have improvement. >> thank you for the question. i would echo what has been said by others on the panel. i think a lot of it has to do with recognition. people are very good at recognizing when someone gets knocked out on the field. that is a very small percentage of all concussions. as our understanding of the symptoms has arisen, it becomes incumbent on us to improve the quality of education we give to coaches, players, trainers, officials about the symptoms of concussion. my sense is in general, culture, speaking to the state of alabama, the coaches i have come into contact with are believers.

they are not purposely hiding kids and putting them back in with concussions. sometimes it is hard to recognize when young athletes do not tell you how they are feeling. we brought up the importance of teammates being involved in diagnosing players. >> how close are we to a better design for helmets? >> i think we are at the beginning. we have been using a standard that has not changed for 40 years that was designed for skull fractures. many investigators are working to improve standards to include acceleration as well as other important aspects of impact. just as the automotive industry did with safety ratings, the market can be relied upon for manufacturers to improve designs to improve sales. i think standards are important part of the equation.

>> thank you. dr. gay, you discussed the fact there is a numerical rating system for helmet impact. it is designed at virginia tech, the star system. you called it the best tool we have for analyzing the merits of helmet systems. can you describe how it works? >> basically, it involves a test where you drop the helmet from a given height, varying height, to the side, front, back. it tries to simulate the kind of impact a player would experience. numerical scores are given to the maximum acceleration the head inside the helmet feels for the given drops, based on a

crude initial model of what causes concussions. it does not take into account rotation or temperature. in my opinion, the reproducibility is not as good as one would like with these tests. i think it is a good first start. it is the best we have right now. i think it needs to be paid attention to. there is a lot of room for improvement. >> thank you. how old are you and what grade are you in? >> i am the senior.

congratulations to you for going on to college. i have a daughter who is a freshman. that means he is a little older than you, but i will be happy to introduce you. i am proud of your testimony. i could not have done what you did. nation has benefited by your testimony. >> thank you. the gentleman from mississippi is recognized. >> thank you for being here on what is a topic we are only starting to learn about. it has been in the news for several years, that is coming to the forefront. work and testimony will be beneficial to us.

parent of a 24-year-old, i appreciate the work you do at the children's hospital. preparation, i had some discussion with parents back home. discussion is i have several friends who have daughters playing youth soccer. they reported an increase in the number of concussions suffered by young ladies playing youth soccer. we have seen in the news, all the news associated with the nfl, helmet-to-helmet contact, and concussions we see on the field of play, but it appears in

everything we do in life, every sporting event there is that danger and risk. that is why i think what you're doing with it in alabama, dr. johnston, what we're doing with coaches, parents, and perhaps using the teammate approach, it may be the safest thing, to have the backup position player be the one to report to the first team when they come out. that might get them off the field. dr. johnston, educate us, what is a subconcussive impact? what does that mean? should subconcussive impacts affect rules of play, and if so, how? >> i think the definition of a subconcussive impact would be all those impacts that happen that do not result in a concussion. as has been pointed out, the rub

with concussion is the diagnosis part. if you look at historical studies, is variable and a lot of that has to do with who is diagnosing it and males versus females, whether or not men or more likely to report symptoms, but a subconcussive impact, and all those other impacts where we have more information to the work that has been done in boston and other places that even these impacts have results in terms of anatomical structure changes the brain over time. it needs to be addressed in terms of lessening the overall cumulative impact load that every player has. football is the most obvious thing in terms of how many practices a week children should do hitting, but that has applications for all sports. >> thank you. if i could ask you a question,

for clarification, if i can ask them, the 77% of military, that figure, is that how many of the tbi faces have suffered concussions? >> trying to bring in -- 77% are concussions, mild tbi. >> can you talk about the work you are doing? is it practical, something we can expect to be rolled out to the sidelines across america, to diagnose for athletes, and perhaps onto battlefields to diagnose our warriors? >> it is very possible. we published a paper last year where we took one of our e.g. systems and recorded on the sideline of the field. the biggest challenge for us in making it practical is getting the processing time down.

for now it takes an hour. if we get it down to five minutes we can sell it to the coaches, because they are the ones who are going to determine. at this point, given all the other issues, the common tests used now are like the impact, which are assessment tools, questions to the player. they have to reflect, and may be foggy because of the concussion. these tests do not have predictability after two days post injury. that is a big problem. it does not predict recovery time, severity of the injury. these biomarkers are the critical things. we hope these will be much more reliable and predictive. >> thank you for being here, and i yield back. >> thank you. generally, this would end, but we have questions, we are going to do a second round. plus, the bells are not going to

go off for another seven minutes. jan has a conflict and she has given us approval that she is going to leave, but she trusts us to ask legitimate questions. >> let me thank this panel, in the previous panel as well. the intensity of the scientific research and then its application to the playing field and so many other fields, i really want to thank you for telling us what is going on. i also wanted to thank ian heaton for coming here today. it is important to have people like brianna and ian to tell their stories and give us a face to the importance of this, and i want to thank the ftc for making sure that false claims are not made, but this is so important, so appreciated. we will have to figure out where

it leaves us, that it has informed us. thank you. >> i would agree with every word of that. so this is a question to you, dr. shenton, and it dovetails into what the gentleman from mississippi was talking about as well. are the symptoms of a concussion or tbi uniform enough so that it is possible for early detection or developing a checklist for a coach or a parent to be used by nonmedical? start with you, doctor. >> no. >> that was easy. >> the symptoms overlap with depression and ptsd and has been a real problem. there was a paper published in the "new england journal of medicine" that said when you remove the effects of depression

