>> great question. how do we get the economy going? i believe the united states is on the verge of massive economic expansion. probably as large as we have ever had in our history. it will be driven by four basic factors. the first and is important by far is the new energy paradigm. for the first time in -- time since the 1950's, we will be an energy exporter instead of an importer. we will have an incredible advantage over the other industrialized countries in this world.

nothing translates to an economy with more aggressiveness -- we are not just talking about oil and gas. we are talking about everything in the economy being impacted in a positive way by a lower cost of energy. we discovered massive capabilities in energy and this will translate into a huge economic opportunity for us as a country. the second thing we have going for us is that we are still the place where great ideas come from. whether it is twitter or facebook or tesla or, in my part of the country, biomedicine, we are the creative people and we are creating these ideas. the third thing we have going for us is that there is a massive amount of capital waiting on the sidelines to invest in these ideas.

so you have a lot of people who are willing to fall and take risks with their money through pension funds and whatever else on people who have these ideas. and the force they -- the fourth thing we have going for us is that we are inherently entrepreneurial people. we are still the best place to come if you have an idea and you are willing to risk and put your sweat into it and grow your opportunities. that is just our culture. what is holding us back? the only thing holding us back is our fiscal policy, the fact that we are running these deficits and debts that put us at risk on the fiscal side. i happen to think we will straighten those out. incrementally, we will get to it. we will get tax reform and we will get medicare reform which is really all that there is left to do. so i am pretty positive about america's future and our capacity for economic growth. a lot of it is coming. 90% of it is coming because washington is not involved. >> one more question. right over there, this gentleman here. >> i am very stern -- i am barry stern.

my concern worldwide, we talked about a big economic stimulus. throughout most of the world, there are too many babies. the demographic your meds are very different -- demographic. meds are very different -- demographic pyramids are very different. the numbers are enormous.

do you see any kind of geopolitical threat of lots of young men unemployed in primarily developing countries? are there any u.s. foreign-policy initiatives and defense initiatives that take these things into account? >> well, that is a very legitimate concern but it is not one that we as a nation or our government can do a heck of a lot about. their is no question that a lot of the radicalism in this world is jürgen by the fact that there are large numbers of young people who don't have much else to do but be radical. and that is especially true in some of your countries which are feeding the islamic fundamentalist movements. what can we do about that? probably very little. we cannot solve the worlds problems of unemployment. but we can have a vibrant national economy and make sure that our economy is vibrant. that does help the world. i saw some statistics somewhere

about the locations of walmart to the rest of the world employment is massive. the economy is growing. we bring a lot of people with us. the best way to make our economy grow is to highlight our strengths and our strengths are in numeral. we are so well-positioned as a country, it is staggering to me. i don't see any way that we aren't going to grow and be extra nearly prosperous. the only thing that will stand in our way is our government. and our government will not stand in our way that long because it is full of people who are wanting to do what is right. it just takes them a while and they have to get a few mistakes in. democracies will get things right after they have tried everything that is wrong. we are in the process of trying a few wrong things but we are still moving in the right in my opinion. we are still of the biggest and most prosperous nation in the world and the best place to live. and as we grow, the world will benefit.

>> thank you very much, senator. [applause] of the weekpreview ahead in congress. >> the map of the world literally changed since they went on the resource -- on the recess. the new bipartisan sanctions bill attempts to get the house whatenate on the same page is ahead when congress returns on monday in terms of the ukraine legislation? >> thousand and seven are going to try to get on the same page, as you say, since they left russia formally annexed crimea. the two chambers have different approaches to a bill that would both levy sanctions on those they feel what are responsible for the bios, and would assure that ukraine gets loan guarantees and direct economic -- assistance. introducedll was

friday, as we do this interview on friday, and ahead in the house, how does this bill of the house will take up any different from what has been in the past? >> they will try to move things and little bit closer between the changers -- chambers. what is essentially happening is that the senate bill, which the chamber will take a boat to also has a restructuring of aid to the international monetary fund that could help ukraine. republicans in that chamber and house republicans disagree. they think it is an extraneous provision that can be done another time. they are backing in error over version. props not the same thing that the house passed before recess, but something that the house chairman and his ranking member rolled out this bill today that could provide a point of compromise. that is good be marked up on tuesday.

whatould this fit in with the white house is passed of the past week? >> they anticipate adding some names. the thinking here is to go after the people who are financing tin and her-- pu relieve in the eyes of congress. it would be in addition to what they already done administratively. congress is getting in the game along with the white house. >> we heard from the majority leader that this will be the first thing they take up: the comeback monday. we also heard a word about a deal that has been done on the engine of unemployment uninsured -- insurance benefits. >> there has been multiple attempts to renew this jobless aid that expired in december. this latest deal has the support of finest senate republicans

meaning that if you get 55 members of the democratic caucus you might be able to advance it. what i would do is essentially renew the unemployment insurance and it would require long-term recipients to get job training and other steps. the problem is that the house republicans are quite hostile to this approach. john boehner says after a three-month interaction that it would be a minimum -- administrative nightmare. getting the eligibility figured out, they say they would rather focus on measures that create jobs rather than renewing what not very goodwas economic assistance. on unemployment is just part of the democrats effort to revive the economic agenda. what did he mean by that your progress there's affirmative right of steps of the democrats were hoping to showcase this a -- to highlight incoming

income inequality. it seems that the kind of stumbled after the gate and they're pushing the back further and further and now of course international events may be overtaking that as well. the stones from opposition to a lot of these measures because of forwarde of a ford -- k . there has to be offsetting cuts in the budget and that is hard to get everyone to agree on. >> thousand senator facing a deadline in two weeks on the medicare payments to doctors. is there another short-term measure ahead of and is there a possibility that they will get a long-term measure passed? >> it is increasingly looking like another short-term patch, perhaps a short as one month. tois medicare reimbursement position, a exercise here washington. they would like to replace the formula that the date these

cuts, but they have had little success in figuring out a way to offset the cost of doing so. ist they would like to do maybe do a nine-month patch that takes this issue off the table that the election. but then you have to find a way of paying for that cabinet is easy to pay for maybe a one-man kick the can down the road measure. that is increasingly looking like it what -- it is what they will do. >> you can follow him on attter, also read his report cq rollcall.com. thank you for joining us. the senate is in tomorrow, 2:00 p.m. eastern time. they will be voting at 5:30 p.m. on that ukraine legislation and the house is a not monday this is in on monday at 2:00 p.m.

votes on that after 6:30 p.m. we will have live coverage of the house here on c-span in the senate on c-span two. also tomorrow, dutch politician and european parliament member will talk about iran's nuclear program prevent her visit to iran last year. she will be live at the atlantic council of and we will take you there at 10:00 a.m. eastern on c-span. >> just two weeks ago, in the midst of a terrible budget on the potomac we saw again the spirit of american heroism at its finest. savinged rescue workers crash victims from icy waters. we saw the heroism of one of our government employees, who would theaw a woman gripped in helicopter line dived into the water and dragged her to safety. [applause]

