no, but my executive assistant told me that the state department was not happy with the talking points. in morning of the 15th. >> as you are preparing for the deputies meetings? >> as i arrived at work. >> you have artie testify that they never came up at the deputies meeting, the talking points, until you brought them up. it was not part of the agenda. the though the ones from national security staff had been the ones to suggest bringing it up. what i am puzzled by, as you look at the edits that you made that were on the chart, you take out most of the words that are in the talking points. though the fbi is ok with them, you take out words because you are afraid they will damage the fbi investigation. you take out everything even related to warnings and a bunch of other stuff. it seems like you are more

interested in protecting the state department than protecting the state department is. more interested in protecting the fbi than the fbi is. director petraeus wanted more information about warnings in there. that does not make sense to me, can you explain the motivation ? >> if you look at what i took out, the vast majority is information related to warnings. said earlier, i thought it inappropriate for the cia to say publicly that we warned of an attack coming. we also had him there that we had sent a warning cable to see no relevance of sending a warning cable to cairo to what happened in benghazi. as a way forthis cia to pound its chest and say look, we warned.

therefore allaying all the blame on the state department. i did not think that appropriate. i thought there would be plenty of time to have a conversation whot what was warned and responded and how. i did not think that discussion should start publicly, that was the judgment i made at a time. >> one other sentence, "the wide availability of weapons and experienced fighters in libya almost certainly contributed to the valley of the attacks -- to the lethality of the attacks." >> we did not know about the training of the attackers at that point, i thought it was speculative and not helpful. i am not saying i made the right decisions, but that is the decision i made. >> it is just such a drastic change.

to be morens seem protective of other agencies that even the other agencies are. you fororell, thank coming and for your many years of service. align myself with what our ranking member, mr. rippers ruppersburger said, expressing my heartfelt sadness for those who served us so bravely. we should be focusing on what we can do to make sure a tragedy like this never happens again. we should be trying to apprehend the murderers who killed these brave americans. anything short of that is an incredible misplacement of time and resources. the changes in the talking points -- do you make any

changes for political reasons? >> no, sir. >> did you know whether or not there were protests when you edited the talking points? >> i believed that there were protests because that is what my analyst thought. >> some engine has been made about the chief of station comments, or memo, stating that this was not a protest issue. >> yes. >> does one assessment from any chief of station, regardless of how qualified that person is, trump all other assessments? >> no. it is an important data point that the analysts take into account. determineiefs do not the analytic line at the central intelligence agency, the analysts do. onas i recall him a meeting february 13, two days after this tragedy took place, when general petraeus was in our committee

for a classified roundtable briefing, you were not there. >> no. >> but you were briefed on what was said? >> i was told later in the day about the request for the talking points. that is the only feedback i got. >> i was not speaking to the talking points specifically. i was going to talk about a specific question that general petraeus was asked and his response. he laid out for us why he believed it was not only sparked by this protest, but why it was spontaneous, and his believe. someone on our committee specifically asked him. how in the world could this happen, do people just drive around the streets with this type of weaponry in the car? he stated, yes, they do. they look for opportunities. was he making this stuff up?

in your view, was this assessment that he gave to us the best assessment given what he knew at the time? >> i think it was a mixture of ' view and a mixture of his own view based on his military experience. >> this is a man who has served had a vastreas and amount of experience. >> extensive experience. >> i would like to go back. i believe we should be looking at what we can do to make sure this never happens again. mistakes on talking points. make sure a tragedy of this nature never happens again and we should be doubling down and doing everything possible to apprehend these murderers. thank you, i yield back. mr. morell, remind me why the state department was upset with the talking points? >> i was told they did not like the warning language either. i was goingent in,

to ask another question, but you talk about deleting the line from the talking points about of notifying the embassy cairo of social media reports calling for demonstrations. >> yes. >> but you do not see any the cableto that, going to cairo, and the fact that this was all being blamed on a video. the protest was because of the video. >> in an explanation, a member of the committee asked for unclassified talking points on what happened in benghazi the night of the 11th of and the 12th. cia sending athe warning cable to cairo saying there is a potential violent demonstration coming against the embassy as relevant to what happened in benghazi. >> even though the demonstration

that was coming was over that youtube video? >> correct. why was ambassador rice chosen to go on the sunday talk shows? >> no idea. >> what was your reaction when you saw her explanation about what happened? >> i did not see her on the sunday shows. >> you have never seen -- >> i did not see her, i was in a deputies meeting. it was days later that i read what she said on the shows. >> what was your reaction when you finally did? that what -- one was she said about the attacks evolving spontaneously from a protest was exactly what the talking points said. it was exactly what the intelligence community analysts believed. when she talks about the video, my reaction was that is not something that the analysts have

attributed this attack too. >> you said on september 13, and analysts said it was a protest based on a number of press and intel reports. how many? numerous reports? >> roughly a dozen. >> how much were press? >> about half-and-half, the committee has all those documents. >> when you finally read ambassador rice's sunday morning talkshow transcripts, did you complain to the white house at saying?t what she was or were you comfortable with what she said? >> i did not complain to anybody, sir. you also stated that you noted there was a conflict between the cos and the analysts. once you notice that, you adjust

it.ressed how quickly and what do you consider appropriate? it very quickly. i was the one who spotted what the cos said in the bottom of an e-mail. it was three or four sentences. i was the one who said this is inconsistent with what the analysts think. we need to figure this out and resolve this. i was the one to do that. that is an appropriate role for the equity director of the cia. i would expect the deputy director to do that. i asked the chief of station for more information. i explained that earlier. he provided it within 24 hours. within 12 hours, i asked the analysts to provide their view on whether they should change based on whether the chief of station said.

i think that is pretty quick. >> do you consider a shift from a protest to a coordinated attack a large shift? is yes.houghts -- one that is significant. the second thought, as i said , we never thought that a protest and a terrorist attack were mutually exclusive. what the analysts believed from day one -- >> could it have been a protest customer -- could have been a terrorist attack that erupted into a protest? >> sure. rice, didn't ambassador who went on five or six shows, ever correct the record? that it was more of an attack than a protest. >> i do not follow you. >> she said it was solely because of the youtube video.

later we learned it was more of an attack men about the youtube video. there was never an attempt to correct the record. >> there was a difference between what it was, a terrorist attack, and what motivated it. those are two different things. no doubt it was a terrorist attack. to this day we still do not know the motivations of the people who conducted the attack because we have not caught any of them. the analysts have views about what motivated the attack. the analysts' view is that it was one of two things. it was what happened in cairo. these guys in benghazi saw what happened in cairo and wanted to do the same thing. the other possibility they see is the revenge for the death of al-libi. we just heard from congressman schiff that the chief of station sees three possibilities -- 9/11 anniversary, revenge for al-lib

i, and the video. the chief of station thanks that the video may have been motivation for the attack in benghazi. a big difference between what happened, and attack, and motivation. >> i yield back. morell. you, mr. i really appreciate your testimony. given your three decades of service to our nation, always working to protect our security and never in a partisan role or spirit. i believe what you are telling us today and your account of what happened. i appreciate that the first point that you made was that you wanted to honor the heroes who lost their lives. we all have to keep that in

mind. i fully supported the accountability review board's investigation of the incident. and findingsns that they had on how we could have done this more effectively. committee,lligence we have held hearings and review documents. i said as the ranking member with chairman was moreland on .he subcommittee on oversight throughout all of this, i have that anyonedence lied or intentionally misled the american people about the attack. nor that anyone, including you, mr. morell, inappropriately edited the talking points with this committee has asked for. we all agree that mistakes were made. there were some things that could have been done better throughout the process of drafting and distributing talking points. i agree with you that you -- and

