they were not given the assets. no one responded to go in and save the two individuals who lost. i believe we had that capability. can you tell the committee if you think we had the capability of saving them at that time once again? >> you mentioned personal assets and time and distance. all those things put together at that moment? i was not in operations -- >> again, we had that capability, i believe.

i was told even before this if we had an incident, we could go in and rescue or resolve a situation. do you believe we have that capability? >> if capabilities were in hand, then they could be employed. >> thank you. >> welcome to our panel. let me pick up on that. you were not in the operational chain of command at the time of the tragedy? >> not in the chain of command. i was serving in a staff role at that point in time. >> you are not making decisions. >> that is correct. >> i do not know if you're familiar with the fact the service committee on february 10 -- i want to quote from it and see what part of this you disagree with. my friend from florida suggests we could have done something from italy. secretary petén -- "secretary panetta, in consultation with general ham, general dempsey, and others, verbally authorized three specific actions. first, two murray and fast the tunes were ordered to prepare

and deploy. second, a special operations unit known as commanders -- cif, was ordered to move to a nato air station in italy and wave instructions. these orders were issued approximately 2-4 hours after the initial attack there it is it your contention we should have done this sooner or more of it? or do you deny it happened? >> my belief is i put in my statement, it has to do with, we should have continued to move forward with whatever forces we were going to move forward with. the timeline was in the operation of the channels. what i am looking at is how we choose to respond in the future really needs to be along the lines of the military feeling empowered to take action under the authorities it has. so that it can move forward and do that --

>> i want to read to you the conclusion of the chairman of the committee, the republican chairman. he conducted formal briefings and under saw that report. he said "i am pretty well satisfied but given where the troops were, how quickly the thing all happened, and how quickly we dissipated, we probably could not have done much more than we did." do take issue with that conclusion? >> the conclusion that he could not have done much more than he did, that is a fact. >> i am sure you can appreciate there might be some who, for reasons, distort your testimony and say we could have done more than we did because -- that is not your testimony. thank you.

if i understood your testimony, libya is a mess. it is a very unstable environment. that is the environment in which we are trying to work and which we were working at the time of the tragedy in benghazi. no amount of u.s. troops and security forces were going to change that environment. >> they will not change the fact the central government cannot exercise -- >> my friend in utah, i went to tripoli, not benghazi. the airport at the time, security was controlled by the militia and not the government. >> i am not aware of whether that is changed. >> that make one very uneasy about security? >> let's hope their friendly. but, it is obviously painful, transparent symbolism of the lack of any authority.

i see you shaking your head as well. do you want to comment? >> i agree with you. >> that is also very important. the testimony the three of you have provided, which i appreciate. again, people can play politics with a tragedy all they want. the fact of the matter is, at the time of the tragedy and even this day, libya is a very unstable situation post-revolution. the object is to do the best we can to try to change that dynamic to create a more stable government that provide security not only for us but also for its own people. a fair statement? >> absolutely. as i mentioned, since 2013, the

u.s. has been planning in helping the libyan government with forces. our diplomats were involved with reaching out to civil society. but it is a tough challenge. i really want to emphasize a lot of this is on the libyan shoulders. this is a country that needs to reach a broad political reconciliation among its faction before they can be in a position to receive outside help. when i talk to people in the state department, there is a sense where there is a lack of partnership on a sense of the other side and you need that. i think much of this is taking time. libya is writing a constitution. they held elections in 2012 that, by all accounts, were relatively transparent and fair. they remain very pro-american, which has been contrasted to many other countries in the

region. >> i want to thank all four of you for your testimony. it is very enlightening. it is a contribution to what has been a conversation about a tragedy in libya. thank you very much. >> thank you. for what purpose does the german from florida receipt -- seek recognition? >> along with 60 members, this letter was sent to the president saying it was a year now since the benghazi attacks. not to be done to bring these people to justice and asking for the ministration to act. >> without objection, so ordered. the gentleman from utah is recognized for five minutes. >> thank you and thank you all for being here. thank you for the service of your country in general. god bless you. thank you for your service over 33 years. on september 11, 2012, what was your ranking title?

>> i served as the deputy director for intelligence knowledge development j two. >> where were you the night of september 11 and 12th? >> at home until i was recalled. >> the operations center in germany. you were in the room. >> yes. >> you were able to see, hear, feel, understand what was going on in that room? >> we worked toward understanding, yes, sir. >> were you ever interviewed by the accountability review board? >> no, sir. >> your primary responsibility was to try -- "j two was focused on attribution, that attacks became a german will very soon after the event." what do you believe they were attributable to? >> an islamist extremist group. >> al qaeda? >> we felt it was austria. >> affiliated with al qaeda.

>> yes. >> aqim, were they involved? how quickly did you come to the conclusion that you believed there were al qaeda affiliates or al qaeda themselves involved engaged in the attack? >> very soon come in the early hours of the activity. >> was it a video? >> no, sir. >> did it spark a protest? >> no, sir. >> i want to get the facts at a time. the cia station chief is quoted as saying, "not not an escalation a protest."

would you agree or disagree with the cia station chief's analysis? >> absolutely, it was an attack. >> jones at the state department, and an e-mail that went to others, hillary clinton's chief of staff says she told the libyan ambassador september 12, 12:46 p.m., i told him the group that conducted the attack is affiliated with islamic extremists. would you agree or disagree with that statement? yes i would agree. the timing of it, i do not know. the content, yes. >> the scandal that is here, that some choose to ignore, a phony scandal, is the fact that the cia station chief, the military themselves.

you have the person sitting front of us, who is the head of intelligence and he is looking at the intelligence. they come to the conclusion that it is austria -- sharia and then you have the state telling libyans. none of them think it is a video. none of them. the military, the cia, the cia station chief, the state department, all of them, the fact that the time, mr. chairman, the facts do not point to a video. that only comes from the white house. what was going on in the room, general? i were people were under attack and people were dying. what is the military doing? >> -- >> were they moving to the sound of the guns and doing what they were trained to do, or were they sitting around and waiting for the state department and hillary clinton to call them up and do something -- and say, "do something." what do they actually do? did we do enough?

your professional opinion. i know you care deeply. what was the mood in the room and what was the feeling? was it to save our people? >> it was desperation -- >> what? >> desperation to gain awareness and be able to do something to save people. >> did they actually do it? the three actions we talked about. the fast team. they are not even trained to go into that fight. the other force we are talking about is coming from the united states of america. we had assets there. did they actually go to the sound of the gun? do they actually going to benghazi? why not? >> basically, there was a lot of looking to the state department for what it was they wanted and in the deference to the libyan people and the sense of deference to the desires from the state department in terms of what they would like to have --

>> did they ever tell you to go save the people of benghazi? >> not to my knowledge. >> we did not run to the sound of the guns. we had americans dying. we had dead people. when did people. and our military did not try to engage in the fight. would you disagree with that? >> the german's time is expired and a gentleman may answer on any of the questions if he did not feel you got enough time to answer fully. >> four individuals died.

obviously we did not respond in time to get there. >> the gentleman's time has expired. >> i thank the gentleman. >> thank you, mr. chairman. this hearing is interesting. it seems to be based on the notion that there were unintended consequences after the intervention into libya. let me begin by saying it is the nature of the beast if one is talking about the mideast. it is interesting to note in contrast when we intervened in iraq, where the consequences -- where we could have prevented by simply letting the monitors on the ground, continue to look for weapons of mass distraction, we went willy-nilly. we did not have anything like that in libya.

