america stronger. in this century, we are competing for investment, brainpower, for economic development on a global basis. we need them as much as they need us. >> governor barbour, do you have a follow-up? >> i don't think there is a single silver bullet. i can't resist talking about one subject we haven't talked about which i think is really important. today it was announced that the united states government is going to quit taking applications for h-1b visas. these are the visas for their very specially skilled -- we only have 65,000 of them plus another 20,000 for people with more than a bachelor's degree, a doctorate or masters degree. science, technology,

engineering, elite of the world who want to come here. they announce they're going to quit taking applications. they started last week. the window was open from april 1 till yesterday. 85,000 were more than apply for. when you have a system that denies these young people to best -- the best and the brightest in the world to come here, go to school, and then we won't let them stay. so they go home and start a factory that employs 800 people. if we had let them, they would've gone to memphis and started a factory that employs 800 people that they would put -- [applause] have -- peoplell

think about texas border. we are in one of the high tech centers of the world in this town where we sit. they need, as the mayor said, they need this talent here. it is talent we are denying to ourselves. i would urge all of you to just do a little bit of research about how many jobs are created by the average person that gets in h-1b visa to come to the united states. in a matter of years, it is multiples. there are like four or six americans working for every one of those immigrants that came near. yet, our government's policies, we don't have enough of these visas to lasting whole week in the supply chain. >> excellent last thought. i did run a little bit over but i will like to thank you very much, governor barbara. -- barbour. thank you, mayor castro.

thank you very much. [applause] >> on the possibility of congressional action on immigration legislation, brendan buck issued the following statement -- >> during this month, c-span is

pleased to present our winning entries in this years studentcam documentary competition. it is c-span's annual competition that encourages medical -- the middle and high school students think critically about issues. students were asked to base their video on the question -- what is the most important issue congress to consider in 2014? sophomores,-winning max foley-keene, anna o'driscoll, and paul bass are from montgomery blair high school in silver spring, maryland. they believe congress should make filibusters reform their most important issue. >> and many of us recognize the iconic visual of a filibuster. i will speak until i can no longer speak. >> i am not going to leave this body until --

>> many people don't know there have been hundreds of filibusters in the past few years alone. there is an invisible filibuster that is bought congress to complete halt. this is the silent filibuster. him0 votes to get confirmed. >> the necessary 60 votes. must returncongress the senate to democratic roots. before talking about the filibuster today, we have to look into the senate passed. the filibuster was born in 1806. aaron burr gave a speech in front of the senate. >> it came about quite accidentally because of the role change that was came about by

the aaron burr. >> he told the senators they should remove the previous question motion. it would quite simply, if passed after having, removed the previous motion question, senators realize there was no way to end debate. they realize that they kept talking, they could stop all business in the senate. thus, the talking filibuster was born. the filibuster was not in the constitution and the founders would've most likely been opposed to the idea. many of our nation's founders hated the idea of a super majority of congress which is what the filibuster has required. >> it will be scandalized to see the way business fails to proceed in the senate today. they have lost a sense of i partisan -- bipartisan cooperation to get things to

move forward. ofin 1917, after the urging president woodrow wilson, the senate adopted eight rule -- a rule. it is a role to would end debat e. it took 67 votes to end debate on an issue which means if 67 senators wanted a filibuster do and that they would pass it. needed were votes lower than 60 votes. this is the threshold that is used today. of u.s.ng period history, the filibuster was a rarely used procedure. there were only 16 filibusters. remained a rarely used procedure throughout most of the 20th century. lyndon baines johnson faced only one filibuster. hay reread has faced more than 400 -- harry reid has faced more than 400.

the silent filibuster is used when 41 or more senators merely threatened to filibuster. this is different from the talking filibuster in which one person takes turn talking for as long as he or she can without eating, drinking, or going to the bathroom. if you have been watching the news, you might've noticed that almost all bills are described needing 60 votes to pass. filibuster meaning that 60 or more senators must vote to end debate on a belt because there was a threat of a filibuster. senators time to vote, are taking time away from working on the issues that are important to our country today and will deeply affect our future. the use of the silent filibuster has becoming worse under the presidency of barack obama. the republicans use it much more. since barack obama has been president, it has been filed more than 470 times. the filibusters

increase, the number of bills passed in congress has decreased. import legislation dealing with the pressing concerns of the nation have been stopped because of the filibuster. without the filibuster, the president's job act, the dream act for illegal immigrants would have been passed to the senate. you support these proposals, they should all have had the chance to be voted on and passed by the majority of the people's representatives, not obstructed by the minority. the senate deserves the chance to conduct the business of the nation. so, what can be done to reform the filibuster and make the senate a more democratic institution? there are many proposals on the table. oregon is aley of leading advocate for reform. >> we get rid of the filibuster on motions to simply proceed to a bill. you are wasting a ton of time. we get rid of conference

committees. if the house has passed the bill and the senate has passed a different version, the two sides should get together immediately. we should change the current 60 votes required to 41. people have to vote affirmatively and if they vote to end the debate, the 41 have to be on the floor. this creates a talking filibuster rather than a silent super majority barrier. a talking filibuster means the american people can see something other than a quorom call. when they see that talking filibuster, they can decide whether the folks that are doing that or heroes -- are heroes or bums. they can weigh in with their own senators. >> there are many reasons people oppose it. some believe strongly in the tradition of the filibuster and other seeing as a necessary

check on the majority. >> it turns into a suction at the point where everybody has said their piece. using them to stop the obama administration from doing what it would like to do. >> many are freighted to reform the system because they are afraid they will lose their power went to become the minority. reform is something that could positively affect the senate for years to come. they must require the minority to be present. congress, filibuster reform is the most important issue for you to address in the 2014 session. >> to watch all the winning videos and to learn more about our competition, go to c-span.org and click on studentcam. tell us what you think about these issues. post your comment on studentcam's facebook page or tweet us.

policy in on how u.s. asia is affected by russia's annexation of crimea. a preview on the president's upcoming trip to asia. discussedstrategist candidates in 2014 and 2016. los angeles times reporter looks ahead to the federal reserve's next move on monetary policy. annie snyder discusses a proposal from the epa. it would amend the clean water act to give the epa jurisdiction. a new study shows that 18% of adults with internet access have important personal information stolen last year. we will take your calls and you can join the conversation at a spoke and twitter. -- at facebook and twitter.

>> i am a loyal duke alum. i didn't do this to hurt duke .>> thank you for coming this hurt. there was a tremendous amount of passion about the story. to amazonave to go and see already that i've reviews and1 star the book is not even been out a week. not many of those one star review writers have read this book. my last book was about goldman sachs. this is in another realm altogether. williamr and duke alum cohan takes a look at the duke lacrosse scandal. >> a discussion about russia's

annexation of crimea and how it could affect u.s. foreign-policy in the region. from the brookings institution, this is over an hour and a half. >> thank you for coming this morning. at brookings we like to think and we like to tell our supporters that are unique strength is our ability to use our breadth of analysts to integrate insights and merge with a global picture that can inform the uniquely global concerns of u.s. foreign-policy. in our view, the crisis in ukraine is an episode which merits that type of analysis in part their its effects on u.s. foreign-policy.