and ptsd, mild tbi does not : conventional mri or ct, they said, see a psychiatrist. it was really not appropriate because there is at least a small minority of people who have mild concussion who go on to have symptoms. they can go on for months, years, and then they can clear up. that is separating it from cte. you need really logical evidence, the same way you want to know values of a blood test for cholesterol or a broken leg. we are moving in that direction, and that is what we need as the hard evidence, because the symptoms are too nonspecific. >> there are studies looking at

a number of citizens, and a wide variety of these symptoms people report, there's no indication to report whether somebody reports lots of symptoms versus a few symptoms, that that has any relation to how long they will recover. >> can we get to a point where the seventh-grade coach, the seventh-grader takes a checklist that the coach could use to determine if that kid should go back into the game? >> there are guidelines out by the cdc and others that list concussion symptoms. the general bias at this point is if an individual reports these symptoms they should be pulled. if you have a concussion and played before the symptoms have resolved, the likelihood of death is much greater, not to

mention further significant concussion that will take longer to recover. >> this is one for dr. johnston. one of the debates occurring in nebraska right now is you have a child or a high school student that suffers a concussion. it has been diagnosed. what do you do next? right now the thought is you keep them home or her home, dark, no electronics. that is the norm. there is a discussion whether that is appropriate or not or to what length. what do you know? what would you recommend? >> i will tell you how we handle things in alabama, which is once an athlete is diagnosed, removed from the field of play, evaluated, we use the sport

concussion assessment tool, the scat tool, which is a sideline-based tool, which has a quick mini inventory of neurological exam and cognitive function. when children have symptoms that persist, they do not return to any sort of play or escalation effect until the symptoms have resolved. those children who have persistent symptoms are then referred to neuropsychologists. >> this is a big question at this point. this comes to what is the best treatment for this injury. let me say the field is moving on this one. the recommendations we make, and i have written several papers on this, is that acute stage of symptoms, the first few days, maybe for some little bit longer if there is a more severe number of symptoms, they really reduce their activity, cognitive and

physical. what you want to do is increase that activity over time, so we did not look at kids until they are asymptomatic. that has the likely negative effects on kids being removed. we initially shut them down and then we gradually bring them back into the school and to physical activity. that has to be individualized, based on the severity of that symptom presentation. that is where we are now. we need a lot of research to help validate that. >> thank you, and mr. lance? gentleman from missouri gets to ask another question -- mississippi. [laughter] i thought you were billy long. >> that hurt. thank you, mr. chairman, in a couple of questions i would have.

if we are looking at this -- dr. gay, if i may ask a question, in your testimony you stated football players are shedding mobility. the decision which helmet to wear is their own, and that player often chooses a helmet's looks over it collision-cushioning ability. do some positions require different levels of collision cushioning, and if so, would you recommend a special helmet for a specific position? >> a great question. currently, there are no position-specific helmets. not tould say that belabor the point, but for

alignment, were you to believe we get no severe hits but a lot of concussive blows, the horse collar is crucial. that a wideoutnd where a horse collar. it is an interesting point. certainly some players might. this is why i am an advocate for the hit system. it will give us detailed information about which position gets hit where. if we have a large database. improving health and designed to react to information we got from that information. you, how muchask money has been spent on sports concussion research? where is the funding coming from? >> unfortunately there is not an ,ssue our committee look that

nor would we have had the resources to pull that out. clearly, you can identify some research that is being done in the federal sector that applies to this. the private research that may be done by a sports leagues, by manufacturers of equipment to themselves, i don't know any good way to quantify that for you. >> i appreciate everybody being here. it is an important issue. we love our children going through sports. we love to watch. we don't want anybody to be hurt that should be hurt. focuslly this increased will lead to better research, protection, and of course, prevention. thank you very much. >> the gentleman from mississippi. >> i just want to thank. this was an all-star panel of medical experts.

and physics. much appreciated. thank you. that does conclude our hearing for today. now, for our witnesses, we have the right to send you a question. a written question. we have 14 days to write those and submit them to you. . would appreciate if you can get them back to us if there are any within 14 days. i wanted thanks for coming out here providing very valuable testimony for us. we are adjourned. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2013]

>> good afternoon. i am cory welt, the associate director of the institute for european, russian, and eurasian center and eurasian studies here at george washington university. at the institute i co-direct a program on new approaches to research and security in eurasia. it is a network of about a hundred scholars on russian and post-soviet affairs and includes experts from north america,

russia, ukraine, other post-soviet states, and europe. the program is supported by the carnegie corporation of new york, macarthur foundation, and george washington university. we have been transfixed by the russian government's audacious invasion and annexation of crimea in ukraine. much of the conversation has concerned the response of the international community, the united states and the european union, and rightly so. as well, the effectiveness of that response, and also there has been much discussion concerning the impact of russian actions on their future role in the region and its global status. we will address all these issues in our q and a and in our discussion as well. first, we would like to take some time to discuss the implications of this crisis on ukraine.

we are fortunate to have several of our colleagues from ukraine in town for a conference. we have two of them who will speak to us today. ukraine is a country that has gone from a revolution to an ukraine has gone from a external to an invasion in a matter of days and beginning to and look forward to its political step out of its current economic crisis as well to ave the opportunity iscuss trying to make sense rather of russian policy, what seeks to n government be achieving with the annexation f crimea and an issue the impact of russian actions on governancelitics and

inside of russia itself. we have an excellent panel. the associate professor of international relations and director of the for international studies in odessa, ukraine. he has conducted research at the oodrow wilson international center for scholars and center for international security university of maryland and co-author of security d european apnd published numerous article. ext we will have a professor and chair of political science

university in the ukraine in the east. e is the founding editor for the journal for global and comparative studies and has held studies at the kenan institute national endowment for democracy. published a number of books and articles on democratization, regime change. third we will have a professor studies in ia estonia. he re moving there in 2010 taught for 13 years at st. petersburg state university in russia. published extensively on russian national identity and foreign policy and domestic and discourses on democracy. e's the author of "russia and others" and editor of idea ering the west, the

