typical for us, that we have a larger force in embassies and facilities that are provided for in country. we had a militia watching our front door from libya. the front door of the facility, a local militia was providing this attorney for it. a quick question -- if you went to libya right now would you be ok if one of the local militias guarded your front door? would anyone be open to that? >> with all due respect, that is the way security is functioning in this country -- >> i understand -- >> [indiscernible] >> a normal security environment that we would run with one of

the local militias -- the local security is provided in libya, a normal environment, that we would have one of the normal glitches. would you trust their loyalty to provide security for your front door? >> as a matter of embassy protocol, i would make sure they are vetted. this is the nature of libya right now. these militias consider themselves the army -- >> did you vet -- >> this is the challenge we have in this country. there was the central army -- >> so we would try to normalize the security situation. the red cross has been run out. we reduce the number of gun toters and increased local militias that we could not vet? >> it is highly risky. traveling to libya, you can feel relatively safe because these

militias provide a neighborhood watch program. many of them are filling the void of the security forces. we need to look at how we use the word "militia" carefully because these are the security forces. >> two years ago it was not normal in a situation, it was more dramatic, no way to vet people, and we have reduced the number of folks who have provided security and increased the people who were watching the front door, and it was clear they were walking away from the front door and we had sharia walk-through and the attack was on. let me take a recess. we will move toward vote and come back and visit again. we will stand for recess until the call of the chair.

>> i recognize the gentleman from tennessee. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i thank the panel for being here. general, special kudos to you. i wanted to talk a little bit about the dod timeline of benghazi-related events. it said it was not until 6:05 that a unit was prepared to evacuate americans wounded in the attack.

the timeline says it was not until 2:15 that the plane took off from germany to libya. can you explain why that took so long? >> no, sir, i cannot. >> general, are you familiar with the term the golden hour? >> yes, sir, i am. >> can you tell us what that means. >> the golden hour is the time between the time you are wounded and receive medical treatment. the golden hour, the ability for you or your buddy to survive is

during that period of time. >> and the survival rate if they do not die on the battlefield, the chance of survival is about 95% if they are reached within that golden hour? >> yes, sir. >> in this case it looks like they were functioning under a golden day by this timeline? >> you could characterize it that way, sir. >> ok. were there indeed assets in the region that could have been deployed sooner? >> again, those are in the operational area, looking back reflectively, there were assets in the area, but operations responded the way they did. my contention is we need more dedicated assets available to the command continuously in order to make a difference in the future. >> if you were given the greenlight to pick up the phone

and make the call to get someone there to help bleeding americans, how long would it have taken, having that opportunity to make a call? how quick could somebody have gotten their? >> with the assets available, i do not have an answer to that question, sir, in an operational environment. i do not. >> do you believe it could have been much quicker than i was? >> i would certainly hope, yes. >> we talked about this earlier in the hearing, you are taught to run toward the gun. all the military people that i know want to run towards danger, not away from it, but they were not able to use that.

why was that? >> within the authorities to move, even the desire to move, it appeared to me from my perspective working there as a staff member of the j2 that there were dialogues ensuing with the state department as to how they wanted to have an approach with libya, whether deference to state or deference to libya. >> i know general ham was in washington that night. was he consulting with the state department? >> from my observation, sitting in that room with him, he was absolutely leaning forward to get answers so he could do something, yes. >> in your opinion, what was the holdup? you testified that the cia knew, the military knew, the state department knew that this was a terrorist attack. who was holding this back? >> i wish i knew from my perspective -- >> well -- >> it appeared state department was the conduit for the african command. >> i can say this, and you as an american and as a civilian, the fact that there was a presidential election a few weeks away and there was a white

house that knew all the same things that these agencies knew, but yet they were busy concocting a story of a cover-up, an alibi that we know now was not true because they were more concerned about protecting their image in a presidential election and saving american lives. the irs targeting to effect the outcome of an election is criminal. this is just sickening. i am sure that you are here today partly because you have similar feelings, and i will not speak for you, but you're welcome to respond. >> the -- i will say that i am here today because as a military professional for over 33 years, as well as a citizen of this country, a father of a previously serving military person, father-in-law of serving military people, neighbor to a

young man down at parris island in basic training in the marine corps, and having served with a number of brave men and women in uniform and in civilian clothes in this nation, we need to get this right. we need to get it right. that is what brings me here today, not that i have all the answers. i do not say that i do. that attention needs to be paid in the most serious way possible to cut through any games and get to the point that we as a nation

