element -- it's a strongly pro-russian area, so you may not get an insurgency. if he goes into eastern ukraine, i think that would be a disaster for russia in the long term even though it might look strong in the short term. and even for us as we think about our responses to this kind of thing, you know, obama's not wrong to think, actually, american military interhavingses in recent years -- interventions in recent years haven't worked out so well and perhaps one should think about other responses before you start rushing to put on your military fatigues. and so i think that, as i say, that he who uses force in the modern world, it's kind of a certain are the row thrill, but it doesn't actually work out that well generally. >> great. roger, we'll just walk down the line. >> thank you. well, on nato i have colleagues on the op to ed page -- op-ed page who have argued this view

that is a great mistake after the end of the cold or war or was extending nato eastward. this gave russia a sense of being corner ld, and here we are. my view is more or less exactly the opposite. i think it's the greatest achievement of the post-cold war years was precisely extending the protection and security of both nato and the e.u. to these nations that had been enslaved within the soviet empire. and i think what we're witnessing today is how much tore sight and diplomatic -- foresight and diplomatic brilliance was shown in achieving that. if lithuania, latvia, estonia to name the most prominent examples and perhaps the most threatened nations by putin's vision of a reconstituted soviet space, if they were not within these

organizations, they would be eminently at risk. and the if there's any -- if there's any sense left, sir, of this far but no further, it is precisely in article v of the north atlantic treaty alliance. and i still believe in it, you know? i think -- i don't believe the united states will renege on that commitment. that is a treaty commitment, and whatever the retrenchment, whatever the wavering, whatever the araised red lines, that is a treaty commitment. i believe it's credible to has cow, and i believe the fact -- to moscow, and i believe the fact that it is in place toddy minishes the risks of this combustible situation escalating. i don't think we should allow any veto from moscow on the extension of the e.u. or nato to

other nations further east, and i think it's the moment to make that clear. that doesn't mean that these things can be accomplished overnight, and they won't be. but personally, i'm in favor of leaving the door open because i believe that history shows us that that's the way you lock in peace, rule of law, security, values to which many people on the face of this earth are deeply attached. yeah, the pinata of the e.u., you know, that's what it is to many people. in europe too, you know? e.u. bashing is a great british sport and not only a great british sport -- and the e.u. has had enormous problems as

everybody knows over the last few years. nevertheless, i think countries want to get into the e.u., and it's not for nothing. serbia and kosovo have resolved their difficulties having been at war recently. why is that? because they both want to get into the e.u., and they know what they have to do to get there. so, you know, e.u. communications are weak. the e.u.'s efforts to build its image and to have a global image that reflects its actual importance, weight and achievement -- and we've just been talking about this, is there a european narrative. americans know what they celebrate on july 4th. what do europeans celebrate? how can we revive this remarkable but amorphous thing? and i think those are issues going forward. just finally on the -- and by

the way, macedonia, you know, what i said about leaving the door open, certainly, that applies to macedonia. there was a question about the vietnam war. well, nations and relations do repair themselves over time, and we've certainly seen that with vietnam. we also know that the cost of that war and the tens of thousands of american dead and the imprint of it on the more than consciousness -- on the american consciousness is indelible and, i believe, in perhaps a little more of a minor key the experience of the iraq and afghan wars on the american psyche and consciousness will also be indelible. so we don't want to get into wars. wars are terrible things. we're speaking here on the centennial of the outbreak of world war i. but i think if the postwar

decades tell us anything, it's that the way to avoid wars is through resolve. it's not simply through folding and weakness. >> thank you, roger. that's great. joe, you have three minutes to bring us home. >> i'll pick two questions, one about nato and one about cuba. cuba is a very interesting analogy. first of all, nato doesn't act. it's governments that act. just like in the crisis it wasn't the e.u., it wasn't nato, it was various foreign min structures -- ministers that did. and in the past it was, obviously, the united states that acted. and if i had my druthers, i would, i would ask, suggest to mr. obama to do a repivot. go back to the central arena and

do what president john f. kennedy did in '61 when he was challenged by khrushchev. he was a young man, i'm going to teach him fear. and and one of his responses was put, i think, 30,000 fresh american troops into europe. but again, nato and the e.u. don't act, and this is a nice little story which has the advance of being true, the foreign policy representative was asked henry kissinger asked 40 years ago what's the phone number of the e.u.? she says we have a phone number, it's mine. dial the phone number, and then you get the computer and it says for germany, press one, for france, press two. of. [laughter] so the repivot is one word i would use. cue what is -- cuba is interesting because it was the reverse. it was when the soviet union challenged the united states on its turf.

with the balance of strategic power, the balance of regional power and the balance of enters was clearly on the side of the -- of interest was cleary on the side of the united states. you don't want to challenge the other guy on your periphery. you want him to have to dislodge you from your center or which is what putin has done with the crimea. that's why it's going to be very difficult to dislodge. now, in the long run, yes, i think in the long run history favors us. russia is what soviet union was, an extraction economy with nuclear weapons whose fate depends on the price of energy. the reason why the gorbachev soviet union went down was that the price of energy suddenly hit the same real level as before the '73 oil crisis. so that's on our side. putin has taken a giant leap

backward from the global markets, from investment, from exchange, from technology transfer. not good for the economy. empire's costly. the mess -- you have to pay a lot to clean up the mess that is both the eastern ukraine and if he grabs it and the crimea. and, you know, within five or ten years there will be oil and be gas coming from the unite, but don't think that -- from the united states, but don't think that's going to start flowing today. there may even be gas from the israeli fields in the mediterranean, but that's kind of medium-run consolation. the nice thing about history being on our side -- which i kind of believe -- is that if history's on our side, we don't have to do anything. we just let history come to fruition. the problem with policy today and tomorrow is that the time frames don't quite mesh.

so i come back to the beginning. coalitions don't organize themselves. there has to be an organizer, there has to be somebody who assumes the cost, and that's why i demand from mr. obama, mr. obama, stop this pivot bullshit. come back to europe. [laughter] i don't think he will. [laughter] >> i like two words, resolve and repivot. i like it. please join me in thanks our panel u.s.es for a -- in thanking our panelists for a wonderful discussion. [applause] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [applause] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014] texas about 10 minutes. >> the headline from senator charles schumer predicting the theident would move deportations of the nation's 11 million undocumented immigrants

but they refuse to support an overhaul of the immigration law. live on thening us phone. thank you for being with us. let's begin on the immigration issue. what can we expect? does have a more social agenda as previous leaders. social agenda than previous leaders of the church probably had. the white house is kind of trying to capitalize on that or build a bridge there. the president recognizes some of -- thengs the pope did pope was talking about are things the white house was talking about. take a moret could humane approach to his immigration policies and deportation. this has been a big issue and a tough position for the white house. the president has been talking

about the comprehensive immigration reform and providing citizenship for these illegal immigrants. his administration has deported more people than any previous administration. pointrying to make the that republicans are enforcing the law. people wanted to go further. agenda with on the income inequality and other social issues the pope has been talking about as well. i think the president will use the opportunity to talk about that more in top publicly about it. -- and to talk publicly about it.