what your internal review found that there was "no effort on the part of the cia's public affairs officers to spend the talking points to accommodate a political agenda or deflect criticism for the agency or the administration." alternately, it is critical that we determine what happened so that we can apprehend the perpetrators and prevent future tragedies at our consulate facilities around the world. i believe we have shifted from legitimate, fact-based oversight into a partisan smear campaign. we must not continue to demean those who lost their lives by perpetrating this obviously political attack line. going forward, there will be other times when this committee will want help in commenting on national security issues to the american public. they will want to protect classified information, although

i would understand the reluctance in coming up with unclassified talking points. what are the key lessons that the cia has learned from this tragic incident? >> as i said, when i was acting director, i asked for two reviews. the first review was a review of our performance in producing the analysis. the second review was a radio of -- the second review was a review of our performance on the talking points. i asked the directorate of intelligence, the analytic arm of the agency, to do the analytic review. and i asked a senior attorney in our office of general counsel to do a review on the talking points. i told him i expected him to look at my own performance. he know that i was deadly serious about that. i told you what the bottom lines

of the talking points lessons learned were. be reluctant to do talking points in the future. but if we do, the experts should be there every step of the way. on the analytic review, we had four lessons. the importance of the precision of language. that first sentence in the analysis on the 13th and the first sentence in the talking evolving the attacks spontaneously from a protest was not well written. believed wasysts not that the protesters became the attackers. believed that the terrorists opportunistically took advantage of the process to attack. of land which is very important. that was number one. number two, beware of unconscious bias. what the analysts were saying to

theselves was one of reasons we bought into the idea that there was a protest, based on a dozen or so pieces of intelligence, which is not a lot. was the fact that there were protests and demonstrations going on all over the place. they said that the fact that there were demonstrations going on all over the place influenced their judgment about benghazi and that they needed to be careful about that kind of bias: four. the third point was that they quicker to write about a change in analysis once they make that change. lin we heard from the hads on the 18th that they seen the video from the state department facility and sauna protest, our analysts were prepared to write but it took them four days to publish a piece. what they were saying is we have to move more quickly.

last lesson learned is that analysts have to push collectors to collect information more quickly. comes from is that one of the criticisms is why didn't the phone and call the people on the ground in benghazi and asked them? the answer to that is i do not want my analysts being investigators, i do not think you one analysts being investigators. the fbi does not want my analysts being investigators and doing interviews. i do want my analysts picking up the phone and push collectors to produce more information and a more timely way. to push the fbi to get those iir's out more quickly. that is the fourth lesson learned. >> thank you. >> mr. morell, thank you for your service. i went to identify mr. thompson's comments about the

importance of finding the folks who did this. ms. czajkowski lead you down a path i was going to talk about, the intellectual membranous of -- the intellectual nimbleness of analysts. we all have pride in a political point of view. wereense that the analysts impacted by their own personal beliefs? >> i do not believe so. >> with respect to the press reports, analytical work is art, not science. have been ablets to tell that the press reports were a daisy chain of one percent reporting and then subsequent press reports. the sheer volume looks like a big deal but it was one person's misinformation. >> that is something they would

look like, i don't know what the facts are in this case but that is something they think about when they look at press reports. >> the weight of evidence to change. the station chief e-mails that i have read, he is more direct in terms of it being an attack. the weight of evidence was unable to overcome the other biases in terms of decision-making. is that a fair statement? >> it is fair. the analysts stuck with their judgment. information,et the you said someone from the state department was pushing back on the talking points. that leadership is concerned about the warning .anguage she said "my building leadership," what does she mean? i am not sure, you will have to ask her.

i believe you are talking about ms. nuland. she was a spokesperson at that time. i do not know that chain of command above her. of comments a lot being made about your post government employment. would use be to us about what role, if any, discussions about your post government service, distinguished government service, played in the job that you now have. >> sure. theirst discussions with can global strategies about going to work for them began in november, four months after i left the job. >> november -- >> november 2013.

months after i left the job. i was attracted to working at because i admired the four principles there. are terrific public servants. it turns out they are terrific businessman, too. it is absolutely true that three of them are democrats. one of them is a republican and you know him very well, he was the staff director of this committee and worked in the bush white house. had mitt romney won the white house, he would have been on the transition team for intelligence. 2012, that had nothing to do with my going to work for begin in november 2013. >> one final question, this may add more confusion. i have an e-mail chain here that

11:15 a.m.15 and from matt olson to a michael j.m. is that you? >> yes. hese are the points that ondi ruppersburger yesterday afternoon. at what point did the talking points actually come? >> i understand that nctc also did talking points. i did not know until that e-mail that there were two sets of talking points. you would know better than i whether i want to sets of talking points. >> the reference to odni is nc tc? >> yes. >> i yield back. >> thank you.

mr. morell, i want to thank you for testifying here today. i want to thank you for your 33 years of service to our country with a great distinction. you have always been country first and have always done your and been very candid and forthcoming in your testimony before the committee whenever you have appeared before me since i have been on this committee. the fact that you are here voluntarily today reinforces how seriously you believe in the truth. we can all agree that benghazi was a terrible tragedy. it is important to remember that we lost four brave americans that day and we must make sure we never let something like that ever happen again. i supported the independent arb

investigation that interviewed more than 100 people, reviewed thousands of documents, watched hours of video. the arb spoke with people on the ground and benghazi as well as tripoli in washington. the top two military and talked tonce -- they military and intelligence officials, as well as outside experts. we in this committee has conducted over size. you have been before us three times and we have reviewed thousands of classified documents and interview the central figures. i believe these never-ending benghazi hearings have become a very costly distraction. partisan and no longer about finding and fixing problems. they have needlessly

consumed thousands of man-hours and millions of taxpayer dollars. i think that is very disappointing. being said, i am happy that you have gotten the chance to address some of the allegations that are out there and to speak directly to us. i thank you again for your candor. i hope your testimony today will to what i believe has become baseless conspiracy theories and at least allow the committee to return to the urgent work we have before us. on that point, i am going to move to an area that does involve real national security concerns and threats that we have to deal with going forward. amendinghat work is the foreign intelligence surveillance act to eliminate collection of metadata while maintaining the capability of vital to keeping us and our allies safe. you are part of the president's panel that reviewed our

intelligence programs, including that metadata collection program. this past sunday you said that the president's plan of approach were very close. you also said the house plan, you would be comfortable with that. can you elaborate on your comments and give us further insight into this topic? >> yes, sir. my main concern as i sat on the weiew group was how do protect this program going forward. how do we make sure we still program because i believe it is vital for the protection of this country. at the same time, it was absolutely clear that we have lost the trust of the american people and we needed to find a way to win it back. group'sew recommendations for designed to do both that. to win back that trust while

protecting the program. the reviewmber, group's recommendations were the government should not hold the data. there should be a court order prior to any query. and who held the data we would leave up to experts. the president's recommendation is completely consistent with the review group's. i actually believe that the house plan, this committee's plan, is very close to the review group's recommendation. in some ways i like this committee's approach a little better. because it actually speeds the process. bringows to bring into, in to play some of the data that is currently not in play. there is a gap out there that i worry about.