are able to support through our military forces the policy and efforts of this country anywhere in the world, and we need to be able to do it and to secure american lives as we get the job done. >> we salute you for that. >> looks like you wanted to answer. the gentleman's time has expired. you may answer, if you may. >> i want to endorse the doctor's position, that there was information available, from elsewhere in the central intelligence agency, as your committee's investigation has brought out. the white house made a political choice but the president was running for reelection, campaigning on the basis that -- was on the run and the tide of war was receding. and the tragedy in benghazi was an extraordinarily inconvenient outlier to that storyline. and i think that is the basis on which the white house -- the choices that people made during the attacks in benghazi in my judgment are unfortunate and had tragic consequences, but the choices the white house made about pretending that we did not

know things that we did know i think are an overt politicization of the events. >> the gentleman from south carolina. you're next on my hit parade. >> i was about to say "your honor." that was a previous job. >> i still get a gavel, but you are shown as next. >> thank you, mr. chairman. general, i am confounded, and i continue to be confounded in what i found so -- and what i find so confounding is the administration's mantra has not changed. even yesterday, the national security council -- and maybe instead of reading comprehension we should teach writing comprehension --

that is the mantra, is that we use the best evidence we had at the time. the facts that we had at the time. you can imagine that i would ache someone who is interested in facts and evidence to say cite all the facts, all the evidence. if your mantra is that we used the best fact in the best evidence that we had at the time, then cite the facts. the first piece of evidence i would introduce is from the state department. you know who cheryl mills is. this is september 12. this is well before the administration started misleading the american people. we got an e-mail from beth jones to cheryl mills and jake sullivan and a plethora of other people.

i told him with him being the libyan ambassador the group that conducted the attacks is affiliated with islamic history miss. so the state department knew the day after that this video had nothing to do with the attack in benghazi. that is the state department. cia station chief in tripoli, mr. chairman, and for those who do not know what that new word means, he repeated it again, not an escalation of protest. this is someone in libya at the time. cia says video had nothing to do with it. now we go to dod, military.

what evidence did you have that this was an escalation of a protest rooted in spontaneity it that got out of control and resulted in the murder of our fellow americans? did the military have any evidence supporting the video narrative? >> no, sir. >> that is what is so confounding, mr. chairman, is the state department knew it was not a video, the cia knew it was not a video, and for those who are a little bit slow, they repeated the word not twice, the military knew it had nothing to do with a video, but that brings us to the white house come and i know, mr. chairman, initially we

were told that the white house had nothing to do with the drafting points, that mike was the one who sanitized those, and change the word from "attack" the "demonstration" to whatever he could do cast the administration in the most favorable light. we thought that it was just mr. morrell doing that, until we got an e-mail from ben rhodes. goal number 1, to convey that the united states is doing everything it can to protect our people in facilities. i'm glad it is dated september 12 because it sure is not their goal before september 11. we have had a hearing at the failure to provide security at our facility in benghazi. it was not their goal beforehand or they would not have refused to provide security to that facility.

goal number 2, to underscore that these protests are rooted in an internet video and not a broader failure of policy. and therein we have our answer. the goal was to do everything we can to deflect attention away from this foreign policy we have in the middle east that is not working. remember the mantra, mr. chairman al qaeda is on the run, osama bin laden is dead, al qaeda is on the run, when they are standing at the front door of our facility in benghazi

getting ready to murder our ambassador and burn it down. and then yesterday you may remember the white house -- i will edit out all the stumbling and stammering that jay carney did -- i will just give you the nuts and bolts of what he said -- that this memo i made reference to has nothing to do with benghazi. i find that interesting because of the third point, and i know i am out of time, but the third goal was to show we are resolute and bring the people who harm americans to justice. if that is not talking about benghazi, where else did we have people harmed, other than benghazi? >> i thank the gentleman, and our goal is to bring people to justice, too. we now recognize the gentleman from texas for five minutes. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman, and general, i appreciate your service. i appreciate your being here today. in your testimony you talked about your training and natural

impulse as a member of the american military is to run toward the gunfire. we have heard testimony today about what we should have done, and we are kind of unclear about what we could have done, and whether or not we have the forces that could have gotten there in time. i'm going to say we definitely should have tried. as an american citizen -- i'm not asking you to give away any secrets or speak -- as an american citizen, does it trouble you we cannot respond in a timely manner to threats to an american embassy in he were in the world? >> it is part of the reason i'm sitting here today, sir. >> thank you. let's talk a little bit about your role in the evening of the benghazi attacks. you talk about you fight your way to the train, the brave men and women in libya, running toward the sound of the guns. he said outside of libya there were discussions going on about how to respond to the attack and these folks also thought the way they were trained. are you referring to the africom headquarters?

