what comes after gaddafi ignores that if gaddafi stays in power it is a direct threat to our national security. senator lindsey graham agreed that taking the fight directly to gaddafi with protect our national security. quote, "yound i cannot protect our vital, national security interests if gaddafi stays." he also stated, "the focus should now be to cut the head off." as the revolution grew stronger, gaddafi embarked on a crackdown. march 17, 2011, he threatened

his own people. president obama explained to the worldwide united states was trying to remove gaddafi. he said "the world watches events unfold in libya with hope and alarm. protests demanded universal rights. in a government that responds to them. they were met with an eye and. gaddafi chose to pass a brutal suppressant. innocent civilians were beaten, imprisoned, and in some cases killed. " obama'smccain supported visit. he said "if he had not acted,

history would have remembered qadhafi in the same breath as former yugoslavia. a source of international shame. " in an op-ed in april 2011, senator mccain wrote this, "the president was -- gaddafi finally met his ugly demise. he was an extremely dangerous tyrant. he supported international ,errorism during the 1980's including a bombing which claimed the lives of 270 innocent civilians. pursuedreportedly chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons. after gaddafi was killed, the

new libyan government reportedly uncovered two tons of chemical weapons gaddafi had kept hidden from the world, yet armed and ready to use. we all know it dedicated and patriotic special envoy named christopher stevens arrived in many ghazi to work with the libyan people on their transition to democracy. forged deep connections with the libyan people during his career. he understood the challenges years of 40 oppression. ambassador stephens believed in the promise of a new future for the country. today, libya is at a crossroads. open a newspaper and you will about stephens believed in the promise of a new future for the country. today, libya is at a crossroads.

violence, weapons in a central government that has continuestates "to build a parp with a democratic and pro-american libya that contribute to the mansion and security, control over the country. on the other hand, the libyan people prosperity, and freedom of the region at a time of resolution area -- of revolutionary change. forward to hearing from our witnesses about how we

assist people of libya. class i thank the gentlemen. all members may have seven days in which to submit opening statements for the record and quotes of senator lindsey graham or john mccain. for what purpose does the gentleman receipt -- request recommendation -- >> one is from the harvard belford center for science and international affairs, entitled, "lessons from libya, how not to intervene." another is an associated press article entitled "libya posses guns." guns."'s "libya, transforming a company into -- a country into a failed state." the other is a state department document partially referenced by -- the subject line

is "libya update." the date is september 12 at 12:46 p.m. there is a paragraph pertinent to our discussion today. it is referencing the libya ambassador. when he said his government expects the former qaddafi regime elements carried out attacks, i told him the groups carried out the attacks is affiliated with islamic extremists. this coming from the state , cheryl mills, secretary clinton posses chief of staff. i live -- i would like to enter this into the record. was the date and time? >> september 12, 2012, hours after the attack. it is what the state department told the libyan government what was happening. "i told the libyan ambassador that the group attacks are

affiliated with islamic extremists. those were the facts as the state department knew them. objection, so ordered. copies will be distributed. we now welcome our guest and witnesses. former robert is the deputy director for intelligence and knowledge development director at the united states after command. and the former deputy command general of the joint task force. and a research fellow at the hoover institution. david ross, phd, is a senior fellow at the foundation for defense of democracies. mr. frederick is a senior associate for middle east program at the carnegie endowment for international

peace. your title is impressive but they're all doctorates. pursuant to the rules, if all witnesses could please rise and raise your right hand. do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth? thank you and please be seated. all witnesses answered in the affirmative. in order to allow sufficient time for questions, i would ask each witness summarize their opening statements, which will be placed in the record in their entirety, as well as other extraneous material. please died -- try to stay close to the five minutes. said,predecessor often green means go everywhere and yellow means hurry up through the intercession and read means stop. please observe that on the countdown clocks. with that, general, you are

recognized. general -- --thank you >> for all the witnesses, pull your mike's close to you because -- they are fairly insensitive. >> thank you. this past year after 33 plus years of service. my service began in 1979 upon enlistment of the united states air force. it has been my honor and privilege to serve as an officer -- 1985.g my i served with many brave and distinguished women. i thank them for their service and example. my time in service was filled with great and humbling opportunities. i am thankful for these as well. i have been shaped by professional education, training, and it's.'s. these personal influences have informed my thoughts on the subject.

to present a sense of context, here's an outline. the chairman has already covered some, but i -- i would like to add i twice served in africa command, first as a colonel and representative to command and next as a general officer as the deputy director of intelligence and knowledge development commission. for the as an officer operation center. during the dawn. and operation unified protector. asaddition, i also served the senior military liaison to the national science foundation. since thelevant science foundation was also an interagency partner. influenced my views on how interagency partnership works. three topics are submitted in my opening statement. the first is the nature of the command. second is the military operations with regard to libya. it discusses strategy,

supporting policy, and policy in --ighly dynamic and limiting it can be highly dynamic and limit strategy when it is challenged to achieve a desired result. benghazi in 2012, this is the most serious. thee are many sayings in military. one that rings most true is you fight the way you train. in benghazi, we did. many with firsthand knowledge recounted the heroism displayed that night. they fought the way they trained. that is in the record. outside of libya, there were discussions that churned on about what we should do. the elements also fought the way they were trained, specifically, the predisposition to enter agency influence had the military structure and spirit of government support waiting for a request for assistance. time, and counts of capability, and discussions of

the question, could we have gotten there and made a difference. is not,e discussion could or could not of time space and capability, the point is we should have tried. as another saying goes, always move to the sound of the guns. we did not know how long this would last when we became aware of this, nor do we completely understand what we had in front kidnapping, a rescue, recovery, hostile engagement, or any and all above. what we did know early on was that this was a hostile action. it was no demonstration gone terribly awry. happened,nt of what the facts lead to the conclusion of a terrorist attack. they were focused on masturbation. the attacks became attributable very soon after the event. thank you for the invitation to appear before the committee. i take this matter very seriously. i am prepared to take your questions. >> thank you, general.

>> the starting point for a conversation about libya is that this is the sailing stake. security is eroding and governance is ebbing. as a result of those things, libya is not able to capitalize on its one big advantage, the oil revenue on which its economy is predominantly based. interested innot the outcome, both for libyan themselves and from the threats that are emanating to us from them, american policy should actually work to strengthen security in libya and strengthen governance in libya, so that the economy can help buffer the transition time of a fragile, democratizing government. our policies are not doing that. our policies are principally interested in limiting our involvement and, as a result, the problems inherent in all

transition societies, the societies that have lived 40 years under a repressive government, and had his functional economies, they need structure assistance and help to the united states knows how to do that in terms of security sector reform, in terms of governance, and yet, we helped overthrow a government without helping establish security or governance. we largely ignored the growing restlessness of the militia in libya, and of the migration of wherest to libya, jihadist saar now in possession of a libyan government military base less than 20 miles from the capital. in overtaking the base, they also got ready valuable american military equipment, which we will be seeing in syria, libya,

and even in our own country, unless we really help manage the problem of jihadist him in libya and elsewhere. building government capacity is the key to doing that. expect the libyan government is going to be able to disarm militia or to control the spread of jihadist him in their territory. that will be the result of political to go see a shin it cannot lead clinical negotiation. militia will not disarm until they have a high level of that the reason for the political vacuum that exists in libya -- the libyans are having a messy and slow, one step forward and aboutep back conversation governance in their country. but they deserve an awful lot us andlp from