yet we went in headfirst. the invasion by the united states of america. many of us were very doubtful about libya, to be sure, and many democrats followed our republican colleagues who argued very forcefully for intervention in libya and democrats were quite split on it. senator mccain, who was the last standard bearer in 2008, the leader on foreign policy, he said in 2011, some still argue we should be cautious about helping the libyan opposition, warning that we do not know enough about them or that their

victory could pave a way for al qaeda takeover. how do your sponsor that argument? >> i think he was incorrect. we did not know enough about the rebels at the time which was testified to by the members of the intelligence committee. >> do we know enough about them now? even if we did, one wonders

whether that could have moved us one way or the other as we saw this dictator in power. dr. wehrey, it seems that senator mccain was saying if we do not intervene, the war might have dragged on longer and al qaeda might have been strengthened. do you agree that was a risk? >> i do agree. if the war had dragged on, you might have seen the de facto partition of libya, gaddafi holding on to loyalist areas. the country might have become a haven for jihadists. >> were these rebels seen as pro-western? >> they were. in my interactions with them after the revolution, even islamists in the east were supportive of nato's help in

their interface with nato. by and large, they remained pro western. what happens in any opposition there are splinters, so you had groups peeled off that were more radical and have links with radical groups, but i think he was accurate. >> thank you very much. i yield back. >> i thank the gentlelady. i would let members know that there will be a vote on the floor at approximately 10:55. we will remain here taking questions, probably for the first 10 or so minutes after they called the vote. we will then recess until approximately 10 minutes after the last vote is called, meaning if you vote quickly and head

back, you will be here when i regavel us open again. we now go to the adjustment from ohio, mr. jordan. >> thank you. i want to pick up where my colleagues was that. you had two statements in her testimony that i think are most telling. the first is always moved to the sound of the guns. that means something for you, doesn't it, general? >> yes. >> you take seriously the airmen, the soldiers, the sailors, you had a chance, you take that seriously? >> yes. >> and you could not do that on september 11 because you said we were waiting for a request of assistance for the state department. you could not act normally the way the military always reacts. in this situation you could not do what the military always does? is that accurate? >> yes. >> and you have been deployed all over the world. has there ever been a situation prior to this where you could

not react in the normal customary way the military reacts? >> no situation -- >> first time in your 33 years rising to the rank of general, you could not do with the military always does, run to the sound of the guns? >> yes, sir, for me. >> why was that the case? what had the state department done in your time at african command, what was the culture, what was the climate, what happened where you could not do what you normally do? >> this was a command created to be a bit different. it was created to work with an interagency environment to ensure -- >> i get that. what specifically? we have soldiers down, people under attack. you know as everyone now knows

it was a terrorist attack. when you have soldiers under attack, you run to the sound the guns. you cannot do that. what specifically had the state department done or said that prevented you from -- we know this is unique and that it was different the was set up, but when that happens you still react the way you are supposed to react, and yet you could not. what did the state department do that prevented you from doing it? >> well, it is not what they did in that particular situation. they did not come with a stronger request for action. >> in your time dealing with libya, when there was a situation, the state department said do this. now they are not giving you guidance at all? >> prior to that, our condition with odyssey guard, we were there to support the state department in setting up and establishing the embassy in

tripoli. therefore, the work that was done relative to libya was one where the state department was in the lead and we worked to support them to achieve the goals of the united states. >> who at the state department did you and the officers directly above you -- did you directly interface with? >> in varying circumstances, but for me, i had interactions when i was in italy working with odyssey guard. would have talked on occasion with ambassador -- >> anyone else? >> briefings back at africom over the summer, andrew shapiro came there as well. he was briefed. and then of course ambassador johnny carson, who was very engaged obviously in what went on. >> and this is andrew shapiro

who was assistant secretary of state for political affairs? >> that is correct. >> part of global strategies, correct currently? >> yes. >> definitely where he works. did the general urge the state department to take a specific action? did you and or the general get specific direction of what to do? >> i cannot speak for anyone other than myself. that was not my place to encourage them to do that. >> and you do not know if the general urged -- >> i do not know if they urged to take action. there was dialogue over what action wanted to be taken. >> the general like you was trained in a culture that says when you have soldiers under attack you respond, right?

>> there was a senior admiral in charge, but they were engaged back in d.c. >> i yield back. >> i thank the gentleman. you mentioned mr. shapiro and the engagement, was libya different in state department interface, and if so, how? >> either -- the answer is, yes, it was different, and it was different because our other engagements, where we were engaged military, where we were supporting the policy of the united states, we worked with a c.t. type focus, counterterrorism type focus. this was the first activity that did not start out as a counterterrorism effort that employed the combat power for africa command. >> thank you. mr. lynch, are you next? the gentlelady is recognized.

>> thank you, chairman. even the atrocities that gaddafi committed, it is no question that libya is much better off without him. after 42 years of rule, we have a delicate transition to a democracy. dr. wehrey, you testified recently that overwhelmingly the country's political leaders are rejecting violence for political means and that they are committed to some sort of a democratic path forward and that they will have greater cooperation with the u.s. can you explain in more detail what their willingness is or how that willingness to cooperate with u.s. is manifesting itself, and what can we do? >> again, it is really significant that some islamists who at one time were foes of the

united states, these leaders are now in the parliament, in ministries, they are meeting with united states diplomats, meeting with our ambassador there. it goes back to the tremendous goodwill that stems from the intervention there. they look at the areas where we can help as applying our own expertise in democracy, how do you run a parliament. you have to remember -- and i was in libya under gaddafi -- it was an orwellian state where people had no role in their self governments. they had no experience that you and i take for granted.

they are sending delegations to other countries to learn how do you run a town council, what are structures for federalism, how do you oversee budget, basic things. the u.s. has an important role to play. there is a tremendous need for security, and the former prime minister came to the united states and asked for u.s. help in training the new libyan army. the united states has stepped up with that request, along with britain, italy, and morocco. we are helping and prepared to help and respect. i would also say engaging with the people of libya. when i talk to the u.s. diplomats, they say libyan society is vibrant. there is an educated class, young people, a thirst for openness, we are training their media, reaching out to youth groups, women, and these are all

incredibly valuable areas. yes, the country has a terrorism problem. but i urge policymakers to not be consumed by the terrorist problem and not let that be the only lens through which we view this country. >> can you speak about their police forces needing help to train their police forces from the u.s. or any other allies? >> other allies. much of this training is already going on in places like italy. the italians, jordanians, turks are involved. many people are training their police. this training is happening in other countries for security reasons. >> are there are additional risks to consider as we support the effort in this transition? are there risks for a program for validation and reintegration of the militia members?

you talked about combating terrorism. as united states helps libya moving forward, i want to make sure we minimize risks to our nation and to our citizens as well. are there any risks we should be keeping an eye on as we try to help them move forward? >> absolutely. when we trained the new libyan security forces we want to make sure we are doing a thorough vetting of these individuals to make sure we are not imparting training and equipment to bad actors. we do this and our engagement elsewhere in a number of states. there are always a number of risks involved. they are asking the tough questions, we are going to step in entering this for, but what are the unintended consequences down the road? we do not want to create a military that steps in and subvert the democratic process in the country, becomes more authoritarian or goes back to the old ways.

i think that is a risk. border control is a huge area we need to focus on. the european union is heavily involved in this. i think the united states needs to push the europeans to take on more of the burden. much of their security is directly impacted by what happens in libya. >> thank you very much. >> i thank the gentlelady. the gentleman from michigan. >> thank you, mr. chairman, and, general lovell, i thank you for your service and your desire to be here. i recognize the fact that you led as commander, but were under command as well, and the frustrations of being under command at times in this situation appeared to be very evident. i appreciate you being here. you mentioned in your written testimony that africom's ability to mobilize and combat power with boots on the ground and in

the implied timeframe was commendable. what do you mean by the implied timeframe? >> the united states was acting under odyssey dawn, and then was supporting under the u.n. resolution. so in working through the compressed time frame prior to oup taking place, the united states was acting with allied partners and more focused nato-plus effort, if you will, with oup. there was a desire to get done what we could get done prior to that and then moving forward. also, there is so much you can do without boots on the ground. i was not in an operational role at the time, but just military

knowledge tells you need is on the ground to hold and make changes, much as the panelists discussed here today. >> effectiveness, could you elaborate, of this policy? >> of a new boots on ground policy? >> of a no boots on ground policy, sir? >> yes, sir. >> you can effect from the sea, you can effect from the air, but you can hold and have lasting change by being present on the ground in a situation where you need more than, say, diplomacy or economic influence and the military is called in. that is serious business and the change takes place on the ground. >> am i to understand then that the effectiveness was compromised, that it was not complete, was not as full as possible, was not satisfactory without having this boots on the ground available to you?

