brings public affairs events from washington directly to you, putting you in the room in congressional hearings, white house events, briefings, encumbrances, and offering gavel-to-gavel coverage of u.s. house all as a public service of private industry. we are c-span, created by the tv industry and brought to as a public service by your local cable or satellite provider. watch as in hd, like us on facebook, and follow us on twitter. >> former assistant secretary of state p.j. crowley discussed the importance of public opinion and diplomacy for the u.s. image abroad. he also talked about the obama administration's response to the situation in ukraine. the discussion was hosted by the american foreign service association washington, d.c.. this is just over an hour. >> unaccustomed as i am from taking questions from a podium,

joe am a pop, thank you very much. it is a pleasure to be here and see a number of colleagues past and present in the audience. i do want to recognize a couple in particular. over here, outstanding foreign service officer and serving as the public diplomacy officer in ipdgc.nce at the later in the year he will be off to turkey, one of the most interesting places in the world for practitioners of public diplomacy. we're doing an analysis of the challenge at gw that we will be releasing later near. back, bruce gregory, also a colleague at gw has just released a thought-provoking report on the ipgdc website. it is an important contribution to the debate about public diplomacy, what it is, what it

isn't, what it was supposed to become, and hasn't yet. i came to understand this debate early in my tenure as assistant secretary of state for public affairs. it appears to be a debate that never ends. as soon as you start the debate, you're drawn back in time, not focused on what was, not necessarily what needs to be. when i arrived across the street, i visited every know can cranium my organization. one particular group, some who have been part of usia and has not moved on -- i said, guys, it has been 10 years, get over it. their response was, we're never getting over it. that group notwithstanding, the debate itself is useful and important. if you look at the title of my whether i'm not sure thought of that or you thought

of that. it is a great title for his speech. you might think the deficit includes the lack of an entity like usia. i'm going to disappoint you. the challenge in the 21st century is fundamentally different than what we experienced in the cold war. even to talk about the current crisis in ukraine and you hear this is a new cold war, now i believe the department is doing very effective public diplomacy work over the past several months. no trouble communicating. victoria nuland, in particular. the policy world and information environment are very different than they were 40 years ago when i entered government service. the world changed dramatically just at a time from when i left the white house in 2001. i came to the state department in 2009. the challenge in today's world is not just about what we communicate about who we are.

we are actually very good at that. but we need to do better in explaining what we do, and factoring public diplomacy and public opinion into the policymaking process. this is where i believe public diplomacy deficit exists. the new undersecretary for public diplomacy and public affairs talk yesterday at a swearing-in ceremony about the power of the story that we tell. is standing in the world challenged in some respects, but make no mistake, as rick said, we put everything together, who we are, what we stand for, what , theoduce, how we innovate opportunities we generate for our citizens another -- and others, the ideas that have come to define this, we are in line for who we are, but the world is not like and in many cases does understand what we're

trying to do. too often there is a gap. closing that gap is vitally important. this poses a bit of a paradox. i do not believe the united states has trouble communicating. i never believed we were all communicated by a guy in a cave. as it turns out, he wasn't in a cave. as it turns out, he was struggling to lead a far-flung movement that also failed to recognize what his actions were communicating to keep communities from which it derived support. go back to 2011 when i was across the street. after mentioning at the podium we are waiting to hear from the libyan government regarding the official status of its ambassador -- he had affected -- then foreign minister called my said,gue jeff feldman and mr. crowley says you're waiting to hear from me. then he never mentioned the ambassador. more recently, secretary kerry

made a comment regarding syria that russia heard loud and clear. it was converted into the removal of chemical weapons from the syrian battlefields. syria mains and horrific tragedy, but at least weapons of mass destruction are no longer part of the equation. too often over the past decade, we have failed to recognize the impact of what we do. chosen not to explain our action or prefer to communicate in private, not public. how many times a week heard, we can't talk about that because it might tip off our adversaries? but in the process, we end up not explaining ourselves effectively to our friends and even our own citizens. is changing dramatically. i don't need to tell an audience like this that fact. strategies for policymaking, public diplomacy.

it is a lot more fun being a professor than explaining u.s. policy across the street. i post a series of questions to my graduate class in public diplomacy at gw. the first one was, does public diplomacy require fundamental change in the 21st century? it's foundations, to some extent, its current functions remain rooted in the cold war world. back then, it was two distinct systems competing for global primacy. aday we still confront contest of ideas, but this contest is very different. there are many more competitors, states, and nonstate actors jockeying for influence in an integrated global system. back then, we could send the distinct messages, information and disinformation to audiences and be reasonably confident the

two would never find themselves in the same room. is anything that we say available within minutes, almost anywhere in the world. there's no such thing as a foreign domestic divide. the concept of plausible deniability is rapidly becoming obsolete. although, that may be news to russia and vladimir putin. a second question i posed to my students was, if public diplomacy needs to adapt, should the majority of effort be and resources be devoted to programs with a long-term or short-term payoff? no one doubts the strategic value of fulbright scholarships, for example. i don't think it is an overstatement to say in the process or evolution of what has become known as public diplomacy , no single program has been more influential or yielded a better or higher roi return on investment than fulbright scholarships.

