asking about but you said i was not part of that organization at the time. i'm sure that was something within againgeneral motors. you and i have a history that goes back to when you were 18 years old. so you were there. your father i believe worked 39 years for pontiac. i go back to 18 years old with again gentlelady mowgeneral mowtors too. when i was 18 my parents bought me a jimmy. it is like a blazer. from 73 to 05 i drove nothing but general motors suburbans. i remember times when the key would be in there and you would go to put your key in and it wouldn't work.

it would vibrate and tear the keys off the teeth. but never once did i have that shut off. for me, they made pretty good ignition switches. can you tell me how many models gm makes today? >> around the globe over 100. >> 100 different models. can you tell me how many ignition switches they make? >> well we sell -- >> if you have 100 models how many different ignition switches would there be. >> i can't answer that question i don't know. >> gm has proven i don't understand this reinventing the wheel. that every car has to have a different set of circumstances to make sure that it meets the

qualifications. i recommend that you work hard with us and our next witness from the national highway traffic administration says that when a car shuts off says that the airbag deploys for 60 seconds. i would ask that you reach out and work not only with your engineers saying hey we have some pretty good why do we reinvent the wheel every time we invent a new ignition switch on these models. so. >> i would welcome the opportunity to have our technical experts look at how we can improve the way the system works. airbag deployment is part of a system. if there are improvements that can be made we would like to be in the forefront of making them. >> thank you ma'am. i thank the families.

mr. chairman i yield back. >> we recognize mr. yardmouth. >> i want to express my condolences to the victims of this tragedy. i know it must be frustrating for you to listen to this testimony testimony. we are looking for answers and so is gm. i was frustrated by the same questions that my colleague had just mentioned i have been driving a long time and this is a pretty well established technology sticking a key into an ignition and turning it. are you aware of other issues that have been discovered in a gm vehicle or over the discovery of key ignition systems? >> i have not reviewed every accident that we vhave ever had.

but in this case it took way too long. >> there is a new technology, i have been driving a car for for and a half years i drive a ford product. it is a push button ignition. i was in a gm car last week that has a push button ignition system. and or a key ignition system and what are the differences first of all in terms of safety, this particular situation wouldn't occur with a push button system. how do you make that decision? >> we evaluate and the push bow ton button start is something that we are evaluating. i'd like our oexexperts to provide that evaluation it is a

component that operates as part of a system i think we would be better served to have our experts cover that. >> you are doing analysis of whether a push button system is safer than a key ignition system? >> there is work done that both can be designed to be safe. it is a function, we have them on some of our vehicles and continue to roll them out. we are looking at doing it across the board. it would be worth doing that analysis. one of my staff members has a 2005 malibu that was recalled because of a power steering issue. she called the dealership and the dealership said that they

didn't know how to fix it. my question to you is, are you confident that gm knows how to fix the vehicles it recalls for the variety of problems that -- >> first of all, if we find a situation that is not safe and we are not sure how to fix it we will find the vehicles and take action. there is a fix whether it is a checks or a replacement of the product. so that does exist for that specific vehicle. >> so she is getting bad information from her dealership or they haven't been told yet. >> i assume or i can follow up if you would like. >> the public would like to know. you if millions of vehicles out there and she was told go ahead and drive the vehicle if she felt safe and i'm not sure if ever i driver would know whether

they should feel safe or not. some people are strong people and maybe it has happened to them before and she know it will take more effort to steer. i don't even know how the average consumer is supposed to know whether they feel safe or not after a vehicle has been re recall recalled. doesn't the company have some disclosure responseibility to say these things happen. >> we provide information to the dealers as well. >> one final question, we talk about and then we are going to have the representative here earlier, one of the things that you are not required to do is to provide warrantee data to the national highway traffic safety administration. do you think that might be considered or helpful in this

case? maybe dots could have been connected sooner? >> i welcome the opportunity to look at what information that nitsa would feel is of value to submit. >> thank you. >> gentleman yields back. i know recognize mr. harper for the next five minutes. >> we will continue to get to the bottom of this. and miss sp axtbarra i know this is not the most enjoyable experience to go through this. but we are in a situation we don't trust the company right now. we have to get to the bottom of this and so we want to continue to ask some questions. if i could get you to refer to tab 28 in your binder, and i want to direct your attention to the people that is found at tab 28. in september of 2005, few months

after general motors decided that there was not an acceptable business case to implement changes to the ignition switch. gm personnel including raymond digiorgio proposed changes about a new ignition switch. it appears the piece cost could not be offset with warrantee savings. is that just the ignition switch? >> generally when people refer to piece cost they refer to the part. >> so he is just referring to that ignition switch that is a yes? >> again i didn't write this note but i'm telling you generally that is what it means.

>> an increase of 90 cents is that correct? >> does the e-mail say there would be an increase of 90 cents? >> yes. >> since the warrantee offset was only 10 to 15 cents gm didn't make the change. >> that is not something that i find acceptable. if there is a safety defect this analysis is in appropriate. >> but that indeed is what happened here correct? >> that is one piece of data as we put the pieces together we will take action. this is not the type of behavior that we want what was lori

question queen's position? >> what is the cost factor in the decision about safety? >> they don't. ji can . >> i can only speak to the way we are running the company. if there is a defect identified we go fix the vehicle fix the part, fix the system. it is not acceptable to have a cost put on a safety issue. >> and that is your position and your goal and the way you want it to be now. but that is not the case of what we are going back and looking at. you are telling us that general motors has changed it's position. but this is how you want it now. >> we in the past had more of a cost culture and we are focusing on safety and quality.

>> when we look at who first authorized the use of an ignition switch that did not meet specifications. >> that is something that we'll learn in our investigation. >> one of the things that concerns us of course when general motors filed bankruptcy in 2009, it wasn't an overnight problem with the loss of profits or losing money each we're. in 2005 general motors lost $2.6 million and 2008 lost 30.9 bill billion and filed for bankruptcy in 2009. the fact that general motors was going through many years of financial issues. did that impact how this was not dealt with at that time as it should have been? >> i can't answer that question.

when i do i'll take action. you indicated earlier that a specific traffic death was not included with the count of fatalities. i would like to see other traffic deaths or serious injuries that were looked at but the determination was made that it was not part of this total. can you get us that information? >> yes. >> will you get that for us? >> yes. >> thank you very much i yield back. >> all right recognize ms. cas tore for five minutes. >> natasha was killed while ridingride ing in a 2005 chevy cobalt. allen ray floyd was killed after

losing control of is2006 chevy cobalt. i understand that the family is in attendance in the hearing today. others have been killed because of gm's defect sif ignition switch. the fact is that we do not know the full extent of the fatalities and injuries and accidents but evidence is growing through this investigation that gm could have addressed this long ago. gm knew about this problem as far back as 2001. gm used the switch in vehicles anyway. the committee sent you a letter about this issue and documents were received yesterday that

show that these in adequate switches were approved by gm in may of 2002. i have a document here in tab 54 in the binder as well. this document shows that the force required to turn the ignition switch was too low. that specification is clearly marked not okay. does this document show that dm officials were aware that the ignition switch did not meet company standards in 2002. >> if if this was provided to the company english engineers. >> in 2004 they were coming up with ways to fix the problem. this is at tab 8 from 2004 shows that gm did reject alternative designs.

