appen. there isn't that many people that say that. there are people whose argument is we should not reward people for breaking the laws. the vast majority of americans, vast majority of republicans, vast majority of conservatives do not believe in deportation f 11 million people. they just don't. as i said earlier, cost is an issue that people -- that has to be confronted. we talk about breaking the law and border security -- people have to understand gun rights -- and this is actually good for the treasury of the united states. you hear a lot about that. the last thing you hear is will they enforce the law? i like president obama.

that is not the issue. he is not going to be president anymore by the time this gets going so let's talk about the real issues we need to deal with. i assume the law will be enforced. >> one of the things we saw were bits of news over the weekend which i think are worth talking about today as we look forward. one related to the potential candidacy of jeb bush. talking very specifically about immigration at the presidential library in college station. the other news that came out as the lead editorial in "the new york times" on sunday was the fact that the obama administration has now surpassed the mark of 2 million deportations to perhaps get tough and ameliorate concerns rom the right. are you comfortable with that? are you comfortable with the evel of deportation?

is that something that needs to be done to bring people into the tent or is there another way to go about that issue? >> my hope is that the administration will go about it a different way. i am not comfortable with the number of deportations. "the new york times" article and other articles have focused on the fact that folks with relatively minor criminal records instead of the significant criminal records, the felonies that have been spoken about, have actually been deported. >> traffic violations. >> things that anybody will not argument that are concerns to the safety of the community or national security. my hope is that the president will find ways that are within his power that are constitutional to ease the evel of deportation.

>> governor barbour, to go back to the issue of governor bush, he wrote a book about immigration which did not provide a pathway to citizenship. one of the things that was pulled out of his speech on sunday was that he was taking a far more moderate view. he in some ways referred to it as an act of love. essentially, those people that are coming to this country are doing so primarily in an effort to improve the economic stability of their lives and the economic stability of their families. is that the right message for your party going forward as we move into the next presidential election cycle or what is the tone you would like to see from whomever the next candidate will be for the republican party on the topic of immigration? >> i thought it was interesting in the 2012 campaign, rick perry and newt gingrich were very moderate, open, closer to what i considered my views, and

it was mitt romney who was the least conservative candidate that saw fit to get over to the ight of them, if you want to describe it that way. i think it hurt him terribly in the election. i think it was a very bad strategic mistake. what people want you to do is tell the truth. if jeb feels that way about it -- it reminds me of my old boss ronald reagan. ronald reagan used to say when the blame america first crowd gets out of hand, you need to apply the gates test. what is the gates test? he says the gates test. open up the gates and see which way people run. they run to america. that is what jeb is saying to me.

this is the place for good reason. we ought to be proud of it. when you apply the gates test and people want to come here. that is what is good about this and i don't find that message has the benefit of being true. whether everybody will take that same view is neither here or there. it is very similar to ronald reagan. >> is that the right direction for the party? >> i think for economic policy, for legal policy, for national security policy, and for immigration policy as well as being the shining city on the hill, every one of those -- we ought to have good immigration reform. >> as you get into the 2016 cycle, you are going to have more republicans than not that are closer to the jeb bush position. somebody with that view who gets into the general election

and makes it more competitive general election against the democrats. >> do you have a particular window? we are around the magazine sitting around thinking that we are going to have two legitimate contenders for the republican nomination which is good for "texas monthly" to be able to write about senator ted cruz and governor rick perry. it is interesting when you pull that moment out of the campaign in 2012, governor perry took a lot of heat about the comment that you don't have park if you don't support the fact that people are living here, whether they are here legally or not, if they had been here for a long time, should not have access to in-state tuition to our public universities. california followed quickly ehind. was that something that is well received on your end? as you are talking about civil

rights components of this, you are also talking about an economic component. is that the tone that you think is the right one for the party to be striking? >> again, what i think people want to hear from candidates is what they really think. rick perry was obviously saying what he really thinks. his record matched what he thought. people should have been sticking their finger in the air and what do people want me to say? be what you are for. the first rule is be what you are for and the second rule is tolerate people who disagree ith you. people can disagree with me on all sorts of things. what is the magic way to talk about immigration? you get people who are becoming ontrived and not useful.

>> fair enough. we are down to a few minutes. i'd like to thank both of you for being here today. mayor castro, if you could solve one problem related to this issue or talk to one person about this issue would have the opportunity to change somebody's mind who maybe disagrees with you, what would it be? if you are able to break through on one aspect of it, what would you most like that to be? >> that is a broad question and a narrow question. i would say to look at the history of our nation and to understand that we have had the challenges throughout the history of our nation with peoples who have come from divination throughout the world. every single time we have been able to surmount those challenges and welcome those groups in because of it it is keeping with our tradition as americans to welcome new immigrants and to find a way to have their brain power, their energy, and their talent to

make america stronger. in this century, we are competing for investment, brainpower, for economic development on a global basis. we need them as much as they need us. >> governor barbour, do you have a follow-up? >> i don't think there is a single silver bullet. i can't resist talking about one subject we haven't talked about which i think is really important. today it was announced that the united states government is going to quit taking applications for h-1b visas. these are the visas for their very specially skilled -- we only have 65,000 of them plus another 20,000 for people with more than a bachelor's degree, a doctorate or masters degree. this is the science, technology, engineering elite

of the world who want to come here. they announced they're going to quit taking applications. they started last week. the window was open from april 1 till yesterday. he 85,000 were more than apply for. when you have a system that denies these young people, the best and the brightest in the world to come here, go to school, and then we won't let them stay. so they go home and start a factory that employs 800 people. if we had let them, they would've gone to memphis and started a factory that employs 800 people that they would put -- [applause]

in texas, you all have -- people think about texas's border. we are in one of the high tech centers of the world in this town where we sit. they need, as the mayor said, they need this talent here. it is talent we are denying to ourselves. i would urge all of you to just do a little bit of research about how many jobs are created by the average person that gets in h-1b visa to come to the united states. in a matter of years, it is multiples. there are like four or six americans working for every one of those immigrants that came near. yet, our government's policies, we don't have enough of these visas to lasting whole week in he supply chain. >> excellent last thought. i did run a little bit over but i will like to thank you very much, governor barbour. thank you, mayor castro. thank you very much.

[applause] >> during this month, c-span is [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national able satellite corp. 2014] >> on the possibility of congressional action on immigration legislation brendan buck the spokesman for house speaker john boehner issued the following statement.

>> during this month, c-span is pleased to present our winning entries in this years studentcam documentary competition. it is c-span's annual competition that encourages middle and high school students think critically about issues. students were asked to base their video on the question -- what is the most important issue the u.s. congress should consider in 2014? second prize-winning sophomores, max foley-keene, anna o'driscoll, and paul bass are from montgomery blair high school in silver spring, maryland. they believe congress should make filibuster reform their ost important issue. >> many of us recognize the iconic image of the talking filibuster. one senator standing up and talking about what he or she believes in for as long as they can stand. >> i will speak until i can no longer speak.