>> i would characterize it as you would obviously have had a different outcome and effect had you had boots on the ground than without it. >> when did africom become aware of political turmoil in libya? >> libya was a country that we watched as we watch all of them -- i'm speaking from a j2 perspective. we kept tabs on all the countries. in the arab spring, we do especially that there could be other effects going across that area. there were things that we watched that were c.t. oriented and things that we watched that were more broadly politically effecting. that began to happen -- >> when you begin monitoring it.

when was that? >> in the early 2011 timeframe. >> did africom have any role in the decision-making process to intervene in libya? what type of role? >> would you repeat? >> did africom have any role in the decision-making process to intervene in libya, and if so, what was that role? >> that would be more at the combatant commander's level than my own. i would not have that information. >> what was africom's role during odyssey dawn? >> to work with allied partners prior to the u.n.'s resolution taking effect to assist the rebels in libya. >> what about unified protector? >> that was a more broad effort sanctioned by the united nations to assist the rebels in libya.

>> dr. gartenstein-ross, some have praised the nato intervention as a model intervention, but your testimony points the consequences of the intervention. what are some of the most pronounced consequences of this libyan intervention? >> the largest is what happened in north mali -- >> the gentleman's time has expired. >> what happened in north mali. a direct line can be drawn between the intervention by nato and the situation in mali. the two are separatists groups and jihadists were able to exploit that. those who fought for gaddafi came back heavily armed.

there are other consequences that could be felt with the flow of arms threat the region, going to egypt, tunisia. lives have been directly lost there, and one thing we saw in january this year is they shoot down of an egyptian military helicopter. we did not know for sure where those arms came from, but the united nations panel of experts which looks at the diffusion of libyan arms and beatty accounts -- contemporaneous media accounts believe that gaddafi's armories are the most likely place where militants were able to get this weaponry to shoot down that helicopter. when you look at the unintended consequences it has made the region must less stable. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you to our witnesses who are here today to testify before this committee, and it is important to recognize that

before us today is a panel of experts for whom we as a committee can gather critically important information and advice as well as insight into the on the ground and geopolitical realities in libya and the greater middle east region. the tragedy that occurred in benghazi is that, a tragedy, and out of those who died serving -- out of respect for those who died serving our country and for the safety of those who continue to do so around the world, it is imperative that this committee gain actionable policy reforms so that we can prevent similar disasters from occurring again. so i want to ask the panel, and i will start with mr. wehrey, in your testimony cannot you discussed at length the challenges that outside assistance, including from countries like the united states, turkey, britain,

morocco, and italy, face in terms of providing training assistance in the development of an effective libyan army. can you elaborate and what your recommendations to this committee would be? >> again, i think i would recognize that before this training can take effect or before you can build a real security sector, you have to have political reconciliation in this country. libyan's have to get together and hammer at out a broad pact. they have to go forward with this national dialogue. much of the paralysis and -- why outside assistance has not had an effect is because there has not been this reconciliation among these factions. i would urge outsiders to focus on sequencing, that we need to support the libyans in these political issues in reforming

their parliament from in the national dialogue, in the constitution so that this training can take full effect. it is the horse before the wagon. there has to be security in the country for these institutions to function. we have to help them to a certain degree create the space for these institutions. i think the united states since at least last year has recognized that this country needs greater help. when i speak to people in the defense department, there is a willingness and appreciation for the situation. nato is engaged. other arab countries, europe, so the willingness is there. >> other panelists, would you propose specific reforms that this committee could recommend? >> in addition to what dr.

wehrey said, there are several other specific things we could do. one of the united states' great strengths in helping transitioning countries is to emphasize how federalism works in the united states, not just politically, but also militarily. the balance of the national guard and reservists and their function in the states is for libya in my judgment a very useful model, because their political reconciliation is not going to progress without a more activist federalism that makes the region's of the country and the tribes of the country feel more politically secure than they now feel. you will not get disarmament and -- of the militia until then. i will focus on that. second, we need to be a much more vibrant voice talking about how the violence damaged the elections, how much it matters that only 15% of the libyan people were represented in the 48 people selected for the constitutional council.

we need to create political attention to this, and that will help them to the political reconciliation they need to make. some people to say nothing can be done because the libyans themselves need to make progress. they will not make progress without us helping them have the security to make brave domestic political choices, and we are under investing in that. >> anyone else, last 17 seconds? >> one performer i would -- one specific reform i would recommend, the council did issue the libyan islamic fighting group you mentioned did issue revisions, breaking from al qaeda, it is important for the u.s. to be aware whether some figures with the government are helping jihadist groups. one thing we learn from our

experience in egypt is back in the damaging. one figure i would draw attention to is a former libyan fighting member whose media advisor had been a member of a global jihadist forum. online jihadist sub celebrated his expenses within government. according to regional media, he has providing shelter to a jihadist group in that country. even while we help libya is good to be aware of and to bring political pressure down on those who are supporting america's enemies. >> thank you. let the walk through couple things. i will be a final question. then we will take a recess. let me walk through five minutes of questions. general, thank you for your service. i want to be able to ask a couple quick questions. based on what you were watching that night, do you feel like the

united states was doing everything it could do to protect the people, its facilities abroad, that the united states was doing every thing it could do to protect its people and facilities abroad, based on what you saw the night? >> no, sir. >> do you believe that night and even during that night, did you believe that this was a protest rooted in an internet video? >> no, sir. >> did you have any sense that night based on what you were hearing about the communication between state and dod and what was happening on the ground, trying to gather information that there was a steadiness and a strength through that evening in trying to make the decisions? >> there was a bit of -- there was definitely a strong desire to come to decisions. there was a period of time where

gaining an understanding of what was needed from folks on the ground, because we did not have a lot of insight -- >> was there communication coordination? were you spending time waiting on the state department to get your information? >> there was a lot of back and forth, yes, sir. >> did you feel like there were clear lines of adjudication and steadiness of leadership so there was a consistent plan that was unfolding? >> it was continually strived for in that room. we were looking back to the united states for more -- >> were you getting it from the united states? in the room where they were planning and strategizing were , you getting clear communication leadership from washington, from the united states, on what to do next? >> my observations were that they were still looking for more decisions. >> does anyone know if we have brought the people to justice that did this in error fantasy

-- in our embassy and our facilities? is anyone aware that justice has been carried out? >> we have not. sir. >> so the four things i just walked through, were the four talking points saying these were the areas that we were going to be talking about when we went into the sunday shows. all things we knew in the initial days are not true and we are still waiting for this statement that came out from the beginning -- we will take these individuals to justice. two years later, so the four things the white house put out, three of them are factually not true, and one was a promise that is still unkept. what were you tracking that evening? were you watching video? were you tracking phone calls? how were you gathering that information during the course of

the evening? >> there were national means to gain intelligence. there were the communiqués we received directly or indirectly from individuals on the ground -- >> you're talking about the e-mail traffic? >> they work through chat, yes, sir. the analysts worked through chat, and the operational channels did the same thing. we also -- at a certain point in time, we were able to swing a bird over there and relieve that and gain more. >> then the phone conversations happening at different points, where the individuals on the ground are in phone communication with other individuals. were you getting information about that as well? >> we knew we would have information filtered back to us that people were back in communication. >> were you were aware there was close circuit tv that was available on the compound itself?