nongovernmental solutions the united states supports. have largely been silent on an election that was and enrichiolence yesterday's parliamentary vote in tripoli was prevented from coming to conclusion by storming out of the parliament by armed men. said, we need to do all that is necessary to help the libyan government transition and we are not. the last thing i would say is that if american policies will governmente fragile transition to establish security and governance, that we actually stateso encourage other to do so, states in the region that constituent it, politically amongst its neighbors, or states country.ide the predominantly, the administration's policies have

criticized the motives and actions of others instead of encouraging them to avoid our own policies. >> thank you. questions thing which members, it is an honor to appear before you to discuss successes and failures of the nato intervention in libya. it seems two days ago that we were seeing rare good news out of libya. oil experts were about to resume after rebels holding it had come to an agreement with the government. on another optimistic note, the parliament had reconvened despite the new prime minister. the previous prime minister had resigned after only six days after his family was attacked. the prime minister before him was kidnapped by rebels. the prime minister vote did not go well. gunmen stored the parliamentary building and forced lawmakers to abandon plans. this is libya today. each step forward for this is another step or two back,

usually driven by security problems. the central government cannot execute basic sovereign functions in its own capital building. gunmen shut down justice and foreign affairs for two weeks due to a -- aan equipment dispute. areide countries questioning whether it is safe to even keep diplomats in libya. jordan's ambassador was kidnapped last month. two diplomats are being held by jihadist. there have been many other attacks on embassies and staff. i do not have to remind anyone of what happened to ambassador stevens. i have submitted testimony explaining at length why i conclude the cost of nato's -- nato responded with extraordinary speed to the situation and save the lives gaddafi would have taken.

this was accomplished with no allied casualties and only a 1.9 nine dollar cost. the question remains -- was going to war in libya the right choice? i would suggest the strategy of intervention would -- should be called into question. the arab spring had stalled at the time and intervening could help reeve the new momentum into the revolutionary events. dictators fallee is noble but noble intentions do not automatically make for wise actions. the intervention came when there were already wrenching changes and unpredictable situation. andtian leaders have fallen there were other revolutionary rumblings. the decision to stop gaddafi's advance but to speed up change. the problems associated with speeding up events could be seen in the second order of

consequences. the most well-known occurred in north molly a, where a collection of al qaeda linked jihadist, including al qaeda's north african affiliates gain control over a lot of territory, prompting a french led intervention in january 2013. the rebellion has a long history , but gaddafi's overthrow transformed dynamics. the via'sjihadist, including als had been ator long supporter and with him gone, they lost a major contributor. there are other ways libya's .ntervention contributed after the dictator defeat, they later wept as caches. the heavily armed return to molly reinvigorated. there were signs that now, a year later, the jihadist may be back and indeed, southern libya has laid a role in their combat al qaedahters from

fled from the advancing french and allied forces into southwest with locallended militants. had been a long supporter and with him gone, theyjihadist ignored afteo been in a situation in libya. a variety of groups operated training camps there. millions have benefited from the flow of arms to neighboring countries. concernors make libya a . 30 miles from the libya border, which have multiple links to libya, including training. despite the superb execution of created aention, this complicated regional dynamic for the u.s. senate helped jihadist groups and has had negative consequences for libya's neighbors. it is not clear the intervention saved lives. that thelars argue

fact the nato intervention prolonged the were meant that it it safe. lives than even if it saves more lives than libya, further lives were lost as a result. this is why i cannot join with who reclaim nato's intervention to be a strategic success. i appreciate the opportunity to testify and i look forward to answer your questions. who>> thank you. chairman, ranking member cummings, committee members, i am grateful for the opportunity to speak with you about libya's security crisis and what the international community can do to assist. i bring the perspective of both a scholar who travels frequently to the country and a military officer who served in tripoli prior to the revolution. governmenth libya officials, military officers, and militia leaders across the country, including benghazi. at the core of libya's crisis is the power of its militias, who

draw support from a wide array tribal, ethnic, and religious constituencies. their persistence is rooted in the absence of an effective governance, representative institutions, and a strong and central army and police. since 2012, the militias have become politicized. they use armed force to compel the passage of a sweeping law barring gaddafi era laws from the government. a prime minister and stopped oil production in the east. weapons are the de facto currency through which demands are pressed. militias have also captured tracking networks. libya's instability has been aggravated by the weak transitional government to put the militias on the payroll. authority of the defense and interior, the idea was to harness the manpower of the revolutionaries to fill the security void left by the nonexistent army, which was deliberately kept week by gaddafi, who feared its potential.

by all accounts, this has been a disastrous bargain. it has attracted new recruits and has given the militia bosses even more political power. that power is especially evident in the east, where militias demand the removal of personnel through state institutions and the implementation of a sharia-based competition before they surrender arms. these actors remain on the outer fringes of libya's politics and security institutions. overwhelmingly, the the countries reject violence for political means. based on a weakness for the central government and an array of informal societal actors come a ngo's and religious authorities have mobilized against the militias, especially radical groups. they have demonstrated a

societal resilience in a moderation that is kept the country from sliding down the path of civil war. i want to emphasize that every libya and i spoke with a true to the crisisthey have demonstratea societal to the enduring legacy of gaddafi's rule, rather than policies or decisions during the nato-led intervention. he deprived libya of even a basic rule of governance. kept the economy, security institutions deliberately weak, and marginalized the eastern part of the country. libyans overwhelmingly remains supportive of the operation and welcomed outside assistance. where are the areas where this insistence can be best supplied? most important task is reforming the sector. the u.s. and its allies are currently engaged in such a project under the offices of what is known as the general-purpose force. in doing so, they must ensure the ranks of the new force are inclusive of libya's diverse tribes and region and that

effective oversight is in place so political factions do not capture the new security entities as the personal militias. it is important to recognize lasting security cannot be achieved without a dressing the economic and clinical motives that drive support for militias. the government has tried to disarm the mobilized and integrate the young men of the militias. none of the efforts has succeeded because the country is paralyzed between opposing political factions. movement ones any the security sector as a win for his rivals. in essence, libya suffers from a balance of weakness amongst its factions and militias. no single entity can compel the others to coercion, but every strong enough to veto the others. with this in mind, the ultimate solution for libya's woes lie in the political realm. in the drafting of a constitution, the reform of its broad-basedd a

affiliation under the broad-based national dialogue. these are areas where outsiders can lend advice and measured assistance, but where the ultimate word must be borne by libyans themselves. for the opportunity to speak with you here today. >> thank you. i now recognize myself for five minutes of questioning. not on this or the armed services committee's primary list of people interviewed in the process, and yet you came forward here today, came forward to the committee, and could you explain to us why you believe it was necessary to come forward to offer us your testimony? >> yes. i came forward because, as a retired officer, most importantly having served a number of years, i felt it was my duty to come forward.

