>> if you missed this regime, you can catch it at www.c-span.org. at least 40 u.s. veterans died while waiting for permits in the phoenix health care system, many of whom were put on a secret waiting list. according to a recently retired top v.a. dr., that is from cnn. we willple moments, take you to the american enterprise institute who are hosting a forum on al qaeda. it investigates why the current

national security policy is inhibit the advancement of al qaeda. we will go now live over to the american enterprise institute in washington. frederick kagan. >> coming inside to this window-less -- we have windows, but we have covered them. i want to thank you for coming happyr talking about our talk with. i am frederick kagan, the director of the american enterprise institute critical threats project. we have been working on al qaeda and especially on the various al qaeda-affiliated movements around the world for a number of years now. topicnfortunately is a that does not show any sign of

diminishing in importance, and it is getting ever more complicated to understand, because what we are finding is a lot of these affiliates and inociates are ramifying their local areas, and both expanding and interacting with one another in new ways. simply major undertakig ng simply to try to follow what is going on, let alone coming up with come up with a coherent recommendations for one instead. just to take that off the table, that is one thing you are not going to get today, is here is the strategy for defeating al qaeda. that is something that we are working on and a lot of people are working on it, but it will take quite a lot of effort. onare here today to focus

trying to understand what we are talking about when we say defeating al qaeda, fighting al qaeda, what al qaeda is, what it is not, and what the implications of that definition are. and i am very thrilled to be able to introduce a very good friend, an old friend. we have known each other for decades and decades. military we were both specialists, and mary habeck was lady,nown as the tank because of her phenomenal expertise on soviet armored doctrine on which she has done some terrific work, which is also unfortunately becoming relevant once again. just for those of you who are pursuing topics, especially young people in the audience,

and you're asking yourselves, will anyone ever care about this? those of us who graduated in the 1990's with degrees in soviet studies are discovering yes pretty much everything becomes important if you wait long enough. i wish we could have waited longer for that one, but that will be a topic for another discussion. has devoted her life for quite a number of years now to understanding al qaeda, to understanding the ideology, and understanding the group as it actually is. we are thrilled to have been able to publish a report, getting it right, u.s. national security policy against al qaeda she has written a number of books, including an excellent primer, called shewing the enemy," and

is working on other books simultaneously that should be coming out shortly. mary has done a fantastic service for us that she will talk about, trying to identify what people seem to mean when they say al qaeda, particularly people in the administration, and then talking about what she thinks it's been. it means.nks then we went katherine zimmerman speak. at thes our team lead critical threats project, and she has been staring at this problem for a number of years now, and last fall published another report on the al qaeda how we, describing should think about the relationship between core and periphery, because that has become really a pivotal question for u.s. policy. before i turn it over to mary and before we start talking

about that, and christoph and made the mistake of trying to drive in on the gw parkway, so he will be joining us when traffic permits. before i turn it over to mary, i want to take commitment -- take a minute and ask everybody to step back and say there is a sound and fury over al qaeda and how it is going. there are things that are generally agreed-upon and then there are things being argued about. lot you will not find a people who will say that al qaeda in the arabian peninsula, in yemen, is completely defeated, not a threat, not fighting, incapable. you will not find a lot of people who will say that. you will not find anybody who will say that the islamic state of iraq, the descendent of al qaeda in iraq, has not regained

-- we know they have regain a foothold in falluja, but the truth is they have regain footholds all around iraq. no one will tell you there are large al qaeda affiliates in syria. that is one of the reasons why we do not want to support the syrian opposition, one of the arguments that has been made. that is a large and powerful franchise, and it has become clear that we have a vibrant franchise in the islamic magreb. the question of whether we have affiliates out there and whether they continue to be strong, capable, is not really in question. that ourquestion policy debates have been focused on is does the united states to need to care? how much of a problem is it for us if these local groups are doing well or doing poorly?

that debate has turned heavily on the question of how do those local groups relate to what the administration called al qaeda core, the group formerly around , whatden after his demise is the role of al qaeda core, is a defeated, and is it appropriate to talk about al qaeda core. that is what we are going to talk about today. i want to point out that is an argument that is in many respects very much on the margins of the question, how is the al qaeda global threat doing these days? into theing to get inside baseball bat is very important when you develop strategy. start by recognizing that pretty much everybody recognizes that groups that are formerly affiliated with al qaeda, including groups that themselves al qaeda franchises, are doing well

around the world. that is where we will start, where the debate begins, and that we can talk about does it really matter. for that i will turn it over to mary. >> thank you, fred. as fred has said, there is one thing that i think most everybody does agree about is we are facing a great deal more violence run the world that is in some way associated with al qaeda. the question is, first, how much is this associated with al qaeda, and how much of it is associated with other groups that do not have organizational links with al qaeda? secondly, what should the our response to this -- what should be our spots to this problem? focus theere i will majority of my remarks. i will begin by out lining for you -- outlining for you about beginning with you where fred said you need to begin with, we are facing a much more difficult problem today than we were in 2011. 2011 began with so much hope,

with the arab spring and also with the death of the man who had planned and carried out 9/11. if you look at just two sets of illustrations in my paper, on pages five and six, i outlined and show the growth in violence in the muslim majority world that is associated somehow with al qaeda. a growth not just in terrorism, which i talk about, but also in insurgencies. it is here that actually the majority of the work that the paper was done back in the summer and then i revised it again in january, and i show that there are now at least in , wheny nine insurgencies back in 2011 we were dealing with three al qaeda-associated insurgencies. the growth from three to

nine. actually, i was called to task by a friend of mine who is an expert on these issues who said you should redo that because we are facing now at least two more countries that are deeply into al qaeda insurgency since january, since i revised this, and i would be libya and the rest of egypt. here i just showed sinai as an insurgency. there is really no argument we are facing a much more serious problem now than we were in 2011, and certainly since we are facing since 2001 when it comes to groups that have some affiliation with al qaeda. the second part of my paper takes a look at what current policy is towards al qaeda, and setll begin with a careful

of remarks on this. se anyt blaming per administration's policies, the growth in this violence. there are all sorts of factors involved in the growth of this and we should remember that the enemy has a vote. the enemy has been doing things that have led to a lot of this increase in violence. there's also all sorts of factors out there in the muslim-majority world that has allowed some of this violence to grow. please do not take that second section as pointing at any specific administration for this growth in violence. having said that, however, i believe that we could be designing better policies for dealing with this new threat we are faced with since 2011. i point out in particular two key issues that i think this administration in particular, although i think you could actually look back and find root for it in the bush

administration, the second bush administration as well, that are preventing us from designing successful strategies for dealing with al qaeda. first is the definition of the enemy. how do we define the enemy? obviously in order to understand where any administration is on this issue look at what they are actually saying about it. there is the national security strategy that came out in 2011 for countering terrorism that quite carefully defined al qaeda as three parts. al qaeda, affiliates, and adherence. my concern with that of the nation was with the first part, which was actually never defined in the strategy itself. al qaeda is al qaeda. well, that is ok, but what do you mean actually by al qaeda? i went looking for that