>> and interagency interactions. that sounds like bureaucratese saying there was a military that night that was not taking steps to the rescue of the americans in benghazi, but were waiting for direction from the state department. would that be a fair assessment? >> that characterization is part of what is in that comment, yes. >> that seems crazy. we have americans who need help or you ought to be able to hop on an airplane and the able to stand down the situation warranted that. i know the general was in washington that night and left commanders at africom. was he consulting the state department about what to do during the attacks in benghazi? >> the admiral worked tirelessly to do that. >> obviously we did not have much of a response there. let me go to ms. schake. in your testimony, you talked about in the arab spring should be focusing on helping these countries out.

you look at the track record that we have under the obama administration with nation building. you look at iraq. a lot of blood, and a lot of treasure shed in iraq and yet we see the al qaeda flag flying in fallujah, seeing instability all throughout that region, we see a civil war going on in syria. it is hard to tell the good guys from the bad guys without a playbook, but we draw a red line and step back from it. we can go over into crimea and see some problems. we really want to be involved in that east on our track record there? >> i share your skepticism about the administration's choices in the middle east.

it seems to me that one of the fundamental mistakes the obama administration is making is they advocate taking action is something that sets in motion all sorts of consequences, but that taking no action means we have no moral responsibility for any consequences. as i think testimony made clear, there are consequences for what we have not done in libya, and mali is bearing them out at the moment, as is libya, and the gap between what the administration claims it is achieving and what we are actually doing in the region is encouraging people to take --

>> i am almost out of time. i have one more question for general lovell. the u.s. intervention in libya was constrained by the prohibition by boots on the ground. you think that puts on the ground and that policy might have been one of the driving forces in the fact that we did not send a response there to benghazi? >> well, i would say if there were boots on the ground and there were marines in uniform, as far as a security team that was around a state department facility, i would say that would intimidate most that were going to try to make an attack. and boots on the ground are the best and only way to hold ground, if that is what you are looking to do. >> thank you very much. i want to point out that as we investigate embassy security and other key factors are the willingness and the ability of the host country to provide security, and i think that is a common understanding at the state department.

anytime a government is undergoing change, both the ability and willingness to provide security for embassies should be severely aggressive, and that should we should immediately be prepared to take of ourselves, and that would've prevented the loss of life in benghazi. >> i thank the gentleman for his comments. we go to the gentleman from arizona. >> thank you. general lovell, what you described as the mission to help the state department reestablished the embassy tripoli, can you describe the mission involved? >> being supportive to the desires of the ambassador, and there was a 16-person dod team that was in place working directly for him. i heard job was to help monitor that situation as well even though they work for the state department.

we also worked to help plan for any activities that might be developing in that particular area. we worked with a group to help with the eod, for example, in one of the areas, and help to provide some of the watch and can vacation when other senior u.s. officials visited the country. >> how would that differ in a normal protocol under military jurisdiction? >> how would that differ under normal protocol for military

jurisdiction? >> we, as the jtf deputy commander -- >> does it change the chain of command any? >> that's the point i was getting too. absolutely. the ssd teamworks for the department of state, and there were no other forces on the ground specifically that we long to us -- belonged to us. >> in your testimony that the state department was in the lead, as we just confirmed, for the effort to get back libya on its feet, one of the things that has been encountered in the investigation of the state department conduct in libya is the overwhelming normalization, whether it be the attempt to reduce security personnel at diplomatic facilities or so-called normal levels or attempt to view the government of libya as normal host nation partners capable of providing protection like my colleague from texas just talked about. did you encounter this normalization philosophy during operation odyssey guard? >> yes, sir, i did. >> could you elaborate a little bit on that? >> yes. or instance, there was a desire

to create a new normal within this environment, which was basically redefining of what i would consider sub-optimal. >> would you consider it hostile? >> yes, sir. >> go ahead, continue. >> the hostile environment we were dealing with, our interaction certainly was not with our interagency counterparts, but the low profile by the american government and the u.s. military in that environment at the time, we were not deploying our forces. there was no marine security attachment, etc., some of the other things you might have seen in place in other areas where you consider a normal type of an environment that was secure, and i guess that is what it really comes down to is how much security are you willing to -- how insecure are you willing to be and still be present is really what it comes down to, and let's face it -- our diplomats take risks every day, but in certain situations, it is always measured risk. when we measured risk in an environment whereby some

yardsticks it comes out -- the measurement comes out short, and it seems to be hostile -- you know, if it looks hostile and smells hostile, it probably is hostile. >> you make this worse because we had an e-mail in regards to what al qaeda was looking to do. one, take out the british embassy. the international red cross, and then benghazi, the consulate. would that not have heightened the awareness that we were in a fractional eyes, more hostile environment -- fractional eyes -- fractionalized, more hostile environment? >> yes, you just describe it. >> this seems absurd to me. are you aware of any operation that was this disjointed in your career? the flagrant -- >> in my career and in my experience, this operation, absolutely in terms of the -- no, sir.