it was an hour-long session between the president and leaders. what do you think transpired? they made their case very strongly and very plainly to the president. that thet a surprise president had his senior -- the president told him we are going to take a deeper look at our policies, we are going to do a review. he didn't put a timetable or a scope on it but he promised them soon to a review to make the law more humane. he did not promise to vastly expand his deferral policy for deportation. we want you to press congress. maybe have a unified front and still get this more comprehensive legislation through. thisnly way to fix

long-term is legislatively. activists understood that they did not like that message because they thought the president -- certainly he has been doing a lot. i think him for that they say time is running out. -- they thank him for that but they say time is running out. are leaving families here. they say they will work with dhs on this review. i have talked to several of them. they don't necessarily have a great deal of hope it will be a dramatic shift. at is what they are looking for. athink you are looking another potential confrontation in another him -- and another couple of months. host: that topic is one of the items the president will focus on this week. hthe president previously met with pope and eight in 2009. our phone lines -- with pope

benedict in 2009. let me follow up with the reporting of carol lee. the president arrives in the netherlands tomorrow morning. as she points out in her piece, this week will give the president a chance to meet with european allies face to face in what she is describing as a fundamental reassessment of u.s. russian relations. can you reelect -- can you elaborate? they met at the white house to give a layout of the goal. it was an ambitious agenda. the situation with ukraine and russia will be the overriding storyline, especially in the first few days when the president is going to go to two different summits. one is a nuclear summits in the

netherlands and the next one is the european u.s. summit in belgium. i think the white house is saying the overriding goal is to andy u.s. allies in europe perhaps maybe put more pressure on russia with more economic sanctions. they are going to start off in the netherlands on the sidelines with the nuclear summit, something the president launched a couple of years back. it requires cooperation with russia. the president made clear they are going to start off with a separate meeting of what they is theling the g7, which seven largest economies without russia. they make the point to russia that they will be left out of these important conversations and more economic sanctions will be put on president put on -- president clinton to encrypt --

president putin to increase pressure. visitlso going to flanders field on the 100th anniversary of world war i. it is an interesting time to do that. statement to make a about the allies and major conflicts. a visual statement, as well. they're going to be doing a couple of other things. him they will talk -- they will talk about some of the conflicts going on. he will go to saudi arabia and talk about the middle east. numbing bring this back to your headline on "washington post.com -- on washingtonpos t.com.

the piece begins by pointing out -- " it look -- it will focus on the australia us -- on the israeli-palestinian peace process." guest: certainly the public statements are political but it puts the pressure on other world leaders. it will be interesting to see what kind of public statements they make together, independently of each other. the president, on other parts of the conference --you will have a huge media contingents traveling with the president. or they will certainly use the

opportunity to talk to the pope to talk about these difficult issues. and i'm sure they will bring that message forward when the president talks to his own media contingents. there's no question it will be a for anl moment african-american president visiting pope francis. i think there will be substantive issues talked about. the pope has talked about things similar to what the president has talked about. the president from his state of said raisingress the minimum wage and econometric -- and economic actions can help. he is on the white house feed for

on keeping nuclear materials out of the hands of terrorists. he will continue the summit on tuesday before traveling to brussels that evening. on wednesday he stops in the cemetery a multipart in the eu summit. you also meet with the secretary general. thursday he will meet with pope francis before wrapping this up thursday. lexie's band. for 35 years in public affairs down from washington. putting you in the room a congressional hearing, briefings, and offering them brief gavel to gavel coverage of the u.s. house as a public service of private industry.

cable created by the industry 35 years ago and brought to you by a public service. watch us in hd, like us on facebook and follow us on twitter. ashington journal continues. to welcome an attorney in washington dc. director of aviation litigation in the reagan administration. initiated onation travelers with two stolen passports. they are not linking these individuals to the disappearance of the airliner. we wanted to use that as a way to focus on interpol and how many passengers may be traveling on stolen passports. .his one headline can you blame?

guest: it is a very difficult thing to explain. interpol has a database of the 40 million lost travel documents. the actually half of checks are made by three countries. why every country is not checking that database is quite frankly beyond me. host: what is interpol? poll: enter poll -- enter thenter poll is international police organization. it is an organization that was founded in the early part of the 20th century. it became active after world war ii. it is not a police force per se. it is an organization to foster international cooperation among

national police forces. it serves a number of functions in terms of intelligence, data gathering that, training, cooperation. .t is an international group 190 nations belong to it. the secondt is largest international membership next to the united nations. of lost these databases travel documents that the information regarding to passports eventually came to light. it came to light after the incident. host: who controls the database? guest: the database is reported .y interpol

they've got 14 different databases. it includes not only lost and stolen travel documents, it includes a firearms, sexual exploitation records, a broad range of information the law enforcement community wants. it is controlled by interpol. they ensure that it is properly administered. host: if i want to travel overseas on your passport in your reported stolen, i go to the airport check-in, is a red flag ago one of the terminal? guest: in the united states, we checked approximately 250 million times in one year time frame. that same year, there were approximately 800 million checks. government, the u.s.

as a member of enter poll actually uses the database at the point at which it makes the most sense. it is part of the routine process. in all likelihood, i would like to believe in all certainty that had anybody used a stolen or lost travel documents in connection with the flight originating in the united states that that would be identified and eight it would come up. there were something in the order of 800 million checks. 60,000 hits were lost or stolen documents. are thee largest users

states,tes -- united the united arab emirates. it is approximately half of the 800 million that are accounted for by three nations. that should not be the case. it simply indicates that of a , hundrednd 90 nations 67 art contribute data that just doesn't make sense. host: the secretary-general had this to say about the stolen passports. i can tell you that our experience is that most of the

passports that are used by people have been reported stolen are used by the true passport holder. there are 42 million passports in the database. that leaves so many travelers that could cause us harm. the world trade center bombing in 1993, one person entered the united states with a stolen passport and he masterminded the attack on the world trade center. from our perspective, it is common sense, prudent to make sure the let no one you don't know crush your border. host: your assessment. guest: i think it is common sense what the secretary-general is saying.