women whomen and serve in uniform, those that serve along with us, in civilian the circumstances of what occurred in benghazi that day need to be known. with all of the discussion that over a full forthcoming to the american people, it is important. it is a duty to be here. >> thank you. our committee has interviewed a number of people, including those downrange, people poking libya and benghazi. i said earlier, we, for the most part, have not interviewed people, the exception being general ham, although carter ham was at the pentagon on september 11. do you believe it is appropriate for us to interview other officers and enlisted personnel that serve with you that day as

part of our discovery of what they believe could have been in what weust military people call the to shop, but also in the three shop and so on? sure, i think is any information that gives the most well-rounded picture, they are important to obtain. questions, as we fan out here, one of the questions i have for you is, your primary job is knowing the risk, knowing who the bad guys are and where they are and knowing what might face them. is that correct? so your expertise is not in the operational response of what reef you lose will wear and react with in time. however, you are intimately familiar with the risk of extremist groups in egypt,

libya, and throughout north now,a and all of africa. african command, basically, does not have any jets. it does not have any conventional divisions. all of the other commands when you need physical boots on the ground. >> roots on the grounds, planes in the air, ships in the sea, etc.. >> however, the role of african command, and i'm not trying to put words in your mouth so please correct me if i'm even a little off, it is in fact to look at a continent in which we have almost no troops and almost no basing. we have a small joint ace but for the most part, we have no .ilitary assets in africa is it fair to say that

counterterrorism, looking for and being aware and working with the government in africa, with or without it, necessary, to combat terrorism and to make sure governments are stable and and to support our missions the eight missions and the embassies? is that really to a great extent why there is a unique command with a four-star general in start -- in charge of it that focuses on this continent of a billion people larger than north america? quest that is precisely the understanding. to help africans help africans, and work with africans and our other partners to do so. role, on september 11, earlier, there was an attack in egypt. did you know of, anticipate, or believe that the attack in egypt was based on seeing a youtube video?

>> personally, no. to you evenr came though intelligence and what may have caused something would have been right up your alley. the hours that ensued on our compound in benghazi, did you hear youtube video? >> briefly discussed, but not from any serious standpoint. >> what time did you first hear there was a video? >> it was early in the evening. the morning.0 in >> absolutely. i would have to say probably i would dismissed -- i dismissed the notion by then by working with other sources. >> i want to follow quick one last thing. you have heard about this early

on and, as the deputy and the highest-ranking person that moment working these issues, you dismiss the idea that this attack was in fact a demonstration that went awry and was based on a youtube video out of los angeles. >> yes, she -- yes, sir. >> thank you. more than three years ago, a wave of clinical change swept through the middle east and north africa. the arab spring promised hope for people oppressed by dictators for decades. -- led to aleft to abrupt change and i look forward to learning how this movement has evolved and how the united states can support a peaceful democratic transition in the region.

i would also like to focus on the choice our country faced when the uprising against again in 2011.i at that time come the united states could have done nothing and allowed gaddafi to remain in power or we could have supported the liberation of libya. at the time, both republicans and them that's called on the president to support the rebels and gaddafi. -- example, lindsey graham "you cannot protect our vital interests if gaddafi stays. " in a general level, do you agree with senator graham? >> yes, i do. >> dr. flake, how about you?

>> yes, i do. >> earlier, i think you would agree with me that there are things you would do to be supportive of the government. what with those things be? >> there are several things. mentioned,parent helping establish a national army that is helping to police libya'territory, rain in the militia as you begin to get political solutions to problems that will permit their andrmament. second, support structure that helps organized civil society and elections in libya. we are doing much too little in helping libya move forward. we do that largely with examples, our own but also what all of us know about society. we know how to do this and we are just not doing it nearly enough. later, on july

3, 2000 11, senator john mccain stated, and i quote, "if gaddafi stays, it is a direct threat to our national security." what is your view and did you agree? >> i did not. he was a brutal dictator. also about as rehabilitated as a dictator could be. the statement he threatened our national security would have been very true in the 1980's, -- in 2011 >> therefore, you disagreed with the senator. >> yes, i do. >> do you agree with the senators? gadhafi was keeping a lid on a lot of things brewing. he was probably not a direct security threat the way he was in the 1980's. it depends on how we define security.

many of the ills that spilled in the current from of libya it were because of his rule, how we kept things quiet down and civil society, marginalize the east. the seeds of extremism were sown during his regime. in that sense, it was a security threat, i think it we know libyans were fighting in iraq and afghanistan. >> what do you think we should be doing? taken tos should be mprove the situation in libya? class under the circumstances, the u.s. is doing quite a lot with other partners in europe and elsewhere. the u.s. is committed to train over 19,000 new libya soldiers as part of the general purpose force. this proposal is underway. with the civil

society. much of the problem is the other side. much of the delay we cannot really invert -- interface with them. they have not agreed to provide payment or the general purchase force, which is why we are unable to move forward with the training of the new army. during my travels to libya since the revolution, i found the international community has been engaged in terms of reforming the sector and helping oversight, reaching out to libya's vibrant civil society. problem ofis is the access. the security situation does not permit us to go out and reach libyans. >> what would you have us do -- there? >> no longer serving in having access to a lot of the pertinent information and data, i would not be able to give you a strong military answer to that.

would be onenswer where it is a set of circumstances where we would have to work together. that development would have to on the ground. >> thank you. i ask unanimous consent to put something on the record at this time. >> the commander general ham, we have also interviewed the advice .ommander , and admirable -- admiral losey. to provide the committee additional suggestions of the people for your electric -- recollection outside the

hearing so it not be public, the people you believe would be most helpful to gain knowledge directly on the fact of the ground that day. >> yes sir. of course. of the list of people we have would theyerviewed, be people that would be able to render an opinion? i am not saying you would come up with the same conclusion, but to have the same type of information? we have the same public service, motor people -- i'm just curious. >> each of those general and, i know them. they are fine officers. >> would they be in a position to render an opinion? >> yes, sir. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014]

[captioning performed by national captioning institute] we willve established get additional names and the names we already interviewed to be ones on your list. >> thank you. a couple of questions. >> he testified we view the night of september 11 that this some of thet just that has been shown -- and assert -- a concerted attack. said, in your position, you would know who would do what.

the state department would also have known pretty instantaneously that there was , i've seen going on videos of some of those transmitted. we had a pretty good idea of what was going on. havetate department should or could have? >> they could or should, yes sir. the attacks started at 9:40, three: 40 in the afternoon here. proximally a six-hour difference, i think. >> yes. it was not an unusual time here in the united states, that the appropriate people in the highest level people should be alerted that something serious is going on at one of our posts.

>> during the day here in the united states, yes sir. >> i do not know if i could have saved the ambassador or the aide with him. they may have been killed -- would you say that is a pretty good>> i do not know if i coulde saved the assumption? that it was not possible to save them because they were probably killed within an hour or two? have thedoes not capability of responding, not ont we should not have had the ground the capability to respond to some kind of attack. would that be a correct assumption? >> typically, the greatest or whatever situation you will be into, to have adequate security. >> i know we have over 100

posts. lifted -- about 14 listed and benghazi was one of them. >> he would have to look to the state department. >> someone failed. they failed to have the proper every post does not have the same risk and every point does not have the same risk ear that was one of the major ones. the time frame did not allow us to save the ambassador as they came in and attacked. attack.n a demonstration in the street. they were killed at approximately 5:15 a.m.

it started at 9:40, a good six hours. i have been to italy, spain, .urkey wea member of congress, if had an incident, this is for benghazi that we could respond and had the capability of responding. particularly, and ambassador or from northtizens africa, it is not exactly the toughest spot. i believe we could have saved those who takes action. do you think we have the ability to do that? >> presently or at the time? time, it did not happen that way. --ers have discussed

>> did the united states have the ability to protect -- >> people at that post, within -- hours >> the military could have made a response of some sort. >> the military could have made a response. individualsose two were not saved. people.and interviewed our military personnel, they were not given the go-ahead. they were not given the assets. no one responded to go in and save the two individuals who lost. i believe we had that capability. can you tell the committee if you think we had the capability of saving them at that time once again?

