in the west through their media channels and so on. should beknow that we careful and not do any of those missteps, that would be one thing. -- regardless of what we do or don't do in kiev, by the government or anywhere else in ukraine, russia would still make up their mind basically corresponding to the idea of what needs to be done with the ukraine. that is even more scary. that leaves us without any kind of leverage the situation. point is a public support for membership. it is gone up dramatically in recent days, as you would imagine. recent polls have been showing %. it has never been that high. including in the east and the south.

the government, is not talking about membership. the current prime minister went to brussels and talk to people, and he said that is not an agenda for ukraine. this is a technical position for our government. we need to look for some alternative ways of providing for security now. notthe ways we had did work. it proved to be absolutely inefficient. all of those guarantees and assurances did not work. what else is left for ukraine to do other than to look for more functioningd a system of providing security? right now it is not a very good conductingor service.

it is on the verge. what i'm seeing and hearing from them, they are even trying to avoid doing this, because there are a lot of pro--- provocations and hostilities. finde would be trying to out why we're asking these questions. we should wait a little bit until things calm down before the new service and polls are conducted. finally, the possibility of conflict in crimea troubles me a lot. i would absolutely agree that it is not regular russian troops who should be scared of, but of irregulars and paramilitaries. not just local people but also people from other regions, chechnya as well. those are some really crazy people there. they might go and do stupid

things. tatars have their own high emotions. that leaves potential for bloodshed. >> the polls that were conducted in february of this year by the international institute. i don't know the new data after the crimean crisis. mike graduate students conducted europeanabout intervention and the so-called

-- union integration. what are the options for the european union integration and for custom union agreement. [indiscernible] membership,out nato there are two different situations. before the crimean crisis and after the crimean crisis. afterwards, number of supporters of nato membership dramatically increased. it increased in my home city and other eastern ukrainian regions. actually, it is questions of a great power game and interrelations between the u.s.

and russia and ukraine. there is a lot of space for negotiations and for regional agreements about military -- about the military state of ukraine and international security after the crimean crisis. unintended consequences. yes, it is probably too early to say something very concrete. i am not sure the situation in the caucuses might deteriorate directly as a consequence of the crimean crisis, but what might happen, and something that is more probable, is the growth of xenophobic attitudes, which inevitably -- which inevitably will follow this pathologic occasion that we are observing now. it will potentially lead to

deterioration of internal interethnic relations in russia. this is definitely a potential. other unintended consequences which might occur -- let's wait thesee what happens -- with eurasian union and the agreement of the eurasian economic union. that was waiting for signature in may. it is not guaranteed that this will happen. what will be the content of this agreement is not very clear. how successful will it be? one more thing which i would probably point out in the context of what was said, with the sanctions, yes, right now you see all the signs in the shops. obama is not welcome here, as a on thee to the sanctions russian elites.

i think this is temporary. it cannot last for long. this solid there is a nation with the bureaucracy and the top, not just resident putin himself, the top leaders who are usually considered corrupt and inefficient and so on and selfish, that is something that can actually in the final analysis turn against president putin. it creates for the division between the public and the bureaucracy rather than consolidation around the flag. concur, we might remember that after the georgian war there was a similar burst of nationalism and support. protests did not come that long afterwards. so that kind of thing can happen again.

i want to just say one thing on ars. i thinkan tat you're absolutely right being concerned about these local groups. i think one thing we have to keep in mind is that the interests of these local elites may well diverge from the interests of vladimir putin and company or the elites in moscow or however you want to phrase it. has been making all these noises about how we are going to respect tatar's there's is one of the laggards as of the republican how they're going to regularize everything. i forget which local politician said, we may have to expel rs from some of

the land they are squatting on. but again, this is the sort of thing where the message -- because the locals are the ones relationsvery hostile for a longars time, whereas moscow is trying >> - [indiscernible] do you have some and talking on this side of the room first? >> i have a question and a comment. arst, this is maybe more question for a citizen of ukraine.

in case putin moves further into eastern ukraine. what kind of sanctions can we expect from the west? question which bothers a lot citizens of ukraine today. as for the comment, i would like to say that this is not the prime issue, but the situation was widely competent commented that theent experts regime was shaken a lot with these events. date was denied nuclear weapons in exchange for any security guarantees for defense and security. that nothing can defend you, maybe except nuclear

weapons. .his is a clear message to iran would annexea russia, the united states and the eu should apologize to iran and korea for trying to enhance their security with the only real means of security enhancement. it means it would be a great impact for the horizontal proliferation or a push for the proliferation movement. then as for the vertical proliferation. dot for thee a big dream of nuclear zero. now russia has a good pretext not to continue its nuclear reductions just

.o create new strategic forces everybody understands that the and creatingng scenarios in ukraine and other places. ofery much support the idea vitislav who says there are no ideas that could be created in the idea that the hostile west is coming will create some as a meanssolidation to enhance russia's security. it means that russia will not pursue any kind of reductions. thank you.

>> my name is abraham. to understand the russian winter olympics provided cover for putin to plan his crimean operation in the same way that invaded georgia during the chinese summer games. what are the prospects for -- moldova?led over could you please comment to what extent the european union is unified in their resolve to come to russian aggression, especially what is the german attitude toward the crisis, thank you. >> thanks to the panel for a very interesting set of

comments. i'm curious about whether there is any difference in what happened in the ukraine. listening to you, these are the same accommodations that might take days after an election, at the regional level to accommodate a new power in kiev. doesn't it matter that this new power did not come into power through an election, that they came to power through other means? encourage the east and the south to support them? as far as russia not moving further into the east, it would also be applicable to never having entered crimea. given that we know they did enter crimea, i wonder if you could update the underlying logic in a way that would incorporate the fact that they invaded crimea and that they won't go any further. >> one more question in the back.