>> no, sir. i was not aware of that. >> there is video feed that was extensive that you can look down the street and see that there is no protests going on in the street, and you can actually see the actions on the compound, and be able to get through that. that video you did not have a feed to. that close circuit tv does exist as well as the predator, the feed you are dealing with as well. all this information is gathering them and you are turning to make decisions and in the process of all these decisions being made and gathering information and giving advice as to what was happening. did you get from state -- let me say it this way -- did you know from state someone would call you if they wanted to take action? was there a clear line of communication -- the military was getting into position of readiness. >> who are you waiting from state to call you?

>> those calls would go back to the operational chain of command, so those people that were engaged were back in washington, d.c. general ham was dealing with that as well. >> there was a clear line of communication, you knew that where that would come from? >> we would be in contact with people. we would hear back at that command center from at my level from a military authority to do something. >> ok. did we have americans back that night -- >> sir? >> the united states military always watches americans' backs. did we have americans' backs that night? >> obviously not, sir. >> based on the situation in or twoow or to doug -- years ago, would you consider the security situation normal

for our facilities? is this a normal security situation? prior to that attack, was this a normal environment for our personnel? >> no, sir. >> does anyone else have a comment on that? was this a normal security environment? >> it was not a normal security environment. >> i have heard there was a push to normalize security and actually withdrawal individuals that were our own, americans, to provide security and to put in country security folks, which is typical for us, that we have a larger force in embassies and facilities that are provided for -- from in country. we had a militia watching our front door from libya. the front door of the facility, a local militia was providing the security for it. a quick question -- if you went to libya right now would you be ok if one of the local militias guarded your front door? would anyone be open to that?

>> with all due respect, that is the way security is functioning in this country -- >> i understand -- >> [indiscernible] >> a normal security environment that we would run with one of the local militias -- the local security is provided in libya, a normal environment, that we would have one of the normal -- local militias. would you trust their loyalty to provide security for your front door? >> as a matter of embassy protocol, i would make sure they are vetted. this is the nature of libya right now. these militias consider themselves the army -- there is no army. did you vet the militia at that time? >> i don't know. i was not there. >> your best guess. >> this is the challenge we have in this country. there was the central army -- >> so we would try to normalize the security situation. the red cross has been run out. we reduce the number of gun toters and increased local

militias that we could not vet? >> from an embassies standpoint i would say it is highly risky. i'm saying from my own perspective, traveling to libya, you can feel relatively safe because these militias provide a neighborhood watch program. many of them are filling the void of the security forces. we need to look at how we use the word "militia" carefully because these are the security forces. >> right, but two years ago it was not normal in a situation, it was more dramatic, no way to vet people, and we have reduced the number of american folks who have provided security and increased the people who were watching the front door, and it was clear they were walking away from the front door and we had sharia walk-through and the attack was on.

with that let me take a recess. , we will move toward vote and come back and visit again. we will stand for recess until the call of the chair. >> the committee will come to order. we now recognize the distinguished gentleman from arizona -- no, i'm sorry.

we recognize the distinguished other doctor, the gentleman from tennessee. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i thank the panel for being here. general, special kudos to you. you were commissioned in our great state of tennessee. i wanted to talk a little bit about the dod timeline of benghazi-related events. it said it was not until 6:05 that a unit was prepared to evacuate americans wounded in the attack. furthermore the timeline says it , was not until 2:15 that the plane took off from germany to libya. can you explain why that took so long? >> no, sir, i cannot. >> general, are you familiar with the term the golden hour? >> yes, sir, i am. >> can you tell us what that means? >> the golden hour is the time between the time you are wounded

and receive medical treatment. the golden hour, the ability for you or your buddy to survive is during that period of time. >> if i am correct, the survival rate if they do not die on the battlefield, the chance of survival is about 95% if they are reached within that golden hour? >> that is why it is the golden yes, sir. hour, >> in this case it looks like they were functioning under a golden day by this timeline? >> you could characterize it that way, sir. >> ok. were there indeed assets in the region that could have been deployed sooner? i in your opinion? >> again, those are in the operational area, looking back reflectively, there were assets in the area, but operations responded the way they did. my contention is we need more

dedicated assets available to the command continuously in order to make a difference in the future. >> if you were given the greenlight to pick up the phone and make the call to get someone there to help bleeding americans, how long would it have taken, having that opportunity to make a call? how quick could somebody have gotten there? >> with the assets available, i do not have an answer to that question, sir, in an operational environment. i do not. >> do you believe it could have been much quicker than i was? >> i would certainly hope, yes. >> we talked about this earlier in the hearing, you are taught to run toward the gun. all the military people that i know want to run towards danger, not away from it, but they were not able to use that. why was that?

>> within the authorities to move, given the desire to move it appeared to me from my , perspective working there as a staff member of the j2 that there were dialogues ensuing with the state department as to how they wanted to have an approach with libya, whether deference to state or deference to libya. >> i know general ham was in washington that night. which left his deputy commander the seniormost officer. was he consulting with the state department? >> from my observation, sitting in that room with him, he was absolutely leaning forward to get answers so he could do something, yes. >> in your opinion, what was the holdup? you testified that the cia knew, the military knew, the state department knew that this was a terrorist attack.

yet, somebody was holding this process back. who was it? >> i wish i knew from my perspective -- >> well -- >> it appeared state department was the conduit for the african command. >> i can say this, and you as an american and as a civilian, the fact that there was a presidential election a few weeks away and there was a white house that knew all the same things that these agencies knew, but yet they were busy concocting a story of a cover-up, an alibi that we know now was not true because they were more concerned about protecting their image in a presidential election and saving american lives. -- van saving american lives. the irs targeting to effect the outcome of an election is criminal. this is just sickening. i am sure that you are here today partly because you have similar feelings, and i will not

speak for you, but you're welcome to respond. >> the -- i will say that i am here today because as a military professional for over 33 years, as well as a citizen of this country, a father of a previously serving military person, father-in-law of serving military people, neighbor to a young man down at parris island in basic training in the marine corps, and having served with a number of brave men and women in uniform and in civilian clothes in this nation, we need to get this right. we need to get it right. that is what brings me here today, not that i have all the answers. i do not say that i do.

but attention needs to be paid in the most serious way possible to cut through any games and get to the point that we as a nation are able to support through our military forces the policy and efforts of this country anywhere in the world, and we need to be able to do it and to secure american lives as we get the job done. >> we salute you for that. >> looks like you wanted to answer. the gentleman's time has expired. if you need to answer, if you may. >> i want to endorse the doctor's position, that there was information available, from elsewhere in the central intelligence agency, as your committee's investigation has brought out. the white house made a political choice that the president was running for reelection,

campaigning on the basis that -- al qaeda was on the run and the tide of war was receding. and the tragedy in benghazi was and the tragedy in benghazi was an extraordinarily inconvenient outlier to that storyline. and i think that is the basis on which the white house -- the choices that people made during the attacks in benghazi in my judgment are unfortunate and had tragic consequences, but the choices the white house made about pretending that we did not know things that we did know i think are an overt politicization of the events. >> the gentleman from south carolina. you're next on my hit arade. >> i was about to say "your honor." that was a previous job. >> i still get a gavel, but you

are shown as next. >> thank you, mr. chairman. general, i am confounded, and i continue to be confounded in what i found so -- and what i find so confounding is the administration's mantra has not changed. even yesterday, the national security council -- and maybe instead of reading comprehension we should teach writing comprehension -- i don't understand what this statement means except the end of it. that is the mantra, is that we use the best evidence we had at the time. whatever that means and what we understood to be the facts that we had at the time. you can imagine that i would ache someone who is interested in facts and evidence to say

