the security situation, how we design programs, how do we make certain the money is spent the way it is intended to be spent. and it will be more costly because you will have to put in a whole new monitoring system. we're pretty cheap. easy for us to get out. but you'll have to design third party monitorings and a whole bunch of nifty systems and not one is a silver bullet. so you have to use multiple. so aid will be more expensive. so, yes, you're correct in that. the second part of your question is will the americans get bored or tired or not interested in this. i don't know how to answer that. americans have supported countries for many years.

we're still in korea years after that war. so there is a commitment from the u.s. government and allies that for another decade to assist afghanistan. i see no change in that commitment. but again, i'll defer to the policymakers. i don't do policy. i don't do military policy. i don't do foreign policy. i just see how it's carried out and how effectively it's carried out. so that question is probably a better question to the secretary of state or somebody in the military on that. but that is a concern. but we've stayed a long time in some countries. >> over here. >> i was associated press correspondent in afghanistan during the alcion days in the early '70s. looking at the list of candidates for the election, can you tell me what reason will is to believe that there will actually be change?

and, also, can you tell us what you really think about the future of afghanistan? >> no and no. and i don't mean to be facile in my answer. my client is the u.s. congress. and you look at the statute. '78 act, and i walk around with all of these. like people walk away with the constitution, i walk around with the '78 act. i have the constitution memorized. and i walk around with our enabling legislation. this is my world. i can't stray from it. my world says hog about designing policy, assuming policy. so it would be unfair for me to

pontificate on that. and let me throw one thing out along this line. no one has asked the question yet. maybe you will. somebody at the last speech i gave asked why are you so negative? i'm actually a pretty positive guy. it may not sound that. i'm the ultimate optimist that the mission will succeed in afghanistan. but -- see, i'm saying something personal. it's in the my i don't think to be a cheerleader. read the '78 act.

my job is to ferret out and report on problems. and i know somebody in some other conference i went to said, well, you but what if somebody reads your version of the facts. i've got two people in my press shop. they're great people. but i only have two people. embassy has over 60 people last time i looked in kabul. i don't know how many a.i.d. has. there is their own press strategy to try to get ahead of us and god only knows how many people in the pentagon. could you probably balance the budget by just cutting that shop. but i got two people. if i'm -- and i know they're good and they like this because they all figure they can get a pay raise because of this. if they're able to change the

entire american opinion on afghanistan by our audits, geez, we're probably the best agency in the world. but i don't think so. i don't think the american people are changing their views on afghanistan based upon an audit on the water system in afghanistan. or on the public school number six. american people are making a decision because they want facts. we're speaking the truth and we're speaking facts. the american people want an honest assessment of what is going on over there and i think that's what we do. i don't know if that answers your question. i think i went around it. >> i'm taking down names and hopefully we'll get to everyone in the right order. so please remember that i am taking your name down. i'm going to identify the next two questioners so that you know the order in which -- so we'll

go to the gentleman standing at the back and then we're coming to the second row over here. then i'm come to the others. >> middle eastern institute. thank you for convening the event. john, welcome. you and i have talked previously about the metrics of success and holing the agencies accountable by extension. just a recommendation to make your task slightly less difficult. ask these agencies what are they trying to achieve. inspection begins at self evaluation. 45 years ago it was established the operation of the world bank and first question was tell me your failures. i don't want to hear your successes. and the entire bureaucratic of

the country changed. thanks very much. >> i think that's a good question. i know we chatted about this. i am telling them their failures. so that's why i'm always interested in successes. and if some of you maybe don't know about, i actually septemnt letter to aid administrator asking them to give me your top ten successes in afghanistan. and explain why. why they viewed them as successful. so i'm doing the reverse of what you did. because that will help me. i do have to do lessons learned report, i do have to do best practices. i can write those lessons learned reports and best practices and white papers on that based upon failure or i can do it upon a mix of failures and successes. i would prefer to do the mix of failures and successes. i suppose you all know the

answer i got from state, dod and aid. they cooperakoop couldn't give ten. my staff said this doesn't make sense. so we sent a letter again saying many that was too complicated. why don't you just give me some successes and how you rate success. the basic answer we got back was, well, health care has improved. education has improved. and women's issues have improved. now, that's true. if you compare to what it was when the taliban failed, when there were no schools open, no clinics, women were scurrying and hiding in cellars, of course it's improved. if you spend over $100 billion in a country the size of texas with a population smaller than texas, you'd think there has to be some improvement. my god.