it memgss s mentions one year lead times and says the tooling costs and piece prices are too high. it concludes thus none of the solutions represent ares an acceptable business case. other documents present the piece cost increase as 57 cents per unit. do you know who would have made the decision about whether to make this change in 2004? >> i find that decision un unacceptable as i've stated. the cost is not what we look at. we look at what it will take the fix the problem and make it safe. we will put the pieces together incidents and actions that are taken or not taken. >> so do you think that a repair

cost cents was too costly? >> we don't even look at cost we make the change. but pthere was a disconnect. in private it approved the switch and then the company a appeared to reject the changes. in 2005 the "new york times" ran a review in which the author wrote about his wife encountering a problem with the chevy cobalt. said she was driving on a freeway when the car just went dead. the only other thing on the can he ring was a remote control fab. in rare cases a chevrolet cobalt

while the car is running when this happens it is still controllable. i find it hard to believe that it was discussed on the paged of the "new york times" and then gm said no big deal engines out cuff all the time. would you consider this a safety issue? >> yes. >> you indicated that you were not aware that gm was investigating the cobalts until december 2013 is that correct? >> i was aware there was analysis related to a cobalt. >> in 50 what was your position. >> in 2005 i believe i was in the manufacturing engineering organization of the company. >> so you were a high level executive at gm responsible for vehicle manufacturing.

>> the equipment that we used to build vehicles. >> in one of the nation's largest newspapers raised the issue in this important new issue and you don't result at the time? >> i was not aware that this was this issue until the recall was introduced on january 31st. i did not know it was an ignition switch. >> that concludes our members but i would like to see if mr. terry would have an opportunity for five minutes. >> thank you. without objection. >> thank you. >> i appreciate this and i'm sorry for being late. but my plane was cancelled for mechanical reasons probably an ignition switch.

us air. >> so getting back to nitsa and i chair the sub committee over jurisdiction and the tread act. and the tread act clearly requires manufactures to in form nitsa within five days of any noncompliance or defects that create an unreasonable risk of safety. did gm contact or notice nitsa of any noncompliance or defects regarding the ignition switch? >> that is something i hope to learn as we go through our investigation. >> what, what is the difference

between noncompliance and a defect? >> that is a very broad question. >> no. >> it is very specific question. >> i think it depends on the specific situation that you are talking about. >> is regarding an ignition switch. >> what is a known non compliant ignition switch. >> my understanding is that is a specific term used by nitsa term standards but i can get you the standards with that versus when we feel that we have found a defect with our parts. >> that is why it is or when it is substandard it is non compliant and a defect is a higher level. that is what we are looking for here today to determine if there was a defect. >> congressman i think in the

language that we use with nitsa there are specific definitions and i would like to provide those to you. >> i can get the definitions for you. >> okay. >> i'm asking how it applies to the ignition switch and nitsa is going to testify there was no notice. >> i didn't hear you? >> my understanding is that nitsa said that gm did not contact them. >> if i find that we did not provide the appropriate information to nitsa we will take appropriate action with the individuals involved. >> thank you. i yield back. >> i think there are no further

questions. >> i just had two questions mr. chairman thank you. >> the first one, is, um i've been sitting here thinking about these new ignition switches that you are putting into the recalled cars. they are based on the 2006 specks but what you are saying miss barra is that they are going to meet the highest safety stand ars when they are manufactured is that right. >> our engineers team is going through testing to make sure that they meet the requirements. >> on tab 53 of your notebook december 5th 2012 the minimum torque on the return side of the ignition switch must be 15n-cm. would that be the standard since

it says it must be that? >> from the position of run to accessory? >> 15 is the minimum. >> yeah, okay. >> and my final question is, i'm impressed this committee has had experience with kenneth feinberg before because he was appointed to help administer the fund set up by bp after deep water horizon and also appointed to administer the fund after the boston marathon terrorist attacks. i want to make sure that what you are doing when you hire him is that you are really doing something. he is usually hired to sort out the value of people's claims and then assign money. i'm assuming that gm is hiring him to help identify the size of

claims and then help spencompensate. is gm -- >> we have hired mr. feinberg to help us assessed the situation. >> there is no money involved at this point? >> we have hired him and begin working with him on friday. >> he has not been given ability to compensate vick tip. >> we are going to work with him to determine what the course of action is. >> might that include compensation? >> we haven't made a decision yet. >> we thank you for your time today. gm has cooperated with this investigation. let me make a couple of requests. members will have other questions for you and we hope that you respond to those within a timely manner.

we also plan to conduct interviews in the recall part and may be requesting more records will you make those available to us? >> we will absolutely cooperate. >> we would like to be notified when you get your internal report and review that report as well. >> we will notify you. >> thank you very much. >> i thank you ms. barra. you will be dismissed but while this is taking place. we are going to take a five minute break to allow mr. fr freidman to take his seat and we will reconvene the hearing >> after her testimony will the subcommittee took a break gm ceo mary barra spoke with reporters for about 10 minutes.

>> we are sorry. second, we are doing everything we can to make sure we provide the greatest support possible to our customers as it relates to communicating to them. we have a dedicated website. we have put more than 100 people in our customer call center to answer the questions. we have communicated broadly if someone is uncomfortable with the vehicle, we are providing loaner vehicles free of charge. we want to learn as much can from the situation. if we can learn and make a better process, that is our goal. we have hired -- we will see

that there is no holds barred in the investigation that he does and we will hold ourselves accountable. we will be transparent as we learn anything double improve the safety of our vehicles and make the industry better, we will be transparent. >> when congressman barton said -- he didn't seem to be getting the information that he needed. that is in sound like you made much headway in there. >> there are very technical engineering terms. the important thing for people to understand is that the subsystems in the vehicle is safe and meeting its performance and meeting all the aspects that are important. we are holding ourselves accountable to make sure the vehicles are safe as possible and we have an unyielding

standard. there are specific things that relate to engineering specifications that i think was misunderstood. >> you met with family members that lost loved ones. what have you heard from them and what did you say to them in response? >> this was a meeting the asked for to get closure. we agreed to keep the meeting private so i need to respect their wishes. >> one more question since you can answer that one and that is when you look acted 2005, gm was starting to struggle financially and some are questioning whether or not gm's financial state played into the decision not to order a recall when you knew there was an issue. do you believe from what you know now that the financial state of gm back then was intervening factor? >> we are doing a complete investigation. we are definitely moving to a culture that is focused on the consumer the customer, high

quality and safety and that is my direction. >> families and consumers deserve more specific answers from you. there were many questions you couldn't answer to. don't they need more? >> that is why we are launching an internal investigation. it is a very complex situation. we need to make sure we have the facts. when we have that information we will share with the regulators, with the legislators, what the customers. i could not. >> muirhead of quality back into about 11 -- back in 2011. are there other defects you are not aware of? >> you didn't have my career background correct. i became aware of an issue that was being examined.

i became aware of this specific incident on january 31 after the recall team made this decision. >> hold on. >> we can provide that off-line. when decisions are made, there was a technical team that goes through and makes the analysis of the situation. it is not been covered with senior leaders. it was done at a technical level so the renault influence. -- so there was no influence. going forward we look at any incidents, they will be reviewed. our product chief executive vice president of global product development and be reviewed with me. that is a change we have already met. >> was customer safety not a priority before?