>> i am not going to leave this body until i do get them, sir. >> many people don't know there have been hundreds and hundreds of filibusters in the past few years alone. there is an invisible filibuster that has bought the senate to complete halt requiring every bill to have 60 votes to pass. this is the silent filibuster. >> 60 votes to get him confirmed. >> the necessary 60 votes. >> in 2014, congress must enact serious filibuster reform in order to return the senate to ts democratic roots. before talking about the filibuster today, we have to look into the senate's past. the filibuster was born in 1806. former u.s. vice-president aaron burr gave a speech in front of the senate. >> it came about quite accidentally because of a role

change that was engineered by the mischevious aaron burr. >> he told the senators they should remove the previous question motion. the previous question motion would quite simply, if passed by a majority end debate and begin votes on a bill. after having removed the previous motion question, senators realized there was no way to end debate. they realized that if they kept talking, they could stop all business in the senate. thus, the talking filibuster as born. the filibuster was not in the constitution and the founders would've most likely been opposed to the idea. many of our nation's founders hated the idea of a super majority requirement in congress which is what the filibuster has required. >> the founders would be scandalized to see the way business fails to proceed in he senate today. they lost a sense of bipartisan cooperation to get things to ove forward.

>> in 1917, after the urging of president woodrow wilson, the senate adopted a cloture rule. cloture is a motion to end debate. as adopted in 1917, it took 67 votes to end debate on an issue which means if 67 senators wanted a filibuster to end, they would pass cloture. in 1975, the votes needed for cloture were lowered than 60 votes. this is the threshold that is still used today. for a long period of u.s. history, the filibuster was a rarely used procedure. between 1840 and 1900, there were only 16 filibusters. the filibuster remained a rarely used procedure throughout most of the 20th century. lyndon baines johnson faced only one filibuster. harry reid has faced more than 400.

the silent filibuster is used when 41 or more senators merely threaten to filibuster. this is different from the talking filibuster in which one person takes turn talking for as long as he or she can without eating, drinking, or going to the bathroom. if you have been watching the news lately, you might've noticed that almost all bills are described as needing 60 votes to pass. this is because cloture is passed in order to end debate to prevent a filibuster meaning that 60 or more senators must vote to end debate on a bill because there is a threat of a filibuster. by taking time to vote on cloture, senators are taking time away from working on the issues that are important to our country today and will deeply affect our future. the use of the silent filibuster has become considerably worse under the presidency of barack obama. the republican minority in the senate has used it exponentially more than any other senate. since barack obama has been president, cloture has been filed more than 447 times. as the usage of the filibusters

increase, the number of bills passed in congress has decreased. important legislation dealing with the pressing concerns of the nation have been stopped from passage because of the filibuster. without the filibuster, the president's job act, the buffett rule, the dream act for illegal immigrants, a public option for the affordable care act would have been passed hrough the senate. whether or not you support these proposals, they should all have had the chance to be voted on and passed by the majority of the people's representatives, not obstructed by the minority. the senate deserves the chance to conduct the business of the nation, not wade through a mass f obstruction. so, what can be done to reform the filibuster and make the senate a more democratic institution? there are many proposals on the table.

senator jeff merkley of oregon is a leading senate advocate for reform. >> we get rid of the filibuster on motions to simply proceed to a bill. that is debating whether to debate. you are wasting a ton of time to no value we get rid of conference committees. if the house has passed the bill and the senate has passed a different version, the two sides should get together immediately and resolve those ssues. we should change the current 60 votes required and change it to 41 to extend debates. people have to vote affirmatively to say they want more debate and if they vote for more debate, one of the 41 has to be on the floor. this creates a talking filibuster rather than a silent super majority barrier. a talking filibuster means the american people can see something other than a quorom call. when they see that talking filibuster, they can decide whether the folks that are doing that are heroes or bums. they can weigh in with their own senators. > there are many reasons people oppose filibuster reform. some believe strongly in the tradition of the filibuster.

others see it as a necessary check on the majority. but, some believe it has gone too far. >> it passes from fairness to the minority into obstructionism at point of which everybody has said their piece. >> they are using them to stop the obama administration from doing what it would like to do. >> many are afraid to reform the system because they are worried they will lose their power once they become the minority. filibuster reform is something that could positively affect the senate for years to come. congress must end the filibuster on the motion to proceed, lower cloture to 55 votes, and require the minority to be present in a debate. congress, filibuster reform is the most important issue for you to address in the 2014 session. >> to watch all of the winning videos and to learn more about our competition, go to c-span.org and click on studentcam. tell us what you think about the issues. post your comment on studentcam's facebook page or

tweet us using #studentcam. weet us using #studentcam. then a preview of the president's upcoming affected by russia's. after that a discussion on the programs available to help veterans transition to civilian ife. on the next washington journal "los angeles times" reporter donald lee looks ahead to the federal reserve's next move on monetary policy. ian e daily reporter annie schneider discussas proposal from the e.p.a. and army corps of engineers that would amend the clean water act to give the e.p.a. jurisdiction over some streams and wetlands and lee rayey of the pew research center a new study that shows 18% of adults with internet access had important personal

information stolen last year. and as always we'll take your calls. and you can join the conversation at facebook and twitter. washington journal. live at 7:00 a.m. eastern on -span. >> i love duke. and i'm a loyal duke alum. and i didn't do this to hurt duke. i did this to really try to figure out what had happened. in a dispassionate way. there's the tremendous amount of passion about this story. even to this day. all one has to do is go on to amazon and see already that i've amassed 25 one-star reviews. even the book hasn't been out a week and a 600-page book so guessing that not many of those one-star review writers have read this book. my last book was about goldman sachs and people have a lot of passion about goldman sachs, too. but this is in another realm

altogether. >> in the price of silence, author and duke alum william d. cohan looks at the duke lacrosse scandal of 2006. sunday night at 8:00 on c-span's q&a. >> for the southwest florida museum of history and our agricultural exhibit, and we highlight the three c's of florida agriculture. which is citrus, cattle and kane. and -- and cane. and the three big industries within agriculture that have made florida what it is today. interesting, all three of those were originally brought offer by the spanish. in the first -- inhas been tabts here in florida. the cattle in the first place was brought over as a food source. for the settlement of florida. and citrus and cane were later brought over as cash crops. well, the cattle established itself as almost -- the early american settlers who came down

here had herd the cattle, they were free roaming. and so the florida cowboy or what we call the florida cracker would herd the cattle once a year during season when they were bringing them to market. but other than that they just kind of roamed the state. and so they adopted very well to our environment. the florida scrub cattle that you see behind me here now, was a specious that was predominant here all the way up into the mid 1900's. nd was very hearty and withstand the cold and the heat and the humidity that we have here. but also did very well in the swamps and the -- out in the grasses. and the sawgrass and so it adapted very well to the florida environment. when the united states purchased florida from the spanish they started that transaction in 1819. completed it in 1821. and at that point, the government was encouraging people to settle florida.