>> find more highlights from 35 years of house floor covered on our facebook page. c-span, created by america's cable companies are the five years ago. rocky today is a public service by your television provider. next an update on afghanistan with the special or general who oversaw reconstruction. this is from the atlantic council. it is about an hour and a half.

good morning, everyone. i'm the director of the south asia center at the atlantic council and behalf of my colleague and our president, i'd like to welcome all of you to this very important session with special inspector general for afghanistan restriction, john f. sopko. as we all know the political and military transition has begun in afghanistan. this is going to be a very critical year. the issue of afghanistan, the issue of costs, the issue of the use of taxpayers monies has been alive in this town and other capitals around the world that have contributed to the actions in iraq and then in afghanistan. and there are in calculations out there on the number of

dollars that are being spent simply by the u.s. there's one particular site that has these meters that run regularly every second updating the cost, and that estimates the cost at about $10 million an hour for the war in afghanistan. of course there are different figures out there. there is the famous brown university study that calculated a cost of 3 to 4 billion roughly. there's been an updated overall cost estimate looking at opportunity costs as well as complimentary costs of the u.s. in these wars that go as high as 6 trillion. there's no end to the numbers. but inspector general john sopko deals with real numbers. he deals with the amount of assistance that's going to afghanistan and how it is used.

and so over the 12 years we've been talking about $102 billion figure for the reconstruction effort. so we will hear from him on how he sees this proceeding, how he sees afghanistan preparing itself for life after the u.s. and allied military presence in the country, and what he sees as the prognosis for the future in the areas of security, elections, governance, narcotics, construction, corruption, the economy as well as the guardianship of the international assistance funds. it's a pretty tall order but i can't think of a better person to do it. he has a great deal of

experience that he brings to the job. he came from an international law firm in d.c. he's worked for more than 20 years on capitol hill and also as a trial attorney with the u.s. department of justice. so a lawyer with a keen eye and an ear to listen to people when he's in the field. i'd like to welcome him and ask him to come and speak. and i also welcome our audience at home courtesy of cspan. inspector general. >> thank you very much. thank you very much for that generous introduction. and good morning to all of you.

it's the first day of spring and it doesn't look like it's snowing. and i think it's appropriate that it is the first day of spring because what i'll be talking about is really the possibility of a new spring in afghanistan, particularly with the new elections. it's a real privilege to be here at the atlantic council. for more than six decades the atlantic council has provided an important bipartisan forum to discuss the most challenging issues confronting the united states and its european allies. nothing in recent memory has been more challenging or more costly than the military and civilian mission undertaken by the united states. nato allies and other coalition partners to secure and stabilize afghanistan. i just returned from two weeks in afghanistan. i have traveled there six times since president obama appointed me as the special inspector

general for afgan stran reconstruction in 2012. as always i visited reconstruction sites and met with afgans and u.s. military civilian and state department employees implements programs in what has become the largest reconstruction effort of a single country in u.s. history. reconstruction has been and continues to be a critical component of the overall u.s. strategy in afghanistan. it is also extremely difficult and dangerous to our colleagues and usa i.d., the state department, military, the many contractors and ngo employees who are tirelessly attempting to carry out the effort. over the last 10 years congress has provided more than $102 billion to build afgan security forces, establish governing institutions, foster economic department.

and our mail tear and civilian leaders have been committed to the ideas that a stable afghanistan with a government able to defend itself as well as provide essential services and economic opportunities to its citizens would be an inhospitable terrain for terrorists. at the end of this year america's longest war will come to an end with the ongoing drawdown of u.s. troops. at most only a few thousand for training and quick response groups will remain. we still don't know the number. the reconstruction mission however is far from over. the united states and its allies agree that afghanistan will require significant international assistance for years and years to come. and it is clear from recent conversations i've had with senior officials in our embassy,

as well as icef headquarters that the united states and the international coalition do not plan to abandon the afgan people. it's my agency's job to provide vigorous oversight of those reconstruction funds. congress created cgar in 2008. unfortunately six hours after the funds had already started. but congress empowered them with a cross can agency jurisdiction to conduct audits and investigation to detect and deter waste, fraud and abuse of this increased funding for reconstruction. we have a staff of nearly 200 auditors, inspectors, investigators and support staff dedicated protecting the enormous u.s. investment by quickly identifying problems and making recommendations to improve program effectiveness. now we all know that 2014 is a

pivotal year in afghanistan. the uncertainties and risks have never been greater. the security, political and economic transition is underway. but they boil down, all of this boils down to basically three serious and important questions. will the afgan security forces stand firm against a resilient and persistent insurgency without the assistant of u.s. troops and coalition troops. will the afgan government hold sufficiently open and honest elections to facilitate peaceful transition? simply put, can the state hold together after the elections? and lastly, will the afgan and u.s. government reach a bilateral security agreement paving the way for the international community to continue provided needed

assistance. however what i really want to talk about is the issue that underlies all three of those questions. and that is the nagging issue of corruption. the consensus among everyone i spoke with in afghanistan over the last two weeks is simply this. allowing corruption to continue unabated will likely jeopardize every gain we have made over the last 12 years. in other words, rampant corruption may be the spoiler for 2014 and beyond. now, corruption in afghanistan is not new or is it unique. cgar has been highlighting concerns about corruption for a very long time. every one of our quarterly reports to congress has highlighted its threat, from the lewding of the kabul bank and the failures of the attorney general to prosecute senior official to the depravation

caused by land seizures, extortion of the people and the loss of support for the government accordingly. since 2009 they've conducted a number of audits of u.s. efforts to combat corruption. we've also pointed out that the united states still does not have a unified anti-corruption strategy for afghanistan. cgar has been sounding the alarm for quite some time about a problem that has only grown worse over each passing year. just how bad is corruption in afghanistan? well last year the general told president obama that quote unquote, corruption is the external strategic threat to

afghanistan. dod repeated that judgment in its semi and report to congress saying corruption again threatens the sustainability of the afgan state. transparency international puts afghanistan in the company of somalia and north korea as one of the three most corrupt countries in the world. in a number of surveys, afgans themselves identify corruption as one of the most serious challenges facing their country. in a 2013 survey, 80% of afgans describe corruption as a major problem and 65% of them said it was worse than the year before. i had an opportunity to speak to integrity watch afghanistan on my last trip there. that's one of the best ngos committed to improving governance. and it's confirmed that afgans consider corruption to be one of

their biggest problems. and in a 2012 survey from all 3 provinces mirrored the findings and rankings of the 2010 survey which highlighted it as a very serious problem. while personal experiences with corruption had declined slightly in their last survey, the total estimated value of bribes paid rose 16% to $1.25 billion in 2012. and an amazing number equivalent to about half of the government's domestic revenues. about one out of every seven afghans or 15% paid at least one bribe in 2012. the average number was four. integrity watch just completed a new survey and they discussed with me some of their findings, but i'll let them -- because they will release it in a week or two -- tell you all the details. but i can tell you that the problem has grown. they found it's grown.