>> i know what i am saying today. >> you have been with the company for over 30 years, yet you claim never once did this ever cross your desk. what do you say to the families? how do you explain that to them? >> there was a pacific -- there is a specific group the ghost of the incident. s. it goes through a technical team that makes that decision. i was never a part of that process in this issue. >> does it anger you >> angers me that we have a situation that took over a decade to correct. i am working day and night to correct that issue. i will work day and night to make that happen. >> following up on that, let me just follow up on that. a man who worked very closely with you who headed the

investigation for more than a year, he was in charge of this. how did you not know about that? what does it say about communication. >> it cap the technical team working on that. we have changed that. i am telling you the truth. >> no ahead. >> [inaudible] whether did that say about your ability to lead this company in the future? >> here doing a complete investigation. there was a document production that was done over a short keyword of time. we want to have an independent person. he will do an investigation. that is what we are looking for. >> going forward, what kind of

latitude will you give? >> ken feinberg is an expert in this area. he has tremendous experience. we will have our first meeting on friday. we will examine a wide range of opportunities. >> will you have an investigation report when it is finished? >> i will be transparent with those items. everything that is appropriate to share in everything that is related to consumer safety. >> will be in written format? i have has not been determined. >> the hearing on gm's ignition switch recall, a problem that has been linked to a dozen deaths continued with testimony from the head of the national highway and traffic safety administration. this is an hour and a half.

>> mr. david friedman has served as the administrator since the 14. he was sworn in on may 15. he became net so --nitsa's deputy administrator. he worked for 12 years. he was a senior engineer. he worked as a deputy director of the clean vehicles program.

under the rules of the committee, you can be advised by counsel. do you choose to be advised? >> i do not. please rise. >> these where that the testimony -- do you swear that the testimony you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth? >> the witnesses now under oath and subject to the penalties set forth. you may now give a five minute summary. >> chairman murphy, ranking members of the committee. thank you for the opportunity to testify. to begin, i would like to say that on behalf of everyone at n itsa, we are deeply saddened by the lives lost. the victim's families and

friends have suffered really. i am deeply sorry for their loss. safety is our top priority. our employees go to work every day trying to prevent tragedies just like these. our work reducing dangerous behaviors behind the wheel and improving safety vehicles and addressing defects has helped reduce highway fatalities to historic lows not seen since 1950. in the case of the recently recalled general motors vehicle we are first to focus on general motors identifying all vehicles -- with the ignition switch defect. it is doing all it can to inform consumers about how to keep themselves safe. we are always -- also investigating whether general motors met its responsibilities to address this defect as required under federal law.

if you fail to do so, we will hold general motors accountable. it has led to record fines on automakers. internally, we have already begun a review of our actions in this case to further our ability to address potential defects. today i will share what i have learned. some of that information raised concerns about airbag deployment. we convened a panel to review that data. neither the cobalt nor the ion stood out when compared to other vehicles.

the two crash investigation reports that we reviewed at the time were inconclusive on the cause of non-deployment. the reports noted that the airbags did not deploy. the power mode was an accessory. these crashes involved unbelted occupants. these conditions began with relatively small conditions. airbags are less likely to deploy in order to avoid doing more harm than good. further, power loss is not uncommon in crashes where airbags deployed. in light of these factors nitsa did not launch a formal investigation. we continue to monitor the data. we have found that the related consumer complaint for the cobalt has decreased by nearly half since the 2007 review. based on our engineering expertise and our process, the data available to nitsa at the

time was not sufficient to warrant a formal investigation. what does this mean? nitsa was concerned and engaged on this issue. this was a difficult case for reuse tools and expertise that over the last decade had successfully resulted in 1000 recalls, including 35 recalls on the airbag non-deployment. these tools and expertise have served us well. we continue to rely on and improve them. for example, we have already invested in advance computer tools to spot defects and trends. we are planning to expand that effort. what we know now is that we need to challenge our assumptions. we need to look at how we handle difficult cases like this going forward. we are looking to better understand how manufacturers deal with this. we are also considering ways to improve the use of crash

investigations in identifying defects. we are reviewing ways to address what appeared to be remote defect possibilities. we are evaluating our approach. between these efforts and those of our department we will continue to improve our ability and ensure that defects are fixed. our ability to find defects requires automakers to act in good faith and provide information on time. general motors is now providing new information to definitively linking airbag non-deployment to faulty ignition -- ignition switches. they are indicating potentially critical supplier conversations. how this information been available earlier, it likely would have changed our approach to this issue. let me be clear. nitsa and the auto industry must

look to improve. i greatly appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today stop >> mr. friedman, you just got into this position of acting in ministry at her. if you are unable or uncomfortable with specific questions about automobile engineering, you are more than welcome to ask someone else. i wanted to find out how nitsa is communicating to the public about this recall. i went to your website to see what i could learn and, do we have that image available? this is all i could find on your website about the recall notice. no information about the broader recalls or parts and the

investigation -- i cannot even click on this. it just yet -- said to get rid of your car key fobass. can you fix this website? >> if there's added information that should be on their to make sure people can get to the information available, we will take the steps right now. consumers can go to our website and get all of the details associated with this recall. they must go to that search button and select the cobalt. >> can you make it easier? >> in 2007, the chief of nitsa wanted to propose an investigation. party correct about that date? if you turn to page 19, it is labeled as a panel for november 15, 2007. this is the powerpoint presentation made on november 15.

the presentations they that there have been complaints of the cobalt airbags. is that correct? >> that sounds correct. there's a charge of airbag warranty claims. that is compared to other comparable vehicles. do you think this is much higher than other cards? >> that is one of the issues that raised concerns on our part. that shows warranty claims.

we have decided whether we need to look further into these cases. >> nhtsa decided not to investigate. there were warranty claims. why was nhtsa convinced that it's investigation was not warranted? >> they decided twice not to go forward with the investigation. what specific information did you have? >> mr. chairman, when we look at these cases, they look at the whole body. victor ortiz of information was not sufficient. there were injury crash complaints associated with non-deployment. it gives you a sense of how large the problem is.