of democracy and struggle for hegemony. a research er researcher at c.n.a. and he is the editor of he journal problems with post-kphraoupb inch and associate at the harvard center.ity davis from 2005 to 2010 he was the executive director of the merican association for advancement of slavic studies. published numerous articles on these subjects. "nationalismthor of for the masses" and he blogs on to the russian milita military. before i turn to the panel i deepest xtend our appreciation to the carnegie

john d.ion of new york, and catherine t. mcarthur george washington for their report. now turn the podium over to our panel. >> thank you, cory. i would like to focus my on several major blogs. two i would like to say things about the crimean ituation, secondly about the situation in my hometown of odessa and generally south of aboute, then a few things the agenda for ukraine as a country the way i see t. few words on western support and assistance that we in these critical details. we have just received another the referendum has didn't extendate, criteria.

numerous voices criticizing this referendum as illegitimate. it has been a farce, a show in worst of the totalitarian society. counted, there not votes were not counted. what happened in crimea is armed robbery. it is when you have people with entering -- s guns who enter a omachine bank and take people hostage. it still is armed robbery because you take something and from someone g else which is not yours. , the n referendum is justification is pure rubbish. here was no threat for the crimean population, ethnic russian speakers in crimea. there was nothing like radio kls crimea.into

it has been created bit russian machine.a what we are having in crimea is our an drama there of highest degree and level. who are hostage to the situation. they have been extremely loyal ukrainian statehood for a while. here's been -- they have been antagonistic to the russian invasion. but right now they are still trying to figure out what they are going to do next. for is the potential confrontation there. on tv they it own, the of their young person was found there of torture, so his body -- what is going to be happening i don't know. there have been examples of

tatars pushed away from their instances of one small burned to the ground. at the same time, i think we are the russian tatars ent trying to buy with various positions in the regional government and assistance and giving crimean in the peninsula. so there will be maneuvering but crimean tatars are unhappy about their land. them.st are c russians in crimea the only portion where they are 60% of ity majority are population. but what about the 40% not ethic russians? social yo ost recent poll l -- sociological

prior to troops moving in apnd us that only 41% of eople in crimea were in favor of ceding from ukraine. is a high figure but what about the rest of the people. those voices are not heard. what we are seeing, people being crimea, families disunited. nternally displaced persons appearing in ukraine in vast numbers. the on the other side of country in recent weeks we have comingo sovereign people from crimea and looking for refuge. they are going to need places to stay and jobs and school for their kids. o it is a human drama actually developing in our own -- before our own eyes. next?ill happen to crimea what should we do about crimea? annexation and

occupation and it still remains and we should operate on that assumption. the troops i believe and many in same e share the assumption should be imgreated as soon as possible. might call it a surrender but the people behaved bravely shown signs of courage and they didn't give pretext for the russian troops the further th invasion in other parts of the ukraine. o, i believe the troops shush td.-- should be evacuate should away try to strangle and cut them from supply of water and electricity or not. are debating e this. for myself i believe that we should not be doing this because a lot of people who are innocent there. that the their fault

referendum and annexation took lace so we should not do anything that would make them suffer unnecessarily. the ukraine isin what should we do with the payments, for example, payments that they have been the crimean population. should we continue or stop them? being we r the time should continue even though it is difficult to do especially as we allg our budget know is kind of empty. another thing we should continue o call this issue to the attention of international organizations, our friends and allies around the globe, we put it on the underof various organizations and bring well. the courts as because armed robbery is robbery. russia has basically taken of our oil digging and drilling facilities by the

crimean shore. nothing else but robbery. that should be seen as such by courts. so the ukrainian government should go to court. we are hearing voices and polls that we should probably ationalize some of the russian property in the ukraine. i don't think that is the right way to proceed. that probably would even and be a bad ine sign for a person thinking about investing in ukraine more so than it used to be. o i don't think too much speaking from my point of view that nationalization of russian property should take place. going on in odessa? igures are different in favor of ukraine maintaining integrity. 24% ofgures there so that citizens and residents of odessa

ceding and idea of becoming part of the russian 3/4 of on, which means he population is not enthusiastic about it. an area where in one-third of the population of joining russia. so, everywhere in the south of aware most should be people, the vast majority, are favor of maintain being the integrity of ukraine. come to the le do separatist camps so to speak? are being m brainwashed and subject to propaganda that have been years on russian tv stations and ukrainian central local channels. many are senior citizens who for the olds times and thinking in terms of a ime machine that would

transport them 20, 30, 40 years ago in the soviet past which is that is another important element and segment of i have d of camp that been talking about. there is the constant manipulation with the language you are well aware and of course most of the alls are coming from the kremlin and moscow. but for one i'm russian speaking ukrainian from odessa and i never felt any persecution or this new government being formed. never felt any kind of scare of this so-called radicals coming to odessa and trying to russian to use the language and talking to my friends and family. fair mind and i do teaching because that reflects the language in my hometon. what kinds of persecution and

russian n against speakers are you talking about in odessa or anywhere else in south? the separatist movement and actions of that movement have een well organized, no doubt about it. the scenario has been written a have ime ago, the plans been drafted a long time ago and the money is falling from the numbers on those peop people. money forst limitless those in that kind of separatist movement. i'm sure many of you have heard bout the situation in odessa where people were brought from outside of the ukraine to odessa brought from areas and pro-russian so younger thugs i would say who to participant in this destabilizing

demonstrations and group on public d attacks buildings in odessa. the thing to remember is levels a lot of people who are there are still lot of people in the law enforcement action feel demoralized. they question their loyalty. do.y don't know what to a new government in kiev is not very successful and not very working with of the people and making them to do their job, which is among other people who arehe attacking public buildings, separatist slogans and so on. courts and prosecutors, i believe that most f the people should be just fired, all of them, and a new actually brought