we think it has the potential to have some impacts throughout the world. people are arty asking what the crisis in ukraine means for efforts to make peace in syria for efforts to de-nuclear ice -- de-nuclearize iran. what this crisis will mean for the pivot to asia or what ever you want to call it. we decided that we're going to try to set the stage for the president's trip to asia by trying to connect the issues of east asia here and ask how the crisis in ukraine might affect what the president hears and does on his trip next week. we have, in my humble and very

biased opinion, the perfect panel with which to do that. on my far right is steve pifer, a senior fellow of europe and georgia of her arms control program. he is a career foreign service officer, retired. among his many posts the most relevant is the former ambassador to ukraine. next to me is michael o'hanlon, a director of research here at foreign-policy studies and has published many books, more than i have actually read. even this week his most recent book is out which is resolving relation to the 21st century. he could wait for the movie but i think you probably should not. of my other side is ken

lieberthal. he was. the director of our it torrent and china center and a professor at the university of michigan. he is also the signature chipper asia during the clinton administration. and oh my far left is jonathan pollack, a senior fellow at the thornton center in east asia studies. and an expert on chinese national security strategy and u.s./china relations. to start off, i'm going to ask the panel a few question and see if there are any connections between the issues. i would like to start with you if you do not mind. the crisis and crimea and ukraine is occupying a lots of the time and attention of u.s. officials. i think it is coming into

question some of the declared strategic trailer tease of the obama administration including the pivot to asia. do you think the united states will have to reorient its strategic rarities to deal with the crisis? are europeans and ukrainians expecting that? >> let me say what kind of a backdrop going back a few years. what you have seen since the end of the cold war is the united states having the ability to have to devote less time and attention and resources to europe. that is largely reflecting the success of european policy over the last 20 years. with the enlargement of the european union, you have really anchored the states of central and eastern europe into institutions. when this policy was launched,

one of the american goal is to get to the point where we did not have to worry about that region so much individually because they would have invitational -- institutional support. you have seen a significant drawdown on the american military commitment here. with the assessment that russia was more of a benign power. that included four heavy divisions in germany at the height of the cold war down to two army brigades in all of europe. with regard to ukraine from 2010-now there's a decision to let the appearance and believe. he was looking at the european union at the main have to draw closer to europe. it made logical sense to let the eu take the lead and support that as the way for ukraine to lengthen its strengths with the u.s. what you have seen over the last several months is an intensification of the u.s. interest and attention on crimea

as has been the escalation of the crisis there with in ukraine. specifically after you have the military occupation of crimea. it was seen as fundamentally breaking the rules of the post-cold war order. you did not use military force to take the territory of another country. my guess is that within the administration after february 24 when you had the new acting government after the former president fled the country and the reaffirm that the interest was drawn closer to the european unions, there was an expectation that the russians would do something to destabilize the government. the russians don't want to see that happen. the expectation was much more. the tools will be the economic levers. they skipped right over that page and went to military occupation of crimea. that has developed the biggest

east-west crisis of the post-cold war era. yesterday you saw a meeting in geneva which has the potential to diffuse the rises. there is no evidence that the armed groups in eastern ukraine have either moved to disarm or evacuate what they have occupied. there's an expectation that there will be more american attention. you're seeing that in terms of american diplomacy in the time secretary kerry is spending. he is making every day phone calls. it is consuming time, tension and resources. it comes at a time when you see an american policy course which really can be broken down into three areas. support ukraine, punish russia,

reassure both. agenda support for ukraine what you have seen is the vice president going next tuesday. a lots of work to help the government which is very vulnerable acquired some more staying power and legitimacy. a lot have worked with the imf on a package that will require ukraine some tough economic reforms. it could fit ukraine in the situation where a couple years down the road the houses in order. you have seen steps to punish russia. ratcheting down bilateral relations across the board here at the g8 has been ratcheted back to the g7. some sanctions have apply to individual russians which seems to be having an effect. he said he said his lowering his estimate 2014 to 0.5%. he said capital flight out of

russia reached $50 billion. there are projections that capital flight could as much as $200 billion. that would be 50% more than russia during the financial crisis of 2008. i think there are more sanctions waiting in the wings. a lot on implementations of geneva. the third area potentially has the most path to pivot asia. what is needed in terms of reassuring allies in nato and bolstering nato? very early on, you saw the u.s. military taping steps. at this particular time, it u.s. air force has this mission. they have no air force.

the americans had that mission. it was to go from four to 10 aircraft. a squadron of f-16s went in for exercises in poland and u.s. navy has had a string of ships going into the black sea. you now have a conversation going on about coming in behind americans that when it is time to take over the air force it will be more than four airplanes. we are open to a conversation. there is a desire for some ground presence. i would not be surprised in the coming month if you see not large detachments but small groups of nato ground forces on the territory in central europe in the baltic states in a way that will not be seen as offensive provocation but will be reassuring in terms of tripwire. if you go back to 1997, nato was

considering an enlargement. they talked about there was no requirement for the substantial combat forces. there is a conversation underway in nato now, how the circumstances have changed in a way that might be changing the policy. there will be a question what are the requirements if there are forces that are moved up. where do they come from? that may have some implications for the u.s. if you look at a greater european pull from the president and perhaps from the american military sources, how does that complicate the ability to rebalance toward asia? >> that is the question i was going to ask you. given all of the demands of the time and resources that steve just talked about and to some degree predicted, we are wondering what you think the

effects will be? before you get into that, this is notionally part of the pivot to asia. it will be helpful for us to know from your standpoint, the pivot is a long-term policy, where does it stand right now? to what degree has this actually started? to what degree has the united states actually rebalanced or pivoted toward asia? >> the rebalance is never a gym addict shift in american resources in the first place. that is both good and bad news for what we are talking about now. i will be curious to hear if ken and jonathan agree with me. it is bad news and that whatever modest momentum we had achieved, which i think was a good idea,

the rebalance and not pivoting or pretending we could ignore previous allies or commitments or regions but trying to reinvigorate our commitment to the asia pacific, it was never involving that many resources in the first place. to the extent we achieved momentum, we sort of lost it larger because diplomatic attention has moved away from the change in personnel from the obama cabinet and top leadership and because sequestration has put downward pressure on the defense budget. whatever modest reallocations we are looking for is not competing with the fact that there is downward pressure. the pie is getting smaller for the whole world. there was not much to the rebalance to begin with in tangible terms. when you get distracted for a year or two, you lose the momentum you have obtained. the good news is the rebalance was never really a thing in the first place.

getting the energy back should not be impossibly difficult. i say this with respect and support for administration policy. i do not think we wanted to overdo the rebalance. i do not think we wanted to get too much in china's face or pretend we could leave the middle east behind. there was an appropriately modest approach. one specific way i try to look at this from a military analysis point of view, and jim steinberg and i wrote about this in our book, out of today's military budget is about $600 billion headed downward as the wars continue to end and sequestration looms again. out of that annual amount, how much have we reallocated as a result of the rebalance? amount that might have been

partially or primarily focused on the middle east or europe before, how much of that have we taken and shifted toward the pacific? there is room for debate. there is no more than $10 million out of that 600. at most a plan to reallocate about 10 billion. that is largely by the navy putting up to 60% of the fleet or it used to be 50%. naval ships can still go to the persian gulf. they do not have to go along the south china sea. they are not necessarily going to be serving the rebalance all the time anyway. that is why i say $10 billion a year is upward bound.

let's say we were spending $250 billion a year on the asia-pacific previously. there is no good way to come up with a good number. now maybe it is going to be 260 billion. that is in the context of the overall pie getting smaller. if we could even sustain that modest increase, i do not know. that will be a question for the future. we can get it back. it is good the president is going to asia this week. it is good has plans to go to asia later in the year. his big trade initiative is in trouble for the asian pacific. i think in terms of the diplomatic attention we can get it back. even if we put modest numbers of ground troops in eastern nato countries in future months as might be appropriate under the circumstances with ukraine, it is not going to deprive us of the ability to shift more of the navy and the air force as we are already doing. i am suggesting we need to continue the momentum the president is trying to build next week.

he has lost a lot of momentum he created would be rebalance. crimea and ukraine and putin do not prevent him from reestablishing that momentum if he stays focused on the job. >> thanks, mike. the asia policy has much to be modest about. given that, how is the pivot seen in asia today? is it seen as a real thing? is it seen as sufficient to the needs of the region? >> words and attention matter. it is not just a matter of $10 billion. one of the things about the military dimension is the military commitment for asia

would not decline despite downward pressure. there is an issue a priority and conceptualization. i think the obama administration saw the rebalance toward asia as perhaps a big strategic framework statement. the idea was to reinvigorate attention paid to the asia-pacific region after an enormous focus after 9/11. recognizing this is by far and away the most dynamic region and the world. u.s. interest requires that we enhance our engagement there. and certainly not be seen as neglecting the region.