and they found that it's expanded into other sectors of their economy when they hadn't seen it before such as education and health fields. what does corruption really mean in practicing terms in afghanistan? two weeks ago, the u.s. military published a study that answered that question in one sentence. quote/unquote, corruption directly threatens the viability and legitimacy of the afghan state. the study entitled, and it's a catchy title, operationalizing county anti-corruption, was initiated by general dunford. the study went on to say, quote, corruption alienates key elements of the population, discredits the government and security forces, undermines

international support, subverts state functions and rule of law. robs the state of revenue and creates bear krarriers to econo growth, up quoe unquote. i command general dunford for ordering the doesn't. he doesn't full any punches. but takes a very hard look, and i highly recommend you all to read it, at the root causes of the pervasive corruption in afghanistan. including decisions made by the united states and its allies that have contributed to that problem. now, i'm going to spend a few minutes on just three of the study's main observations. they echo my auditors and investigators and what they have found over the years. in fact, some of general dunford's findings draw directly from sigar audits. but they also illuminate three

critical themes relevant to what we and the afghans will face for 2014. first of all, the initial u.s. strategy in afghanistan not the only failed to recognize the significance of corruption. remember, this is dunford's study, but may have fostered a political climate conducive to corruption. the second theme is massive military and usaid and international aid spending overwhelmed the afghan government's ability to absorb the assistance. that, coupled with weak oversight, created opportunities for corruption to grow. the third heem was ttheme was l anti-corruption strategy reduced effectiveness of all coalition efforts in this area. let me address the governance issue and lack of political will

together to tackle corruption. as the dunford report indicates, the u.s. military utilized proxy forces composed largely of warlords associated with the northern alliance to drive the taliban and al qaeda from power. however, civilian and military analysts pointed out in the report and elsewhere these warlords often used that u.s. support to rate with immunity and improve their political positions. afghan political leaders have built allegiances by cutting political deals that put such powerful figures in key government positions. these figures have in turn used their government positions to especial entrench and expand patronage that have traditionally been an important feature of afghanistan's politics. in some cases these networks

have morphed into criminal networks involved in everything from extra judicial land seizures and extortion to nar cottics traffic and money laundering. this is something that the noted afghan analyst sarah chase calls an integrated network that alienates the afghan population and ynd mines one of our key reconstruction goals of creating a legitimate afghan state that can deliver services to its people. the kabul bank saga exemplifies how this patronage system and the failure to prosecute people guilty of gross fraud and abuse is undermining the afghan economy and jeopardizing our reconstruction work there. before its collapse as we all know in 2010, the kabul bank was afghanistan's largest private

bank. but individuals and companies associated with the bank basically used it as a ponzi scheme and stole about $935 million largely through fraudulent loans. about 92% of that money stolen went to 19 individuals and companies. afghanistan central bank fortunately for the afghans covered those losses which were equivalent to far more than half of the government's entire revenue in 2010 and represented 5% of their gdp. now, more than a year ago, the joint anti-corruption and monitoring and evaluation committee issued a full report on the kabul bank scandal. that committee reported that the afghan attorney general's office deliberately slow walked the

kabul bank investigation and did little to recover funds or bring many of the main culprits to justice. underscoring the difficulty in reducing corruption in afghanistan is the fact that most of those culprits had very, very strong ties to powerful afghan politicians. the kabul bank crisis has had a profound impact and continuing impact on the entire financial sector. sigar recently issued an audit that found that afghanistan's banking system remains extremely fragile and poorly regulated. our and i had uditors concluded afghanistan is at the risk of another banking crisis. afghanistan must have a reliable banking system that observes and enforces internationally accepted rules in order to attract foreign investment. and if you don't the attract the

foreign investment, afghanistan will remain a client state. a welfare state to the international community. as well as to keep international assistance flowing, we have to have a working and safe banking system. failure to sufficiently reform and regulate the banking sector is putting that government's immediate development future at risk. for example, the imf's extended credit facility or ecf provides medium term assistance to low income countries at little or no interest. the loan agreement with afghanistan is contingent on government making banking and financial reforms that would increase transparency and accountability. the imf will not disburse any ecf funds without a favorable board review of the afghan financial banking systems. it has not disbursed any funds since 2012 because afghanistan

has not the made enough progress on those reforms. equally troubling, the financial action task force, or fatf, which is a body that sets the standards required to com p bat money laup tering, terrorist financing and other threats, just a few weeks ago again down graded afghanistan's status due to continued failure to approve the antimony laundering regime. if there is no improvement, experts caution afghanistan will be black listed in june.ey laun. if there is no improvement, experts caution afghanistan will be black listed in june. when they revisit the issue. a black listing could be devastating to afghanistan's financial sector and the overall economy. you now, this is serious. the afghan government has yet to take it seriously despite our

embassy and the international community's repeated efforts to convince them of its consequences to their long term need to attract investments to improve their economy. now, what i've described in the banking and financial sector is also true in other sectors. we don't have time today to go into each one of them, but in response to numerous survey, afghan citizens have described the judiciary, the police, the courts, and many other sectors of afghanistan as particularly corrupt. equally troubling is the issue of afghanistan's capacity to absorb aid and the donor's ability to oversee that aid. and that is another point raised by the dunford report. let's consider our reconstruction activities in fiscal year 2010. congress appropriated the president obama's request for

horn $16 billion to rebuild afghanistan idea. this did not include the tens of billions of dollars also spent that year on military operations. according to the world bank, afghanistan's total gdp in 2010 was only $15.9 billion. so reconstruction assistance alone amounted to more than the country's entire estimated gdp. since 2010, congress has provided nearly $63 billion more in reconstruction programs. now, many afghans and u.s. officials and scholars have asked, and i do, too, how was afghanistan with its very poor economy going to efficiently absorb such largess. and why would krumt officicorru

and others looking at the floods of poorly from viced cash and annen certain future not take advantage of the opportunity to take a cut for themselves. to compound the absorption problem, sigar has found that the u.s. implementing agencies have exercised limited oversight on this spending. sigar has cataloged a lack of planning, contract management and quality control. consequently, sigar has found schools that have been built so badly they are in danger of collapsing, clinics with no patients bs patients, or clinics with patients but no doctors or clean water, bases that are not useable, potential of ghost workers in the army and police, and roads that are d disintegrating faster than we can rebuild there. there are many valid excuses. lacks of security tops the list.