we do need to preserve cultural educational and exchange programs that produce such demonstrated long-term benefits. that we have to step back and asked some tough questions. do we need to achieve understanding and influence everywhere? after all, we're the only country in the world that seemingly has a diplomatic presence and a policy interest that one way or another, affects every square inch of the earth. when our policy allegedly pivots from one part of the world to another, say to asia, do public diplomacy resources have to pivot as well? and what are we trying to achieve with these investments? a benefit of the doubt? traction? does that translate to influence? all good questions without easy answers. but no doubt a meaningful slice of the public diplomacy pie should be devoted to long-term efforts that are not trumped by

the immediate. there is tension in the dual nature of public diplomacy today , the need to focus on the long-term even as we deal with the crisis of the moment. but we can do both. question i posed regarding importance of public opinion as a factor in the public -- policymaking process. as the most influential country in the world, we are always going to say things and do things that someone is not going to like. at times, to the occasional constant -- consternation of my policy colleagues, i would seek out public disagreements with world leaders. the late hugo chavez called the ridiculous by name in his weekly television show. one of the highlights of my time across the street. my policy colleagues said, ignore him. i argued there was a significant, regional debate are ready underway. the question was simply, are we going to join that debate?

on a local, regional, or global basis, we have always welcomed debates and far more often than not, these debates have advanced our interest, policies, and values. in my view, we should never shy away from them. public opinion today is becoming more strategic. it is not to say we are to win a popularity contest. foreign policy is still guided significantly by elite public opinion, which the u.s. government has always successfully cultivated. as you have seen over the past 10 or 15 years, we cannot ignore domestic and global public opinion, whether dealing with the prime minister or president for life, neither of us can take street sentiment for granted. "gps," the program public global square. the world now has access to a

wider array of information than ever before. more and more of the world is connected, the most potent is an in our arsenal today cell phone, smartphone, connected to the internet and with a very good camera. media has of social been understood, perhaps it has even been overstated. but it is increasingly powerful tool for policy and social actors. what we saw three years ago with the arab uprisings were real revolutions. they were not facebook, twitter, or wiki revolutions. particularly in egypt, are organized never played a vitally important role, so did networks like the april 6 movement. they were enabled by an information infrastructure in egypt that could not be cut off, despite government attempts to do so. in syria, the opposition is struggling, not because it is out connected, but because at

least for the moment, it is outgunned. that said, we saw the power of social media last summer when countless reports using youtube and other channels advanced credible evidence that chemical weapons were being used on a large scale, which forced the united nations and major powers, including the united states and russia, to respond. that said, the documentation of atrocities in syria are all forms of media has not translated into a groundswell of public support for a more activist or interventionalist policy. the so-called cnn, al jazeera, or facebook affects are real. a have an agenda setting role, the ability to mobilize public opinion around a specific cause, but these were limited time. they can change the status quo. they can impose real constraints on policies that are unpopular, even if they're not in and of themselves deterministic.

they are a force in the 21st century policy environment that is vitally important. now, if that is the case, what about the fourth question i posed to my students? what is the relationship between diplomacy and public diplomacy? wereg the cold war, they separate functions, particularly shortly given the distinct differences of the department of state and the united states information agency. for the past 15 years, they have been related functions of the integration of the two agencies in 1999. i don't think anyone in this room would suggest that the integration that was envisioned back then has been complete. it remains very much a work in progress. decided, broadly speaking, in today's policy environment -- raise yourself -- he two are synonymous. in a global interconnected world, diplomacy is no longer just a province of government,

government dialogue behind closed doors. diplomacy in today's world is necessarily public. think back to my time in a couple of instances, frank wisner, a guy we all know and love, took a sensitive to the medic trip to cairo in 2011 to see mubarak shortly before he was were forced into -- he was forced into retirement. he never made it to the embassy for being pictured on the sidewalk near his hotel. in the last two days, john brennan was outed this past weekend when he made a side trip to ukraine during the european travel. whatever we do is going to be defined by someone. it might as well be us. i think the state department was right over the weekend to it knowledge john brennan's trip, something the cia does not normally do. i mentioned earlier a report by , wholleague bruce gregory

suggested in his report that public diplomacy is no longer distinct from diplomacy. it is now more appropriate to speak of the public dimension of diplomacy in a world in which events seem to be accelerating, were the actions and statements of government are more visible and frequently subject to intense public scrutiny, were no entity can enact realistic challenges alone, but we're gaining clinical consensus for action is more and more difficult. and thus, we are effective diplomacy requires not just an understanding of the substance, but also the competing national interests, clashes of histories, and complex politics of any issue. let's look at a few examples. let's pause for one second.