no. >> you made a comment earlier that the best forces to put our forces there in a fragmented aspect -- that is the best deterrent. without those, are you not inviting an attack? >> you very well could be through your own vulnerability. >> what was africom's role in libya? >> digital mistimed has expired, but you can finish quickly. >> did libya receive any sort of heightened monitoring? >> most certainly. as some of the other panelists have stated today, we absolutely had a keen watch from a ct perspective, absolutely, as well as also just helping to monitor things going on in the nation and in general. >> i thank the dome and. >> thank you. >> we now go to the gentleman from florida.

>> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. general, can you explain the significance of the fact that it was not just the intelligence shop, but the intelligence and knowledge development shop? >> yes, as i also provided in the written statement, the intelligence and knowledge development division was the nomenclature used to identify what would be a typical to shop in other. later on, it became a j2 shop but retained a knowledge development peace. knowledge development has more to do with many sources that

maybe unclassified open source type reporting, etc. so you are trying to bring in and coalesce a more comprehensive intelligence picture utilizing knowledge. in a command and in a fear of operations such as africa where you have a great need for intelligence and information but not many resources to go get it, using open source and other types of things could be your best source of information. >> in that position, you were able to observe the interplay between the military and state department as it relates to those issues, correct? >> the exchange of information, others as well.

>> in terms of military response, sometimes people -- we have had other hearings and they said, "we would not have been able to get there in time." my response is once you know you have been in contact, you do not know how long the whole enterprise is going to last. once the first word that we have problems at this annex, it could have lasted 12 hours, 24, 48 hours, so the idea that somehow looking back in hindsight and saying, "we did not marshal forces, we would not have gotten there in time" -- that just does not satisfy me. am i wrong in that? >> no, sir, i don't believe you are. it's one of the motivating factors for me to be here this environment now, so we do not do this again. >> my thing is you guys are waiting for the state department. the state barton said we need to help these guys. even if you end up getting their little bit late, i think it matters to the american people that there was the effort made and we were willing us a nation

to devote the effort -- devote the resources we had to try to save those men. i think it would have mattered to those families. it seems to me the idea of the video, this deception that was propagated to the american people -- one, it actually hurt the counterterrorism efforts we have heard on this committee. immediately after, libyans were upset with us because they had tried to take action against terrorists, and we were saying it was just a video and trying to downplay the fact. our own administration said it was a terrorist attack. it actually, i think, brought more attention to the video and gave islamists the pretext to pursue more violence. so you have a situation where the american people, based on the e-mails we have seen in this investigation and the families of the fallen, were deceived about who perpetrated that attack, and we have not -- and have not been leveled with about our government response. he spent a lot of time talking about who did what in the white house. that's very important because the truth matters, but even to

this day, the perpetrators have not been brought to justice at all. if forces really could not have made it there in time to prevent the americans from being killed, then at least we would like to see the administration of then stared death by bringing these terrorists to justice, and yet, to this day, this has just been something that has happened and we have not responded in kind, and i think that that really is something that bothers me to this day. i thank the witnesses for coming, and i yield back -- >> with the gentleman yield? >> yes. you were not doing operational, so i don't want to get into the operational side, but from an intelligence standpoint, you earlier said that you knew -- and i will paraphrase -- from the get-go that this was not a video in citing some sort of

demonstration but in fact a terrorist attack -- is that correct? >> that's correct. >> when you knew it, the deputy, the vice admiral, did he know it? >> most certainly. i worked directly for him. >> to your knowledge, did general carter ham know it back on stateside? >> he certainly should have. >> from your experience long time in the military, is it reasonable to assume that the secretary of defense also would have known what each of you in the chain of command knew since he was standing by general ham? >> that's the way it should work, sir. >> is there any conceivable way at 3:00 in the morning that anyone could reasonably be promoting the youtube video from the white house or from anywhere in the know in government? >> if they were in the know? with relative information that we were putting out, no, sir. >> for someone to do that at 3:00 in the morning stood guard time, they would have to either not know what you, your boss, and your boss's boss new and presumably people above him, or they would have to be working contrary to what was known.