then there is the high turnover built into our hr systems of the military and civilian, some working there. it's amazing. when i go there, i've seen people -- i've only been there two years and i'm like the longest serving person in theater. i see people who give me beautiful descriptions of what they're going to do and three months later they're gone. how can it work on such a turnover that fast? there is also a lack of integrated system to track reconstruction projects. we don't even know what we spent and where we spent it. 12 years into this. that is the frustrating thing p i just approved asking for a list of where we spent their money. we still don't know. now, the bottom line is, and this came very clear from my latest trip, is that u.s.

implementing agencies had no more capacity to oversee the assistance than afghans had of absorbing it. the united states and its coalition were unfortunately slow to recognize that danger. it was in 2010 that sthey startd to focus on it, a concerted effort to establish a number of task forces to try to identify and deal with the corruption. during that same period, the u.s. embassy circulated a draft comprehensive anti-corruption strategy. but it's never been approved. as i mentioned earlier, the united states still does not have a strategy to fight corruption. now, although the u.s. government and its allies have been slow to address the challenge of corruption, and despite what i've said, i do not

believe it's too late. we have a tremendous opportunity with next month's presidential provincial elections. we have a new and unique opportunity to help the of a beg afghans tackle this problem. all the major candidates say they want to combat corruption. so let's really help them.tackl. all the major candidates say they want to combat corruption. so let's really help them. to protect reconstruction, the united states must make this a real priority. as cigar oig has been saying for some time, we must have a comprehensive civilian military anti-corruption strategy backed by political as well as financial will and capital. likewise as a number of the coalition ambassadors told me just last week and cautioned, this approach must be unified and coordinated so corrupt afghan officials cannot play one country against the other.

now, on my latest trip, i was told we must also be tough. we must demand that the afghan government become a true partner in all of this, the new government must begin p by complying with the international agreements that it has already made to undertake the reforms promised at tokyo and chicago and elsewhere. we must also embrace conditionality and pragmatic incentives. the united states and other donors must set realistic meaningful conditions orr incentives in areas we're willing to enforce. in other words, the conditions must be achievable and worthwhile with incentives geared to incremental achievements. but ultimately i was told we and our allies must have the courage to risk saying no.

to the afternoon begghans if t comply. my work the significance car has convinced me that the united states must consider the following to help fight corruption. we must hold our own employ crease and government contractors accountable. we must also insist the afghans hold their government employees and their contractors accountable. we must continue to support u.s. and internationally funded anti-corruption efforts such as task force 2010, afghan threat and finance center and others. we should care less about burn rate and more about how funds are actually being spent. by this i mean we must focus on

outcomes or impact of our programs and not on just outputs. we need to recognize that too much money spent too quickly with too few safe guards is a recipe for reconstruction disaster. we need to insist that the afghan ministries develop and maintain good internal controls to receive u.s. and coalition funds. and lastly, we must continue to provide support for afghan civil society groups fighting corruption such as the mec, integrity watch afghanistan and nascent independent afghan media. now, i come away from every trip with concerns. but i also come arouway with ho. the hope comes from seeing and meeting the hard working and

extremely dedicated americans whether military, sfo, civil servants or contractors who put their lives on the line every day to help the afghans build a better future. but this hope also comes from meeting with afghans. and before closing, i want to say just briefly something about afghan civil society. afghanistan has a growing number of organizations and individuals dedicated to exposing corruption and fostering the rule of law. it has the beginnings of a robust media that is highlighted and reflected afghan d dissatisfaction with corruption. it also has organizations who are working to raise awareness and increase accountability of afghan governing institutions. likewise, my investigators and auditors have worked closely with many brave and dedicated afghan law enforcement officers

and public servants who are committed to the rule of law and the economic and social development of their country. we should never forget them. we should never abandon them. in conclusion, i believe we have a window of opportunity to tackle corruption. if the elections go well, afghanistan will have a new government. however, this new government will be dealing with an international community that has far less patience for corruption than before. so it must act quickly to prove to the international community that it is serious about attacking the problem. united states and its coalition allies must speak with one voice on the issue of corruption. we must set achievable conditions for assistance. we must also carefully reexamine each and every one of our reconstruction programs to

determine whether their objectives still make sense and are realistically attainable. i was very pleased to see that isaf in particular was doing that with every one of their reconstruction programs. the costs in afghanistan both in lives lost and moneys spent have been enormous. it if we don't take advantage of this opportunity and get serious about corruption right the now, we are putting all of those fragile gains at arriving. risk. this is our longest war. if we get it right, we can create a model for future contingencies. and help the afghan people build another country that does not become a safe haven for terrorists. thank you very much. [ applause ]

>> thank you very much. as expected, this was forceful and detailed. and we are grateful that you took the time soon after your visit to afghanistan to come and share your views with us and with the audience at home courtesy of c-span. last year we hosted your counter part for iraq, stewart burn. at that event, he released a book about learning the lessons from iraq. and one of the things that came

up was why the united states has failed to prepare for these kinds of stability and reconstruction operations. we've gone in a number of times to different countries around the globe and each time it's groundhog day. we try and create things on the fly. and as you said, the momentum is created to have an extensive burn rate and not on thousand justify the spending or to make sure the money stays in the country. why do you think this is the case, and if so, where does that responsibility lie in washington? >> you know, let me answer the question a little differently.

i've been looking if he problem of bad government problems since 1982. i believe my staff is doing a wonderful job. what we are identifying is not new to the u.s. government. last summer we came up with a number of reports that i thought were yunbelievable. buildings that cost $30 million and they were going to rip down brand new. a school that was basically melting because it was so poorly constructed. and i remember calling up senator nunn and i said, senator, what's going on? and i see a former colleague of mine from senator nunn's office sitting in the audience. and senator typical, and that's

why it was so great to work with sam, he said let's get the old gang back together again. so john hamre, a bunch of the other people from the armed services and psi, let's get together and talk. so we went over to csis actually and sat down, had a nice lunch. and the bottom line was, and i remember he pointed me to talk to a couple of his friends who were former heads of gao, and they reminded me, and the senator reminded me, and head of gao reminded me, defense department procurement has been on the high risk list since 1991. and it's never gotten off. the defense department to this day cannot give you an auditable budget, an auditable books and records. you look at all these agencies,

i first was exposed to problems in the government by looking at chlt usaid programs in egypt which were horrible at the time. so this isn't new. what is unique about afghanistan and what is unique about traffic iraq is when you're in a war and th you're spending on steroids and money is going out the door. so i can't answer directly on doctor we don't loan. all i can say is we have many problems in how we procure, hire and fire employees and how we hold people accountable pl and it's a problem since i came on in 1982. i first started working with the government in 1978 and people were complaining aboutcame on i. i first started working with the government in 1978 and people were complaining abouton in 198. i first started working with the government in 1978 and people were complaining about turnover and employees and all of this

