decision. >> now, we know that the ignition switch was, in fact, redesigned because it didn't meet the specs that were there. is that right? >> yes. >> now, i would guess engineering 101 would normally require that when you assign a new part or replace a new part or replace a part with a new part that that newly redesigned part, in fact, should have a different number on it. is that right? >> that is correct. >> so that didn't happen, right? >> that's correct. >> didn't happen. who within gm made the decision to move forward with that redesigned switch without a new part number? do you know who that is? >> i do not know the name of the individual. >> will you be able to find that out for us? >> yes, i will. >> will you give that name to our committee? >> i can provide that. >> is it likely that that same

person was the one that decided not to recall the defective version? where did -- where in the timeline is that? >> i don't know but that is part of the investigation that we're doing. >> do you know when it was that it was discovered, what year, what -- you know, where in the timeline that it was discovered that, in fact, a new part number was not assigned? >> i became aware of that after we did the recall and the timeline was put together. >> so that was just in the last month or so. is that right? >> that's when i became aware. >> but when did gm recallize that no new part number had been assigned? >> again, that's part of our investigation. i want to know that just as much as you because that's an unacceptable practice. it is not the way we do business. >> so, you've stated publicly that something went wrong with our process. how's the process supposed to work? how's this -- how are you

redesigning the process to ensure that, in fact, it should work the way that it needs to work? >> well, one of the things we are doing is the investigation by mr. valucas. i have some early findings from mr. valucas. as we look across the company, it appears at this time there was information in one part of the company and another part of the company didn't have access to that. at times they didn't share information just by course of process or they didn't recognize that the information would be valuable to another area of the company. we have fixed that. we have announced a new position, jeff boyer, vice president of global vehicle safety. all of this will report to him. he will have additional staff and will have the ability to cut across the organization and we'll also have the right functional leadership that understands what's going on in the different areas. so that's a fix we have already made and he's operating that way today. operating that way today. >> so when gm received

complaints about ignition switches for a number of years, ended up resulting in the redesign ignition switch in 06, when was it that anyone linked up the ignition switch problems to look at the cobalt air bags not deploying? was that about the same time? later? >> that is something i very much want to understand and know. but again, we're doing an investigation that spans over a decade and it's very important because designing a vehicle is a very complex process that we get a detailed understanding of exactly what happened so we can fix processes and make sure it never happens again. >> when was it that gm informed nitsa that a redesign -- did in fact gm inform nitsa that the ignition switch had been redesigned? >> i don't know that.

>> i yield back. >> we recognize mr. waxman for five minutes. >> thank you. we heard about how in 2002 gm had faulty ignition switches in cobalts and other cars that caused many of the problems that led to the recall from model years 2003 to 2007. so new ignition switches were designed and approved by general motors. these were switches that were used -- were used in model years 2008 to 2010. does that all sound right to you? am i correct in what i'm saying? >> there is a couple of statements you made at the beginning that i don't know to be true. >> in 2002, gm approved the use of what turned out to be faulty ignition switches -- >> they were actually -- they

were parts that went into a 2003 was the earliest model. >> the tests were done in 2003 about the the cars were 2003 to 2007. so there was a recall of those cars and new ignition switch designed and approved by gm and these new switches were in use in the model year 2008 to 2010 cobalts and ions. >> to the best of my knowledge, that's correct. >> in a briefing last week, delfi said the new switches did not immediate specifications, the force to turn these switches was two-thirds what it should be and documents also confirm that top gm officials were aware of the outer switches in 2008 and

2002 vehicles in december 2013. so there's a document if you want to look it up, it's tab 39, page 6 of your binder. there was a december presentation for gm's high level executive field action decision committee and that -- athat meeting the performance measurement for half of the 2008 -- you go to 2008, 2010, model year vehicles, ignition switches were below minimum gm required specifications. my question to you is are you concerned that many 2008 to 2010 year cars have switches that do not meet the company specifications. >> as we assess the situation, i understand there was work going

on to look at the switches again and look at just because the switch -- a part doesn't meet information doesn't mean it is a defective part. as that analysis was going on the same time we were looking to make sure we can get all of the spare parts when we recognize spare parts might have been sold through third parties and no tracking to know which vin we made. >> a lot of these car was model years had switches that were just as effective as the 2003 to 2007 cars. those cars were recalled but you didn't recall the model year 2008 to 2011 vehicles until a month later. why did the company belong in these newer vehicles? >> my understanding is the company was assessing those switches but at the same time in parallel they were looking at the spare parts issue and it

became very clear we needed to go and get all of the vehicles because we couldn't identify which vehicles may have had a spare part put in them. we recall the entire population. >> you recall those vehicles and recalled them later? >> yes. >> you knew there was a problem. you're recalling these later vehicles did not mention the faulty switches originally installed in the cars, only quote faulty switches may have been used to repair the vehicles. why did the company not announce that sub par switches may have been installed in vehicles in the first place? >> there was an assessment going on to understand if the specification parts performance was adequate. >> wasn't it misleading to say that the company didn't tell them subpar switches may have been installed in the first place. what if i owned a later model car with the original ignition

switch, your recall implies i don't have to do anything but my car might still have a subpar switch. your company conduct a detailed analysis to determine if they are safe and will you provide the committee with warrant tee reports and others so we can do our own analysis. >> i believe we're recalling all of those parts. all of those vehicles are being recalled. >> they've all been recalled. i must say, in conclusion, i'm concerned. i know you've taken this job in an aus pishs time and trying to clean up a mess left behind for you for your predecessors but i have one last question, how can be you are sure new switches be installed beginning april 7th will finally meet gm's requirements. >> we have done -- we're working very closely with our supplier. personally looking at the

performance and we will do 100% end of line testing to be sure the performance and safety and functionality of these switches are safe. >> gentleman's time expired. i want to be clear, did you review the documents that gm submitted to the committee? >> no, i did not. there was over 200,000 pages. >> how about the document mr. waxman was talking about? >> this page right here? >> yes. >> i actually saw this for first time a day ago. >> okay, thank you. now recognize miss black burn for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. you mentioned several times in your comments today's gm, my assumption is you're going to run gm in a different manner than it has been run in the past. >> that's correct. >> and you're making some changes. i want to ask you just a little

bit about time line to help us get our hands around this because this is the first investigation we're going to do. we're going to have others and continue to look at this to get answers and figure out what has happened here between you all and nitsa and also within what happened to gm. so you mentioned in your testimony that this came to light on your watch. so i'm assuming that there was no widespread knowledge in gm about this issue until you became ceo. am i correct on that? >> at the senior level of the company, we learned of this after the recall decision was made on january 31st. i was aware in late december there was analysis in a cobalt issue but had no more information than that. as soon as we understood the senior leadership understood this issue and that a recall decision had been made, we acted without hesitation. >> okay then, how did you find

out about it? was it through someone bringing the issue to you to say miss barra we have a real problem here or doing your due diligence did you find out about it? >> the leadership committee made a decision on january 1st and notified mark rice who picked up the phone and called me. >> could you submit to us the members of that leadership committee that make those recommendations? yes. >> then was your predecessor, mr. acreson, was he aware of this issue? >> not to my knowledge. >> he was not. >> are any of the members of the leadership committee also -- were they a part of his leadership committee? >> there are members of today's team that were also members of his leadership team and to my knowledge they were not aware. >> do you think there was a cover-up or it was sloppy work? >> that is the question i've

asked mr. valucas to uncover. >> do you think it had anything to do with the auto bailout? >> i'm sorry. >> with the auto bailout? >> i need to get the results of the study to make all determinations. >> and going back to what mr. upton said, you're going to be sharing that information with us. >> yes. >> okay. the engineers that were responsible for this, have you brought them into the process? i know this is something that the part was actually created by delfi. and they have an engineering teamworking on that. they have a shared responsibility and liability in this entire issue. have you met with them and with the engineering team that was responsible for this switch?