when the team did that comparison, the cobalt did not stand out. it was above average. >> employees of nhtsa raised be ratified flag. they said something was not right. did anybody ask questions about why the airbag did not deploy? i look at the statement and there are a number of things. did anybody ask the question if there was anything else? my understanding is that folks were trying to understand why the airbags did not deploy. when they look at the crash investigation as well as the data available though special

investigations were inconclusive. they were happening in off-road conditions. >> i understand. i am looking at reasons why the airbags would not deploy. you are talking amongst yourselves. what specifically did nhtsa at gm? >> i don't have a record of that i do not have records of us asking that question. >> you say that gm did not provide the information. it is important for the families to know what happened. this is a key government agency that is tasked with protecting the safety of the public. i want to know those questions get asked. >> they get asked of the car company when we moved into the

investigation phase. what this phase was -- concerns were raised. roughly half of the cases that are brought up are brought up to investigations and half or not. one of the things that we are looking at relative to this process going forward is, do we need to make any changes? i do believe that there are some changes that we need to make to engage automakers. we need to put them in a position of letting us know if our concerns are shared by them. >> i know the family members would want to know what you would change about this whole process. >> thank you. nhtsa investigated airbag

non-deployment. as he talked about, it was never able to connect the dots between that problem and defective ignition switches. when i want to know is, do they have the relative information they needed to make a fully informed determination? what did the agency believed about the connection between the ignition switch and airbag non-deployment. the agency mistakenly believe that the airbags were deployed 60 seconds after the power cut off. why did nhtsa think that? >> that knowledge was actually from years of experience. there was a problem where airbags would go off long after

the vehicle was turned off. they had capacitors in them. those capacitors are designed to store energy. if power is lost, the airbag can still deploy. >> that is these on the gm service literature? >> my understanding is that his beast on the each of the experience. i apologize if i was not clear in my testimony. we have since found that service information and confirmed our information. a power loss would not stand out. >> you were not there but nhtsa was basing its determination on experience. how is it that it failed to connect the dots between the

airbag problem and the ignition switch problem. >> i believe there are two situations here. the information we had at the time indicated that there were two possibilities but in front of us. one of them was the ignition being off could have been a cause. the other one was the circumstances of the crash. in those two cases, the more likely scenario was that the crash was more likely to yield to the airbags not deploying. >> you said that gm had critical information that would have helped identify the defect that they did not have. what information could gm have given you at the agency that would have helped identify the real problem? >> i made that statement based on looking at the chronology. there were a few things in that

analogy that raised serious concerns for me. the first was that there was a change relative to the ignition switch. we were never informed of that change. the second was that there was a conversation with the buyers about their control algorithm. we were never informed of that conversation. we did not have the detail on how that our rhythm works. third, general motors created a direct connection in their recall. if we had any of those problems, i truly believe it would have changed how we approach this. >> is gm is changing a part, or they were fired to inform of that change -- required to inform that change?

>> i can get back to you on that. >> it seems that that is critical. in your opening statement, you said that in order for nhtsa to make a correct determination you need all of the information. you need the company -- based on what you know now, do you think at the time that all of this was happening, gm was acting in good faith? >> we have an open investigation into that question. if we find out that they were not, we will hold them accountable. >> i hope that you will informed this committee whether they did or didn't. >> absolutely. >> when you expect to finish that investigation? >> i cannot put a timeline on it. we're getting hundreds of thousands of documents from gm. the deadline was april 3. is not clear that they will provide all of the documents.

we are making sure that they can continuously produce documents. as soon as my team can combine information in those documents to indicate that general motors had information we will move forward with how to hold general motors accountable. >> thank you. >> with regard to the question there is a change that we need to notify you about. i have a different part number. i don't know what the requirements are about that. >> we need to know what information you were reviewing. will you please provide that information? >> we can provide a significant amount of documentation. we will continue to do so. >> i recognize the chairman of the committee. >> thank you.

i know you and the committee are looking to information. thousands and thousands of pages. that continues. it looks like we will be getting some more. i wrote an act that passed unanimously. president clinton signed it into law. a major point of that was that nhtsa would get the information it needed. they would detect a trend as quickly as they could. when nhtsa considered whether to investigate back in 2007, the early warning data was one of the factors that was cited in the defect assessment. correct? like that is correct. >> what was the problem? the gm not report the information? was nhtsa unable to sort through

the information? >> we have an open investigation to determine whether general motors failed in their responsibilities. we will definitely report to this committee the result. we looked at all the available information using an approach that we had used successfully to lead to over 1000 recalls influenced by nhtsa over the last 10 years. we used a process to look into the data and look into consumer complaint data. there was a variety of other information. we dug into the data and we analyzed it. we tried to see if there was a defect trend that stood out. the data did not support that. it showed that the cobalt did not stand out. we look at the special craftsmanship. it was inconclusive. this is a case where the team

worked very hard to try to understand what was happening. it was not able to see significant trends or clear enough defect. what i am learning from this and where we have to go in the future is that we need to look carefully at the possibilities. we need to reconsider the way we are using these investigations. we need to continue to invest in tools. they are growing out of the watson ibm software. we must more efficiently use our resources. we have to move all of these tools forward the we have to look for opportunities for changes. >> you look to embark on investigation. do you consider the number of deaths? is there some trigger that you use to warn of further exploration? is that one death, for jeff's, 20? is there some kind of standard put into place?

>> there is not. our goal and what i would love to be able to do is to do with the defects before there's a single death. it is the manufacturer's responsibility to report these effects and get them fixed. when they do not, it is our job to find them. we do not have a simple rule of thumb. each case is different. we have opened the investigations after one instance that it was needed. we have tried to rely on trend data. i cannot give you a specific. >> let's play monday morning quarterback. today is april 1, 2014. these problems arose over the last 10 years. what would you have done? what would you like to have your potter from gm that you did not have in the last eight-10 years? >> what i can tell you based on

the chronology is that i would've liked to have had information that they have changed parts on the ignition switch. i would've liked to have had information that they were talking to their suppliers. they appear to have concerns about the algorithm. i would certainly have liked to have had information directly linking the ignition switch defect to airbag non-deployment. as we go through our investigation, i should be able to go back and let you know if there is information. >> are you sure that they did not provide this information? >> it is my understanding that none of that information was available. we are continuing our efforts. we want to make sure that we understand what happened. i cannot give you a comprehensive answer. i yield back.