this strategy, integrating economic, military and diplomatic components not separately toward northeast asia, china and southeast asia but an approach the entire region. they tried to integrate policy toward all of asia. we have never been able to do that effectively. it is a very high bar. putting that actively on the agenda was an impressive goal to seek and pursue. all of this was to ensure that america would play an ongoing role and devote sufficient resources to that. you heard the terms used even

among the first three speakers here. >> you personally use read. mike used three. rebalance was the original name of the strategy. that frankly was contentious within the administration. there were some not in the white house who wanted to call it a pivot. jazzier, sharper. who cares about rebalancing when you can pivot? the difference is substantial in terms of the implication in terms of what you are doing. it sounds at this is the center of everything. the rest is by the body. the third term that has been used that i think should have been used from the start and describes what we are seeking to do was to reinvigorate. we never left asia. we have had he's -- huge interest out there.

we put so much attention elsewhere that reinvigorating the effort to asia would have put us in the right position. with the kind of contention, very quickly pivot won out. here we have been more balanced. if you look at the popular discourse, it is all about the pivot to asia. when you say pivot to asia and raises three questions that are very much in the mind of various audiences in asia about what they should expect and how they evaluate the future of this policy, what this policy will be able to produce. to what extent a success of the pivot in the future depends upon an assumption that the middle east will go smoothly and that europe will not again become a

major problem? 80 think of it as a pivot in the literal sense, that is an obvious concern. -- if you think of it as a pivot in the literal sense, that is an obvious concern. what part helps overcome dysfunction in washington which may make a high executive branch policy not very credible and implementation? thirdly, can the u.s. deliver on both economic and security elements in a way that is credible to allies and partners in the region but also avoids the trap of falling into making china the bull's-eye of the policy rather than making china a central component. that is something that sounds like a rhetorical distinction.

it is the largest trading partner virtually every country in asia. if you can build china in a constructive fashion, and that is not easy, but if you can say on that side of the line, you really are achieving greater stability in asia and a huge u.s. role there. if china is on the other side of the line and asia becomes increasingly divided, countries feel they have to choose one way or another. there is not a single country that would consider that a successful american effort here at the want to have america handle the relationship with china wisely. do not divide asia. don't force us to choose. with that as a background, let me look at where we stand in

views of the pivot. i think the developments added to the recent developments in the ukraine. the key premise relies on not having things go wrong elsewhere. it is now quite watchable. -- questionable. countries will be looking among other things for skillfully assurance both on the president security commitments and on the tactical skills. the initial news was bad. the president had to cancel his last major trip to asia because the government was shut down.

pessimism over the trade promotion authority and the ability to deliver on the trade if that is successively negotiated. these are major concerns. they should be seen in isolation. there is widespread appreciation in asia of the economic recovery in the u.s., we're now the strongest growing economy of the industrialized world are now encountering a lot of trouble. the president has used executive authority through the epa to actually go establish a pretty good record on meeting commitments on greenhouse gas emission. there's greater confidence that the u.s. will avoid another government shutdown.

there's more confidence that the u.s. is still capable of real economic dynamism. that is huge. there are still concerns about government dysfunction. i think tpp will be a test of that enormous repercussions. positive or negative depending on where we need to go. the issue of whether china is the bull's-eye or china is a central part of reinvigoration strategy toward asia that we can handle well is one that we want to make it the latter. there is a lot of pressure that pushes the administration tactically to make comments and commitments that the chinese would interpret as the former. one of the real tests in the

coming months and years will be how they need to stay on a constructive side. how ukraine plays that will be one of the elements that will shape that assessment. >> i guess i do want to get into that. with all of that as background, how is the president seeing this trip? what is he trying to accomplish? how are the asians seeing the trip? are they integrating the concerns steve articulated in the understanding of what the president is doing? >> i cannot say president obama has shared with me what his goals are. this is somewhat speculative. my to do list will be more my own list rather than his might be.

it is important to step back for a moment. in november 2011, that was the formal roll out of the rebalanced strategy. i think the gestational elements were there from the very earliest months of the administration. it was then given the germanic rollout with president obama making successive stops in hawaii and australia and then indonesia. the background is so much of this discussion and did they is precisely the way infants and words and actions are interpreted. the world today, 2.5 years later, looks quite different. asia and the united states looks difference compared to what we saw at the time of the policy rollout. if i can say the rebalance was an ambitious statement of policy

intent, it was a very incomplete vision. it remains in critical respects an unrealized vision highlighting just how difficult it is to get some kind of a reconfiguration across the entirety of the united states government. the fact that the asia-pacific region is going to be ever more central to american interests seems an unexceptional comment. in the same way, the economic gravity is shifting toward the asia-pacific region and we should expect over time that it moves to reflect that reconfiguration. the question persists, to what end? how is it going to be meshed against global foreign policy?

if i were coming up with a to do list, here is mine. the first is the preeminent goal for president obama to demonstrate that the rebalance has staying power and genuine strategic significance and that it is not a code word for the counterbalancing of chinese policy. we need a much fuller strategic conversation. in this case, country to country, recognizing the visit to malaysia and indonesia is a rescheduled activity from before. in my view, we still seem stuck very much in bilateral relationships when our aspirations are to a larger regional vision. i understand there's a lot of

multilateral activity in southeast asia, much less of the in northeast asia. it is still the focal point of our economic and diplomatic compared to the growing importance that we attach elsewhere in the region. there is the need for that fuller strategic conversation. our own strategy is increasingly in question. in this respect i have to say going back to the exuberance of the rollout of the rebalance strategy it was an oversold strategy that did not reflect realistic possibilities about what you could expect. we need to acknowledge openly and i think president obama is very much capable of this, that

the rebalance requires some reallocation of resources but that there is a pie. if you're asking questions about what the united states can realistically expect to do, it'll be a function of three alternatives. either we will somehow convince the congress and others to commit more resources to what we do in the region, we will have to make do with less, or number three we make very clear to our allies and partners in the region that we expect commensurate contributions on their part if we're going to achieve a larger vision for the region in the long term. this is part of that discussion.

there is a need for by lateral -- bilateral discussions on issues that are invariant with the american interest of policy goals. we cannot be a disinterested third party. we find a way to reconcile these differences. i do not see us being able to stand on the sidelines. the best may be the anamoly of the incredible frigidity between korea and japan. they are america's two most important regional allies. they are both headed by right of center government. they barely speak to one another let alone cooperation. the actually got them in the room at the same time. as we are all familiar, their

there are deep grievances here. both of these countries try to define a role for themselves in the world that is to come and finding their interests in great conflict with one another. first, the elephant in the room, we have alluded to it here it its name as china. the question is can we actually see the kind of intelligent discussion that needs to be held almost country by country about longer-term relationships with china, longer-term questions about the international role. it is often asserted that no one in asia wants to force a choice between the united states and china. at the same time, it would be in prudent for the united states to force a choice between china and japan. both are important to american

interests. japan is a long-term ally. china is very much the rising power. a successful strategy has to find some kind of an inclusive a successful strategy has to find some sort of exclusive content. much less the future of this reason -- region going the direction that we don't want to see. finally, a very few quick comments. ukraine may be on everyone's minds. certainly it is reflected in this panel but it should not dominate what president obama discusses on the trip. it is not uppermost for the region as a whole and it will only become so and it certainly could if recent events reconfigure a more lasting strategic alienation between the united states and russia and

between russia and europe. do not know if we are there yet but that is what we are here to discuss. events in the ukraine could divert and distract the larger focus on the goals in the asia-pacific region. and in that respect send the wrong message. in can seet attention diverted from this in the context of ongoing events. but we must work hard not to let >> it wasn interesting listening to these presentations. one is struck by the fact that with the obama administration was doing was an effort that they were trying to turn the gigantic ship of american foreign-policy in recognition of

long-term trends and strategy. the history uniform policy does not actually look like that. we are able only to turn the ship us date through reaction to events rather than reaction to conceptualizing changes in the world. one cannot help but think good try by the obama administration but maybe they misunderstood the nature of how america changes is foreign-policy. now we have a crisis, which is an opportunity. ken said the pivot depended on reinvigoration -- reinvigoration

depended on, excuse me, i cannot you be terms of straight. it is difficult when the all mean the same thing. he said it depends on the middle east calming down a little bit and europe not flaring up again. it does not seem to have been working out. jonathan said the defense budget is fixed. i wonder, with all the crisis happening, if we can inc. of -- think of the defense budget where crises come to roost on the domestic side of american foreign-policy. it how will all of these interlocking crises come to roost in the defense budget? can we look for new things to them?