what you guys have crafted here allows for the closure of that gap, that is very important. i could support the president's plan, i could also sport this committee's plan. toce i have this opportunity speak to the american people, i want them to know how much this committee does on all sorts of issues. it is not -- it is very vigorous oversight. i have sat in this chair a lot. questions.ions, fair on no program was there a more oversight than the 215 program. q, mr. morell. i want to thank and commend the chairman and the ranking member for the work they have put on .he legislation ending double data program and the data being held by the government. i appreciate that and appreciate

your insight. hopefully, going forward we will pass legislation soon. the programright, is vital to our national security, but the american people have to have confidence that we're doing it the right way and it will never be abused. i think this is the right path forward. thank you for your work on that bill with us. that was an important piece of legislation moving forward. it would not have happened without your help. mr. king? >> so many questions from beginning to end on this whole issue of the talking points. to believe your version would require almost absolute faith in your word. paragraph of your statement, you say you value the ability to communicate with congress and general and this committee in particular. you were sitting at the table

along with other officials when we were trying to find out who changed the talking points. i don't think anyone on the committee had the faintest idea that you had anything to do with those talking points. it was not until six months later after all the questions the inquirysked in about to changed the talking points, six months later we found out how directly involved you were when the white house released the e-mails. that was at best misleading by omission. at worst, lying by omission. , by not being forthcoming i think you violated your obligation to this committee and to the congress. several other things -- you dismissed the e-mail to the station chief and benghazi. we cannot go into the details of that. i have a different interpretation. you made reference to signals intelligence. if we know what the station she

felt, why he believed that not should be significant, he is the guy on the ground closest to it. for you to bring up the issue of signals intelligence today when those who were familiar with the full context know why it should not be taken seriously. it is again misleading. you said there was no politics and no changes done for political reasons. yet, you look at victoria nuland. she said she had serious concerns on the talking points about arming members of congress to start making assertions to the media that can be abused by members to be the state department for not paying attention to agency warnings. that is clearly a concern about their reputation. have -- we also have a memo, is masses information out

there, particularly in congress. the fact response to that we need to correct the record." they wanted to use this for political purposes and frame their nature of the debate. victoria nuland finally says "this does not resolve all my issues." my building leadership. who is the leadership she is talking about? the seventh floor, who on the seventh floor? then we go to the e-mail from general petraeus. you quoted him at the very end. i had never known anyone who was a leader of any department who was more controlling than general petraeus. that she seems so passive. "this is not what vice-chairman ruppersberger was hoping to get." why was general petraeus so

passive and sitting back the way he was. it goes back anything i saw in his testimony before our committee. then you accompanied susan rice to see senator ayotte and senator mccain. the question about the fbi. the fbi changed the talking points, that had to be changed. after you leave the government, you go to a firm, beacon global. is af its principals person in the leadership of the state department, one of those victoria nuland was worried about. then you go to cbs news, ben director ofher is cbs news. you can smile and say this is a conspiracy. isolated, i might agree with you. but the totality is why people have questions. you can answer whatever you want. at what time were you told that general petraeus was under investigation? were you aware of the day the talking points were being prepared? timing not remember the

of my awareness of that investigation. that's pretty significant. the director of the cia, you are number two, he is under investigation for criminal charges. it would seem to me that you should have been told about that immediately by the white house or someone in the administration in the event you had to take over at a moment's notice. hishow did that influence decision on the talking points? >> i did not know anything about what was going on with general petraeus until the day before he resigned. >> no one told you anything. nobody in the white house said anything to you. >> no. >> you had no knowledge. >> no, sir. >> when you accompanied susan rice to senator mccain and senator ayotte and senator graham, is a customer fo -- is it customary for cia agents to accompany -- >> i was asked to go --

>> is it customary? >> it was an ad hoc thing. she was not a presidential nominee, she had not been nominated yet. >> that is why she was meeting with the senate. >> she was trying to explain what she said on the sunday shows. i was asked to go with her >> who asked you? >> the white house, denis mcdonough. i was asked to explain the consistency between the talking points -- about the attack evolving from a protest. i was asked to talk about the consistency between the talking points unclassified analysis, that is why i was asked to go and that is what i did. >> the main question you are asked about the fbi, you got wrong. information you volunteer, you got wrong. >> yes. >> two months after the talking points you go up there with susan rice to brief the senators

and the key facts you were wrong. >> i was asked a question, who took al qaeda out of the talking points? the got it wrong and said fbi when the cia was the one to take it out of the talking points. timei was thinking at the was about another change that the fbi had asked for. the fbi made another change because it did not want to be too definitive about who conducted the attack. i got it mixed up. i corrected the record as soon as i found out, within several -- fbihey call the fbi and the protested vigorously. >> nobody from the fbi called me. iey called nobody at the cia, just checked this. they called nobody at the cia. i corrected the record long the fbi was upset. i did not know the fbi was upset until a couple months ago. >> why didn't you check?

if you had two months to prepare, how come within four hours you decided -- >> what happened was, i was i made auestion, mistake, i got in the car to go head oflangley, my congressional affairs, who was with me in the meeting said "michael, i think you got that wrong." i said let's go find out and if i did let's correct the record. we got back to headquarters and had a meeting where i find out that i was indeed wrong. i told my head of congressional affairs to correct the record. within two or three hours he had done so. not within 24, as some people had said. i did not wait until i heard that the fbi was upset before i corrected the record. i corrected the record as soon as i found out. how many people in this town do that? >> i am just saying we have to believe a lot of circumstances and totality to believe you.

i find that difficult to do. i yelled back. -- i yield back. >> mr. morell, can you speculate -- how do you feel about the reasons why we have not been bring the perpetrators to justice? >> that is a good question. it has been eight months since i left my job as deputy director. i have no idea what the status of the investigation is, i have no idea what the status of cia support to that investigation is. i cannot speculate on where things stand, that is a question for the fbi. to my colleagues on the other side who think this is some kind of a witchhunt, the reason we are pressing is because we do not have retribution. we have an ambassador and american heroes who were killed.

they were brutally murdered. we are getting bureaucratic whatever you want to call it nobody can take responsibility. we talked to the fbi and they have one version, i know this is not the cia's job. that is the reason it is not going away. i want to see them brought to justice, i want retribution. i would pull the switch if i could. this is outrageous, that is why the american people are upset and this committee is not going to let it go. that is why most of the american people -- i get this? more -- i get this question more and more. who said this, that. we have people running around who killed americans who are sipping mai tais and we cannot do anything about it. i do not think we should let it go. especially for the memory of

those heroes and for everyone else in the cia. excuse me, mr. morell, you have been there for so many years and seen brave men and women put their lives in harms way time and time again. is this the message we want to send to people on the front lines? all this time can go by and the u.s. cannot bring these thugs to justice? >> i agree with you 100%. there is nobody who wants to bring these guys to justice more than me, you know why. >> i know that and i appreciate it. the problem we have got is that we cannot get anyone in the great united states of america. this government, with all the resources we have to bear, we get all kinds of stories about why this cannot happen. if it was a month later or two months later we might say ok, there might be some reasons why.

this is a long time. this is a long time. i think we send a message to anyone else who wants to pull this kind of a stock that maybe the u.s. is not so serious about all this. i do not blame this on you. for anyone wondering why this is going on, this is why it is going on and should never be let go until we get to the bottom of it. >> no apology necessary. mr. nuñez. >> thank you. mr. morell, just to follow-up. the reason the perpetrators have not been brought to justice is because they are not labeled "al governmenthe u.s. will stop is that right? >> i don't know that. did consider them to be al qaeda, didn't they? >> what we said and what the analysts still believe is that the attackers that night, some

of them were affiliated with al qaeda. you.ank i will switch topics. you participated in a deputies committee on september 12. you do not mention it, but you also participated in a deputies call on the 13th. in both of these, you discussed the benghazi attacks. >> correct. >> who else participated in that call? >> which one? >> on the 1213. >> i do not remember in detail who participated. >> let me be specific, was anyone from traveling on those calls -- let me be specific, was anyone from tripoli on those calls? >> on the 12, i remember. amman, both of the chief of station and the deputy were on.

i think they were under 13, but i do not remember for certain. in our investigation, the first evidence that we have of this mysterious intel product that you brought up on the 13th. >> i do not remember saying that -- briefing the deputies that there was a protest at the deputies meeting on the 13. i would not be surprised at all that i did so. why do i -- >> the way i understand, maybe this will spur your recollection. you got an update on the call from the chief of station and d mr. mcdonough led the call. mr. mcdonough turn to you and you talked about this new stream -- this new product?