tha that. so i think the problem is we never make changes. we write a lot of reports -- i won't mention his nameso i thin never make changes. we write a lot of reports -- i won't mention his name because i don't like to burn my sources. . but a nice three star general had a very candid conversation with me. and he said, you know,but a nic had a very candid conversation with me. and he said, you know, i did this in the balkans, i did it in haiti, i did it in awfrica, i dd it in iraq, and you know i'm army and we write lessons learned. and we wrote lessons learned reports after every one of those engagements listing out all the problems. and he said when i went over to afghanistan the first time, he's been there two or three time, he said i figured it was all fixed. the problem is we write great lessons learned reports. we don't write how to apply

them. so you got to in-september advise. i don't want to filibuster the question, but one of the things that is unique about us.i don't question, but one of the things that is unique about us.advise. i don't want to filibuster the question, but one of the things that is unique about us. i took this job, and myself and my satisfy could have been fat, dumb and happy at other jobs. i recruited people in most of the senior staff and even some of the less seen jor, took a pay cut to come with me. we all have the view that we finally want to change this. and i'm picking on the way the government works. so this is my last hoorah probably in the government. especially after my reports who would hire me. but we have to turn it around.

i said one of the reasons we publicize the reports is to try to turn the ship around. yes, women be rk yes, we embarrass some people. but when you get embarrassed, many times you change what you do. and let's pot kid ourselves. most people in the united states today think the government doesn't work. the vast majority -- not vast majority, but a majority of americans don't support afghanistan. i think the fact that we have a very active inspector general, and i think no one will criticize us for not being active, appointed by the president of the united states, reporting to the people and congress, that is the most important thing out there that may save support for international engagements in the future. so i don't know if i answered your question exactly. i don't know what is in the american psyche. we tend to go back -- we go in

full barrels blasting away and put our money in, and sometimes we put it in faster than we can think. and maybe that's just the american spirit. but we're going to try to change that by trying to about pose the particular particular problems that cause that waste. >> yes, but you didn't fully answer my question. >> no, i'm an attorney, so --ro. >> yes, but you didn't fully answer my question. >> no, i'm an attorney, so --ar that cause that waste. >> yes, but you didn't fully answer my question. >> no, i'm an attorney, so -- >> the u.s. spirit is also one of problem solving. so why hasn't there been an institutional response? sigar and iraq inspector general's office all have sunset clauses so they fade away into the distant memory. if the issue is one of creating institutional memory and knowledge, why not have a permanent body which has plans in place and lessons learned and

a certain regularity about the staff so it's not a question of when, but whatever the next crisis occurs, that the u.s. if it goes in goes in with its eyes wide open. and that was my question, who is going to take the lead on something like that. >> the institutional bodies are already there. you have the dodig, state ig, usaidig, who are there who normally will carry on. '78 inspector general act created inspector generals. sigar was created because they were pouring so much money in and you needed something to look across the spectrum. our group was created to do the same thing. but as the money goes down, the regular igs and general accounting office can do this, i

caution the -- and the other thing is congress has and you would of all of our records. we report to them all the time. a lot of these changes that really need to be made are not at the level of the secretary of defense or secretary of state. we have to change the culture of procurement officers and people who manage contracts. a lot of these changes are not that difficult. and i always throw this out. and i realized this when i was working for senator nunn. we always kept running into the same problem of lack of cooperation between law enforcement agencies. that was always the finding in every one of our reports. there wasn't coordination and cooperation between law enforcement agencies. did anybody ever change the personnel rules? did anybody ever change the performance standards, the am performance standards for the employees to make certain that cooperation was something they

got graded on? i never really thought of that until i worked for the commerce departme department. and secretary of commerce made affirmative, a priority. so every senior executive got rated on what he did about affirmative action. and i tell you, you want to grab the attention of a bureaucrat? hold up his pay rise, hold up his performance review. and all of a sudden you see change. but when i talk about that on the hill and i talk about that to bureaucrats, they all say, that won't make a difference. but we've never tried. so this isn't rocket science. we just need somebody to start tinkering around. and i think you'll get people to spend more time on how money is spent than on just spending the money. my message to all of you you is

oversight is mission critical in afghanistan. and oversight should be mission critical in every government program. >> thank you. moving to a different topic which we raised in a report with a presidential candidate in afghanistan, wrote for us five years ago when we launched the south asia center. he raised the question of how many cents of every dollar that was spent in afghanistan was actually staying in afghanistan. have you made a rough estimate of the $102 billion that has gone for reconstruction if you know roughly how much was actually spent inside of afghanistan and how much left the country either you because of afghans or because of the way

we have the contracting organized for such work? >> we have not done that study. and that would be a difficult study. we're just trying to find out how much money we spent and where we spent it in afghanistan. i'd love to do that. i think that's worthwhile. but we just don't have that percentage. i've heard that criticism. it's a criticism i hear all the time. we're concerned about that, but i just heard criticism from provincial government about the kandahar food zone. and again, we haven't verified it, but that was his complaint. all the money is being spent on the kandahar food zone, but it's being spent in kabul or spent in northern virginia. it's not being spent where it needs to be done. but again, we haven't verified

those concerns. >> well yor, i don't want to democrat nature t dominate the questions. we have a great audience here. i'll try to identify the people in the order i see them. if my vision isn't strong, please excuse me. what i would suggest is wait until the microphone reaches you and identified yourself and then please ask your question and we'll try to get as many in before 11:00. so we start here. >> trudy rubin, "philadelphia inquirer". listening to you and having listened to stewart bohen, it's morel to have to reinvent the wheel so i just want to ask two questions that are reinventing the wheel because they apply to afghanistan and iraq. firstly on the side of laying conditions and stopping money flow if the afghan officials

don't live up to them, afghan officials notably hamid karzai have used this as blackmail betting on the fact that the u.s. would be afraid to stop the money relest the government collapse. how is that going to change with a new government. and on the u.s. side, it has become clear despite hillary clinton's efforts some years ago to have civilian control of aid in combat zones that combat zones defeat u.s. civilians. officials don't get out of the embassy compounds. usaid doesn't get out of the compounds. they rely on contractors who don't get out of virginia. and so -- or don't get out of compounds. and it's the very rare case where u.s. officials are actually out there looking. so how in the world is it possible under those conditions to do anything serious about oversight and isn't in a wthat