- should be brought into their positions. that is an important issue ecause the judiciary branch in the ukraine was for years basically nonexistent. it still is. same people there. talk about a new society and government with the same people ourpg those those ns -- occupying positions? people in my hometown have dominated ever since that we had in odessa. the people who are incitingt and who were violence against preventers use of armed forces nd they are taking part in separatist activities. that should explain the odessa.n we find in why is it there are some eparatist demonstrations and actions that are not countered in a proper way by local government or court or police or security service? security service we should emember have been heavily

infiltrated by russian agents. having before 2010 that has been a fact of massive infiltration. see what we y we see in odessa in the south and it well organized and well funded. e also have a very strong pro-ukrainian poor. people who are saying we don't know about it. maybe we will like him. we have had a lot of people not enthusiastic. but everything changed for many odessa in ukraine when russian troops came to crimea. who were eople questioning party loyalties are kwraoeufp united because the country is under attack. people taking f part in various marches,

media is ocial booming. betweene soccer matches of south the slogan and east and west being together. inhave a generational change place for sure because a lot of oungsters, most of the youngsters are pro ukrainian unlike with some senior citizens in odessa. intellectuals in odessa came out strongly in support of territorial integrity. various actors, painters, sculpt sculptors. musicians, they have recorded heir own statements and collective statements in support of territorial integrity. made media basically mr. putin, please go home. that was the main message. on the other side of the spectrum in the separatist camp

people who are actually unknown in our city. obody knows their names or where they came from. those people are aliens to us. not in existence prior to this event. so we're talking about the the activist side of odessa speaking strongly in territorial integrity and while there is a bunch of reinforced from the de of ukraine making efforts. for ukraine there are several priorities today. first of all to withstand the invasion. aggression.russian to try to continue to fight for further d prepare for invasion. we hope it won't happen but we need to be ready. yes, we are tkpweufrbg our money money r -- giving our from our small salaries and

army.s to support our people have given their money to army.rt the it would be laughable if in the for the drama of the situation. government should be supporting the money and enough money for the army to survive but that was not in the ukraine recent years. it has been almost destroyed in ukraine so people like myself eing a university professor giving some of our savings to the army so the army could be performing its functions. the second priority is to -- drag the e country out of the deep in.omical pits it is that would require passing unpo -- passing un populpopular money from cepting the international fund and radically increasing the would s that the people have to do. that is not going to be popular

but that is needed because there no way to delay it. that needs to be done. the better. ukraine is deeply wounded now. is very much where we have a eak state and we can authorities in kiefer -- kiev strong civil society. country keeping the together. -- are we ppy about happy about everything the government does? absolutely not. issues about inclusiveness and being cases.sive in many there are the same faces people of seeing on their of it screens. ut it is much been the one we we arefor the time being coalescing around this government because we are understood attack so we need to

stay united. finally on the support from the west and particularly from the united states, we are very that support. thinking that sanctions have been delayed. we have been thinking that the drastic are not enough. you bet we are. but at the same time whatever from t we are receiving this country is very important. in the matter so is very important. will sail al aid through and we will receive the assistance. one of the most popular figures ukraine, i have a facebook and my page the other day that like to have her working as minister of fortune affairs of ukraine. hat would be great for our country. i suppose so. a lot of people monitor her statements and security council it was a

delight. kind of military assistance we might get including ready to eat meals and and so on, the commitments for u.s. armed allies in upport eastern europe within nato, that is a good sign. we are hearing about a joint nato and xercise with u.s. military. that is a good sign. we understand the sanctions face difficulties. nothing moves fast and quick enough. there are difficulties. it is a democratic country so coordinate activities with various agencies. not where one person decides everything. inally, i would like to say that we ask that the united thing. do the right to us what the united states is oing in supporting ukraine corresponds to both interests of

these countries. help we're receiving today important. we are grateful. e can see clearly who are our friends. thank you. applause] >> thank you very much. that is professor dubovyk. i would like to introduce our next professor.

a number of ukrainian cities have have seen the activity and it is ll of restoring the original government so elections of the and lled governance unification with the russian federation. in some places it was compounded disturbance of public order attempts to take over and nal administration rising of russian flags, demands referendum and russia to introduce military troops to ukraine. events in the russian segment

taking place in a places.f due to the petition of the local elite. ultimately were upported by the ukrainian protestors. had several s thousand people strong and it the presence e to of the pro ukrainian emonstration and ability of violence groups. some elites most notably from various movements were legalg with the so-called frameworks. in my comments i will briefly general context ukrainian n of the

authorities and local elites and in of russian government the events in eastern and southern ukraine. in speaking eastern ukraine i to a number of among them odessa and crimea.blic of ogether these territories have 3 million people and about 48% of the population of ukraine. peop roughly 23 million eople, there are 14.5 million ukrainians, 63% and around seven are russian, 30% of the region.ion of the in other words, the southeastern

home to approximately ukrainian russian who mostly reside in big cities. the ratio of the russian 14,000 in ranges from one reasonable until 72% in gdansk reas and in 38% and 36% in another region. crimea about 60%, 58%. everywhere ukrainians and combine to close to 95% of the total population regardle regardless. is crimea where

are a significant minority. astern and south of the region of kroeup has traditionally been communist old of the the of ukraine although level of support has significantly declined from elections of 2007 o parliamentary elections of 2012. during the 2012 parliamentary for the the support to 30%.nged from 55% another region. the russian nationalist party marginalitionally been in the ukraine in large part due he area they occupied and

communist party of ukraine. has been known to attempt to have political including in laces like odessa and crimea where russian nationalist forces on had a movement and so could create potential to do have.better than they several weeks prior to the depo of yanukovych and he russian intervention in crimea one key was to conduct a ukrainian statehood which produced interesting results. unification that with russia was supported by 41% crimea.eople in dunyosk and 24% in

odessa. , around 4% in another 3.7% in so it is not difficult to see that there is a correlation between the russian population and people unification with russia as one big state. come l organizations have to the fore.