-- happen? >> i think we have to remember our strength. we have a lot of things going on in the world. it a lot of competition for our attention and resources. you're were kind enough to mention my book. and thank you for holding it up yet again. our colleague bruce jones just put out an excellent book called "still hours to lead." it said the so-called decline is robust. or at least we have it within our means to make sure it does not happen. other countries may be rising. it is not me that america has to decline. on top of that we have allies but combined budgets are $400 billion to $500 billion. i met even factoring in neutral countries are more inclined to work with us than against us.

we are in a tremendous position of strength. china clearly is the number two military power in the world at this point, with 200 billion dollars. jonathan may have his own preferred figures. in any event, the rise is significant and important. it does cause some concern. we do not want to make china feel like it is the bull's-eye. we do not want to view our policy as one as containment. we called our book strategic reassurance and resolve. we need hedging, plus engagement. that is the old way if inking -- of thinking. we need to stay resolute in regard to our interests and

allies. at the same time, look for way too--conclusion with china. i think the way in which mr. obama has handled ukraine and the implications that people will try to draw from that has generally been fine. it is not over yet. it is not a happy story. i think the american message has basically been what you have done so far is pretty darn bad. it is a mildly unacceptable. crimea was historically, largely russian. we do not have it within them are power to do what he did anyway. ukraine is not a formal ally.

who needed to pay a price. he needs to be put on notice that if he gets any more aggressive there will be potentially a much higher price to pay. we're talking through the modalities of how that would happen with german and polish friends who need that gap. we're beginning to have the conversation. we're doing this in the context of a world which we have collectively put a lot of pressure on iran in the past couple of years. we have learned a lot about how to apply them more strategic way. who knows it. he has actually helped us with the iran sanctions. he knows he could be the target of a ramped up level of sentience if he goes further and moves into eastern ukraine. i think this is a balanced

message for what china and their allies need to hear about the territories in the east china seas. we should not go to war against china the minute there is an altercation. we need this kind of a balanced approach. we might meet with sanctions there as well. it may not make every japanese friend equally happy. we have to show some restraint and judicious mess and how we use military force to respond to crises that may or may not be the end of the world. the way he has handled ukraine should be reassuring to the extent people want to draw lessons about how we might handle future crises in asia as well. there is a lot more to say there. >> i want to get you to disagree with that. there is a lot of talk, particularly in this town, but does not see the obamas a demonstration reaction as that will balance. they see it as underwhelming as speaking loudly and carrying a

little fix. i am wondering, how are the chinese judging the united states reaction to this? are they likely to draw any conclusions for their disputes in the south or east china sea? >> what has happened in ukraine gives china problems anomalous every dimension. first of all, the chinese hate the notion of having a revolution from below supported by the west and recognize as legitimate by the west.

fairly early on some officials press strong support and went to ukraine. we clearly said effectively we've got it. who are looking to preserve the option of associating with europe are democrats and people whose values and choices should be respect to. as has moved to an actual takeover of power, we have supported the new government there as a legitimate government. albeit a transitional one. moving to an election. the chinese find everything about that wrong. secondly, the chinese always say territorial integrity is important. they do not like the idea of crimea likely having a referendum seen by the central

government from the start as illegal. supported by soviet forces. >> you may be right again. supported by russian special forces. who has now son they were very much a part of the issue. the chinese look at that was some horror themselves. certainly they have a strong policy of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries. to their mind russia has violated that. with european support in kiev,

we also have violated it. there's nothing they see that looks good to them here. if you look at the comments to date, their bottom line is clearly that there is no bottom line. >> we should get them to work at brookings. >> that you should respect history, resolve things lyrically and peacefully. do it multinational he. oppose the illegal action at the end of the day. there is no there there. i have heard chinese officials say if you cannot a girl out what our bottom line is we have succeeded. this is where they are now. will the way the u.s. has

handled this attention make them more aggressive? i really do not think so. i do not think that has any clear impact or likely impact at all. i think one of the issues that may develop and it really develops an understanding what led to evolve in ukraine and what will evolve and u.s./russian relations that they said prediction is always very difficult. he was absolutely right in that. if this really deteriorates, if our sanctions go from being on putin cronies and russia thanks to sexual sanctions that lead to much less dependence over time on gas from russia and europe, presumably more dependent on us

over time. the the chinese are in a very different position. they have seen relations with russia as a counterbalance to being overly dependent on the u.s. they see potentially russian gas as more available and cheaper if it does not have an outlet in europe. they may be quite prepared to pick up the russians slack and be seen by the u.s. and europeans as effectively making it more difficult to get rested to behave and what we consider to be a responsible way.

that can affect dynamics in a lot of ways. that is based on several contingencies, none of which is by any means certain. >> china will not take lessons for its territorial disputes from the u.s. reaction. the argument on that generally goes that if the u.s. is not able to stand up to russian aggression, the chinese will draw the lesson that the united states will not stand up to chinese aggression in the south china sea. why aren't you worried about that? >> it is a very clear distinction. we have long-standing alliances in asia with most of the countries where the territorial disputes with china are most severe. we have stated time and again that we will meet our alliance commit and. we will argue about what that means to meet our commitments here in we do not have an alliance. we have not tried to make

ukraine part of nato. it is a different situation. the chinese are very clear about the differences. >> let's bring this back to europe. what are the europeans looking for? are they looking for specific messages? what i would think they would look for this. that president looks at this to convey the hands. it is unlikely to see resources expanding.

resources be it time or money or military are not in the tent. are there additional commitments to asia that could take away from europe. you have to go one way or another. on the military side, it seems like looking at the pacific legion, the focus will be on american air and naval assets. we have these on the backseat. there may not be a huge contingents over that. the other thing will be today we did not see any illegal groups. for five days around this may be a similar situation.