>> you mentioned personal assets and time and distance. all those things put together at that moment? i was not in operations -- >> again, we had that capability, i believe. i was told even before this if we had an incident, we could go in and rescue or resolve a situation. do you believe we have that capability? hand,capabilities were in then they could be employed. >> thank you. panel.ome to our let me pick up on that. you were not in the operational chain of command at the time of the tragedy? >> not in the chain of command. i was serving in a staff role at that point in time. >> you are not making decisions.

>> that is correct. >> i do not know if you're familiar with the fact the service committee on february 10 -- i want to quote from it and see what part of this you disagree with. my friend from florida suggests we could have done something from italy. "secretaryetén -- panetta, in consultation with general ham, general dempsey, and others, verbally authorized three specific actions. first, two murray and fast the tunes were ordered to prepare and deploy. second, a special operations unit known as commanders -- cif, was ordered to move to a nato air station in italy and wave instructions. these orders were issued

approximately 2-4 hours after the initial attack there it is it your contention we should have done this sooner or more of it? or do you deny it happened? >> my belief is i put in my statement, it has to do with, we should have continued to move forward with whatever forces we were going to move forward with. the timeline was in the operation of the channels. is how welooking at choose to respond in the future really needs to be along the the military feeling empowered to take action under the authorities it has. so that it can move forward and do that -- >> i want to read to you the conclusion of the chairman of the committee, the republican chairman. he conducted formal briefings and under saw that report. he said "i am pretty well

satisfied but given where the troops were, how quickly the thing all happened, and how quickly we dissipated, we probably could not have done much more than we did." do take issue with that conclusion? >> the conclusion that he could not have done much more than he did, that is a fact. >> i am sure you can appreciate there might be some who, for --sons, might this sort might distort your testimony and say we could have done more than -- that is-- because not your testimony. thank you. if i understood your testimony, libya is a mess. is a very unstable environment. that is the environment in which we are trying to work and which

we were working at the time of the tragedy in benghazi. of u.s. troops and security forces were going to change that environment. >> they will not change the fact the central government cannot exercise -- >> my friend in utah, i went to tripoli, not benghazi. the airport at the time, security was controlled by the militia and not the government. >> i am not aware of whether that is changed. very uneasy one about security? >> let's hope their friendly. painful,s obviously transparent symbolism of the lack of any authority. i see you shaking your head as well. do you want to comment? >> i agree with you.

that is also very important. the testimony the three of you have provided, which i appreciate. again, people can play politics with a tragedy all they want. at fact of the matter is, the time of the tragedy and even this day, libya is a very unstable situation post-revolution. the object is to do the best we can to try to change that dynamic to create a more stable government that provide security not only for us but also for its own people. a fair statement? >> absolutely. since 2013, the been planning in helping the libyan government with forces. our diplomats were involved with reaching out to civil society. but it is a tough challenge.

i really want to emphasize a lot of this is on the libyan shoulders. this is a country that needs to reach a broad political reconciliation among its faction before they can be in a position to receive outside help. when i talk to people in the state department, there is a sense where there is a lack of partnership on a sense of the other side and you need that. i think much of this is taking time. is writing a constitution. they held elections in 2012 that, by all accounts, were relatively transparent and fair. pro-american,ry which has been contrasted to many other countries in the region. >> i want to thank all four of you for your testimony. it is very enlightening. to what hasribution conversation about a tragedy in libya. thank you very much. >> thank you. for what purpose does the german from florida receipt -- seek

recognition? >> along with 60 members, this letter was sent to the president saying it was a year now since the benghazi attacks. not to be done to bring these people to justice and asking for the ministration to act. >> without objection, so ordered. gentleman from utah is recognized for five minutes. >> thank you and thank you all for being here. thank you for the service of your country in general. god bless you. thank you for your service over 33 years. on september 11, 2012, what was your ranking title? served as the deputy director for intelligence knowledge development j two. >> where were you the night of september 11 and 12th? .> at home until i was recalled click the operations center in germany. you were in the room.

>> yes. >> you were able to see, hear, feel, understand what was going on in that room? >> we worked toward understanding, yes, sir. >> were you ever interviewed by the accountability review board? >> no, sir. >> your primary responsibility -- "j two was focused on attribution, that attacks became a german will very soon after the event." what do you believe they were attributable to? >> an islamist extremist group. >> al qaeda? >> we felt it was austria. >> affiliated with al qaeda. >> yes. im, were they involved russian mark -- involved?

how quickly did you come to the conclusion that you believed there were al qaeda affiliates or al qaeda themselves involved attack?in the >> very soon come in the early hours of the activity. >> was it a video? >> no, sir. -- >> did itart sparked a protest? >> no, sir. >> i want to get the facts at a time. the cia station chief is quoted as saying, "not not an escalation a protest." would you agree or disagree with the cia station chief's analysis? >> absolutely, it was an attack. statees at the department, and an e-mail that

went to others, hillary clinton's chief of staff says she told the libyan ambassador september 12, 12:46 p.m., i told him the group that conducted the attack is affiliated with islamic extremists. would you agree or disagree with that statement? yes i would agree. the timing of it, i do not know. the content, yes. the scandal that is here, that some choose to ignore, a phony scandal, is the fact that the cia station chief, the military themselves. you have the person sitting front of us, who is the head of intelligence and he is looking at the intelligence. they come to the conclusion that sharia and then you have the state telling libyans. none of them think it is a video. none of them. the cia, the cia station chief, the state

department, all of them, the fact that the time, mr. chairman, the facts do not point to a video. that only comes from the white house. what was going on in the room, general? i were people were under attack and people were dying. what is the military doing russian mark -- doing? -- >> were they moving to the sound of the guns and doing what they were trained to do, or were they sitting around and waiting for the state department and hillary clinton to call them up and do something -- and say, "do something." what do they actually do? did we do enough? your professional opinion. i know you care deeply. what was the mood in the room and what was the feeling? was it to save our people? >> it was desperation -- >> what? >> desperation to gain awareness

and be able to do something to save people. >> did they actually do it? the three actions we talked about. the fast team. they are not even trained to go into that fight. the other force we are talking about is coming from the united states of america. we had assets there. did they actually go to the sound of the gun? do they actually going to benghazi? why not? basically, there was a lot of looking to the state department for what it was they wanted and in the deference to the libyan people and the sense of deference to the desires from the state department in terms of what they would like to have -- >> did they ever tell you to go save the people of benghazi? >> not to my knowledge. >> we did not run to the sound of the guns. dying.americans

we had dead people. when did people. not try toitary did engage in the fight. would you disagree with that? is expiredan's time and a gentleman may answer on any of the questions if he did four individuals died. obviously we did not >> respond in time to get there. gentleman's time has expired. >> i think the gentleman. >> thank you, mr. chairman.