definition amongst all of the statements that have been made by this administration, including the head of the cia, security, homeland and a whole range of other folks to see if there was a clear public definition of what constitutes al qaeda itself, rather than the fillets or adherents. the result is i could not find a clear definition. -- and ig at things should say i cannot find a clear definition until january of 2014. by sort of piecing things together from these statements and from the way that this, the current u.s. government the u.s.d the role of in the world, i was able to come up with what i believed was the official definition, and in january of this year that was actually confirmed the by a public statement by matt olson in his testimony before congress. that definition is that al qaeda

is sometimes called, consists of all of those people who participated in some way in 9/11. al qaeda core consists of all those people who participated in some way in 9/11. if you look at the authorization for the use of military force, that is in fact how al qaeda was defined legally back in september of 2001. this administration above all else is concerned with the rule of law, and doing things in a very legal matter. they have a sincere and firm commitment to that, and i take them at their word. abouts what the amf says those people that the united states can use military force against. should itsaid that,

not also include all those people who have replaced those folks, who have been killed off since 9/11, because there are probably several thousand people killed off by first the bush administration and this administration in their attempts to do with al qaeda. i actually found a couple -- a public statement that also says, no, people are not being added whohat list of people belong to this, and there was a statement actually back in march that firmly states we are about to strategically defeat al qaeda because we are down to just a handful of al qaeda members that need to be dealt with through attrition, that is, to killing or capturing. that is the official definition of al qaeda itself. then there is the view of al qaeda's objectives. al qaeda's objectives are defined primarily in terms of u.s. national interests. that is, al qaeda has as its

primary objective to kill americans and to attack america. in fact it a good-looking with -- looking if you go looking at what al qaeda says you come to a different conclusion. al qaeda says their goals are first and foremost to taste the united states out of what they secondly, tonds, impose a very extremist and unique version of sharia on unwilling muslims, secondly cannot to create some form of shadow government, thirdly to overthrow what they call apostate leaders of their countries, and finally, to create something they call a caliphate. most of what al qaeda wants to achieve has nothing to do with the u.s. at all, has everything to do with them imposing their will on the rest of the muslim majority world and on varying unwilling muslims. you can see this by taking a look back at what al qaeda has

been actually doing since the 1990's to today, and they have been focusing a vast majority of their effort on taking over him posing very extremist version of sharia rather than attacking the united states. the 9/11 commission report notes that 99% of the effort in the 1990's was dedicated to creating a mujahedin who would carry out their plan in the rest of the majority world, and only 1% was dedicated to attacking the united states. in my opinion the second vision of the administration has also been askew. thanks for this great that threat the book, explains why the policy that is exceptionsese two is flawed, because the policy that comes out of this is one based on attrition, that is, killing and capturing the small

group of known people, and once they are gone, the united states will be safe, and we know longer need to worry about al qaeda. i go into detail in critiquing this. the final third of the paper is about thinking about what we should be doing in order to design a good strategy, one that gets it right, as i put it in the paper. -- i beginhe with with a definition of the enemy that attempts to get at the scale and scope of the problem we are actually facing. before you take a look at that, you should know that i affirm and support a lot the policy preferences that underlie some of this definition and some of these assumptions. i also want to see the u.s. be able to take this fight from something that involves military to something that is just law enforcement. that is absolutely my policy preference.

i want to see all of our troops come home. i want to see an end to war. i do not want to see a militarization of something that does not need to be militarized. i affirm and support that policy preference, and i think it underlies what administration is saying. i also support the need for partners who will be engaged in the fight and not be depended wholly on us to carry on this drug if -- the struggle that mostly involves their country, their lands, their people being killed by al qaeda. just as an aside, the united states has lost thousands in this fight with al qaeda. but muslim-majority countries are losing hundreds of thousands. this is a fight that obviously we need to have partners and we need to have people working with us. over not about us taking and running things. i affirm and support that policy preference.

we cannot let our policy anderences drive reality our definitions of what is really going on. i am afraid that that is in fact what is going on. that we are not looking first at the problem set and allowing that to determine our policy, but determining what we want to be true, what we would like to see an outcome, determine how definitions of the enemy. that is the argument i make in the final third that getting those definitions right, understanding who our enemy really is, and understanding what the objectives are should be what drives our policy, regardless of whether that leads to the kinds of policy preferences we actually want. iq. -- thank you. [applause] thank you, mary. i would like to follow up on need toclusion that we understand what the enemy is and defining al qaeda properly in

order to have a strategy to fight it. i gotk the take away that from your report was that because we have improperly defined al qaeda we are only fighting a fraction of our enemy force and not only that we are fighting in a way that actually is not fighting the enemy itself. to be that sounds like a losing strategy. i think what is most helpful is to talk through how i al qaeda today is operating, how it has adapted to some of our policies, and why it is important that we start looking at the network itself, the affiliates from and the associates in and supper stopar stuffs -- preventing ourselves from limiting ourselves from defining -- the alarter that qaeda core that was active on 9/11. the key point in my report that

i wrote in september is that the network extends across the muslim-majority world and it is the relationships between the different groups, between affiliates and the core group in pakistan, between affiliates and the local group of thugs, on whom they rely for support and also at times are just as dangerous as the affiliates themselves that make the al qaeda network so resilient. the wheel and spoke model that we have heard about before, where there is a central group that you can pound away and want to get rid of that center the spokes will simply fall apart and they will become their own localized insurgencies or threats. it is not the starfish model goals it haseaded -- it has tentacles and if you chop one arm off --

instead of a network, if you pushed out in one area, it will support itself to be able to crop up in areas where it has historical presences and it will also move resources, writers, bertie's, funds -- expertise, funds, into another era, and that is what we're are seeing in syria today where all of a sudden syria has reinvigorated the al qaeda network which we have not seen since we were fighting in iraq. what does that mean? that means that if we continue to only focus on the groups that pose the most direct threat to the homeland today and only beat out the al qaeda core or al qaeda in yemen we are really not going to win. and we are not going to win because in syria al qaeda is seeing that as a staging ground. it is the primal fight for al qaeda today.

sent aa core leadership committee from pakistan into syria to serve as a policy-planning group to help support al qaeda's affiliate in syria, to help it develop trainers, fighters on the ground in order to see victory in serious. that is a forward-leaning organization and one that is not covered today under our counterterrorism strategy against al qaeda. but al qaeda sees serious as something that will in the end bring about the islamic caliphate, and that is where mary draws out the ideology. it is the teaching about the setting of the stage for what they see should come about. the other place where al qaeda has adapted is it no longer uses its name as a brand mark. it is a print and certainly

extremely powerful where we see it in al qaeda in the arabian peninsula, in yemen. has is the group that attacked us three times since 2009. the best re-think nice desk the most recently recognized groups have not adopted today. al qaeda brings about american reaction. we craft our policy in reaction to simply naming a group al qaeda. and i will turn to the sahel region, which is one of best cases recently where you can look at how al qaeda has adopted to this aussie and the reaction it gets -- to this policy and direction he gets from the united states. a recent study lays out how these groups are operating. what you can do is look at al sahel,n magreb, in

revolutionize how it is working them and as the confident knowledge that as the conflict in mali broke out, -- they denied connections to al qaeda, never had a relationship ap, but there were meeting notes that showed leadership and the leader of -- were sitting down and figuring out how to maintain their relationship and keep it covert. that means we have not called on -- al qaeda. many people did not consider it to be part of the al qaeda network, but what i can see it actually was a fighting force on the ground and was tasked with governing the local villages and actually being that local face that -- does not have in mali.