i mean, you know, throw it up against a wall, something will stick. but what specific program lend to the doubling of the life expectancy in afghanistan? and this is so critical now. as the amount of money is decreasing, we have it know, we have to rack and stack. see, if you don't rate your programs, then you get sequester. we'll cut everything across the board, the good programs as well as the bad programs. so they can do it and that would really help me. so we sent the letter also to the ngos and said since the government can't tell me what works, you tell me what works. and we got shaome responses, actually some pretty valid responses and some of the people in the ngo community are in the room but we said we wouldn't identify who they were. and now we turn to the

contractors. i'm trying to find out what works in afghanistan. and not the why this broad thing that health has improved. well, what led on health being improved? what led to women's issues being improved? is it building schools or is it building clinics, is it doing this, is it doing that? so we really need that help and we're open to any input from anybody on what works or what doesn't work and why. and we'll give you anonymity if you want it. we're trying to make a record so we understand and not do it again. >> i'm a reporter for german national radio. and i've reported from afghanistan since 2007. i very much appreciate your openness regarding the failings and failures of the u.s. in afghanistan and wish i would ever encounter such openness from german officials there. but i've got two questions. have you met any of the

remaining ten presidential candidates, and have they presented a viable, credible concept for the fight against corruption? the other, you said there should be a concerted effort among donors so they can't be played off against each other. you can be more concrete than -- well, tell us more about your ideas. >> on the presidential candidates, i have met some of the presidential candidates before they were presidential candidates. i have just as a policy have not met with any of them again or any of their staff. i've told my staff not to meet with any of their staffs because this is an afghan election and i don't want anybody to think we're showing favorites, not showing favorites, not doing anything. so we're staying clear in any of that. so i can't answer that question. i won't answer any question about my views on the election

other than it looks good. my last meeting with the regional security people, some of the provincial leaders as well as our embassy officials out in the field, it looks like it will be a good election. it's optimistic. there is the threat of violence. but it looks like everybody has their act together, it's moving well. so i'm hoping for the best. so i'm sorry i can't answer your question about that. on the concerted effort, again, i don't want to attack any of our allies. because we are equally at fault i think. but some of the allies, the eu itself, has talked about conditionality. and some of the allies have been more -- and i don't want to, you know, burn any of them -- but have actually said we're not going to give you money about if

you don't do something. now, an interesting issue which i can talk about because i did talk to the eu deals with watfa which is the law enforcement trust fund in afghanistan. and that's how we, i mean the coalition, united states, europe, et cetera, paid for the salaries and expenses for the police. and the eu based upon internal audits and inspections they did became very concerned about not so much the afghans, but how the u.n. -- u.n. runs it -- they're concerned about their ghost workers, about other issues. and they actually conditioned and withheld funding. now, that's good. the problem was i don't think anybody shared that information with all the other allies. and my last trip to afghanistan,

pot this last on not this last one, but the one before, i talked to our officials in the isaf entity -- i don't even know what the acronym stands for. combined security -- i'm looking at high stamy staff. but anyway, they didn't know the eu had withheld funds, they didn't know the eu had concerns about how the trust fund -- and this is a big trust if you said. billions of dollars. was being used. so that raised some concerns. we're not talking enough with the allies abdominal lnd allies talking enough with us about the oversight issue. so that said, i go out of my way it to meet with as many of the allies as i can on trips here. i've gone to brussels and been briefed and briefed eu and nato officials. we talked to the ufrn ap u.n. a