is it time to do something more? the russians is not live up to this. one lady asked are you now prepared to move or were? those are the things they will be looking at. that's we live by to go. >> i will make this quick. with respect to the defense budget, we have seen several times in my memory major reconfiguring event that changed the entire framework with which we looked at the defense budget. specific lead the soviet invasion of afghanistan and 911 where the

gates opened and american power in all its forms is manifest. i'm not saying we're at that went. i do not know yet whether or not the events in ukraine will have that kind of a configuration. they could. that would be a moment where again the american balance of interest would be redefined. it might have some very direct implications for whether or not the united states is able to push ahead with its long-term strategies in asia. ken has arty alluded to the problematic circumstances of the negotiations here. if the united states appears a bit beleaguered and perhaps with states going their own way, then they will have to ask how much staying power it does the rebalance have over the longer term? i am not predicting it. it is more to flag that as a

possible issue. we want to make sure that his policy options remain as limited as possible. putin is visiting china next month. his arty making noises about all kinds of expended collaboration with china. we will have expectations of china and that regards to they do not simply exploit the situation for their own advantage. he has had five meetings with prime minister abe. the last thing we wish to see is that putin find a way to hone in on such an important and essential relationship to american interests. i would not preclude a gambit from him to north korea. the russians have been very much a kind of a marginal fact to in

the discussions here on the new lunar -- nuclear issue in particular. it is possible that putin in particular will find options to sweeten the deal with pyongyang in a way that gives north korea more running room, a get out of jail free card. that is something that will bear careful consideration in the months to come. >> thanks. i guess now we can go to the audience. when you get the microphone, these identify yourself. please be reasonably brief. please ask a question. why don't we start with this gentle man right here? >> exhibited intelligence review. i would like to go back to and build on what ken said about the chinese reaction. it seems to me the resolution of the crisis and crimea will be absolutely or probably decisive in terms of how the chinese will

react to the u.s. reinvigoration program or the new major powers agreement. it seems to me that putin has been made into a bogeyman. i cannot see any russian leader excluding them from an agreement in which ukraine would become a part of the eu with some carrots that had to do with some relationships with nato as well. given the relationship between ukraine and russia that any russian leader could have accepted that without some kind of reaction. >> the refusal of the u.s. to get some kind of meeting prudent had asked for -- putin had asked for seemed foolish and brought this to a critical

stage. how they get out of this is going to be key. sanctions are very good. the russians after leningrad and stalingrad, they are very tough people. if they think they are being attacked, they will consolidate around putin. if there is some agreement over and above these agreements that have been made in geneva, they will hopefully lead somewhere, russia can be part of the solution. perhaps the chinese fear that they are being targeted as well. if it goes to a prewar situation with more and more military troops on either side of the border, the chinese are going to see themselves targeted as well. i think that is decisive as to what is going to happen. >> that is an interesting

comment. >> thanks. i'm from the mitchell report. i have been sitting here this morning and realizing that i am not quite sure what this panel is about. >> thanks. [laughter] >> is this about crimea? we have two or three china experts on the panel. is this china? is this the nexus between them? if the latter is the case, it comes back to the observation that a smart asia policy is one

that makes china a key factor but not the bullet -- bull's-eye. i don't ask that in a critical sense. this is more of an analytical sense. what is it from the standpoint of the panelists that we are driving at today? what is the underlying thrust of what brought this panel together? i know you don't do this because there was nothing else to do on good friday. >> we can take one more question. then we will come back. >> i have but the state department and most of my experience has been in europe. assuming that putin will forge

ahead and not adhered to this agreement, what if the action were to deploy troops the baltic states? what would the reaction be in china, japan, and korea? >> let's start with steve. if you can address the question of the carrot to putin and russia. >> if you look over the last several years, there was a carrot in the sense that while nato was not in a position, if you look at what was going on in ukraine, there was not going to be progress on that front. the government said they did not want to join and the current

government says it as well. as important, it is a controversial issue in ukraine. the government is trying to raise good ability in eastern ukraine. the nato question was off the board. the more difficult issue is polls are consistently showing ukrainians want to draw closer to the european union. the problem here is in putin's idea, that is unacceptable. that is where it goes. the european union is not nato. i could understand the russian concern about nato. it seems to apply to the eastern -- european union as well. it is a difference in terms of where ukraine wishes to go. >> mike, can you address the

question about the panel? >> happy to. i think it is useful to try and understand foreign leaders. i think we should not apologize for what putin has done. it is unacceptable. in 1994, russia was signatory to an agreement in bucharest -- budapest. it said we would guarantee the territorial integrity very of ukraine. let's not let them off the hook on that. >> we are very clearly saying this is not a military commitment. it is an implied the somatic -- diplomatic agreement. they have violated many agreements. >> that is one reason why we are having the family -- panel. it was a big jail in international -- change in international politics.

if there was anything to that, we had gotten to a world where interstate war among established major powers wasn't really happening. that was a good thing. putin is challenging that basic edifice of the international system today. now we see our president going on a trip to another part of the world with huge power. what has happened in ukraine is going to be on people's minds. the tectonic shift is big enough that we need to try and apply the lessons from one place to another. secondly, we had to ask if there were resources that the united states had that were adequate to the task of the rebound or if they would be siphoned off again for parts of the world we are

trying to rebalance or pivot from. we heard discussion about that. the consensus of this panel is there is not a requirement or necessity for what is happening a -- in ukraine will invalidate our ability to concentrate on the asia-pacific. there's a challenge in the asia-pacific rebalance successfully. we want to get the individual pieces right. the third piece of this is the one that i tried to comment on. our japanese and korean and filipino officials and the reason going to wonder if we are still dependable. you have heard most of us say that we don't necessarily see a reason why the united states should not be dependable.

we think he then states treaty commitments are firm in the asia-pacific. it is a valid question and i am confident that it is on people's minds. is this indicative of a potentially retrenching and less engaged united states that is not going to be as dependable in east asia. our asian allies should not have that worry. it is worth talking through and recognizing. mr. obama will have that question posted to him next week more than once. >> to build on what mike is saying, the united states is a global power. it is uniquely a global power. one of the ways in which our world is interconnected is through the medium of global power because of what happened and how we react in one region. the lessons drawn from u.s.

credibility have implications elsewhere. that is a we are trying to do here. you can tell me later if we succeeded. >> i think it is interesting, kind of like a balloon. if you squeeze it in one direction, it goes in one direction. the u.s. is a global power. the fundamental premise of this panel is precisely how does the united states simultaneously remain relevant in all regions of strategic importance to the united states and can we do it in conjunction with our allies and with other partners or are we and our threshold of some kind of a discontinuous change that will leave the world a much messier place in the future? i don't know if we are at that point during we are trying to be

realistic about what we do with our resources. i agree that there is a tendency in certain circles to endlessly disparage american capacity and american well -- will. we could talk ourselves into looking much less resolute than i think we actually are. >> i would have word to that. because we have pegged this as ukraine and the rebalance asia, it puts a premium on the military side of things. i actually think from a chinese perspective, the most important development in the coming 12 months will be whether or not the u.s. succeeds in negotiating a high-quality partnership in asia.

this would necessarily include substantial market access and concessions by japan, which they have never been prepared to do before. if they can get that through the u.s. congress. if we can do so, we are in the early stages of moving forward on negotiations with similar partnerships with europe. that is huge. what sparked a lot of this crisis in ukraine was the notion that ukraine would opt for the european union association and not the custom union. these need not be exclusive. there is another multilateral trade negotiation going on in

asia. china is very much involved in that. we are not a part at that. it is a much more superficial agreement. if we get this treaty through, it is a huge boost overtime to our economy and the integration of asia. i will bet a fair amount of money that china will seek to join that. many leaders in china now see potentially joining that as providing a political leverage to carry out economic reforms at home that they want to pursue but they face vested interest in opposition. that is a huge win. that demonstrates american initiative and capacity to shape favorable outcomes in a region.