take ukraine, for example. the obama administration is playing a limited hand in ukraine quite effectively. there is imbalance of interest in this challenge. the countries far more important to russia's national interest than america's or europe's. but the u.s. and europe have continued to offer close relations to countries that define themselves in terms of what they are for and not just what they are against. i am intrigued by the revisionism that is crept into the debate about ukraine that europe and the u.s. have overreached when extending eu or nato membership to countries in central, southern, and eastern europe. really? tell that to poland, the czech republic, romania, or the baltic states who have never doubted the importance of political, economic, and security alliances . the last six months have done more to remind populations in the west about the importance of friendships and alliances than

two decades of political hectoring about diminishing defense budgets. the united states and europe have been clear, firm, and ,atient, but what is at stake how the crisis can be solved, and the consequences of ongoing russian intimidation, infiltration, and in a village in. -- meet relation. the president has kept the door open. we certainly hope john terry will be successful this weekend as discussions in geneva. resolve with this restraint i think has helped the for the u.s., to regain influence that it lost in recent years. as for vladimir putin, whatever his short-term political or even territorial gains, he stands to be, i think, the loser over the long run.

the $50 billion investment in the sochi olympics may have bought him some domestic political points, but to use a new diplomatic phrase, poof. $50 billion has gone out the window and with that, some $60 billion in international investment capital. and the cost of appropriating crimea will continue to go up. after suggesting we need to do a better job of aligning actions and words, i do not 40 minutes of said just that this is easy. take egypt. in the aftermath of the military intervention that overthrew president morsi, the united states declined to say whether or not it was a military coup. it was. yourugh, not garden-variety. after all, it was and remains popular with the majority of egyptian citizens. the u.s. met a narrative regarding egypt, the political center of the air world was governments must respond to the

aspirations of its people. i said that. i tweeted that consistently in early 2011. on the surface it would appear egypt's military leader and soon to be its new president ,al-sisi , is doing just that. i'm not calling it a coup, the u.s. avoided the legal requirement to suspend all military assistance to egypt and retain the presumed leverage that goes with $1.5 billion in aid. but as subsequent events have shown, the united states unwillingness to declare egyptian military action a coup has dramatically undermine the american democracy narrative in the middle east. to be sure, president morsi, while elected freely and fairly cut was not governing effectively or democratically. but there is also little reason to believe the egyptian military was going to be a democratic agent of change.

subsequent actions on the rollback not just the 2012 election, but the 2011 revolution as well. the leaders of the april 6 movement have been given three-year jail sentences just upheld by an appeals court. journalists from al jazeera is broadcasting 2011 provided staying power to the tahrir movement have been arrested. notwithstanding, american aspirations, there is no reason to believe that egypt is on a path to and inclusive democracy. this has all the makings of a no-win. the u.s. is simultaneously accused of doing too much and not doing enough. accused of defending morsi and condoning his overthrow. but the fill your to take a position has been no panacea, either. one recent poll the -- show the u.s. has a 4% approval rating in egypt. within the margin of error. which makes it possible that we

have offended literally every man, woman, and child in the country. removal of a dictator in 2011 to be on the right side of history. but what we've seen is that history is not static. when push came to shove, we cast our lot with another military strongman, rather than an elected leader. i'm not saying that is a great choice. but this was a lesson that we thought we learned in the aftermath of 9/11, and we still have to relearn. the key question is, to what extent public diplomacy or the public dimension of diplomacy factored into the decision to maintain the military dimension of the relationship? every indication is the answer was, public diplomacy played a marginal role at best. again, which underscores the ongoing challenge of integration of public diplomacy within the

inner workings of the department of state. take another case study, the recent and avoidable crisis over the arrest of an indian diplomat for visa fraud. from india's standpoint, her alleged mistreatment while in custody. the united states has a right to defend its laws, and their strong evidence that she consciously work to deceive the united states regarding her appearance to our visa laws. the case was the third such incident where indian diplomats were accused of mistreatment of their domestic employees. ther tit-for-tat response, removal of security barriers around the us embassy in new delhi, undermined in his narrative as a rising power committed to upholding international norms. fingers at to point any specific decision over the past nine months. but the question is, where was the application of sound public diplomacy practice to resolve the situation before it became a