the there have been a number of in support of this. pa organization in my home city, the name of the is up loload created .high rank iing man there are several groups in odessa region. reason to believe that a number of policeman who protests were e nfluenced to join the russian federation. here are a lot of different participate in

this. social and economic motivation , at least for of participants demonstrations, business of symbolic of was support with the russian rather than direct unification. single situation like my ho kiev.own it so, the ukrainian media have russian the current protest as a productive activity and ssian special service political group. likely truth. there is presence among russian citizens who arrived from russian territory. not to should be careful downplay the importance of the local actors in this protest.

t is clear that some were not supported by close to 50% of the ukrainian population. was significantly high in the cities to the south country. of the often he protests were they led by certain means were ideological and that was case. a size of the protests in simplyof the cities were the kiss of russian federation is not under the estimation. extending the direction of the ukrainian authorities to these in the southeast in period it iskovych

important to understand the olitical transition after the collap collapse. toen completed. there are three basic partners regional transition in ukraine.nd southern he first model that is efection of local elite from a is an example of he defections from power and network. the second model is the transition where settlements or arrangements with electrical elites from power. power, party of

my city is the best example of transition with part of city council and makes an ouncil and arrangement with the new power for new kind of government. transition you can see in the southern region of probably odessa region. third model is local elites against central government with military t of fortune troops like in crimea or with of paramilitary protest

with strong support of parts f the electrical economical elit elite. anyway, in the aftermath of the oligarchs and important parts of regional defected the yanukovych they were inclined from k with a new power the separatist movements. see, for example, of a governor of some regions.

various cities it has not spoken against the new now local elites ried to facilitate support for ukraine anti-war protests after massive russian intervention in crimea. of s an interesting model eastern tlement in ukraine region and probably the local y to accommodate elites and agreement between -- between the center and region. some time some of regional elites took a position similar ones of the protest and sponsored the across of local para milita organizations.

they have been openly speaking of this and protection of russian language eastern ukrainian regions. at the same time, other parts of temporarily weakens the structure of the staete especially in the law segment.nt the police and security is very slow unfortunately. sometimes they will be and leading otest to this. eventually it is translated in the systematic attempts to separatist activities. groups in various

most members from organizations after the shooting in my home city two people were 12 were wounded. there's a lot of evidence of decline of protest activity but the situation still remains very shaky and unclear due to the russian factor. on example, the referendum and last weekend and a lot of marches and demonstration

.n odessa in conclusion, i would like to a new political eography of ukraine after the annexation of crimea. in preparing our representation calculations me about the results of the -- presidential election of 2004 and 2010.ential election of

actually, we have a new situation and have one of the more interesting results november lections of 21 of 2004. it is very interesting. he difference between his opponent in 0.58%.s only results.ry close to severalry similar others and probably in the fort in you tial elections

more national s new division and cleavages between political parties. new political tphu situation in ukraine. from the international point of new it is the start of a era of international regionsless -- relations tion order and rmation of d disintegration of the regime of and result of regi power in ation of eastern and southern ukraine ith the creation of the local very cal regimes with

inter-elite e of arrangements. thank you for your attention. [applause] very much, professor. our next proffer -- proffer from estonia. >> thank you, cory. presentation will be about russia and trying to make sense position and behavior in this situation. let me start by saying that is also going through very difficult times. as a t mean it justification or request for mpathy or even by no means as an attempt to somehow downplay

ukrainians in he the current situation. there is a division between majority and the minority who feels isolate and not a good country to be in. in estonia border is not very easy for us because creates anxiety in the local community which is deeply oncerned about the possible consequences of the annexation f crimea for the baltimore particul -- baltic ic states and -- states and all of the things we become were conspiracy true and we know what to expect. but let's try to make sense of going on. there are different explanations f what they are trying to achieve and the simplest is probably that russian behavior

just opportunistic. russia just takes whatever is there to grab. his kind of simple logic which dictates to expand when you can expand. here is, of course, some truth to this explanation. but i would say that it wouldn't qualify as a full explanation of russia's behavior. the empty space with imply, for instance -- well, i would imply nviting turkistan to join the union a long time ago because there were requests and annex or incorporating in the other areas, tion some have been requesting that. for some reason it started with crimea. and all of that can still happen. but i would say that now if it happens it would happen because

crimea, not for its own. but i feel uncomfortable describe be russia's behavior as simply opportunistic and cold-blooded expansion inch. there is too much ideology and passion even. is a course there different explanation which also helps to qualify why for not turkistan and that is ethnic national inch and arced that putin has sided with the ethnic and nalists in russia supports the defending of the wherever they s are and wherever there are conditions good for that. turkistan and others are outside the picture because them furtherrating with russia would mean

integrating the population and is design -- desixeno poeb -- xenophobe why and that is case where you are helping ellow russians and that brings a lot of bonus points. would let to argue sake ase and just for the of experiment let's imagine that the security guarantees states that nato provides lose credibility. would russia hesitate it take them over? i think most of us now would say no. baltic states will probably be somehow incorporated and the russian sphere. it is not next directly but that