time. information. and where we can be used by any country, especially our own, the united states government, to get information from the allies, i tell them use me. use my reports if it can help you. the germans, specifically because you report for german news source, we've heard some good things. i don't know enough to actually comment other than i met with the deputy ambassador to germany and he's opened the door for us to come in and get further briefings on how the germans approach. we don't have a monopoly on what's right. i think we can learn a lot from our ally, and we should learn a lot from our allies and our neighbors in afgs.

i don't know if that answers your question. >> sunlight does a lot of good. the united states agency in pakistan within the last few years, highly publicized the stopping of a contract for entity well known to be associated with aid work, and because of the publicity, it had a demonstration effect on all the other civilian aid. >> i think so. that's one of the reasons you want totize this and get the message out. that helps. >> just so i'm not accused of being left leaning, i'm going to the right for the next question, and they know i'll come to the others. >> thank you very much. i'm with the u.s. department of state. a couple of questions. stewart bohen on his exit was proposing called called the u.s. office of overcontingency operations. he had a grain of optimism that

could perhaps be established. i don't see too much movement in that direction. but is something like that, whether in terms of a specific office or the capabilities that he was proposing, would that be helpful in terms of look at future? and a related question is you determined they were established because of the tremendous amount of resources that were being put into these twop countries. is the role of the special inspector generals simply a kind of surge capability, or do you bring something to -- does a special inspector general bring something greater to this effort than the igs of the particularly agencies of the gao? >> okay. let mel quickly on the proposal that stewart bohen had and then

i'll answer your question. the answer is yes to the last part of your request e. i'll go into more detail. stewart did make that recommendation. again, i gefr that i don't do policy, i do process. and so i don't really think it's my position to recommend, and i haven't been asked, to recommend creating or not creating an entity such as stewart recommended. i will say this. this helps to answer your second question. i got enough authority, enough power, enough resources to do the job. i like temporary agencies. you know. there is a problem with creating another agency that will exist that never goes. i mean, i'm still waiting. i remember when i was working for sam nun. they finally abolished the tea

tasting board, which had been established right after the revolution. okay? when you create an agency, it s never goes away. i don't know if you need it. special inspector generals are great. i got the '78 act. i got my name in the legislation. my enabling legislation gives me more authority than the average i.g. has. i'm given unlimited hr authority. i can hire and fire at will. that's tremendous. and you need it for a temporary agency. my pay, i can give bonuses. i can do a lot of things. it's not outrageous, what we can do, but i can give hiring bonuses, which most of the government can't. i can pay retention bonuses. but the hiring and firing means that if i need somebody quickly, and i need somebody who has the

fire in the belly, which is the way ai proech my staff, i ensure they have the fire in the belly. and when i took over the job, we had ha 60% attrition rate. 60%. let me just back up. sigar was not always this aggressive. it was publicly attacked in a bipartisan fashion for its lack of aggressiveness, its inability to do its job. and we went through some hard times. when i took over it was 60% attrition rate. you can't operate at that. when i took over, we were only producing four products per quarter. we have cut that attrition rate for a temporary agency. it's down below half.

we're producing 30 products per quarter. and part of the reason is because i can hire people, men and women, in afghanistan and here who are dedicated who have the same fire in the belly. i remember my former chief of staff, who is now my head of audits wrote an e-mail saying uh-oh, it's a fitb type. it's the fire in the belly type. i basically tell people we're here for a limited amount of time. we got a mission. the white house said two things to me, fix it and fix it fast. so i don't have time for a ten-year engagement. we have to do something really quickly. that's what congress and the white house asked us to do. so i'm able to get people who have the fire in the belly.