hearing is interesting. based on thee notion that there were unintended consequences after .he intervention into libya let me begin by saying it is the nature of the beast if one is .alking about the mideast it is interesting to note in intervened inwe iraq, where the consequences -- where we could have prevented by simply letting the monitors on the ground, continue to look for weapons of mass distraction, we went willy-nilly. we did not have anything like that in libya.

yet we went in and -- headfirst. the invasion by the united states of america. many of us were very doubtful about libya, to be sure, and many democrats followed our republican colleagues who argued very forcefully for intervention in libya and democrats were quite split on it. mccain, who was the last standardbearer in 2008, the leader on foreign policy, he 2011, some still argue we should be cautious about helping the libyan opposition,

warning that we do not know enough about them or that their victory could pave a way for al qaeda takeover. how do your sponsor that argument? incorrect.he was we did not know enough about the rebels at the time which was testified to by the members of the intelligence committee. >> do we know enough about them now? we did, one wonders whether that could have moved us one way or the other as we saw this dictator in power. mr. wehrey, it seems that senator mccain was saying if we do not intervene, the war might d on longer and al

qaeda might have been strengthened. do you agree that was a risk? >> i do agree. if the war had dragged on, you might have seen the de facto firtition of libya, gadda holding onto loyalist areas. the country might have been come -- have become a haven for jihadists. >> were these referrals seen as pro-western -- were these rebels seen as pro-western? >> they were. in my interactions with them after the revolution, even islamists in the east were supportive of nato's help in their interface with nato. by and large, the remained pro-western. what happens in any opposition there are splinters, so you had groups peeled off that were more

radical and have links with radical groups, but i think he was accurate. >> thank you very much. i yield back. gentlelady.he i would let members know that there will be a vote on the floor at approximately 10:55. we will remain here taking questions, probably for the first 10 or so minutes after they called the vote. we will then recess until approximately 10 minutes after the last vote is called, meaning if you vote quickly and head back, you will be here when i regavel us open again. we now go to the adjustment from ohio, mr. jordan. >> thank you. i want to pick up where my colleagues was that. you had two statements in her testimony that i think are most telling. the first is always moved to the sound of the guns. that means something for you, doesn't it, general?

>> yes. >> you take seriously the airmen, the soldiers, the sailors from a you had a chance, you take that seriously? >> yes. >> and you could not do that on september 11 because you said we ofe waiting for a request assistance for the state department. you could not act normally the way the military always reacts. in this situation you could not do what the military always does? is that accurate? >> yes. >> and you have been deployed all over the world. has there ever been a situation prior to this where you could not react in the normal customary weight of the military reacts? >> no situation -- >> first time in your 33 years rising to the rank of general, you could not do with the military always does, run to the

sound of the guns? >> yes, sir, for me. >> why was that the case? what had the state department done in your time at african command, what was the culture, what was the climate, what happened where you could not do what you normally do? this was a command created to be a bit different. it was created to work with an interagency environment to ensure -- >> i get that. what specifically? we have soldiers down, people under attack. you know as everyone now knows it was a terrorist attack. when you have soldiers under attack, you run to the sound the guns. you cannot do that. what specifically had the state department done or said that prevented you from -- we know this is unique and that it was

different the was set up, but when that happens you still react the way you are supposed to react, and yet you could not. what did the state department do that prevented you from doing it? >> wlel, it is not what they did in that particular session -- situation. they did not come with a stronger request for action. >> in your time dealing with libya, when there was a situation, the state department said do this. now they are not giving you guidance at all? >> prior to that, our condition with odyssey guard, we were there to support the state department in setting up and establishing the embassy in tripoli. therefore, the work that was done relative to libya was one where the state department was in the lead and we worked to support them to achieve the goals of the united states. >> who at the state department did you and your -- and the officers directly above you ash

did you directly interface with? circumstances, but for me, i had interactions when i was in italy working with odyssey guard. would have talked on occasion with ambassador kretz -- >> anyone else? africomings back at over the summer, andrew shapiro came there as well. he was briefed. and then of course ambassador johnny carson, who was very engaged obviously in what went on. schapirois is andrew who was assistant secretary of state for political affairs? >> that is correct. >> part of global strategies, correct currently? >> yes.

he works.ely where did the general urged the state department to take a specific action? getsou and or the general specific direction of what to do? >> i cannot speak for anyone other than myself. that was not my place to encourage them to do that. >> and you do not know if the general urged -- >> i do not know if they urged to take action. there was dialogue over what action wanted to be taken. washe general like you trained in a culture that says when you have soldiers under attack you respond, right? >> there was a senior admiral in charge from a but they were engaged back in d.c. >> i yield back. >> i thank the gentleman.

mr. shapiro and the engagement, was libyan different in state department interface and if so how? -- the answer is, yes, it was different, and it was different because our other engagements, where we were engaged military, where we were supporting the policy of the united states, we worked with a c.t. type focus, counterterrorism type focus. this was the first activity that did not start out as a counterterrorism effort that employed the terry combat power for africa command. >> thank you. lynch, are you next?

the gentlelady is recognized. >> thank you, chairman. even the atrocities that gaddafi committed, it is no question that libya is much better off without him. after 42 years of rule, we have a delicate transition to a democracy. mr. wehrey, you testify. recently that overwhelmingly the country's political leaders are rejecting violence for political means and that they are committed to some sort of a democratic path forward and that they will have greater cooperation with the u.s. can you explain in more detail what their willingness is or how that willingness to cooperate with u.s. is manifesting itself, and what can we do? again, it is really significant that a lot -- some

islamist who at one time were foes of the united states, these leaders are now in the ministries, they are meeting with united states diplomats, meeting with our ambassador there. it goes back to the tremendous goodwill that stems from the intervention there. they look at the areas where we can help as applying our own democracy, how do you run a parliament. you have to remember -- and i was in libya under gaddafi -- it was an orwellian state where people had no role in their self governments. they had no experience that you and i take for granted. they are sending delegations to other countries to learn how do you run a town council, what are structures for federalism, how do you oversee budget, asic things. the u.s. has an important role

to play. there is a tremendous need for security, and the former prime minister came to the united states and asked for u.s. help in training the new libyan army. the united states has stepped up with that request, along with britain, italy, and morocco. we are helping and prepared to help and respect. i would also say engaging with the people of libya. when i talk to the u.s. diplomats, they say libyan society is vibrant. there is an educated class, young people, a thirst for openness, we are training their media, reaching out to youth groups, women, and these are all incredibly valuable areas. a terrorismntry has problem. but i urge policymakers to not be consumed by the terrorist problem and not let the the only lens through which we view this

country. >> can you speak about their police forces needing help to train their police forces from the u.s. or any other allies? >> other allies. much of this training is is already going on in this is like italy. the italians, jordanians, turks are involved. many people are training their police. this training is happening in other countries for security reasons. >> are there are additional risks to consider as we support the effort in this transition? are there risks for a program for validation and reintegration of the militia members? you talked about combating terrorism. as united states helps libya moving forward, i want to make sure we minimize risks to our nation and to our citizens as well. are there any risks we should be keeping an eye on as we try to help them move forward? >> absolutely.

when we trained the new libyan security forces we want to make sure we are doing a thorough vetting of these individuals to make sure we are not imparting training and equipment to bad actors. we do this and our engagement elsewhere in a number of states. there are always a number of risks involved. they are asking the tough questions, we are going to step in entering this for, but what are the unintended consequences down the road? we do not want to create a military that steps in and subvert the democratic process in the country, becomes more authoritarian or goes back to the old ways. i think that is a risk. border control is a huge area we need to focus on. the european union is heavily involved in this. i think the united states needs to push the europeans to take on more of the burden. much of their security is directly impacted by what happens in libya. >> thank you very much.