>> that's correct. >> thank you. >> we now go to the gentlelady from wyoming. >> thank you, mr. chairman. general, i am late to this hearing, but i had the advantage of your written testimony. so if these questions are a bit redundant, forgive me. but some things caught me in your written testimony. you said, "we did not know how long this would last," -- "this" meaning the attacks on nine/11/12. "we did not know how long this would last when we became aware of the distress, nor did we completely understand what we had in front of us, be it a kidnapping, rescue, recovery, or

protracted hostile engagement." can you elaborate on that? what was it like watching from stuttgart what was happening in benghazi? >> i further went on to say "or any or all of those things." it was a situation where we were very much in the hunt for information so we could give the commander advice on station and the commander back and see -- back in d.c. the best information possible. we were very much on the trail of chat rooms, etc., using the mechanism -- not to go into it too deeply, but using the

mechanisms out there for an intelligence organization to formulate understanding based upon facts. that's what we pursued, and we provided that to our on scene commander, the vice admiral, as well as of channeled that and sent it across to other organizations so that we were sharing to the maximum extent possible in order to help build that picture of understanding and flesh it out even further. it's not good enough to know what is going on right there. we need to find attribution so that then you can take action. you want actionable intelligence. >> at what point did you know that no assets were going to be sent to benghazi that night? >> it began to become more and more evident as the morning went on. it appeared as though that was to take place, but it even continued on further as we tried to help fbi and others get in there after, if you will, the death of those americans to go into the pursuit mode.

as i just described, actionable intelligence is what you provide to an operator. >> and who was making the decision not to go in, not to respond? >> from my perspective, it appeared that it was up channel, beyond the department of defense, somewhere outside of dod. we respond to civilian leadership, and that is what we would be looking for. >> normally, those kinds of decisions would be made after the military conferred with civilian leadership in washington? >> yes, now we are into my boss's boss's business, but indeed, that would be who he would be talking with. >> and that would be the normal chain of discussion? >> yes. >> did you assume that those discussions were going on -- those discussions between the military chain of command, the

state department, the defense department, and the white house? >> absolutely. the reason i can state it is emphatically is because part of what we did as an intelligence organization -- and all intelligence organizations, you are looking for what is the next steps are you can ferret out the best pieces of information and fact to help inform so that those operations can be informed and effective. >> in your military experience, what would have been a more normal response in the middle of the night, 3:00 a.m., stutgart time, when you knew you had an ambassador down, and later in the night, you knew you had personnel on the cia, and there was an exchange of fire -- what would you have expected in your military experience to happen?

>> go, go, go. >> when did it become apparent to you there would be no go? >> as the morning progressed and we had some people moving at some point in time, they were asked to stop midway through some of their deployments. there was no -- it did not appear to us that there was any momentum behind it. >> how many of you work together in stuttgart watching this unfold -- excuse me, mr. chairman. my time has expired, general. thank you. >> i now recognize myself for five minutes.

i want to complete that thought. i know you care deeply about our military family. you are one. we have parents, loved ones, others -- what would you say to the mother of one of the people that was killed? did we, did the military, did the pentagon, did the united eighth of america do everything it could to save those people? >> i would say sorry for your loss and your sacrifice. we should have done more, whether it was in preparation prior to or execution at the time. even if we simply just burned gas and airplanes moving people. we have to have the confidence of the american people that provide us with their sons and

daughters, brothers and sisters, moms and dads and continue to fill the uniforms and the civilian positions that are so key and so brave as well out there in harms way. we have to ensure that we rebuild the trust -- this is bob lovell talking to you now. we have to rebuild their trust. it's a big part of why i want to be here, because we need to say to them, "we should have done more." we owe it to the memory of those people that are fallen into those that were hurt and wounded. >> could we have done more? >> i'm sure we could have done more. >> secretary of hillary clinton whispered, evidently, according to one of the mothers, whispered

in the ear said, "it was the video that had done this." is that true? >> absolutely not, sir. >> when did you think it was over? when were our americans in harms way? when were they safe? >> they are still not safe today, sir. >> when did you think the fight was over? >> we are still there. >> that night, though, september 12, while we still had people in benghazi, when was the fight over? >> when the people from benghazi finally made their way back and were extracted back to tripoli. >> your opinion, your vantage point -- they're in libya, was al qaeda on the run? >> no, sir. >> what was going on with al qaeda, september 11, september