it has gotten to the point now where when you look at who the leader of -- was, he had been active and interacting with aqim in many years. he was not someone who simply all of a sudden said i and al qaeda now. we needsomething that to recognize and her policy of al qaeda, that there is a group of leadership that is active today thomas not operating under official al qaeda titles. we may not have the al qaeda number three who we have killed many times over be the most threatening person anymore. it may be the leader of the group that seems local, but who as as aed i facilitator. we need to think about how they interact formally within that work, but what they are doing, what actions they are taking to serve the purpose of al qaeda,

and think of the group as something that has changed today. we cannot limit our strategies simply by name. that is one of the key ways that i have seen al qaeda at that, it has obscured its relationships, it has prevented us from reacting to its newfound itstionships by hiding how tentacles have reached out throughout the muslim-majority world. i will and there and leave it up to questions. i can't talk at great length about how these groups are interacting and sharing resources and fighters into syria, yemen, somalia, west africa, but at risk of boring the audience i will end there. bruce, youkatie, and made it through the washington traffic. i am thrilled to have you,

really one of the best and most established experts on this topic at georgetown now. yes, georgetown. really excited to hear what you have to think about it. >> [indiscernible] discussing these issues with mary for a long time and know her thinking. one thing -- two things are quite unique about dairy's work in this -- mary's work. anybody who talks and speaking on this subject at all. there was a long time when where there was little discourse on al qaeda, when the arab spring created a sea change where democracy would flower and civil protests and civil disobedience and theped terrorism,

threat of al qaeda was seen to be nonexistent. ow different h that has become. second, this is a specially valuable piece of work because even when people discuss al qaeda or terrorism in general so little of the conversation or the dialogue deals with strategic issues. strength,nk is mary's her background in military strategy and history, and in her dissection and analysis of al qaeda's own strategy, and i think is absolutely critical, and also something that is being neglected. let me make a few observations in general that i hope will supplement what mary has written and also what katie has said, and then draw things together for a bit of a conclusion. the dimensions of the challenge we face today are best evidenced by the fact that al qaeda's presence in twice as many

countries than it was six years astonishingt is an development. for the past several years we have been told that al qaeda was on the verge of judy chu clap, -- should he just -- strategic collapse. this happened when economies were shrinking, agencies and bureaucracies across the world are shedding personal and having do with less. al qaeda has reversed process and has expanded. it is not only the physical presence and not only the number of fighters, but we see that al hasa's brand and ideology prospered at a time when we were more inclined to count them as having been completely irrelevant, or at least that was the cliché around the time of the arab spring. especially worrisome, something that mary brought up, is not

only is there being this externally -- extraordinary expansion,, but the core al qaeda in pakistan has remained remarkably resilient to the extent that few people have imagined. i have written on this. on this.also focused much of the conventional wisdom over the past decade or more has been consistently incorrect. the strength of the core is yet another example. core al qaeda has always had a much deeper bench then we have imagined, and this is why mary's strategy thatthe relies on attrition is not going to succeed over the long run. there are any number of individuals who most of us in this room have not heard of, but are veterans of the

afghan-soviet war, who have three decades of experience and credentials to assume positions of leadership in the organization. we saw rauf and others as amongst this number. also what has enabled al qaeda suit to survive when it has been onslreatest on-site -- aught in history has been to thecome and obviate even most consequential countermeasures directed against it. we see the changing demographic of al qaeda, the al qaeda core, and of al qaeda in pakistan, where the canonical al qaeda fighter of the past was a pashtu hills,ng down the satchels full of grenades, including ak-47's, and we see in ensure itsways to

longevity, recruiting among middle-class pakistanis to join the organization. and amongst that number faruq and others are some of the people who have assumed qaeda,ing roles in al much like a person who was killed recently. zaw--alk her he has proved beahari has also proven to more resilient. it has to be the challenge from , and he has reasserted control over the movement that he still retains with the expulsion, but what worries me enormously in the al qaeda ferment is this immense between the

core and other groups, which will lead to data competition, and we have seen historically when groups of people against one another that they become much more lethal and acted. discordantther very developed over the past couple years is how al qaeda's global jihadi orientation has had resonance across the while alcal expanse qaeda is active. we have seen groups in north and west africa has well as in east africa not only prosecuting local struggles, but also buying very much into the global ideology and their worldview come and this was clear with -- for example. i will not repeat what mary writes, but al qaeda thinks

strategically, and that is why mary's work is so important because we need to think just as strategically about al qaeda. especially because i think we are at a critical juncture or crossroads in our struggle. resurrectednot only itself, become much more relevant than we imagined it could have in a short time, because of the syrian civil war, but i think that's. is going to be a game changer unless we are active against al qaeda in a number of different levels. not to repeat what katie and others have said, but the influx of foreign fighters is in and of itself alarming. the open-source conservative estimates put this number at 8000. reports from the european allies indicate over the past 18 months the steady increase in all fun exponential growth, of the number of individuals going to serious. another thing that is misleading

and more disturbing about that figure, because that is just foreign fighters. many countries are not counting their citizens or their residents who are going to syria on unitarian missions, -- on humanitarian missions but are providing other assistance to al qaeda. even the 8000 figure is on the low side. even in the united states, except for the 30 or so somali-americans that went to somalia after 2008, we have never seen this concentrated outflow of the united states citizens and residents going to a jihadi confit. i would be hard-pressed to name even a dozen, and maybe on one hand that americans that are with core al qaeda in afghanistan, yet we have seen at least according to publicize publicizedeast 60 --

reports, at least 60 individuals have gone over. the greatest challenge in responding yto or embracing mary's policy recommendations are twofold, and i am reminded officer'stish observations about the intervention of domestic and foreign-policy in united kingdom he said930's, where everybody was for the quiet life. that is not so different here. i was on the hill a few weeks ago speaking to a congressman whose constituency includes the whoyork metropolitan area lost many constituents in the attacks 13 years ago, and he said raising this issue of the al qaeda threat or even invoking 9/11 he sometimes feels -- and this is from the new york area speaking to his own constituency