i yield back. >> i think the gentlelady. the gentleman from michigan. >> thank you, mr. chairman, and ell, i thank you for your service and your desire to be here. youcognize the fact that led as commander, but were under command as well, and the frustrations of being under command at times in this situation appeared to be very evident. i appreciate you being here. you mentioned in your written testimony that africans' combat to mobilize and power with boots on the ground and in the implied timeframe was commendable. what do you mean by the implied timeframe? states was acting

under odyssey dawn, and then was supporting under the you and resolution. then working through compressed time frame prior to oup taking place, the united states was acting with allied partners and more focused nato-plus effort, if you will, with oup. there was a desire to get done what we could get done prior to that and and then moving forward. also, there is so much you can do without boots on the ground. i was not in an operational role at the time, but just military knowledge tells you you need is on the ground to hold and make changes, much as the panelists discussed here today. >> effectiveness, could you

elaborate, of this policy? >> of a new boots on ground policy? >> yes, sir. >> you can defect from this -- effect from the sea, you can effect from the air, but you can hold and have lasting change by being present on the ground in a situation where you need more than, say, diplomacy or economic military isd the called in. that is serious business and the change takes place on the ground. understand then that the effectiveness was compromised, that it was not complete, was not as full as possible, was not satisfactory without having this boots on the ground available to you? it asould characterize you would obviously have had a different outcome and effect had you had boots on the ground

than without it. become awarefricom of political turmoil in libya? libya was a country that we watched as we watch all of them -- i'm speaking from a j2 perspective. we kept tabs on all the countries. in the arab spring, we do especially that there could be other effects going across that area. there were things that we watched that were c.t. oriented and things that we watched that were more broadly politically effecting. that began to happen -- >> when you begin monitoring it. when was that? >> in the early 2011 timeframe. com have any role in the decision-making process to intervene in libya?

>> would you repeat? africom have any role in the decision-making process to intervene in libya, and if so, what was that role? >> i would not have that information. roleat was africom's during odyssey dawn? >> to work with allied partners prior to the lynn resolution -- prior to the un's resolution taking effect to assist the rebels in libya. >> what about unified protector? effort was a more broad sanctioned by the united nations to assist the rebels in libya. mr. gartenstein-ross, some

have praised the nato intervention as a model intervention, but your testimony points the consequences of the intervention. what are some of the most pronounced consequences of this libyan intervention? >> the largest is what happened in north bali -- hashe gentleman's time expired. >> what happened in north mali. a direct line can be drawn between the intervention by nato and the situation in mali. separatists groups and jihadists were able to exploit that. those who fought for gaddafi came back heavily armed. there are other consequences that could be felt with the flow of arms threat the region, going to egypt, tunisia. lives have been directly lost

there, and one thing we saw in january this year is they shoot down of an egyptian military helicopter. we did not know for sure where those arms came from, but the united nations panel of experts which looks at the diffusion of libyan arms and beatty accounts dafi'se that gad armories are the most likely place where militants were able to get this weaponry to shoot down that helicopter. when you look at the unintended consequences it has made the region must less stable. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, mr. chairman. take you to our witnesses who are here today to testify before and it isttee, important to recognize that before us today is a panel of experts for whom we as a committee can gather critically important information and advice into the onnsight

the ground and geopolitical realities in libya and the cradle -- greater middle east region. the tragedy that occurred in benghazi is that, a tragedy, and out of those who died serving our country and for the safety of those who continue to do so around the world, it is imperative that this committee gain actionable policy reforms so that we can prevent similar disasters from occurring again. so i want to ask the panel, and i will start with mr. wehrey, in your testimony cannot you discussed at length the challenges that outside assistance, including from countries like the united states, turkey, britain, morocco, and italy, face in terms of providing training assistance in the developing -- development of an effect libyan army. can you elaborate and what your recommendations to this

committee would be? again, i think i would recognize that before this training can take effect or before you can build a real security sector, you have to have political reconciliation in this country. libyan's have to get together t a broadr at ou pact. they have to go forward with this national dialogue. much of the paralysis and watch outside assistance has not had an effect is because your has not been this reconciliation among these factions. i would urge outsiders to focus on sequencing, that we need to support the libyans in these political issues in reforming their parliament from in the national dialogue, in the constitution so that this training can take full effect. is the horse before the wagon. there has to be security in the country for these institutions

to function. we have to help them to a certain degree create the space for these institutions. states sincenited at least last year has recognized that this country needs greater help. when i speak to people in the defense department, there is a willingness and appreciation for the situation. nato is engaged. other arab can trees, -- other arab countries, europe, so the willingness is there. >> other panelists, would you propose specific reforms that this committee could recommend? in addition to what mr. wehrey said, there are several other specific things we could do. one of the united states' great strengths in helping transitioning countries is to emphasize how federalism works

in the united states, not just politically, but also militarily. the balance of the national guard and reservists and their function in the states is for libya in my judgment a very useful model, because their political reconciliation is not going to progress without a more activist federalism that makes the region's of the country and the tribes of the country feel secure thanally they now feel. you will not get disarmament and told them. i will focus on that. second, we need to be a much more vibrant voice talking about how the violence damaged the elections, how much it matters that only 15% of the libyan people were represented in the 48 people selected for the constitutional council. we need to create political attention to this, and that will help them to the political --ular consideration

political reconciliation they need to make. some people to say nothing can be done because the libyans themselves need to make progress. they will not make progress without us helping them have the security to make brave domestic political choices, and we are under investing in that. anyone else, last 17 seconds? >> one performer i work redmond -- i would recommend, the issue revisions, breaking from al qaeda, it is important for the u.s. to be aware whether some figures with the government are helping jihadist groups. one thing we learn from our experience in egypt is back in the damaging. one figure i would draw attention to is -- former libyan fighting member whose media advisor had been a member of a global jihadist form.

-- forum. according to regional media, he as providing shelter to -- jihadist group in that country. even while we help libya is good to be aware of and to bring political pressure down on those who are supporting america's enemies. thank you. let the walk-through couple things. i will be a final question. then we will take a recess. let me walk through five minutes of questions. general, thank you for your service. i want to be able to ask a couple quick questions. based on what you were watching that night, do you feel like the united states was doing everything it could do to protect the people, its facilities abroad, that the united states was doing every thing it could do to protect its people and facilities abroad, based on what you saw the night? >> no, sir.