12 in the months leading up to that? were they on the run? >> no, sir. there were actually affiliates and islamist extremists our responsible for the perpetration of these attacks. >> were they growing in strength, shrinking and strength? >> my estimation would be that they were growing in strength. in number and in capability. >> my understanding is that your shop, day two, africom, 17 hours before the e-mail, they actually produced a document -- my ranking member and other embers of this committee, the front of the e-mail is stamped "secret," but the second page i believe is not classified. it is not stamped with anything. in deference, i am not putting it out there, but what i do hope this committee does, what i hope the american people can see for themselves is what the military

intelligence thought was happening there in libya and clearly, they put this out saying -- it says multiple times, i have read it myself -- it says al qaeda, aqim, and this was sent to the state department as the best intelligence that you have -- to the state department -- as to what happened with the attack and what the attack to file might look like if we wanted to counter. do you have knowledge of this document? are you familiar with this document? as i described it, would that be an accurate representation? >> i have not seen the document itself, but i will certainly comment on the information you just characterize, and, yes, that was the picture we were working with. those were the facts we were working with. >> my fellow colleagues here -- again, the facts as we know -- military intelligence, sharing

with the community and the state department, they believe that it was al qaeda, aqim responsible for the attack. that was the best information. those were the facts as we have them. my time is now expired. i now recognize the ranking member. >> general, first of all, i want to thank you for your testimony. as i sit here and in listening to many witnesses, as a lawyer, i can tell that this is something that is very important to you, and i thank you for coming forward. you talk about the military and how we had to protect them and our state department people, and certainly, i agree with in the interest of time, and one of the things that i have done as a member of this committee is also tried to protect the integrity of the people who come before us.

we have had general hamm, and they came to different opinions. and that's ok. but they are probably watching this right now, and i want to make sure that just as you, i'm sure, feel very strongly about your opinion -- i want to make sure that you are saying what i think you are saying so that they are very clear because they are men who have given their lives for our country, too, and so i just want to ask you a few things. it seems like you are saying one thing in response to questions from the side of the room, and another thing in response to questions from the other side of the room. in your written testimony to the committee, you said this -- "the discussion is not in the could or could not in relation of time, space, and capability.

the point is, we should have tried." but when mr. connolly was asking you questions, you said you were not in the chain of command. you said you were not really talking about benghazi, but about the future, and you said that you agreed with the republican chairman of the house armed services committee who said that the military did in fact try. let me just go through the specific steps the military took on that night and ask you whether they are accurate -- because, again, we have people here who have testified before us and given statements that maybe you have different opinions. first, chairman mckeon found that our military, including general ham, general dempsey, and others, authorized two marine platoons to prepare to deploy.

do you agree that this did in fact occur? did that happen? do you know? >> that they move forward? >> yes or no? >> yes. >> second, chairman mckeon found that a special operations unit assigned to the european command which was training in croatia was ordered to move to a u.s. naval air station in italy. do you dispute that? >> no, sir. >> third, chairman mckeon found that a special operations unit in the united states was also dispatched to the region. you do not dispute that, do you? >> no. >> am afraid i do not understand why you're testifying today under oath that the united states military did not try to help the night of the attack, and how do you explain that?

>> i did not say that they did not try. >> what did you say? i know general hamm is watching this. i want him to be clear. >> i am not disputing any of their actions or testimony. i am speaking to as a nation we should try to do more. that the preparations prior to the capability and capacity that we put forward in order to deal with situations such as this so that in the future, as we find ourselves out there in an expeditionary government environment or just in places around the world that we have provided as much military capacity and capability as we can muster so that we can support the people and have their backs in those situations. my testimony was not to counter the previous statement --

>> i just wanted to make sure. i just wanted to make sure we were clear. that's all. all of us would have liked the military to have responded more quickly, and changes have been made to allow the military to respond faster. what the military did mobilize forces. it did ask, and it did try. you can see that now that you have been presented with the actual evidence. you can agree that they did try. >> i have always stated that they did try and acknowledged that. my point is there is more we should be able to do, and if there is a further line that we can move towards, if across the interagency -- this is spoken about in the way you have described it to me, as a dod issue. this is not about a dod issue. this is an interagency issue, and that is what we really need

to look at here. i respect absolutely what the house on services committee put together, but they looked at it from the dod perspective, and why i came to this body was that i felt it looked more broadly across the spectrum of all the agencies, and the fact of the matter is that is the perspective we need to have so that we can see exactly across the board how we interacted, how we behaved, how that translated into action, and most importantly in any situation, in action -- inaction. as we have heard from some of my colleagues here, inaction can at times even be worse. we need a comprehensive, across-the-board interagency view so that we can move ourselves or word into those next steps. >> again, i want to thank you very much. >> thank you, sir.