>> i have not met with the specific engineering team that is responsible. but i am speaking to leadership and those individuals are being interviewed as part of the investigation. conducted by mr. valucas. >> did you see this was a defective part when you talked about it earlier? >> we have learned when we knew when the recall decision was made and we later went back and looked at the chronology, there's points that suggest and that's why we're doing the investigation. >> okay. all right. now, i think that you're going to hear from more than one of us about not having the new part number assigned. that -- who made that decision? was that strictly a delfi decision or did that come into the gm supply chain for that decision to be made as to how the part number would be coded?

>> at the general level, general motors is responsible for general motors parts numbers. but again, that's part of the investigation to understand how that happened. >> okay. does that seem inconceivable to you? >> yes, it is inconceivable. it is not our process and it is not acceptable. >> i would think that it probably is not. have you asked delfi if you can have access to their documentation and e-mail chain dealing with this issue? >> i have not. again, mr. valucas will go as the investigation takes them to get the information he needs to get a complete and accurate accounting of what happened. >> my time expired. thank you, i yield back. >> just for clarification, we have asked for that e-mail chain and we'll let you know when we get that. rerecognize mr. mr. dingell for

five minutes. >> thank you for your koucourte. i begin by telling the families injured or killed by the defective general motors vehicles that they have our sympathy and we believe the events here are tragic indeed i join efrp expressing my condolences to the families killed or injured in those crashes. now it is federal regular tors and general motors to determine how the deaths could have happened and to take reasonable steps to ensure the safety of american motorists and their families are moving forward. expect that this investigation will be thorough. i counsel all of the stake holders to be unabashedly forthright.

ms. barra, all of my questions will require yes or no answers. if you cannot answer some of my questions, i expect that you will submit responses for the record and all available relevant supporting materials. now ms. barra, is it correct that gm has now recalled approximately 2.5 million small cars in the united states due to defective ignition switches? >> yes. >> is it correct that gm recently expanded its recall of small cars because it was possible that the defective ignition switches may have been installed as replacement parts, yes or no? >> yes. is it correct that the ignition switch in question was original natalie bought in late 1990s and

approved in february of 2002? yes or no. >> yes. >> ms. barra, is it correct that general motors own design specifications were such ignition switch required 20 plus or minus 5 centimeters of torque to move the switch from the accessory position to the run position, yes or no? >> yes. >> ms. barra, is it correct general motors approved production of such ignition switch despite test results by delfi during the approval processor ppap, showing that the switch did not meet gm's torque requirement, yes or no? >> that's not clear to me. >> now, ms. barra, is it correct a general motors approved

redesign of the ignition switch used in the presently recalled vehicles in april of 2006? >> yes. >> ms. barra, is it correct that gm's torque requirement was a redesigned switch remained the same as for the original ignition switch, yes or no? >> it is not clear to me that's why we're focusing the investigation on that area specifically. >> that information becomes available, would you submit it to the committee? >> yes, i will. >> did the redesign ignition switch meet gm's torque requirements yes or no? want me to say it again? >> to your knowledge did the redesign ignition switch meet gm's torque requirement, yes or no? >> it's part of the investigation. >> ms. bar rara, will you submit

an explanation of the factors that gm takes into consideration when approving a part for production, are there a circumstances where gm may approve parts or production when such parts do not make such design specifications, yes or no? >> yes. >> if so, could you please submit materials for the record explaining when and why that might occur? >> yes. >> ms. barra, i appreciate the lengths to which gm under your leadership is willing to recall the vehicles and ensure that they are safe to drive. gm's cooperation with the committee is necessary in order to understand the process by which and the reasons decisions were made leading up to the 2014 recall. you may have so far done so and i expect that you'll continue to do so.

thank you for your courtesy, mr. chairman, thank you, ms. barra, i yield back the balance of my time. >> now recognize the chairman emeritus, mr. barton from texas. >> i want to make this the general observation. this is probably the last major investigation that this subcommittee and full committee is going to conduct where we have the services of mr. dingell and mr. waxman. we've had a history on this committee in this subcommittee going back 40 or 50 years, when we have major issues we try to approach them on behalf of the american people in a nonpartisan very open way. and it certainly appears we're going to continue that tradition today. so i hope that we can show the best to the american people that

the congress at its best gets the factses and presents the fact and in the future we protect the public health and safety for the american people. with that caveat, i have a few questions. a number of congressmen have made the point that the ignition switches didn't appear to meet specifications. and my assumption is that you've agreed that they did not meet specifications, is that correct? >> we've learned that as we did the recall. >> now, i'm an industrial engineer and i used to be a registered professional engineer, i'm not currently registered but have been in the past. why in the world would a company with the stellar reputation of general motors purchase a part that did not meet its own specifications?

>> i want to know that as much as you do. it is not the way we do business today. it's not the way we want to design and engineer vehicles for our customers. >> i don't understand. i'm -- i'm never worked in an auto assembly environment. i've worked in a defense plant, an aircraft plant. i was plant manager of a printing plant. i've done limited, very limited consulting in the oil and gas industry. but i've never been a part of an organization that said we set the specs when a part doesn't meet the specs, we go ahead and buy it anyway. you're currently the ceo but at one time i think before you became ceo, you were the vice

president for global product development purchasing and supply chain. is it your position now that general motors will not accept parts that don't meet specifications? >> we will not accept parts that don't meet our performance safety functionality durability requirements. as i mentioned before. in the steel example, there will be times where there will be a material or a part that doesn't meet the exact specifications but after analysis and looking at the performance safety and durability and reliability, the functionality, it will be okay. that happens very often as we buy steel to make the bodies of the vehicles. >> then you don't need specifications -- with all respect -- what you just answered is gobbly guk.

why in the world would you not refuse it and only accept the part that meets specification? >> there needs to be a well documented process if you accept a part that doesn't meet -- >> would the gentleman yield? >> briefly, yes. >> do you want that information? >> on steel? >> on the ignition switch -- >> if it didn't meet specifications, you would have the information on the starters that it met all of the other criteria. >> that is part of the investigation but clearly, by the fact we made a recall, it did not meet the performance -- >> we have the advantage as subcommittee that we know now what happened in the past. we know now there's a real problem. we know now that a number of young people have lost their lives and apparently because of this, this defect so we have the

advantage of hindsight. and i -- i understand that. but as she xbrust said and number of others, there's no reason to have specifications if you don't enforce them. this next question is not a trick question but it's an important question. right now, how many parts are being used in general motors product that don't meet your own company's specifications? >> i don't have that exact number but i can tell you the parts that we're using today meet the performance and the reliability, the safety they need to if we find we have a part that is defective that doesn't meet the requirements, then we do a recall. >> well, again, with -- that's not an acceptable answer i think to the american people. we're not telling you the specifications -- now, there are some safety specifications that

by law and nitsa by regulation sets but there shouldn't be a part used in any gm product or any other automobile product that is sold in the united states that doesn't meet the specifications. my last -- >> at what level was the decision made to override and use this part even though it didn't meet specification? was that made at the manufacturing level? the executive level? or even at some subcomponent purchasing level? do you know that? >> that's part of our investigation to find that -- answer that question. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you. gentleman now recognizes mr. braley for five minutes. >> you've been focusing your attention on members of this committee and answering our questions. i've been staring at these photographs in the back wall and

i see young women the same age as my daughter. i see young men the same age as my two sons. my son paul owns one of your cobalts. i see a young marine and his dress blues and reminded the forecast i have in my office upstairs of my father at the age of 18 and his dress blues at camp pendleton. and the focus of this hearing so far has been on gm's commitment to safety, which i think we all agree on is an important topic for this hearing. you testified in your opening and i think i'm quoting, our customers and their safety are at the center of everything we do. and you responded to a question from ms. blackburn and told us you were going to run gm differently than it's been run in the past. i have a copy of gm's march 18th press release announcing jeff boyer as your new vice president of global vehicle safety.

in this press release, he is quoted as saying, nothing is more important than the safety of our customers and the vehicles they drive. today's gm is committed to this and i'm ready to take on this assignment. 20 years ago before this hearing an iowa family harmed by another defective vehicle gave me this promotional screwdriver set that they got from their local gm dealer. and if you look at it on the outside, it has a slogan. safety comes first at gm. my question for you, what's changed at gm? isn't it true throughout its corporate history, gm has represented to the driving public that safety has always been their number one priority.