burn rate continues to be the metric. >> let me address with the issue of just saying no. which i think was coined by somebody in the white house dealing with drugs, i think. you know, you said president karzai or whomever essentially blackmailed us because he doesn't think we will say no. well, you know, the new government maybe will have that attitude. but it takes two to tank tango here. we need to be able to take that risk. and not helter skelter. it has to be a planned strategic approach to this. it's got to be we're giving you the money and our congress and our parliaments or whatever will not allow us to get the money to

you unless you meet these conditions that maybe you agreed. we just have to have the political will to say it. there is a tendency to think that it's really to their benefit to take our money. and we're just so lucky that they are taking our money. and that is sort of a bizarre approach to this. we're giving the money for a reason. and if -- i know we don't want to get into a position where we're imposing our values, but we can't leave our values at the shore. and if we're giving money and we know it's going to be wasted, or it will violate our own internal law and regulations, i think we have a problem with that. now, we talked about that in a

recent audit on looking at how usaid handled some assessments they made on the various ministries. and it got some press not too long ago. and basically a.i.d. did a wonderful job, brought in accounting firms to look at the capacity of the ministries to use and protect that money. and in each instance, they found that the ministries could not safely and effectively handle that money. and under usaid regulations, they should not have given the money to them. now, they waived their opwn internal controls because they made the statement, the decision had made many to give direct assistance to the afghans. so we had to waive them. now, we found no evidence that said you had to waive it, so we

raise that hd that concern. so i think the reporter's question is very valid. sometimes we have to have the political will not the to be blackmail blackmailed. the question about civilian control of aid and who will give aid,he to be blackmailed. the question about civilian control of aid and who will give aid,e to be blackmailed. the question about civilian control of aid and who will give aid, to be blackmailed. the question about civilian control of aid and who will give aid,to be blackmailed. the question about civilian control of aid and who will give aid, who will give it is an area we're ver concey concerned abou. we were one of the first agencies to say we got a problem here. and i heard that first time i took the job. general allen told me that. my first meeting with general allen and my first meeting with the regional security officer in the state department in the kabul embassy said people here don't realize the world is change. we won't be able to get out. i didn't know what it meant. i didn't know anything about it hour of safety, we have to go 30 minutes out, 30 minutes back to a schedule 2 hospital.

but they were concerned that a lot of the u.s. government agencies in the embassy com bound were not taking that seriously. so we highlighted that. now, i think aid officials would love to get out.o we highlighte. now, i think aid officials would love to get out. state department officials would love to get out. u.s. corps of engineers would love to get out. but all are faced with a security problem. does that mean we stop all aid? no. but we have to design a system that at least from where i come from, remember, i don't do policy, i do process, if this is your policy to give u.s. assistance, and ayou can't get n american out there to take a look at the project or to find out if would your subsidizing the salaries of all the police, are there police at the other end getting the money, you got for design a system that is effective. it's my job basically -- i'm like the canary in the coal mine. when i fall over and die with my feet up in the air saying that's

saying we got a problem. and when i've been banging the drum and my staff is banging the drum, we got a problem, guys. are you planning for it? what are you going to do to protect the u.s. taxpayers' dollars? we're not saying stop it. we're just saying design an effect differen effective plan. this isn't new. when i showed up, i asked a.i.d. and dod and state, and i said what did you to in some other countries. let's bring in the best practices from there. and i was going away talking to the german relief programs and talking to the canadians, norwegians, and i said they all have best practices. so we just held a symposium which is very rare. unique for an ig to hold a symposium off the record bringing in everybody from the world bank, the u.n., state

department, a.i.d., dod, you you name it, let's share best practices. because what i've been finding -- and it's not only now. it's been for again 30 years i've been looking at this. you won't talk to her. and she doesn't talk to him. and nobody shares the information. so we're going to be preparing a report on best practices. you can do it. it's not the gold standard. the gold standard is having an american auditor or p investigator go out there and kick the tires. but we're in the going to be able to do that. so do we stop all aid? i don't think so. but we have to do it smartly. >> thank you. next question over there. >> it strikes me that it will be harder for us to do this as we pull down either now or two years from now and the american public will get, you know, cl k

clinky about other things. these need to be done, but do the chances decrease that they are done as time goes on? >> there are two parts of that question. yes, it will be harder to do it in the future. because of the security situation, how we design programs, how do we make certain the money is spent the way it is intended to be spent. and it will be more costly because you will have to put in a whole new monitoring system. we're pretty cheap. easy for us to get out. but you'll have to design third party monitorings and a whole bunch of nifty systems and not one is a silver bullet. so you have to use multiple. so aid will be more expensive. so, yes, you're correct in that. the second part of your question is will the americans get bored or tired or not interested in this. i don't know how to answer that. americans have supported countries for many years. we're still in korea years after

that war. so there is a commitment from the u.s. government and allies that for another decade to assist afghanistan. i see no change in that commitment. but again, i'll defer to the policymakers. i don't do policy. i don't do military policy. i don't do foreign policy. i just see how it's carried out and how effectively it's carried out. so that question is probably a better question to the secretary of state or somebody in the military on that. but that is a concern. but we've stayed a long time in some countries. >> over here. >> i was associated press correspondent in afghanistan during the alcion days in the early '70s. looking at the list of candidates for the election, can you tell me what reason will is to believe that there will actually be change? and, also, can you tell us what

you really think about the future of afghanistan? >> no and no. and i don't mean to be facile in my answer. my client is the u.s. congress. and you look at the statute. '78 act, and i walk around with all of these. like people walk away with the constitution, i walk around with the '78 act. i have the constitution memorized. and i walk around with our enabling legislation. this is my world. i can't stray from it. my world says hog about designing policy, assuming policy. so it would be unfair for me to

pontificate on that. and let me throw one thing out along this line. no one has asked the question yet. maybe you will. somebody at the last speech i gave asked why are you so negative? i'm actually a pretty positive guy. it may not sound that. i'm the ultimate optimist that the mission will succeed in afghanistan. but -- see, i'm saying something personal. it's in the my i don't think to be a cheerleader. read the '78 act.