>> do you believe that night and even during that night, did you believe that this was a protest rooted in an internet video? >> no, sir. >> did you have any sense that night based on what you were hearing about the communication between state and dod and what was happening on the ground, trying to gather information that there was a steadiness and a strength through that evening in trying to make the decisions? of -- there a bit was definitely a strong desire to come to decisions. there was a period of time where gaining an understanding of what was needed from folks on the ground, because we did not have a lot of insight -- >> was there communication coordination? >> there was a lot of back and

forth, yes, sir. >> did you feel like there were adjudication and steadiness of leadership so there was a consistent plan that was unfolding? >> it was continually strive for in that room. we were looking back to the united states for more -- >> were you getting it from the united states? were you getting clear communication leadership from washington, from the united states him on what to do next? >> my observations were that they were still looking for more decisions. know if we have brought the people to justice that did this in error fantasy in our facilities? is anyone aware that justice has been carried out? >> we have not. >> so the four things i just walk through -- walked through,

were the four talking poitns saying these were the areas that we were going to be talking about when we went into the sunday shows. all things we knew in the initial days are not true and we are still waiting for this statement that came out from the beginning >> we will take these individuals to justice. two years later, so the four things the white house put out, three of them are factually not true, and one was a promise that is still unkept. what were you tracking that evening? how were you gathering that information during the course of ening?drenin means towere national gain intelligence. there were the communiqués we received directly or indirectly from individuals on the ground

-- >> you're talking about the e-mail traffic? >> the chat. the analysts work through chat, and the operational channels did the same thing. -- at a certain point in time, we were able to swing a bird over there and relief that and gain more. phone conversations have a different points -- the individuals on the ground are in phone communication with other individuals. were you getting information about that as well? >> we knew we would have information filtered back to us that people were back in communication. >> were you were aware there was close circuit tv that was available on the compound itself? >> no, sir. >> there is video feed that was extensive that you can look down the street and see that there is no protests going on in the

street, and you can actually see the actions on the compound, and be able to get through that. that video di you did not have a feed to. that close circuit tv does exist as well as the predator, the feed you are dealing with as well. all this information is gathering them and you are turning to make decisions and in the process of all these decisions being made and gathering information and giving advice as to what was happening. did you get from state -- let me say it this way -- did you know from state someone would call you if they wanted to take action? was there a clear line of the military -- is getting into position of readiness. you waiting from state to call you? >> those calls would go back to the operational chain of command, so those people that were engaged were back in washington, d.c. the general was dealing with that as well. >> there was a clear line of communication, you knew that

where that would come from? >> we would be in contact with people. we would hear back at that from at my level from a military authority to do something. >> ok. did we have americans back that night -- >> sir? >> the united states military ?lways watches americans' backs backse have americans' that night? did you consider this attrition normal for our facilities? is this a normal saturday situation? prior to that attack, was this a normal environment for our personnel? >> no, sir. >> does anyone else have a comment on that?

was this a normal security environment? >> it was not a normal security environment. a pushve heard there was to normalize security and actually withdrawal individuals that were our own, americans, to provide security and to put in country security folks, which is typical for us, that we have a larger force in embassies and facilities that are provided for in country. we had a militia watching our front door from libya. the front door of the facility, a local militia was providing this attorney for it. a quick question -- if you went to libya right now would you be ok if one of the local militias guarded your front door? would anyone be open to that? >> with all due respect, that is the way security is functioning in this country -- >> i understand -- >> [indiscernible] >> a normal security environment that we would run with one of the local militias -- the local security is ethically provided

in libya, a normal environment, that we would have one of the normal glitches. would you trust their loyalty to provide security for your front door? >> as a matter of embassy protocol, i would make sure they are vetted. this is the nature of libya right now. these militias consider themselves the army -- vet -- you >> this is the challenge we have in this country. there was those central army -- >> so we would try to normalize the security situation. the red cross has been run out. we reduce the number of gun toters and increased local militias that we could not vet? >> it is highly risky. traveling to libya, you can feel

relatively safe because these militias provide a neighborhood watch program. many of them are filling the void of the security forces. we need to look at how we use the word osha carefully because these -- the word militia carefully because these are the security forces. >> two years ago it was not wasal in a situation, it astro-med or more dramatic, no haveo vet people, and we reduced the number of folks who have provided security and increased the people who were watching the front door, and it was clear they were walking away from the front door and we had sharia walk-through and the attack was on. let me take a recess. we will move toward vote and come back and visit again. we will stand for recess until the call of the chair.

[captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] i recommend -- i recognize the general from tennessee. thank you, mr. chairman. i thank the panel for being here. general, special kudos to you. i wanted to talk a little bit about the dod timeline of benghazi-related events. it said it was not until 6:05

tot a unit was prepared evacuate americans wounded in the attack. the timeline says it was not that the plane took off from germany to libya. can you explain why that took so long? >> no, sir, i cannot. general, are you familiar with the term the golden hour? >> yes, sir, i am. >> can you tell us what that means. hours is the i time between the time you are wounded and received medical treatment. the golden hour, the ability for you or your buddy to survive is during that period of time. >> and the survival rate if they do not die on the battlefield, the chance of survival is about 95% if they are reached within that golden hour?

>> yes, sir. >> in this case it looks like they were functioning under a golden day by this timeline? >> you could characterize it that way, sir. >> ok. were there indeed assets in the region that could have been deployed sooner? >> again, those are in the backtional area, looking reflectively, there were assets , but operations responded the way they did. need moreion is we dedicated assets available to the command continuously in order to make a difference in the future. >> if you were given the greenlight to pick up the phone and make the call to get someone there to help bleeding americans, how long would it have taken, having that

opportunity to make a call? how quick could somebody have gotten their? i with the assets available, do not have an answer to that question, sir, in an operational environment. i do not. >> do you believe it could have been much quicker than i was? >> i would certainly hope, yes. earlierlked about this in the hearing, you are taught to run toward the gun. all the military people that i know want to run towards danger, not away from it, but they were not able to use that. why was that? authorities to move,even the desire to it appeared to me from my perspective working there as a that member of the j2 there were dialogues ensuing with the state department as to

how they wanted to have an approach with libya, whether deference to state or deference to libya. was inow general ham washington that night. was he consulting with the state department? >> from my observation, sitting in that room with him, he was absolutely leaning forward to get answers so he could do something, yes. >> in your opinion, what was the holdup? knew,stified that the cia the military knew, the state department knew that this was a errorist attack. who was holding this back? >> i wish i knew from my perspective -- >> well -- >> it appeared state department was the conduit for the ask for african command. and and you this, as an american them and as a

civilian, the fact that there was a presidential election a few weeks away and there was a white house that knew all the same things that these agencies knew, but yet they were busy concocting a story of a cover-up, an alibi that we know now was not true because they were more concerned about protecting their image in a presidential election and saving american lives. the irs targeting to effect the outcome of an election is criminal. this is just sickening. i am sure that you are here today partly because you have similar feelings, and i will not speak for you, but you're welcome to respond. i will say that i am here today because as a military professional for over 33 years, as well as a citizen of this a father of a

previously serving military father-in-law of serving military people, neighbor to a young man down at parris island going down in basic training in the marine corps, and having served with a number of brave men and women in uniform and in civilian clothes in this nation, we need to get this right. we need to get it right. that is what brings me here today, not that i have all the answers. i do not say that i do. that attention needs to be paid in the most serious way possible andut through any games get to the point that we as a nation are able to support through our military forces the policy and efforts of this country anywhere in the world, and we need to be able to do it and to secure american lives as

we get the job done. >> we salute you for that. >> looks like you wanted to answer. time haseman's expired. you may answer, if you may. >> i want to and doris the -- i wanted to endorse the doctor's position, that there was information available, from elsewhere in the central intelligence agency, as your committee's investigation has brought out. the white house made a political choice but the president was running for reelection, --paigning on the aces that was on the run and the tide of war was receiving. and the tragedy in benghazi was an extraordinarily inconvenient outlier to that storyline. and i think that is the basis on which the white house -- the choices that people made during the attacks in benghazi in my

judgment are unfortunate and had tragic consequences, but the choices the white house made about pretending that we did not know things that we did know i think are an overt politici zation of the events. >> the german from south the gentleman from south carolina. you're next on my hit parade. i was about to say your honor. that was a previous job. >> i still get a gavel, but you are shown as next. >> thank you, mr. chairman. , and i, i am confounded continue to be confounded in what i found so -- and what i find so confounding is the administration's mantra has not changed.