he indicated that approximately half of those 40 million are actually being used by the proper person, that is indicator half thought they lost their passport and found it but it was already reported in the database. the secretary-general is indicating correctly that those that remain are questionable. they are being improperly used. why countries are not using this on a regular basis, i have heard various explanations, it doesn't make much sense irrespective of the malaysia airlines flight. what we are going to see in aree tragedies is there

collateral matters that we become aware of in the investigation that are not rightly related to the actual sent or whatever it may turn out to be. we learn about an area where we can improve. we can improve on a global basis. our first caller is from texas. 9/11, i rumor hearing that bush was able to out of bin laden family the united states. i am wondering why nobody has ever said anything about the family being here. guest: i think that is a fair question. is a function of

post-9/11. a great deal changed about the world post-9/11. we became much more security centric. we became much more border centric. air travel changed dramatically for all of us. the developments we have seen in terms of the database, if you look at the interpol statistics, it is extraordinary to see its growth from the time it was 2002ally put together in until 2014. there had already been 100 28 million checks of the database. be oneber is going to billion checks by the end of this year.

issue,s of the bin laden the issue was thoroughly investigated in terms of their coming across borders in their travel. at caller can certainly look the various reports that were put out. that was thoroughly looked at in terms of how that occurred and why it occurred. host: you can join in on the conversation. the me share this headline from the new york daily news. guest: right now, the issue has presented itself. it is expected that our lawmakers call for changes in

this area. is one ofhumer several lawmakers that has indicated that countries should be penalized if they are not checking these databases. we speaking out of this, i would imagine that international organizations will. we will talk about what international airlines should be doing. we are a traveling society. i think that is why there is such a fanatic interest in what is going on right now in terms of the amount of speculation regarding what occurred with the malaysian flight. we are an international world. i think we will see a change

here. possibly over the coming months we will see a dramatic use of the they to base improving. lostll see the numbers of travel documents being reported. we will see increasing go into the database go up substantially. host: linda makes this point. why require them? our next caller is from houston. caller: i have a question about stolen passports. we don't have that here.

host: we have cecile join us. i have knowledge of the people getting together at one sitting. i want to know how well-connected is the system with an are poll and the rest of these organizations. guest: that is a great question. --hink enter poll coordinates among nations. every country that is a member has a central bureau. for is the contact point

enter poll. it is relatively easy for that law-enforcement organization to contact enter poll. interpol has an office in washington. all of the law-enforcement agencies and the major police departments are in contact and part of the central bureau in terms of use. the amount of communication and coordination is very significant. interpol puts itself out there for national police departments in terms of information sharing and intelligence and in terms of assistance. they have a response that will

hours toched in 24 help on forensics and fingerprints and dna. they have technical capabilities that they will put into play. they are an available organization. host: from the website, their mission is the world's largest police organization with 190 member countries. if you get more information from logging on to its website. paul is calling from connecticut. caller: good morning. comment --

host: i think paul is calling on a cell phone. we are getting some feedback. i'm calling on the woman who mentioned bin laden. theas my understanding that 9/11 happen by 19 saudi who were middle-class citizens. not on the list and enter poll would not have picked i think that is accurate in terms of the hijackers. the prior callers in three had to do with bin laden's family. there was a great deal of him

media coverage about them traveling after 9/11. there is controversy regarding those issues. part of the caller's question in terms of whether they would have been on the list if they were traveling on lost aavel documents, it was function of the 9/11 of vents that the database came together. what we're looking at now is essentially post-9/11 developments in terms of the interpol database. host: dave is in the phone from california. caller: good morning. i think the debt different reasoning eliminates all the possibilities except that the aisle -- malaysian airliner was hijacked.

if there had been a mechanical failure, the copilot would've reported it to the air traffic controllers when he signed off. the plane had changed course and the tracking devices and transponder had been turned off several minutes earlier. this is getting a lot of attention. guest: it is. i think the comments about the flight going into pakistan or suggesting it was in pakistan has been something that general mcinerney has been an advocate of in terms of believing that is what occurred. the otherve seen on news networks is a tidal wave of speculation. , youyou don't have facts really do find yourself engaging

in speculation. the bits and pieces of evidence can lead to different theories. if we do find the cockpit and we find out what occurred, i think we will be left with speculation. host: steve is joining us from oregon. caller: thank you for taking my call. i am wondering how much checking in a border crossing from mexico into california and texas. there are many thousands of cars basis in on such a rapid that not much checking is happening. guest: if anybody has ever gone i think theder

caller is correct. we have different types of relationships there. each individual passport is not being checked. is going toot that change remains to be seen. i would suspect that as it relates to mexico and canada and we are not about to see every document being checked at every border crossing. host: this question is from one of our viewers. the lost and stolen databases only one of 14 databases that enter poll maintains. -- interpol maintains. they focus on terrorism. intelligence.

they provide information for police forces. they engage in trading activities on the forensics side. teamsave rapid response they will send out at the request of member nations. they are a very active organization. , they arethey are not not a police force. makingl see interpol arrests on television, but they don't make arrests. they facilitate communication. they do issue bulletins. they have a series of other color-coded bulletins. their goal is to facilitate

coordination and communication. they are very effective at that. we are talking about passports and interpol. roger is join us from houston. caller: good morning. i have a question for mark. host: go ahead. my issue was i am adopted. not have access to our religion will birth certificates. there is a lot of difficult in getting a passport. can't properly identify residents, how can we

keep track of people who are coming inbound? guest: that is a fair question. to the surface of the issues that we have domestically in terms of identity documents and establishing identity and tracing identity. that process can only be as effective as the documents themselves. if documents are fraudulently issued, i don't think checking a database is going to tell us anything. the caller raises a good question. it really has to be addressed in a national basis in terms of internally versus and interpol basis.

work with interpol the kgb or the cia? guest: they work with all national law-enforcement agencies. in terms of whether they work ,ith the kgb or the equivalent i don't know what the russians do. .ussia is a member of interpol malaysia is a member of interpol . certainly, the united states is a member of interpol. dealing and so far as with international terrorism, the cia liaises with them. this goes back to nbc headline. what concerns would you have?