>> i do not remember, but i would not be surprised if i breach of the deputies on the 13th that the attack had evolved from a protest. why wouldn't i be surprised, because that very morning we published a piece that said that. director was to represent the views of the cia at the deputies meeting. you, did the deputy national security adviser, denis mcdonough, now the white house chief of staff, did he know about that product before you mentioned it? >> which product, the 13th? >> he would have read that that morning. >> had you conspired beforehand? what? conspired to do >> talks about that the protest

led to the attack. he was not prompting you to announce -- >> this was the cia's judgment at the time. a written product produced, disseminated -- >> that was all they had signed off on. the problem here, this station chief, the base chief, all the in benghazi have all reported that the assault began as a preplanned attack, not a protest. the products you were using on the 13th was cted by every single person on the ground in libya. >> did not know it at the time. whenntil saturday morning the e-mail was sent by the station she. >> what were you talking about

at the deputies meetings? assertion of a protest on the 12th. under 13, any discussion of a protest would have been based on the classified product produced that morning. >> in all the discussion, were you ever involved in your tripoli?ns with >> they were on the screen on the 12th and i believe the 13. they do not say this was not a protest. >> the chairman of this committee went out -- we had significant intelligence product where the chairman of our committee was able to go out and say this was an attack, on the 12th, i believe. you are telling me you are on tripoli sometimes twice a day and you do not know until the 14th or 15 that

everybody on the ground believes this was a preplanned attack? >> we believed from the get-go this was an attack. we believed from the get-go this was a terrorist attack. believeysts did not then or now that there was significant preplanning. >> i understand that, mr. morell. the problem is you have all these conflicting stories. you talked to the senators, they were changed by the fbi, not the white house. later he took responsibility for that. there are other contradictions about whether or not the white house was involved in the talking points. proved to be false, you have an excuse for .verything

when the chairman asked you about sitting next to jim clapper in november 2012, you do not have an excuse, you only have an apology. >> i have an explanation of why i did not say anything in whoonse to the question took al qaeda out of the talking points, because i did not know at the time who did that. you sat in front of our committee in november 2012. you would not have had to be you just saidd what you knew at the time. arco i do not believe that, i would be here anyway. the only thing i would have been able to say at the time was i do not know who removed al qaeda from the talking points. what i can tell you is that i myself played a role in editing those talking points. that was the only thing i could've set of the time. >> my time is expired, thank you

for letting me go over. >> thank you. we morell, on september 11, know there is a fair amount of activity going on at the compound that day. chris stephens is active that day, the turkish ambassador had come to visit the compound on that day. we know from eyewitness testimony on the ground from the turkish ambassador, when he was there and all through the day, there were no sightings and no indications of any gathering of any protesters around the compound around benghazi. there was closed-circuit television, there was the february 17 brigade. there were people all -- there were people offering security. no one at any time prior to the attack gave any indication there was a protest going on at the

compound. rso himself said there was nothing going on. the chief of station of tripoli said he had no indication of any protests going on. the political officers had no indication of anything going on. involved in this situation, no one had any indication of a protest going on. , the obama administration allowed its spokesman, for the first time and in the first public disclosure, five times on the sunday morning shows made a false narrative that a youtube video was the reason that explained that there were protesters, we now know are aberrations and never existed -- we now know they are apparitions

and never existed. this is a big issue. we have e-mailed in front of us, cables and a front of us that do not lie. that is not a conspiracy. the e-mails and the cables are very clear about what we knew and when we knew it. we know that while the attack was going on, there was already from the state department at 4:05 p.m., and alert put out from the state department. of the compound was under attack. the second was at 6:08 p.m. that ansar al-sharia, and al qaeda linked terrorist group operating credit for theed account. we also know that a cable sent out on the 12th reported the participation of islamic militants and make clear that u.s. facilities in benghazi had come under attack. even your first draft from the cia that was just repeat it , the ciay, 11:15 a.m.

and the u.s. government knew that islamist extremists with towels to al qaeda -- with ties to al qaeda participated in the attack. the talking is that points, prepared by your office, when they intersected with the white house -- those organizations within the white house included senior state , seniornt officials national security officials. all of those that you talked to -- all of these -- the only change that happened was senior white house officials. we know from the e-mails, particularly from victoria the date stamp time at 9:24 p.m., ms. nuland wrote

that the problem remained. her superiors were unhappy. they did not resolve all my issues or those of my leadership. from the national security foreign policy further advised the group. the issues will be res olved the following morning at the white house. at the white house, saturday, before ms. rice went on the sunday shows. they were resolved in the favor of the white house. what is really odd here is that the false narrative that was given on sunday morning somehow strangely added out with the view of the white house six weeks before the presidential elections that al qaeda was nearly defeated and the global war on terror was over. everyone on the committee knows that wasn't true. al qaeda was not defeated. everyone on both sides of the aisle knows that the global war on terror was not over. of thes the narrative

white house in the run-up to the election. how weird that that was ultimately reflected in the talking points against all knowledge from people on the ground and knowledge this committee have. that is why we are upset. the american people, from my perspective, were intentionally misled by this administration as to what happened in benghazi. >> can i respond? i would make two points. thatr one, the narrative the attack default spontaneously from a protest was a narrative communityligence analysts believed. not just cia analysts, intelligence community analysts. that turned out to be incorrect. but that is what they believed at the time. there is no politics there whatsoever. that is point number one. point number two, let me give you the facts of what the state department changed and those

talking points and what the white house changed. the white house changed three things -- the first thing the white house changed was to add cairo in front of the word embassy for the sake of clarity. the second thing was to rearrange a couple sentences, purely stylistic. the third thing the white house changed was to change the word consulate to diplomatic post for accuracy. those were the only changes the white house made. the changes the state department made, just two. they also wanted to change the word consulate to diplomatic post for the same reason. the second change was to remove the entire bullet on ansar al-sharia. because state said it was premature to single out a specific group. the cia agreed because the only unclassified evidence we had at 'se time was ansar al-sharia public statement, which they then retracted. the state department and the

white house made five changes only. all of them, in my view, insignificant. >> mr. morell, they do not have to change because you made the changes for them. >> the changes i -- >> that is the point, that is why you are in front of this committee. you made substantive changes for the white house. whether it was on behalf, we do not know. but we know you are the one who made those changes. record,u look at the what you will see is the changes i made were fully consistent with what our analysts believe that the time. period. >> the analysts that were part of the bureaucracy, not the individuals on the ground with eyewitness testimony. through as early as september 12 has sent you a cable that it was not a protest but an attack. those were intentionally ignored. >> do you believe we should have accepted the chief of station's of you without question that it

was a protest? >> i believe that the totality of the information was off he anded -- was obfuscated that there was an intentional misleading of the public. >> if you believe we should accept his version of what happened, you also have to accept his view that it could be the video that motivated the individuals to attack that night. him yesterdayth behind closed doors. he was adamant from the very beginning that this was not a spontaneous protest will stop we heard from him directly yesterday that at no time did he believe it was based upon the video. it is not just him, it is the rso, the chief of base, those who came from the annex, the political officers. all of them agreed to take that versus some press report in one signal. the weight and balance are not even equal. the evidence overwhelmingly pointed to an attack that was al

qaeda or the hottest related -- related.st >> it was not just one sig -- >> more than one? >> there was also reporting from the cia station there was a protest as well as from the department of defense. was -- from the department of defense. there was multiple intelligence pieces. >> thank you, mr. chair. thanks, mr. morel, for being here. thank you for your service to our nation and i will like to thank all of us who work at the cia, those nameless, faceless individuals who continue to work hard to make sure our nation is protect it. like everyone who has said, today, one of the most important things is to make sure this does not happen again. i would point out that something like this probably will not

happen again if all the indicators were given their due attention. reports the of deteriorating condition, the two prior attacks, the assassination attempt on the british ambassador. the fact the brits pulled that in benghazi. -- pulled out of me -- benghazi. the fact that multiple requests were made to the department of the state to increase the security posture were denied. the cia facility where requests for additional personnel and security material were granted. there has been a lot of talk about who made what change and when. perhaps something you may want to bring back to the ic, if you is veryversation simple, microsoft word, track changes, and we could know who made what changes when. the issue of whether this was politically driven -- why was

the cia public affairs and think rationally as congressional affairs officers personal intimately involved in the drafting of the drafting points without having -- it seems more from a public relation to respect to the public perspective. >> two thoughts on that. one is, it is not inappropriate for the office of public affairs in the office of congressional affairs to be involved in this. after all, it was a committee of congress that asks for them. and they were going to be made public their it so, not inappropriate for them to be involved. what didn't go right was the exclusion of a substantive expert in the editing session conducted by those two officers. that was the mistake that was made. >> i guess the follow-on, why wasn't there a subject matter expert that point of time knowing that very request of the committee is to be able to go out and give some type of informs you of what happened? >> i don't know the answer to

that question. at the point that editing session occurred i still was not even aware this committee had made the request to >> some of my colleagues have already referenced the e-mail from victoria nuland met with time that "doestember 14, not resolve the issues of my building leadership." the more concerning e-mail with 39me stamp that same day at 7: from victoria that again kind of leads as down a path that some of the concerns were being driven by perception and political thought rather than substantive thought, and that one says, in part, "the penultimate point could be theed by members to be state department for not paying attention to agency warnings, so why do we want to feedback, either? concerned ...."