even yesterday, the national security council -- and maybe instead of reading should teachn we >> --g a branch in writing comprehension -- that is the mantra, is that we use the best evidence we had at the time. the facts that we had at the time. you can imagine that i would ache someone who is interested in facts and evidence to say cite all the facts, all the evidence. if your mantra is that we used the best fact in the best evidence that we had at the .ime, then cite the facts the first piece of

evidence i would introduce is from the state department. you know who cheryl mills is. this is september 12. this is well before the administration started misleading the american people. we got an e-mail from beth jones to cheryl mills and jake sullivan and a plethora of other people. i told him with him being the libyan ambassador the group that isducted the attacks affiliated with islamic history miss. so the state department knew the day after that this video had nothing to do with the intact -- the attack in benghazi. that is the state department. cia station chief in tripoli, mr. chairman, and for those who do not know what that new word means, he repeated it again, not an escalation of protest. this is someone in libya at the time. says video had nothing to do

with it. now we go to dod, military. what evidence did you have that this was an escalation of a protest rooted in spontaneity it that got out of control and resulted in the murder of our fellow americans? did the military have any evidence supporting the video narrative? >> no, sir. >> that is what is so confounding, mr. chairman, is the state department knew it was not a video, the cia knew it was not a video, and for those who are a little bit slow, they repeated the word not twice, the military knew it had nothing to do with a video, but that brings us to the white house come and i know, mr. chairman, initially we were told that the white house had nothing to do with the drafting points, that mike was the one who sanitized those, and change the word from attack the demonstration to did whatever he

could do cast the administration in the most favorable light. we thought that it was just mr. morrell doing that, until we got .n e-mail from ben rhodes 1, to convey that the united states is doing everything it can to protect our people in facilities. i'm glad it is dated september 12 because it sure is not their goal before september 11. we have had a hearing at the failure to provide security at our facility in benghazi. it was not their goal beforehand or they would not have refused to provide security to that facility. to underscore that these protests are rooted in an internet video and not a broader failure of policy. and therein we have our answer. the goal was to do everything we flect attention

away from this foreign policy we have in the middle east that is not working. remember the mantra, mr. chairman al qaeda is on the run, a some of bin laden is dead, al qaeda is on the run, when they are standing at the front door of our facility in benghazi getting ready to murder our ambassador and burn it down. and then yesterday you may -- iber the white house will edit out all the stumbling and stammering that jay carney did -- i will just give you the nuts and bolts of what he said -- that this memo i made reference to has nothing to do with benghazi. i find that interesting because of the third point, and i know i am out of time, but the third goal was to show we are resolute and bring the people who harm americans to justice. if that is not talking about benghazi, where else did we have people harmed, other than benghazi?

>> i thank the gentleman, and our goal is to bring people to justice, too. we now recognize the gentleman from texas for five minutes. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman, and general, i appreciate your service. i appreciate your being here today. in your testimony you talked about your training and natural impulse as a member of the american military is to run toward the gunfire. we have heard testimony today about what we should have done, and we are kind of unclear about and we could have done, whether or not we have the forces that could have gotten there in time. i'm going to say we definitely should have tried. as an american citizen ash i'm not asking you to give away any secrets or speak -- as an american citizen cannot does it trouble you we cannot respond in

a timely manner to threats to an american fantasy anywhere in the world -- an american embassy in he were in the world? >> it is part of the reason i'm sitting here today, sir. >> thank you. let's talk a little bit about your role in the evening of the benghazi at tax. fight yourout you way to the train, the brave men and women in libya, running toward the sound of the guns. he said outside of libya there were discussions going on about andto respond to the attack these folks also thought the way they were trained. are you referring to the africom headquarters? interagency interactions. disposition,the has a military structure, and in the spirit of government support them waiting for request for assistance from the state

department. that sounds like bureaucratese saying there was a military that night that was not a master taking steps to the rescue of the americans in benghazi, but were dating for direction from the state department. would that be a fair assessment? >> that characterization is part of what is in that comment from a yes. >> that seems crazy. we have americans who need help or you ought to be able to hop on an airplane and the able to stand down the situation warranted that. i know the general was in washington that night and left his equity commanders at africom. was he consulting the state department about what to do during the attacks in benghazi? >> the admiral worked tirelessly to do that. >> obviously we did not have much of a response there. schake.o to ms.

in your testimony, you talked about in the arab spring should be focusing on helping these countries out. you look at the track record that we have under the obama administration with nation building. you look at iraq. a lot of blood, and a lot of treasure shed in iraq and yet ec the al qaeda flag -- yet we see the al qaeda flag flying in seeing instability all throughout that region, we see a civil war going on in syria. it is hard to tell the good guys from the bad guys without a book, but we draw a red line and step back from it. we can go over into crimea and -- some problems eric problems. we really want to be involved in that east on our track record there? >> i share your skepticism about the administration's choices in

the middle east. it seems to me that one of the fundamental mistakes the obama administration is making is they advocate taking action is something that sets in motion all sorts of consequences, but that taking no action means we have no moral responsibility for any consequences. clear,ink testimony made there are consequences for what we have not done in libya, and m ali is bearing them out at the the gapas is libya, and between what the administration claims it is achieving and what we are actually doing in the region is encouraging people to take -- >> i am almost out of time. i have one more question for general lovell. the u.s. intervention in libya was constrained by the prohibition by boots on the

ground. you think that puts on the ground and that policy might have been one of the driving forces in the fact that we did not send a response there to benghazi? >> well, i would say if there were boots on the ground and there were marines in uniform, as far as a security team that was around a state department facility, i would say that would intimidate most that were going to try to make an attack. and boots on the ground are the best and only way to hold ground, if that is what you are looking to do. >> thank you very much. i want to point out that as we ,nvestigate and busy security -- embassy security and other key factors are the willingness and the ability of the host country to provide security, and i think that is a common understanding at the state department. anytime a government is undergoing change, both the

ability and willingness to provide security for and the seas -- embassies should be severely aggression, and that should the two immediately prepared to take care of the cells -- take care of ourselves, and that would've prevented the loss of life in benghazi. >> i thank the gentleman for his comments. we go to the gentleman from arizona. >> thank you. ll, what you described as the mission to help the state department reestablished the embassy in aaa, can you describe -- in tripoli, and you describe the mission involved? >> being supportive to the andres of the ambassador, there was a 16 -- percent -- 16-person dod team that was in place working directly for him. i heard job was to help monitor

that situation as well even though they work for the state department. we also worked to help plan for any activities that might be developing in that particular area. we worked with a group to help for example, in one of the areas, and help to provide some of the watch and can vacation when other senior u.s. officials visited the country. >> >> how would that differ under normal protocol for military jurisdiction? deputyas the jtf commander -- >> does it change the chain of command any? >> that's the point i was getting too. absolutely. teamworks for the department of state, and there were no other forces on the ground specifically that we long to us --