cite all the facts, all the vidence. if your mantra is that we used the best fact in the best evidence that we had at the time, then cite the facts. call your first witness. introduce your first piece of evidence. i'll tell you the first piece of evidence i would introduce is from the state department. you know who cheryl mills is. this is september 12. this is well before the administration started misleading the american eople. we got an e-mail from beth jones to cheryl mills and jake sullivan and a plethora of other people. i told him with him being the

libyan ambassador the group that conducted the attacks is affiliated with islamic history miss. so the state department knew the day after that this video had nothing to do with the attack in benghazi. that is the state department. cia station chief in tripoli, mr. chairman, and for those who do not know what that new word means, he repeated it again, not an escalation of protest. this is someone in libya at the time. cia says video had nothing to do with it. now we go to dod, military. what evidence did you have that this was an escalation of a protest rooted in spontaneity it that got out of control and resulted in the murder of our fellow americans? did the military have any evidence supporting the video narrative? >> no, sir. >> that is what is so confounding, mr. chairman, is the state department knew it was not a video, the cia knew it was not a video, and for those who are a little bit slow, they repeated the word not twice, the

military knew it had nothing to do with a video, but that brings us to the white house come and i know, mr. chairman, initially we were told that the white house had nothing to do with the drafting points, that mike was the one who sanitized those, and change the word from "attack" the "demonstration" to whatever he could do cast the administration in the most favorable light. we thought that it was just mr. morrell doing that, until we got an e-mail from ben rhodes. goal number 1, to convey that the united states is doing everything it can to protect our eople in facilities. i'm glad it is dated september 12 because it sure is not their goal before september 11. we have had a hearing at the failure to provide security at our facility in benghazi. it was not their goal beforehand

or they would not have refused to provide security to that acility. goal number 2, to underscore that these protests are rooted in an internet video and not a broader failure of policy. and therein we have our nswer. the goal was to do everything we can to deflect attention away from this foreign policy we have in the middle east that is not working. remember the mantra, mr. chairman al qaeda is on the run, osama bin laden is dead, al qaeda is on the run, when they are standing at the front door of our facility in benghazi getting ready to murder our ambassador and burn it down. and then yesterday you may remember the white house -- i will edit out all the stumbling and stammering that jay carney did -- i will just give you the nuts and bolts of what he said

-- that this memo i made reference to has nothing to do with benghazi. i find that interesting because of the third point, and i know i am out of time, but the third goal was to show we are resolute and bring the people who harm americans to justice. if that is not talking about benghazi, where else did we have people harmed, other than benghazi? >> i thank the gentleman, and our goal is to bring people to justice, too. we now recognize the gentleman from texas for five minutes. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman, and general, i appreciate your service. i appreciate your being here today. in your testimony you talked about your training and natural impulse as a member of the american military is to run oward the gunfire.

we have heard testimony today about what we should have done, and we are kind of unclear about what we could have done, and whether or not we have the forces that could have gotten there in time. i'm going to say we definitely should have tried. as an american citizen -- i'm not asking you to give away any secrets or speak -- as an merican citizen, does it trouble you we cannot respond in a timely manner to threats to an american embassy in he were in the world? >> it is part of the reason i'm sitting here today, sir. >> thank you. let's talk a little bit about your role in the evening of the benghazi attacks. you talk about you fight your way to the train, the brave men and women in libya, running toward the sound of the guns. he said outside of libya there were discussions going on about how to respond to the attack and

these folks also thought the way they were trained. are you referring to the africom headquarters? >> and interagency nteractions. >> you wrote the disposition, has a military structure, and in the spirit of government support them waiting for request for assistance from the state department. that sounds like bureaucratese saying there was a military that night that was not taking steps to the rescue of the americans in benghazi, but were waiting for direction from the state department. would that be a fair ssessment? >> that characterization is part of what is in that comment, yes. >> that seems crazy. we have americans who need help or you ought to be able to hop on an airplane and the able to stand down the situation warranted that. i know the general was in washington that night and left commanders at africom. was he consulting the state

department about what to do during the attacks in enghazi? >> the admiral worked tirelessly to do that. >> obviously we did not have much of a response there. let me go to ms. schake. in your testimony, you talked about in the arab spring should be focusing on helping these countries out. you look at the track record that we have under the obama administration with nation building. you look at iraq. a lot of blood, and a lot of treasure shed in iraq and yet we see the al qaeda flag flying in fallujah, seeing instability all throughout that region, we see a civil war going on in syria. it is hard to tell the good guys

from the bad guys without a playbook, but we draw a red line and step back from it. we can go over into crimea and see some problems. we really want to be involved in that east on our track record there? >> i share your skepticism about the administration's choices in the middle east. it seems to me that one of the fundamental mistakes the obama administration is making is they advocate taking action is something that sets in motion all sorts of consequences, but that taking no action means we have no moral responsibility for any consequences. as i think testimony made clear, there are consequences for what we have not done in libya, and mali is bearing them out at the moment, as is libya, and the gap between what the administration

claims it is achieving and what we are actually doing in the region is encouraging people to take -- >> i am almost out of time. i have one more question for general lovell. the u.s. intervention in libya was constrained by the prohibition by boots on the ground. you think that puts on the ground and that policy might have been one of the driving forces in the fact that we did not send a response there to benghazi? >> well, i would say if there were boots on the ground and there were marines in uniform, as far as a security team that was around a state department facility, i would say that would intimidate most that were going to try to make an attack. and boots on the ground are the best and only way to hold ground, if that is what you are

looking to do. >> thank you very much. i want to point out that as we investigate embassy security and other key factors are the willingness and the ability of the host country to provide security, and i think that is a common understanding at the state department. anytime a government is ndergoing change, both the ability and willingness to provide security for embassies should be severely aggressive, and that should we should immediately be prepared to take of ourselves, and that would've prevented the loss of life in benghazi. >> i thank the gentleman for his comments. we go to the gentleman from arizona. >> thank you. general lovell, what you described as the mission to help the state department reestablished the embassy tripoli, can you describe the

ission involved? >> being supportive to the desires of the ambassador, and there was a 16-person dod team that was in place working directly for him. i heard job was to help monitor that situation as well even though they work for the state epartment. we also worked to help plan for any activities that might be developing in that particular area. we worked with a group to help with the eod, for example, in one of the areas, and help to provide some of the watch and can vacation when other senior u.s. officials visited the country. >> how would that differ in a normal protocol under military urisdiction? >> how would that differ under

normal protocol for military jurisdiction? >> we, as the jtf deputy commander -- >> does it change the chain of command any? >> that's the point i was getting too. bsolutely. the ssd teamworks for the department of state, and there were no other forces on the ground specifically that we long to us -- belonged to us. >> in your testimony that the state department was in the lead, as we just confirmed, for the effort to get back libya on its feet, one of the things that has been encountered in the investigation of the state department conduct in libya is the overwhelming normalization, whether it be the attempt to reduce security personnel at diplomatic facilities or so-called normal levels or attempt to view the government of libya as normal host nation partners capable of providing protection like my colleague from texas just talked about. did you encounter this normalization philosophy during operation odyssey guard?