>> i can't speak to the statements that were made in the past. all i can tell you is the way we're working now, the training we've done, we've changed our core values, we're leading by example. we're -- one of the process changes we've also made in addition to when the technical community makes their decision about a safety recall or a recall, we are going to be reviewing it. the head of global product development and myself, to see if there's more we want to do -- >> hasn't the core values of general motors always been that safety comes first? >> i've never seen that part before. >> isn't it true that throughout the history of the country it's made representations like this to the driving public as a way of inducing them to buy your vehicles? >> today's general motors, all i can tell you is today's general motors we are focused on safety.

we have over 18 vehicles that have five-star crash rating. our entire buick lineup meets that requirement. >> but we're talking about these vehicles and what's changed. have you had a chance to read this article in the saturday new york times florida engineers, eureka moment with a deadly gm flaw. >> i believe i read part of that article. >> he wrote about an engineer named mark hood at a loss to explain why the engine in brook melton's cobalt shut off causing her fatal accident in georgia. then he bought a replacement for $30 from a local gm dealership and the mystery quickly unraveled. for the first time someone outside gm even by the company's own account, had figured out a problem that it had known about for a decade and is now linked to 12 deaths. even though the new switch had

the same identification number, mr. food found big differences and the article continues, so began the discovery that would set in motion gm's worldwide recall of 2.6 million cobalts and other cars and one of the gravest safety crises in the company's history. do you agree with the author this is a grave safety crisis in the history of general motors? >> i've said that this incident took way too long. it is not acceptable and that's why we're making radical change to the entire process. adding more resources and naming vice president of global vehicle safety who is tremendously experienced and of the highest integrity. we will continue to make processes and process changes and people changes as we get the results of mr. valucas investigation and take all of those recommendations and make changes. >> before i yield back, mr. chairman, i would like to ask unanimous consent to have this article added to the record for the hearing if it's not already

part of the record. >> we have no objection -- >> if the gentleman would yield his remaining second. ms. barra said they changed their core values. it would be great to submit what those new core values for gm are so we have those for the record. >> we'll ask for the record. >> i would also like to have any prior statement of core values from general motor over the last 20 years so we can see what has changed, mr. chairman. >> we'll ask members for several to submit for the record. we recognize the vice chair dr. burgess for five minutes. >> thank the witness for spending so much time with us this afternoon. you mentioned, ms. barra, that over a decade ago general motors embarked upon a small car program. do you recall why that was? >> i'm sorry? >> why did they embark upon a small car program over a decade ago? >> to have a complete portfolio, i believe.

>> the but the remission or type of car that was manufactured by gm previously had not fit that model, it was an entirely new business line that g mx was undertaking? >> the cobalt and several cars but specifically about the cobalt, it was following a previous small car but it was an all new program architecture, et cetera. >> was any part of this done in -- because of the cafe standards that were changing? any of this done because of congressional action that occurred previously? >> i can't answer that question. i wasn't in decision-making at that point. >> let me ask you this, when mr. waxman was giving his opening statement he said it was a shame that national highway traffic safety administration did not have access to the same information that general motors had. do you think that was a fair statement for him to have made?

>> as part of the investigation, i'm looking at what information was provided and when. >> and that's -- becomes then the troubling part of all of this. i think you look at tab 8 in the information binder, and this was talking about the ignition key, cylinder assembly and the date of the pdf that i have is january 1st of 2005, again, we'll find that under tab 8 but later on in the same document, it says we're closing this with no action. the main reasons are all possible solutions were percented and lead time was too long and cost and piece price were too high and none of the solutions seems to fully countermeasure the possibility. so that was all in january of 2005. then you know, as part of our

document evaluation for getting ready for this hearing, there were several accident reports that were supplied to us and one of those occurred not too far away in maryland in the middle of the summer of 2005. and that accident sequence, a cobalt hit a series of trees at the end of a kul desack and the driver was fatally injured and wasn't wearing a seat belt. wasn't a large individual, weighed about 100 pounds. because the air bag did not deploy, it would be my you have too wonder, if the air bag deployed. her body into the steering column or the steering wheel being indented to the lower part of the driver's body, hit her under the rib cage resulting in a liver laceration which

resulted in the time sequence together of the crash and get her to the hospital. you can't help but wonder because the other injuries that were reported with that crash, are really fairly mild. i can't help but think the people evaluating this must have asked themselves why no air bag went off with this type of crash? she was going 70 miles per hour and hit an oak tree. wouldn't that be a logical place for an air bag to deploy? >> it's a very tragic situation. some of the fatalities in this vehicles, we see as a tragedy and we have apologized. as i read the document that you asked me, i find that unacceptable that any engineer would stop at that point if there was an issue that they felt was a safety defect and that's why we're doing the investigation, to put a complete time line together and i commit to you we will take action and

made process changes and will fix the process. our goal is to have a world class safety process. >> i respect you for being here and answering that way. one of the other accidents that's reported in our binder under tab 20 was a head-on collision that occurred in pennsylvania. where the cobalt was not at fault, another car went over the center line and there was a hit on impact and air bags did not deploy and driver of the other vehicle, the air bag did deploy. it seems this should be a red flag to people who investigate air bag nondeployment as an occurrence or as an issue, the fairness let me state that all of the front see occupants in both vehicles were deceased as a result of that accident. the deployment of the air bag in that situation did not protect -- preserve the life of the driver. but still, you would have to ask the question, you have a cobalt and hyundai meeting head on.

why do cobalt air bags not deploy? exact same force for both vehicles and there was no interseed ent jarring of the vehicle. didn't run off the curb or run over another tree first. so the air bag did not deploy and why would that have been the case in that particular accident? >> it's a tragic situation. any time there's a loss of life in a traffic situation, this is not a report -- or an investigation that was done by gm. i can't answer your questions because it's usually very complex as they look at that. i can't comment on this particular study. >> if that is part of your internal -- >> time expired. >> i would like you to make that available to the committee staff and committee. >> we'll make whatever information we have available. >> thank you. >> we now recognize miss janikowski for five minutes. >> mr. braley talked about the pictures in the back and what

makes it more painful, these deaths were needless. i want to ask you for something more than an apology. one of the many questions raised is how gm today -- how you will handle accidents that happened prior to the company's bankruptcy. gm filed for bankruptcy in june of 2009 emerging as new gm, six weeks later. that means that new gm, the company as it exists today, i've been told may not be libel for accidents that occurred prior to july 2009. is that your understanding? >> we at general motors want to do the right thing for our customers. that's why we feel this is an extraordinary situation as i have said. it took too long to get to the answers and understandings about this part. that's why we've hired mr.