this is nothing to be talking aout whether it was demonstration, and the salt, but trying to make sure the department of state was being protected based on what was going to be provided. grant it, this process was taking place before the talking points came to you for final edit but in the totality of looking at all the information provided to the committee we see the state department trying to backtrack or cover themselves from not paying attention to warnings. the follow-on e-mail was from david andamans -- david adams -- the last bullet will read to members like we have been repeatedly warned. we will work with this in the morning. get comments back. that is when the final e-mail came back from her saying it does not address the other concerns. you can see why the information does not necessarily point to giving us the best possible information, but it being filter so as to -- being filtered so as

to protect the department of state. >> i was not aware of any of those e-mails. i never saw any of those e-mails. i made the decision earlier, much earlier than those e-mails were written. i made the decision to take the warning language out. and the directors cheech -- chief of staff was standing there, and the reason why i thought it had to go -- and that was long before the state department ever wrote those e-mails. >> understanding it happened on a parallel pathway. you did not know they had -- today, not knowing it was taken up by you because the draft had not been edited by you with the e-mail came out. they were still making the same request. >> i've made the decision to take the warning language out long before i ever edited a talking point but today before. >> did the department of state know they would take it out? >> probably not. >> it takes me back to the

e-mail from the department of state being concerned about .ercent should -- perception >> but to be fair to them, though, for us to have said in unclassified talking points that you could use that we warned and warned and warned and not give them the opportunity to say, here is what we did in response to those warnings, i felt was not appropriate. >> i appreciate that. but the fact is, they did nothing in response. >> i did not know that -- >> that is for another discussion -- >> and i thought there would be plenty of time to have that discussion and as it turns out that has been plenty of time to have the discussion. >> i yield back. >> thank you, mr. chairman. there have been suggestions on the other side of this investigation is political and we continue to process this after 19 months. i remind everyone there is an investigation across the capital that has been going on six years

on the cia. tens of million dollars that continues this day. so i think it is perfectly appropriate for this committee to get the facts of this incredibly important matter, not only for the lost lives but this is about trust in the cia, to, and trust in the cia's role when it gives information to the committee. is an agency the american people needs to be able to rely on, two. is go in the inter-agency review process at all? we asked the cia for information all the time. multiple occasions. probably much to folks of millions and we are always asking for information. why did this go through the entire nation -- it's agency presses? why is a political appointee involved at all? >> of this is a very good question. first of all, it was very important that we coordinated the talking points with the rest

of the intelligence community because this was an intelligence community judgment, as i mentioned earlier. that'sd not do something without coordinating with those helping to come to the judgment. provide it we had to to the fbi and the department of justice because they had just opened an investigation into the death of four americans, and it was very important we not say anything in and unclassified fashion that could put that investigation at risk. number three, we thought it important to share the talking points with the state department who had just lost officers. and number four, we were getting talking points to a congressional committee to talk about a very, very important national security issue and it is important to let the white house know when you are going to do that. that is why we went through the interagency process. >> this is what we are up against. every single change that gets

made makes this thing plain-vanilla rather than getting to the heart of what was going on. it happens at a time when you have not acted in a role, more of a public affairs officer then intelligence. that is why you are getting the questions you are getting today. i think that is a legitimate line of inquiry as to whether political actors will involve putting up talking points to this committee that were requested not from the state department, not from the white house, but from the central intelligence agency. >> the national security staff was the organization at the white house that coordinated on these talking points. they are not a political entity. this many was not intentionally misled and i think you also used were deliberately. do you think we were in a virtually misled? what's -- inadvertently misled? >> i think looking back at things he could've done better,

there is no doubt in my mind that we lead people to think about this in not exactly the right way. and the example i would give. i would give two examples. the example i would give is not using the right language when we involvedattack spontaneously from the protests, because that gave the impression the protesters became the attackers. we never thought that it we could have written that sentence better. when i sat here and did not speak up when director clapper was asked a question by the chairman, who took out al qaeda, i should have said something. i didn't. i did not live. i did not mislead. but i could have done better. >> that is a long answer to a yes or no question. where we misled? >> no. >> i have a different view. you said we still don't know the

motivation of the folks that evening. >> correct. you want to know that until you actually get them. >> i think you are focusing on the micro. we know they were ok to -- al qaeda affiliated and i think i know precisely why they attacked and killed americans. to sit here and say we don't know the motivation of al qaeda when they kill americans i think the disingenuous. focusing on the micro of the motivation of an integral -- individual at the moment and not getting into the organizational behavior. >> not everyone who was there was associated with al qaeda. this was a mix of groups. this was a mix of people. some of whom were affiliated with al qaeda. know exactly why the al qaeda guys were there. i don't know why the rest of them were there and i don't know why they decided to did attack when they did. i don't know what motivated the

timing. and we won't know that until we talk to them. >> i yield back, mr. chairman. but mr. rooney? >> thank you, mr. chairman. i would like you, if i could, change direction to look at based -- a little bit. i think we have gone at nausea him and quite frankly we have all these pages of what the e-mails were back and forth, what you testified to, what you intended. i don't think that you are a liar. i don't and you are a dishonest person. i do think there are some mistakes you said you made. there are clearly political things going on in these e-mails, whether people want to acknowledge that or not. it is what it is. we are all human. you might say the people who work or the national security operation in the white house are not political people. we all know that they are. they just are. be democrats or republican administration, it is the truth that people consider how is this going to look in november, just as the president

and secretary clinton said they were against the surge in iraq or political reasons. the same thing i think is going on here. but besides that, one of the things -- you made mistakes in this whole process is, you said you were in a mann -- aman that they question mark >> yes, i was. >> were you at the embassy? where did you say you were at that point? >> in the evening i was at dinner with liaison partners in amman. >> when you talk about how you relied on your analyst to get whatever formation you could garner from benghazi immediately after, as opposed to necessarily the station chief on an equal footing, say this event happened in amman while you were there and there was a station chief, as you were seeing it, would you call washington and ask an

analyst that in washington what is happening in amman even though you were there and the station chief was there? it seems like an equal if not greater weight would be on the person who is actually on the ground. >> the way the process works is the people on the ground collect information and they send that information to washington. the analysts take that information, which is not the totality because the analysts are getting information from all sorts of places, not just from people on the ground. the analysts look at the totality of the information and they come to a judgment. and that is cia's official position. >> do you think that is a good way to go. >> i do think that is a good way to go. and let me say something else. -- chiefs ofion station, are encouraged, if they have a different view, to write

their own analysis and disseminate it to policymakers. they are encouraged to do that. >> let me switch, if i could -- you also talk about the military that showed up the next day at the annex. what is the military -- who is the military? >> two military officers from tripoli who volunteered to go with our officers to benghazi, individuals are absolute heroes. they were on the roof when those mortars hit and they successfully removed the injured and the dead from that roof under fire. they have been decorated, rightfully so. and i am grateful that they volunteered to go to benghazi that night. because had they not, more people would have died. >> can i ask you a question in regard to -- this is a little outside of your lame -- the annex and your personnel that