>> mr. cummings, would you yield for question? i'm trying to understand -- all he units you mentioned were headed to tripoli. none were headed to benghazi. you know that, right? when it comes to what was done for the people dying in benghazi, none of them were going to help them. they were not activated for the people dying in benghazi. >> i asked him what i wanted to ask him. he was very clear, and i appreciate it. >> thank you. we now go to the gentlelady from wyoming. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i yield such portion of my time as he wishes to use. >> i thank the gentlewoman from wyoming. to follow-up on the chairman's point and to the point the ranking member is trying to make, we had two teams that in a public setting, general hamm said can respond within hours. i think the day -- that begs the question why the team went into

tripoli, and it took almost 24 hours to get there. 24 hours. these people operate on just a few hours, and yet, it took them just -- it took them 24 hours. i think that begs the question. the other thing is that it's very clear the team was not intended to engage in the fight. that is not what they do. it's not what they are engaged to do. it is not what they train to do. if you want to put somebody in the fight, there are other troops in other types -- and other types of assets you would put in, but these people were not put into place to go into benghazi. the commanders and extremists force, again, i beg the question -- this fight started at 9:40 p.m. 6:00eneral said it was

something in the morning when this got started. it was so bad in tripoli they had to evacuate the embassy in tripoli. again, did they try to do what they were ordered to do? were they ordered to engage in benghazi? the answer was no. that is the concern. general, is there anything you would want to further comment on? >> no, sir, i would not. >> what about the idea at the fast team is getting ready to deploy? people are dead. we are in a fight. why did the fast team have to change clothes out of their military uniforms and into civilian clothes? do you have any knowledge that? >> i was not directly related in, but watched the conversation.

there was a sensitivity to the impact-- >> what do you think about it? >> sir, at that point in time, some must have thought it was a great idea to have marines out of uniform to go in there. i would want marines in uniform -- >> why do they wear the uniform? >> because without saying the word, it is the visual symbol of the united states of america, the marine corps, and what it has represented. >> the outrage is we have got

them to fight. somebody at the state department wanted them to change their clothes because they did not want to go in with the american flag. they wanted to know who was on whose side. it took them an hour later to engage because they wanted them to look better. that is the outrage. do you have any other personal comment? you have been in the military for more than 33 years. if you had ever seen that happen before, how does that make you feel? >> i do not want to see that happen again. if we are set -- if marines are our choice and going forward, they are in uniform because they are marines. we have other forces that can go places that are not wearing that uniform. >> they were going to tripoli, correct? >> to tripoli. >> they were not even going to benghazi. that is the point. i yield back.

>> reclaiming my time, general, i have one last question. about a gentleman named andrew shapiro -- this is someone who is a former assistant secretary of state, former senate staffer to former secretary clinton, played a prominent role in coming out to africom and providing guidance with what the military would do with respect to libya. did his prominence seem odd to you given your military experience? >> he was in a bureau that was active with africa command, especially through our j5 shop. his area was influential in that

we would certainly need to coordinate what it is we were doing with that interagency partner. he did come to the command and interact with members of the command. >> my time has expired. i yield back. >> i thank the gentlelady. we now go to the general. >> in your testimony you said that new normal in libya, now fractured in many lines. was anything normal about the so-called new normal in libya after gaddafi and could you elaborate? >> normal by my definition would be functioning government that has intact political process, a prospering economy, and a military that is disciplined and

able to defend for the defense for the nation. that as we have heard here today the libyans continue to struggle with as they move forward. >> after the fall of gaddafi it becomes more chaotic? >> absolutely. >> could you highlight what you knew beforehand about eastern libya? what were you predisposed to as far as following intelligence? >> obviously that was where for a some of the rebel activity at the time began, much about what we also watched in that area was what we would consider the good guys and the bad guys, what really were the roles that those forces were in that were

militias or others. when you are in the j2 shop, you are continuously trying to identify especially forces that are not part of government forces. you are trying to discern all the time how friendly to our viewpoint are those types of forces. we spent a lot of time in the eastern libya as well as other areas around the country because it is so fractionalized by militia groups. some can be interested in their community being a safe place to live and prosper and can be what we would consider benign and their viewpoint, but then there

are others where we would look at them and consider them extremists, whether they would be islamist extremists or others, so constantly trying to keep track of what was going around the country, not just even in that particular portion. >> in that portion would you consider a hotbed -- >> a hotbed, absolutely. that is where the strongest part of the revolution came from. >> a normal ceo or someone receiving this intelligence has to put a higher priority on that, right? >> that is one of the areas to put a high priority on in a country, absolutely. >> i want to go back to the accountability review board in 1999 in kenya. we outlined specifics that should be in place. we had admiral pickering, who is part of that discussion, sitting in front of this committee earlier. they should have known. if we had followed those protocols, we would not have had