crisis? war, once the decision was made to proceed with the legal case, to employee public diplomacy work -- resources to define what the case was about and what it was not about. indication,ery those on the public diplomacy and public affairs side of the house were either not consulted in meaningful ways, or perhaps did not even know about the case until she was turned over to u.s. marshals service a diplomatic security. effective diplomacy on both sides eventually moved our countries beyond the crisis stage, but not before considerable damage was done to what president obama has termed one of the defining relationships of the 21st century. now, the question is whether as part of the policy process diplomatic costs are weighed alongside the strategic benefits of inaction or nonaction, and where there is a likely recognition of potential public

costs, are steps taken to potentially mitigate the impact? take pakistan for example. the united states is never going to gain the trust and confidence of the majority of pakistani citizens, at least not why the u.s. tries to maintain constructive relationship with india. pakistanimer ambassador to the united states has written an excellent book about the history of u.s. pakistani relations, relationship has a long history of misconceptions and dysfunction on both sides. in the most recent public opinion polls in pakistan, roughly 2/3 of pakistani consider the united states an enemy. this is a potential strategic problem in the context of what was once considered the war on terror, now aptly renamed the war against al qaeda. we have said for a long time

there's no connecticut solution to the challenge of violent, political extremism. former secretary of defense donald rumsfeld appropriately questioned a so-called snowflake in 2003, whether the u.s. strategy was creating more extremists that it was eliminating. that remains a fundamental question. not attended to set off a bomb in new york was motivated by drone operations in pakistan. they have been instrumental in reducing the threat posed by core al qaeda. along with the death of osama bin laden, of course. to be clear, the threat has not disappeared, but represents a danger that can be effectively managed at a reduced level of effort. but what we continue to do in pakistan comes at a very high cost. from a policy standpoint, it appears the obama administration, notwithstanding

the presence pledges to increase transparency of drone operations, has respected an arrangement struck between the bush administration and the musharraf government that neither country would talk publicly about drone operations in pakistan. the united states treats drone operations as a secret. that whatever we chose to call them, they are not invisible. the media provides regular updates on drone operations in a number of organizations coming . they catalog the effectiveness and impact. all the supposed secrecy accomplishes is enabling pakistan to mislead its own people about what it knows about drone operations and the fact they are in pakistan's interest as well as america's, and it enables pakistan to say to his own people, drones are violation of pakistani sovereignty. which they are not.

the secrecy surrounding drone operations denies the united states the use of public diplomacy tools to raise understanding and lower the costs of what is being done in this leader of operations. -- theater of operations. we have to factor in the diplomatic cost into these kinds of decisions as we look to the future. after all, when the u.s. in the war in afghanistan later this year i'm a the american people still need to understand their technology will remain at war, even if the army is not. our policymakers used to make sure that policy -- they need to make sure that policy and security benefits outweigh the public diplomatic -- public diplomacy it costs. today when we talk about foreign policy and public diplomacy, we recognize as a whole of government challenge, day in and day out, the state department is still a leading actor when it comes to policy development and the execution for foreign

policy. but it is not necessarily the dominant player it once was. obviously, the defense department with its global presence and its healthy budget has a major role to play as well. -- much is global about economic issues. particularly in iran, sanctions have become the course of tool of choice, which gives a major international diplomatic role to the treasury department. one of the major advances over the last dozen years since 9/11 has been the increased international cooperation with combating terrorism and violent political extremism. the state department has a role to play, but so does the justice thertment, the fbi, intelligent services, and now the department of homeland security. it is all together at an overseas diplomatic mission, and it creates a faster rate issues and responsibilities for u.s. ambassador in his or her country

team. no wonder former secretary of state hillary clinton called for the transformation in a way we structure in command our embassies around the world. in this environment, public diplomacy has to continue to adapt as well. in many respects, public diplomacy has undergone the most profound trade commission already of any foreign-policy element over the past 15 years. seems thee time, it public diplomacy community faces the very same challenge it did 15 years ago. cull in his excellent history of usia said with a couple of exceptions, it was always kept at arms length when it came to the policymaking process. i think the good news if we look at the integration of public diplomacy into the apartment estate is that pd is now represented at the policy table.