-- i feel i am talking about gettysburg. that is the first big challenge. maryecond big challenge is sensibly, and those who have followed the al qaeda challenge for the past decade or more, have often argued is it cannot be conceived as a counterterrorism mission. counterterrorism is tactical. it is about attrition. to really make an effect as we have always argued and long known when we have invoked the struggle for arab minds or muslim minds, to make a difference and have a lasting impact, one has to change the dynamics of these environments. involves a strategic approach and one that is based on counterinsurgency. there is any single word more reviled or to state in washington right now than

counterinsurgency, which is another challenge. as soon as you start speaking about things of foreign internal defense, development, the kind combat operations that are needed to prevent this type of resurrection or recrudescence of terrorism, people run in the other direction. terms, thecrete first step is much more proactively contain al qaeda'd growth. that is remarkable, that we have to talk about a continued -- a containment policy. this entails at a time when we want to focus in words, when an excellent article in the current issue of "the new yorker" reminds us how the situation in iraq has deteriorated since our withdrawal for years ago. it does demand greater engagement, specifically,

intinued engagement afghanistan, pakistan, yemen, and syria. effectivequires more pressure on and negotiations with some of our hostess allies in the war on terror -- some of war onsest allies in the terrorism, especially turkey, and again it means that we cannot completely turn our backs on south asia, because those problems exist along the afghan -pakistani order. again, to be more pessimistic than mary, or more discordant, we have to be seriously concerned about the threat of a terrorist attack somewhere, ridiculously i would argue more likely in europe than in this entry, and involving a chemical weapon. ofre have been a spate arrests of al qaeda operatives

in turkey and in iraq in particular, in israel, and elsewhere in the middle east who have been either seized with actual quantities of sarin nerve gas. that is too much of a cluster of in a specific region in a short time that one can ignore. another affiliate's goals in serious to see assad's chemical stockpiles. this has become a much more serious threat of terrorists using unconventional weapons in the future than it has been at any time in recent years. a better capability to scan the horizon of potential al qaeda expansion, we have proven inept at that. its expansion. finally, i would say, and this is one of the strengths of mary 's reports, is that she

underscores the uncomfortable fact that the struggle against terrorism cannot be wished away despite all the temptations and the drive to declare victory and just to come home, that this is an ongoing challenge. al qaeda has a strategic vision and plan. we will only effect of the when we adopt one as well. thank you. [applause] thank you, bruce. and thanks to all the panelists. i will open it up for questions in one minute. i want to throw a couple of thoughts that are spurred by this, and if you want to pick them up in questions, but the panelists can pick them up. is the question of the role of the authorization of use of military force in our strategy against al qaeda. i wonder if we have not reached

the point where we have a hammer and we are looking for nails and we have defined our strategy against al qaeda to be coextensive with the limits of , because the mechanism for dealing with al qaeda has been attack targeted strikes. as we talk about the limits of lose ideas of the us one sett allows of tools, but we have not been talking about the other sets of tools, for reasons that bruce pointed out. another thing that is remarkable that is not remarked upon very much and i want to mention because it was not raised is the united states has created by policy the largest sanctuary for al qaeda that the group has ever known in iraq and syria. because we will not conduct targeted strikes in iraq and syria, we have created an absolute safe haven from the

standpoint of our attack in those two countries. which is really remarkable when you look at the very allowance and we felt ---- the virulance of those franchises, and it is something we should think about. at aei, we tend to have conversations that are focused on realpolitik and narrowly scripted u.s. national security interests, and it is important to be able to tie anything relating to the discussions of these of military force in any way to narrowly scripted national security interests. another thing that has been undergirding our approach to these problems for the last several years has been a view that it is not our problem fundamentally, it is not for us to do anything about it, when hundreds of thousands of people are killed, when war is raging across a large portion of an area of strategic importance, when atrocities are being

committed on massive scales, we need a compelling national security reason separate from that to be involved. we have had people, including people in the administration, suggest it was in our interest to have a civil war in syria persist because hezbollah was fighting al qaeda and how wonderful is that. seeingblem is we are that in addition to the fact that those policies are in my opinion morally reprehensible and an indefensible, they are bad strategy because the conflicts themselves and the atrocities and radicalized populations and become magnets for radicalization and become laboratories for experimentation by the enemy that are in fact dangerous. we have made a mistake by going so far in the direction of a realist approach to all of these problems that we have missed the fact that even a realist would have to recognize the problems that some of these humanitarian

crises are creating. with that i will open it to the audience. our ground rules are please wait until -- raise your hand cannot wait until the microphone comes to you, identify yourself, and fraser brief statement in the form of a question. -- and phrase your brief statement in the form of a question. >> [indiscernible] thanks very much for the discussion. -- arab spring >> microphone. [indiscernible]

as a number of people have said, the arab spring is the background here. and it may be that [indiscernible] al qaeda. as was mentioned, it has produced a situation in which there is action mobilization in ization, -- factional the dispute between individuals and the islamic state of iraq and syria. i was wondering what the panelists thought about how that goes forward, and on the one organization or

the network, the core and the network, deal with that. yeah, just how they see the dynamic of that. >> who wants to start? mary? >> so, my reaction to the arab spring has not changed from 2011 to today. i gave a series of talks in 2011 in which i said i have a lot of hopes about which direction this will go, but i also have a lot of fears. i outranked both of those at the time. in many, not all, but many of the countries that experienced such a huge outpouring of hope in 2011, we are seeing some of those fears realized. in some cases it is because capable governments were replaced by governments that were less capable in counterterrorism terms and in

policing their own borders and in controlling violence within their territory. , right now,, libya as far as i know, does not even have a government. to police they borders are make certain that the violence is not viral of control, not just within libya, but with all of its -- but within all of its neighbors as well. people at first who replaced mubarak in egypt, there was a lot of hope based on that new government, the democratically elected government, but violence was already spiraling in the which even under morsi, shows some lack of capacity and as really gotten out of control since the military decided to take over. a very capable partner is no longer able to police its territory a way it once was. one could go around actually to

a lot of places. the one place where there is more hope today that i think van fear -- i think van fear is tunisia, where you have a group that has some relationship with al qaeda's ideology, there the violence has not spiraled out of control. and one can still have some hopes about it. i do believe that unfortunately that was one of the driving factors. of release of prisons thousands upon thousands of people who were arrested by those governments drove a lot of this violence as well and egypt and elsewhere. well, you know, al qaeda was knocked off balance by the arab spring. we know the symbol full of governments that will was bottabad.in a

al qaeda has been more adept at taking advantage of the arab spring than anyone else. meaning back then was al qaeda was no longer relevant. demonstrated its relevance in north africa and in the levant. it has been able to take advantage of some of the phenomenon and we have seen in the arab spring. the greater recruitment, jihadi's that have been left out of prison, but we do not have a firm grasp on what their recruitment activities were like during this time when there were opportunities to recruit. within theregion and also foreigners al qaeda has clearly seized on what was the driving forces behind the arab spring with the use of social media, and this has transformed and is something of a game changer. it is a challenge as well, which is why they're creating their own english-language magazine, because he cannot control the controlsewage -- can't

the message. of 24,000 followers in syria. this is one of the best recruitment platforms one could imagine. it is going to create a situation different from afghanistan even 30 years ago. the one bright spot is the faction novelization, -- the factionalization, the inviting, but at least historically most types of splintering and factionalization have created higher levels, not lower. to respond to the point about taking a realistic view of this, the israelis have one of the clearest views of what creates.ization certainly in syria they view the fighting there between theyllah and al qaeda --

will not cancel each other out. volatileextremely region that is very difficult to control and may not play out in the way we hope it will. >> [indiscernible] >> the core partly -- two things, it is ramping up its involvement, attempting to develop its relevance. one thing is a lot more of its propaganda has been in urdu than in arabic. my future is that the al qaeda core right now is biding its time and waiting to see what happens in afghanistan and what u.s. forces are left behind. i do not think it is dead. it is quite yes and. then it will become more assertive. that is the end of that.