it bridges some of the geopolitical divide. focusing on ukraine too much may be -- wouldn't want to focus on the military side of this alone. >> ukraine crisis is a crisis about economic integration. it is about uncertainty. >> it was sparked by that. it is becoming a different kind of crisis. >> let's get back to the audience. >> thank you. i like to come back to the point by dr. liberal about the extent of brain china on board of -- bringing china on board. how is that possible on both economic and political

dimensions? it is easier to convince china that the u.s. asia policy will be beneficial for china. how is that going to be possible to convince china that it is not a code word for counterbalancing china? when the u.s. says it is not taking sides, it is abiding by its commitments to its allies, china does not by the words. the u.s. is taking sides. how do these two things reconciled with each other? >> thank you. i would like to know if any of you are able to comment on the context of this letter that was distributed to ukrainian jews

yesterday. does it suggest a next level of more overt anti-semites as him -- anti-semitism? >> let's take the third question right here. >> thank you. i have two questions. we talked about the u.s. military budget a lot. we did not talk about china. given their economic slowdown, is this budget sustainable? >> that was my first google glass question. but start with ken. can you answer the question about the chinese view of rebalance? >> i think the chinese have a strong tendency to see the u.s. over time almost predetermined

to take an array of measures to slow down and complicate and disrupt china's rapid rise. this is based on two fairly fundamental things. one is china's modern history is you lose if you bet on the altruism of other countries. they come at the modern world with a bad hundred 50 years -- 150 years. there is a deeply ingrained notion that number one it will never give way to number two without a fight. even if we are not going to

engage in a war, we will will try to complicate china's rapid rise. you can construct a narrative on that based in part on, to hear out of washington and various voices in washington will support any narrative you want to develop. you can pick and choose and we are very fractured us and vocal. -- frack to us -- fractuous and vocal. you build chai's -- ties to china. we have done that in a hugely dynamic way. even on the military side, we are now expanding our military with direct interaction with china. both sides are committed to expanding that. we are negotiating a treaty with china.

a lot of the reforms that china is advocating domestically are things we have advocated for them to do for years. we have provided expertise in thinking through some of those issues. there are a lot of ways in which we engage china very broadly. these are a very institutional -- these are on a very institutionalized basis. i think in addition to that, we need to do a little more. we need to do more in terms of articulating our conception for the region. it is not just the principle of obeying international law and respecting territory integrity. how we see the region evolving and not just categorical terms. we have a stronger story to tell him that. >> can you take on the question of anti-semite is him --

anti-semitism? >> there was a pamphlet that went around. it said that as of a certain date, all jews in the area would have to register and pay a $50 fee to do so. there was a lot of contact with local jewish leaders in that area. this letter was a provocation. it is an ugly thing. it is not clear that it was put out. >> this is a kind of open ended game that goes on. you don't have a situation where there is perfect equivalence between how china does its expenditures.

i do want to play the numbers game appearance supple. it would seem to me that on the one hand, if there is a sustained slowing of the economic growth rate in china, there will be pressures on their increases in the defense budget. this is partly as a function of inflation rates in china. they have been forceful in recent weeks and reinforcing the commitment for china to be a stronger power to protect its interest. the fundamental question is not the numbers that we use but as we see china emerged as a much more consequential military power in years to come, what are the purposes to which that power is put? as ken noted, our defense ties

with china are one of the quiet success stories of the last year or more. my own impression from conversations with chinese officers is that this is not a momentary consideration. it does not mean to say that china or the pla has warm and fuzzy feelings toward everything the united states military may do. one way or another, we will have to adapt and interact with the realities of china being a larger military power. the question is whether or not they can show restraint in how that power is demonstrated and utilized. unless you find a situation that the future of this region is less promising in the event of china exploiting its capacity in ways they insist they will not, this could be very different from the receiving end of that

power. >> i have a couple of things to add. we tend to think that china is spending two percent of its gdp on military. how you measure their gdp is open to some conjecture. the issue of purchasing power versus a more traditional peer exchange rate conversion. the estimates i've seen range from $7 trillion to $10 trillion a year. it is a number two military power in the world. its rate of increase has been five to 10% a year. it is not always the 10%. there is ambiguity.

there are reasons to think it may not always reach that high. it is still going up. ours is coming down. this does raise the question at what point do the lines begin to converge and what does that mean? i will quickly say that one of the things steinberg and i say in our book is when they reach half the spending of american military spending, they should think about it. we try to balance that with the argan -- argument needs to be moderated and made more ecumenical. even the chinese in some elements of our thinking and planning and operations change the name to something more to mine. -- benign. we are not looking to get in their face.

i want to go in to that in detail. china is the number two world military spending power. they spend about $200 billion a year. that may slow down a bit. we will have to see. >> let's go back to the audience. >> my name is steve. china's one area of your redemption is taiwan. in response to the russian seizure of crimea, could this embolden chinese hardliners with the declining economic growth rate might look for a success and the taiwan strait -- in the taiwan strait?

>> i would like to ask and elaborate on that question. given the perceived weakness of the u.s. response to the seizure of crimea, this is a fundamental change to the world order. what are the ramifications of that response for our allies'interest? what are the ramifications on our response to the seizure of crimea on our allies confidence in our ability to maintain our interests? >> over here to the right.

the gentleman in the blue tie. >> thank you. i am here from western carolina university. we solved the geopolitical importance of the west since the conclusion of world war ii. this was exasperated by the end of the cold war in the 1990's. my question is are we seeing a shift in the importance of the west to the east? has the response from the united

states and other western countries been appropriate to russia's action in crimea to address the shift in power? >> thanks. those are all questions that we thought the panel would generate. i will take that as validation. >> i would even add a little bit to some of those questions. another thing that putin has done is demonstrate a new model of aggression. his created ambiguity about whether aggression is even taking place and having a deniability about it that has made the response more difficult. has china learned any lessons from that? >> i want to take on the china and taiwan a question. on taiwan, i don't think that china sees what russia has done

in the crimea as instructive or encouraging as to what it can do in taiwan. the concert is quite the opposite. russia took over crimea without overt force of military force. it also took it over with a referendum. you can argue that it was a loaded referendum. i am not aware of anybody who is been to crimea that thought that less than 50% of the people there were pro-russian. >> 50% of the population was ethnic russian. -- 58% of the population is ethnic russian. only 40% of the population wanted some change of status. the referendum was provoked from outside.

>> you won't have a similar situation regarding taiwan. china could not absorb taiwan without fierce resistance by the population of taiwan. they could not do it without a major military action across the taiwan strait, which would be obvious to everyone and incur large loss of life and change the dynamics of the region. china decided some time ago that their best bet by far was to build economic trade and other ties with taiwan, in a gradual process do that hoping that over time a democratic taiwan will

see on balance some form of formal unification. they have a provision in their legislation that allows them in a sense if taiwan declares independence or if over a long. of time taiwan remains outside of china, it would justify in their mind the invoking of that domestic legislation to use force against taiwan. i don't think anybody on the mainland is thinking that the time has come for that. o'er the time will come in any foreseeable future. >> very quickly on the maritime issues. i have been doing some reading on ancient history. post-world war ii settlement.

it is stunning when you look at how so much of what was configured in the western pacific after the surrender of japan was almost an afterthought. it was never really reason through. it is really extraordinary if we go case-by-case. the problem now is that you have states, not just china. actors that feel they are coming-of-age. higher levels of military capacity that could possibly, depending on circumstances, trigger a larger conflict. i am not predicting this. i think there is a world between incidents in the east china sea and the south china sea and the overuse of force. in a variety of ways.

we see the dispute between china and japan related to what the -- you actually have chinese maritime vessels and the like. this ought to be a definite discussion. several of the leading dispute ants, it's the kind of thing that it really does require if -- i am using we as a collective label, the states themselves must be mindful of the great risks and uncertainties that are entailed in all of this.

i worry about it in particular about the dynamic between china and japan. the consequences of which, if worse, itto something would have profound reverberations for not only both countries but the united states region as a whole. >> i have one thought in regard to the big picture question. there is no doubt a shift is happening but i will come back to our interests elsewhere. europe still an amazing economic and political situation. it the most successful alliance in military history. the allies that are not doing and obviouslyily,

we like to see them able to do more. they still had 30,000 troops in afghanistan and the partners in thepersian gulf -- industrial democracies are still within nato. they are still in the middle east fighting revolutions. and asia is extremely important but we have got to come back to the point that america is still a global power. we are still in a very strong position in the think there is no reason to come back to gary's question. prevent mr.have to obama from having a successful trip next week? and reinvigorating the rebalance will take some effort. they have lost a little bit of the focus on it. >> i will come back briefly to

this question about sanctions and what happens after geneva. i would argue that worse sanctions at this point may be appropriate. maybe after geneva you give a little bit of time. week, the middle of next if we don't see other commitments, we have to face up to the next step. the model here is that they have not invaded. if 45,000 russian troops going to eastern ukraine tomorrow, my guess is it is not a hard decision for europe to apply harsh sanctions. they will stay below if that threshold. he came out and said there are no russian troops or agencies in the ukraine about 20 minutes sixr he said that insignia weeks ago were russian troops. situation into a where five days from now, they pretty much look like today, does the west conclude that

there is an invasion of sorts going on in the eastern ukraine? it may have implications in terms of the asia aspect of this. >> thanks. i think this is the first panel in my experience that has talked ,bout those anti-semitism chinese and military spending, and managed to connect them. owe is a wide range and we some things to the panel. these join me. [applause] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014]