but does not yet have the influential voice that is required. public diplomacy is not just constructiveg a environment for national interests. it is not just about in enabling function for diplomacy, but an essential element of diplomatic practice. this does not require, in my view, change up or darker sea, but perhaps a change in process. -- or perhaps a change in process. perhaps the development of foreign-policy has shifted to the white house. this is a domestic and international, political reality and i have served in all three places. the defense department, state department, national security council. and office the nfc of global engagement. it is not particularly large or

influential. in other words, dust as it was, go back 15 years and beyond -- just as it was, go back 15 years and beyond. it is underrepresented just as it was in the truman administration. there's a public diplomacy interagency working group that needs to be strengthened and charged with advising the policy deputies and principles regarding the public diplomacy implications of all major foreign-policy decisions. as a general rule today, certainly in my time in government, public diplomacy is a major consideration after a policy decision, but not before. this is what needs to change. now, the world is becoming more that isent whether -- true whether or not you consider the implications of the works of chelsea manning or edward snowden. responding effectively to the snowden revelations has been a distinct challenge as it seems to be unfolding in slow motion.

the u.s. government is not certain what snowden took with him and how much of this material now rest in the hands of outlets like "the guardian" and "the washington post" of whom one could surprises this week. wikileaks was far less than we feared. but in government today, we still operate under the assumption that whether or not an action becomes public is a matter of choice or chance. matter of near certainty. we need to adapt to that reality. the bin laden raid was secret. it was not invisible. and just as we are a safer world today because of his demise, we are still expressing were found diplomatic impact from the

ripple effects of that action. take for example the of dr.tions of the use afridi in the effort to understand what was going on inside the abbottabad compound. that has profoundly affected regional perceptions about public health initiatives that are in never buddies interest, including the pakistani people. this is not to say that pulling out all the stops to get bin laden were wrong. but we must operate under the assumption that what we do will become known and how to explain those difficult choices and where they have to be made to try to mitigate those effects. if the impact of a potential action is too severe, it is necessary to go back to the drawing board and choose another option. even in the most secret compartments of our government today, just as we have lawyers

in these classified settings to evaluate the legal implications of actions being contemplated, we need to have public diplomacy experts at that same table to judge what the impact of an action will be and are the policy and operational benefits outweigh the public consequences of our actions. given the expanding reach of both traditional and social media, public opinion is becoming more important in the conduct of foreign-policy. and it is a matter of our public policy as well as those overseas. this is a global stage. more and more people have front row seats. as weas true conceptualize the conflict of the experience over the past dozen years, what was true when conflict equally applies to areas where we are not. policy and public diplomacy today is about people.

well forulations as protecting them, engaging them, understanding their history, their culture, their politics, what they think about the united states and what they expect from the united states, our ability to pursue our national interest will increasingly require international cooperation, understanding, and support. to achieve that, the united states will have to be seen as legitimately. and we are competing in a world of narratives could just as we did during the cold war, but now there are more narratives than just two. there are many that we need to do a better job of connecting what we say and what we do as part of that broader, strategic narrative. as has been said, in this competitive environment, the player with the best story will ultimately win.

as rick said yesterday, and rightly, we do have a great story to tell. thank you very much. [applause] >> we open the floor to any and all questions. starting with mike. we have a microphone here if you would like. >> and my on? ok. a quick question, do you approve of the usaid support for regime change in cuba? is that the right way to go about what many would say is the goal? >> do i support the goal of regime change in cuba? cuba hasime change in been the united states policy

for 60 years. support using social media up cubantry to open society? absolutely. i was there at the state aigrtment when the contractor was apprehended in cuba and we continued to urge his release and return to his family. one of the more interesting and relatively unknown actions were ongoing efforts within the state andrtment is through drl the cautious, but definite use of circumvention technology to try to open up spaces. i mean, this is a losing battle.

you take a country like china try to tryorts they to control the flow of information. i was in beijing last may and the two things you could not do, you could not tweet because they were afraid, and you could not read "the new york times" because of the ongoing coverage of the corruption that china is in fact understanding as a threat to their political legitimacy. this is an ongoing challenge, but i absolutely think it is toper for the united states try and find a way to introduce societies thatto are currently closed. and i think trying to control whether populations know about what happens in the rest of the world.

i don't think we should be shy about that. other questions? yes, i believe you said pd is not at the foreign policymaking table. but it still doesn't have any real influence. what, in practical terms, could pd get that influence? well, under judith mchale and perhaps before her, the idea was developed under jim glassman that you would have the public diplomacy for deputy i assistant secretaries. they are in their regional beings as policy is developed. it is unclear whether they are in the key meetings yet. the real meetings at crunch time

where they -- go back to what i said about the interagency working group on public diplomacy. as soon as i arrived, i had an early meeting in one of the situation rooms. i said, hey, we meet theodically and talk about tools of to medication, the channels available. were not talking about public diplomacy dimension of the issues the deputies are wrestling with and teeing up for the principles and the president. i said, why don't we have an interagency policy meeting that feeds the perspective into what the deputies should think about in terms of public diplomacy as they are wrestling with option a, option b, option c, recognizing that any time he gets to the deputies or particularly the principles, all of the good options are gone? they looked at me like i had two heads.