fineberg, we feel he has had extensive experience and will bring his experience and objectivity to assess what are the appropriate next steps. we do understand that we have civic responsibilities as well as legal responsibilities. >> are you saying that the hiring of mr. fineberg indicates that gm will give some kind of settlement with those individuals whose families whose loved ones lost their lives? >> we are -- we have just begun to work with mr. fineberg. our first meeting will be on friday. it will take probably 30 to 60 days to evaluate the situation. so i have -- we have not made any decisions. we have just started this process with mr. fineberg. >> and that might include people who have been injured as well? >> again, we have not made any decisions. >> let me ask you this. during gm's restructuring, did the company disclose what it

knew about the ignition switch defect by 2009 there is now doubt that officials in gm were aware of this problem. >> i was not aware of this issue. i can't speak to what was disclosed but -- again, our investigation will cover if there was any information. but to my knowledge it was not known at the senior leadership of the company. >> does gm accept responsibility for the accidents caused by the company's defective vehicles? >> first of all, i again want to reiterate we think the situation is tragic and we apologize for what has happened and we're doing a full investigation to understand -- >> i'm talking about responsibility and even liability. >> responsibility and -- i'm sorry, i don't understand. >> and even liability. you would take responsibility -- is the company responsible? >> the new gm, is it potentia

responsible? >> we will make the best for our customers realizing that we have legal obligations and responsibilities and as well as moral obligations. we're committed to our customers and work very hard to do the right thing for our customers. >> i hope that you do do the right thing. let me ask you about some of the people who potentially knew about this. where's my -- hold on one second. you've reported the first time a president of global vehicle safety. i'm underwemed by that, thinking it's such an obvious thing to have someone high up that would in fact be able to connect the department so everybody knew. i guess it's a good thing it's finally done. we know that degiorgio was the engineer who approved the

redesign in 2006. is he still an employee? >> i believe he is. >> do you know who signed off on the initial faulty ignition switch that did not meet your specifications? >> i don't. but that's what i will learn with the investigation after we have a complete investigation from a very complex process, we will take action. we will change process and deal with any people issues. we demonstrated in the issues we learned in india with about a year ago, we will take serious steps and hold people accountable. >> no one right now has lost their job as a result about this knowledge about this defective part? >> we're just a few weeks into the investigation about mr. valucas and already made process changes. as i return to the office after this we'll begin to look at the implications now that we have data coming from the investigation and take the

appropriate steps. >> thank you. i yield back. >> gentleman yields back. mr. gingry for five minutes. >> thank you very much. this hearing is much appreciated. pretty poignant to me since brook melton lived in my congressional district today and had it not been for an outstanding plaintiff's attorney in the judicial district of georgia and bringing this case, i'm sure it was against the local dealership, resulted in a settlement but it brought to light what's going on now. and the purpose hopefully some good can come from this hearing. i want to thank chairman murphy for holding it and investigating the root cause of the general motors recall of over 2.6 million vehicles linked to these defects. unfortunately, i heard just

yesterday that the recall now includes 6.3 million vehicles. i do want to speak about this young lady named brook melton a nurse in georgia, which at the time was in the district i represent and she was tragically killed march 10, 2010 on her 29th birthday. and horrific side impact accident on highway 92 and the ignition switch in the accessory position, just the day before, just the day before her death, she took her 2005 chevy cobalt into the dealership for service. the service report stated, customer states engine shutoff while driving. please check. end of quote. despite the the fact that a service bulletin was issued for faulty ignition switches back in 2005 for that make and that

model, the on-site mechanics cleaned the fuel line and fuel injection and told her to come pick up her car, which she did. brook melton's tragic death is not acknowledged as part of this recall because it involved a side impact instead of a front impact. mrs. melton's parents, ken and beth, they are not here today i don't think but they deserve answers. ms. barra, is brook meltton included in general motors death count, yes or no? >> to my knowledge, no. it was a side impact. >> right. why did general motors not include the nondeployment of air bags from side impact accidents resulting in loss of life or injury in this recall? >> as you look at a frontal collision in the way the air bag is to operate, i believe the assessment, the assessment was made that would be potentially be related to the switch.

>> but if you connect the dots, the ignition gets knocked off to the accessory position and there was a problem, using faulty, even by your own standards, equipment, and so maybe what happened was that all of a sudden the car stalls and she's driving perfectly, trying to control without any power steering and power brakes, may very well have -- i don't know the details of that zept. may have run through a four-way or red light and slammed into from the side. and whether it was a head on collision or side collision, it was from the same reason and she is dead and that was almost four years ago. i don't understand why general motors does not include the side deployment of air bags in this recall. can you explain that to us?

>> first of all, all of the accidents and fatalities are very tragic, as you've indicated and we're deeply sorry for those. we've been very clear of the number that we put forward. there's been a lot of analysis to look at potential incidents and -- >> well, general motors investigate or do you plan to investigate whether this condition relates to the non nondeployment of air bags in side impact crashes? >> we have individuals that are looking at the available information from accidents -- >> you told us about your recent hire and i hope -- lastly ms. barra, to what extent does gm regularly inform dealerships, like the dealership obviously in cobb county, the 2005 technical service bulletin on faulty ignition switches so that these service technicians and young guys maybe working there six months to a year, that they

properly address a customer complaint like brook had the day before her death. >> i'm sorry was your question how do we communicate service bulletins? >> how do you make sure that these dealerships all across the country and their service departments are making sure that their technicians are getting and receiving the instruction? >> we can provide details and exactly how we communicate service bulletins and how it's ruled out to each of the dealerships across the country. >> i hope you will. thank you, ms. barra. >> related to the questions with all of the cars recall and waiting for parts, what are drivers supposed to do in the meantime when the car is sitting in the driveway? >> we have to communicate and we've done extensive testing that if you take the -- if you have just the ignition key with the ring or just the ignition key the vehicle is safe to drive. if people are not comfortable with that, we are making loaners or rentals available. they can go to the dealer.

we have over 13,000 customers that have these vehicles in rentals or loaners right now. >> and you're assuring people it is safe to drive if they just take the -- >> there's been extensive testing done by the engineering team and with just the key and the ring or just the key, we believe it is safe based on our testing. >> recognize -- >> mr. chairman, is that true of the earlier ignition as well as the 2006 -- all of them, all of these cars that's true? >> yes. >> thank you. >> you're recognized for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i have to believe for the members of family members and friends of the victims of this tragic outcome, it must be very painful process to sit here and listen to the exchange. just to comment first, we're hearing a lot about information

that would come post the investigation or the review. however, i hold in my hands february report and a march report to nitsa on behalf of gm under your watch, that provides detailed time lines with a whole bit of knowledge exchanged. i'm confused somewhat about that fair amount of knowledge that has been formally exchanged in nitsa and at the same time we're hearing, we don't know until the investigation is complete. so there's a conflict that i think is brought to bear here in terms of in exchange that has been detailed in the last few weeks. under the watch of the new general motors today's gm. and at the same time, when i was

listening to representative from illinois asked about the corporate chart and the changes, no changes have been made. we're waiting for that pending the investigation. but at the same time, we characterized or labeled it as today's general motors. while we're all products of the environment that produces us, the cultural impact of gm seems to still be in play with a number of people who have perhaps shifted positions but part of that organization. so comfort me by telling me that there's a new thinking. there's a new culture that has been set at gm while all of the players are there in the corporate chart. tell me how the company is restructured and reorganized so as to bring comfort to the

consumer. >> first, there are many new people in the company as well as people who have experienced across the company. there is a new structure, for instance, in global product development. we've stream lined and took out an entire layer of management in the product development. we've completely redone the quality processes over the last -- it started in the 2011, 2012 time frame. we changed our test procedure and added additional validation, there's been a complete remake of the way we drive quality and test failure instead of testing to a standard. that's just one example and we've looked across the entire organization. we've rebuilt our supplier quality organization and over 100 resources just in this country alone. there's systemically gone across the company and making changes. even in the chronologies which i think you held up, those are the

most detailed chronologies that we have ever provided, sharing in a summary fashion with the information we have now that we are conducting an investigation with mr. valucas, we've also roled out new values with rilgsships matter and individual excellence. we've trained thousands of people and most importantly, it's leadership at the top. it's the leadership of how we behave and when we make decisions and focus on the customer, focus on safety and focus on quality. i can tell you in -- from my leadership team and the next layer, we continue to drive that every day. we recognize culture exchange doesn't happen in a year or two. but we're well on that journey and we will -- are dedicated to it and very clearly want to have the safest vehicles on the road. >> and will you make that list public from the report that you're anticipating?