and one of the main draws for florida was to come down here and capture these free roaming cattle. and use that as a monetary source and as a business. and so that industry really started in the early 1800's. built all the way through the civil war. and then became a very important issue during the civil war. >> this weekend book tv and american history tv take a look at the history and literary life of fort myers, florida. including a stop at southwest florida museum of history. saturday at noon eastern on cspan 2 and sunday at 2:00 on c-span 3. >> next a discussion about russia's annexation of crimea. and how it could affect u.s. foreign policy in the region. from the brookings institution, this is just over an hour and a alf. >> hi. welcome to brookings and thanks

for coming this morning. at brookings, we like to think and we like to tell our supporters that our unique strength is our ability to use our breadth of analysts to integrate insights from various regions and emerge with a global picture that can inform the uniquely global concerns of u.s. foreign policy. and in our view, the crisis in ukraine is an episode which merits that type of analysis. and in part through its effects on u.s. foreign policy. we think it has the potential to have some impacts throughout the world. people are already asking what the crisis in ukraine means for u.s. efforts in -- to make peace in syria, for u.s. efforts to denuclearize iran

and most relevantly given that the president is going to asia next week, what the crisis will mean for the pivot to asia or whatever you want to call it. so we decided that we're going to try to set the stage for the president's trip to asia by trying to connect the issues of eastern europe and east asia. explicitly here. and ask how the crisis in ukraine might affect what the president hears and does on his trip next week. we have in my humble and very biased opinion, the perfect panel with which to do that. on my far right is steve pfeifer who's a senior fellow in our center on the u.s. and europe and director of our arms control program. he's a career foreign service officer, retired career foreign service officer.

and among his many posts the most relevant for this panel is that he's the former ambassador to ukraine. next to me is michael hanlon who is a senior fellow and director of research here in foreign policy studies and who is published many, many books. i think more than i've actually read. and most recently, even this week, i think, his most recent book with jim steinberg is out which is strategic reassurance and resolve, u.s.-china relations in the 21st century. i'd heartily recommend it to you. you could wait for the movie but i think you probably shouldn't. [laughter] on my other side is ken lieberthal who's a senior fellow in foreign policy and global economy and development at brookings. he was previously the director of our thornton china center and a professor at the university of michigan. and he's also during the clinton administration was the senior director for asia in the

white house. and on my far left is jonathan pollock, who is a senior fellow in the thornton center and in the center for east asia policy studies and previously a professor at the u.s. naval war college and an expert responsible chinese national security strategy and u.s.-china relations. so to start off i'm just going to ask the panel a few questions and see whether we can find out whether there's any connection between these issues and then we'll go to the audience. so steve, i'd like to start with you if you don't mind. the crisis in crimea and ukraine is obviously occupying a lot of the time and attention of u.s. officials. and i think it's pivot to asia. do you think the united states its have to reor yeb priorities to deal with the crisis? europeans and ukrainians expecting the united states to do so? what'sme start by saying

the back drop going back a few years before this crisis. end you've seen since the of the cold war is the united states having the ability to less time, less attention, less resources to europe. that's largely reflected the of american and european policy over the last 20 years. nato,h the enlargement of the european union, you have really anchored the states of europe, theeastern baltic states into trans-atlantic institutions. one of the goals on the american the pointo get to where we didn't have to worry about that recent on so much, havese they would institutional support. you've seen a significant over the last 25 years, in part reflecting an assessment benignssia was more of a power. so from a military presence that included four heavy divisions in germany at the height of the cold war, down now to two army

europe, so all of fairly significant drawdown. to ukraine from 2010 on i think there was a decision by the administration to let the europeans take the lead. that reflected the fact that the government in ukraine as of 2010 was looking at the european draw as its main path to closer to europe. so it made logical sense basically to take the lead and support that as the way for ukraine to thicken its links with the west. seen over the last several months is an intensification of u.s. interest and attention on crimea as there's been the escalation of ukraine.s there within specifically after you had the crimeay occupation of and the annexation by russia which was seen as breaking the the post cold are order. that you did not use military ofce to take the territory another country.

afterss is that february 24 when you had the new in kiev afterent the former president fled the country and they reafoirled that their interest was in drawing , thereto the european was an expectation that the tosians would do something destablize that government because the russians don't want to see that happen. expectation was much more that the tools the russians would use would be the economic levers and they skipped over that and went to the military occupation of crimea. provoked probably the biggest east-west crisis of the post cold war era. yesterday you saw a meeting in geneva which produced a statement which has the diffuse that crisis, but a big question will be implementation, and least theely at ficial results today are not good, there is no evidence that the armed groups in eastern ukraine have moved to disarm or to evacuate the buildings that

occupied. given the scale of the crisis i expectation inn europe and ukraine that there will be more american attention you're seeing that in terms of american diplomacy, in terms of the time secretary is spending and that the .resident is spending every other day he's making phone calls about the situation ukraine, so it's consuming time, attention and resources. time when yout a see an american policy course which can be broken down to areas, one support ukraine, two, punish russia and nato.reassure bolster so what you've seen is the vice president is going next tuesday, secretary of state has already been there. a lot of work to help that kiev which is .ulnerable a lot of work with the imf on an

which willpanel require ukraine to make tough economic reforms. down the road the houses in order. you have seen steps to punish russia. ratcheting down bilateral relations across the board here at the g8 has been ratcheted back to the g7. some sanctions have apply to individual russians which seems to be having an effect. he said he said his lowering his estimate 2014 to 0.5%. he said capital flight out of russia reached $50 billion. there are projections that capital flight could as much as $200 billion. that would be 50% more than russia during the financial crisis of 2008. i think there are more sanctions waiting in the wings.

a lot on implementations of geneva. the third area potentially has the most path to pivot asia. what is needed in terms of reassuring allies in nato and bolstering nato? very early on, you saw the u.s. military taping steps. at this particular time, it u.s. air force has this mission. they have no air force. the americans had that mission. it was to go from four to 10 aircraft. a squadron of f-16s went in for exercises in poland and u.s. navy has had a string of ships going into the black sea. you now have a conversation going on about coming in behind americans that when it is time to take over the air force it will be more than four

airplanes. we are open to a conversation. there is a desire for some ground presence. i would not be surprised in the coming month if you see not large detachments but small groups of nato ground forces on the territory in central europe in the baltic states in a way that will not be seen as offensive provocation but will be reassuring in terms of tripwire. if you go back to 1997, nato was considering an enlargement. they talked about there was no requirement for the substantial combat forces. there is a conversation underway in nato now, how the circumstances have changed in a way that might be changing the policy. there will be a question what are the requirements if there are forces that are moved up.