really? the public diplomat in chief and the government today is been roads. he is a magnificent, magnificent , thoughtful person. he is also doing 100,000 things at the same time. a publicust not yet diplomacy process that feeds into the policymaking process that is organized or structured. it is all ad hoc. i think that is something we need to develop. i think strengthening the role of pd, deputy assistant secretaries, is an important step in this process. i would like to hear your opinions on the white house's current messaging with regard to the ever strengthening sanctions feelst russia, and how you the white house is either addressing or not addressing the

comments in the media, which specifically hit on the fact those sanctions reduce u.s. business involvement in russia and thereby, decrease our possible leverage in the future? said in my remarks, i think so far the white house has been pretty effective in the sense that we haven't let rhetoric get ahead of what we believe we are actually capable of doing. the president has been clear. there will be cost. obviously, we have to produce those costs. i don't think vladimir putin can overlook when $60 billion in international capital leaves russia in this quarter alone. as he calculates what his next up is, and god knows what that is, there are things the united states is doing and there are market responses to that that i

think are very, very important. this is what fundamentally is different. never mind, were not talking about nuclear weapons, which is also different than the cold war. but russia's economy is far more integrated in the global system today than it was 50 years ago. and this does provide the u.s. and europe import leverage. i think the president has been cautious because, let's be honest, ultimately, the toughest decisions in this process as we raise costs are going to be done in europe rather than the united states. but i think the president is giving putin time and enough missteps or when he when he oversteps, that then you're increasing the political consensus behind a long-term challenge that is going to be a very, very difficult. i think we can, over time, again

thehe the great work that new energy bureau is doing at the state department. ultimately, we have a very important energy car that we can play over time to help wean europe off russian energy and onto western energy. that is something that we began to wrestle with in 2009. i think the bush administration was focused on the issue even before the obama administration came into office. that is the long-term solution. in the meantime, you have to manage that, but i know the german government has begun to ukraine as just the beginning of an effort to kind of shift in a different direction. as much as it is about imposing othern putin, i think the thing the west needs to do is redeem the choice that ukraine

has made to turn west rather than east. this is a difficult environment. i know one of the most important steps to take is a credible election to rebut the russian narrative that the current term government is ill -- a legitimate and a bunch of fascist. so having a good election in ukraine is important and it may calm some of the fears that have arisen in the eastern part of the country. unfortunately, the longer this turns, you don't have a climate that led itself to an effective election and second, even if putin doesn't have a grand design on ukraine, it gives time for some of these actors, some of whom might be and of the control of russia and some whom are not, and all of a sudden they do something for which the various powers, the u.s., russia, and europe, cannot

overcome. now all of a sudden you have a dynamic that nobody controls. that is the greatest danger the longer this goes on. i do think in this particular case, notwithstanding the criticism -- the president isn't strong enough, russia -- putin is a better leader and that kind of nonsense, does anybody want to go to war in crimea? .he reality is, no the president is making sure that rhetoric and actions and capabilities stay pretty much aligned. seen from we have experiences in some cases, particularly in syria, our rhetoric has gotten pretty far danced from what we are actually prepared to do -- far advanced from what we're prepared to do. >> thank you for your comments. you spoke about the increasing tendency over the last 20 years

for national security policy, foreign policy, to be made at the white house. >> i don't think that was a groundbreaking statement. >> no, but it strikes me the media is presenting it more and more as if there is a huge disconnect between the white house and then bureaucracies -- and debris are christie's concerning foreign policy. i'm wondering if you can speak to whether there is any interaction between the state department, the nsa, as they , and whethery there is any input there? >> well, yeah. i mean, there's a very rich level of interaction. there is even far more -- i

important and productive interaction in the 1990's. i know having served at the white house in the second term of the clinton administration, i think the team at that point of sandy berger and madeleine , thatht con george tenet was a very effective team. they did not see every issue the same way. they would challenge each other and test each other in terms of policy options, but they gave the president very good advice. the president followed that advice. i think there was great coordination and executing u.s. foreign policy at the time. i did not serve in the bush administration from the cheap seats, it was my impression

there was dysfunction in that process in the first term. e could not overcome the cheneys between rumsfeld axis on the one hand axis on the powell other. he did nothing the president was willing to make that kind of or bridge that divide. rice came to the state department. steve hadley moved up to be a very effective national security advisor. bob gates came in, one of the great team players you're ever going to encounter. in the second bush term had a much better and more effective foreign-policy ordination and execution than the first term. into lessons carried over the obama administration. the reality about the obama administration, there was very intensive policy process, and that continues to this day.