to haveverybody's going a second thought about those issues. you need to ask if the country you are flying in out of checks the database. if people are flying on documents that are not lost or stolen. i think it will be greater attention shown to that. i think senator schumer's comments were joined at that. host: carol is calling from baltimore. guest: my knowledge of enter is limited tool james bond movies. i always thought of it as a professional organization. my idea has changed. it seems to be a political statement when today's after the announced thatol

they did not think it was an act of terrorism. guest: i think you raise a good point. i would disagree in terms of characteristics as a political organization. their constitution and bylaws specifically prohibit them from getting engaged in any activity of four areas. one of those areas is clinical related issues. that does not believe -- mean that people will not run afoul of those prohibitions. toon't think it is fair suggest that comment is reflective of the fact that there are political organizations.

certainly, i think the fact that we are dealing with 190 nations raises certain questions in terms of how willing those nations are to share information. we see that in the united nations. host: where does the money come from? guest: it comes from the member nations. they pay statutory charges. they are essentially dues. in accordanceed with their ability to pay. host: sasha sent and a tweet earlier. i don't know how many americans on a passport. host: when you look at where the agency is going in the future, there will likely be changes.

what would be your recommendations? guest: i think we do have to look at implementing a requirement at least in the contact -- context of this country they can be a forced -- and forced overseas. if you are a member of enter poll, -- interpol you should use the databases. one of the explanations that has been given is why the database may not be accessed by even member nations is the cost associated with accessing it. apparently there is a charge. interpol has a network they can be accessed. they are able to give access right at the border.

it is basically invisible and seamless. there are some comments that have been suggested that the cost of getting that front-line access is high. interpol has said it is not high. that is an issue that is going to be focused on. i think we will see change. i think will be change for the better. i think we'll see much wider use of that database. it may come in the form of some mandate. host: we will conclude on that moment. ands an expert on interpol >> thank you. >> on the next washington the brookings

institution links the economic downturn with public opinion polls show a little support or u.s. intervention in global hotspots like ukraine. then a reporter will look at how astes compare and the spirit always we will take your calls and you can join the conversation via facebook and twitter. washington journal live at 7:00 a.m. eastern on c-span. >> the millennial generation are paying money into a system to support a level of benefits for today's retirees that they have no realistic chance of getting when they themselves retire. rebalancingto be a of the social compact. it is a very difficult challenge for this country politically.

it is by far the biggest thing we do. symbolically that as a alltry we are a community in this together. these are programs that affect everybody. the old map of these programs does not work. >> the looming generational showdown tonight at 9:00 on the tv's afterwards. in a few weeks, your chance to being the west. he will take your calls, e-mails and tweets on the midis, iraq and afghanistan by from noon till three eastern on and up. every weekend on c-span2. look for the clubs have.

next, how federal science policy can help some national security threats like fukushima and aviation safety. a special adviser to ernest munis. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] the hospitality here at the baker center has been remarkable. it's a wonderful place, and i'm happy to be here. as an academic who ended up in washington for some reason, i wanted to give you my personal take on computational science, what we do, and kind of how i view this.

i think it is an interesting story. i hope you will find it interesting, too. as a beta tester, i think this can fail and still be part of your learning. so we could look at it that way. i have, i guess, some framing thoughts on computational science. i guess i should project this. let's see. there we go. there are just a few topics i would like to talk to today, tell you a little bit about how i think about it, where i see the challenges. some examples for what we've done and how we use it, and where we are headed. depending on time, i will cover some of these in different ways.

there is no even or simple way to explain how we apply simulation these days. certainly from popular culture, we have a sense that simulation can do remarkable things. you only have to go to the theater or look at all the content out there where virtualization is part of almost anything you see these days, but when you have the temperate reality and make decisions and there are consequences to those decisions, it's a little bit to front, and i wanted to tell you a little bit about that world -- it's a little bit different. the degree of trust is still emerging. there is not a unique way to characterize how well we think we are predicting something and how much we trust it, and there's a lot of work to be done there. there are some places we do it by statute and other places

where you really need champions and advocates at the right time to say that these tools could be brought to bear, and i hope to give you a few examples of that. really, trust -- there is not an easy way to explain why you trust simulation or why you do not. for everybody, it is somewhat experiential. there is a personal aspect to that, and you see it among scientists, and i see it in washington among scientists. some believe it and some do not. again, you can trace this back in many ways. you can trace it back 500 years to descartes and bacon and deductive and inductive reasoning and different ways to approach the world. either you believe empirically that until you test it, you cannot do the next step, or you believe that you can set up some

intuitively derived set of premises, and from that build your understanding. those are two lines of thought that exist today. you will find a collection of scientists, and some will say that unless you do the experiment, they do not believe anything you predict. again, the whole idea of trust and when you call upon simulation to help you is still deeply rooted in personal issues that are hard to capture, and i hope you keep that in mind as we go through some of the examples today. i will try to cover a collection of different topics and try and show you some of the commonality of what is behind these, and i hope you find it interesting. prediction is really part of our everyday life. you deal with it, whether you are trying to figure out what is going to happen in march and the

in caa tournament or the world cup in rio -- the ncaa tournament or the world cup in rio or the sochi olympics. prediction comes in many places. you predict things by yourself. i would say that among all the predictions you do, the consequences are probably fairly limited. the consequences of making a bad prediction are typically not severe. maybe you will get wet because you did not expect it to rain. maybe you did not fill out your bracket in march very well and did not win the pool. but i would say that is not a high-consequence type of decision, but today, we are turning to simulation quite a bit more to help us in -- whoops, i'm sorry about that -- and helping us understand a number of types of more serious problems, more societal

problems, and i view them as being in two categories. as an epidemic -- as an academic, i resonate -- and certainly i resonated in my previous career -- on the class of output-based type of simulations. this is the kind of problem that a scientist poses. it is typically well-defined. you know what to measure. in scientific parlance, you know the degrees of freedom. you know what to measure. you have a theory, and you are trying to solve the. , and it has been an exercise in mathematics in controlling your approximations to solve that, and you have something you want to measure. maybe you are studying protein confirmation, or maybe you want to measure the mass of the proton.

you can pick your quantity, but it is scientifically precise. you know the degrees of freedom, and typically, it's a matter of controlling the approximation when you put it on the computer. it also has the benefit that you are the specialist. when you solve that kind of problem, you are the master of that domain, and you control it. the other class of problems that i see -- let me call outcome-based -- are the ones that i find more interesting these days. these are the ones that are technically imprecise. they are ill-post. they are integrally societally-based. they are things that impact people. you want to know why things are going to happen and why they are important to you. often, you do not know what the degrees of freedom are. you do not know where to start. you might not be able to control the models or the approximations.