where do they come from? that may have some implications for the u.s. if you look at a greater european pull from the president and perhaps from the american military sources, how does that complicate the ability to rebalance toward asia? >> that is the question i was going to ask you. given all of the demands of the time and resources that steve just talked about and to some degree predicted, we are wondering what you think the effects will be? before you get into that, this is notionally part of the pivot to asia. it will be helpful for us to know from your standpoint, the pivot is a long-term policy, where does it stand right now? to what degree has this actually started? to what degree has the united

states actually rebalanced or pivoted toward asia? >> the rebalance is never a gym addict shift in american resources in the first place. that is both good and bad news for what we are talking about now. i will be curious to hear if ken and jonathan agree with me. it is bad news and that whatever modest momentum we had achieved, which i think was a good idea, the rebalance and not pivoting or pretending we could ignore previous allies or commitments or regions but trying to reinvigorate our commitment to the asia pacific, it was never involving that many resources in the first place. to the extent we achieved momentum, we sort of lost it larger because diplomatic

attention has moved away from the change in personnel from the obama cabinet and top leadership and because sequestration has put downward pressure on the defense budget. whatever modest reallocations we are looking for is not competing with the fact that there is downward pressure. the pie is getting smaller for the whole world. there was not much to the rebalance to begin with in tangible terms. when you get distracted for a year or two, you lose the momentum you have obtained. the good news is the rebalance was never really a thing in the first place. getting the energy back should not be impossibly difficult. i say this with respect and support for administration policy. i do not think we wanted to overdo the rebalance. i do not think we wanted to get too much in china's face or pretend we could leave the middle east behind. there was an appropriately modest approach.

one specific way i try to look at this from a military analysis point of view, and jim steinberg and i wrote about this in our book, out of today's military budget is about $600 billion headed downward as the wars continue to end and sequestration looms again. out of that annual amount, how much have we reallocated as a result of the rebalance? amount that might have been partially or primarily focused on the middle east or europe before, how much of that have we taken and shifted toward the pacific? there is room for debate. there is no more than $10 million out of that 600. at most a plan to reallocate about 10 billion. that is largely by the navy putting up to 60% of the fleet

or it used to be 50%. naval ships can still go to the persian gulf. they do not have to go along the south china sea. they are not necessarily going to be serving the rebalance all the time anyway. that is why i say $10 billion a year is upward bound. let's say we were spending $250 billion a year on the asia-pacific previously. there is no good way to come up with a good number. now maybe it is going to be 260 billion. that is in the context of the overall pie getting smaller. if we could even sustain that modest increase, i do not know. that will be a question for the future. we can get it back. it is good the president is going to asia this week. it is good has plans to go to

asia later in the year. his big trade initiative is in trouble for the asian pacific. i think in terms of the diplomatic attention we can get it back. even if we put modest numbers of ground troops in eastern nato countries in future months as might be appropriate under the circumstances with ukraine, it is not going to deprive us of the ability to shift more of the navy and the air force as we are already doing. i am suggesting we need to continue the momentum the president is trying to build next week. he has lost a lot of momentum he created would be rebalance. crimea and ukraine and putin do not prevent him from reestablishing that momentum if he stays focused on the job. >> thanks, mike.

the asia policy has much to be modest about. given that, how is the pivot seen in asia today? is it seen as a real thing? is it seen as sufficient to the needs of the region? >> words and attention matter. it is not just a matter of $10 billion. one of the things about the military dimension is the military commitment for asia would not decline despite downward pressure. there is an issue a priority and conceptualization. i think the obama administration saw the rebalance toward asia as perhaps a big strategic framework statement.

the idea was to reinvigorate attention paid to the asia-pacific region after an enormous focus after 9/11. recognizing this is by far and away the most dynamic region and the world. u.s. interest requires that we enhance our engagement there. and certainly not be seen as neglecting the region. this strategy, integrating economic, military and diplomatic components not separately toward northeast asia, china and southeast asia but an approach the entire region.

they tried to integrate policy toward all of asia. we have never been able to do that effectively. it is a very high bar. putting that actively on the agenda was an impressive goal to seek and pursue. all of this was to ensure that america would play an ongoing role and devote sufficient resources to that. you heard the terms used even among the first three speakers here. >> you personally use read. mike used three. rebalance was the original name of the strategy. that frankly was contentious within the administration. there were some not in the white house who wanted to call it a

pivot. jazzier, sharper. who cares about rebalancing when you can pivot? the difference is substantial in terms of the implication in terms of what you are doing. it sounds at this is the center of everything. the rest is by the body. the third term that has been used that i think should have been used from the start and describes what we are seeking to do was to reinvigorate. we never left asia. we have had he's -- huge interest out there. we put so much attention elsewhere that reinvigorating the effort to asia would have put us in the right position. with the kind of contention, very quickly pivot won out. here we have been more balanced. if you look at the popular discourse, it is all about the pivot to asia.

when you say pivot to asia and raises three questions that are very much in the mind of various audiences in asia about what they should expect and how they evaluate the future of this policy, what this policy will be able to produce. to what extent a success of the pivot in the future depends upon an assumption that the middle east will go smoothly and that europe will not again become a major problem? 80 think of it as a pivot in the literal sense, that is an obvious concern. -- if you think of it as a pivot in the literal sense, that is an obvious concern. what part helps overcome dysfunction in washington which may make a high executive branch policy not very credible and

implementation? thirdly, can the u.s. deliver on both economic and security elements in a way that is credible to allies and partners in the region but also avoids the trap of falling into making china the bull's-eye of the policy rather than making china a central component. that is something that sounds like a rhetorical distinction. it is the largest trading partner virtually every country in asia. if you can build china in a constructive fashion, and that is not easy, but if you can say on that side of the line, you really are achieving greater

stability in asia and a huge u.s. role there. if china is on the other side of the line and asia becomes increasingly divided, countries feel they have to choose one way or another. there is not a single country that would consider that a successful american effort here at the want to have america handle the relationship with china wisely. do not divide asia. don't force us to choose. with that as a background, let me look at where we stand in views of the pivot. i think the developments added to the recent developments in the ukraine. the key premise relies on not having things go wrong elsewhere. it is now quite watchable.

-- questionable. countries will be looking among other things for skillfully assurance both on the president security commitments and on the tactical skills. the initial news was bad. the president had to cancel his last major trip to asia because the government was shut down. pessimism over the trade promotion authority and the ability to deliver on the trade if that is successively negotiated. these are major concerns. they should be seen in isolation.

there is widespread appreciation in asia of the economic recovery in the u.s., we're now the strongest growing economy of the industrialized world are now encountering a lot of trouble. the president has used executive authority through the epa to actually go establish a pretty good record on meeting commitments on greenhouse gas emission. there's greater confidence that the u.s. will avoid another government shutdown. there's more confidence that the u.s. is still capable of real economic dynamism. that is huge. there are still concerns about government dysfunction. i think tpp will be a test of that enormous repercussions. positive or negative depending

on where we need to go. the issue of whether china is the bull's-eye or china is a central part of reinvigoration strategy toward asia that we can handle well is one that we want to make it the latter. there is a lot of pressure that pushes the administration tactically to make comments and commitments that the chinese would interpret as the former. one of the real tests in the coming months and years will be how they need to stay on a constructive side. how ukraine plays that will be one of the elements that will shape that assessment. >> i guess i do want to get into that.