>> i will have my friend mr. kerry assist me. the chairman of the committee showed you this picture and said he could not navigate past this page. he said if new information became available you would get that on the website. we learned in the first -- if you take your car to general motors, they will give you a loner or rental. i would call that germane and critical. i think it would be enticing to drive a 14 while they drive your car. i yield back. >> i received a call from one of my constituents who try to get a loaner car and said he could not have one. >> you could put on, take all your keys off the key ring except the ignition key. >> at is clearly on there. just to be clear, the reason we did that is because safety is

our priority. we are investigating the case. safety is our top priority, which is by the first thing i wanted people to see was how to keep themselves safe. i want to be clear, that is why we have that information. i didn't want anyone out there not to understand the steps to keep themselves safe. i agree it is a good idea to put -- i will have to see if we can put it -- another way to point people to it. >> people need to know if it is safe to drive their cars. you are now recognized for five minutes. >> thank you. mr. friedman, let's look at -- this is internal decision-making processes. the questions will require yes or no answers. is it true that contractors for the special crash program conducted threesome -- three

separate investigations in 2005, 2006 and 2009? >> yes, that is correct. >> is it correct that the office of defects investigation reviews -- in deciding whether to open a formal defects investigation? >> those are part of the process. >> is it correct that gm submitted ew our data -- ewr data concerning the chevy cobalt's. in 2006? yes or no? >> could you repeat that please? >> i'll give it to you again. is it correct that gm submitted ew our data -- ewr data force

chevrolet -- four chevrolet cobalt's? >> yes. >> is it correct that the investigation follows a multiple step process in order to determine whether a defect exists in the vehicle? >> yes. >> that process includes an initial and valuation -- evaluation, preliminary of valuation, and engineering evaluation? >> we will act earlier in that stage if we have compelling information there is a defect. we do not wait necessarily to go through the whole process if we have sufficient information. >> let's verify something.

is it correct yet the office of defects convened an initial panel in 2007 to investigate the non-deployment of airbags in the 2003-2006 chevy cobalt and i and? -- ions? >> is correct. >> him -- is a correct that the review was printed by fatal crashes? >> that was one reason. >> what were the other reasons? >> we were looking at consumer rep -- two planes. i can get back to you with each of the pieces of information that were involved. we do have a memo that was provided when it was proposed to

move this to a defect. >> would you submit that for the record? >> yes. >> were there other things that triggered this review? >> my understanding is it was all the items in the memo. >> so there were not other things. is it correct that odi -- because there was a lack of discernible trend? >> yes, that was one of the reasons. >> what were the other reasons? >> the crash investigation information was inconclusive and did not point to a specific defect. >> to be clear, at the time of the 2000 initial evaluation, mitzvah -- nitsa had concluded

that the cobalt was not overrepresented compared to other vehicles with respect to injury crash?rates >> that is correct. >> any other reason? >>was there any other reason? >> in 2000 and seven -- in 2007. >> nitsa did not have it any information the time of the investigation that linked airbag non-appointment to ignition switch deployment. >> we did not have specific information that provided a direct link. >> see you agree? >> i believe so. >> i am troubled. it appears we have a flaw in the decision-making process which is related to defects. i recognize and i am like most

of the members of the committee, i think critical that the fact that nitsa is shortstaffed and underfunded. i am compelled to agree with administrator friedman that congress may need to examine the use of special crash investigations in the graph -- screening process. how blessed to get -- west bank to get nitsa the information it needs. we will help improve the safety of american voters and their families. i yield back. >> now recognized. >> five minutes. >> thank you. in your written testimony, you suggested that your agency did not pursue investigations into

the issues with cobalt and ion because they were not aware of information developed by nasa -- general motors. has nitsa had any concerns with the lack of safety defects and concerns? >> i would like to get back to on the record with that. >> just look at 1034 it is right there in front of you the head of oda even -- odi e-mail general motors. it is the bottom of second page. with me4 -- are you with me? >> i am with you. >> you and to read the first paragraph?

and then look up and i will know you have read it? he stated that the general perception was general motors is slow to act and communicate. you read that. were you aware of the concerns raised by odi? >> i was unaware of the specific e-mail but i have been in a meeting where they sat down with general motors and made it clear to have them that they have to follow an effective process. >> there was deathly some concern. >> with each and every automaker, we need to make sure they have a good and effective process to deal with this. this e-mail -- >> did the agency have similar concerns in 2007-2010 when it inclines to advance

investigations into nonappointment of airbags? >> i don't know. >> you were with nhtsa at the time? >> i have been there a year. . >> do you think nhtsa is enough to get the information it needs? >> they looked clearly and carefully at the data. i believe the reason we did not move forward was because the data can -- indicated that the cobalt did not stand out and we do not have conclusive information as to -- >> in 2005, gm issued the technical services bolton. that is 12 -- tab 12. this service bolton -- all within -- this technical services bulletin.

it instructed the dealers exactly what to do to provide an insert that converted a key from a slot design to a whole design. -- hole design. they believed this would reduce the force exerted while driving from shaking the keys or bumping them with your knees. in 2006, the bolton was included -- expanded to include the make and model. unfortunately, in the case of the girl from my congressional district saying my engine is cutting off for no reason. i know they must've gotten the technical services bulletin, but all they did was give her the car the next today and lead her to her death. was nhtsa aware of the technical

services bulletins related to the issue? >> brooke's death was a tragedy and the kind we work every day to avoid. i believe we were aware of that technical services bulletin. at the time, it would not have been seen with airbag malfunction. >> i believe you. when people are driving impaired texting e-mailing whatever. they do not change the oil when they should. the brakes are worn out. this is the responsibility of people. when they are doing everything the right way and they take their car in, they think that they trust the service

department of the dealership you can understand why she is gone -- her parents and all of these parents, these families -- are irate. they expect that if they are doing it right thing, they ought to be safe. >> i understand. i would say that consumers should expect as they are designed. >> thank you, i yield back. >> i would venture to say they would think the car keys do not have to be monitored. >> you are recognized for five minutes. >> take you for appearing today. -- thank you for appearing today. nhtsa has a central role for safety. how did they not identify the debt the trend? >> when our team looked at the data, the trend -- there was not a trend that stuck out. when it came to non-deployment, the cobalt was not an outlier. >> was gm forthcoming with their

data? >> that is the exact question. the reason we have the investigation. i do have concerns about the --4 conversations they had with suppliers. any other information they may have had. if they did not fully the -- follow the law we are going to hold them accountable as we have with many other automakers. >> the new york times reported about ignition switch is used in the recall vehicles. according to the times many of the complaints and detailed frightening scenes in which moving cars stalled at high speeds. a number them -- of them warned of catastrophic consequences if something was not on. -- done.

nhtsa received 250 rick -- complaints, but never open an investigation. if consumers submitted with these -- these complaints -- they were met with silence. mary's daughter died in a 2005 cobalt. she has tried to contact nhtsa for information but received form letters. she said, i just want someone to hear from me. we have no closure or answers. i don't know she is still here. she was in the audience. has nhtsa been in contact with her? >> my understanding of what happened with her -- first of all, she deserves answers. that is why we are looking at what gm did. that's why we are making sure what happened. what she has been through is a tragedy.

we have to make sure those do not happen again. in terms of my understanding of her contacts those were made through our complaint system. in those systems as we note in the website we do not necessarily respond to all of those complaints. we are looking for potential problems. if they do not contain sufficient permission, if we have question -- -- the goals to find problems. in this case, my answer standing is she the complaint after being notified of a recall that nhtsa did influence. >> i don't have five minutes. -- have five minutes. did you really received 260 complaints over five years? >> i don't have the exact numbers.