so i don't need a permanent home. everybody coming knows it's temporary. i like agencies that go out of existence. we will go out of existence when the amount of reconstruction funds fall below $250 million a year. that's money in an authorized, appropriated, and not yet spent. so we go out of existence six months after that. i'll tell you, there's $20 billion still in the pipeline not yet spent, so we may be around for a while. but i don't think -- i do have unique powers. and if you look, and particularly my unique power is not only the hiring and firing capability, but we look at all reconstruction by any u.s. government agency. stewart bohen had certain pots of money he could look at. if you spend a dime on

reconstruction. whether you are the state, dod, or the department of commerce, i own it. and that's one authority. if you look at my statute, it uses the term independent, like in every other paragraph. so they really say independence. it specifically said no government agency does not cooperate with us. no government agency can stop any of our audits, investigations and inspections. so we have tremendous authority here. we are unique. we have unique authorities. we're also not housed in any one government agency. state is in state. we sort of sit above everything just looking at reconstruction. so if we can't help the taxpayer, then, you know, i don't know what else can. but i don't think a permanent entity is really niece at this

time. we got the authority. >> thank you. inspector general we are running short of time. so i'm going to ask two persons to ask their questions together, if you don't mind. >> well, she's waiting. the lady at the back, and then the gentleman here. and then if you can take these two together, we would appreciate that. >> mine is more comment rather than question. >> identify yourself, please. >> i've been a senior adviser to nato and the u.s. military. but i've also got a background as an aide worker both in iraq and afghanistan, which is probably why i was chosen. one of the biggest problems, sir, from my vantage point, and please remembers i just returned after 12 nonstop years in iraq and afghanistan has been the inaccessibility of for offices for sigar in iraq and

afghanistan. the theory is fantastic, your housed with lots of security within the state department offices. how then is anyone who wishes to put in a complaint against contractors, against government officials, against what have you, how are they supposed to come to you? in my own case, i would come back to america, to washington, to deal with the sigar offices, and i would give them the names of people who wished to talk to them. the sigar authorities were afraid that people's lives could be compromised if they were to be seen coming out of their offices in kandahar and baghdad. first of all, the offices need to be made more accessible. and where we have had successes, to answer a portion of your ten questions, it's when we've dealt

with community professionals, lawyers, daughters, engineers, established business entities. not whom we awarded for whatever favors. et cetera, et cetera. just a brief comment on what we were talking about. >> can we move to the gentleman in the front here and get his question? >> sure. and i promise to be short. >> i'm dr. hank from emeril planet tv. i have four best practices from within afghanistan that i would love to share with you that's been on our tv program. looking at the nuch and looking at the ngos, what is your prognosis as far as how easy or difficult that may be to work with local entities to expand green job training and to use the assets left behind by the u.s. military and others as we mover forward past 2014.

and thank you for being here and your excellent report. >> thank you very much. let me answer the question about access to us. you can always access us on the internet. we get a lot of complaints, and a lot of contacts to our staff because we have a hot line. i don't have ittized. by you can find it on our website. the other thing on getting access to us, we're also located, unlike most of the other agencies, we have the largest law enforcement presence in afghanistan. we're at five or six locations there. i have people outside the wire at the bases. but the point you raise is a serious one. it's hard to get outside the wire. it's hard to get afghans inside the wire to talk to. u.s. contractors, it hasn't been a problem.

and a lot of u.s. contractors and government employees come back to the states and we see them there. we've never had a problem where people can't find us. they always do and are always nice and interesting places. i've met people under trees and at night, behind buildings when i'm in the embassy. there are plalss where you can meet, so that's not a problem. in my staff i have interesting and devious ways of meeting people. so if you need to talk to us, we'll get a way to protect you, we're very serious about protecting people, whether you're afghan, u.s., or international coalition. the question about -- and i don't really fully understand, but the question about how to this get with ngos and work with them, it's -- we try to work with them all the time. i meet with a group of ngos every time i go there. my staff meet with them on a regular basis. they do get outside the wire. they are outside in the