>> yes, sir, i did. >> could you elaborate a little bit on that? > yes. or instance, there was a desire to create a new normal within this environment, which was basically redefining of what i would consider sub-optimal. >> would you consider it hostile? >> yes, sir. >> go ahead, continue. > the hostile environment we were dealing with, our interaction certainly was not with our interagency counterparts, but the low profile by the american government and the u.s. military in that environment at the time, we were not deploying our orces. there was no marine security attachment, etc., some of the other things you might have seen in place in other areas where you consider a normal type of an

environment that was secure, and i guess that is what it really omes down to is how much security are you willing to -- how insecure are you willing to be and still be present is really what it comes down to, and let's face it -- our diplomats take risks every day, but in certain situations, it is lways measured risk. when we measured risk in an environment whereby some yardsticks it comes out -- the measurement comes out short, and it seems to be hostile -- you know, if it looks hostile and smells hostile, it probably is hostile. >> you make this worse because we had an e-mail in regards to what al qaeda was looking to do. one, take out the british embassy. the international red cross, and then benghazi, the consulate.

would that not have heightened the awareness that we were in a fractional eyes, more hostile environment -- fractional eyes -- fractionalized, more hostile environment? >> yes, you just describe it. >> this seems absurd to me. are you aware of any operation that was this disjointed in your areer? he flagrant -- >> in my career and in my experience, this operation, absolutely in terms of the -- no, sir. o. >> you made a comment earlier that the best forces to put our forces there in a fragmented aspect -- that is the best deterrent. without those, are you not inviting an attack? >> you very well could be

through your own vulnerability. >> what was africom's role in libya? >> digital mistimed has expired, but you can finish quickly. >> did libya receive any sort of heightened monitoring? >> most certainly. as some of the other panelists have stated today, we absolutely had a keen watch from a ct perspective, absolutely, as well as also just helping to monitor things going on in the nation nd in general. >> i thank you, gentleman. >> thank you. >> we now go to the gentleman from florida. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. general, can you explain the significance of the fact that it was not just the intelligence shop, but the intelligence and knowledge development shop? >> yes, as i also provided in

the written statement, the intelligence and knowledge development division was the nomenclature used to identify what would be a typical to shop n other. later on, it became a j2 shop but retained a knowledge development peace. knowledge development has more to do with many sources that maybe unclassified open source ype reporting, etc. so you are trying to bring in and coalesce a more comprehensive intelligence picture utilizing knowledge. in a command and in a fear of operations such as africa where you have a great need for intelligence and information but not many resources to go get it, using open source and other types of things could be your

best source of information. >> in that position, you were able to observe the interplay between the military and state department as it relates to those issues, correct? >> the exchange of information, others as well. > in terms of military response, sometimes people -- we have had other hearings and they said, "we would not have been able to get there in time." my response is once you know you have been in contact, you do not know how long the whole enterprise is going to last. once the first word that we have problems at this annex, it could have lasted 12 hours, 24, 48 hours, so the idea that somehow looking back in hindsight and saying, "we did not marshal forces, we would not have gotten there in time" -- that just does ot satisfy me. am i wrong in that? >> no, sir, i don't believe you are.

it's one of the motivating factors for me to be here this environment now, so we do not do this again. >> my thing is you guys are waiting for the state department. the state barton said we need to help these guys. even if you end up getting their little bit late, i think it matters to the american people that there was the effort made and we were willing us a nation to devote the effort -- devote the resources we had to try to save those men. i think it would have mattered to those families. it seems to me the idea of the video, this deception that was propagated to the american people -- one, it actually hurt the counterterrorism efforts we have heard on this committee. immediately after, libyans were upset with us because they had tried to take action against terrorists, and we were saying it was just a video and trying to downplay the fact. our own administration said it was a terrorist attack. it actually, i think, brought more attention to the video and gave islamists the pretext to pursue more violence. so you have a situation where the american people, based on the e-mails we have seen in this investigation and the families of the fallen, were deceived

about who perpetrated that attack, and we have not -- and have not been leveled with about our government response. he spent a lot of time talking about who did what in the white house. that's very important because the truth matters, but even to this day, the perpetrators have not been brought to justice at all. if forces really could not have made it there in time to prevent the americans from being killed, then at least we would like to see the administration of then stared death by bringing these terrorists to justice, and yet, to this day, this has just been something that has happened and we have not responded in kind, and i think that that really is something that bothers me to this day. i thank the witnesses for oming, and i yield back -- >> would the gentleman yield? > yes.

>> you were not doing operational, so i don't want to get into the operational side, but from an intelligence standpoint, you earlier said that you knew -- and i will paraphrase -- from the get-go that this was not a video in citing some sort of demonstration but in fact a terrorist attack -- is that correct? >> that's correct. >> when you knew it, the deputy, the vice admiral, did he know it? >> most certainly. i worked directly for him. > to your knowledge, did general carter ham know it back on stateside? >> he certainly should have. >> from your experience long ime in the military, is it reasonable to assume that the secretary of defense also would have known what each of you in the chain of command knew since he was standing by general ham? >> that's the way it should work, sir.

>> is there any conceivable way at 3:00 in the morning that anyone could reasonably be promoting the youtube video from the white house or from anywhere in the know in government? >> if they were in the know? with relative information that we were putting out, no, sir. >> for someone to do that at 3:00 in the morning stood guard time, they would have to either not know what you, your boss, and your boss's boss new and presumably people above him, or they would have to be working contrary to what was known. >> that's correct. >> thank you. >> we now go to the gentlelady rom wyoming. >> thank you, mr. chairman. general, i am late to this hearing, but i had the advantage of your written testimony. so if these questions are a bit redundant, forgive me. but some things caught me in your written testimony.

you said, "we did not know how long this would last," -- "this" meaning the attacks on ine/11/12. "we did not know how long this would last when we became aware of the distress, nor did we completely understand what we had in front of us, be it a kidnapping, rescue, recovery, or protracted hostile engagement." can you elaborate on that? what was it like watching from stuttgart what was happening in enghazi? >> i further went on to say "or any or all of those things." it was a situation where we were very much in the hunt for information so we could give the commander advice on station and the commander back and see -- back in d.c. the best nformation possible. we were very much on the trail

of chat rooms, etc., using the mechanism -- not to go into it too deeply, but using the mechanisms out there for an intelligence organization to formulate understanding based pon facts. that's what we pursued, and we provided that to our on scene commander, the vice admiral, as well as of channeled that and sent it across to other organizations so that we were sharing to the maximum extent possible in order to help build that picture of understanding and flesh it out even further. it's not good enough to know what is going on right there. we need to find attribution so that then you can take action. you want actionable intelligence. > at what point did you know that no assets were going to be sent to benghazi that night? >> it began to become more and more evident as the morning went n.

it appeared as though that was to take place, but it even continued on further as we tried to help fbi and others get in there after, if you will, the death of those americans to go into the pursuit mode. as i just described, actionable intelligence is what you provide o an operator. >> and who was making the decision not to go in, not to respond? >> from my perspective, it appeared that it was up channel, beyond the department of defense, somewhere outside of dod.

we respond to civilian leadership, and that is what we would be looking for. >> normally, those kinds of decisions would be made after the military conferred with civilian leadership in ashington? >> yes, now we are into my boss's boss's business, but indeed, that would be who he would be talking with. >> and that would be the normal chain of discussion? > yes. >> did you assume that those discussions were going on -- those discussions between the military chain of command, the state department, the defense department, and the white house? >> absolutely. the reason i can state it is emphatically is because part of what we did as an intelligence organization -- and all intelligence organizations, you are looking for what is the next steps are you can ferret out the best pieces of information and fact to help inform so that those operations can be informed and effective.

>> in your military experience, what would have been a more normal response in the middle of the night, 3:00 a.m., stutgart time, when you knew you had an ambassador down, and later in the night, you knew you had personnel on the cia, and there was an exchange of fire -- what would you have expected in your military experience to appen? >> go, go, go. >> when did it become apparent to you there would be no go? >> as the morning progressed and we had some people moving at some point in time, they were asked to stop midway through some of their deployments. there was no -- it did not appear to us that there was any omentum behind it.