on the factionalization point, they used to be a commercial that was saying when banks compete you win. in this case i say when terrorist groups compete you lose because they tend to bid against each other for international support and recognition by doing the most outrageous things they can possibly do in order to attract attention, and that is worrisome. i might disagree with verse about one thing. hiri may have made a mistake in expelling isis. i think it will turn out to be bad because the last thing i want to see are the groups like cometpeten start on a stage, and the only thing that we say is not terrible about them is they have been focused on their region.

i'm not sure they do not win that dogfight over the long term. it a goodre zawahiri call there. i think he misjudged the situation. question? >> carnegie endowment. probably asked this question in my place. i want to pick up on the notions that the egyptian, curt egyptian forces -- sorry, government, is less capable than the mubarak government, and then go more broad. f the sameon is, i military, why is it that they are less capable than they were in mubarak, and is or something

else about the government that is driving the expansion of al qaeda? where i want to take this, what i have not heard in the discussion today is whether legitimate grievances against local governments or their perceived backers are not in only drivingnot recruitment, but even driving some of the ideology. in other words, i get the description of the very extremist version of sharia which is hated by the population upon which it is imposed. that is not a recipe for success. is there something else that we are overlooking in the behavior of some of these governments that we might be tempted to ally with for their short-term counterterrorism capabilities that may not in fact be driving, helping drive the expansion of al qaeda? >> i agree completely. so my comment about capability

was not solely about c.t. capability or military capabilities, but the ability to find a political solution to the problems that they are facing as well, and to include populations that might otherwise have grievances. the first solution that was chosen by the military to some of the popular uprising was to meet that with a great deal of violence. ad i have -- i actually teach class on irregular warfare where you can go back and look at the onset of insurgency in multiple cases, and you find in nearly every case in the 20th century in the 21st century, a radicalizing violent incident that in fact is kerry th -- in fact is carried out by the government in an attempt to suppress in many cases what are perceived by people as rightful

grievances, and it is the use of that violence that in fact sets so i do not want to make it sound like this when it use the term capability, i am talking or military ct capability, but on the third hand am of the release of so many thousands of egyptian terrorists and people who had been deeply engaged with al other violent groups early in the arab spring, as loss of visibility about what was going on in the , ilence that ramped up their think there was also a lots going on there that led by people who claim some sort of iniliation with al qaeda

order to take advantage as bruce says, of this permissive environment that led to a lot of the growth in violence as well. warms my heart to hear sarah answer that question. there are few people in the world that have more of a right to answer that question and continued focus on it and sarah who was a crusader on the issue in afghanistan. risking her life among other things for a long time. of being inrivilege afghanistan with her for some portion of that time, which was a highlight of an otherwise fairly dismal experience. port --o put a sharp went on the answer to that. that because we do not like to talk about counterinsurgency anymore, we

have lost sight about the fact that it is an insurgency and you do not have it just because you have a small tiny cell of people who are trying to do bad stuff and terrify people. you have an insurgency because you have a significant population that has a significant grievances with what is going on that a small group can take advantage of and hijacked. we saw that in afghanistan. sarah saw it much longer than i did but we had a predatory government that was drawing a lot of people that were not otherwise sympathetic to the taliban but were supporting the taliban. syrian is another case. another example is iraq. i do not think is possible to question the degree to which the prime minister's approach to dealing with what started off as a peaceful protest movement among the sunni population radicalized it and drove a very

ni majorityony -- su back into the arms of al qaeda. this is not just about the use of military worse on protesters or government escalating but governments that are predatory in terms of irruption that are isolating minorities that are excluding people from the franchise that are in other words behaving in ways that make them seem illegitimate in the eyes of the people. we as a country have been very went to recognize that as a problem for us, and we are especially and when the state in question is supporting us and we are trying to use our hammer in looking for nails. to bring this all the way around, and the panel can free -- feel free to react, are we totally head on backwards in the sense that we're so focused on the situation strategy, so focused on looking for people

who can help with that that we are actually fueling the problem by supporting or trying to support governments that are so illegitimate that they in fact are making the problem much worse even as they cooperate in limited ways with the strategies? ok. >> daniel plush. student at john hopkins. regarding the video that surfaced last week featuring terrorists in the ap, i wanted your thoughts on the video, and more specifically, it was a very brazen step for him to be outside exposed. issues ofmanagement the past couple of years, could this be another fractional ization, it is his inclination

-- inclination to per do a more jihadist strategy. yes, it obviously expresses a that -- i of offense watched the whole video put out .y track at least 100 leaders or top people apparently within al qaeda in the arabian peninsula out there. i am not even sure if we know it is al qaeda in the arabian peninsula but gathered together and have a congratulatory meeting about releasing some of the prisoners. that was the purpose of the get-together. to me it expresses confidence.

does it show something about ization? i sta he is part of the al qaeda leadership. somewhere down the hierarchy he, he is part of that core leadership now, so i do not think it expresses it. this is a statement of confidence. it is very interesting to think about when you are dealing with a terrorist group that competition leads to greater violence. when it comes to insurgencies, better outcomes, as long as the insurgencies spend all of their time focusing solely on each other, and again, do not use it as a competition

and focusing their guns on an outsider in order to gain territory or make a statement for outside supporters. one of the key counterinsurgency techniques that people attempt to practice is splintering insurgent group's. in some cases there was contradictory evidence and can lead to the final collapse. what is most likely to happen with al qaeda is it is most likely to move down there scale if there was a counter -- a competition over territory and so on, move down the scale to some sort of terrorist activity and have to fight its way back up again, even if the competition did lead to the grading capabilities. having said that, i have been

watching very carefully the public statements by people in qaeda central versus statements of support for isis. and the result has been a very interesting change over the past two months. either supporting ices or a neutral stance or actually supporting al qaeda central. lining up the support for the rebels. month there has been a movement in the other direction. that we might be seeing al qaeda central come out on top in this argument, unfortunately.