i do know at nhtsa we look, we look at every single complaint. my understanding of the complaints is wherefore -- they were forestalls annalee a small number were for airbag non-complaint. -- were for stalls and only a small number were for airbag non-deployment. >> you might have somebody that looks at complaints from different parts of the country. if somebody identifies and says, we need to focus on these. >> a human eye looks at each of those. whether that is a larger small number, based on these analysis, that was not a very large number compared to a lot of the other complaints to read -- complaints. >> you told me about how you

respond to consumer real planes -- complaints. look -- if we do not respond to e-mails and letters as a member of congress, we will hear about it. if i get a number, we respond to them. i know i am almost out of time. thank you for your courtesy. >> we will recognize the man from louisiana. >> thank you for being with us in participating. i know you had talked about the decision back in 2007, when the chief of defect assessment division had suggested opening investigation -- an investigation. when was the decision made not to open the investigation? >> that was made in 2007. what the chief of the effects --

defects division was what he was supposed to do. he was looking for potential defect cases and bring those up to a panel. are a broad set of evidence is considered. >> is that the trend with regard to peers? similar cars with similar problems? >> is one of the pieces of information that was used. as well as crash investigations. about half of those that are brought up do not end up going to investigation. we have designed our system to make sure we have at least two bank teams always looking for potential problems. raising that question. >> i would be curious to bp information within nhtsa that helps make the decision not to move forward with the investigation. between 2007 and then when your

agency subsequently decided not to. when you look at the chart we have from 2007, there is a chart. you have the other periods -- peers. it seems to spike with the cobalt. if the internal decision-making was that they were similar to their perers -- if you can get the committee would enter -- whatever information you have that went into the final call to reject what was a warning from the defect assessment division -- can you give us that

information? >> i believe we have provided that information to the committee. if there is additional information, i will make sure -- >> did you have something else you want to add? >> i wanted to be clear about what the data showed. i believe you are talking about this chart. the bars represent the potential defects in the complaint rate. they are not spiking or standing out in complaint -- comparison to the others. >> the blue one. >> the blue line is the volume -- i believe that is the volume of reports. no that is the volume of sales. how many vehicles were sold. the complaint rate the important data we are looking at is the cars. >> did you take on -- action in the other cars? >> in some cases, you did -- we

did. >> if we can get the list of the cars you did. clearly you did not indicates the cobalt. if you could get us that. i do want to ask a few other questions. in your testimony, we made a few -- i don't know if you'd call them accusations. you are pursuing an investigation. i know you addressed this earlier. if you have specifics you are referring to, can you get that to the committee? >> the commute -- specifics are in my testimony. there are three things i am concerned about. first is that they have identified there is a link between the ignition switch and airbag non-deployment. second is that they changed a part. word is that they had conversations with their suppliers about the airbag algorithm in relation --

>> final question. gm had critical information that would have helped identify this defect. have you gotten our staff that critical information already that you feel gm had? that would have helped the defect? >> that information is the information you -- referred to in the chronology. the committee has asked for all that information. >> sorry we have that? >> if you do not have that information -- i just wanted to clarify. we don't only look for trends. if there is a clear defect, we move forward into the investigation. i don't know the answer, but in some cases there may not have been as large a trend, but if there is a clear defect, we would have investigated. >> i want to make sure we're clear. when he is referring to the

information even this committee if you can highlight specifically the information you did not have that gm later gave you that would have changed your decision, and make sure you give it to the committee. >> what i'm referring to, specific items that are identified in general motors chronology. we are getting that information from general motors, -- >> thank you mr. chairman. gm has confirmed it knew as early as 2001 that the ignition switches contain defects. by 2004, gm had a body of consumer complaints that raised enough questions for them to open an internal in generating inquiry. -- engineering inquiry. meanwhile, you're agency was beginning to receive its own

body of consumer complaints. cars stalling. ignition switch failures. in 2005, as you're agency was monitoring nonappointment issues the special crash investigation found that the ignition switch was in the accessory position. you said at this point it was not clear what was happening. then information came out subsequently -- should this have pointed us in the right direction? the agency investigated a second crash of the cobalt where the airbags did not in light -- that fully. -- did you not deploy. the crash test found it could be

the result of power loss due to movement of the ignition switch. gm was providing your agency with early warning resort -- reports. in addition to the crash investigation. we are all trying to figure out how it took so long for these effective switches to trigger recall. and then raise red flags. how the highway traffic safety administration could have noticed this issue sooner if gm had been more forthcoming. the committee investigation has revealed that gm approved switches for these cars that did not as occasions in 2002 and again in 2006. keep -- up did tm -- did gm ever

inform me -- >> of which fact? >> that the ignition switches did not meet the company's specifications. >> is my understanding we did not have that information. >> gm had over 130 warned he claims on the recalled vehicles that referred to problems with the ignition switches turning off. turning the car off when going over bumps. is it true that gm provides -- provided aggregate data of the warrantee information? but not specific warrantee claims? >> what all car companies provide our aggregate -- are

aggregate numbers. we don't know what the reason for those warranties could be. on the airbag side, the complaints could be because the airbag light was going on when it should not. o'er the passenger sensor was not working. we don't have the information in detail as to what each and one of those warranty claims is. >> if gm had shared those claims, would that have been helpful? >> the specific war and to claim you are speaking of are related to the ignition switch. >> the 130 that have come out. >> my honest answer is, i don't know. that is because we did not have the information we now have from general motors directly connecting the switch to the airbag recall. >> the state of the law is that

in early warning reports on any type of vehicle problem the car companies do not have to provide you these this thick warned equal -- provide you the specific warrantee claims. they give you the summary. do you think it is time to look at the law? if a car company has -- 130 warned he claims that are specific and related with safety defect, would that be helpful to your agency? maybe change the law and say when a car company becomes aware they have so many of these safety defects, they have to provide you this warrantee complaint? >> i have to look at the exact

data before i will be able to tell you whether it will be gullible -- valuable. >> when a company has gathered a mass of safety defect complaints, that would be helpful. >> if they have information regarding a defect, i believe that information they would without a doubt have to provide. >> the law does not provide that. >> if they have information about a defect, the would. you are referring to warranty claims which may or may not be associated with the defect. >> i think this is an important issue for the committee to look at. there may be some new line drawing or direction on what these early warning reports -- if there is serious safety information that a car company has gleaned, it really needs to be affrighted. -- provided. >> we now recognize -- >> mr. friedman, thank you for

being for us. it has been a long afternoon. your testimony, you stated that in 2007 and 2010, there was not enough evidence to conduct a formal investigation. despite the number of complaints before fatal crashes that had already shown up. in 2012, your agency opened an investigation into an airbag problem that some hyundai models -- my understanding is this is based on a single complaint. i think nonappointment is a serious issue. -- non-deployment is a serious issue. why wasn't it a serious issue when it was coming in with cobalt?