>> i am from george washington university. my question is about the economy. i know none of the panelists are economists, but you said something about the long term dangers of the economic situation. of course it was the economy that triggered the protests in maidan last year. my question is if the eu and united states will be able to absorb the turbulence is that willie -- that will be cost by necessary austerity measures. now the ukraine and russia live symbiotic economic unity. there will have to be a dissociation. unrest ascause social we have seen in greece, a far more stable country and is ukraine. which kind of government in ukraine will be able to regulate these kinds of unrest that are foreseeable and that will determine the future of ukraine?

so, i can take two of these kind of parallel -- why won't they intervened and what further steps if they do intervene. obviously, there is no certainty here, right? it seems that the main difference is that crimea is -- there are three. one is the presence of a base. two, crimea is self-contained. there is an obvious stopping place. into luhansk, maybe you should also go into donetsk.

why you're added maybe you should take kiev. that doesn't mean that they won't do it, but ukraine will have no choice but to defend using arms, i mean. that is a big difference. it is not that russia can't defeat the ukrainian military. seen in u.s.e interventions in various places in the world over the last few decades, it is easy to invade, it is hard to hold. there will be a lot of there would be a lot of pain to occupying troops, i think, so i think that is the reason why. the population, even in the easternmost regions, even if there were sizable percentages

of some cities, as we heard from the polling data, rural areas are predominately ukrainian speaking. you know more about this than i could hope to. it seems it is much more complicated. as far as further steps, we have the plan, level three sanctions. in the end, assuming we don't want to go to war, the final step is cutting russia off from the international financial system. that is the extreme sanction iran is under. that obviously causes a lot of pain to europe.

there are further steps that can be taken. that is another reason why i kind of like the obama response. if you have a limited amount of ammunition, you don't want to use all of it that once. if things get worse, you want to be able to do more within the upper limit of what you're willing to do. so that is another benefit. there was a question about using the winter olympics as a cover. i don't see it. putin spent a lot of money to use the winter olympics is a big p.r. show for the regime. nobody remembers that anymore.

it still works on the domestic scene, but as far as internationally, it was wasted. to me, that is another indicator this was not something planned much in advance. can you address the germany question? i can do it. go ahead. >> i will pick up where you stopped with the olympics. it refers back to the question about different measurements. within russia, these are two consecutive victories. in international politics, the crimean situation seems to have annulled whatever was gained by the winter olympics. it was a limited exercise to

protect russia's influence and show that russia is still strong. in terms of potential further intervention, let me risk producing one more nightmare scenario. why don't you demand the corridor? that could be a clever move from a certain point of view. it is all possible. at the same time, we must be aware of the fact that people in the kremlin, the ministry of defense, the ministry of finance, there are some sensible people. they must be able to at least make the case.

the risks grow exponentially as you continue down that path. that probably partly answers the question about moldova. moldova will get close attention from the european union. the association agreement is already in the pipeline. the free trade area is probably going to be in place soon. yes, of course, it is quite possible there is some agitation in moldova proper by russia. it is already very much agitated by itself. nothing is excluded.

there is a possibility for overstretch. the reaction of the e.u. and germany, there is a strong presence of this position in germany. let's do business with russia. let's forget about the politics russia is trying to play, this kind of appeasement attitude. it is very strong in the business circle and intellectual circles. it had been there before the ukrainian crisis. it is still there. it is still very tangible. germany within the e.u. is not exactly on the russian side, but on the more moderate side, let's put it this way. again, there are limitations to what can be done.

they will come under pressure domestically from civil society. a crucial indication of what the e.u. is going to do would be the helicopter carriers which france is scheduled to deliver to russia. that will be a litmus test for the determination of the e.u. to do something about ukraine and russia. >> the question about what would happen after the russian invasion in eastern ukraine and sanctions. they would probably need military protection from international forces. ukrainian territorial integrity.

aggression is important in the crisis in crimea. the eastern ukraine indicates in current political international system which was created in 1945. symbolically, this order in 2015. the resolution of the way of development. it is one point of view. the question about occupation of eastern ukraine.

the central government does not have capacity to keep power in eastern ukraine without settlement of part of eastern ukrainian elite. in the current situation, in the ukrainian regions, the pattern is integration. the new government [indiscernible] the second pattern is transition. the settlement with the formal elite [indiscernible] between the governor and the cabinet. failed state and failed region.

[indiscernible] no settlement, no negotiation between kiev and crimea. it is the way to civil war. it is the topic of my future academic paper on a solution for ukraine. establishing a new ukrainian constitution and resolution between east and west ukraine. each part of ukraine, 50% of elections include government. the democratic but formal part of the region. you need government in ukraine if you want to keep the eastern

region in ukraine. >> we have about one more minute. >> my colleagues have done a good job answering questions, so i will give it to you cory. >> let me say thank you very much to our panelists for a stimulating discussion. we are hopeful and optimistic about ukraine's future, the relationship of ukraine with its neighbors. please join me in thanking the panel. [applause] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014] >> met i called and comment on "washington journal." the new discussion on the outlook of the global economy.

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