the next target. and it wouldn't stop there. the russian populated areas. it would most probably involve repetition of 1940. this is sort of an intuitive knowledge that we will have the possible kwpbss of we have justd that passed. is the only lodge skwrubg there re in -- logic out in operation. another explanation is to say that this is sort of a different sort. domestically motivated and attempt to divert attention from potential economic crisis to war which would probably long enough to divert the anks from domestic problems -- divert the attention from domestic problems. but if it was such a

cold-blooded calculation, it should have ncluded some assessment of risks and costs. and i wouldn't say that it looks rational from this perspective. because the costs are already there. for the are huge economy in the first place. was he russian economy stagnating or had been stagnating before the intervention. it was in bad shape but it was not collapsing. oing what russia does now strongly increases the possibility of a collapse, economic collapse. basically the logic would be what do we do? economy ollapsing the for the sake of presenting a collapse of the economy. sound very n't rational to me. probably part of the picture but the whole time operation was executed too

skillfully. is kind of a mixture of each in factors, isolation looks credible to some extent but not really fully credible. and, of course, we can always go he usual academic way and say this is a combination of factors. a certain phenomenon. but there is a certain magic apply to ich if you the situation it will put all the pieces of the puzzle in place. formula might sound benign but i will say it. his is the restoration of the soviet union. i mean it more as a policy. to prove ing to try that putin is intent on soviet union. what i'm arguing is a more productive one. the restoration of the soviet union has already

happened. explain what i mean. yes, russia is still much union than the soviet and will probably never be able lost ain the lands it during the soviet collapse. world whiche of the is shared by the majority of the in this d elites is mage the country stretches beyond its internationally recognized borders. when putin had a description of in ukrainian state being permanent crisis the last 20 years it is a view shared by compatriots. for many russians the post-states are nothing but history. the sovereignty are questionable at least. in order to understand what is to -- n one simply moves and also what might happen elsewhere -- one needs to look

evidence of the soviet world view. self-determination is a key ideology.of soviet we know that. ethic russians were the dominant group, the first among equals officially re other recognized nationalities and ethnic homeland kpurl autonomy. -- cultural autonomy. is being promised today. but there is much no are to the crimea than support of fellow russians. it was also justified by allusions to that are clear to anyone who grew up in they originate in the history text become which or girl had on their desk. russianula was like the

russian naval warriors. hey are directly from soviet mythology. .t is a direct quote soviet course the history explains why propaganda presenting effective the russian refuvolutiorevoluti. the ukrainian national liberation being part based on profoundly antiwestern attitudes inherited from the times of the kold war. this mentality all political evelopments dearrived from geo -- derived from the struggle and west and st there is no such thing of people

preve protesting and fighting for rights. everything that laps in ukraine -- happens in ukraine or lsewhere as long as it was not from moscow had to be washington. no other possibility exists. and the ukraine revolution in there image was a victory for ukrainians.t the back the doesn't fight next would be in moscow so it a defeat's way to turn in a victory but creating the support for the regime. so, unfortunately, it seems that it ukrainian case has made lear that the project of fostering a tpnew identity for russia which was initiated in -- 1991, 1992, has failed. what happened is russian society

on the only shared legacy that it has. of empire.s but what is important to imperial is not the it is form supported by the soviet system. first universal education and indoctrination hat reached all over the country. everyone went to the school and learned it and the cliches now work. and other nations in the post-soviet space have other memories. it appears that russia didn't have anything like that and this the e main reason for failure of the new identity of russia. in the new generation the argument was 10 years or 15 years back that the new will no longer be soviet. have fewnew generation alternatives to choose from and

ince they have no firsthand experience of living in the soviet times and experience the soviet regime e or life, they were even more the people in their 40's and 50's to embrace the new identity. and i would argue that with the rallying around putin over the annexation of the soviet union has een restored in terms of the continuing the terms of the this cal identity of entity and its global outlook. o, anyone who wants to understand what was going on and what to expect from the kremlin at the -- must look future must look at the soviet past. e don't know what is going to happen in connection exactly. we can not predict whether e stern ukraine will b

elsewhere or what will happen the next few years. we can say that crimea was a vetial case, very symbolic, -- so it would be logical to stop there for the time being comes out of this whole move. ut i think that and here i'm coming back to where i started. we should also think about .ussia and its future also oviet restoration is crucially important for any evaluation of the prospects of regime. the main reason for the soviet economy. was the it was too dependent on exports and been -- hydrocarbon experts and exports. it could be that putin's government will follow the same

will be some economic catastrophe. what crucial question is happens next, not what brings down the current regime but what after wards that would be that the soviet people seated ir deeply antiwestern mind setd still consumers.e west as the same phenomenon is observed in today's russia. brandishing their productic they brandished their patriotic feelings as rely on imports in almost every aspect of their daily area. -- experience. anyone who can afford to go abroad for shopping or were some -- tourism will do it. the population might welcome more engagement with the west. they have the hope of achieving a higher living standard. but it becomes too risky. historical parallels become too

risky. painful memories of the interior collapse -- the ukrainian crisis has reopened the old sores. it did not heal any wounds. the contrary was the case. russia remains extremely fragile. this is not good news for anyone who wants to be democratic or peaceful. [applause] >> thank you very much. that was a professor from the university of tartu in estonia. our final speaker is an associate at harvard university. >> thank you. my main expertise is in military. i will start by talking about the russian military operations.

i will expand a little bit on a couple of the things that were touched on. the "why now" aspect. i will talk about the u.s. policy and response and some of the implications of where this might be going. as far as the military operation, we have to remember one key fact that makes crimea very different from the rest of ukraine. there is a relatively large contingent of russian troops that are based there by treaty and by agreement long before any of these events happened. the normal contingent that was there is about 14,000. primarily navy personnel. it also includes some naval infantry anthony the infant trajan -- and some naval air

forces. it was relatively easy to augment those forces with special forces troops. russia did bring them into the existing base without it being as noticeable as it might have been in other parts of ukraine or elsewhere. you remember from tv, they could take off their idiotic error -- insignia appearance as little green men. in russian social media, they -- polite people. they occupy key locations around ukrainian military bases.