>> german soldiers would be really reassuring. the initial response -- [indiscernible] tim pawlentyakers, will talk about key issues facing the banking and credit card issue including the security of credit card numbers and online banking and signing reform bills in congress and the

amount of capital big banks should have on hand. "newsmakers," sunday on c-span. >> on tuesday, president obama begins a trip in asia. house briefing, national security adviser susan rice briefed reporters on the trip and took questions on ukraine. this is about 25 minutes. >> thank you. good afternoon. the president's trip to asia is an important opportunity to -- presidente obama is rebalancing.

nearlye next five years, half of all growth outside of the united states is expected to come from asia. a region that includes several important u.s. allies, developing democracies, and emerging powers. we increasingly see our top priorities tied to asia with access to new markets or promoting exports or protecting our security interests and our core values. the countries we are visiting -- japan, korea, malaysia, and the philippines intersects with our leading priorities. these are modernizing our alliances, promoting democratic increasing, commercial ties, investing in institutions, and deepening people to people exchanges. -- unlike many of the presidents overseas trips, there

are no large summits involved. the agenda in each country cap focus intensively on energizing our bilateral relationship and inventing the different elements of our asian strategy. at a time of ongoing regional tensions particularly with regard to north korea and territorial disputes, the trip offers the chance for the united states to affirm our commitment to rules-based order. there is a significant demand for united states leadership and our strategy of rebalancing to asia includes economic, political, security and cultural interest in north east and south east asia. the different components of our strategy would be on display throughout the trip. thanher nation other united states has a network of alliances and partnerships in asia that match ours. our alliances remain the foundation of our strategy.

we are focused on modernizing these alliances to make the more relevant to the 21st century and to our security challenges while building them into platforms for cooperation original and global challenges. given its rapid economic growth and political clout, south east asia has been another cornerstone of our strategy and the president's visit to malaysia has been said to be the first since lyndon b. johnson as was to the philippines would advance our engagement with this critical region. expanded american investment links to asia is also fundamental to our efforts to access new markets, create american jobs, export more goods from here and if united states to that very important region. throughout the true, the president will have the opportunity to meet with business leaders and promote initiatives like select usa that support investment in a united states.

is a focal point to establish high standards for trade across the asia-pacific and to ensure a level playing field for u.s. businesses and workers. in visiting japan and malaysia, partners, the president will have the chance to continue to make progress on this up port and -- important agreement to make sure it meets america's objectives. the president will bring affirm our commitment to our allies and partners which allow us to deter threats and respond to disasters . on the trip, the president will build on the progress of the recent trilateral meetings with japan and korea as we seek to morece cooperation broadly. it will allow us to reaffirm the peaceful resolution of maritime and territorial disputes the system with international law.

and it will allow us to underscore commitment to helping respond to humanitarian and other disasters. our asian partners frequently look to the united states as a partner of first choice given our significant and unique capabilities and our technical expertise and in each of the countries we would be visiting, we have seen and the last few years, tragedies of the sort that have been exceedingly taxing and traumatic for people in each instance the united states has been able to lend prop a very effective support to our friends and partners in support of their response. we have demonstrated throughout whether from the japan earthquake in 2011 to the 2013 typhoon in the philippines and tragedyn air flight 370 disaster inferry south korea, we are therefore our friends when they need us

most. ben and i are happy to take questions. >> heading to asian against the backdrop in the situation in the ukraine. your sense of house prices in -- your sense of how the crisis is impacting -- [indiscernible] if you could give us a sense of the status of the agreement of russia and given the pro-russian forces, they have no plans to leave? have been in close communication as you can imagine with our allies and partners around the world include in asia as it relates to what is happening in the ukraine. we have been talking with them about the importance of strong, international front to uphold principles that we all hold dear. the sovereignty and integrity of nations. the need for peaceful resolution of disputes. we will continue to have that

discussion throughout each of the stops on our trip. i think it is fair to say that japan and south korea are major have hadonomies and we to reassess the implications of what has transpired in ukraine further economic and diplomatic relationships in particular with russia and we have coordinated closely with japan and the g7 context on our shared responses to what has happened in the ukraine and we will continue to do so. the countries of the region clearly are watching this carefully at our cognitive of the implications of the larger international order given in the importance of the unity of the international community and assist in the ukraine's sovereignty be upheld and maintained in the global condemnation of russia's annexation of crimea and efforts

to destabilize ukraine. these are countries part of the united nations a you will have seen a couple of weeks ago when the general assembly, an overwhelming vote of condemnation of russia's actions. to al share a commitment rule-based order. with respect to what transpired in the agreement yesterday in a geneva, which as you know committed all the signatories in particular russia and ukraine to forces thategular are engaged in destabilizing activities to require that those forces vacate the buildings and public spots that today are occupying illegally in their be an amnesty granted -- granted that lay down their arms willingly and peacefully. and there be a constitutional process which is ukraine's on process toown

resolve the issues which are so critical to ukraine's future. we expect and we will be watching whether russia does or does not uphold its responsibility to use is very considerable influence to restrain and withdraw those thegular militia from buildings and spaces they have occupied. we will look to see what russia says and does and whether it supports another critical aspect of the agreement which was the agreement that the ose will send in the monitors to those towns where they are most needed to help facilitate a peaceful resolution of the standoffs. we will see over the coming days whether russia uphold its agreements. we have seen ukrainian

government began to take steps to do its part by beginning to take steps to implement an amnesty law for those who lay down their arms. the president and prime minister making constructive public comments about constitutional reform and decentralization. if we do not see action commensurate with a commitment that russia has made yesterday in a geneva which we all welcome, obviously, we have been clear that we and our european partners remain ready to put additional cost on russia for failing to adhere to its obligations. carry andry and others have -- secretary kerry and others have given a deadline? directetary kerry had talks with sergey lavrov and with the contralateral meeting making clear the expectations and we will be looking to see in

the coming days whether the agreement that was reached is in fact implemented. it will be obvious as events unfold. think thehow do you situation in ukraine, the conversations you had with korea and japan about identification -- [indiscernible] eventually brought up about disputes over territory in the region and what are you trying to accomplish on the question of the idea? we expect the issue of territorial claims and disputes in the region will come up in our discussion in both countries. the united states' position has been consistent and clear and we do not take a position on the sovereignty but we have insisted that they be result peacefully on the basis of international law and without resort to

coercion or the threat of the use of force. that has been consistent and that is indeed the same principle that we have applied to the situation any ukraine. i expect what we are talking about other aspects of the maritime and other territorial claims that we will continue to reinforce the american perspective. it seems as though earlier in the week administration officials were saying the sanctions, new sanctions to come immediately. --anced secretary kerry advanced secretary kerry push the deadline past the weekend. if it a hard deadline? >> there was progress in a geneva yesterday. while geneva was a document to which all sides committed and a document with which their apostate commitment in it, what

we have said it is not the words, but it is the actions. we'll be watching very carefully to see if the commitments that were made in a geneva which is honored would be -- if they are not, we have been very clear that we are ready along with our partners to impose additional cost. >> now that there have been costs, is that over the weekend? >> over the coming days. >> of the other thing i wanted to ask is there is a report in "the london times," that to the united states is looking to put sanctions on president putin's personal wealth. is the united states look at sanctioning the president of russia personally? >> i will not go into foreshadowing individuals that

in the united states may target. we have been clear that there are additional individuals, close associates of senior leadership, and those entities that they are associated with that remain very much potential targets of additional sanctions. with also said there are other potential ways and the framework of our executive orders that we could impose cost should it be necessary. and in the event of a dramatic escalation or significant escalation, including the potential for russia to move its own forces on the border inside of ukraine, those costs and sanctions could include targeting very significant russian economy. beyond that, i am not going to be specific.