>> how many of you work together in stuttgart watching this unfold -- excuse me, mr. chairman. my time has expired, general. thank you. >> i now recognize myself for five minutes. i want to complete that thought. i know you care deeply about our military family. you are one. we have parents, loved ones, others -- what would you say to the mother of one of the people that was killed? id we, did the military, did the pentagon, did the united eighth of america do everything it could to save those eople?

>> i would say sorry for your loss and your sacrifice. we should have done more, whether it was in preparation prior to or execution at the ime. even if we simply just burned gas and airplanes moving people. we have to have the confidence of the american people that provide us with their sons and daughters, brothers and sisters, moms and dads and continue to fill the uniforms and the civilian positions that are so key and so brave as well out here in harms way. we have to ensure that we rebuild the trust -- this is bob

lovell talking to you now. we have to rebuild their trust. it's a big part of why i want to be here, because we need to say to them, "we should have done more." we owe it to the memory of those people that are fallen into those that were hurt and wounded. >> could we have done more? >> i'm sure we could have done more. >> secretary of hillary clinton whispered, evidently, according to one of the mothers, whispered in the ear said, "it was the video that had done this." is that true? >> absolutely not, sir. >> when did you think it was over? when were our americans in harms way? when were they safe? >> they are still not safe today, sir. >> when did you think the fight was over? >> we are still there. >> that night, though, september 12, while we still had people in

benghazi, when was the fight ver? >> when the people from benghazi finally made their way back and were extracted back to tripoli. >> your opinion, your vantage point -- they're in libya, was al qaeda on the run? >> no, sir. >> what was going on with al qaeda, september 11, september 12 in the months leading up to that? were they on the run? >> no, sir. there were actually affiliates and islamist extremists our responsible for the perpetration f these attacks. >> were they growing in strength, shrinking and strength? >> my estimation would be that they were growing in trength. in number and in capability. >> my understanding is that your shop, day two, africom, 17 hours before the e-mail, they actually produced a document -- my

ranking member and other embers of this committee, the front of the e-mail is stamped "secret," but the second page i believe is ot classified. it is not stamped with anything. in deference, i am not putting it out there, but what i do hope this committee does, what i hope the american people can see for themselves is what the military intelligence thought was happening there in libya and clearly, they put this out saying -- it says multiple times, i have read it myself -- it says al qaeda, aqim, and this was sent to the state department as the best intelligence that you have -- to the state department -- as to what happened with the attack and what the attack to file might look like if we wanted to counter.

do you have knowledge of this document? are you familiar with this document? as i described it, would that be an accurate representation? >> i have not seen the document itself, but i will certainly comment on the information you just characterize, and, yes, that was the picture we were working with. those were the facts we were orking with. >> my fellow colleagues here -- again, the facts as we know -- military intelligence, sharing with the community and the state department, they believe that it was al qaeda, aqim responsible for the attack. that was the best information. those were the facts as we have them. my time is now expired. i now recognize the ranking member. >> general, first of all, i want to thank you for your testimony. as i sit here and in listening to many witnesses, as a lawyer, i can tell that this is something that is very important

to you, and i thank you for oming forward. you talk about the military and how we had to protect them and our state department people, and certainly, i agree with in the interest of time, and one of the things that i have done as a member of this committee is also tried to protect the integrity of the people who come before s. we have had general hamm, and they came to different opinions. and that's ok. but they are probably watching this right now, and i want to make sure that just as you, i'm sure, feel very strongly about your opinion -- i want to make sure that you are saying what i think you are saying so that they are very clear because they are men who have given their lives for our country, too, and so i just want to ask you a few hings.

it seems like you are saying one thing in response to questions from the side of the room, and another thing in response to questions from the other side of the room. in your written testimony to the committee, you said this -- "the discussion is not in the could or could not in relation of time, space, and capability. the point is, we should have ried." but when mr. connolly was asking you questions, you said you were not in the chain of command. you said you were not really talking about benghazi, but about the future, and you said that you agreed with the republican chairman of the house armed services committee who said that the military did in fact try. let me just go through the specific steps the military took on that night and ask you

whether they are accurate -- because, again, we have people here who have testified before us and given statements that maybe you have different opinions. first, chairman mckeon found that our military, including general ham, general dempsey, and others, authorized two marine platoons to prepare to deploy. do you agree that this did in fact occur? did that happen? do you know? >> that they move forward? >> yes or no? >> yes. >> second, chairman mckeon found that a special operations unit assigned to the european command which was training in croatia was ordered to move to a u.s. aval air station in italy.

do you dispute that? >> no, sir. >> third, chairman mckeon found that a special operations unit in the united states was also dispatched to the region. you do not dispute that, do you? >> no. >> am afraid i do not understand why you're testifying today under oath that the united states military did not try to help the night of the attack, and how do you explain that? >> i did not say that they did not try. >> what did you say? i know general hamm is watching his. i want him to be clear. >> i am not disputing any of their actions or testimony.

i am speaking to as a nation we should try to do more. that the preparations prior to the capability and capacity that we put forward in order to deal with situations such as this so that in the future, as we find ourselves out there in an expeditionary government environment or just in places around the world that we have provided as much military capacity and capability as we can muster so that we can support the people and have their backs in those situations. my testimony was not to counter the previous statement -- >> i just wanted to make sure. i just wanted to make sure we were clear. hat's all. all of us would have liked the military to have responded more quickly, and changes have been made to allow the military to respond faster. what the military did mobilize forces. it did ask, and it did try. you can see that now that you have been presented with the actual evidence. you can agree that they did try. >> i have always stated that they did try and acknowledged

hat. my point is there is more we should be able to do, and if there is a further line that we an move towards, if across the interagency -- this is spoken about in the way you have described it to me, as a dod issue. this is not about a dod issue. this is an interagency issue, and that is what we really need to look at here. i respect absolutely what the house on services committee put together, but they looked at it from the dod perspective, and why i came to this body was that i felt it looked more broadly across the spectrum of all the agencies, and the fact of the matter is that is the perspective we need to have so that we can see exactly across the board how we interacted, how we behaved, how that translated into action, and most

importantly in any situation, in action -- inaction. as we have heard from some of my colleagues here, inaction can at times even be worse. we need a comprehensive, across-the-board interagency view so that we can move ourselves or word into those ext steps. >> again, i want to thank you very much. >> thank you, sir. >> mr. cummings, would you yield for question? i'm trying to understand -- all he units you mentioned were headed to tripoli. none were headed to benghazi. you know that, right? when it comes to what was done for the people dying in benghazi, none of them were going to help them. they were not activated for the people dying in benghazi. >> i asked him what i wanted to ask him. he was very clear, and i appreciate it. >> thank you. we now go to the gentlelady from wyoming.

>> thank you, mr. chairman. i yield such portion of my time as he wishes to use. >> i thank the gentlewoman from wyoming. to follow-up on the chairman's point and to the point the ranking member is trying to make, we had two teams that in a public setting, general hamm said can respond within hours. i think the day -- that begs the question why the team went into tripoli, and it took almost 24 hours to get there. 4 hours. these people operate on just a few hours, and yet, it took them just -- it took them 24 hours. i think that begs the question. the other thing is that it's very clear the team was not intended to engage in the fight. that is not what they do. it's not what they are engaged to do. it is not what they train to do. if you want to put somebody in

the fight, there are other troops in other types -- and other types of assets you would put in, but these people were not put into place to go into benghazi. the commanders and extremists force, again, i beg the question -- this fight started at 9:40 p.m. >> again, i think the question, this fight started at night. the general just said it was 6:00 something in the morning before they were able to get out of benghazi. it was so bad in tripoli they had to evacuate the embassy in tripoli. again, did they try to do what they were ordered to do? were they ordered to engage in benghazi? the answer was no. that is the concern. general, is there anything you would want to further comment n? >> no, sir, i would not. >> what about the idea at the

fast team is getting ready to deploy? people are dead. we are in a fight. why did the fast team have to change clothes out of their military uniforms and into civilian clothes? do you have any knowledge that? >> i was not directly related in, but watched the onversation. there was a sensitivity to the impact-- >> what do you think about t? >> sir, at that point in time, some must have thought it was a great idea to have marines out of uniform to go in there. i would want marines in uniform -- >> why do they wear the uniform?