my job is to ferret out and report on problems. and i know somebody in some other conference i went to said, well, you but what if somebody reads your version of the facts. i've got two people in my press shop. they're great people. but i only have two people. embassy has over 60 people last time i looked in kabul. i don't know how many a.i.d. has. there is their own press strategy to try to get ahead of us and god only knows how many people in the pentagon. could you probably balance the budget by just cutting that shop. but i got two people. if i'm -- and i know they're good and they like this because they all figure they can get a pay raise because of this. if they're able to change the entire american opinion on

afghanistan by our audits, geez, we're probably the best agency in the world. but i don't think so. i don't think the american people are changing their views on afghanistan based upon an audit on the water system in afghanistan. or on the public school number six. american people are making a decision because they want facts. we're speaking the truth and we're speaking facts. the american people want an honest assessment of what is going on over there and i think that's what we do. i don't know if that answers your question. i think i went around it. >> i'm taking down names and hopefully we'll get to everyone in the right order. so please remember that i am taking your name down. i'm going to identify the next two questioners so that you know the order in which -- so we'll go to the gentleman standing at

the back and then we're coming to the second row over here. then i'm come to the others. >> middle eastern institute. thank you for convening the event. john, welcome. you and i have talked previously about the metrics of success and holing the agencies accountable by extension. just a recommendation to make your task slightly less difficult. ask these agencies what are they trying to achieve. inspection begins at self evaluation. 45 years ago it was established the operation of the world bank and first question was tell me your failures. i don't want to hear your successes. and the entire bureaucratic of the country changed. thanks very much. >> i think that's a good

question. i know we chatted about this. i am telling them their failures. so that's why i'm always interested in successes. and if some of you maybe don't know about, i actually septemnt letter to aid administrator asking them to give me your top ten successes in afghanistan. and explain why. why they viewed them as successful. so i'm doing the reverse of what you did. because that will help me. i do have to do lessons learned report, i do have to do best practices. i can write those lessons learned reports and best practices and white papers on that based upon failure or i can do it upon a mix of failures and successes. i would prefer to do the mix of failures and successes. i suppose you all know the

answer i got from state, dod and aid. they cooperakoop couldn't give ten. my staff said this doesn't make sense. so we sent a letter again saying many that was too complicated. why don't you just give me some successes and how you rate success. the basic answer we got back was, well, health care has improved. education has improved. and women's issues have improved. now, that's true. if you compare to what it was when the taliban failed, when there were no schools open, no clinics, women were scurrying and hiding in cellars, of course it's improved. if you spend over $100 billion in a country the size of texas with a population smaller than texas, you'd think there has to be some improvement. my god. i mean, you know, throw it up against a wall, something will

stick. but what specific program lend to the doubling of the life expectancy in afghanistan? and this is so critical now. as the amount of money is decreasing, we have it know, we have to rack and stack. see, if you don't rate your programs, then you get sequester. we'll cut everything across the board, the good programs as well as the bad programs. so they can do it and that would really help me. so we sent the letter also to the ngos and said since the government can't tell me what works, you tell me what works. and we got shaome responses, actually some pretty valid responses and some of the people in the ngo community are in the room but we said we wouldn't identify who they were. and now we turn to the contractors. i'm trying to find out what

works in afghanistan. and not the why this broad thing that health has improved. well, what led on health being improved? what led to women's issues being improved? is it building schools or is it building clinics, is it doing this, is it doing that? so we really need that help and we're open to any input from anybody on what works or what doesn't work and why. and we'll give you anonymity if you want it. we're trying to make a record so we understand and not do it again. >> i'm a reporter for german national radio. and i've reported from afghanistan since 2007. i very much appreciate your openness regarding the failings and failures of the u.s. in afghanistan and wish i would ever encounter such openness from german officials there. but i've got two questions. have you met any of the remaining ten presidential

candidates, and have they presented a viable, credible concept for the fight against corruption? the other, you said there should be a concerted effort among donors so they can't be played off against each other. you can be more concrete than -- well, tell us more about your ideas. >> on the presidential candidates, i have met some of the presidential candidates before they were presidential candidates. i have just as a policy have not met with any of them again or any of their staff. i've told my staff not to meet with any of their staffs because this is an afghan election and i don't want anybody to think we're showing favorites, not showing favorites, not doing anything. so we're staying clear in any of that. so i can't answer that question. i won't answer any question about my views on the election other than it looks good.

my last meeting with the regional security people, some of the provincial leaders as well as our embassy officials out in the field, it looks like it will be a good election. it's optimistic. there is the threat of violence. but it looks like everybody has their act together, it's moving well. so i'm hoping for the best. so i'm sorry i can't answer your question about that. on the concerted effort, again, i don't want to attack any of our allies. because we are equally at fault i think. but some of the allies, the eu itself, has talked about conditionality. and some of the allies have been more -- and i don't want to, you know, burn any of them -- but have actually said we're not going to give you money about if you don't do something. now, an interesting issue which

i can talk about because i did talk to the eu deals with watfa which is the law enforcement trust fund in afghanistan. and that's how we, i mean the coalition, united states, europe, et cetera, paid for the salaries and expenses for the police. and the eu based upon internal audits and inspections they did became very concerned about not so much the afghans, but how the u.n. -- u.n. runs it -- they're concerned about their ghost workers, about other issues. and they actually conditioned and withheld funding. now, that's good. the problem was i don't think anybody shared that information with all the other allies. and my last trip to afghanistan, pot this last on

not this last one, but the one before, i talked to our officials in the isaf entity -- i don't even know what the acronym stands for. combined security -- i'm looking at high stamy staff. but anyway, they didn't know the eu had withheld funds, they didn't know the eu had concerns about how the trust fund -- and this is a big trust if you said. billions of dollars. was being used. so that raised some concerns. we're not talking enough with the allies abdominal lnd allies talking enough with us about the oversight issue. so that said, i go out of my way it to meet with as many of the allies as i can on trips here. i've gone to brussels and been briefed and briefed eu and nato officials. we talked to the ufrn ap u.n. a

time. information. and where we can be used by any country, especially our own, the united states government, to get information from the allies, i tell them use me. use my reports if it can help you. the germans, specifically because you report for german news source, we've heard some good things. i don't know enough to actually comment other than i met with the deputy ambassador to germany and he's opened the door for us to come in and get further briefings on how the germans approach. we don't have a monopoly on what's right. i think we can learn a lot from our ally, and we should learn a lot from our allies and our neighbors in afgs. i don't know if that answers your question. >> sunlight does a lot of good.

the united states agency in pakistan within the last few years, highly publicized the stopping of a contract for entity well known to be associated with aid work, and because of the publicity, it had a demonstration effect on all the other civilian aid. >> i think so. that's one of the reasons you want totize this and get the message out. that helps. >> just so i'm not accused of being left leaning, i'm going to the right for the next question, and they know i'll come to the others. >> thank you very much. i'm with the u.s. department of state. a couple of questions. stewart bohen on his exit was proposing called called the u.s. office of overcontingency operations. he had a grain of optimism that

could perhaps be established. i don't see too much movement in that direction. but is something like that, whether in terms of a specific office or the capabilities that he was proposing, would that be helpful in terms of look at future? and a related question is you determined they were established because of the tremendous amount of resources that were being put into these twop countries. is the role of the special inspector generals simply a kind of surge capability, or do you bring something to -- does a special inspector general bring something greater to this effort than the igs of the particularly agencies of the gao? >> okay. let mel quickly on the proposal that stewart bohen had and then i'll answer your question. the answer is yes to the last part of your request e.