>> i firmly believe we are focused on figuring out whether they are in competition, who is the top guy and essentially waiting for someone to stick your head up high enough so we can hit them on the head. he has been part of al qaeda since before 2001. he was hand selected by bin laden to be his personal aide and spent four years next to bin andn for he was arrested then eventually back to yemen where he gained his freedom. i think we actually need, and the experts do as well as we coreate al qaeda core and al qaeda meaning al qaeda core, the group in pakistan, senior leadership we generally think of as al qaeda and core al qaeda

being those individuals who are active on 9/11 and have dispersed all of them subscribing to al qaeda ideology and a vision that mary lays out in her paper. we cannot say that simply because she -- because he was sitting in yemen that he was not part of al qaeda core. he has always been there, just simply now formally part of the al qaeda core hierarchy. that i think is a very key point to make, because if we are looking for guys to hit, there are plenty of guys who will stick out there had. that is what we really need to be addressing. just a brief technical note on the irregular warfare aspect always look at

who believes they need to cover their faces into has no trouble at all showing their face as an expression of confidence in their own control versus fears of being captured or killed. in that video, lots and lots of all had their faces uncovered and had no trouble showing themselves. to me, that is an expression of confidence. >> paul light. -- white. the panel talked about mainstream groups and affiliated groups pretty much across the muslim world, and i wonder if it really make sense to think about qaeda as we are talking about here as opposed to manifestation of a radical political ideology

that anytime there is a group could adoptt they the ideology or move forward in an al qaeda affiliated group or similar organization could pop up. doesn't really make sense to think of al qaeda of a concrete entity that can be defeated, problem solved, or is it really our broader security problem, a chronic security problem to be managed? in the paper i give a proposed definition of al qaeda that i think it's at we are where we're really at with the struggle in this particular group. briefly i define it as an idea or ideology and organization. i think they go together in some ways. ideologythere is an behind what they are doing. in technical terms, it is their

men had should and particular extremist version. very unique version of sharia that you can follow around the globe to say these guys are al qaeda. along with that, the jihadist methodology comes attachment to a strategy that has specific objectives associated with it. i think they are imagining something kind of fuzzy. the groups i associate with al qaeda is quite specific. ideology has very specific things attached to it. in the same way, the methodology , strategy methodology is very specific things attached to it. it does not matter therefore

whether you have command and control between these groups that have an attachment to this very specific ideology and the core, as everyone calls the leadership. because they are committed to the same object is and will cause precisely the same amount of damage, regardless of whether there is command and control coming from one to the other. to that, i would lay out the challenge of finding an al qaeda affiliate that does not have a personal network that reaches back to al qaeda core or one of the affiliates themselves. there is a network. these groups are operating together and there is sharing of resources and that comes from trust. that is not build up by saying i believe in al qaeda ideology today.

there is a vetting process. we see that on a small scale with troops and our reject did -- and are rejected because credentials are not good enough for al qaeda and we see that in either naming an affiliate or trying to figure out who is part of the network itself. it does have a network behind it. over time,ld that which is why we need to be looking at what is happening today and not basing on 2001. the problem is there is a temptation to see al qaeda everywhere. it is created responsibly look out to see it anywhere. i think it has led to a very unfortunate belief that these are all local problems. that west africa, north africa,

prosecuted by local groups that adopt the name al qaeda because they get more attention. that may be suing some instances. , going outok at that to documents released a couple of years ago, bin laden 2004 had already identified nigeria ground for al qaeda expansion. over the time when supposedly the al qaeda core cease to exist come and the series, trainers, persons providing intelligence, facilitators were surfacing. that was not at all a phenomenon. making -- active on waiting for the connections. mary is absolutely right to say that the split has benefited

core al qaeda. is bad or dispute was unfolding and attempting to get various forces in the region over to its side. the sophistication toward networking and northwest and east africa over the past six years. we have been saying al qaeda core cease to exist and is a relative and completely inactive. that particular example, because i think it was incredibly of a strip around the same point from the other direction. check moment.

originally it really was a locally focused insurgency. not that we might come after them but it would harm them with the local people. with thermed isis local people. there has been upcoming -- uprisings. jan has been much more level and have -- clever in how to manage that. does the group batter, you have to be able to answer the question, why did they make the choice publicly to reaffirm its

allegiance and membership in this specific global t hardy organization when the view was that was not a good idea and the standpoint of domestic consumption. , is theret's, i think a resource allocation parts of this that we have not really thought about at all. the command and control relationship i do not think is the right way to think about it. i do not think you have dr. evil calling at number three and telling them do this right now, stroking a cat. you do definitely have global resources that are allocated different ways. foreign fighters sometimes to show up that there are foreign piper -- foreign fighter pipelines. groupsof the reasons why for cyst in being affiliated with al qaeda even when it is probably not in their interest locally. money andere are resources attached to it as well.

that goes along way to answering if it is just ideology or an organization. question over here. turkey and i might -- i am a consultant. thing i noticed, i just checked every page of the report. i have not seen one word about turkey and the reports. i would like to ask the question regarding the atv. thatnk it is a coincidence it is spelled like action. there is a connection there. march 19 aboutle the wrong enemy. aboutt book talking regardingwith u.s.

the times they played with double-faced. also, i would like to talk about article in the london book review on the subject of turkish intelligence to syrian al qaeda groups. >> to continue down the ideology route, i should note i think it is an idea on ideology as well

as an organization. please don't take that as contradiction. even if you do not see signs of organizational connection or proof of this, that does not mean this group does not have a connection to al qaeda core objectives, and therefore, we can sort of ignore them. that actually rings me to your question, which is when i look at what i see is a connection typetowards ottoman ideology or ottoman centric ideology, and a desire to work with and protect do things with -- turkish people around the world. and until very recently a connection therefore to the ideology of a man named gooden rather than to al qaeda's vision

of global jihadist and very specific vision of the world. that -- i understand there has been a difference between the two. my reaction to that is to say by using the definition i have used -- that does not mean that some government in turkey at some point might think their interest outlined with a different ideology, but i do not see how oft works in the favor political process and security of the orders, specifically where al qaeda is the stabilizing everything in a way that is not in the national interest of turkey or the party. i do not think it is in the interest to do business with al qaeda.

historically they have always been able to sustain themselves when they are able to use borders. the problem with serious is it has a border that is completely uncontrolled with iraq and one that is unevenly controlled with turkey. the mover of foreign fighters is well recognized. i think it is greater intervention and cooperation for how you can really close off the conduit, which has become critical to sustaining not just the groups. we like, more moderate and secular groups but al qaeda to be more discriminate. >> former student from last fall. >> my question is if the

worldview is potent ideology or organization that is able to move throughout the world to uncover and spaces with weakened institutions. almost like a virus spreading. what is the right mixture of preventative medicine from the united states point of view to manage this through partner forces, what have you. what does that look like, especially in an air restricted budget? >> a nice way of sneaking in what is the strategy against al qaeda and the five minutes question? i will let the panel take a swing at that and whatever panel they want to because it is a broad enough question. mary laid out the strategy quite effectively. it is recognizing al qaeda

itself is a strategic animal and by havinge dealt with its own strategy. on.annot only rely has to be broader. has to address fundamentally achieving a recalibration in an environment so it does not , and that isism also what insurgency is all about. think you will find the panel largely in accordance with what the broad prescription would be. it is not actually the most pressing issue we face in fighting al qaeda but certainly a component. i personally believe we need to underscore what mary's conclusion was, which you need

to invite the entire al qaeda network as a whole. we have been playing the game of mole for- whack a 13 years and will continue to go lay it if we only fight the head of it. does not mean putting american boots on the grounds in every single territory where al but it doesbase mean recognizing al qaeda where it is an developing a strategy and deceit -- discrete policies that undermine the group where it it's operating, whether it is addressing legitimate antigovernment grievances or building up governance capabilities, building up local security forces that can hold and control the territory that is sovereign to the state. i think that is what we are looking at is a large history instead of going piecemeal over a network that has adapted over the years. >> i do not have to add much to

what my colleagues have to say. you can read the broad source of things i have to say about the strategy and what i have to say in the paper itself. i think we do need to have a and that we have to rely on something other than attrition and killing or capturing a set group of people as the way forward and have to take into consideration -- consideration political and governance issues in order to deal with the problem. sneaking in one last question. right over here. likes my name is donna lee. much more importantly, i was a student of the professor so i will ask you this question. in the 2012 campaign president

inma stated leadership pakistan was effectively decimated. this was in contrast to intelligence coming out of pakistan itself that there was concerns and the intelligence committee of every us -- going into after pakistan in 2000 one. according to a top security the group was not diminished by drone attacks. what that is actually doing is adding to the anti-americanism that takes away from the much needed expectation on who the enemy of the state really is. basically, what are your thoughts on the nightmare tonario of al qaeda successfully carry out attacks in all four provinces, something other groups have not been able to do in pakistan.