you do not know how precise your answer is, but that is the place where we need the most help. typically, these are multidisciplinary kind of problems where you have to work with other people. you have to ask questions outside your comfort zone, and they are hard. i think discovery lies there in general, and this is the class of problems i would like to illustrate today. in this second class of outcome-based problems, we do not ask scientifically precise questions, but the thing we care about is what you have to do and when. you know, what is your confidence that you can actually help. ? what does it mean? what does it mean to you? what happened? what are the risks? what are the risks it might happen again he? how do you bring science into answering questions that are not scientifically precise? where do you start?

how did you do that quickly? what tools do you have at your proposal -- at your disposal to help inform that? often, you do not even know if you are asking the right questions. often, you have to ask if the right people are asking the right questions. in any case, are you even positioned to answer them? when you think about societal positions -- i will talk about fukushima, the underwear bomber, the satellite shootdown, the oil spill -- you know, collections of things that impacted people where science help inform the decisions to be made -- again, you know, real problems, real issues often time urgent, but the kind of quality of the question you want to answer through simulation is like that, so that is not precise. what is the measure of what does it mean? the average person wants to know what it means for them on my how it will impact their life.

whether you will have electricity or whether you can get gasoline or groceries or is your lifestyle impacted. that is the societal issue you are concerned about, so how do you manage the needs of science with the imprecise needs of questions of this quality? i want to mention maybe one additional quick digression. at the same time that we are interested in solving these problems, we have a changing world. there was a piece a few years ago comparing the ipad 2 to the cray supercomputer, and with the level of computing you carry in your pocket, it's remarkable, and if you project out 10 or 15 years, the kind of timescales departments have to think about for planning big infrastructure,

what is the infrastructure we are thinking about? what are the tools we have to have? how do we work through their so the country can be responsive to answer these types of questions? today, there's a growing set of westerns we worry about, whether it is energy or security or climate health, critical infrastructure. there are more and more places where we think that there is a role for computational science to inform us in decisions because many of these things cannot be tested or instrumented or done before it happens, so these are places where virtualization is an important step in characterizing the risks and decisions we might have to make. among the kinds of problems we might have, there are again two categories -- data-rich and data-poor. i just want to distinguish those

to keep them in the back of your mind. there are some problems -- sensor data, weather data, places where you have nothing but data, and your problem with simulation is to figure out what it means, causes and effects, correlated signals. that is not always easy. solving the inverse problem from a rich set of data is a very hard problem in trying to figure out what really impacts what. there are problems that are data-poor. certainly a nuclear weapons program is an example, but i will give other -- i would say the supernova work is data-four. tony would certainly love to instrument the next supernova before hand and get all the data

you want, but you cannot do that. if you get data, you will be happy, but you can only get a very limited set of measurements, and making sense of that israeli model-dependent. among the classes, it's not just simulation broadly. there are different qualities of questions we ask. there are different data -- different kinds of data and different assumptions we have to make on the models we need. a sense of some of the things that we have turned to simulation for in the past few years -- certainly while i have been in washington. i thought it might be a little illuminating. i would be remiss being at oak ridge, also with y 12, in places where the department invests heavily, not to say a little bit of the nuclear weapons program. i think it is an interesting tour de force of simulation. i just want to capture a couple

of things for you just for that reason. in the bottom corner, it's just kind of a cartoon illustration of the kind of complexity -- in understanding how we do understand weapons now without testing them -- we stopped testing in 1992. you know, in the record year, this country did 98 nuclear tests. the integrated amount is 1054 tests. over our history, kind of our legacy, but the problem scientifically is really multi-scale. it starts at the nuclear scale at the scale of nuclear interactions for fission and fusion processes. it spans the size of the weapon or the meter size and even

beyond. it's more than a 15 order of magnitude problem. for those in washington, you can think about it in terms of the federal budget, which is about $3.5 trillion -- it's like managing the federal budget at the 3.5-sent -- 3.5-cent level. the question is how you qualify the trust in the predictions you make at the different scales. to say that you have confidence with the federal budget is going and you have confidence you can say where it will be next year. it's a challenging problem, but it is a place where laboratories have excelled in doing that. anyway, there are a lot of questions we ask these days just at the bottom of that slide. we want to know whether they are safer if we have more options to make them more secure.

we need to know what other people are doing. we worry about terrorists and proliferation, and they are very broad questions we are starting to turn these tools to, but in view of time, let me go perhaps to more interesting things or at least that you might find more interesting. i remember february 1, 2003. i had not been government very long. i was returning from a conference in san diego. at the end of the terminal is a little round area that has the gates in the middle, and i was waiting to board. i looked over at the television sets, and i was watching the reentry of the space shuttle, and i cannot quite make sense. i was looking at that knowing that the shuttle was passing overhead at the time, and there were three or so bright lights coming down.

i could not tell what that was, and it was the shuttle breaking up on reentry, but it was kind of a moment that is etched in my mind. one of those things where you are staring -- you think you know what you're looking at and you really have no idea what you are seeing. on the monday after that, the national laboratory was already in touch with nasa to ask what they could do to help with the kinds of tools that were available. was there something they could do to assist in understanding the problem yet but it's a post talk issue but nevertheless something we needed to do. nasa understood, as you could see in the video, that home -- that foam had come off. they took some high-resolution

movies -- see if i can get this -- and they were able to see the foam coming off, and if you calculate the relative speed, it's about 700 feet per second that this block of foam came off and struck the shuttle. at the time, they had a tool. you can read about it. there's a very good report from the columbia accident investigation board that went through this. very thoughtful and detailed report. one of the things they found -- the model -- the tool that they had, which really had its genesis in micro-meteorite impacts in the 60's -- in the 1960's grew into their tool of choice in the late 1970's and late 1980's, but it was used outside its domain of validity, and no one knew. those that understood where you could use it were no longer there. there was not a sense of how predictive it was. it was viewed as a conservative

tool, and it told you there was not a problem. the shuttle was on its 28th flight, so it was known that the foam hit it, and it was viewed that this was not a problem. we had a look at the problem. nasa certainly reach out to a number of places to do the analysis. one of the things that they found is that the strength properties of the front end of the wing -- what i have in blue is a picture of the simulation of the reinforced carbon front ends of the wings that were used to understand what happened -- anyway, they started a detailed analysis of failure modes. the question here is what went wrong. what is the failure mode? you are reentering the