>> are you saying given that one of the leaders of the progression forces has already projected the current ukrainian government is legitimate. are you said we hold moscow responsible for making sure these rubbles, progression forces leave the buildings they occupied? >> what we are saying is, we believe that russia has considerable influence over the actions of those who have been engaged in destabilizing activity in eastern ukraine. a russia has committed to use that influence to try to ds glade and diffuse the situation and that includes vacating the buildings -- and that includes diffusing the situation and vacating the buildings and cooperating with

the monitors and other steps including public statements that was signal to de-escalate the situation. give us a better understanding of the conversation that have taken place is in regard to the confirmation of the jewish community and the report there were pamphlets, outrages as described by the secretary of state as grotesque and unacceptable. what the president's thoughts were and what did he and ministers has committed to doing -- and what the administration has committed to doing? >> the administration has expressed the discussed quite bluntly. we found the pamphlets to be sickening. they have no place in the 21st century. we have conveyed that. very forcefully to all concerned secretary kerry had in the

conversation very plainly with foreign minister lavrov yesterday. the joint statement that was issued in geneva made reference to anti-semitism and other forms of bias to action precisely for that reason because we were so outraged and alarmed by the servicing of the pamphlets. tpp.u mentioned would you describe that in the context of the trip? and if you do not have any deliverables on that, make it less of a success? a some analysts are calling china containment to work, do you view that differently? tpp, we havect to made a great deal of progress over the past many months in arms of achieving ultimately comprehensive if, high standards regional trade agreement.

we expect the president's travels and works in the coming weeks and months on tpp will continue to yield progress. we expect that as a result of that, we will be able to conclude an agreement. i think it is yet another opportunity to advance our opportunities and i believe our tpp partners view it as that way. in the run-up to the trip, progress has been made and we expected to continue. this remains a very important aspect of our rebalance to the asia-pacific region. one that holds great promise for the countries in the region as well as for the united states. there've been outside estimates that experts suggest that as $125.5 billion dollars in annual exports could accrue from a successful conclusion of the tpp and we will continue to

work towards that. given its significance to all concerned. with respect to the trip and whether it ought to be viewed as containment of china, i would say this trip has a very positive, affirmative agenda and that is how we are looking at it. as an opportunity to solidify and modernize our alliances and partnerships as an opportunity to advance our agenda including tpp and international interest ourn opportunity to affirm commitment to the region and its security and show the united states will remain for the long-term, a major security stabilityd force for and democratic development. and also, an opportunity to deepen our people to people ties and relationships. hence, the young leaders fo rum which we are looking for two throughout president

the region. it is a positive agenda that underscores the united states' commitment to the region is growing and the cornerstone of and it'sl engagement going to be there for the long term. >> you said repeatedly -- [indiscernible] ign in pro russian forces, have we see any signs of they are doing it? >> we will continue to watch very carefully to see what they do and say and how the monitors are allowed to operate when they deployed which will begin over the weekend. i do not take the statement of leader asual, a rebel definitive. i think over the coming days, will have the opportunity to see what russia can and will do to

uphold its end of the agreement. whether you are considered sanctioning putin's assets? >> i was not named individual targets. >> you're going to say sectors are on the table? >> would've said from the outset and if you read the president's order, there our room for sanctions. >> wanted to knock down the idea -- >> i do not think it's asstructive as policymakers we make very complex and difficult situations to start into getting to name individuals on our sanctions list. if you know how sanctions enforcement work, it is counterproductive. >> china is looking carefully about how the president talk about the maritime disputes in

the china sea. if you going to use the kind of language that angela merkel used that angered china somewhat? is thepresident -- president going to meet with anybody from the delegation? >> on territorial disputes, you will hear the president say what has been consistently you as policy which the disputes need to be resolved and ought to be resolved, not through coercion anythings, not through but peaceful, diplomatic means based on the rule of law. international law in particular and the land of the sea. that will continue to be our strong view that we have shared that in all of our engagements with concerned parties including the president had the opportunity to meet with the president xinping. with respect to your second

question, i think the president is not a likely to have that meeting. >> you mentioned the u.s. -- allies, we have been there when they need us. does the administration feel it in the to reassure any worries from them about u.s. willingness to defend them in terms of aggression in the region? >> there should be no question, where we have alliance commitments and asia-pacific region or anywhere else in the world. will uphold those obligations willingly and definitively. [indiscernible] time go to the region at a when our allies in the region are very much appreciative of us and committed to our alliance

relationships in these alliances are only strengthening in the context of more uncertain environment. >> can you inform us of any additional information on possibility of joint u.s. nato monitoring of the elections in the ukraine, got? >> nato does not do election monitoring. >> any form of monitoring that might be possible? >> i expect it the ukrainian government invite outside monitors that they may be forthcoming whether they invite them from nongovernmental organizations, individuals from the friendly states, the eu, it is their choice. nato is not an election monitoring or political organization. l very much.u al >> political strategist

discusses the politics and candidates in 2014 and 2016. senatorial mayor and mississippi immigrationk about policy. after that, a form on how u.s. policy in asia is affected by russian annexation of crimea. >> whether an award for good journalism, as a politician i declare in making a judgment on that. serviceward for public for possibly the greatest betrayal of our national secrets of all times, it strikes me as quite bizarre. i think there's a real danger of the media world. passing itself on the back without understanding the consequences for the dangers that we face in a very dangerous world.

i think there's a dangers disconnected there. newspaper,"guardian if i am an individual gave the danes of operatives outside the jurisdiction, that would be breach of the terrorism and and the united kingdom and would apply to me as an and official, why did not apply to newspapers? >> the san antonio mayor, julio >> liam fox. , the senatorial book festival including authors and panels on the stories that shape san antonio. the nsa, big brother on saturday starting at 1:00 p.m. on c-span two. history tv, toward the nsa's cryptologic museum and learn about secret code and

their role in u.s. history. sunday at 6:00 and 10:00 on c-span 3. political predictions from a panel at the annual world affairs at university of colorado with the democratic and republican strategist. and talked about the 2014 2060 elections. from boulder, colorado, this is one hour and 20 minutes. >> thank you. mic on? oh, yes. sorry for that. i want to get started. we run as tight a ship as we can for world affairs. welcome to session 2164 of the conference of world affairs, entitled "the political crystal

ball." how appropriate, given what is coming in the next couple years. today is tuesday, april 8, and we are in umc 235. -- ime is suzi addicks m have the pleasure of moderating this panel today. we will have each of our panelists give some comments, roughly 10 minutes. them an opportunity, if they wish, to comment on each other's comments. up tonviting you to come the microphones on either side of the dais. we will give preference to students. if i see students in line, do

not feel upset if i call them to the microphone ahead of you. that is the focus of the conference. i want to start this morning by reminding all of you to turn off your cell phones, any other elect rick -- electronic devices that you have. we do this out of respect for our panel and each other. we do not want these things going off in the middle of our meeting. i am when to start by introducing our four panelists in the order in which they will speak. on this, socided there is no significance to be read into the order in which they will speak. our first speaker is to my immediate left, david bender. he is well known to many conference attendees for his involvement in public issues and political activities. he also has been a broadcaster and an author. one of the things you may not know about david is that his interest in politics goes way, y