with all of that as background, how is the president seeing this trip? what is he trying to accomplish? how are the asians seeing the trip? are they integrating the concerns steve articulated in the understanding of what the president is doing? >> i cannot say president obama has shared with me what his goals are. this is somewhat speculative. my to do list will be more my own list rather than his might be. it is important to step back for a moment. in november 2011, that was the formal roll out of the rebalanced strategy. i think the gestational elements were there from the very earliest months of the administration. it was then given the germanic rollout with president obama making successive stops in

hawaii and australia and then indonesia. the background is so much of this discussion and did they is precisely the way infants and words and actions are interpreted. the world today, 2.5 years later, looks quite different. asia and the united states looks difference compared to what we saw at the time of the policy rollout. if i can say the rebalance was an ambitious statement of policy intent, it was a very incomplete vision. it remains in critical respects an unrealized vision highlighting just how difficult it is to get some kind of a reconfiguration across the entirety of the united states government. the fact that the asia-pacific region is going to be ever more

central to american interests seems an unexceptional comment. in the same way, the economic gravity is shifting toward the asia-pacific region and we should expect over time that it moves to reflect that reconfiguration. the question persists, to what end? how is it going to be meshed against global foreign policy? if i were coming up with a to do list, here is mine. the first is the preeminent goal for president obama to demonstrate that the rebalance has staying power and genuine strategic significance and that

it is not a code word for the counterbalancing of chinese policy. we need a much fuller strategic conversation. in this case, country to country, recognizing the visit to malaysia and indonesia is a rescheduled activity from before. in my view, we still seem stuck very much in bilateral relationships when our aspirations are to a larger regional vision. i understand there's a lot of multilateral activity in southeast asia, much less of the in northeast asia. it is still the focal point of our economic and diplomatic compared to the growing importance that we attach elsewhere in the region. there is the need for that fuller strategic conversation.

our own strategy is increasingly in question. in this respect i have to say going back to the exuberance of the rollout of the rebalance strategy it was an oversold strategy that did not reflect realistic possibilities about what you could expect. we need to acknowledge openly and i think president obama is very much capable of this, that the rebalance requires some reallocation of resources but that there is a pie. if you're asking questions about what the united states can realistically expect to do, it'll be a function of three alternatives. either we will somehow convince the congress and others to commit more resources to what we

do in the region, we will have to make do with less, or number three we make very clear to our allies and partners in the region that we expect commensurate contributions on their part if we're going to achieve a larger vision for the region in the long term. this is part of that discussion. there is a need for by lateral -- bilateral discussions on issues that are invariant with the american interest of policy goals. we cannot be a disinterested third party. we find a way to reconcile these differences.

i do not see us being able to stand on the sidelines. the best may be the anamoly of the incredible frigidity between korea and japan. they are america's two most important regional allies. they are both headed by right of center government. they barely speak to one another let alone cooperation. the actually got them in the room at the same time. as we are all familiar, their there are deep grievances here. both of these countries try to define a role for themselves in the world that is to come and finding their interests in great conflict with one another. first, the elephant in the room,

we have alluded to it here it its name as china. the question is can we actually see the kind of intelligent discussion that needs to be held almost country by country about longer-term relationships with china, longer-term questions about the international role. it is often asserted that no one in asia wants to force a choice between the united states and china. at the same time, it would be in prudent for the united states to force a choice between china and japan. both are important to american interests. japan is a long-term ally. china is very much the rising power. a successful strategy has to find some kind of an inclusive a successful strategy has to find some sort of exclusive content. much less the future of this reason -- region going the

direction that we don't want to see. finally, a very few quick comments. ukraine may be on everyone's minds. certainly it is reflected in this panel but it should not dominate what president obama discusses on the trip. it is not uppermost for the region as a whole and it will only become so and it certainly could if recent events reconfigure a more lasting strategic alienation between the united states and russia and between russia and europe. do not know if we are there yet but that is what we are here to discuss. events in the ukraine could divert and distract the larger focus on the goals in the asia-pacific region. and in that respect send the wrong message.

in can seet attention diverted from this in the context of ongoing events. but we must work hard not to let >> it wasn interesting listening to these presentations. one is struck by the fact that with the obama administration was doing was an effort that they were trying to turn the gigantic ship of american foreign-policy in recognition of long-term trends and strategy. the history uniform policy does not actually look like that. we are able only to turn the

ship us date through reaction to events rather than reaction to conceptualizing changes in the world. one cannot help but think good try by the obama administration but maybe they misunderstood the nature of how america changes is foreign-policy. now we have a crisis, which is an opportunity. ken said the pivot depended on reinvigoration -- reinvigoration depended on, excuse me, i cannot you be terms of straight. it is difficult when the all mean the same thing. he said it depends on the middle east calming down a little bit and europe not flaring up again. it does not seem to have been

working out. jonathan said the defense budget is fixed. i wonder, with all the crisis happening, if we can inc. of -- think of the defense budget where crises come to roost on the domestic side of american foreign-policy. it how will all of these interlocking crises come to roost in the defense budget? can we look for new things to them? -- happen? >> i think we have to remember our strength. we have a lot of things going on in the world. it a lot of competition for our attention and resources. you're were kind enough to mention my book. and thank you for holding it up

yet again. our colleague bruce jones just put out an excellent book called "still hours to lead." it said the so-called decline is robust. or at least we have it within our means to make sure it does not happen. other countries may be rising. it is not me that america has to decline. on top of that we have allies but combined budgets are $400 billion to $500 billion. i met even factoring in neutral countries are more inclined to work with us than against us. we are in a tremendous position of strength. china clearly is the number two military power in the world at this point, with 200 billion dollars. jonathan may have his own preferred figures. in any event, the rise is significant and important. it does cause some concern.

we do not want to make china feel like it is the bull's-eye. we do not want to view our policy as one as containment. we called our book strategic reassurance and resolve. we need hedging, plus engagement. that is the old way if inking -- of thinking. we need to stay resolute in regard to our interests and allies. at the same time, look for way too--conclusion with china. i think the way in which mr. obama has handled ukraine and the implications that people will try to draw from that has

generally been fine. it is not over yet. it is not a happy story. i think the american message has basically been what you have done so far is pretty darn bad. it is a mildly unacceptable. crimea was historically, largely russian. we do not have it within them are power to do what he did anyway. ukraine is not a formal ally. who needed to pay a price. he needs to be put on notice that if he gets any more aggressive there will be potentially a much higher price to pay.