used -- why wasn't there enough evidence to perceive with general motors. >> airbag non-deployments are serious issues. we treat them seriously. i will have to get back to you on the specifics of the hyundai case. it goes back to one of the points i made before. we are looking for two potential things. the best thing to be able to find and the clearest thing to be able to find is when there is an obvious education of a defect. all it takes is one if that is clear. >> i agree. we were not here when the ceo testified. one of the questions i posed was for the accident that occured in maryland in 2005. a lot of problems that might. the airbag did not deploy when the car impacted some trees. it was a serious impact.

so serious that the driver was then pushed and compressed against the steering wheel -- she broke the rim off the steering wheel three that is a massive amount of force for a 16 -- 106 pound of body. i have the report that it was investigated in december, 2006. that is a big deal. that airbag did not deploy. different from the other accidents we were given information about. because of the nation -- nature of the injuries, i can tell you that the airbag would have saved her life. without the airbag, there was no chance at all. in airbag might have made a difference. the steering wheel that she broke off actually compressed against, just below the diaphragm and rib cage.

over the course of the next hour and 45 minutes, she bled out. in airbag might have made a big difference. contrasting that with another accident in pennsylvania, in 2009, a head on collision between the hyundai and cobalt. the cobalt was not at fault. the hyundai came over the center line. the closing speed was probably close to 100 miles per hour. everyone in the front seat died. but the cobalt airbag did not deploy. the hyundai did. unfortunately, it did not make any difference. here you have a side-by-side identical speed at which the airbag occurred. the deceleration forces were identical.

this is a problem. don't you agree? >> congressman, when airbags do not employ, that is a serious issue. there is also an issue when airbags deploy. 200 people because airbags deployed when they did not or to strongly read -- too strongly. part of the reason why this information ended up not being conclusive because they are designed to not go off. that is the safest thing. >> i can't imagine. i'm not an engineer. i can't imagine any circumstance where impacting an oak tree at 70 miles per hour would not be a situation where you would not want the deployment of the airbag. i can't think of any reason why the airbag would add to the lethality of those accidents. >> congressman, i understand why

you feel that way. in the case of the 2005 crash, and in general with the airbags if you have a small strike first, the risk is that the occupants may be moving forward during the crash. if you are moving forward, and the airbag is opening it actually could cause more harm than good. >> it couldn't have caused any more harm that night. first impact the -- the first impact was with a five inch pine tree. >> i now recognize mr. barton for five minutes. >> i want to apologize to the other members were still here. i have been watching the hearing. i apologize for not being here physically to go ahead of some of you folks. having said that, i will go ahead.

i have listened to most of what you said today on the television. i think it is obvious that gm has some real questions they have not done a good job of answering today. i also think as the federal regulator on the block there are some valid questions for your agency. my first question is at what level of accidents or deaths or incidents of malfunction triggers more than normal nhtsa review. not necessarily a full-fledged investigation. in hindsight, we have 13 deaths that are attributable to this

problem over a 10 year period. i don't know how many accidents or injuries. when would nhtsa look at something and say, there is an anomaly. we need check it out to read books i appreciate your question. part of what -- there are important questions that nhtsa has to answer in addition to general motors. you have questions, we have questions. my focus is making sure nhtsa does everything we can dealing with these cases. when it comes to your question, each case is different. ideally what i would like to have happen is we find -- automakers find and fix these defects right away. if they don't, i want to find and fix the defects. >> there are internal reporting

systems, monitoring systems -- into if a specific model started showing up 100 accidents that were unexplainable that would be a big enough lead that somebody would say, what is going on? if you have a steering problem or rate problem -- brajkeke problem, enough you could see in your reporting somebody would say, hey. we need check that out. >>i am told there were some internal employees that njhhtsa said that, before gm admitted there was a problem, there were mid-level people that said, we need to look at it. a decision was made that it was not at the level of further investigation. is that true? >> we have a process to do

exactly what you just said. we have people reading every single one of the more than 45,000 complaints coming in. a team dedicated to do that. looking at all the early warning data. red flags were raised. concerns were raised. it was proposed, because that exact process concerns were raised. this issue was brought to a panel. the job of the panel is to consider all the evidence. the initial evidence as well as a more detailed look at the data. whether or not there is a clear trend. information to have concern over the specific defects. what i am seeing is we need to reconsider and look at how we deal with cases where there may be something consider a remote excavation? should we change the way for you

-- we follow-up on it? these are things we are learning. >> i want to make one general comment and then one question. we pointed out to the gm executive that was here that the part did not meet the specifications. it didn't just almost not meet them. it didn't meet them by a long way. a third. two thirds off. when he below -- it was way below, not a little bit. that is not nhtsa's problem. on the general point that dr. burgess was asking about, when airbag is not to play when it runs into a tree, and the response from nhtsa is we did not know how that system was supposed to work, i don't think that is a very good answer.

isn't this is supposed to know -- nhtsa supposed to know? is interagency supposed to find out if you do not know? >> the circumstances of these crashes were much more consultative than that. we applied expertise. we applied our understanding. a process that has worked to generate one to 99 recalls over the last decade. are there improvements we need to make? yes, absolutely. i'm committed to making sure that happens. i wish these crashes were as simple as they appear to be. i was just wish the connection was as direct as we now know. >> hindsight is always easier. >> hindsight is 2020. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> we recognize the gentleman from virginia for five minutes. >> i appreciate you being here.

i would ask several questions. following up on why did not nhtsa know. -- hindsight is 2020. but there are warning signals. i am looking at cap 18. -- have 18. -- tab 18. they sent out, notwithstanding the indications dad perceives a pattern of non-deployment that is not exist in their periods. -- peers. when you combine that with the flag i think you mentioned earlier. you were getting a number, about

200 some complaints on this particular vehicle. you start adding those together along with the fact that you all knew there were i think it was three where the airbag did not deploy. and the admission was -- somebody should have started an investigation. those coincidences might've been more than coincidence is. -- coniincidences. apparently the man who put this altogether together was an investigator for a one-man law firm. you have an engineering investigator who figures this out. i would say to you, what can you do better? have you called but investigator to train some of your folks to look at some of these coincidences? when you start seeing a series of negative things happen, that might be where you should look.