>> because without saying the word, it is the visual symbol of the united states of america, the marine corps, and what it has represented. >> the outrage is we have got them to fight. somebody at the state department wanted them to change their clothes because they did not want to go in with the american flag. they wanted to know who was on hose side. it took them an hour later to engage because they wanted them to look better. that is the outrage. do you have any other personal comment? you have been in the military for more than 33 years. if you had ever seen that happen before, how does that make you eel? >> i do not want to see that happen again.

if we are set -- if marines are our choice and going forward, they are in uniform because they are marines. we have other forces that can go places that are not wearing that uniform. >> they were going to tripoli, correct? >> to tripoli. >> they were not even going to benghazi. that is the point. yield back. >> reclaiming my time, general, have one last question. about a gentleman named andrew shapiro -- this is someone who is a former assistant secretary of state, former senate staffer to former secretary clinton, played a prominent role in coming out to africom and providing guidance with what the military would do with respect to libya.

did his prominence seem odd to you given your military experience? >> he was in a bureau that was active with africa command, especially through our j5 hop. his area was influential in that we would certainly need to oordinate what it is we were doing with that interagency partner. he did come to the command and interact with members of the command. >> my time has expired. i yield back. >> i thank the gentlelady. we now go to the gentleman from arizona.

>> in your testimony you said that new normal in libya, now fractured in many lines. was anything normal about the so-called new normal in libya after gaddafi and could you elaborate? >> normal by my definition would be functioning government that has intact political process, a prospering economy, and a military that is disciplined and able to defend for the defense for the nation. that as we have heard here today the libyans continue to struggle with as they move forward. >> after the fall of gaddafi it becomes more chaotic? >> absolutely. >> could you highlight what you knew beforehand about eastern libya? what were you predisposed to as far as following ntelligence?

>> obviously that was where for a some of the rebel activity at the time began, much about what we also watched in that area was what we would consider the good guys and the bad guys, what really were the roles that those forces were in that were ilitias or others. when you are in the j2 shop, you are continuously trying to identify especially forces that are not part of government orces. you are trying to discern all the time how friendly to our viewpoint are those types of

orces. we spent a lot of time in the eastern libya as well as other areas around the country because it is so fractionalized by ilitia groups. some can be interested in their community being a safe place to live and prosper and can be what we would consider benign and their viewpoint, but then there are others where we would look at them and consider them extremists, whether they would be islamist history mists or others, so constantly trying to keep track of what was going around the country, not just even in that particular portion. >> in that portion would you consider a hotbed -- >> a hotbed, absolutely. that is where the strongest part of the revolution came from. >> a normal ceo or someone receiving this intelligence has

to put a higher priority on that, right? >> that is one of the areas to put a high priority on in a country, absolutely. >> i want to go back to the accountability review board in 1999 in kenya. we outlined specifics that should be in place. we had admiral pickering, who is part of that discussion, sitting in front of this committee earlier. they should have known. if we had followed those protocols, we would not have had this catastrophe. do you believe that event was totally preventable in enghazi? >> totally preventable? >> yep. >> uh -- no, not totally promotable. we are dealing in an environment -- to clarify my answer. the reason i do not believe it is totally preventable is we are dealing in a hostile environment, in an environment where we are dealing with xtremist organization.

>> that may qualify that. given the information that should've been normally going up the chain, for somebody to make a chain, this was preventable? >> perhaps not even exposures of and be there. >> exactly. >> are you familiar with the term "malpractice"? >> i do not want to have it happen to me. >> i'm a dentist. america does not understand our jargon. when an executive who is in charge of facilitating the standards of the consulate does not make the qualifications, there is a hotbed of activity, they knew there was something come along the lines, that should been defended, you consider this not practice? >> i would go along with that. >> ms. schake? > i am hesitant to agree to be honest.

the reason is the confidence i place in chris stevens and his trip to benghazi. while i absolutely agree with you that the state department should've been paying more attention to the growing jihadist threat and the growing militancy of militia in benghazi, i would not want to take away from an american ambassador the ability to assess the risk of his mission or putting himself in harm's way, which stevens did a lot of in benghazi. >> doesn't he also have the liability of those who are surrounding him as well? >> an excellent question. >> yeah. >> since i was not in the room, i cannot speak to that or not. >> given the circumstances, there is definitely an attack? >> we see a lot of deficiencies in terms of what it was happening at the time and leading up to what happened at the time and also thereafter the

response. as you know, malpractice is a steep standard. he deficiencies are clear. >> i thank all of you and i will yield myself my final five minutes. general, and this applies to all of you, but i will concentrate on the general for a moment. general, when i was on active duty i did joint exercises, had the opportunity to serve with a lot of other services, and they used terms like jaamfu and jaafu, but they stood for joint army air force foulup, not always that way. in your case, this is not about the joint command that is known as africom. this is about interagency. on 9/11, leading up to with the normalization policy, but on 9/11, with the assets available in and out of libya, you had a state department to a certain extent under mr. shapiro, under

someone who had special authority for one country with africa, and the near east was run by other people. you had one country libya that was being run by different group of people. you mentioned this earlier. they determined that there are not you got to go. is that correct? >> when you say got to go, you're talking about -- but if the assistant secretary shapiro - if he had called the deputy combatant commander and said we need you to put all assets on the target, would you have been taking action at that command in concert with the european

command to begin moving assets toward benghazi sooner? >> from my perspective working at a staff officer at j2, what i saw going on and surrounding, it appeared to me had the state department made such a request within the authority that existed on the part of the combatant commander, they could ave done more. >> and within the joint interagency arrangement, you saw for, during, and after 9/11, the decision did not belong to the department of defense. it belonged to the department of state? >> there are certain things that a combatant commander can do, but a greater sense of interaction and what it is that would happen within that country, absolutely, publication

-- consultation with department of state would have been warranted. >> the vice admiral, general ham, yourself, nobody had the authority to unilaterally launch combatant aircraft and personnel? >> a combatant commander has authority, absolutely. how coordinated they would be by the state department and the executive within our nation, that is where that combatant commander has that dialogue along with the secretary of defense, to ensure that we take he right action. >> basically put a suit and tie on, dress nice -- weapons to go in as marines to take a little liberty with the order that was given to get out of your uniforms before going into tripoli. that was a state department decision. that was not a combatant commander decision, to your knowledge? >> i would not think a combatant commander would say that, but --

it is not a typical approach to take with marines if you're sending them in harm's way, with my experience. and re an armed service, if you show a heavy assault rifle or a machine gun, generally, the uniform just emphasizes who you are, because you are showing what you can do. the fast team did have a number of weapons. in your opinion, and i will have you take off the september 11 hat, as a retired military officer who saw the relationship and the arrangements that existed for africa, at the african command, relative to how decisions were made to go or not go in support of americans in harm's way, would use insist on aterial changes so there could

be faster response in the future? >> sir, one of the very first things i would look at would be the capacity and capability that is afforded to the combatant commander that would be immediately at his disposal. that is absolutely necessary, that is necessary given the sheer size of the content itself in the number of government that exists. so many things can happen on that continent in any of those countries. it can be anything from a need from a needle evacuation to comment you know, it use of alongand power, anything that spectrum. first and foremost would be to properly or equipped to the best extent possible