>> i'm sorry. >> will you make the list that will be coming forth public? >> the list of -- i'm sorry. >> the full report coming from mr. valucas. >> mr. valucas will make the findings and why give the appropriate findings -- >> what about full report zpl jo know if he'll give a report or share findings. >> if he does, will you share the report? >> we'll share the appropriate information. >> not the full report? >> i don't know if there will be a full report. >> if there will be a full report, will you share? >> we'll be transparent and share what's appropriate. >> in other words, there's no commitment to share the full report? >> i'm saying i will share what is appropriate. >> i hear the answer. mr. chair, i yield back. >> gentleman from louisiana, mr.

xal ease. my prayers are with the families who lost their lives and others who have been impacted by this. obviously the questions we have are even more pertinent to the families here and that's why it's important we ask the questions and get answers and work to ensure we can prevent something like this from happening again. we've got to get into the rereal details an what went on during this period of years. unfortunately years where it seemed somewhere inside of general motors there was knowledge that this was a problem before it got to the level of recall. and want to first take you, ms. barra, to the tab you got there, tab 38. tab 38 is the signoff. this is called the general

motors commodity validation sign-off. this is the actual sheet that the engineer signed off on that approved the design in the faulty ignition switch. have you seen that document before? >> this is the first time i've seen this document. >> what we're talking about here, how long have you been aware of the problem with these faulty ignition switches? >> i was aware there was a faulty ignition switch on january 31st. >> of this year? >> this year. >> as you're going through i'm sure some of the questions you have or asked and maybe some of the ones we're having, first question you would want to ask, did we know well in advance and why didn't you prevent it from happening? the first thing we are all talking about is when was this found out within gm to the point they made a change. you made a design change.

this form is dated april 25th of 2006. so 2006 is when your engineers and there's a name on the sheet, an actual engineer who you said under only earlier is still employed with gm. there's an engineer that signed this document requesting, not requesting, approving a change in this ignition switch. in fact, with a part number, part number is on here. has anyone at gm taken this -- an employee of yours, you can pull him aside right now and ask him, when you signed off in 2006, number one, why didn't you exchange the part number. and number two, why did you approve a change in the ignition switch and not bring it to the level of recall? in 2006 clearly people lost their lives after, after this was signed off on. so do you know right now, you're under only. do you know of anyone that has asked the person that signed this, signed off on this, have any of you asked him those basi

questions? >> i know this is part of the valucas investigation and i want to know the answers -- >> do you know of anyone who has asked that question. he's an employee of yours right now -- you can if we do an independent investigation, that we let him do a thorough investigation, talk to people and there is not a lot of side investigations going on. he is the one standard we will use in the investigation. we have to bring objectivity to it. lex you talk about a new culture. has anyone been held accountable as of now for what has happened? >> we learned of this on january 31. >> you have a design change in 2006 related to what we are talking about. the recall was issued in 2014, but the product, the faulty ignition switch was redesigned

in 2006 by one of your engineers who is still an employee of general motors. if you find that information out, would you get that to the committee? >> it would be part of the investigation. >> later on we will have the acting administration of the national highway transportation safety. i would like to get your response. he said we are pursuing an investigation into whether gm met the timeliness responsibilities to reports and address the defect under federal law. are you aware whether or not gm has met obligations of timeliness? you are not aware at this time. that, can aware of i amhare that with us >> aware of the findings i have shared today. >> he said gm had critical

information that would have helped to identify the defect. the gentleman testifying right after you. the opportunity to come behind him and respond. what would you say in the response that gm had critical information that would have identified this? >> we have artie learned through the investigation that there were points in time when one part of the information -- organization that had information not shared across the part of the organization. made changes to the structure and responsibility so it will not happen again. >> we expect -- appreciate getting the full range of questions. green ofognize mr. texas. >> congratulations on being the

ceo of general motors. like a lot of my constituents, i have been a customer of gm and the cannot list the number of vehicles they own. i lease a malibu and have a blazer. we keep them for a long time. it seems like on a bipartisan basis, we are trying to find out what is happening. gingrich, a good friend of mine and physician, he thanked the plaintiff's lawyer. so is my here now but there is a reason we have the civil barb. you have gone down the litany with the other questions with problems happening. in 2002 the switch was blown back.

they were notified of a problem. i thought about my wife's key ring. it has everything in the world key phrases. i cannot imagine it would be an issue. 2007 you modify them for future models. though it still fell below the initial torque standards by gm. modify the switch ignition. i have a constituent whose mother owns a 2003 regal which is ten years old and she has owned gm products like i was for years. the regal began stalling and turning off and the car had less

than 50 tho,000 miles. each time the dealer did not fix the problem. she finally found a shade tree mechanic who finally fixed it. i hold the shop to a higher level because they know the product. can you confidently say that these are limited only to those models of vehicles or is it other ones like the regal or like the malibu i drive? >> again, i'm not aware of any other stalling issues.

if there is a defect that you are aware of, i would like to look into it. >> i have a couple of minutes left. i represent an industrial air yaxt what we do is dangerous. you have to take extra concern about it. it looks like in the years, the culture of the company is not there to deal with that. as the new ceo i would hope that you make sure it happens. i have said i hope that i have a kem chemical plant or refinery and we were able to pin point what the decision was made that they didn't do that caused people to die. that is what happened here. general motors is a greater company than to do that. i would hope the culture of your

corporation would be better so that it would continue to easteearn the respect that this lady and i ha have. but you need to fix it. and fix it as quickly as you can because it will cause problems. >> i agree with you. it is completely my responsity. i will work day and night and i recognize that it is my responsibility. >> should she have her mother in phoenix take that regal back and have it checked by a dealer now? >> yes, i wish you would send a note to me. >> i'll get you that information. thank you mr. chairman. i recognize mr. griffin for five minutes. >> you have indicated that not having a part number when the part was changed in 2006 was not

acceptable. is that correct? >> yes. >> i guess it is hard to figure that somebody would have done that by accident. that was a breach of protocol wasn't it? ji don >> i don't think there was an acceptable reason to do that. it might be that it is harder to track the problem with the old part when you have an improved new part that is put in it's place isn't that correct? yes, or no? >> yes. >> while you have indicated that you did not know the individual name of the person that made that decision do you know whose job title it was or whose chain of command it was not to create a new part number for that part? >> it would be within the engineering organization and i will learn that and we will take