atmosphere, going from non-continuing to continuum modeling -- non-continuum to continuum modeling, trying to figure out what could have happened. an important part of the analysis was to get a piece of age reinforced carbon material, and they found the age properties depended on the number of free entries, that the string is degraded each time you reenter. this 1 -- think 41 of the 44 tiles on the shuttle were original. each time they reenter, oxygen penetrates the micro courts and reduces the strength properties. they started to characterize -- they managed to get small amounts of age reinforced carbon and characterize the stress and strength properties and started to do some analyses of what will

your modes could have happened. in the end, what they found is that a cubic foot of foam roughly hitting at 700 feet per second would break through and cause these to fail. they discovered this finally in march. march of 2003. it was not until july of 2003 that the experiments were done at southwestern research institute, which demonstrated then -- and the thing that actually got news attention was if i remember seeing this on cnn, in my mind, we saw this a you months ago, but for those who are in. click driven, this was when the answer was obtained, but it demonstrated then -- you could see a picture of the simulation at the same time of the foam --

the foam hitting the win, and it demonstrated that this was a failure mode, and as the shuttle started to reenter, the hot gas reentered the wheel well and started to melt the inside of the wing, and it caused the catastrophic failure of the shuttle, but it was a place again where simulation tested the different scenarios. it showed that it was not the wheel well problem, which was originally thought is the primary cause of ale your, that it happened through the foam hitting the wing. you had to characterize the material. it was a very complex set of situations -- of simulations because again, you are asking how it failed, and you are not sure what to measure. in 2006, we launched a satellite, and it basically never made orbit.

it was in kind of a cold, tumbling state for a couple of years, and we were approached to try to understand what we can do about this. it was a classified project -- now declassified. the program name was burnt frost. the issue was with what confidence could we provide the president that one could shoot this thing down -- what were the modeling confidences of the scenario in which you could shoot this out of the sky. the issue here was a large hydrazine tank, toxic material. it was frozen. it is not a hard calculation to see just from the thermal considerations that it would not melt upon reentry.

it would pass through reentry, and being uncontrolled, you cannot steer it into the ocean. it goes wherever it goes. we were asked to try to understand this. it was an interesting project over a couple of months. there was a movie -- i'm not playing the music because i do not like it, but the team put this together as kind of an homage to their efforts, but it has a couple of nice pictures, so i clip it and put it in their. you might recall that in 2007, the chinese shot down or hit one of their own satellites, and it was in a fairly high orbit. as a consequence, there are still over 2000 pieces of debris in orbit at about i've hundred

40 miles up -- 540 miles up that we worry about. the question is what if we could shoot this satellite down and alone a point so there would not be debris left. as the satellite is coming in in an uncontrolled way, a kind of skips over the atmosphere, and you do not know where it is going to hit. as it hits and changes its trajectory, and accelerates dramatically. if you wait too long, it goes too fast, and you will never hit it. there is a small window that you have to guess that -- or do more than guess -- to try to understand whether there is a kill shot for the satellite. it was finally decided that at about 153 miles up, one could do that. at first, the simulations gave about 80% confidence that this

could be done in the window of time. i think the satellite made about 16 revolutions per day, so you had a couple of tries to do it before it was too late. basically, the satellite look like a hydrazine tank and something that looks like a coke can. if you hit the coke can part, it would be like a bullet through paper. you would have no impact. you really had to hit the tank and predict the telemetry. when the shot was done, it matched exactly what the predictions were. it was known to be a kill shot. it was a place where, again, the initial estimate was 80% confidence. the decision at the top at the time was that's not good enough. "let's continue working on this." when it could be done with 95%

confidence, then it was done, and it was really a remarkable missile shot done from this aegis cruiser. again, it was kind of a time-urgent problem. it came out by surprise. we have tools. we have people who understand satellites. we have people who understand thermal mechanics that understand ale your and characterization and code and all this, and you have to somehow grab all of this, put it together, and tried to see if you can actually address this question. fukushima, again, was a problem of this quality. i remember again this pretty visibly. we were watching on tv in the office that morning trying to figure out what this meant without having a sense of the reactor facilities yet. it was about the synonymy

itself, which was just devastating -- it was about the tsunami itself, which was just devastating. it is a place where we have the ability to send things, robots into very harsh radioactive environments. it's a place where we can do air sampling. something born out of the old nuclear testing days is atmospheric modeling because we cared quite a bit about where radiation goes, so there are still many resident skills that can be used to monitor. we were brought into this in a couple of ways -- one for emergency response, including teams here at oak ridge who were called to task to help, but the

questions that arose that came to us in part were the following -- what is the danger? how bad can it get? at any given time, there are 5000 to 6000 student visas for u.s. students in japan. every year, there are 500,000 to 600,000 u.s. tourists, so there is a large u.s. population there, and the question that comes up is -- do we even evacuate u.s. citizens? there was going to be a mid-day meeting in tokyo, which meant a meeting in the middle of the night, and we had little more than an hour to figure out what we can add to this conversation. the call went out in the middle of the night to the livermore director to mobilize the sender, and -- mobilize the center. you can say you want to model it and you have great atmospheric models, but you still have to try to capture what is coming out of it and how much. the initial conditions, i would

say, were not well known at the time, but the questions were significant because if you decide to evacuate u.s. citizens, it is a logistics problem. how many airplanes, whose airplanes? it's not a simple thing to do if you decide that there are citizens at risk. people also wanted to know what it means for people on the west coast of the united states. for specific u.s. interests, there were a lot of questions that we cared about quite a bit. what are those rates? which isotopes? and things of higher degree refinement. the initial estimate was from the simulations that were done, that tokyo was not at risk and we did not have to worry about that, but i have to say, it's not easy to do these kinds of scientific problems through the

conventional way of peer review. you can't pull together your best team of people in the middle of the night and say, "you've never worked together before, but why don't you answer this in an hour?" how do we become better at harnessing the skills in the country in a way that can answer these questions which seem to come up almost annually? i think this was a case where we did quite a bit of air sampling and air modeling. we didn't really quite a bit of support for japan, and i think there was a very positive story that came out of this. what happened at the site, what it means to japan, and what it means to u.s. citizens as well or to the continental united

states. there are other places -- it was -- we had been working for a good year or so on trying to look at governance models, how we work with -- how many agencies can come and partner with us at our national laboratories to solve some of their interesting problems. what is the way we can engage other agencies to answer their strategic issues using the tools we have like at oak ridge or other national laboratories. we had had a conversation with janet napolitano on december 18 on this, saying that the partnership model is part of our effort to develop stronger strategic relationships between