areas that connect crimea to the rest of ukraine. this could be done very quickly. it was done very quickly. it was done before people knew what was going on. that was the key for the success of the operation. by the time the ukrainian government, which was not the most organized, had taken over, and they saw what was going on, they already control most of the key facilities. what this tells us about the russian military is that special forces are very well-trained and equipped. they can carry out covert operations effectively. we should be careful because this does not necessarily the to

the quality of the entire military force. we should not make assumptions that a lot of the other brigade and other forces in russia have a much lower state of readiness. the forces that were brought into crimea came from the southern military district. it is one of russia's or military district of that is where they have expected combat or the past 10 years. in chechnya, the world georgia, -- the war with georgia, various counterterrorism unit. there are relatively few conscripts. it has the most modern equipment. it was interesting and there was a kind of divergent very tactic used where there were these highly publicized exercises that

were conducted by the western military district around eastern ukraine. there were lots of troops supposedly being used. everyone pay attention over here, at the same time, troops from the southern military district -- if you follow the open press, it is like there was nothing going on there. they were the ones who were brought in together with some airborne forces. and they brought in people who are generally kept a higher age of readiness. that is how it was done. that is a fairly small number of troops at that level. if you look at other russian forces, a of the brigade commanding levels of worry -- 40%-60%.

what i am trying to say is just because russia has highly effective troops, we should not assume that it has 750,000 highly effective. that is something to keep in mind. there are also some serious limitations on logistics. that would make sustained operations much more difficult to carry out then a quick strike like this. this did not involve any work fighting. -- war-fighting. in terms of the implications for what we know about russian military capabilities, they can plan a good operation and do it well. but we have not learned that much about how the russian military would function in an actual serious conflicts, especially over a period of time. i will leave it at that.

i will leave the military aside for now. i had a few points on why putin did this and i cross them off as we went through them. this is good. it is nice to be thinking along the same lines. i think there is an obvious question of "why now?" there is an important corrective that needs to be made. this is not a victory for putin. this is a loss for putin. when we look at everything together -- if we look at

putin's position at various points in time when yanukovych agreed to go with golden -- putin and not sign the agreement, he thought he had ukraine. in february, when the protesters -- when he thought he had a deal with yanukovych, there was instability. it looked like he had all of ukraine. suddenly, ukraine is lost. what happens is, and this goes to the why now question, and we mentioned briefly, "why now?" is that you will not suddenly make the best of a bad situation. that is where this tactical reaction to losing ukraine is to

take what you can get. crimea is relatively easy to get. not only that that reduce the below in a way, it also destabilizes ukraine in the short term. there are benefits for putin there. it is a miscalculation. unless ukraine has changed a lot, it seems to me that the government was right for a situation that was similar to what had happened after the word resolution -- orange revolution. there were disparate elements in the coalition. they would fall relatively quickly. the russian government could choose one or more of them to

make an alliance with or buy off. then they could restore their position to some kind of equilibrium. by intervening, as we heard, they unite the rest of ukraine against the attacker. now we have -- they provide more assistance from the west. i think that was the miscalculation. that is where we get into some of these ideological and his -- historical factors that lead to some of these issues. i do not have a lot of time, but i want to get to some of the u.s.-based policies.

i think that the obama administration has handled this pretty well. it was not initially clear -- now, sitting back after crimea has been annexed, we can say, of course. he was going to take over crimea. that was not clear initially. by warning of serious consequences well allowing for putin to de-escalate was the right course of action. as it became clearer and clearer that the equation was not on the table, we are seeing the ramping up of sanctions.

the second part of that is that some people say that sanctions are not hurting enough. the administration looks weak. i am not seeing what the alternatives are from those critics. i do not think that military intervention is on the table. nor should it be. i do not see what the alternatives are. serious sanctions are at the same time -- the meditations are the ones that do not hit the average russian. it is not their goal. -- fault. hitting the regime the right target. it would make it easier for putin to rally the population

around the flag. whereas what i see going forward now is that sanctions will hurt the elite. at the same time, our conception in the u.s. and europe of what russia is about and what russian foreign policy is about has fundamentally changed. that will affect how -- the willingness of the west to invest in russia. that will cause economic pain to russia. it will not be directly blamed on the west. there will be less investment. the russian stock market is down. it may rise in the future, but he will be at a lower level now.

europe is going -- there will be steps to reorient away from russia. that will take time. but again, it is going to cause economic pain to those russian elites. that is why i think this is the right direction. it is not just a select -- a slap on the wrist. let me conclude by talking about some of the risk factors for the future. i see short-term risks, medium risk, and long-term risks. short-term risks, and the obvious one is instability. it seems pretty clear that russian intelligence in eastern ukraine is working with locals to create instability.

it will be very difficult, but very important the ukrainian government to stabilize that situation. the second risk is in crimea. that has been alluded to. the crimean tartar population. this is a population of about 300,000 people. they are not happy with the way things are. it is possible that they could be bought off. i do not know. i have not talked to them. there's going to be the source of instability for wresting control crimea. there is also some number of

ukrainian patriots stilling crimea. some have fled, but somewhere there. those are the short-term risks. the medium risks are the key. one of the big things for me that is coming out of his speech that -- putin's speech was the statement about defending ethnic russians outside russian borders. that is a huge threat to a whole bunch of countries. obviously ukraine, khazakstan. we mentioned the baltic states. this creates a security threat to the region. it carried out, it has broader implications for the international borders.