>> this gives me a chance to plug my next book coming out from basic in 2015. attacking al qaeda's grand strategy. callss what al qaeda adaptation of other jihadist groups in an attempt to get everyone on their page ideologically and organizationally. i think they are very active in this regard in pakistan. groups that it started off with completely different interests, leadership that might have been to al qaeda. very interested in co-opting them to their ranks and working

with them in a very pragmatic them onventually get the right page as they would put it and aimed at the right direction. that is what i see happening in pakistan. very much forll coming. please join me in thanking the panel. [applause] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014] >> a related story said of the grid based in libya that was originally created by special operations to train authorities to hunt down terrorists has been

converted into a terrorist training camp. that original report on the daily beast. an update from the middle east today from the washington post. reporting that israel has broke off talks with the palestinians today, a day after palestinian authorities announced a reconciliation between his majority party and the more militant action, which was -- which does not recognize israel as a legitimate country. going to the and brookings institution for a look at recent elections and south asia, specifically afghanistan and india. several policy analyst will look at various security, economic and political issues resulting from the election. just about to get underway here on c-span. >> good afternoon, everyone. michael hanlon from the

brookings institution foreign-policy program. we are here at a brookings event at carnegie space. grateful for hosting us today. just to my right is of the -- is another brookings scholar who is an expert on afghanistan. she has been much of her career working on a couple of excellent books on counter narcotics and the listed economies than is the topic of her current research project. she wrote a book about afghanistan called" aspiration and ambivalence" a year ago and was going to be in election observer until violence precluded that, which is a natural starting point for some of the discussion i know she will get into in a moment about what has been going on in afghanistan in the next few weeks. a foreign service officer who spent two more difficult years and the most difficult place you

could imagine as u.s. ambassador to pakistan in the 2010-2012 time, which as you will recall included not only osama bin laden and another challenge in the u.s. pakistani relations. as distinguished career. notable previous assignments in iraq, serbia and another of other european countries. we are grateful to have him here today. finally, ambassador teresita --affer, foreign sermon former foreign service officer largely focused on south asia. ambassador to sri lanka and served in india, pakistan and bangladesh and knows a great deal about the entire subregion -- region. along with her husband broke one of my favorite policy book, how to negotiate with have to stand. that is not necessarily her most amos book. she wrote a stellar volume on

u.s.-india relations in recent years. our format today is i will begin with broad format -- broad questions to each of them. all three know a great deal about all three countries. we will ask them to speak about one country. the ambassador for pakistan. ofn in the second round discussion appear we will go into the inner linkages, other issues and once we're done with that, we will go to you for the questions and be done at 3:00. without further ado, let me thank you very much for your research and insight for how you will frame this discussion about afghanistan where we stand in the counting process and vote validation process right now, what you have been watching so far and what do you anticipate in the coming weeks. >> good afternoon.

but ended up not going to afghanistan to monitor the elections because the run-up to the elections turned out very vibrant event. a very purposeful effort on the part of the taliban to disrupt the elections. for several weeks and months before hand, a were issuing statements that you election official workers and candidates should be targeted, and they in fact did engage in a great deal of violence and people should not go to vote. it was irrelevant if i went or did not go to observe the election. turned out greater than election officials expected from the to vote, despite

the great violence and despite miserable weather during the time of the election. of thes out many stations ran out of ballots and people could not vote much to the frustration having stood for in lined hours standing risking their lives and bad weather. i think the reason why many now are looking at the first round of elections with great optimism, people really came to understand that this is the single most important transition among several transitions taking place. power from the u.s. invasion and hamid karzai.

it has gone very well so far. today we were supposed to hear more on the result that i have not seen them yet. if they have come out, i do not see the numbers. a man widely perceived to be as a politician from the north as a he has tallied 40 four percent. afghani 33%. that likely means there will be a runoff. second round in the elections. he has to have more than 50% of the vote. avoiding aal energy

runoff. by many as ay seen desirable outcome. i am quite skeptical. i think it would be quite extraordinary for either of the two men to concede. particularly for abdullah. before the second round in the 2009 elections. president hamid karzai. i do not think the deal is likely. i think it is perhaps questionable decision to be to see aopes and runoff as a problematic outcome. targeting the candidates that is a possibility. that could set off a nightmare. so good.

i would add one more thing to my opening remarks. as much as both afghans themselves and the international community, washington, are preoccupied with the election, both rounds are all me one step or several steps in the process of power transfers. much still has to happen in the process of transferring power after there is a new man in the palace. it is a process that will go on for many months. even the depths that the new president will go at some point will be negotiated. layers and will be layers of institution.

>> thank you. >> should we give president card confidence. they've raved the taliban and voted in huge numbers. the security forces helped to protect that process. if he was trying to cheat, he did not do a very good job. looks like he got 10% of the vote. how do you read that? should we give president karzai at least unacknowledged meant of if not great applause that he stayed out of the cost us and there was a big campaign cap the >> we do not frankly know about fraud.

rather substantial story of fraud. so the key question about fraud is whether it is acceptable to the afghan people and politicians or whether it is fraud that is so skewed that it is not acceptable. so far the reaction seems to be quite calm. breath on hold our the process. he is leaving. the impressive thing is the elections were held on time for the first time ever and more difficult weather. he seem not to have an very directly in the process. sure he has to be very -- chartingarging what it will look like and probably very act the in the

bargaining very currently taking place. despite the pressures on him come he has said he will except the result and not challenge the result. it into thenot make second round, they will retract that and challenge it. >> there is a lot of interconnection but we will save that for the second round. if you could please catch us up a little bit. not so much on pakistani elections but how you see pakistan politics doing a year on into the new government that would be much appreciated. >> thank you for spending time with us in the middle of the day to discuss these topics. we mays a process where want to look to 2014 for the

reasons of our own government to look at this as some sort of drake or goal after which there might be a different kind of situation. i think we will be a little disappointed if we expect a sharp break in 2014, despite in happens with tehe bsa afghanistan. at least from the pakistani view, there were ongoing issues and overwhelming feeling that the government that has been in power now for a year, that this is not the government that has chosen to or is capable of making decisions. there had been a lot of hope that there might be more purpose, focus, that somehow the faced due to personality or issues of split , and the rest of the government led by the coalition that somehow they would come out licke stagnation and would up into the sense that pakistan

could get moving under sharif. i think the electorate gave him a fairly resounding mandate had hoped for that. seems, iss shown, it that he will be timid or at least very careful. this seems to be matched also to the approach of the other real power center, the army. have been manyre rumors about him pending military insurgents, something america has pushed for for a very long time and something people in the country that are very much looking for a simple up have to scan a governmental assault against the militants, does not seem likely that will happen anytime soon either. it is almost as if what you see in pakistan is that pakistan, rather than taking the initiative.