agencies, which turned out to be timely in a number of ways. one week later on december 20 5, 2009, -- december 25, 2009, there was the underwear bomber, who was stopped from igniting his petm that he kept in his underwear in that flight. it started a relationship between the department of energy and the department of homeland security and aviation security to try to answer some of these questions of how we protect against this. could this happen again? what are the risks of this happening? it was an interesting problem. for this particular type of issue, it is a competition of different effects going on, of all the elastic energy stored in the airplane and whether you can dissipate it before catastrophic cracks propagate through the skin and the ribs of the

aircraft. we worked on this with them for some time. i would have to say it has been a valuable thing. i cannot say too much more about this other than there are a lot of interesting issues in aircraft security here, and there was quite a bit learned from this, but there was a place where we had to become aviation experts to answer these questions because it was time-urgent to figure out what the risks were. i have a few other examples, but let me perhaps go towards

simulation. i want to say a couple of things about the tools here before i get to some summary points. the tools we use are -- we talk about simulation as something simple, but those, certainly here at the laboratories that program on these -- it's a tour de force. a computer is maybe 100 or 200 racks a system, each weighing more than a car. it takes teams of experts and people to attack these from across a broad set of disciplines. extremely nontrivial to deliver any of these kinds of simulations or products. really champions. these systems take megawatts of power.

i remember when we were starting up the whites -- i think it was the white supercomputer. it runs at about 4.7 megawatts when it is working. when it's idling, it's about 2.5. they were running the first simulation of around the first benchmark, something that jack likes very much. his organization, the top 500 tracks annually and has done for many years, the return started, and suddenly, there was a two .5-megawatt spike in the local power grid, which is a couple of thousand homes -- there was a 2.5-megawatt spike in the local power grid. these are not just computers. they are very complex things that you really have to think about in different ways.

when we had the first, you know, large system up there in the top corner, 10,000 processors, i think it was about the size of a basketball court. there was a chip intel, which has effectively the same computational power. picture of a colleague there holding this back in 2011. the equivalent power from this machine in 1996. we are looking ahead at the technology, keeping in mind that portable electronics and basically 600-plus-billion-dollar portable electronics market cannot be steered very much by federal investment, but perhaps strategic investment at the margins can still derive quality computers for the problems that we need to solve in the years to come. it's a challenge. kind of the system we are

looking at would probably be, in the best case, 20-megawatt type of system. 10 to the 18 calculations, operations per second are notional goals for this, but we need to be functionally useful. let's see. since i have a tendency to talk a little bit too long, let me go to thinking a little bit about the future. going back to where i started, there is not a natural place for anyone to stop and ask what is

simulation? what can it do for us? often, we end up in crises and we end up in places where we are responding to something and doing the best we can with what we have. it's important to start looking ahead and asking -- where could we add value? i picked a couple of things the president has added recently. the climate action plan. certainly, his nuclear security agenda from a number of speeches. places where you could imagine there could be a role for simulation in a substantive way. the question is -- how do we do that? who is going to do it? it's one thing to say that. the question is -- who does what? if there is not a central place to think about this, it's incumbent on people, on those invested in the outcomes, to think about that and try and make it happen. decisions are typically not made by scientists. i do not say that is good or

bad. i simply observed that the kinds of questions we are faced with often are not scientific, and the problems are often not well defined, but we want to know what it means to people, what it means to the economy. we want to know very big, societally-based questions. when you try to dissect these, they typically cover a number of different disciplines, a number of different skills, many fields of specialty. rallying people to try to address them can be nontrivial and somewhat unnatural. it does not overlay on university structures, either. there is not a natural place to go to try to address some of these questions. peer review is typically not available. you do not have time to sit back with your team of experts and get your panel together and go through whether what you have

done is right. if you are trying to others -- understand whether you need to evacuate people -- you just do not have time for that. the question is how you build in a sense of pedigree, quality, prediction so we do not end up doing something foolish. i think that is very nontrivial. it's a real problem that requires scientific attention because we typically do not stop -- we typically stop at error bars, and it does not translate to the average person and to the kind of meta-questions that are emerging now. simulation is certainly showing its value. we find it in more and more places, largely because there are champions out there who pull it all long and no way to inject it, but it is not still a natural place to go. many of the problems we get -- we do not have oil spill simulation experts that we call on for underwater crises. we do not have the experts for

pick your topic, and we cannot afford to contract them for every problem we have, so we have to figure out how to create a more responsive infrastructure from the tools and people we have. i think there's a lot to offer. there's a lot of promise, but we are going to have to figure out again how to transmit the degree of confidence in anything we do. perhaps understanding how we can be more responsive -- there are washington issues, i'm sure, but there are places where the university could see themselves. there are places national labs could see themselves. where you know when to inject this into a conversation and how you do it. even asking if these are the

right questions to be asking. progress here, success against the next set of threats, of urgency, i think, will require communication and greater partnership among the different entities among a broader set of scientists, from social scientists to health, to physical, and mathematics. certainly industry, labs, and government. i don't see the number of issues diminishing. i see them growing. i see the complexity increasing. i see the kinds of things that we are expecting people to answer becoming a little more refined, and i think we have to be prepared for that, but i think there's a very positive story on what this country does in simulation and how we turn it to these problems. i hope i have made at least some

impression that this is of interest. thank you for your time, and i'm happy to take questions. [applause] >> we are recording these presentations, and we would like the questions and answers to be done to the microphones. we have microphones we can pass around. also, you can ask dimitri questions at the reception. if you have a question -- anybody want to go first? tony? tony, do you have a question? >> i enjoyed the presentation. do you think we could have saved columbia? a lot of people at nasa thought we could have.

>> i would not consider myself qualified to answer that. even if we had in a timely way discovered what the issue was, mitigation is an entirely different problem. i did think about that question, though, and i did think that this was the right next question to ask, but i do not think there is anything to help you with that. >> coming back to the nasa example, i think one of the interesting pieces there was you talked about the crater code being used outside of its valid parameter set, but you also raise the point that there was a human factor associated with that, and that the skill set or the knowledge or the depth of knowledge, at least, of what was

actually in that code and how it was developed his loss. as we are no longer talking about codes that are thousands of lines long but millions of not trillions of lines long, how do we deal with that problem? >> this is really at the heart of, you know, a field called uncertainty quantification. there is not a good answer. it is a place we are working with universities around the country to try to understand. certainly there is work at our laboratories, but you are exactly right. an experienced code writer might remember where all the right punctuation is in the code for maybe 50,000 lines of code, but when you have one million lines of code, it's hard to figure out what is in their -- in there. there are all kinds of sources of uncertainty from assumptions