were there, what americans should expect in the future should something like this happening again and try to avoid it? it is really what i think all of us want to get to, to not have four people get killed. what do people on the ground that that's what can people on the ground assigned in those places can expect if they go and serve their? ground can people on the assigned to those places can expect? this was not designed to be a military special forces response --that of it distance responders were in benghazi that day at a hotspot. whatever. what -- my question is, at the died,mbassador stevens which was shortly after midnight, and the amount of time that went on, the mail -- the amount of hours that went on until the two military guys showed up and the mortar of the

air next stop, we were told there was not enough time for a military response to get there, but the one question i continued to have and the one question we need to know moving forward so we can keep our agents safe and embassies states, is how do they know at the time that ambassador killed -- the administration, secretary of state, you -- how did they know it was going to end so there would not be enough time to get a military response there? it ended at dawn and they were hoping it would end at dawn, the people at the annex. but we had absolutely no idea it would be the case. what it it went on 8, 10, 12 hours. don't feel thei administration was ever going to benghazi andse to put boots on the ground and another middle eastern country because of whatever perception that might have political or otherwise. but for them to just say that was not enough time to get anybody -- how did they know it was going to end -- when it was

going to and? so, i can't tell you about the decision-making and discussions of the department of defense because i am totally unaware of those. but what i can tell you is that there were three attacks that night. there was the attack on the diplomatic facility in benghazi. when our officers showed up at anddiplomatic facility rescued the state department officers and took them back to the cia annex, there was a second attack and it occurred immediately upon return to our base. that attack lasted about a half-hour hour or so, and that attack was repulsed. then things were quiet. things were quiet for a number of hours. three and a half or four hours. but things were acquired before what i think happened -- things were quiet before what i think happen. they went away and got heavier weapons and came back for another go at it. there was a period of time in

which it appeared this was over. understand it doesn't answer your question completely, but i just offer that context it >> is to chairman, i appreciate. but for the safety of people like us in the future, just because there is a gap in time, no one -- knowing no one is coming from the united states of america is very disconcerting. more second? one i think you asked the most important question is, what can we do going forward to minimize the chances of this happening again. be able toer guarantee it will not happen again. there are always risks. but i think that the things we need to do to make sure this doesn't happen again is, one, i improveed to intelligence collection. in places like benghazi where there is real risk, we need to make sure we have battlefield kind of awareness. i think this committee knows in

the days leading up to the attack in benghazi we were about to install a special system at our base in benghazi that would have gave us better intelligence. we need better intelligence. two, we need to make sure security posture -- posture of these facilities is as secure as they can be and we need to make sure the military is always postured in a way where it can respond as quickly as possible. >> mr. thornberry? morell, in addition to the reasons you were discussing with mr. lobiondo and mr. rooney on why this is important, there is another area i want to ask you about. we have heard for some time involvement of the national security council staff ofday to day running military operations, intelligence operations, around the world.

about is gates talked very explicitly in his memoirs and his anger at the micromanagement coming from the same staffers at the white house, and talked about secretary clinton's view of the , and others have written about this frustration. you served as deputy director of the cia, at the director of the cia. you experience such frustrations of secretary gates and clinton and others? >> as you know, the central intelligence agency conducts some extremely sensitive operations. and i routinely discussed those operations with mr. brennan and with mr. mcdonough. and i would get out -- asked a lot of questions. i never felt i was being micromanaged there nor have i ever felt i've been micromanaged here. experience or have

knowledge of national security council staffers directly calling chiefs of station around the world and being down into the day-to-day involvement? >> that didn't happen, to my knowledge. the interaction between the national security staff and the central intelligence agency was almost exclusively -- not largely -- but almost exclusively from mr. brennan and mr. mcdonough to me. is, isess i'm wondering that because of your level? because we have all these e-mails showing a variety of people under them that were involved in these talking points and other things. i guess where i am going is, the light that shines on the day-to-day operations, what does it tell us about not only how this administration works but the bigger institutional dangers. for a second.

cia, 33 years. >> yes, sir. >> would you say that the cia is more independent today than it was when you enter, or less? from micromanagement, political pressure. i do not mean be republican or democrat. but the influence of the bosses at the white house. >> very hard for me to say because when i started in 1980, i had no contact, association, interaction, with the white house. i was 21 years old. it was really a question of my time working with the bush administration and with the obama administration. honestly, sir, i did not see a huge difference in the extent of interest and questions about what it is we were saying analytically and doing operationally between the two administrations.

>> some of us were around nearly as long as you and remember iran-contra and the difficulty when operations are run out of the white house. --raises grave concerns institutional concerns. as important as this incident is, even beyond. articulate the candidate comments of some people will have served time in the administration i think raise that -- particularly, the candidate comments of some people who have served time in the administration. >> thank you, mr. chairman. to clear up a couple of things. mr. morell, your testimony that things were quiet for three hours is in direct conflict with things that we have heard from folks who were there at inx on the ground during that time period. with president

bush in florida and you immediately came up with the conclusion that this was osama -- i am notl qaeda asking you to go back through your thought process, but what gave you the ability to know that? timecause i knew at the that there were only two countries who were capable of doing something like what happened on 9/11. iran and iraq. and i thought they would have everything to lose and nothing to gain by doing so. and i knew there was one other organization in the world who had that capability, and it was too i came to that conclusion. >> between february and the attack is between february of one to 12 and the attack, we have approximately 4000 pages of intelligence reporting that came out of the cia.

i am sure you are aware of all of that. >> absolutely. of the attackre on the british ambassador, the threeoss, the two or bombings that were at the facility. 11, the was september 11th anniversary of 9/11. thought not in your seen andhen of having been aware of these 4000 pages of intelligence, especially the assessment that the cia put out about al qaeda didming stronger in libya, you not go through that thought process and come up with immediately in your mind that w ho was capable of doing this,

who would want to do it on the , especiallysary with your knowledge of all of those intelligence reports? the cia sent out a cable to in thetions and bases days before the anniversary saying, hey, pay attention, it is the anniversary. this would be a great time for these guys to hit us. and please share this with your liaison partners and please share this with the chief of mission and with rso's. did go out.ing that is something we always paid attention to, was the anniversary of 9/11. absolutely. your thought process never said it could be al qaeda? >> no. said from the get

go al qaeda was involved in the attack. >> and they said it was involved in the attack. >> but you took it out of the talking points -- >> i did not take it out. ie people have alleged personally took out al qaeda from the talking points. that is not true. >> who did? officers fromf our office of congressional affairs and office of public affairs took it out. i did not take it out. i did not know it was in there when i looked at the talking points. taking it outhat was the right thing to do. let me explain why. because the only way we knew that anybody who was involved in that attack that night was associated with al qaeda was from classified sources. in, the director would have to be classified

information. and i don't think that is what this committee was asking for. that this know committee was not asking for us to declassify anything. so it turns out in retrospect that taking an out was the right thing to do from a sources and methods perspective. >> so the classified was that it was al qaeda -- i'm confused here. >> the only way, sir, the only way we knew that some of the people who were involved in the attack that night were associated with al qaeda was from classified sources. did those classified sources tell you it was a demonstration? >> there were classified sources who told us it was a demonstration. i am not sure if they were the same sources or not. >> if you look at the whole picture, that i think the whenity of people look at,

those talking points were edited, it edited in favor of the administration's philosophy of how they wanted to be portrayed in libya. now mr. brennan is now the director of the cia -- when he was a national intelligence adviser, i guess, or security advisor at the white house, and mcdonagh was and now he is the chief of staff, it is a lot ofind of get to information about maybe what they were looking at as national security advisor versus what kind of job they have now. your 33k you for years of service. >> just want to clarify, how -- howe term al qaeda what that is close classified ok, if wend secondly, could get there, you also took out islamic extremists.