i'll go into more detail. stewart did make that recommendation. again, i gefr that i don't do policy, i do process. and so i don't really think it's my position to recommend, and i haven't been asked, to recommend creating or not creating an entity such as stewart recommended. i will say this. this helps to answer your second question. i got enough authority, enough power, enough resources to do the job. i like temporary agencies. you know. there is a problem with creating another agency that will exist that never goes. i mean, i'm still waiting. i remember when i was working for sam nun. they finally abolished the tea tasting board, which had been

established right after the revolution. okay? when you create an agency, it s never goes away. i don't know if you need it. special inspector generals are great. i got the '78 act. i got my name in the legislation. my enabling legislation gives me more authority than the average i.g. has. i'm given unlimited hr authority. i can hire and fire at will. that's tremendous. and you need it for a temporary agency. my pay, i can give bonuses. i can do a lot of things. it's not outrageous, what we can do, but i can give hiring bonuses, which most of the government can't. i can pay retention bonuses. but the hiring and firing means that if i need somebody quickly, and i need somebody who has the fire in the belly, which is the way ai proech my staff, i ensure

they have the fire in the belly. and when i took over the job, we had ha 60% attrition rate. 60%. let me just back up. sigar was not always this aggressive. it was publicly attacked in a bipartisan fashion for its lack of aggressiveness, its inability to do its job. and we went through some hard times. when i took over it was 60% attrition rate. you can't operate at that. when i took over, we were only producing four products per quarter. we have cut that attrition rate for a temporary agency. it's down below half. we're producing 30 products per quarter. and part of the reason is

because i can hire people, men and women, in afghanistan and here who are dedicated who have the same fire in the belly. i remember my former chief of staff, who is now my head of audits wrote an e-mail saying uh-oh, it's a fitb type. it's the fire in the belly type. i basically tell people we're here for a limited amount of time. we got a mission. the white house said two things to me, fix it and fix it fast. so i don't have time for a ten-year engagement. we have to do something really quickly. that's what congress and the white house asked us to do. so i'm able to get people who have the fire in the belly. so i don't need a permanent

home. everybody coming knows it's temporary. i like agencies that go out of existence. we will go out of existence when the amount of reconstruction funds fall below $250 million a year. that's money in an authorized, appropriated, and not yet spent. so we go out of existence six months after that. i'll tell you, there's $20 billion still in the pipeline not yet spent, so we may be around for a while. but i don't think -- i do have unique powers. and if you look, and particularly my unique power is not only the hiring and firing capability, but we look at all reconstruction by any u.s. government agency. stewart bohen had certain pots of money he could look at. if you spend a dime on reconstruction. whether you are the state, dod,

or the department of commerce, i own it. and that's one authority. if you look at my statute, it uses the term independent, like in every other paragraph. so they really say independence. it specifically said no government agency does not cooperate with us. no government agency can stop any of our audits, investigations and inspections. so we have tremendous authority here. we are unique. we have unique authorities. we're also not housed in any one government agency. state is in state. we sort of sit above everything just looking at reconstruction. so if we can't help the taxpayer, then, you know, i don't know what else can. but i don't think a permanent entity is really niece at this time. we got the authority. >> thank you.

inspector general we are running short of time. so i'm going to ask two persons to ask their questions together, if you don't mind. >> well, she's waiting. the lady at the back, and then the gentleman here. and then if you can take these two together, we would appreciate that. >> mine is more comment rather than question. >> identify yourself, please. >> i've been a senior adviser to nato and the u.s. military. but i've also got a background as an aide worker both in iraq and afghanistan, which is probably why i was chosen. one of the biggest problems, sir, from my vantage point, and please remembers i just returned after 12 nonstop years in iraq and afghanistan has been the inaccessibility of for offices for sigar in iraq and afghanistan.

the theory is fantastic, your housed with lots of security within the state department offices. how then is anyone who wishes to put in a complaint against contractors, against government officials, against what have you, how are they supposed to come to you? in my own case, i would come back to america, to washington, to deal with the sigar offices, and i would give them the names of people who wished to talk to them. the sigar authorities were afraid that people's lives could be compromised if they were to be seen coming out of their offices in kandahar and baghdad. first of all, the offices need to be made more accessible. and where we have had successes, to answer a portion of your ten questions, it's when we've dealt with community professionals,

lawyers, daughters, engineers, established business entities. not whom we awarded for whatever favors. et cetera, et cetera. just a brief comment on what we were talking about. >> can we move to the gentleman in the front here and get his question? >> sure. and i promise to be short. >> i'm dr. hank from emeril planet tv. i have four best practices from within afghanistan that i would love to share with you that's been on our tv program. looking at the nuch and looking at the ngos, what is your prognosis as far as how easy or difficult that may be to work with local entities to expand green job training and to use the assets left behind by the u.s. military and others as we mover forward past 2014.

and thank you for being here and your excellent report. >> thank you very much. let me answer the question about access to us. you can always access us on the internet. we get a lot of complaints, and a lot of contacts to our staff because we have a hot line. i don't have ittized. by you can find it on our website. the other thing on getting access to us, we're also located, unlike most of the other agencies, we have the largest law enforcement presence in afghanistan. we're at five or six locations there. i have people outside the wire at the bases. but the point you raise is a serious one. it's hard to get outside the wire. it's hard to get afghans inside the wire to talk to. u.s. contractors, it hasn't been a problem. and a lot of u.s. contractors and government employees come

back to the states and we see them there. we've never had a problem where people can't find us. they always do and are always nice and interesting places. i've met people under trees and at night, behind buildings when i'm in the embassy. there are plalss where you can meet, so that's not a problem. in my staff i have interesting and devious ways of meeting people. so if you need to talk to us, we'll get a way to protect you, we're very serious about protecting people, whether you're afghan, u.s., or international coalition. the question about -- and i don't really fully understand, but the question about how to this get with ngos and work with them, it's -- we try to work with them all the time. i meet with a group of ngos every time i go there. my staff meet with them on a regular basis. they do get outside the wire. they are outside in the provinces. they give me a better feel, and

actually get a better feel than the embassy gets. whether our government will be able to continue working with them, i don't know. it's going to be the difficulty of getting out there. ch and that's a serious problem. that's why i so much encourage, you know, helping the ngos in afghanistan, whether it's on oversight or green issues, health issues. because they're the ones with the eyes and ears. they're out there. they're community based. that's what we're going to have to rely on. and we're toying with an idea to yutz the ngos. to be our eyes and ears to monitor programs. that's more difficult. tths not the gold standard. we have to, who is watching the watchdogs? who is going to watch the people, you know. so that's a whole process that we have to do. we have to deal with the ngos. we can't forget them. we