and models to places where there is a mix of empiricism and calibration. there is no methodology to propagate uncertainty through the entire spectrum of sources of uncertainty, and i think even qualifying all the potential sources of uncertainty is hard. so it is a place where we need work. i don't think there is a good answer for that, but it is really where we have to look. ultimately, if someone is going to make a decision, you have to have a simple distilled amount of information on the degree of trust in what came out. it is a cartoon, so the question

is -- to what extent is there confidence and knowledge behind it? i think that is a problem that needs to be worked on in years to come. it's really at the heart of complex simulation. >> dimitri, you said something earlier that really affected me -- i'm sure it did everyone here -- when you said these things happen annually. obviously, there is a pressing need to look ahead. with regard to how we set things up to better prepared to respond, what are your thoughts on that? how can we set up a better framework, given, as you said, we can't expect these things to happen, unfortunately, yearly --

we can expect these things to happen, unfortunately, yearly? >> that's a good question. building and responsiveness is hard because of how we support people and fund people. everyone is busy, and it requires people who want to be involved in this. we need to know who is out there and whether they are willing at the ready to help. when something urgent happens, you go to the short list. who comes to your mind? it is kind of human nature -- who do we have? we have to get a little better than that and think broadly about the experts resident in this country. there is probably a next step in

understanding what that means, whether there are barriers in funding or regulations we would have to change. i don't know. with the oil spill, the lab director, tom hunter, really left his job for about four months. we had laboratory people doing only that. it was a nontrivial commitment, so the question is -- would you be ready to leave what you are doing today if we say, "i really need you?" can you afford that? it's not for everybody. finding a subset of those who are inclined to dedicate themselves to some of these problems, which might be short or long term, is part of that, but understanding what assets we have is another.

we do need a bit of an inventory so that we can be more responsive and understand whether there are barriers that have to be changed through any legislation or policy changes or simply communication. wikileaks was another great example. the guy did not go into it, but i skipped over it. another place where suddenly, there was a massive data set. aside from doing any keyword search, is my name in their? is our department in there? there is something more sophisticated you could do. there are graph analysis estimates we could look at. what's the content? what is the knowledge involved? what do you distilled from this when you look at it in its entirety? there are interesting and complex problems, so sometimes you need material science people. sometimes you need algorithms and graft people.

ultimately, though, you need computer people. >> i noticed that you had a good year component to your presentation. i know goodyour work at linked to model the next generation tire -- good-year worked at length to model the next-generation tire. many of our corporate partners are coming to us, asking to simulate experiments ahead of spending a lot of time and energy and money actually

confirming the experiments, so we are seeing a groundswell interest in that, and it speaks to the fact that although this will not be commonplace, it will be more routine in the future. do you see that coming in that realm? >> i hope so. we have a few examples of where things like that work, where the partnerships with businesses have worked. my personal characterization of the story was it required the company to be in crisis before it forced adoption as a new paradigm for tire development. in the end, it led to the top-selling tire in germany. they are really marquee products. i think the president of north american tire was the one who finally championed this in 2004 when goodyear was against the ropes. we found in talking with different companies, you often find people doing simulation and those engaged in thinking about

the world this way often not having the top cover from their leadership. there is not the pull from the top from the management from the leadership saying, "i want you to inject this new way of thinking into our business model." typically, what we hear is, "they don't care. you are too expensive. what have you done for me now? we need this by next quarter." but the story was a decade-old. it started in 1993 and showed value in 2004. it saved the company. but it took that long. it was beyond thinking through quarterly profits, so that is hard to do. when companies are at risk, there are a few stories out there on, "that's what leadership looks at all the

options on the table," and they are willing to change the model dramatically. i don't know of too many examples where it has happened where things are going well. >> hopefully, that will change. >> capturing the r.o.i. is something we need to do more of. >> i think we have time for more -- one more question. >> thank you for a very stimulating conversation. you talked much about how to prepare in terms of the people and the science. you talked about, you know, assumptions. how much can be trust and belief in the data and the outcome of the models, but the input is very important, of course. of course, you need to draw on data that is in the public sector and the private sector and the academic sector. can you do more in terms of validating existing data sets and documenting them well enough

that it is not applied for what it was originally intended for and we did not know about the limitations? the nation has not very successful, i think, in implementing metadata standards, and i think more could be done. what do you think could be done in terms of getting the data sets more useful so we can trust them better? >> i think one of the things -- you know, one way to address that is we need to do what is useful to do in the first place. i don't think we should have standing armies on the ready for trying to anticipate inc. that might happen -- things that might happen because we will

never get it right, and we will waste money and you do not want people idled. given that you cannot anticipate what is going to happen, the move towards simply doing what we are doing better for what we need to do anyway is probably what we should be doing. if there are places where we can improve standards if we can improve the quality of what we think we are doing, the methodology, that should be something that we do and we try and capture, but the only other thing we can do is structure ourselves so that we can then be responsive to draw upon what we have learned to throw it at the next crisis. >> thank you. before we wrap up, i thank dimitri for his excellent presentation. we have guests from the department of energy, from the

12 facility and from the oak ridge labs. i'm delighted our friends in the community were able to join us today. i may have overlooked some guests, so i'm sorry if i did that. we will have a reception shortly. i'm very left with the fact that i have a wonderful colleague of mine you helps me organize these things. the actual commerce asian today was cohosted by the baker center and the howard hall institute for security. i like to thank howard for their help. thank you for coming on a very cold day. if you'd like to join us for some refreshment and more questions with dimitri, you can join us all stop help me thank dimitri for his time. we'd like to get a small token of our appreciation. [applause]

of the is a look at some live events scheduled tomorrow on the c-span networks. a dutch politician number will talk about iran's nuclear program and her visit to iran last year live from the atlantic consult starting at 10:00 eastern here on c-span. the acting director of the white house national drug control policy will be testifying on president obama's $4 trillion budget for 2014. that is live at 3:00 eastern on c-span three. >> joining us is karen ignagni, the president and ceo of america's help care plan. joining us is mary agnes carey and julie rovner of national public radio.

let me begin as we approach the deadline with the affordable care act. what will it look like? >> it will look like it looks like today on april 1. what we hope we see is a large number of individuals who are how the joining in march. we will not really know that until april until we have a sense of who coming in. it is a marathon. it has never been a sprint. we expected the healthier people would probably wait until the last bit of time to sign up. we have to see now what happens. we can get a better sense of that to the end of april. >> if you give the white house a grade to get young people to sign up, what would you give it? >> looking at the last several weeks particularly, there is a lot