we're talking through the modalities of how that would happen with german and polish friends who need that gap. we're beginning to have the conversation. we're doing this in the context of a world which we have collectively put a lot of pressure on iran in the past couple of years. we have learned a lot about how to apply them more strategic way. who knows it. he has actually helped us with the iran sanctions. he knows he could be the target of a ramped up level of sentience if he goes further and moves into eastern ukraine. i think this is a balanced message for what china and their allies need to hear about the territories in the east china seas. we should not go to war against china the minute there is an altercation. we need this kind of a balanced approach. we might meet with sanctions there as well. it may not make every japanese

friend equally happy. we have to show some restraint and judicious mess and how we use military force to respond to crises that may or may not be the end of the world. the way he has handled ukraine should be reassuring to the extent people want to draw lessons about how we might handle future crises in asia as well. there is a lot more to say there. >> i want to get you to disagree with that. there is a lot of talk, particularly in this town, but does not see the obamas a demonstration reaction as that will balance. they see it as underwhelming as speaking loudly and carrying a little fix. i am wondering, how are the chinese judging the united states reaction to this? are they likely to draw any conclusions for their disputes in the south or east china sea? >> what has happened in ukraine

gives china problems anomalous every dimension. first of all, the chinese hate the notion of having a revolution from below supported by the west and recognize as legitimate by the west. fairly early on some officials press strong support and went to ukraine. we clearly said effectively we've got it. who are looking to preserve the option of associating with

europe are democrats and people whose values and choices should be respect to. as has moved to an actual takeover of power, we have supported the new government there as a legitimate government. albeit a transitional one. moving to an election. the chinese find everything about that wrong. secondly, the chinese always say territorial integrity is important. they do not like the idea of crimea likely having a referendum seen by the central government from the start as illegal. supported by soviet forces. >> you may be right again. supported by russian special forces.

who has now son they were very much a part of the issue. the chinese look at that was some horror themselves. certainly they have a strong policy of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries. to their mind russia has violated that. with european support in kiev, we also have violated it. there's nothing they see that looks good to them here. if you look at the comments to date, their bottom line is clearly that there is no bottom line. >> we should get them to work at brookings.

>> that you should respect history, resolve things lyrically and peacefully. do it multinational he. oppose the illegal action at the end of the day. there is no there there. i have heard chinese officials say if you cannot a girl out what our bottom line is we have succeeded. this is where they are now. will the way the u.s. has handled this attention make them more aggressive? i really do not think so. i do not think that has any clear impact or likely impact at all.

i think one of the issues that may develop and it really develops an understanding what led to evolve in ukraine and what will evolve and u.s./russian relations that they said prediction is always very difficult. he was absolutely right in that. if this really deteriorates, if our sanctions go from being on putin cronies and russia thanks to sexual sanctions that lead to much less dependence over time on gas from russia and europe, presumably more dependent on us over time. the the chinese are in a very different position. they have seen relations with russia as a counterbalance to being overly dependent on the

u.s. they see potentially russian gas as more available and cheaper if it does not have an outlet in europe. they may be quite prepared to pick up the russians slack and be seen by the u.s. and europeans as effectively making it more difficult to get rested to behave and what we consider to be a responsible way. that can affect dynamics in a lot of ways. that is based on several contingencies, none of which is by any means certain. >> china will not take lessons for its territorial disputes from the u.s. reaction. the argument on that generally goes that if the u.s. is not able to stand up to russian aggression, the chinese will draw the lesson that the united states will not stand up to chinese aggression in the south china sea. why aren't you worried about that?

>> it is a very clear distinction. we have long-standing alliances in asia with most of the countries where the territorial disputes with china are most severe. we have stated time and again that we will meet our alliance commit and. we will argue about what that means to meet our commitments here in we do not have an alliance. we have not tried to make ukraine part of nato. it is a different situation. the chinese are very clear about the differences. >> let's bring this back to europe. what are the europeans looking for?

are they looking for specific messages? what i would think they would look for this. that president looks at this to convey the hands. it is unlikely to see resources expanding. resources be it time or money or military are not in the tent. are there additional commitments to asia that could take away from europe. you have to go one way or

another. on the military side, it seems like looking at the pacific legion, the focus will be on american air and naval assets. we have these on the backseat. there may not be a huge contingents over that. the other thing will be today we did not see any illegal groups. for five days around this may be a similar situation. is it time to do something more? the russians is not live up to this. one lady asked are you now prepared to move or were? those are the things they will be looking at. that's we live by to go.

>> i will make this quick. with respect to the defense budget, we have seen several times in my memory major reconfiguring event that changed the entire framework with which we looked at the defense budget. specific lead the soviet invasion of afghanistan and 911 where the gates opened and american power in all its forms is manifest. i'm not saying we're at that went. i do not know yet whether or not the events in ukraine will have that kind of a configuration. they could. that would be a moment where again the american balance of

interest would be redefined. it might have some very direct implications for whether or not the united states is able to push ahead with its long-term strategies in asia. ken has arty alluded to the problematic circumstances of the negotiations here. if the united states appears a bit beleaguered and perhaps with states going their own way, then they will have to ask how much staying power it does the rebalance have over the longer term? i am not predicting it. it is more to flag that as a possible issue. we want to make sure that his policy options remain as limited as possible. putin is visiting china next month. his arty making noises about all kinds of expended collaboration

with china. we will have expectations of china and that regards to they do not simply exploit the situation for their own advantage. he has had five meetings with prime minister abe. the last thing we wish to see is that putin find a way to hone in on such an important and essential relationship to american interests. i would not preclude a gambit from him to north korea. the russians have been very much a kind of a marginal fact to in the discussions here on the new lunar -- nuclear issue in particular. it is possible that putin in particular will find options to sweeten the deal with pyongyang in a way that gives north korea more running room, a get out of jail free card.

that is something that will bear careful consideration in the months to come. >> thanks. i guess now we can go to the audience. when you get the microphone, these identify yourself. please be reasonably brief. please ask a question. why don't we start with this gentle man right here? >> exhibited intelligence review. i would like to go back to and build on what ken said about the chinese reaction. it seems to me the resolution of the crisis and crimea will be absolutely or probably decisive in terms of how the chinese will react to the u.s. reinvigoration program or the new major powers agreement. it seems to me that putin has been made into a bogeyman. i cannot see any russian leader excluding them from an agreement

in which ukraine would become a part of the eu with some carrots that had to do with some relationships with nato as well. given the relationship between ukraine and russia that any russian leader could have accepted that without some kind of reaction. >> the refusal of the u.s. to get some kind of meeting prudent had asked for -- putin had asked for seemed foolish and brought this to a critical stage. how they get out of this is going to be key. sanctions are very good. the russians after leningrad and stalingrad, they are very tough people. if they think they are being attacked, they will consolidate around putin.

if there is some agreement over and above these agreements that have been made in geneva, they will hopefully lead somewhere, russia can be part of the solution. perhaps the chinese fear that they are being targeted as well. if it goes to a prewar situation with more and more military troops on either side of the border, the chinese are going to see themselves targeted as well. i think that is decisive as to what is going to happen. >> that is an interesting comment. >> thanks. i'm from the mitchell report. i have been sitting here this morning and realizing that i am

not quite sure what this panel is about. >> thanks. [laughter] >> is this about crimea? we have two or three china experts on the panel. is this china? is this the nexus between them? if the latter is the case, it comes back to the observation that a smart asia policy is one that makes china a key factor but not the bullet -- bull's-eye. i don't ask that in a critical sense. this is more of an analytical sense. what is it from the standpoint

of the panelists that we are driving at today? what is the underlying thrust of what brought this panel together? i know you don't do this because there was nothing else to do on good friday. >> we can take one more question. then we will come back. >> i have but the state department and most of my experience has been in europe. assuming that putin will forge ahead and not adhered to this agreement, what if the action were to deploy troops the baltic states? what would the reaction be in china, japan, and korea? >> let's start with steve.