what will happen to the american presence in the region. approach andical taking an initiative, not only because they are enormous issues as you all know, enormous economic challenges, it long-term challenges that take the challenge of water in the region, that if it is not dealt with in coming years will be change ofthat utterly politics in the country and will have a huge impact on the country as well. this longer-term things do not appear to be on the agenda. what appears to be on the agenda is stability. keeping pakistan stable. making sure the alliances remain , and perhaps in this case, making sure he does not get outflanked on the right, so intofore adding credence

the discussions and negotiations with the taliban to try to at least convince the public that something is being done whereas outside observers have a healthy skepticism about whether the talks will make progress. seems to be planning a more cautious game as well. butadly, for those of us had booked for new initiatives whether in governance, whether in economics and whether there are possibilities in dealing with the neighbors that i will turn to later emma does not look

like that is happening. my last point i would make is that i think for those of us that are pakistan's friends from the outside come a we would do ourselves a favor, even a pakistan does not change much in 2014 come in to see the end of chance forrole as a us to reconceptualize our approach to take into account regional issues, to try to not look at pakistan as we have for so many years down the bilateral track or supplement that with a broader approach to indian issues, afghan issues, perhaps breakdown bureaucratic issues that limit india pakistan ties or what others can do to help the ties. that is to say, even if pakistan does not show the leadership we had hoped for, it might be a time for us to come up with ideas for how we can support a future for pakistan that is perhaps a little more bold than what we see for domestic

reasons. >> two quick look if i could in the introduction. the first one even though there have not been big policy initiatives, do you see slight improvement in the pakistani economy or stability of the country based on either trends against the insurgency or the lowball partial economic lessery that has hurt them than the great recession and all the things that happened in 2009 at so that is my main question. i have to admit your last question made me wonder if you think it is time we change the u.s. government organization and at least in the foreseeable future think about eliminating the position of special representative for afghanistan -- pakistan or modifying structures. i very much believe it would be wise for us, not precipitously but to have a bureaucratic structure in the state department, white house and also military and white house and military community.

can look regionally, if we can structure ourselves regionally and i think it will inp our thinking so people places like brookings can give advice to people working on crosscutting issues in the way we have failed to do that. critiques i have had is if you have american soldiers in afghanistan come if you look through the lens of afghanistan and look at pakistan am a what afghani to see is the network, and that is not it. gotten awayons have and could be very useful. the second point you make, have things gotten better? i went to pakistan in 2010 and went straight to help. and i left and things have gradually gotten better. that is the contribution i have made before leaving town.

that said, i do think things for the period. tcalmed we experience problems at the end of the musharraf era that i think were ramped up to had. this is more on the bilateral track, but also domestically. we have democracy coming back. a lot of things are going to get better. i think now we are much more realistic. we have realized now the imbalances. a long-term commitment to the country. now people are been more modest and realistic in what they expect. i am a little less angular about pakistan's ability, because i think it is a trap taste on the more sense of the economy, the fact that the economic powers of the country may make money.

people who are there are doing well. when you see the sheets at bed bath and beyond them of their fellow pakistani sheets. these are people who know how to make inks. the opening to the global economy that would make pakistan achieve that prosperity it deserves, that has not happened. representative of the traditional business in many ways was the kind of guy who might have been, had he been could, the person who push to see structural change in the economy that would open it up to the rest of the world, and specifically open it up to india where the real advantages to both countries could live.

for that to change, it has to open to the world economy. >> thank you. you are speaking about an ongoing process. in afghanistan there was a luxury of talking about a completed first round. you are in the middle of the first round that has nine the print days in phases. if you could explain to us what you are able to discern and what you are going to expect? and cameron have talked about process in the sense of talking about dynamic pakistani politics in the afghani selection process. i will talk a tiny bit about process, but mostly what i think we ought to be looking for. this election like every other election india has ever had, the largest exercise in democratic electoral process that the world has ever known. in order to maintain order for

the elections across this huge country, voting this year is on nine different days. with anork quilt illustration of where each takes place. do not -- not a clean line across the map. elected as a membership of 572. the indian elections are famous for being 572 separate elections. two year you actually have parties for the national election competing. this has been the case for the past three or four elections. it has brought the party

independence and has led or solely run most of the government independence. but which is widely regarded as having run out of juice during the most recent administration. it is also the scandal. the other party with national intions is the policy bjp, doing nationalist -- hindu nationalist headed by the chief minister of one of india's most dynamic state. is a guy with a lot of baggage. a very good job and developing his home state. he is also an autocratic type. he comes out of the hottest -- hardest line part.

ministerrtantly, chief at the time of ethnic riots 12 aars ago, which left over thousand people dead. brought court case against him on the charges was the mist for insufficient evidence to convict. there is a third possible outcome that is actually in my judgment more likely. the third possible outcome is there might be a rickety coalition of regional parties.

which basically run on local issues. does not get enough seats to put together the winning coalition, then you could get a conglomerate of the regional parties, possibly with congress support. to look for as we get the election results on the which will be on may 16. say, and these comments presupposed there will be a government led of some sort area that is not a law, and i will talk about the different possibilities later on. the first thing to look at is economic policy. he has made no secret of his belief this should also be the heart of indian foreign policy. he has provided relatively few clues as to what his economic

policy would be. a big believer in growth. he has focused a lot on -- infrastructure and implementation. he has proclaimed his enthusiasm about investments, including foreign investment, but not including foreign investment and multibrand retail am a one of the hot button issue on the indian scene. does on economic policy will to a large extent set the tone for relations with the united states. the other part of that tone will be set by the fact that the united states revoked his visa on account of the riots nine years ago. while we have reestablished contact with moby, something he agreed to and greeted our ambassador with a smile and huge bouquet of roses when they met in february, we do not know how

much of a bad taste in his mouth that will leave, although he has also said publicly it will not have anything to do with relations with the united states. third teeing -- and to look for. -- third thing to look for. policy speecheign he gave, he was clearer call in his praise of the previous prime minister. who among other things made a considerable effort to be the guy who brought peace between india and pakistan. the right balance between chante peace.ruck see he' we are left with one potential positive in the relationship with actress and. be ablea guy that may to get the trade opening between the two countries unglued.

the pakistan army willing to get back on the positive side of that issue. they have been on both sides but at different times. one potential negative outcome is there is a bad security incident, a bombing incident or something else that could be traced to or laid at the door of .akistan that would be a situation where would be a tough and probably military response. we do not have a way of figuring that out in advance. asked thing to look at is afghanistan. he has not said much about afghanistan, modi