appropriate action. >> would that have been under your chain of command? >> february of 2011. >> but it never get to you? >> no, it did not. >> i have this question and i think that the answer probably is that your investigation will reveal this it is concerning that the trial lawyer that uncovered this, you have sharp people working at gm as well do you not? >> i believe we do. >> it is one of those questions that i'm sure your investigation will uncover but why didn't your team of engineers connect the dots and figure out when the ignition slips into the auxiliary position the airbags won't function properly? >> those are the questions i want to answer it has taken way too long and we will make

changes and hold people accountable. >> not only hold people accountable and i know you are in a tough spot on that. i know you have said that one of the kwengs thquestions that i w is that it wouldn't it be easier to list it in the bankruptcy instead of having to come out now wouldn't it? >> the best thing in the world would be as soon as we find a problem would be to fix it. >> and here's here's one of the things that concerns me. have you been given estimates yet by mr. feinberg or others as to best or worst-case scenario? >> we have been in conversations with him and i believe we will work through him to evaluate the situation. >> has anybody else given you a

best or worst-case scenario in the situation? >> there have been a lot of estimates but none specifically to he. >> would those liability issues have negatively impacted the prospects of either a bail out by the federal government or prior to the bail out, the people who were lending you money to keep gm afloat with it's heavy liabilities would not those that have come forward by this problem have had the potential to dissuade private investors or the federal government from giving cash to gm. >> as i look attis, and fix it, then there aren't liabilities and they are contained.

we are going to make the change and accept that. >> i don't feel appropriate commenting. >> i appreciate that. >> when this issue first came up the core spending problem resolution tracking report document identified the issue of severity three. i'm referencing back to some of the documents that your folks have given us in 2004 or 2005 when your problem resolution tracking system report came out it related this problem as being

severity three. what does that mean? i don't have a specific definition for that. >> can you get one for us? >> i can. >> i revealyield back. >> did gm purposely and willfully negotiate during a bankruptcy issues or in the process of obtaining the loans purposely with hold the information about the cobalt or other cars? >> i am not aware i didn't personally with hold information but i can not speak to any other person. i thank my colleagues for their

focus on this hearing. this issue came to light in 2006 is that correct? >> through our investigation it came to light. it came to light to me on january 1st, 2014. that is totally irrelevant to the people who lost their lives. you are the current ceo, but that is not relevant. >> i thought you asked when i became aware of that. >> no, gm. >> that is what we will learn in our investigation. >> you changed the witch ed th 2006. >> would it be logical to 2006

to 2007? >> i hope to get those answers. >> wouldn't that be a starting point? somebody for some reason decided to change a very kacritical pare car between 2006 and 2007. let me ask you this. if you had recalled cars aggressively in 2006 when you were making the decision you gm, not you. changed the switch. how many cars has you recalled when you made the decision to change the switch? >> i can get you the exact number but it would have been significantly less. >> give me an estimate. you can talk to your back row there if you want. i would assume it is something about $1.2 million.

>> just from -- you would have cut it at least in half or maybe more. >> we are starting with vehicles that the saturn ion was in production in 2003. >> what would have been the cost had they done it in 2007? >> when we looked at the population from 2003 to 2007, it would have been a higher number. that would have probably, the estimated cost is something less than $100 million. >> what do you estimate would be the cost of the recall now that it is being done 8 years later? >> there is a larger population. >> i want an estimate. i want people to be able to hear this. the decision delayed is money and lives at risk. i'm trying to get an opinion

from you and it is ball park so it can be adjusted as to what the cost would have been had you acted 8 years ago. >> we would have had a smaller population. >> i'm not trying to be difficulty don't understand your question. >> if i were on the board of directories and i had an oblygation to shareholders and i had a company that could have acted 8 years ago with a problem but by not acting let that problem do more damage to shareholders and to the bottom line and to the reputation of this company and cause we don't know how much harm to citizens, i would want an answer to the question. >> i agree and it would have been substantially less at that

time from had we done it than what it would be now. >> gm was involved in litigation concerning allegations that this switch was involved in problems caused by this? >> yes. >> and gm settled some of these matters correct? yoo corre >> correct. >> those were secret? >> they are confi dengsal. >> they are by both parties. >> it usually means by the party that pays the damages. >> this is not good. >> do you believe that when a company that has been sued about a matter involving product safety where a person has been seriously injured or has died that the company that settles should be entitled to keep

secret what that settlement was about. >> i'm not -- i think that there are issues associated with that that every settlement is unique and that is a decision that is agreed to buy both parties. i don't have a comment on that. >> if a company, gm or any other company settles litigation, and pays a substantial amount of money pertaining to an allegation about serious body injury or death, should that company be permitted to keep secret that settlement, information to protect the public. >> if the two parties involved in the settlement agree to it that is their agreement. >> so if you don't have to do it you don't have to do it.

>> i yield back. >> now recognize the gentleman from missouri for five minutes. >> thank you. thank you for being here. and i want to thank the families that are here today for keeping safety in the forefront of americas and congress's consciousness when it comes to automobile sef afety and we hav heard about this same sub committee in the past. dealing with the issues when i came to congress. we have heard about the toyota accelerating car issue and like i said, i wasn't here, but i can imagine that the questions were similar who knew what when, did you know this person, have you done anything about it. i want to take a different tact with my line of questioning as i

normally do. people ask me all the time do you think you make a difference? when you go to congress, you are up here a few years do you think you are making a difference. that is hard to tell somebody. but today, this is a day that i want to look back on and say i think i made a difference. we got some answers do you remember the gm faulty ignition switch. >> yes, and with that i thank the families for being here and keeping it in the forefront of safety. there are not other people sitting in the same seats, hopefully there won't be a next

time and the finger pointing, the old analogy, when you are pointing a finger, you have three pointing as yourself. what i would like to get answers to is how the national transportation national highway traffic safety administration and you all as an automobile manufacturer if you can work, to see that this doesn't happen again so that the two organizations can work together and drill down on problems when we first learn them whatever the next problem may be the chairman's questions a while ago and i don't know what he was asking about, but you said i was not part of that organization at the time. i'm sure that was something

within agageneral motors. you and i have a history that goes back to when you were 18 years old. so you were there. your father i believe worked 39 years for pontiac. i go back to 18 years old with again gentlelady mgeneral motor. when i was 18, my parents bought me a jimmy. it is like a blazer. from 73 to 05 i drove nothing but general motors suburbans. i remember times when the key would be in there and you would go to put your key in and it wouldn't work. it would vibrate and tear the keys off the teeth.

but never once did i have that shut off. for me, they made pretty good ignition switches. can you tell me how many models gm makes today? >> around the globe over 100. >> 100 different models. can you tell me how many ignition switches they make? >> well we sell -- >> if you have 100 models how many different ignition switches would there be. >> i can't answer that question i don't know. >> gm has proven, i don't understand this reinventing the wheel. that every car has to have a different set of circumstances to make sure that it meets the qualifications. i recommend that you work hard with us and our next witness from the national highway

traffic administration says that when a car shuts off says that the airbag deploys for 60 seconds. i would ask that you reach out and work not only with your engineers saying hey we have some pretty good, why do we reinvent the wheel every time we invent a new ignition switch on these models. so. >> i would welcome the opportunity to have our technical experts look at how we can improve the way the system works. airbag deployment is part of a system. if there are improvements that can be made we would like to be in the forefront of making them. >> thank you ma'am. i thank the families. mr. chairman i yield back. >> we recognize mr. yardmouth.