if you can address the question of the carrot to putin and russia. >> if you look over the last several years, there was a carrot in the sense that while nato was not in a position, if you look at what was going on in ukraine, there was not going to be progress on that front. the government said they did not want to join and the current government says it as well. as important, it is a controversial issue in ukraine. the government is trying to raise good ability in eastern ukraine. the nato question was off the

board. the more difficult issue is polls are consistently showing ukrainians want to draw closer to the european union. the problem here is in putin's idea, that is unacceptable. that is where it goes. the european union is not nato. i could understand the russian concern about nato. it seems to apply to the eastern -- european union as well. it is a difference in terms of where ukraine wishes to go. >> mike, can you address the question about the panel? >> happy to. i think it is useful to try and understand foreign leaders. i think we should not apologize for what putin has done. it is unacceptable. in 1994, russia was signatory to an agreement in bucharest -- budapest.

it said we would guarantee the territorial integrity very of ukraine. let's not let them off the hook on that. >> we are very clearly saying this is not a military commitment. it is an implied the somatic -- diplomatic agreement. they have violated many agreements. >> that is one reason why we are having the family -- panel. it was a big jail in international -- change in international politics. if there was anything to that, we had gotten to a world where interstate war among established major powers wasn't really happening. that was a good thing. putin is challenging that basic edifice of the international

system today. now we see our president going on a trip to another part of the world with huge power. the tectonic shift is big enough that we need to try and apply the lessons from one place to another. secondly, we had to ask if there were resources that the united states had that were adequate to the task of the rebound or if they would be siphoned off again for parts of the world we are trying to rebalance or pivot from. we heard discussion about that. the consensus of this panel is there is not a requirement or

necessity for what is happening a -- in ukraine will invalidate our ability to concentrate on the asia-pacific. there's a challenge in the asia-pacific rebalance successfully. we want to get the individual pieces right. the third piece of this is the one that i tried to comment on. our japanese and korean and filipino officials and the reason going to wonder if we are still dependable. you have heard most of us say that we don't necessarily see a reason why the united states should not be dependable. we think he then states treaty commitments are firm in the asia-pacific. it is a valid question and i am confident that it is on people's minds. is this indicative of a potentially retrenching and less

engaged united states that is not going to be as dependable in east asia. our asian allies should not have that worry. it is worth talking through and recognizing. mr. obama will have that question posted to him next week more than once. >> to build on what mike is saying, the united states is a global power. it is uniquely a global power. one of the ways in which our world is interconnected is through the medium of global power because of what happened and how we react in one region. the lessons drawn from u.s. credibility have implications elsewhere. that is a we are trying to do here. you can tell me later if we succeeded. >> i think it is interesting, kind of like a balloon. if you squeeze it in one direction, it goes in one

direction. the u.s. is a global power. the fundamental premise of this panel is precisely how does the united states simultaneously remain relevant in all regions of strategic importance to the united states and can we do it in conjunction with our allies and with other partners or are we and our threshold of some kind of a discontinuous change that will leave the world a much messier place in the future? i don't know if we are at that point during we are trying to be realistic about what we do with our resources. i agree that there is a tendency in certain circles to endlessly disparage american capacity and american well -- will. we could talk ourselves into looking much less resolute than i think we actually are.

>> i would have word to that. because we have pegged this as ukraine and the rebalance asia, it puts a premium on the military side of things. i actually think from a chinese perspective, the most important development in the coming 12 months will be whether or not the u.s. succeeds in negotiating a high-quality partnership in asia. this would necessarily include substantial market access and concessions by japan, which they have never been prepared to do before. if they can get that through the u.s. congress. if we can do so, we are in the early stages of moving forward on negotiations with similar

partnerships with europe. that is huge. what sparked a lot of this crisis in ukraine was the notion that ukraine would opt for the european union association and not the custom union. these need not be exclusive. there is another multilateral trade negotiation going on in asia. china is very much involved in that. we are not a part at that. it is a much more superficial agreement. if we get this treaty through, it is a huge boost overtime to our economy and the integration

of asia. i will bet a fair amount of money that china will seek to join that. many leaders in china now see potentially joining that as providing a political leverage to carry out economic reforms at home that they want to pursue but they face vested interest in opposition. that is a huge win. that demonstrates american initiative and capacity to shape favorable outcomes in a region. it bridges some of the geopolitical divide. focusing on ukraine too much may be -- wouldn't want to focus on the military side of this alone. >> ukraine crisis is a crisis about economic integration. it is about uncertainty. >> it was sparked by that. it is becoming a different kind of crisis. >> let's get back to the audience.

>> thank you. i like to come back to the point by dr. liberal about the extent of brain china on board of -- bringing china on board. how is that possible on both economic and political dimensions? it is easier to convince china that the u.s. asia policy will be beneficial for china. how is that going to be possible to convince china that it is not a code word for counterbalancing china? when the u.s. says it is not taking sides, it is abiding by

its commitments to its allies, china does not by the words. the u.s. is taking sides. how do these two things reconciled with each other? >> thank you. i would like to know if any of you are able to comment on the context of this letter that was distributed to ukrainian jews yesterday. does it suggest a next level of more overt anti-semites as him -- anti-semitism? >> let's take the third question right here.

>> thank you. i have two questions. we talked about the u.s. military budget a lot. we did not talk about china. given their economic slowdown, is this budget sustainable? >> that was my first google glass question. but start with ken. can you answer the question about the chinese view of rebalance? >> i think the chinese have a strong tendency to see the u.s. over time almost predetermined to take an array of measures to slow down and complicate and disrupt china's rapid rise. this is based on two fairly fundamental things. one is china's modern history is you lose if you bet on the

altruism of other countries. they come at the modern world with a bad hundred 50 years -- 150 years. there is a deeply ingrained notion that number one it will never give way to number two without a fight. even if we are not going to engage in a war, we will will try to complicate china's rapid rise. you can construct a narrative on that based in part on, to hear out of washington and various voices in washington will support any narrative you want to develop.

you can pick and choose and we are very fractured us and vocal. -- frack to us -- fractuous and vocal. you build chai's -- ties to china. we have done that in a hugely dynamic way. even on the military side, we are now expanding our military with direct interaction with china. both sides are committed to expanding that. we are negotiating a treaty with china. a lot of the reforms that china is advocating domestically are things we have advocated for them to do for years. we have provided expertise in thinking through some of those issues.