this catastrophe. do you believe that event was totally preventable in benghazi? >> totally preventable? >> yep. >> uh -- no, not totally propreventable. we are dealing in an environment -- to clarify my answer. the reason i do not believe it is totally preventable is we are dealing in a hostile environment, in an environment where we are dealing with extremist organization. >> that may qualify that. given the information that should've been normally going up the chain, for somebody to make a chain, this was preventable? >> perhaps not even exposures of and be there. >> exactly. >> are you familiar with the term "malpractice"? >> i do not want to have it happen to me. >> i'm a dentist. america does not understand our jargon. when an executive who is in

charge of facilitating the standards of the consulate does not make the qualifications, there is a hotbed of activity, they knew there was something come along the lines, that should been defended, you consider this not practice? >> i would go along with that. >> ms. schake? >> i am hesitant to agree, to be honest. stevens made a decision about his trip to benghazi. while i absolutely agree with you that the state department should've been paying more attention to the growing jihadist threat and the growing militancy of militia in benghazi, i would not want to take away from an american ambassador the ability to assess the risk of his mission or putting himself in harm's way, which stevens did a lot of in benghazi.

>> doesn't he also have the liability of those who are surrounding him as well? >> an excellent question. >> yeah. >> since i was not in the room, i cannot speak to that or not. >> given the circumstances, there is definitely an attack? --there was definite neglect. >> we see a lot of deficiencies in terms of what it was happening at the time and leading up to what happened at the time and also thereafter the response. as you know, malpractice is a steep standard. the deficiencies are clear. >> i think all of you, and i will yield myself my final five minutes. general, and this applies to all of you, but i will concentrate on the general for a moment.

general, when i was on active duty i did joint exercises, had the opportunity to serve with a lot of other services, and they used terms like jaamfu and jaafu, but they stood for joint army air force foulup, not always that way. in your case, this is not about the joint command that is known as africom. this is about interagency. if i understand you correctly on , 9/11, leading up to with the normalization policy, but on 9/11, with the assets available in and out of libya, you had a state department to a certain extent under mr. shapiro, under someone who had special authority for one country with africa, and the near east was run by other people. you had one country libya that was being run by different group of people. you mentioned this earlier.

they determined that there are not you got to go. is that correct? >> when you say he got to go, you're talking about -- >> if the assistant secretary shapiro -- if he had called the combatant commander and said we need you to put all assets on the target, would you have been taking action at that command in concert with the european command to begin moving assets toward benghazi sooner? >> from my perspective working at a staff officer at j2, what i saw going on and surrounding, it appeared to me had the state department made such a request within the authority that existed on the part of the combatant commander, they could have done more. >> and within the joint

interagency arrangement, you saw for, during, and after 9/11, the decision did not belong to the department of defense. it belonged to the department of state? >> there are certain things that a combatant commander can do, but a greater sense of interaction and what it is that would happen within that country, absolutely, publication with department of state would have been warranted. >> the vice admiral, general ham, yourself, nobody had the authority to unilaterally launch combatant aircraft and personnel? >> a combatant commander has authority, absolutely. how coordinated they would be by the state department and the executive within our nation, that is where that combatant

commander has that dialogue along with the secretary of defense, to ensure that we take the right action. >> basically put a suit and tie on, dress nice -- weapons to go in as marines to take a little liberty with the order that was given to get out of your uniforms before going into tripoli. that was a state department decision. that was not a combatant commander decision, to your knowledge? >> i would not think a combatant commander would say that, but -- it is not a typical approach to take with marines if you're sending them in harm's way, with my experience. >> with the armed service and if you show a heavy assault rifle or a machine gun, generally, the uniform just emphasizes who you are, because you are showing what you can do.

the fast team did have a number of weapons. in your opinion, and i will have you take off the september 11 hat, as a retired military officer who saw the relationship and the arrangements that existed for africa, at the african command, relative to how decisions were made to go or not you go in support of americans in harm's way, would use insist on material changes so there could be faster response in the future? >> sir, one of the very first things i would look at would be the capacity and capability that is afforded to the combatant commander that would be immediately at his disposal. that is absolutely necessary, just given the sheer size of the continent itself and the number of governments that exist on the continent.

the number of countries. so many things can happen on that continent in any of those countries. and it can be anything from a need for a neo-evacaution to the use of power. first and foremost would be to equip or agree to other arrangements with centcom, and we have finite resources and we are doing the best that we can. in this instance it seems focused on this particular command i would look and say if we are asking for them to do more and to ensure that we have got the backs of all of our americans around the continent and we are partnering with the african partners that we have there on the continent, we certainly need these types of resources in the locations proximate to where they would have to be engaged.