>> i took out the word islam in front of extremists. islamic in front of extremists. for two reasons. most importantly, i took it out because we were dealing with demonstrations across much of the muslim world as a result of the video. and the last thing i wanted to anything to further inflame those passions. that is why i took the word islamic out. it was a risk judgment. the second reason i took about is what other kind of extremists are there in libya. >> for clarification of the you haveut in the memo in front of you you through the line through the sentence. that being said, there are indications islamic extremist participated and the line goes through all of that. that was a mistake and you

see in the final talking points, that that is back in the talking points. how does mentioning al qaeda disclose classified sources? chairman,was told, is the only way we knew that is from classified sources. that there was nothing unclassified that said that al that some of these individuals were associated with al qaeda. >> i have to tell you, that confuses me greatly. in all the conversations we have a committee and talking about events around the world, that one -- i am just not following that logic, how that would disclose sources. was in there. >> i understand. i am just trying to understand the logic. >> explaining why -- day sayingp the next it had the hallmarks of an al

qaeda attack. i don't think i was disclosing classified sources in doing it. anyway, i just wanted to clarify that. mr. nuñez? i want to go back to the intelligence product you referenced on the morning of the 13th. --specifically, who came up with the product? in our office of terrorism analysis. >> cia only? analysts -- analysts from the office of terrorism analysis drafted a piece and then coordinated it across the intelligence community. >> you're telling me it is like -- approved >> i don't know exactly which ones. you will have to ask the agency for that. but it was coordinated in the intelligence community, and if he would- dni or he or

say it was an intelligence community view. >> we know the boss was. do we know who the analysts were? analyst to focus on extremist groups, terror groups in north africa, and i believe it is those analysts who worked on that product. >> when you look into this, you said there were more data point to that shows there was a protest. i think you used the data points. >> what i said in the written there were a that handful or a dozen or so reports, both press reports and intelligence reports, saying there was a protest. >> hold on, let me just clarify. the dozen you referenced were mostly press reports. there were only a few outliers as it related to sig in -- and

the reporting that we had at the time, there were more hum in t then sin int was that there were not protest then did. -- the band did. -- than did. >> not true. at the time the analysts wrote the piece on the 13th the only information they had about the protest was that there was a protest. there was not a single piece of information that there was not a protest. that is what i was told by the analysts. >> you may not have known about it, but all of the eyewitnesses on the ground --e-mail, live chat. analysts did the not have access to what the people on the ground saying at the time. like at some point to go down to the cia and the with those analysts and let them explain it. >> i am sure they would welcome

it. >> i do not understand. it sounds like somebody got thrown under the bus. when one of the cia personnel survivors, who is going to retire leaves the cia, do you know what they told me? leavingd me they are the cia because they don't want to be left to die again. ok? , and i think it should set you. >> if that is the way they feel, it upsets me. >> here is another problem with this. as it relates to the personnel. personnel, they have the right to make a complaint with the oig. right? filedwere oig complaint related to these benghazi attacks, weren't there? >> i am not aware. >> you are not aware that there were complaints filed to the oig?

know, i don't remember. i am not aware of specifics. i am not aware of when they happened. you have this. i will ask these for the record. did you ever asked the cia and or ava buckley not to conduct an investigation? >> no. him at all talked to about such an investigation? what may have briefed the director at some point but i do not recall. >> you said earlier you did not know about the complaint. >> he may have briefed us but i don't remember. >> have you ever talk to david petraeus about the oig investigation? >> not that i remember. murderedare four americans that you would think when cia own personnel file complaints, the oig should follow up and an investigation. >> i believe so, too. why didn't a question mark >> i don't know. you will have to ask david. >> i yield back.

>> thank you, mr. chair. thank you, mr. morell. i want to clarify to make sure i understood what you said. whether it was the information from the people on the ground, the station chief, friends and, when of information that a cable sent september 12 i the cia --tion chief in libya eyewitness confirmed participation of islamic militants and made clear that u.s. intelligence facilities in benghazi have come under attack. that was clearly sent by the station chief. we know the rso on the ground, the chief of days, the political officers, thegrs tripoli chief, all of them on the grounds that the same thing, but i thought i just heard you say, mr. morell, that the information taken from eyewitnesses on the ground wasn't given to your analysts. that they looked at the press reports, the intelligent

products -- is that true? >> what you have to understand, is that the information didn't come all at one time. the information came in pieces over time. and when the analysts wrote their piece on the 12th, that 13th, thehed on the information that they had said it was a protest. they had no information that said there was no protest veered there may have been people on the ground who knew there was no protest, but they had not yet been interviewed and those interviews had not yet been disseminated. in fact, they were not disseminated for some time. they were not disseminated until after the analysts changed their judgment about the protest. so there is a flow of information that is really important to keep in mind i do look about how the analysts are trying to do their job. >> but again, it seems like the

-- is interesting. if you have analysts are islamic news of sources and they can put out a propaganda narrative, if you will, then of course whatever your analysts report would be what the propaganda news of sources say. what we heard behind closed doors from people on the núñez justs mr. said, it was an outlier report, one, that this was in fact a protest. , the guyg else he got on the ground, is that this was an attack, and islamic inspired attack. what i am saying is that if your analysts are only looking and they are narrowing their focus to such an extent that they are only going to see what want them to see,

then none of them -- none of us should be too surprised that that is what they get as a product. served as a committee and the american people if we don't take the totality of the information about something this important so we get it right. t just in the immediate two days afterwards. the president of the united states two weeks later in front of the united nations continued the false narrative that it was a youtube video that was responsible for what happened. as a matter of fact, that filmmaker want to jail for a year, and he was the only otheroat while the criminals in benghazi are still wandering the streets. he is the only one who ever has gone to jail. is it no wonder that the american people are absolutely upset about this -- because how interesting that at the you when the number one agenda

item for the organization for islamic cooperative was to criminalize any speech in any country that somehow up so -- mohammed?prophet why is it that what the president before was perla to the agenda. and it has nothing to do with the facts on the ground reported by the eyewitnesses on the ground. it seems to me that what you analysts andyour not take into account the truth. that is what gives us problems. >> so, ma'am, i just want to clear something up here. really important. there is an implication in what you're saying that the analysts were aware of the eyewitness accounts when they did their wrote it on the 13th. they were not aware. not aware of the eyewitness accounts.

i just wanted to clear that up. >> thank you, mr. chairman. againrell, i'm going back to this intelligence report you used september 13 that you had in your possession on september 13 -- extremists capitalize on benghazi protest. you were quick to point out that there was no mention of a video in that. >> wrecked. >> -- >>: wrecked. >> you fail to mention there were two other cia pieces produced on the 12th, both mentioned the "recently released inflammatory video." were you aware of these two products that were published on september 12? inprobably did i don't know what context those references were rate -- were made. >> if the reference to the benghazi protests were not related to the video, what type

of protests that your analysts believe it was in reference to? view on what motivated the attackers overnight changed over time. was they said on the 13th that the attackers -- >> you can't have it both ways. recs are you going to let me answer the question? >> i am just saying you can't have it both ways. >> i am not trying to have it both ways. i am trying to explain the facts to you. on the 13th, the analysts said that what motivated the attackers was what happened in cairo. that they saw the guys go over the fence into the embassy compound in cairo and wanted to do the same thing in benghazi. they later added another possible motivation, which was the one here wii's call for revenge for the death of a l-libi. those are the two motivations the analyst talked about, period. i don't understand -- >> why do your analysts ignored