there are a lot of ways in which we engage china very broadly. these are a very institutional -- these are on a very institutionalized basis. i think in addition to that, we need to do a little more. we need to do more in terms of articulating our conception for the region. it is not just the principle of obeying international law and respecting territory integrity. how we see the region evolving and not just categorical terms. we have a stronger story to tell him that. >> can you take on the question of anti-semite is him -- anti-semitism? >> there was a pamphlet that went around. it said that as of a certain date, all jews in the area would

have to register and pay a $50 fee to do so. there was a lot of contact with local jewish leaders in that area. this letter was a provocation. it is an ugly thing. it is not clear that it was put out. >> this is a kind of open ended game that goes on. you don't have a situation where there is perfect equivalence between how china does its expenditures. i do want to play the numbers game appearance supple. it would seem to me that on the one hand, if there is a sustained slowing of the economic growth rate in china, there will be pressures on their increases in the defense budget. this is partly as a function of

inflation rates in china. they have been forceful in recent weeks and reinforcing the commitment for china to be a stronger power to protect its interest. the fundamental question is not the numbers that we use but as we see china emerged as a much more consequential military power in years to come, what are the purposes to which that power is put? as ken noted, our defense ties with china are one of the quiet success stories of the last year or more. my own impression from conversations with chinese officers is that this is not a momentary consideration. it does not mean to say that china or the pla has warm and fuzzy feelings toward everything the united states military may do.

one way or another, we will have to adapt and interact with the realities of china being a larger military power. the question is whether or not they can show restraint in how that power is demonstrated and utilized. unless you find a situation that the future of this region is less promising in the event of china exploiting its capacity in ways they insist they will not, this could be very different from the receiving end of that power. >> i have a couple of things to add. we tend to think that china is spending two percent of its gdp on military. how you measure their gdp is open to some conjecture.

the issue of purchasing power versus a more traditional peer exchange rate conversion. the estimates i've seen range from $7 trillion to $10 trillion a year. it is a number two military power in the world. its rate of increase has been five to 10% a year. it is not always the 10%. there is ambiguity. there are reasons to think it may not always reach that high. it is still going up. ours is coming down. this does raise the question at what point do the lines begin to converge and what does that mean? i will quickly say that one of the things steinberg and i say in our book is when they reach half the spending of american military spending, they should

think about it. we try to balance that with the argan -- argument needs to be moderated and made more ecumenical. even the chinese in some elements of our thinking and planning and operations change the name to something more to mine. -- benign. we are not looking to get in their face. i want to go in to that in detail. china is the number two world military spending power. they spend about $200 billion a year. that may slow down a bit. we will have to see. >> let's go back to the audience.

>> my name is steve. china's one area of your redemption is taiwan. in response to the russian seizure of crimea, could this embolden chinese hardliners with the declining economic growth rate might look for a success and the taiwan strait -- in the taiwan strait? >> i would like to ask and elaborate on that question. given the perceived weakness of the u.s. response to the seizure of crimea, this is a fundamental

change to the world order. what are the ramifications of that response for our allies'interest? what are the ramifications on our response to the seizure of crimea on our allies confidence in our ability to maintain our interests? >> over here to the right. the gentleman in the blue tie. >> thank you. i am here from western carolina

university. we solved the geopolitical importance of the west since the conclusion of world war ii. this was exasperated by the end of the cold war in the 1990's. my question is are we seeing a shift in the importance of the west to the east? has the response from the united states and other western countries been appropriate to russia's action in crimea to address the shift in power? >> thanks. those are all questions that we thought the panel would generate.

i will take that as validation. >> i would even add a little bit to some of those questions. another thing that putin has done is demonstrate a new model of aggression. his created ambiguity about whether aggression is even taking place and having a deniability about it that has made the response more difficult. has china learned any lessons from that? >> i want to take on the china and taiwan a question. on taiwan, i don't think that china sees what russia has done in the crimea as instructive or encouraging as to what it can do in taiwan. the concert is quite the opposite. russia took over crimea without overt force of military force. it also took it over with a

referendum. you can argue that it was a loaded referendum. i am not aware of anybody who is been to crimea that thought that less than 50% of the people there were pro-russian. >> 50% of the population was ethnic russian. -- 58% of the population is ethnic russian. only 40% of the population wanted some change of status. the referendum was provoked from outside. >> you won't have a similar situation regarding taiwan. china could not absorb taiwan without fierce resistance by the population of taiwan. they could not do it without a major military action across the taiwan strait, which would be obvious to everyone and incur

large loss of life and change the dynamics of the region. china decided some time ago that their best bet by far was to build economic trade and other ties with taiwan, in a gradual process do that hoping that over time a democratic taiwan will see on balance some form of formal unification. they have a provision in their legislation that allows them in a sense if taiwan declares independence or if over a long. of time taiwan remains outside

of china, it would justify in their mind the invoking of that domestic legislation to use force against taiwan. i don't think anybody on the mainland is thinking that the time has come for that. o'er the time will come in any foreseeable future. >> very quickly on the maritime issues. i have been doing some reading on ancient history. post-world war ii settlement. it is stunning when you look at how so much of what was configured in the western pacific after the surrender of japan was almost an afterthought. it was never really reason through. it is really extraordinary if we go case-by-case. the problem now is that you have

states, not just china. actors that feel they are coming-of-age. higher levels of military capacity that could possibly, depending on circumstances, trigger a larger conflict. i am not predicting this. i think there is a world between incidents in the east china sea and the south china sea and the overuse of force. in a variety of ways. we see the dispute between china and japan related to what the -- you actually have chinese maritime vessels and the like.

this ought to be a definite discussion. several of the leading dispute ants, it's the kind of thing that it really does require if -- i am using we as a collective label, the states themselves must be mindful of the great risks and uncertainties that are entailed in all of this. i worry about it in particular about the dynamic between china and japan. the consequences of which, if worse, itto something would have profound reverberations for not only both countries but the united states region as a whole. >> i have one thought in regard

to the big picture question. there is no doubt a shift is happening but i will come back to our interests elsewhere. europe still an amazing economic and political situation. it the most successful alliance in military history. the allies that are not doing and obviouslyily, we like to see them able to do more. they still had 30,000 troops in afghanistan and the partners in thepersian gulf -- industrial democracies are still within nato. they are still in the middle east fighting revolutions. and asia is extremely important

but we have got to come back to the point that america is still a global power. we are still in a very strong position in the think there is no reason to come back to gary's question. prevent mr.have to obama from having a successful trip next week? and reinvigorating the rebalance will take some effort. they have lost a little bit of the focus on it. >> i will come back briefly to this question about sanctions and what happens after geneva. i would argue that worse sanctions at this point may be appropriate. maybe after geneva you give a little bit of time. week, the middle of next if we don't see other commitments, we have to face up to the next step. the model here is that they have not invaded.

if 45,000 russian troops going to eastern ukraine tomorrow, my guess is it is not a hard decision for europe to apply harsh sanctions. they will stay below if that threshold. he came out and said there are no russian troops or agencies in the ukraine about 20 minutes sixr he said that insignia weeks ago were russian troops. situation into a where five days from now, they pretty much look like today, does the west conclude that there is an invasion of sorts going on in the eastern ukraine? it may have implications in terms of the asia aspect of this. >> thanks. i think this is the first panel in my experience that has talked ,bout those anti-semitism

chinese and military spending, and managed to connect them. owe is a wide range and we some things to the panel. these join me. [applause] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014]