>> i want to express my condolences to the victims of this tragedy. i know it must be frustrating for you to listen to this testimo testimony. we are looking for answers and so is gm. i was frustrated by the same questions that my colleague had just mentioned i have been driving a long time and this is a pretty well established technology sticking a key into an ignition and turning it. are you aware of other issues that have been discovered in a gm vehicle or over the discovery of key ignition systems? >> i have not reviewed every accident that we have ever had. but in this case it took way too long. >> there is a new technology, i

have been driving a car for for and a half years, i drive a ford product. it is a push button ignition. i was in a gm car last week that has a push button ignition system. and or a key ignition system and what are the differences first of all in terms of safety, this particular situation wouldn't occur with a push button system. how do you make that decision? >> we evaluate and the push bow t button start is something that we are evaluating. i'd like our oexperts to provid that evaluation it is a component that operates as part of a system i think we would be

better served to have our experts cover that. >> you are doing analysis of whether a push button system is safer than a key ignition system? >> there is work done that both can be designed to be safe. it is a function, we have them on some of our vehicles and continue to roll them out. we are looking at doing it across the board. it would be worth doing that analysis. one of my staff members has a 2005 malibu that was recalled because of a power steering issue. she called the dealership and the dealership said that they didn't know how to fix it. my question to you is, are you confident that gm knows how to

fix the vehicles it recalls for the variety of problems that -- >> first of all, if we find a situation that is not safe and we are not sure how to fix it, we will find the vehicles and take action. there is a fix whether it is a checks or a replacement of the product. so, that does exist for that specific vehicle. >> so she is getting bad information from her dealership or they haven't been told yet. >> i assume or i can follow up if you would like. >> the public would like to know. you if millions of vehicles out there and she was told go ahead and drive the vehicle if she felt safe and i'm not sure if ever i driver would know whether they should feel safe or not. some people are strong people and maybe it has happened to them before and she know it will

take more effort to steer. i don't even know how the average consumer is supposed to know whether they feel safe or not after a vehicle has been reca recalled. doesn't the company have some disclosure responsibility to say these things happen. >> we provide information to the dealers as well. >> one final question, we talk about and then we are going to have the representative here earlier, one of the things that you are not required to do is to provide warrantee data to the national highway traffic safety administration. do you think that might be considered or helpful in this case? maybe dots could have been connected sooner? >> i welcome the opportunity to look at what information that

nitsa would feel is of value to submit. >> thank you. >> gentleman yields back. i know recognize mr. harper for the next five minutes. >> we will continue to get to the bottom of this. and miss sp abarra i know this not the most enjoyable experience to go through this. but we are in a situation we don't trust the company right now. we have to get to the bottom of this and so we want to continue to ask some questions. if i could get you to refer to tab 28 in your binder, and i want to direct your attention to the people that is found at tab 28. in september of 2005, few months after general motors decided that there was not an acceptable business case to implement

changes to the ignition switch. gm personnel including raymond digiorgio proposed changes about a new ignition switch. it appears the piece cost could not be offset with warrantee savings. is that just the ignition switch? >> generally when people refer to piece cost they refer to the part. >> so he is just referring to that ignition switch that is a yes? >> again, i didn't write this note but i'm telling you generally that is what it means. >> an increase of 90 cents is that correct? >> does the e-mail say there

would be an increase of 90 cents? >> yes. >> since the warrantee offset was only 10 to 15 cents gm didn't make the change. >> that is not something that i find acceptable. if there is a safety defect this analysis is in appropriate. >> but that indeed is what happened here correct? >> that is one piece of data as we put the pieces together we will take action. this is not the type of behavior that we want what was lori

questi queen's position? >> what is the cost factor in the decision about safety? >> they don't. ji c . >> i can only speak to the way we are running the company. if there is a defect identified we go fix the vehicle, fix the part, fix the system. it is not acceptable to have a cost put on a safety issue. >> and that is your position and your goal and the way you want it to be now. but that is not the case of what we are going back and looking at. you are telling us that general motors has changed it's position. but this is how you want it now. >> we in the past had more of a cost culture and we are focusing on safety and quality. >> when we look at who first authorized the use of an ignition switch that did not

meet specifications. >> that is something that we'll learn in our investigation. >> one of the things that concerns us of course when general motors filed bankruptcy in 2009, it wasn't an overnight problem with the loss of profits or losing money each we're. in 2005 general motors lost $2.6 million and 2008 lost 30.9 bi billion and filed for bankruptcy in 2009. the fact that general motors was going through many years of financial issues. did that impact how this was not dealt with at that time as it should have been? >> i can't answer that question. when i do i'll take action. you indicated earlier that a specific traffic death was not

included with the count of fatalities. i would like to see other traffic deaths or serious injuries that were looked at but the determination was made that it was not part of this total. can you get us that information? >> yes. >> will you get that for us? >> yes. >> thank you very much i yield back. >> all right recognize ms. cas tore for five minutes. >> natasha was killed while ridiride ing in a 2005 chevy cobalt. allen ray floyd was killed after losing control of is2006 chevy cobalt. i understand that the family is

in attendance in the hearing today. others have been killed because of gm's defect sif ignition switch. the fact is that we do not know the full extent of the fatalities and injuries and accidents but evidence is growing through this investigation that gm could have addressed this long ago. gm knew about this problem as far back as 2001. gm used the switch in vehicles anyway. the committee sent you a letter about this issue and documents were received yesterday that show that these in adequate switches were approved by gm in

may of 2002. i have a document here in tab 54 in the binder as well. this document shows that the force required to turn the ignition switch was too low. that specification is clearly marked not okay. does this document show that dm officials were aware that the ignition switch did not meet company standards in 2002. >> if if this was provided to the company english engineers. >> in 2004 they were coming up with ways to fix the problem. this is at tab 8 from 2004, shows that gm did reject alternative designs. it memgs mentions one year lead times and says the tooling costs and piece

prices are too high. it concludes thus none of the solutions represent ares an acceptable business case. other documents present the piece cost increase as 57 cents per unit. do you know who would have made the decision about whether to make this change in 2004? >> i find that decision unacceptable as i've stated. the cost is not what we look at. we look at what it will take the fix the problem and make it safe. we will put the pieces together incidents and actions that are taken or not taken. >> so do you think that a repair cost cents was too costly? >> we don't even look at cost we

make the change. but there was a disconnect. in private it approved the switch and then the company appeared to reject the changes. in 2005 the "new york times" ran a review in which the author wrote about his wife encountering a problem with the chevy cobalt. said she was driving on a freeway when the car just went dead. the only other thing on the can he ring was a remote control fab. in rare cases a chevrolet cobalt while the car is running, when this happens it is still

controllable. i find it hard to believe that it was discussed on the paged of the "new york times" and then gm said no big deal engines out cuff all the time. would you consider this a safety issue? >> yes. >> you indicated that you were not aware that gm was investigating the cobalts until december 2013 is that correct? >> i was aware there was analysis related to a cobalt. >> in 50 what was your position. >> in 2005 i believe i was in the manufacturing engineering organization of the company. >> so you were a high level executive at gm responsible for vehicle manufacturing. >> the equipment that we used to build vehicles. >> in one of the nation's

largest newspapers raised the issue in this important new issue and you don't result at the time? >> i was not aware that this was this issue until the recall was introduced on january 31st. i did not know it was an ignition switch. >> that concludes our members but i would like to see if mr. terry would have an opportunity for five minutes. >> thank you. without objection. >> thank you. >> i appreciate this and i'm sorry for being late. but my plane was cancelled for mechanical reasons probably an ignition switch. us air. >> so, getting back to nitsa,

and i chair the sub committee over jurisdiction and the tread act. and the tread act clearly requires manufactures to in form nitsa within five days of any noncompliance or defects that create an unreasonable risk of safety. did gm contact or notice nitsa of any noncompliance or defects regarding the ignition switch? >> that is something i hope to learn as we go through our investigation. >> what, what is the difference between noncompliance and a defect? >> that is a very broad question. >> no.