from secretary clinton to jim steinberg when he was deputy national or deputy secretary of state, even jack lew as deputy secretary of state, they got pulled into five or six deputy committee meetings on a daily basis. at some point, a couple of my colleagues of the assistant secretary level were saying, do you have any more meetings? we will be able to do what they've told us to do because by the time we get out of a policy meeting, they have gone to bed and region x, y, or z. there is tremendous coordination. in the public diplomacy cents, i have daily interactions with my c andagues at the nf others. i knew whatever was in my book --dow to the podium to brief when i went to the podium to

brief, the policy guys at defense and nfc had seen and strangled, in many cases, the language i had in the book. in fact, one of my friends was in charge of western hemispheres affairs, when he would see the daily guidance, he would say, who is briefing today? if he found out was made, he cut the guidance and have saying, ok, he's going to exaggerated anyway, so i might as well reduce it to the lowest common denominator. there is tremendous integration today. the reality is, foreign-policy is formulated at the white house, and i'm not saying that is wrong, and then executed at the state department quite effectively. >> figure. time for one last question. there is one in the back. please, go ahead.

my question really is a andtion of the process tactics used by state department spokesman or spokespersons. you don't necessarily know what questions are going to be asked every day, but i imagine in general, what you end up with is answering the questions that you thought were going to be asked and you don't have time for much more. i guess my question really is, to what extent can the moresperson's job be used super actively, over actively, to bring up in the way points you want to make, a question that has not been asked yet? it seems to me, otherwise, no matter how good you are, you tend to be defensive -- you or whoever -- tend to be there to answer the questions you think

will come up. if they come up, you've done your job. to what extent can you and fill -- spend time dealing with questions that have not been asked, but are definitely, definitely high priority in the state department and maybe even the white house, too? >> that is a great question. i tried to open the briefing by saying something. i mean, the question came up when i was there, the questions come up sometimes in our discussions at gw since. does the united states state department have to brief every day? united is, we are the states of america. we have a global policy. we care about every square inch of the earth. we have an opinion about everything. we ought to express that opinion. i was thought it was a good idea

that in some fashion, either the spokesman or the secretary would be out every day and have something to say of importance regarding the crisis at the moment or things that were on our radar, but not necessarily on the front page of "the washington post" or "the new york times." the washington post or the new york times. i would occasionally try to introduce a topic i knew would not be asked, that was in my book, that was reflective of what the state department was doing, but i knew was not going to be asked. i tried to introduce policy elements on africa. there was not an african bureau journalist in the room. in the state department briefing room, it is interesting. a couple of pre-things go on at the same time. the first couple of rows are the american journalists.

a couple rows, you have the south agent journalists, and sometimes they would turn and ask a middle east question, and you would go, ok, what is going on here? in the back worthy asia and journalists. they would wait very politely. . used to tease them "ask me a question. asked about north korea." to find a way to introduce a subject i know is not going to be asked or is reflective of good work from the state department or somebody who did not get that kind of headline. in this environment, you know what? that information would find a niche. i used to tweak out a lot of

things as the state department spokesman. crazy.e policy guys if there was something in the book that did not get out, if i could noodle it down to 140 characters, i would try to push something out. a nugget onshed out indonesia. the defense department came back and said, you did not tweak the guidance. i said, every word was from the guidance. they carefully crafted a certain line on indonesia. it was this, but that. and i said, this, but not that. and they said, you lost the nuance. i said, there is no nuance on twitter. it is 140 characters.

the state department is a remarkable agency. dollar for dollar, the american people get more out of the state department. there is wonderful work being done. bringve to find a way to that workout. so, i dragged some people down to the podium. there might be five journalists there. you ask a couple questions. again, you ship it out in today's world, it is going to find a home somewhere. so, yeah, you try to find a way to push out things that are important, but not necessarily things that are going to make headlines. i am a retired u.s. and foreign commercial service worker and overseas i always sis departmental policy being the most important we worked with.

using thee in japan very evocative american lifestyle and culture to sell things that apple bought were themck, or at least market in a more attractive way. more recently there has been a of concern about the mainstream american culture, the "sex and culture that is so overwhelming that it is undermining and contributing to terrorism, in the sense that people see our culture as decadent. more recently, in a senate hearing, secretary was talking .bout benghazi senator paul made reference to sending comedians to india. and of course --

be partext of this may of a cultural engagements. so, i was just wondering, on this newer issue for public diplomacy -- >> you raise a lot of issues there. unpack a couple of things. i think that any time we can show the wonderful sense of have, it is as wonderful thing. i thought senator paul was kind of off base with that. conversely, you see the dynamic withemerged in egypt yousef on one hand and the engagement he had with john stu for -- john stuart. -- jon stew art. that is what is happening across the middle east. you read a good book by robin and it"rock the casbah,"