there are lots of countries that have ethnic minorities that live in other countries. china. hungary. this is something that if russia does not back away from it, -- putin talked about domestic issues. this is essentially operationalizing regular people living their regular lives as a potential fifth column. they will now be treated with suspicion. that is the jurists. it is a huge risk. to go with that, there are potential efforts to piggyback on annexing other countries. that also could create more instability.

in the long term, and i will not speak too much about this, but the economic situation in ukraine. it is something that has to be dealt with. i think the way that ukraine wins in the long run is to become more attractive as a place to be than crimea is in russia. that is where ukrainians go. i'm not economist. i do not know how to do that. that seems to me to be a long-term challenge. not just the economy, but also the governance as well. [applause] seems to me to be a long-term challenge. not just the economy, but also the governance as well. [applause] i will stop there. >> thank you. we have some time for discussion.

i invite questions. please keep them brief. please identify yourself. >> hi, i am from georgetown university. do you think the current actions will have some impact in future years? what about fiscal year 2016? for the u.s. yesfor the u.s. >> i'm sure it will. i do not know how. i am not a u.s. defense expert. i know that there are people in the pentagon and various regional commands that are thinking about russia that have not been thinking about russia for a while.

i am sure that will translate into structure and planning and so forth. it is hard to tell. there are no numbers yet. >> i am vice president of george washington university. i am a ukrainian-american. i want to complement the panel. this is an impressive and informative panel. especially professor dubovyk. you should run for political office given how passionately you spoke. what is your educated guess about russia going into eastern ukraine in the foreseeable future? do you think it will happen? yes or no? >> i hope it will not happen.

i do not think it will happen. >> my opinion is the probability is about 7%. [laughter] 7% probability of invasion into eastern ukraine. >> i think it is possible, but not very probable. i am with them. it is possible, but there have to be missteps by the ukrainian government along the way. if the opportunity presents itself, it is certainly possible. i do not think it is in the plan. >> i have discussed this topic with my friends and my colleagues yesterday. it is only about 5% or 7%.

iter the crimean referendum was maybe 15%. now it has gone down. [laughter] >> i am from georgia. i have fresh memories of russian activities in the same manner and same style. one thing i would like to comment about the measuring of success is that putin has a different measuring system of his own success. please do not measure how we view successor loss. he does not care. a successful economy, people's lives, these are not measurements for him. i think in terms of projecting,

he embarked on a road where he cannot stop. if he stops, it means defeat to him. he has to continue. he needs more victories. where he will dive, in which endeavor, it is hard to judge. with eastern ukraine, i think he now possesses more tools to make things turbulent there without military intervention. that should be the issue where theinterim government for elections both they should concentrate on helping ukraine. i have a question also in this regard. it was clearly seen in putin's recent interview when he had his appearance justifying his very arrogant public appearance justifying his behavior that russia would not stand with nato on its own borders. the expansion of nato is

something he fears. this will undermine russia. he will view it as his defeat. what is the ratio of public service has been conducted in ukraine of nato membership? >> let's collect a few questions. >> hello. my question is for the two professors. aboutth mentioned polls the percentage of people in different ukrainian cities would want unification of russia. i want to know when those old -- when those polls were there areand also if any indicators about the current feeling in the cities are. i know you are from those cities, see probably have some perspective on that. over the last 2-3 weeks, there have been a lot of propaganda.

that can change the opinions of people. [inaudible] >> i have a phd in crimea. i've been going to crimea for the last 12 years. i am a crimean scholar at george mason. i want to address some issues. i spoke with the leader of the crimea movement. he spoke with president putin this month. putin wanted to talk to him and he invited him to meet in moscow.

they spoke on the phone. putin asked him his support on annexation. he told them that they always supported ukrainian territory. this annexation was against the budapest agreement of 1994. when he came back, he said everything was planned. this is just my opinion. you guys are talking about the soldiers. there were 25,000 soldiers together in sevastopol. those green men are not my worries. my worries are that i have been in crimea for the last will be years -- 12 years and i have seen those people who are called russian unity and other groups. they have been training against the enemy for the last when 20 years.

the pro-russian guys are also my friends. these guys are local people. those are the scariest ones. they just tortured and killed crimean tartare. kidnap someone else. they killed a member of the opposition party. iny're walking around tatar neighborhoods. there are other things. when the mosque was burned, the construction of the mosque in december 2012, it was russian unity.

. i don't have a question, i'm sorry. it was just a little comment. >> thank you, i am emily andrews. first of all, one comment. his't he clever to move capital? bywas an area that was also the soviet union where there were a lot of russians. i question is about unintended consequences for routine -- for president routine? are the further movement in the caucuses, in particular because of what has happened to the tartare is in the media and what the russians had done?

i have a feeling that could be many unintended consequences for what has just happened. >> the first thing is a comment on comments. this could lead to further invasion of russian troops. and i think that is the case. obviously, we are seeing routine operating based on some kind of he isl picture that constructed about what is going on in ukraine. it doesn't really matter what ukrainian government does or doesn't do. he would still be talking about polygrams and riots and missing journalists and people being tortured. none of it is true. that is still a picture what is projected to the russian consumers. it is also the picture that russia is trying to eject people in the west through their media

channels and so on. should beknow that we careful and not do any of those missteps, that would be one thing. -- regardless of what we do or don't do in kiev, by the government or anywhere else in ukraine, russia would still make up their mind basically corresponding to the idea of what needs to be done with the ukraine. that is even more scary. that leaves us without any kind of leverage the situation. point is a public support for membership. it is gone up dramatically in recent days, as you would imagine. recent polls have been showing %. it has never been that high. including in the east and the south.