>> it is very specific question. >> i think it depends on the specific situation that you are talking about. >> is regarding an ignition switch. >> what is a knownon compliant ignition switch. >> my understanding is that is a specific term used by nitsa term standards but i can get you the standards with that versus when we feel that we have found a defect with our parts. >> that is why it is or when it is substandard it is non compliant and a defect is a higher level. that is what we are looking for here today to determine if there was a defect. >> congressman, i think in the language that we use with nitsa, there are specific definitions and i would like to provide

those to you. >> i can get the definitions for you. >> okay. >> i'm asking how it applies to the ignition switch and nitsa is going to testify there was no notice. >> i didn't hear you? >> my understanding is that nitsa said that gm did not contact them. >> if i find that we did not provide the appropriate information to nitsa we will take appropriate action with the individuals involved. >> thank you. i yield back. >> i think there are no further questions. >> i just had two questions mr. chairman thank you. >> the first one, is, um i've

been sitting here thinking about these new ignition switches that you are putting into the recalled cars. they are based on the 2006 specks but what you are saying miss barra is that they are going to meet the highest safety stand ars when they are manufactured is that right. >> our engineers team is going through testing to make sure that they meet the requirements. >> on tab 53 of your notebook december 5th, 2012 the minimum torque on the return side of the ignition switch must be 15n-cm. would that be the standard since it says it must be that? >> from the position of run to accessory? >> 15 is the minimum.

>> yeah, okay. >> and my final question is, i'm impressed this committee has had experience with kenneth feinberg before because he was appointed to help administer the fund set up by bp after deep water horizon and also appointed to administer the fund after the boston marathon terrorist attacks. i want to make sure that what you are doing when you hire him is that you are really doing something. he is usually hired to sort out the value of people's claims and then assign money. i'm assuming that gm is hiring him to help identify the size of claims and then help spcompensa. is gm --

>> we have hired mr. feinberg to help us assessed the situation. >> there is no money involved at this point? >> we have hired him and begin working with him on friday. >> he has not been given ability to compensate vick tip. >> we are going to work with him to determine what the course of action is. >> might that include compensation? >> we haven't made a decision yet. >> we thank you for your time today. gm has cooperated with this investigation. let me make a couple of requests. members will have other questions for you and we hope that you respond to those within a timely manner. we also plan to conduct interviews in the recall part and may be requesting more

records will you make those available to us? >> we will absolutely cooperate. >> we would like to be notified when you get your internal report and review that report as well. >> we will notify you. >> thank you very much. >> i thank you ms. barra. you will be dismissed but while this is taking place. we are going to take a five minute break to allow mr. freidman to take his seat and we will reconvene the hearing in five minutes. thank you. >> first, we are there because we were attacked in new york city in 3000 americans were murdered. that is why we went to

afghanistan to get those people who were killing us. second, president obama has said there is a limit to this within two years, we are not doing it anymore. i agree with you, julie, at some point you have to let them do it. get away goal, if we from the afghans and look at what the first goal was, if i had told you or any of the in 2001 that we would not be attacked again in the united states of america for the next decade, none of us would have believed that because at that point al qaeda had more of the advantage. now we have al qaeda and terrorists definitely on the defensive. get outn at this point most of the forces from afghanistan. so i agree with you. we have been successful in what we really wanted to do as a country, and that is to protect

ourselves. >> vietnam vet , assistant westse secretary,binj bing will take your question is for three hours live on sunday on both tv. >> during this month, c-span is pleased to present winning entries in the student cam documentary competition. the annual competition that encourages middle and high school students to think critically about issues. to createere asked their documentary answering the question what is the most important issue congress should consider in 2014. one of our second prize winners are seniors and alexandria, virginia. >> article one, section eight of the constitution says commerce a

hot the power to raise and support armies, provide and maintain a navy and make rules for the government of land and naval forces. a constitutional studies fellow explains. >> the government is instituted at the very beginning from first principles to provide for common defense and general welfare. political -- political theory one hundred one. congress has a pretty wide berth to spend money on defense, navy and has developed the air force. >> it is the responsibility of leaders in the department of defense like the chief of new -- naval research to report to the secretary of defense for what they need in the budget to be successful. >> each year we put in the wish list. is -- we really want to work on it will gos and through the marine corps

leadership and that get submitted and pushed onto the secretary of defense. once the secretary of defense has that, he looks at the army wish list, marine corps wish list, air force wish list and a few other entities. they tried to balance things out in they go and send it up the hill to the president and the president says i like it or fix it a little bit and after that has been approved, then they will submit it to congress. afterss takes that year it is submitted and now looking at reviewing it. they will ask us questions. eventually congress will be satisfied and then will sign a bill. >> in 2011 congress passed the budget control act in order to reduce the make -- funding by $1 trillion over 10 years. we asked regimen freemen, research fellow and defense and

homeland security cello to explain how the budget control act works. >> the law says now shall not send -- spend this amount for defense, and if you do, we will sequester, go across the board to every program equally. so there is no way without changing the law that puts the sequester in place that you can spend more than that amount. you will be right where you would have been, even if you did pass it. place, thein sequestration cuts to the department of defense will have dramatic and possibly irreversible effect on the military ability to provide for national defense. >> in many places when the sequestration comes in or continued resolution, it not only dramatically slows down the research but in many cases you may lose people, brilliant people. people you do not get back again. they have to go away and you may

never get them back into your laboratories. will takest saying we one percent on the top uniformly across everything is a very blunt instrument. it is not as good of policy as having more surgical cuts. cookie-cutter approach. saying this is how we will do it. when he gets to our districts, which isfinance prevented through government dollars and foreign military money, the cookie-cutter approach really did not apply to work wellly does not for us. >> we cannot put out some broad-based directive or guidance because each employee is affected differently by the directives we receive from the higher headquarters. hoursinvest a lot of man

and a lot of human capital that we would normally use doing our routine, day to day jobs. >> i think sequestration is the worst way of handling the budget, other than not cutting at all. reductions in spending must be made. we simply ask congress to pass a budget that allows making cuts for changes. >> too many appear to believe we can maintain a solid defense that is driven by budget choices, not strategic ones. defense has contributed more than half of the deficit measures year to date. there are some in government that want to use the military to pay for the rest. to protect the sacred cow that it's entitlement spending. consider that word am entitlements. entitlements of -- imply you are

eligible for a certain benefit. i cannot think of anyone who deserves that more than our troops by volunteering to put their lives on the line for the country, they are entitled to the best training and leadership our nation can provide. budget sustain the military strength in an environment of constrained resources, giving dod the time and flexibility to make the necessary reductions and adjustments over a 10 year time. hard choices will have to be made over the next few years. >> now it will finally start to say, maybe with the world being what it is in the missions being what they are, the tolerance being low, we can cut the army a little more. we are now in a different fiscal environment. newly these are forcing us to more fully can rent the tough

and painful choices. to make the reforms necessary, put this on the department of have to maintain military strength for the 21st-century and to meet the new and complicated threats, we will have to do things differently. this will require the continued partnership of congress. lex congress has taken steps in the right direction with recent budget agreements. however, there are still work to be done in 2014 and beyond in order to ensure deficit reduction plans are implemented strategically. >> to watch all of the winning videos and learn more about the competition thomas go to www.c-span.orga and click on student cam. post your comment on the facebook page or tweet us. committeeuse budget will mark up chairman paul ryan's budget plan today in a session that is expected to last late