is all about how a musical underground is popping up. you have guys trying to do this. and it is a losing proposition. if we can make fun of ourselves, what kind of role model is that? i think it is a wonderful idea that the united states displays a sense of humor. we should do it more often. i try to use twitter with a sense of humor. in 20 and nine, chuck todd of -- of nbc saidck todd e year.he tweet of th i beat out sarah palin and snooki. was as jimmy carter bring out korea -- to someone who was in america to -- who was imprisoned in north

korea. hey, you need to pay attention to united states travel warnings. we are running out of ex-president's. [laughter] kim family ended up at a show in west singapore, i said, hey, the family should get out more often. a wonderful thing. that is what culture is all about. the other side of the coin is, there is a delicate issue of when a and what happens government -- turkey's list for example. it tries to turn off social media because there is something on youtube they don't like. and obviously we demonstrate by example that, you know, you are allowed to ignore it. [laughter]

it is ultimately what tolerance is all about. if we practice it, then we can lead by example. go, oh, yeah,g to we ought to -- over time, they will. but obviously this is a process that will take some time. i do think in the cultural area, sure, we do have programs they don't like. by the same token, we have to have an open door on the side. every once in a while, we have a controversial figure a university wants to bring here , oh, we can't have that. again, we have to lineup. if we are going to have a vigorous debate about issues, then let's have that debate. we are now in a war where there is no divide. what we do, they say and hear. what they do, we see and hear. to the extent we can foster this

conversation, eventually we arrive at some sort of accommodation. the last comment i will make is one of the more remarkable points -- in afghanistan in 2010, there was a military operation and we arrested two out to zero journalists. i did not know about it. doug wilson, my counterpart at department of defense, did not know about it. general petraeus did not know about it. it turned out these guys were dart of the taliban embe process. you know, we have guys that go with soldiers. these guys were on the taliban phone tree and they would get calls. they would say, hey, if you set a camera on this block tuesday night, something might go off. we arrested them because they were providing terrorist support to the taliban.

the day before this happened, i was criticizing russia for jailing yet another round of journalists. i was going to dog, and we both talked to general petraeus, -- i was going to doug, and we both talked to general petraeus, and he was going, what the heck? government is very big. looking at a potential action and trying to connect it to something bigger is very hard. looking and saying, what if this becomes public? can i explain it? if i can't explain it, don't do it. later on, the head of strategic communication for general petraeus sat down with the hejazeera bureau chief, and said, here is what you guys were doing that caused us concern. era bureau chief said, they were violating our guidelines on reporting. hmm.

the moral of the story is, why don't we start their? --there? have that conversation first. either use all the problem or we will solve the problem. do it where you are able to handle a situation with hubble diplomacy in mind before it pops into the open, before it becomes unflattering portrayal in this or that publication. that is the mindset we have to have. i am always an admirer of the marines. every marine is a spokesman, you know, for that service. i think we have to have that same mentality across government . that in today's world, what ever we are doing is going to become public. if so, we another. have to have a public dimension to what we are thinking, what we

are doing, what we are communicating, and try to figure out if in the process of doing that you can narrow the gap between what we say and what we do. >> with that, let me thank you again. [applause] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014] sacco and a look at an article ofm "e," on the appearance ,wo supreme court justices antonin scalia and ruth bader ginsburg. the justices discuss the first amendment and a personal friendship. they talk about how they might approach a potential case examining the nsa surveillance programs, although the court rejected an appeal from a privacy rights advocate group to hear the case. you can watch that conversation

at 9 p.m. eastern. we will have that right here on c-span. >> and again tonight at 9:00 eastern, we will hear that conversation between justice scalia and justice ginsburg from

the national press club from last week. you can listen in, 9:00 eastern tonight on c-span. hurtdidn't do this to try. i did this to really to figure out what happened in a dispassionate way. again, there is a tremendous amount of passion about this story, even to this day. all one has to do is go on amazon and see already i have amassed would you 51 star reviews. the book is not been out a week and it is a 600-age book. i am guessing not many of those havetar review writers read the book. this is in another realm altogether. >> in "the price of silence," author and duke alumni william dukehen talks about the

lacrosse scandal. >> next, officials from the department of justice and hispanic legal advocates talked about deportation and the possibility of an immigration bill passing in congress this year. this is from american university's college of law. it is about two hours. >> by way of introduction, my name is juan sempertegui. as the regional vice president of the hispanic law coalition. this is the third time -- the third conference i'm saying this, and people think i'm joking, but it's really serious. in my three years serving as a yetonal president, i have to find a latino practicing in west virginia. if you know anybody, please, let me know. the hispanic national bar assoio