-- they went along with the i protest,est, al-lib but why did they ignore the other two pieces that talked about the video and they do not include that in this analysis? >> i don't know the answer to that, sir. >> i yield back, mr. chairman. >> your time is out. i just want to clarify again for the public, i think this is important. the talking points are one of the data points and what concerns the committee as we look at all the classified materials going forward, that the narrative may not have been for a political campaign, which is beyond your position, mr. that narrative continued on afterword and subsequent. so we have seen the fact -- we have seen the pulling back of certain counterterrorism programs that we believe leave extremists onmic

the battlefield in the way we wouldn't do before. we have seen the very fact that we have a number of individuals who have been left on the battle yield, we know participated in a terrorist act that killed americans in benghazi, something that wouldn't happen before. and our concern is trying to understand all of this, and that narrative, and did that narrative lead into what israel policy today, which is why you see members so frustrated about what are we doing to bring these people that -- back. and if there were those involved in the decision who did not believe terrorism is alive and well that poses a threat, you can see that narrative actually being implemented in a way that i think is dangerous to the united states, and that's why i think you see the concern of this committee. and, by the way, behind closed doors in this committee, there is bipartisan concern, as even salt today, about moving forward , about things that are not

being done that we used to do that i do believe put america in a position to be more vulnerable. that is why i think you see the interest and the emotion today. i want to, again, thank you for your candid testimony today. i want to thank you for your 34 -- 33 years. someone told when you started when you were 11. i think your wife floated that to us. we do appreciate it. thank you for being here voluntarily. >> you're welcome. good to be here. ave spoken at h length about counterterrorism, both deeply, are deeply concerned about the threat to this country and where it is headed. and i really appreciate that. >> thank you. for mr. chairman, thank you this hearing. i think it is important to have these hearings. i do want to say to my republican members that i respect each and every one of you do have a point of view, and i think the reason this committee has been so bipartisan is both democrats and

republicans might not agree but we respect the fact someone has another point of view. and we try to come together for what is right for the american people. i think where i am personally -- not speaking for their members need to continue to have investigations when there are issues important as this and the american people are looking for answers. my point was that we have had separate congressional hearings, we have had thousands of hours spent on investigation, and yet we are still looking for the issue of whether or not the fact that we have, the fact that we have before us, were politically motivated. i think that is really where this is coming down to. and there are some people who could think -- and i am sure people of both side to think it is or is not, but the chief asked -- maybe i am speaking as a lawyer -- but we have to deal with facts. i think you present yourself well in that regard. i also want to talk about mr. lobiondo. i respect him a lot. a patriotic american.

they travel to dangerous places to be the oversight he needs to do. that is where i am basically is what he is talking about. we need to make sure that the focus is finding these bad guys he killed americans. data is where our focus is. conducting the majority of the investigation, working with other people, and that may be is another area we need to look. but at this point, where the evidence is, we have to somehow decide where we are going from here. highestuld be the priority. if in fact -- and i have a lot of respect for mr. pompeo was that the investigation will last more than six years. i know the chairman, the way he works. a former fbi agent and i was former investigative prosecutor. if there is any evidence that would come to a different factual conclusion than we have come to now we have to look at that. but we have to prioritize. with so many issues. russia-china threat, cyber threat, terrorism threat. it goes on and on. we only have a certain amount of hours in a day. it comes to a time, where do we

go here? do we keep getting these hearings where we have not seen -- i have not seen anything new that gets to the issue. if there is evidence of that we will try to deal with it. in conclusion, i also have a lot of respect for you. i know you served your country well. it is unfortunate sometimes allegations that get out there. but you came before us. you did not back away. and i think your factual statements hopefully will do a lot to clear up some of the allegations that have been out there. thank you for your service. >> people can find the statement by tomorrow or even later today they will have you the statement online for public review. the meeting is now adjourned. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014] [captioning performed by national captioning institute]

>> during this month, c-span is pleased to present our winning entries in this year's a student cam video documentary competition. cunningham is c-span's annual competition that encourages middle and high school students to think critically about issues. students were asked to create their video answering the question -- what is the most important issue or u.s. congress should consider in 2014? one of our second prize winners is mckinleigh lair, a junior from jenks high school in oklahoma. she thinks congress should consider the issue of illegal immigration. >> forehand, inside out. ok? since the age of eight i have been passionate about tennis. i have a high national ranking and i have won a state championship.

as a.m.not be as good today without the help of my coaches, because my most recent quote is from argentina and i became interested in the impact of immigration on american life, not just athletics but sciences and art. my personal research led me to conclude that the most important issue facing congress today is immigration reform. the impact of immigration on the arts, i visited an internationally acclaimed dance --.any tulda ballet ballet.a ♪ tulsah a company like ballet, our dancers come from all different countries and different nationalities. >> we might be a small ballet company in the middle of america, but we are a world class organization. andire choreographers stagers and dancers from around

the world. we have 25 dancers and 16 of them are foreign. so immigration plays a big role in our company. our spanish dancers, they give a different emotion onstage then maybe the chinese dancers do. but when everyone comes together, it is really beautiful, and they feed off of each other and they learn from each other. >> to look at the impact of sciences, i visited a chemistry lab at the university of tulsa. >> the united states is number one in chemistry. of immigrants working as a graduate student or or facultypost docs members. most of the graduate students and postdocs of any school are going to be foreigners. so these students, when we get them here, they contributed by working in research labs, and pharmaceutical companies, and chemical companies.

it results in the betterment of society. meeting these incredibly talented people, i was astonished to learn that even they can be discriminated against simply because of where they are from. think one of the most negative aspects of our current immigration system is the labeling. we talk about bullying in school and name-calling and how wrong that is, but we as adults, as leaders, as lawmakers, as elected representatives, we are the worst of the lot and bringing back the word illegal to label a group of people as illegals is very damaging. it is a scarlet letter. that is what not to germany did to the jews. >> i do not know what the legal meant. before taking drivers ed, and i cannot apply for jobs, i needed social security number and i couldn't. again, i couldn't.

>> they are not criminals. they are not here to change the bloodline. they are not here to change the culture or language or food. >> i remember elementary school, pledging allegiance to the flag. not knowing i was pledging allegiance to a flag i was not a part of. my parents, yes, they crossed , most people call a crossing illegally. i see it as something heroic. they sacrificed something to give me a better life. that is something you can't take away. here, student who came she was the valedictorian of her senior class. she came here as an outstanding student. she was taken away like a thief in the middle of the night and taken to a country she really knew nothing about. to me, that's un-american. that is not what the statue of liberty says. ,> you're hungry, you're tired

especially of poor -- you have to give them food stamps question mark for that about a. width to support their children? and obamacare? they need to erase that from the statue of liberty, just like they closed ellis island -- that is why the statue was there. you are literally welcoming boats. , mr. corker, mr. cowan -- >> i was thrilled when the u.s. senate by overwhelming majority did what was right for america. they passed an immigration bill. >> they got together and they came up with that 845 page bill. it was great. overwhelmingly the senate passed it in june. >> the bad news is that bill is now sitting in the house of representatives. they have not been able to move it forward. they have not been able to get agreement. >> we have no intention of ever going to conference on the senate bill.

>> that valedictorian who happens to be undocumented should be given the opportunity to go to college and as a reward for getting that education and being a productive member of this society, our society -- because they aren't going back home -- home is here. so whenm their papers, that brain surgeon graduates, they can go to work. and save some lives. >> if only the dream act was passed, part of me would be happy but the other part of me would not be ok because my -- separatingt families is not the solution to sell the broken immigration system. >> we have to be visionaries, and this is why i think the current congress has failed miserably, because the people that we have elected, they don't have a vision. i can't see past their noses. >> they are not all valedictorian, they were not -- were not all brought in by their parents, for everyone that is a valedictorian there is another hundred of their that way 130

pounds and they have calves beside the cantaloupes because they are hauling pounds of marijuana. >> is is not immigration. this is an invasion. >> we are really shooting ourselves in the foot when we say to some of the most talented people in the world that we are not going to let you in, we're not going to let you stay here, we will not let you become part of the united states. that is the exact opposite of what we have done through most of our history. we would be harming ourselves to follow this kind of policy. >> to watch all of the winning videos and to learn more about our competition, go to www.c-span.org and click on it itcam and tell us -- click on studentcam and you can post your comment on the facebook page or at tweet us using the #studentcam. >> houses back in this morning