>> our team was looking at this issue. the defects assessment division was doing their job. we have a system. it is designed to raise those red flags. about half the time, the reef fish recommendation of that division end up moving on to investigations. what i see in this case is one of the things i mentioned before. how do we make connections between remote defects. in this case, you had one theory which was the accessory the key being in the accessory position, could have caused this. in the crashes we look that come of circumstances led investigators to believe it was much more likely the airbags did not go off because of the circumstances of the crash. i understand completely why it looks like -- it should have been clear.

it's clear because we have that connection. >> let me raise this concern. this memo indicates there is a reliance. i'm implying this from the wording. notwithstanding gm's vacation they see no pattern or problem. that statement shows it relies on gm. likewise, in your testimony, you state this understanding was verified talking about the power loss situation. this situation was verified by the service literature during our dude diligence effort. if you have a company with a car not functioning i would like to think with 51 employees versus the one-man law firm, you would look at something other than the service literature and not necessarily rely on gm indications that they see no problem or pattern. i'm of -- concerned there was

too much reliance on information from gm, including their service literature, and what they saw as problem patterns. when in fact, i think you were supposed to be finding the problem patterns. i understand it is easy in hindsight to say that. these are warning signs that go off to me as a legislator that maybe you need to take a look at that. when you see problems, maybe the service literature of the company is not the vest place to get your information. >> just to be clear, we did not rely on general motors when it came to defects and we did our own analysis of the data. our analysis indicated the cobalt did not stand out. i wonder if i was not clear enough. we did not rely on that service alton. -- bulletin. we relied on our expert understanding of airbag systems. >> it was based on the service

literature for the cobalt. is that what you said? >> my testimony sounds like it was not clear enough. what happened was once we found out about the defect, we looked into the service literature to confirm our understanding. the literature we looked at confirmed our understanding. which was -- >> your understanding at the time and the service literature were both wrong. >> that is correct. >> i yield back. >> the chairman yield back. we now recognize mr. long. >> i want to thank the chairman andy raking member. -- and the ranking member. we originally were not scheduled to be in the soon. a lot of us had to change our travel plans. we have been sitting here through the entire hearings today, because it is a very

important issue we are discussing. they can mr. friedman for being here today with your testimony. when i think of nhtsa i think of the green bay packers linebacker number 66. >> nhtsa is the national highway traffic safety administration. an organization whose mission is to save lives by reducing issues like drug driving, unbelted occupants, vehicle safety. finding vehicle defects. >> i just wanted to get that on the record. i know what it is. a lot of people, when they hear that all they, -- day, i wondered what it is. do you have any way to track

consumer complaints to auto dealers short of waiting for them to reach out to you? to have any way to track people coming in? the car is stopped and it died? you have to wait for somebody to come to you? >> we have early warning data, which tracks the cases where warranty services are provided on vehicles. >> anytime a warranty services provided, we are notified. >> we are notified of accounts. we have an account of those. and the part that is associated with. >> did you get -- when you get that? >> once a quarter. >> what kind of marketing do you do? how would a consumer know or learn about the nhtsa? ?what kind of marketing do you do?

if i had a problem, it would not pop into my head to call you. how can we let the american public know, if they have an issue, how can they contact you? >> some of the things we're looking at doing -- on every single letter that goes out, nhtsa's name is on that letter and is in clear red letters this is a safety recall information. we have apps that are available online that we try to make sure the consumer. downloads. they allow the consumer to lodge complaints to us. we are moving forward with each will that will allow all consumers to come to our website, put in there been number -- thiereir vin number. we have additional efforts to

make sure people are aware of wh o nhtsa is. i am concerned we are not at the cup of the list when people have complained. we have been talking about ways to make sure we have waste -- if you have a complaint, come to nhtsa. this is one of the vital tools we have to find those defects. i would appreciate any help we have. >> or tomorrow you will be able to say you can take your car in and get a free loaner or rental. >> absolutely. >> at what point is the consumer supposed to reach out to you? >> at any point they have a concern. >> what point is that? if i go home this evening and get a recall in my vehicle and

e-mail -- in the mail, dry run to the phone? or wait until i'm not satisfied with the dealer? when should consumers reach out? >> if you get a recall letter the first thing you should do is contact your dealer and get your vehicle fixed. >> i'm talking about contacting you. if it is standard thing, i don't need to call you? >> if you are concerned, absolutely. typically, we want people to contact us will be for there is a recall. we rely on and look at over 45,000 consumer complaints every year to spot these trends. i want anybody to reach out to us anytime they have a concern about their vehicle. they feel their safety is at risk. so we can have that information. right now, we have 45,000 complaints. i would like that number to get up to 50,000, 60,000, 70,000

complaints. so we will have more information. >> i don't have any time left, but i would yield back my did. -- if i did. >> thank you gentlemen. the gentleman from jim roscoe -- nebraska. >> five minutes. you testified mr. friedman -- for in your testimony you testified that there were reports that showed power loss. one of these has been highlighted in several newspaper articles that the sci noted during airbag investigation. the question i have is did these reports merely report the vehicle power mode as a fact?

or did they report and identify it as a potential contributing factor? >> the two reports handled the case differently. my understanding is in one of the reports, it simply had an entry in the edr do to -- data that indicated that the power mode was accessory. in another case, it was included in the special crafts investigation. they were two possible reasons why the airbag did not deploy. one possible reason was the airbag switch -- the other was because the yielding nature of the trees was not sufficient. >> i'm sorry? >> you said the you need -- yio elding nature of the tree --

i don't want to get out and down into the impact of a tree. the point is they were noted in two reports. what is the communication process between the sci and the odi? somebody has to take that up and say, maybe we should follow up on that. what is the process? >> the process depends on circumstances. in some cases, our office will ask the prosecutors to go out and look at a crash. in other cases, when the crash investigators follow up on a crash, they will get to the attention of the office of defects investigation. we try to make sure that both teams are talking to each other and sharing information. >> in these two reports, did the

sci, special crash investigator, communicate that there was a problem? >> i don't know if they specifically communicated the accessory issue. when the team looked at -- especially the investigation that indicated there were two possible reasons -- >> the odi new there may have been -- the switch may have been part of the problem? >> odi would have been aware of that. >> odie i was aware? >> -- odi was awar? e? >> i believe so. our teams do talk to each other but one of the things i thinker need to discuss is if we could change the way the crash

investigations are used. in this case, i want to note that the draft version of the report indicated that the crash investigators thought the more likely reason the air pegs -- ba gs was because of the circumstances. >> i would think that if you know there's a problem with the switch, automatically turning to significant that successors would have been significant. i need to ask -- the early warning reports. you were receiving early warning reports from gm? >> that is correct. >> in my question, to the president of gm, she said they were submitting those.

were they required when they know there is a problem with the specific item in that car? like the ignition switch? that one of the many items to be submitted within the ew r? my understanding is that if they are aware of a problem that is not reported. >> under the tread act they have to support that secretly -- separately. >> they are required to report warranty claims and other information to us. if they saw a defect, the needed to report that to us separate from -- that is simply their requirement. >> i am over my time, but i do need to get on the record. what is noncompliance versus defect? >> really quickly noncompliance

means you did not meet the standards we have. it a defect means you may have met the standards, but there were something wrong with the state -- vehicle. >> i thank you gentlemen. i ask for unanimous consent that the documents will be entered into the record. i also asked a binder been introduced into record and make appropriate redaction. without objection. hearing no objection, in conclusion, thank you to the witnesses and members that participated in today's hearings. they have 10 business days to submit questions for the record. please respond promptly to the questions. anything else? thank you.